To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Freedom of religion – Turkey.
Journal articles on the topic 'Freedom of religion – Turkey'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Freedom of religion – Turkey.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Vural, Hasan Sayim. "Two Generations of Debate on Freedom of Religion in Turkey." Religion and Human Rights 8, no. 3 (2013): 243–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18710328-12341258.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Within the debate on freedom of religion in Turkey, we can identify two distinct generations, both of which are alive with an oscillating degree of vibrancy. The first generation of debate has evolved around the question on the proper place of Islam in the secular nation-state; while the second one has encompassed the plural concerns of protecting the rights and freedoms, pertaining to religion or belief, of a diverse multitude, under the rule of law. The first generation of debate resulted in a dual deadlock: Freedom to religion versus freedom from religion. The second generation is informed by a pluralisation of parties and concerns. The first generation has produced well-established results in jurisprudence, where the effect of the second generation is far from being significant. Yet, as this paper will explain in conclusion, we have good reasons to expect the second generation to prevail over the first one.
2
Temperman, Jeroen. "Freedom of Religion and Belief in Turkey." Religion and Human Rights 8, no. 3 (2013): 179–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18710328-12341256.
Full text
3
Ukenov, A. "Religion as an Instrument of Soft Power in International Relations." Al-Farabi 76, no. 4 (December 15, 2021): 197–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.48010/2021.4/1999-5911.15.
Full textAbstract:
The article examines the cases of using religion as a “soft power” in the example of Russia and Turkey. Based on foreign policy strategies, each state forms its own discourse in the use of religions as “soft power”. The article substantiates the idea that world religions have the greatest potential in solving interstate issues, as carriers of a unique historical experience of spiritual and political globalization, as institutions of spiritual power that accumulate significant material and other resources, as well as as institutions of civil society that promote the values of freedom and humanism. The use of religion as «soft power» becomes another argument in criticizing the theories of secularism. The analysis of the discourse of religion as a “soft power” was made on the example of the foreign policy strategies of Russia and Turkey, taking into account their political authority in the international arena, as well as their perception as one of the centers of world religions.
4
Yıldırım, Mine. "Are Turkey’s Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief Permissible?" Religion & Human Rights 15, no. 1-2 (April 23, 2020): 172–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18710328-bja10010.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This article constitutes a summary of the findings of an inquiry into the utilization of the restriction clause of freedom of religion or belief in the course of restriction of this right in Turkey. It demonstrates that FoRB is restricted in various ways by public authorities which rarely involve a systematic application of the FoRB restriction clause. Despite Turkey’s human rights obligations in the area of freedom of religion or belief and the high status conferred to international human rights law under Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution the impact of international provisions on the protection of FoRB in Turkey remains insufficient and inconsistent. The right to freedom of religion or belief has been restricted through measures based on “established practice”, decisions of public authorities based on laws and regulations not directly dealing with this right and court decisions that are not in full compliance with international law.
5
Hazza, Thaer Najrs, and Anmar Mahmoud Khalaf. "Religion and state in Erdogan's mind." Tikrit Journal For Political Science 3, no. 12 (February 22, 2019): 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.25130/poltic.v3i12.8.
Full textAbstract:
If there are events that confirm Samuel Huntington's argument about the clash of civilizations and Bernard Lewis's thesis on Islam, such as the establishment of the Islamic state in Iran, and the events of September 11, what all these people condone is that Islamist movements are not always an extension of fundamentalism In countries such as Turkey and Indonesia, social movements helped bring in democracy, after decades of authoritarian rule by secularist regimes backed by the army. Religious groups in these countries have participated in the transition to democracy. In Turkey, Islamist groups have fought the vessels in order to strengthen democracy, and in order to participate in the achievement of freedom of opinion and expression and the promotion of religious and human rights, and this is what he did Erdogan and his colleagues since they receive power in Turkey
6
Lerner, Hanna. "Permissive Constitutions, Democracy, and Religious Freedom in India, Indonesia, Israel, and Turkey." World Politics 65, no. 4 (October 2013): 609–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887113000208.
Full textAbstract:
The article addresses the question of what role formal constitutions play in mitigating intense conflicts over the religious character of the state. In contrast to common views in constitutional and political scholarship, it demonstrates that the ideal of liberal constitutionalism is not compatible with the political reality and types of conflicts that characterize religiously divided societies. Analyzing four processes of constitution drafting in which issues of religious law and religious identity were at the heart of the debate—India, Indonesia, Israel, and Turkey—it argues that under deep disagreement over the state's religious character, the drafters adopt either a permissive or a restrictive constitutional approach. While the former implies strategies of constitutional ambiguity, ambivalence, and avoidance in order to allow the political system greater flexibility in future decision making on religion-state relations, the latter approach uses repressive constitutional constraints designed to limit the range of possibilities available to future decision makers. The article further explores the long-term consequences of the two approaches and argues that (1) permissive constitutional arrangements, more than restrictive arrangements, are likely to promote the democratic functioning of future governments; and that (2) permissive constitutional arrangements may facilitate greater freedom of religion, but they are also likely to lead to greater restrictions on freedom from religion, compared with restrictive constitutions.
7
Özgül, Ceren. "Freedom of Religion, the ECtHR and Grassroots Mobilization on Religious Education in Turkey." Politics and Religion 12, S1 (2019): S103—S133. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048318000779.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis paper examines grassroots mobilizations in Turkey against the government's policies on religion and education (RE), and the potential effects of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) on their mobilization. Specifically, it follows the ways in which grassroots actors frame their discourses of secularism and freedom of religion in education during a period when the Turkish government is aiming to increase the role of Sunni-Islam in national education, while at the same time refusing to implement ECtHR decisions regarding RE. Drawing on empirical research, it analyzes the role the ECtHR and its case law play in the diverse rights claims and discourses of three different types of mobilizations that is going on in the field of RE: (i) legal mobilization, and right to exemption and freedom from religion, (ii) political mobilization, and new discourses of pluralism and secularism, (iii) monitoring and policy-based mobilization and national and international advocacy for pluralism and equality in education.
8
Burak, Begüm. "Secularism and Rise of Sunni Islam in Turkey: The Otherisation of the Alevis." Malaysian Journal of International Relations 9, no. 1 (December 30, 2021): 105–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/mjir.vol9no1.6.
Full textAbstract:
State-religion relationship is one of the elements which shape state-society relationship, and this relationship determines the quality of democracy. Alevi citizens in Turkey have been suffering from unequal treatment in terms of state attitude towards their religious freedom and education. Turkey has a sui generis secularisation background which is identified as not having equal distance to all belief systems. Turkish style secularism represents an understanding which has alienated the Alevi citizens and seen them as the “others”. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established to introduce and promote a specific understanding of religion, namely Sunni Islam. In this study, the concept of “otherness” in the constitution of Turkish national identity will be employed as an analytical tool in exploring how state-religion relationship in Turkey has been an important factor producing inequalities between citizens leading to discrimination towards the Alevi identity. In this regard, the role of the Directorate of Religious Affairs will also be discussed while focusing on the rise of Sunni Islam.
9
GÜLOGLU, Yavuz. "The Effects of Judical Bodies’ Interpretation Forms Of Legal Rules in Turkey on the Education Freedom in Universities." International Journal of Modern Education Studies 2, no. 1 (August 7, 2018): 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.51383/ijonmes.2018.20.
Full textAbstract:
The freedom of conscience and belief can be defined as the freedom of people in what they wish to believe without the compulsion of political power and other people by means of laws and other means. The belief of religion that can be accepted as the natural extension of the freedom of conscience and belief is to be free in doing the requirements of the religion that the people believe in with its rituals. While it is not possible and effective to make restrictions in freedom of belief, today, there are some restrictions in some judical systems in freedom of worship. With the principle of secularism which is settled among the principles that the alteration of which are not even be proposed, there have been some different decisions about the administrative acts that cause the violation of belief and worship freedom in the implementation of the right of education which is secured with Constitutional Law in Turkish Constitution. In this study, the effects of the incompatible decisions of administrative jurisdiction about the implementations of the administration related to the education right of students at universities, which is secured by the Fundemental Law, on the freedom of education, especially for the last ten years, will be examined.
10
Onal, Recep. "The presentation of main Islamic Sects in the context of freedom of thought and multi-diversity in course books of ‘education of religion and ethics’ lesson in primary and secondary schools in Turkey." International Journal of Innovative Research in Education 4, no. 2 (August 24, 2017): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.18844/ijire.v4i2.2316.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract
Religion education which has an important place in the education systems of countries, has a direct influence on political, religious and socio-cultural developments. Emerged under the roof of Islam, sect and groups which adopt different ideologies have been shaped according to the religious understanding of ruling powers or the political conditions. Almost in every country, religious affairs are under the control of governments and acts in accordance, as in Turkey. Unlike Western countries, modern Turkey is not multi-religious and multi-cultural. Hereby, Islam is in the center of religious education in Turkey. The main objective of this paper is to analyze how main Islamic sects are presented in the course books of ‘Education of Religion and Ethic’ lesson served by The Ministry of Education. The course books of ‘Education of Religion and Ethic’ lesson are used as resources and scan-analyze method is followed.
Keywords: Education of Religion and Ethics, Islam, Islamic Sects, Sunnism, Shiaism, Alevism.
11
Tatari, Eren. "Populism and Secularism in Turkey." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 20–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v23i2.438.
Full textAbstract:
This article analyzes the impact of two key components of Kemalist ideology, populism and secularism, on the policymaking process of modern Turkey by utilizing historical institutionalism and the political-cultural approach. The Headscarf Ban Policy, which has been implemented discretionarily since 1981 and intensively since 1997, provides an illustrative case study of the broader debates over freedom of religion, secularism, and democracy, and helps to uncover the influence of populism and secularism, as well as the interaction between these two principles. The analysis reveals the principle of populism, which has been much overlooked in the literature, as a key determinant of state-centric reforms as well as a method of legitimizing the undemocratic version of secularism advocated by the state.
12
Tatari, Eren. "Populism and Secularism in Turkey." American Journal of Islam and Society 23, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 20–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v23i2.438.
Full textAbstract:
This article analyzes the impact of two key components of Kemalist ideology, populism and secularism, on the policymaking process of modern Turkey by utilizing historical institutionalism and the political-cultural approach. The Headscarf Ban Policy, which has been implemented discretionarily since 1981 and intensively since 1997, provides an illustrative case study of the broader debates over freedom of religion, secularism, and democracy, and helps to uncover the influence of populism and secularism, as well as the interaction between these two principles. The analysis reveals the principle of populism, which has been much overlooked in the literature, as a key determinant of state-centric reforms as well as a method of legitimizing the undemocratic version of secularism advocated by the state.
13
Yildirim, Mine. "Conscientious Objection to Military Service: International Human Rights Law and the Case of Turkey." Religion & Human Rights 5, no. 1 (2010): 65–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187103210x513639.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe assessment of claims of conscientious objection to military service under freedom of religion or belief provisions has been an evolutive process in international human rights law. In Turkey, the right to conscientious objection to military service is not recognized, nor is there a specific punishment due for non-performance of military service on grounds of religious or philosophical beliefs. Military service is compulsory for every Turkish male citizen. The article in hand aims, firstly, to provide a survey on the status of the right to conscientious objection to military service in international human rights law and to propose a harmonizing interpretation that would allow for the evaluation of cases of conscientious objection under relevant provisions protecting freedom of religion or belief and secondly, to evaluate the Turkish legislation in relation to conscientious objection to military service and highlight human rights issues that arise due to a lack of legal regulation on conscientious objection to military service.
14
Nathwani, Niraj. "Islamic Headscarves and Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the Relevant Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights." Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 25, no. 2 (June 2007): 221–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016934410702500204.
Full textAbstract:
This article will first present two cases at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): Dahlab vs Switzerland and Leyla Sahin vs Turkey and then comment on these two decisions focusing on the following issues: State neutrality; negative freedom of religion; right to education; gender discrimination; discriminatory statements; religious discrimination; political extremism. This article will argue that the reasoning of the ECtHR in the cases Dahlab vs Switzerland and Leyla Sahin v Turkey is questionable and at odds with important principles developed in the established case law of the Court.
15
Eko, Lyombe, and Lea Hellmueller. "One meta-media event, two forms of censorship: The Charlie Hebdo affair in the United Kingdom and Turkey." Global Media and Communication 16, no. 1 (February 22, 2020): 75–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1742766519899118.
Full textAbstract:
This study analyses British and Turkish media conceptualizations of the Charlie Hebdo affair. Editorial decisions to republish or not to republish the Mohammed cartoon cover reflected the politico-cultural pressures on the journalistic fields in both countries. The controversy demonstrated that the editorial autonomy of the British media outlets enabled them to engage in ‘eclectic neutrality’, the right to decide to republish or not to republish the cartoons. Despite the severely constrained journalistic environment of Turkey, where expectations of respect for religion take precedence over freedom of expression, the Turkish media engaged in symbolic acts of resistance in furtherance of freedom of expression.
16
Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. "ALEVIS UNDER LAW: THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN TURKEY." Journal of Law and Religion 29, no. 3 (October 2014): 416–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2014.18.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractProponents of minority rights are calling for urgent measures to protect the Copts in Egypt, the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan, and the Baha'i in Iran to secure religious diversity, shield minority populations from discriminatory practices, and prevent the outbreak of religious violence. State governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international tribunals promote religious liberalization as the antidote to the violence and discord that is often attributed to these divisions. Enshrined in international agreements and promoted by a small army of experts and authorities, legal protections for religious minorities are heralded as the solution to the challenges of living with social and religious diversity. This article examines how the complexities and ambivalences of ordinary religious belonging are translated and transformed through the process of becoming legalized and governmentalized. It documents the risks of adopting religion as a category to draw together individuals and communities as corporate bodies that are depicted as in need of legal protection to achieve their freedom. The argument is developed through an extended case study of the legal status of the Alevis in Turkey, a community and a category formally constituted as a single whole as part of the Turkish nation-building project. It evaluates two legal constructions of Alevism by the Turkish state and the European Court of Human Rights. While premised on differing assumptions about Alevism, both erase the indeterminacy and open-endedness surrounding Alevism as a lived tradition embedded in a broader field of social and cultural practices, while bolstering the role of the state in defining and overseeing Turkish religiosities.
17
Yıldırım, Mine. "The Right to Establish and Maintain Places of Worship in Turkey." Religion and Human Rights 8, no. 3 (2013): 203–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18710328-12341259.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The protection of the right to worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief and to establish and maintain places of worship in Turkey serves as a good illustration of the nature of de jure and de facto restrictions in contrast to what appears to be a general recognition of the right to freedom to worship. The protection of the right to establish and maintain places of worship in the Turkish legal system appears to be restricted in three key areas, namely: (i) planning regulations; (ii) permission of public authority; and (iii) legal personality. Turkey must take necessary measures to bring its legislation and practice in line with international human rights obligations.
18
Sauer, Christof. "Religious Freedom and Pluralistic Europe. Challenges for Christians." European Journal of Theology 29, no. 1 (December 1, 2020): 49–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/ejt2020.1.006.saue.
Full textAbstract:
SUMMARY Christians in Europe face challenges regarding freedom of religion or belief which differ in magnitude or character from those facing Christians elsewhere. The 51 states associated with geographical Europe are predominantly Christian but denominationally diverse and in part highly secularised. Those which cause highest concern in global religious freedom surveys are on the fringe of Europe: populous Russia and Turkey and less populous Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Yet numerous western countries also give cause for concern. Problems identified are stereotyping, vilification and hate speech; violence against people and objects; state control of religious practices; excluding religion from public life; and suppressing conscience, traditional Christian ethics and truth claims. Christian responses to such challenges include descriptive, legal and spiritual approaches, such as litigation, political lobbying and campaigning, cooperative strategies, intellectual engagement and attempts at shaping culture. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Christen in Europa stehen vor Herausforderungen im Blick auf Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit, die sich in Ausmaß und Charakter von denen unterscheiden, denen sich Christen anderswo gegenübersehen. Die 51 Staaten, die mit dem geographischen Europa assoziiert werden, sind überwiegend christlich, aber konfessionell vielfältig und zum Teil stark säkularisiert. Diejenigen, die in globalen Erhebungen zur Religionsfreiheit am meisten Anlass zur Sorge geben, liegen am Rande Europas: die bevölkerungsreichen Länder Russland und Türkei sowie die weniger bevölkerungsreichen Aserbaidschan und Kasachstan. Aber auch zahlreiche westliche Länder geben Anlass zur Sorge. Als Probleme werden Stereotypisierung, Verunglimpfung und Hassreden, Gewalt gegen Menschen und Objekte, staatliche Kontrolle religiöser Praktiken, Ausschluss der Religion aus dem öffentlichen Leben und die Unterdrückung des Gewissens, der traditionellen christlichen Ethik und der Wahrheitsansprüche genannt. Christliche Antworten auf solche Herausforderungen umfassen beschreibende, rechtliche und geistliche Ansätze, wie Prozessieren, politische Lobbyarbeit und Kampagnen, kooperative Strategien, intellektuelles Engagement und Versuche die Kultur zu gestalten. RÉSUMÉ En Europe, les chrétiens font face à des problèmes en matière de liberté religieuse et de liberté de conscience, dont la nature et l’ampleur diffèrent de ceux que rencontrent les chrétiens dans d’autres parties du monde. Les cinquante-et-un États constituant l’Europe géographique sont majoritairement chrétiens, mais en même temps très divers au plan confessionnel, et en partie très sécularisés. Ceux qui suscitent le plus de préoccupations selon les enquêtes mondiales sur la liberté religieuse se trouvent à la périphérie de l’Europe : la Russie et la Turquie, très peuplées, ainsi que l’Azerbaïdjan et le Kazakhstan, moins peuplés. Cependant, la situation dans de nombreux pays d’Europe de l’ouest est également préoccupante. Parmi les problèmes constatés figurent les stéréotypes, la diffamation, les discours haineux, les actes de violence contre les personnes et les biens, le contrôle exercé par l’État sur les pratiques religieuses, l’exclusion de la religion de la sphère publique, les atteintes à la liberté de conscience et la mise en cause de l’éthique chrétienne traditionnelle et de la revendication de vérité. Pour y faire face, les chrétiens peuvent avoir recours à des approches descriptives, juridiques et spirituelles, telles que les procès, le lobbying, les campagnes politiques, les stratégies de coopération, la présentation argumentée de leurs positions, et les tentatives de façonner la culture.
19
Sauer, Christof. "Religious Freedom and Pluralistic Europe. Challenges for Christians." European Journal of Theology 29, no. 1 (December 1, 2020): 49–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/ejt2020.1.006.saue.
Full textAbstract:
SUMMARYChristians in Europe face challenges regarding freedom of religion or belief which differ in magnitude or character from those facing Christians elsewhere. The 51 states associated with geographical Europe are predominantly Christian but denominationally diverse and in part highly secularised. Those which cause highest concern in global religious freedom surveys are on the fringe of Europe: populous Russia and Turkey and less populous Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Yet numerous western countries also give cause for concern. Problems identified are stereotyping, vilification and hate speech; violence against people and objects; state control of religious practices; excluding religion from public life; and suppressing conscience, traditional Christian ethics and truth claims. Christian responses to such challenges include descriptive, legal and spiritual approaches, such as litigation, political lobbying and campaigning, cooperative strategies, intellectual engagement and attempts at shaping culture.ZUSAMMENFASSUNGChristen in Europa stehen vor Herausforderungen im Blick auf Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit, die sich in Ausmaß und Charakter von denen unterscheiden, denen sich Christen anderswo gegenübersehen. Die 51 Staaten, die mit dem geographischen Europa assoziiert werden, sind überwiegend christlich, aber konfessionell vielfältig und zum Teil stark säkularisiert. Diejenigen, die in globalen Erhebungen zur Religionsfreiheit am meisten Anlass zur Sorge geben, liegen am Rande Europas: die bevölkerungsreichen Länder Russland und Türkei sowie die weniger bevölkerungsreichen Aserbaidschan und Kasachstan. Aber auch zahlreiche westliche Länder geben Anlass zur Sorge. Als Probleme werden Stereotypisierung, Verunglimpfung und Hassreden, Gewalt gegen Menschen und Objekte, staatliche Kontrolle religiöser Praktiken, Ausschluss der Religion aus dem öffentlichen Leben und die Unterdrückung des Gewissens, der traditionellen christlichen Ethik und der Wahrheitsansprüche genannt. Christliche Antworten auf solche Herausforderungen umfassen beschreibende, rechtliche und geistliche Ansätze, wie Prozessieren, politische Lobbyarbeit und Kampagnen, kooperative Strategien, intellektuelles Engagement und Versuche die Kultur zu gestalten.RÉSUMÉEn Europe, les chrétiens font face à des problèmes en matière de liberté religieuse et de liberté de conscience, dont la nature et l’ampleur diffèrent de ceux que rencontrent les chrétiens dans d’autres parties du monde. Les cinquante-et-un États constituant l’Europe géographique sont majoritairement chrétiens, mais en même temps très divers au plan confessionnel, et en partie très sécularisés. Ceux qui suscitent le plus de préoccupations selon les enquêtes mondiales sur la liberté religieuse se trouvent à la périphérie de l’Europe : la Russie et la Turquie, très peuplées, ainsi que l’Azerbaïdjan et le Kazakhstan, moins peuplés. Cependant, la situation dans de nombreux pays d’Europe de l’ouest est également préoccupante. Parmi les problèmes constatés figurent les stéréotypes, la diffamation, les discours haineux, les actes de violence contre les personnes et les biens, le contrôle exercé par l’État sur les pratiques religieuses, l’exclusion de la religion de la sphère publique, les atteintes à la liberté de conscience et la mise en cause de l’éthique chrétienne traditionnelle et de la revendication de vérité. Pour y faire face, les chrétiens peuvent avoir recours à des approches descriptives, juridiques et spirituelles, telles que les procès, le lobbying, les campagnes politiques, les stratégies de coopération, la présentation argumentée de leurs positions, et les tentatives de façonner la culture.
20
Akbulut, Olgun, and Zeynep Oya Usal. "Parental Religious Rights vs. Compulsory Religious Education in Turkey." International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 15, no. 4 (2008): 433–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157181108x374752.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractDespite parents having primary responsibility, it remains the State's duty to ensure its citizens' education. The orientation of the State's education can be secular can religious; however, the State – having the discretion on curriculum – should comply with human rights principles by promoting pluralism and refraining from indoctrination. In this respect, discussions around religious education have been, and are, highly controversial. This has especially been the case for countries such as Turkey, which have pronounced religious minority groups in their territories. In this regard, the Alevis of Turkey, as the largest religious minority in the country, have been the main actors of a long lasting legal struggle to strive for respect for their freedom of religion as well as parental religious convictions. This article aims to answer to what extent Alevis in Turkey can assert their parental right to religious education through invoking international human rights law, particularly under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.
21
Özgül, Ceren. "Legally Armenian: Tolerance, Conversion, and Name Change in Turkish Courts." Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 3 (July 2014): 622–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417514000279.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractOver the last fifteen years, hundreds of Muslim citizens claiming Armenian descent have submitted petitions to Turkey's secular legal authorities asking for changes to both their name and religion in the public record. In this article, I discuss the name-change cases of Armenian return converts to further the debates on Turkish secularism and to critique the body of scholarship that welcomes the governing Justice and Development Party's legal reforms as a measure of growing religious tolerance. In the article's first part I analyze the historical foundations of the regulation of religion and name changes in Turkey by fully and explicitly engaging with law as a site where minority difference is constructed, authorized, and challenged. The article's second half offers an alternative reading of how tolerance functions as an aspect of the Justice and Development Party's reforms. Based on my investigation of specific legal forms of argument that converted Armenians and their lawyers put forward in today's secular courts, and how legal officers of the state respond to them, I demonstrate that legal reform has shifted the definition of religion as a marker of minority difference in legal space. I argue that the historical context of name change and religious conversion forces the limits of existing understandings of freedom of religion in Turkey, and that this renders visible historical injustices that cannot be resolved simply through the notion of “religious tolerance” in the courts.
22
Langlaude, Sylvie. "Indoctrination, Secularism, Religious Liberty, and the Echr." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55, no. 4 (October 2006): 929–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iclq/lei135.
Full textAbstract:
With its judgment inLeyla Şahin v Turkey,1the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has once again addressed the place of religion within the European Convention system. The Court considers two types of cases. The first focuses on individuals but has repercussions on the relationship between State and religious communities. The Court is much more individualistic in these cases, in that it focuses more on the individual and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Court emphasizes values such as the prevention of indoctrination, neutrality, secularism and laïcité, especially in relation to Islam. The Court tries to promote and enforce a normative order of secularism but this has unfortunate consequences for religious freedom. The second deals with the compatibility of entire domestic regimes regulating religious affairs with the Convention, including questions of legal personality and registration, leadership and property ownership, positive obligations of the State towards the protection of religious communities against third parties, and freedom of religious choice. The aim is to promote tolerance, religious diversity, pluralism and a market place within religious beliefs. It will be shown that these two strands in the caselaw do not always sit happily together.
23
Leigh, Ian. "New Trends in Religious Liberty and the European Court of Human Rights." Ecclesiastical Law Journal 12, no. 3 (July 8, 2010): 266–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0956618x10000396.
Full textAbstract:
This article analyses recent trends in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerned with the right to freedom of thought, belief and religion (Article 9, European Convention on Human Rights) and the right of parents to respect by the state for their religious and philosophical views in the education of their children (Article 2, Protocol 1).1 These developments include notable decisions concerned with protection from religious persecution in Georgia, with religious education in Norway and Turkey and with the display of crucifixes in state schools in Italy. It is apparent that the European Convention religious liberty jurisprudence increasingly stresses the role of the state as a neutral protector of religious freedom. For individuals religious freedom is now also recognised to include not only the right to manifest their religious belief but also freedom from having to declare their religious affiliation. As the religious liberty jurisprudence comes of age, other significant developments, for example in relation to conscientious objection to military service, can be anticipated.
24
Öcal, Adem, Süleyman Yiğittir, Laima Kyburiene, and Gemma Navickiene. "A Study on Turkish and Lithuanian Young Adults’ Perception of Values." Education and Urban Society 52, no. 3 (May 18, 2019): 489–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0013124519848053.
Full textAbstract:
Whether on a national or an international level, it is important to settle how values are comprehended and justified. This study investigates how university students in Turkey and Lithuania make sense of certain values. The study has a pattern of a case study. The respondent selection was made by benefiting from the studies conducted in both countries. The investigation reveals how three values (family, social justice, and freedom) were understood by university students in both countries, and how they were justified. The data were collected through one of the qualitative research methods, the semistructured interview. The respondents included 32 students from Lithuania, and 40 students from Turkey. The data were analyzed using the content analysis technique. The results of this study suggest that values can be perceived differently both in individual and social platforms, and that, depending on the part of the society they emerged from, values can be justified by various points of view rooting from religion, tradition, and culture.
25
Thornton, Arland, Shawn Dorius, Jeffrey Swindle, Linda Young-DeMarco, and Mansoor Moaddel. "Middle Eastern Beliefs about the Causal Linkages of Development to Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights." Sociology of Development 3, no. 1 (2017): 70–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/sod.2017.3.1.70.
Full textAbstract:
This paper investigates the extent to which people in five Middle Eastern countries endorse key beliefs of developmental idealism that associate development with freedom, democracy, and human rights. Developmental idealism is a set of beliefs concerning the desirability of development, the methods for achieving it, and its consequences. The literature suggests that these beliefs have diffused worldwide among elites and lay citizens and posits that when such beliefs are disseminated they become forces for social and economic changes. Although developmental idealism research has primarily examined family and demographic issues, developmental idealism has tremendous potential to influence other aspects of society. This paper extends knowledge by considering societal aspects not addressed previously in the developmental idealism literature: personal freedom, democracy, and human rights. Using survey data from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, we investigate how publics of these countries associate development with these elements. We find that majorities believe development brings greater personal freedom, democracy, and human rights. Conversely, the data show that in four of the countries majorities believe more personal freedom contributes to development. These findings provide support for the idea that developmental idealism beliefs concerning freedom, democracy, and human rights have diffused to lay publics in these five Middle Eastern countries. We also find evidence of uniquely Islamic developmental models; a significant proportion of people in these countries believe that more religion will bring more development.
26
Geaves, Ron. "RELIGION AND ETHNICITY: COMMUNITY FORMATION IN THE BRITISH ALEVI COMMUNITY." Numen 50, no. 1 (2003): 52–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852703321103247.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe article explores the Alevi community, a little-studied Muslim-influenced heterogeneous religious tradition whose roots are in Eastern Turkey, and provides recent fieldwork of the Alevi presence in London which has appeared through migration since the 1980s. This community development is compared with the older Alevi community in Istanbul. The intention is to use the high number of Alevis who live in diaspora communities to analyse the relationship between religion and ethnicity. The author argues, that even though the Alevi revival that has manifested since the 1990s and in which Alevi youth participate visibly, appears to be cultural rather than religious, closer examination of Alevi religious traditions indicates that the forms taken by the revival have their roots in traditional Alevi spiritual beliefs and practices in which values of tolerance, heterodoxy, freedom and justice prevail. The article concludes that although Alevi youth appear to be diverging significantly from their Sunni Muslim counterparts in their respective identity quests, religion plays a significant role for both although the manifestations of revival are almost diametrically opposed. This can be explained by the different manifestations of belief and practice in each community.
27
Falski, Jacek. "Regulacje ograniczeń w zakresie noszenia symboli religijnych w ocenie Komitetu Praw Człowieka ONZ." Przegląd Sejmowy 3(164) (2021): 243–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.31268/ps.2021.41.
Full textAbstract:
The article provides a critical analysis of three individual notification opinions issued by the UN Human Rights Committee in July 2018 on the compatibility of existing regulations in States parties (France, Turkey) on bans on wearing religious symbols with the freedom to manifest religion guaranteed by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, the text points out the dichotomy – in terms of content – of positions on this issue between the universal body and the regional reference body (the European Court of Human Rights) and also addresses such systemic issues as the problem of legal force of the Committee’s opinions, the lack of dialogue or even isolationism of international bodies ruling on human rights, or the dispute over the primacy of their decisions.
28
Wilson, M. Brett. "Ritual and Rhyme: Alevi-Bektashi Interpretations and Translations of the Qur'an (1953–2007)." Journal of Qur'anic Studies 17, no. 3 (October 2015): 75–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jqs.2015.0212.
Full textAbstract:
This article explores the forays of Alevi and Bektashi writers into the genres of Qur'anic interpretation and translation. A sizeable religious minority in Turkey, Alevi and Bektashi authors are relative newcomers to these fields and their cultivation of contemporary Qur'anic literature resembling that of their Sunnī counterparts is a significant development. This study examines how their treatments relate to shifting political and religious environments in Turkey and, furthermore, considers their style, sources, and arguments. It contends that interpreting and translating the Qur'an have become integral to Alevi-Bektashi participation in broader public debates over religious practice, freedom, and identity in modern Turkey.
29
Toshkulov, Juraboy. "CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SECULAR STATE AND RELIGION: FOREIGN AND UZBEKISTAN EXPERIENCE." Review of Law Sciences 6, no. 3 (October 10, 2022): 5–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.51788/tsul.rols.2022.6.3./woas9818.
Full textAbstract:
The article analyzes the types of states in terms of the content and essence of state-religious relations, the constitutional and legal foundations of freedom of conscience in accordance with the constitutions of the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Poland, the French Republic, the Republic of Turkey, Japan, the Republic of Estonia, Czech Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan, their common features, similarities and differences, using secular scientific and comparative methods, appropriate conclusions are drawn, suggestions are made on the directions of research work that will be carried out in the future. Given the growing influence of the religious factor in the socio-political, spiritual and ideological spheres in the current period, and also taking the intensified preparation of constitutional reforms in our country into account, the author considers it relevant: a deep and comprehensive study of international and regional documents on the relationship between the state and religion with scientific analysis; conducting extensive scientific research on the genesis and evolution of the norms governing relations between the state and religion; a comparative study of the legislation of foreign, including secular countries, regulating relations between the state and religion in practice in the current period and making suggestions and recommendations on the critical use of achievements in this regard in improving national legislation. Also, considering the activation of socio-political forces that are trying to use religion for political purposes, and the fact that they pose a serious threat to countries, regions and international security that use religion as a disguise, especially Islam, the development of the draft “Convention against terrorism under the mask of religion” and its adoption by the UN General Assembly is a requirement of the time.
30
Şentürk, Recep. "Jedinstvo u mnogostrukosti / Unity in multiplexity." Context: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 5, no. 2 (March 15, 2022): 69–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.55425/23036966.2018.5.2.69.
Full textAbstract:
History testifies that Muslims are successful in diversity management. Islamic polity has never aimed to build a community exclusively for Muslims; instead, Muslims built an Open Civilization from Andalusia to India where people from different cultures lived together. Islamic law has taken adamiyyah (humanity regardless of religion) as the subject of Islamic law to which rights and duties are accorded. This tradition, originating from Abu Hanifa, has formed the foundation of a universalistic interpretation of Islam in the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. The present movement in the Muslim world from dictatorships towards democracy is a long-delayed outcome of Islamic political ideals and values, which give utmost priority to unity, freedom and justice. There is a strong universalistic Islamic political tradition, the last major example of which is the Ottoman Khilafah whose pluralistic legacy has yet to be claimed. Islamic unity in diversity or Open Civilization is rooted in the multiplex Islamic thought.
31
Kayaoglu, Turan. "Getting Turkey Back on Track to Democracy, Human Rights, and Religious Freedom." Review of Faith & International Affairs 14, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 14–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2016.1184447.
Full text
32
Tekelioglu, Ahmet Selim. "Muslim Civil Society and the Politics of Religious Freedom in Turkey. By Jeremy F. Walton." Journal of the American Academy of Religion 85, no. 4 (October 23, 2017): 1166–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfx060.
Full text
33
Westrheim, Kariane, Michael Gunter, Yener Koc, Yavuz Aykan, Diane E. King, Jordi Tejel, Joost Jongerden, and Martin Van Bruinessen. "Book Reviews." Kurdish Studies 1, no. 1 (October 4, 2014): 225–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/ks.v2i2.402.
Full textAbstract:
Adem Uzun, “Living Freedom”: The Evolution of the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey and the Efforts to Resolve it. Berghof Transitions Series No. 11. Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2014. 48 pp., (ISBN: 978-3-941514-16-4).Ebru Sönmez, Idris-i Bidlisi: Ottoman Kurdistan and Islamic Legitimacy, Libra Kitap, Istanbul, 2012, 190 pp., (ISBN: 978-605-4326-56-3). Sabri Ateş, The Ottoman–Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 1843-1914, New York; Cambridge University Press, 2013. 366., (ISBN: 978-1107033658). Choman Hardi, Gendered Experiences of Genocide: Anfal Survivors in Kurdistan-Iraq. Farnham, Surrey and Burlington Vermont: Ashgate, 2011, xii + 217 pp., (ISBN: 978-0-7546-7715-4).Harriet Allsopp, The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East, London and New York, I.B. Tauris, 2014, 299 pp., (ISBN: 978-1780765631).Khanna Omarkhali (ed.), Religious Minorities in Kurdistan: Beyond the Mainstream [Studies in Oriental Religions, Volume 68], Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2014, xxxviii + 423 pp., (ISBN: 978-3-447-10125-7).Anna Grabole-Çeliker, Kurdish Life in Contemporary Turkey: Migration, Gender and Ethnic Identity, London: I.B. Taurus, 2013, 299 pp., (ISBN: 978-1780760926).
34
Benhabib, Seyla. "Transnational legal sites and democracy-building." Philosophy & Social Criticism 39, no. 4-5 (March 28, 2013): 471–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453713477351.
Full textAbstract:
Until recently the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ was a forgotten concept in the intellectual history of the 18th and 19th centuries. The last two decades have seen a remarkable revival of interest in cosmopolitanism across a wide variety of fields. This article contends that legal developments since the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights and the rise of an ‘international human rights regime’ are at the forefront of a new cosmopolitanism. Yet there is a great deal of skepticism toward such claims on the part of those who maintain that democracy and human rights are best furthered by the nation-state framework. Still others confuse legal cosmopolitanism with the spread of a uniform system of rights across different national jurisdictions. In several writings in the past, I developed the concept of ‘democratic iterations’ to argue against such skepticism as well as misunderstandings of legal cosmopolitanism. In this article, I show how democratic iterations unfold across transnational legal sites, which encompass various national jurisdictions and through which contentious dialogues on the application and interpretation of such fundamental rights as ‘freedom of religion’ in different jurisdictions can emerge. To document such processes I focus on the Leyla Sahin v. Turkey case which was adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights in 2005.
35
Ecklund, Elaine Howard, and David R. Johnson. "Secularity and Science: What Scientists around the World Really Think about Religion." Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 73, no. 4 (December 2021): 242–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.56315/pscf12-21ecklund2.
Full textAbstract:
SECULARITY AND SCIENCE: What Scientists around the World Really Think about Religion by Elaine Howard Ecklund et al. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 352 pages. Hardcover; $31.95. ISBN: 9780191926755. *I was raised in the 1980s and 1990s under conservative evangelicalism, which means my father's bookshelf was full of creation/evolution texts, and we never missed Ken Ham when he came to town. The conflict narrative between science and religion was in full force then, and it remains with us today (if slightly diminished). Religious conservatives weren't the only ones talking secularization, though. Scholars such as Peter Berger had observed decades earlier that science often acts as a carrier of secularization. Berger lived long enough, however, to see that secularization did not unfold as expected, and he modified his view near the close of the millennium to indicate that secularization is not a uniform process. Rather, we observe "multiple modernities " marked by various trajectories of secularization and religious growth. *Such is the essential backdrop for Secularity and Science: What Scientists around the World Really Think about Religion. Here, Rice University sociologist Elaine Howard Ecklund and her team ask a simple and compelling question: If science is linked to secularization--as the story so often goes--what do scientists actually think about religion? The answer comes via survey research on 20,000 physicists and biologists in France, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as 600 in-depth interviews. The result is an impressive and wide-ranging report not only on the status of religion and science in a global perspective, but also on several theoretical and practical considerations surrounding the secularization debate. As sociologists they take care to address hierarchical and institutional matters (i.e., academic rank, university status and prestige, levels of science infrastructure, etc.), and as scholars of religion they investigate how religious factors vary across national contexts (i.e., definitions of religion and spirituality, religious characteristics of populations, state-church relations, antagonism between scientists and the general public, the place of religion in the scientific workplace, etc.). Each country or region receives a focused chapter, briefly summarized below. *The United States (chap. 3, "The 'Problem' of the Public") is characterized by a soft secularism in which 65% of scientists believe in God. US scientists aren't particularly antagonistic to religion, but significant conflict between scientists and the public exists due to the large, politically active, conservative Christian population. This public issue plays a role in undermining the US scientific enterprise. *In the United Kingdom (chap. 4, "'New Atheists' and 'Dangerous Muslims'"), 57% of scientists believe in God. The UK is characterized by a unique dynamic in which new atheist scientists speak at the popular level while at the same time half of the country's scientists originate outside the UK, often bringing religious values with them. UK biologists expressed concern about a growing Muslim population and implications for some realms of scientific thought (e.g., evolution). *In France (chap. 5, "Assertive Secularism in Science"), 49% of scientists report belief in God. French secularism is based on laïcité (freedom from religion) and the state actively excludes religion from public life. The result is that dialogue between religion and science is difficult to sustain, with laïcité disproportionately affecting Muslim women in science. *Eighty percent of scientists in Italy (chap. 6, "A Distinctively Catholic Religion and Science") believe in God. Conflict between science and religion is a non-issue, largely due to the monolithic nature of cultural Catholicism ("Everyone's Catholic. And nobody cares," p. 7). Even non-Catholic scientists, many of whom identify as "spiritual but not religious," tend to see religion and science as separate realms in what could be called "a version of religious modernity." Scientists belonging to certain Catholic networks appear to have better access to jobs, funding, and other opportunities. *In Turkey (chap. 7, "The Politics of Secular Muslims"), 94% of scientists say they believe in God. Turkish scientists broadly believe in God but do not see themselves necessarily as personally religious. They observe little conflict between science and religion when Islam is considered broadly, but express concern about the ascendancy of a political form of Islam which threatens academic freedom. Many Turkish academics are leaving the country, and scientific infrastructure has suffered in recent years. *In India (chap. 8, "Science and Religion as Intimately Intertwined"), 90% of scientists report belief in God, and religious affiliation among scientists is higher than in the general public. India is a growing scientific superpower, and religion is so "in the air" that Indian scientists often make connections between religion and science without even noticing. A number of Indian scientists observe that the "conflict" between religion and science is a Western construction. *In Hong Kong and Taiwan (chap. 9, "A Science-Friendly Christianity and Folk Religion"), 90% (Taiwan) and 74% (Hong Kong) of scientists believe in God or gods. Like India, affiliation among scientists is higher than in the general population. Both of these regions' education systems have been influenced by Christianity, and scientists in Hong Kong speak of meeting faculty and administrators in the sciences at Christian churches. Despite the influence of Christianity, the Western science and religion conflict narrative is not strong. *These summary points hardly do justice to the scope of the authors' project, but they do highlight something that they themselves hold up as a central finding: namely, that conflict between religion and science is an invention of the West. The data indicate that a conflict perspective animates just one-third of scientists in the US, the UK, and France, with the remaining countries evincing much lower numbers. Rather, science and religion are most commonly viewed as different aspects of reality--independent of one another--a view embraced by both nonreligious and religious scientists. Regarding religious scientists, the authors report that from a global perspective there are many more than commonly assumed. Even scientists themselves consistently underestimate the proportion of their colleagues who are religious. *Overall, the book provides tremendous insight, thanks to rich quantitative and qualitative data, into how national and social contexts shape and interact with scientists' views of religion. No other study of this magnitude exists, and that fact alone makes it a remarkable achievement worthy of examination. Its greatest strength lies in the treatment of each country and region, with effective data and storytelling illuminating the relation between science and religion in that location. *The primary weaknesses are the minimal synthesis of cross-national data and the limited discussion of how results fit within the larger secularization debate (which the authors use to frame the book). Secularization themes are treated on a country-by-country basis, but only seven pages of the concluding chapter attempt a synthesis, and the discussion is largely practical. Given the expertise of the authors involved, it feels like a missed opportunity for a more theoretically rich discussion. I would like to have seen, for example, discussion on whether the independence model (as opposed to the conflict model) is itself linked to secularization. The majority of the world's scientists may be at least nominally religious, but without explicit philosophical and theological work to engage science, isn't it probable that the independence model might just as easily contribute to secularization as oppose it? In other words, whose secularity are we talking about? Strong atheists may view independence as accommodating religion; the highly devout may interpret it as another facet of secularity. *That said, the book is an empirical rather than a theoretical work, and an excellent one at that. The data are rich enough for readers well versed in the secularization debate to incorporate them into their own hypotheses. The primary message, supported by a wealth of rigorous data, indicates that global scientists are more religious than we often realize, and that narratives around science and religion in the US are not the only ones requiring our attention. *Reviewed by Blake Victor Kent, Westmont College Department of Sociology, Santa Barbara, CA 93108.
36
Thio, Li-Ann, and Jaclyn Ling-Chen Neo. "Religious Dress in Schools: The Serban Controversy in Malaysia." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55, no. 3 (July 2006): 671–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iclq/lei110.
Full textAbstract:
There has been a spate of litigation before constitutional and human rights courts challenging restrictions on wearing religious dress in state schools as an infringement of religious freedom rights.1 These cases implicate deeper constitutional issues pertaining to State-Religion relations, religious pluralism and expressions of religious identity in the public domain of multicultural societies. Within Europe, this problem relates to the issue of integrating immigrants into national society and preserving secular political orders. The European Court of Human Rights in Leyla Sahin v Turkey2 [‘Sahin’] noted that within democratic societies, opinions ‘reasonably differ widely’ on State-Religion relations, reflected in the diversity of national approaches. For example, the 2004 French law banning ostentatious religious symbols from public schools,3 embodying a strict, doctrinaire secularism, contrasts sharply with the more accommodating liberal approach where British schools pragmatically offer students alternative uniforms to satisfy religious dress codes for public modesty. The English Court of Appeal in Shabina Begum v Governors of Denbigh High School4 [‘Begum’] held, in applying the Human Rights Act,5 that the school as a state institution was obliged to consider the claimant's religious rights under Article 9(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights [ECHR], and to justify its school policy under the Article 9(2) limitation clause. The United Kingdom is ‘not a secular state’6 as statute provides for religious education and worship in schools.
37
Ordem, Eser, and Ömer Gökhan Ulum. "Gender Issues in English Language Teaching: Views from Turkey." Acta Educationis Generalis 10, no. 1 (April 1, 2020): 25–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/atd-2020-0002.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractIntroduction: Research into gender diversity and equality of gender in humanities has been mounting since 1960s, when post-modernism and post-structuralism emerged as a reaction to metanarratives of modernization. Methods and approaches in ELT also arose in the same years. However, queer and LGBT identities were intentionally ignored in ELT discipline and departments, although English as a lingua franca was already hailed in the inner circle. This study aimed to unearth the views of young adult learners of English regarding LGBT. Two data collection instruments were administered. A standard scale composed of 21 items that measure homosexuality attitudes was given to the participants (N= 113). In addition, a semi-structured interview was prepared to elicit the participants’ views (N=12). The results of the study show that most of the participants showed a positive attitude towards LGBT. However, they reported that this topic was never addressed in ELT settings.Methods: The study was qualitatively designed to elicit the views of young adult learners regarding homosexuality. A standard scale developed by Kite and Deaux (1986) and which was psychometrically sound and reliable to identify the attitudes towards homosexuality and a descriptive phenomenographic research method were used to learn the ideas of the participants. Phenomenographic research method aims to elicit lived experiences of individuals by using experiential description. Although there were 600 young adult learners of English, only 113 of them volunteered to participate in the study. The participants studied English as a foreign language at a public university in Turkey. The average age of the participants was 18. A semi-structured interview was conducted with 12 of the participants.Results: The findings of the study represent that most of the participants ascribed positive attitudes towards homosexuality. Further, a big number of the informants put forward the significance of such concepts as freedom and respect for personal preferences. Besides, an average number of respondents attributed homosexuality as a hormonal disorder encountered in society. The majority of the respondents put an emphasis on the taboo of religion. They revealed that homosexuality is a taboo which is strictly forbidden in Islam and such issues should not be voiced explicitly in our daily life.Discussion: This study dealt with the issue of LGBT and homosexuality in foreign language settings by taking the views of young adult learners of English into consideration. The results show that homosexuality representation is insufficient in ELT textbooks, curriculum and materials. Although most of the participants showed a positive attitude towards the representation of homosexuality, they noted that LGBT was never addressed in classroom settings. Similarly, Gray (2013) also emphasizes that LGBT identity was not represented in ELT, though considerable progress has been legally made in the UK. Nelson (2002) strongly recommends that queering ESL through discourses may help ESL develop a more diverse attitude towards LGBG identity.Limitations: This study was limited to only young adult learners in English language teaching. In addition, only two collection data tools, a standard homosexuality scale and a semi-structured interview form, were used. Besides, convenience sampling was used. The sampling was confined to 113 participants for the scale and 12 learners for the semi-structured interview form.Conclusions: The results show that most of the participants have positive attitudes towards acceptance of homosexual identities. Although ELT textbooks and materials tend to discard LGBT identity, teachers and students can queer ELT, EFL and ESL classrooms by using the tenets of progressive education and critical pedagogy. The use of participatory approach can be reinforced and expanded in ELT world encompassing not only inner circle but also outer and expanding circles. Materials, tasks and activities need to be updated in ELT curriculum. The first discussions of equality of gender in post-modernist and post-structuralist theories can be perceptibly seen in ELT by endorsing and developing critical pedagogy.
38
HAVA KÖPRÜLÜ, Melek, and Sezer AVCI. "ECONOMIC VIOLENCE AND WOMAN'S LIFE." GOBEKLİTEPE Saglik Bilimleri Dergisi 5, no. 7 (March 15, 2022): 56–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.55433/gsbd.115.
Full textAbstract:
iolence against women is an issue that should be addressed as one of social problems of a society because the phenomenon of violence is a factor that takes away their right to live and prevents them from being involved in the society. The phenomenon of violence is a social reality that exists in Turkey, similar to that in other societies. When people think of violence against women, they often think of physical violence. However, both national (Turkish) and international platforms indicate that violence can be physical, sexual, psychological, and economic as well. Economic violence is one of the types of violence that women are exposed to. The economic violence refers to the use of money and economic resources on women as a means of sanction, power, and threat which impoverishes women and makes them dependent on individuals. The fact that economic violence, which is accepted as one of major barriers to economic and social development and development of countries, is accepted by a great majority of women, contributes to the fact that the existence of economic violence in that society is not noticed and is regarded normal. Women are exposed to economic violence not only by their husbands at home, but also outside the home. This exposure is based on the traditionalism of the society and the idea that men should be more dominant and have the right to decide in the political, legal and economic decision mechanisms of the society. The fact that women and men have equal rights and this can be implemented not only on paper but also in practice in order to prevent economic violence against women depends on increasing the education levels and raising awareness in the society for this sensitivity. All women in the world have the possibility to experience gender-based violence regardless of religion, language, race, economic and financial freedom, and professional status. Because of all these reasons, the fight against violence phenomenon is important not only in Turkey, but also at the global level for the welfare of all women. In this study, the problems encountered by women in business life and the effect of economic violence on women are discussed.
39
Shodik, Ahmad Fajar, Muhammad Faiz, and Hasbi Sen. "PEMIKIRAN POLITIK KEBANGSAAN SAID NURSI DI TENGAH TRANSISI TURKI MENUJU REPUBLIK." Al'adalah 23, no. 1 (April 19, 2020): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.35719/aladalah.v23i1.26.
Full textAbstract:
Artikel ini berusaha untuk mengkaji prinsip-prinsip politik kebangsaan Said Nursi (1877-1960 M) yang ia praktikkan di Turki, yakni dengan memilih jalan perjuangan politik secara kultural. Wujud perjuangan-nya adalah dengan dakwah keimanan dan pengungkapan hakikat alquran serta menghindari politik identitas atau politisasi agama demi kepentingan-kepentingan politik yang sesaat dan sektarian serta mengorbankan kepentingan umat Islam secara umum. Kajian ini mencoba menganalisa prinsip-prinsip politik Nursi seperti asas tauhid, musyawarah, kebebasan, persamaan, keadilan, serta nilai-nilai yang mendasarinya. Kajian ini mendapati bahwa pandangan politik kebangsaan Said Nursi ia implementasikan dalam dakwah Risalah Nur yang selalu mengedepankan al-‘amal al-ijabi (aksi positif) dan meng-hindarkan aksi destruktif dan negatif mesti tidak sehaluan dengan kebijakan pemerintah sekular Turki ketika itu. This paper seeks to examine the national political principles of Said Nursi (1877-1960) which he practiced in Turkey, namely by choosing the path of cultural political struggle. The form of struggle is through the propagation of faith and disclosure of the essence of the Koran and avoiding identity politics or the politicization of religion for temporary and sectarian political interests and at the expense of the interests of Muslims in general. This study tries to analyze the political principles of Nursi, such as the principles of tawhid, deliberation, freedom, equality, justice, and the underlying values. This study found that the national political view of Said Nursi that he implemented in the preaching of Risalah Nur, which always put forward al-'Aamal al-ijabi (positive action) and prevented destructive and negative actions must not align with the policies of the Turkish secular government at that time.
40
Osman, Fatima. "Legislative Prohibitions on wearing a Headscarf: Are they justified?" Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 17, no. 4 (April 11, 2017): 1348. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2014/v17i4a2167.
Full textAbstract:
A headscarf, a simple piece of cloth that covers the head, is a controversial garment that carries various connotations and meanings. While it may be accepted as just another item of clothing when worn by non-Muslim women, it is often the subject of much controversy when worn by Muslim women. In recent years the headscarf has been described as a symbol of Islam's oppression of women and simultaneously of terrorism. As the debate regarding the acceptability of the headscarf in the modern world continues, an increasing number of states have legislated to ban the wearing of the headscarf. This article critically examines the reasons underlying these bans and argues that these prohibitions are not justified. It does this by first analysing the place of the headscarf in Islam, its religious basis and its significance to Muslim women. It argues that the headscarf is more than just a mere religious symbol and that Muslim women wear the headscarf as a matter of religious obligation. The headscarf is considered to be an important religious practice protected by the right to freedom of religion. Thereafter the article examines legislative bans on the headscarf in France, Turkey and Switzerland in order to identify the most popular justifications advanced by states and courts for banning the headscarf. It critically evaluates the justifications for protecting secularism, preventing coercion, promoting equality and curbing religious extremism, and disputes that the reasons put forward by states and accepted by courts justify banning the headscarf. It thereafter explores how South African courts would respond to a headscarf ban and argues that schools and employers should accommodate the headscarf. While Muslim women may not have an absolute right to wear the headscarf, there has thus far been no justifiable reason for banning the headscarf.
41
Hart, Kimberly. "The Reckoning of Pluralism." American Journal of Islam and Society 31, no. 4 (October 1, 2014): 128–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v31i4.1076.
Full textAbstract:
At the time Tambar wrote The Reckoning of Pluralism, there was a briefopening in Turkish political life during which ethnic and sectarian pluralitywas both imaginable and debatable. This opening, initiated by the ruling AKP,attempted to create an official conversation about the Alevis and the Kurds.This move indicated that those who have state power were willing to acceptthe suggestion that Turkish nationalism could encompass sectarian and ethnicdiversity. The opening, however, was brutally closed via the violent attackson peaceful protestors during the Gezi Park events of 2013. Turkishpolitics changes rapidly, and what was a moment of optimism among thosewho hope for a greater freedom of expression in Turkey may be revived.This means that Tambar conducted his research when Turks were beginningto discuss religious and ethnic difference, the ongoing war with the Kurdsand possible solutions, and a troubled national memory avoided by nationalisthistorians. Only further research can tell us if the Alevi community feelsthere is a possibility of greater religious expression. But even within thecontext of this brief opening, Tambar’s work contributes to the question ofhow the Turkish government locates, defines, and confines religion, in thiscase Alevism, in the national imaginary via nationalist historians.Tambar’s work contributes to a growing body of ethnographic and sociologicalliterature on Turkey’s powerful if obviously constructed ideologicalworldview, in which the state ushers into existence self-evident “truths” forits citizens. In this case the truth is the origin, meaning, and role of the nation’sAlevis. The author describes how their history has been domesticated (chap.3), how public performances of religiosity are self-contained by the Alevis,who are now burdened with the need to perform national unity and forget aspectsof ritual that appear “irrelevant” to contemporary, urban, political, andideological issues (chaps. 2 and 4), and how ritual has become intellectualizedand historicized (chap. 5). Chapter 6, the final chapter, discusses a non-stateAlevi mosque run by imams trained in Iran.The book will be useful for specialists, for whom lingering questionsabout this group’s oft-repeated “shamanistic” origin is a puzzle. Tambar forcefullyilluminates the origins of this nationalist fiction and the related denial ofany possible connection with Shi‘i Islam. Naturally, for those with some backgroundin Ottoman history, the denial of the Alevis’ sectarian connections to ...
42
Korneev, V. V., V. Y. Khaustova, and A. O. Khodzhaian. "Progressive Taxation of Individual Income in Islamic Countries." PROBLEMS OF ECONOMY 2, no. 48 (2021): 187–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-0712-2021-2-187-193.
Full textAbstract:
The economic results of the development of Muslim countries have raised the question of the existence of an increasingly focused Islamic financial and tax model. Taxes in the Islamic economic model provide an implicit link in the relations between the state and individuals, thus determining the limits of conditioned freedom and mutual obligations. The article is aimed at identifying the indicative features of progressive taxation of individual income in some Islamic countries. The research results show that Islamic countries are characterized by the unity of religion (faith) and such elements of the social system as the organization of power, as well as family, economic and other relations. The boundaries of the personal and the public, the individual and the national are transparent and strictly regulated. The peculiarities of the Tax Institute in Muslim countries, terms of taxation and tax usage rules are considered. It is proven that nowadays approaches to taxation in Islamic countries are diverse. It is determined that progressive taxation of individual income is widely used in Turkey, Pakistan, Tunisia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and other countries, and partly in Saudi Arabia; "tax heavens" are typical for the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Omani; proportional taxation is still used in Malaysia, Sudan, and Kazakhstan. The main types of taxes in Muslim countries are analyzed, their evolution is studied. Modern foci of progressive taxation of individual incomes in specific Muslim countries are revealed. The advantages of the Islamic financial model in terms of tax policy modernization and compliance with tax discipline, unconditional fulfillment of obligations and concluded agreements are identified. It is substantiated that using some elements of the progressive tax scale applied in the practice of Islamic finance can prove useful in a number of areas, providing budgetary and social balance in the "corridor of opportunities", bringing mutual responsibility of citizens and the state in fulfilling obligations, creating an annuity and mutually beneficial economic behavior pattern. It is proved that the progressive tax withdrawal of a part of large incomes will give a restrictive and restraining result of control over their redistribution in the public interest, as the socio-economic behavior of individuals, their powers and responsibilities must be balanced
43
Cevik, Neslihan. "The Muslimist Self and Fashion: Implications for Politics and Markets." Numen 66, no. 4 (June 18, 2019): 422–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685276-12341547.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis article introduces the rise of a new religious expression, Muslimism, in Turkey at the turn of the 21st century. I identify Muslimism as a prominent example of a new global category of religion, New Religious Orthodoxies (NRO). Muslimism and NROs neither reject nor submit to global modernity but engage aspects of it using religious categories. I then link Muslimism and NROs to the broader discussions on Muslim subjectivity formation, looking at Islamic fashion and how Muslimists respond to global modernity and its imaginaries, practices, and institutions. My empirical findings show that, historically, Islamic fashion has functioned as a site of hybridity, allowing pious Muslim females to resist binary patterns of identity, public space, and everyday activities, to challenge authoritarian formulations of religious community and redefine the (female) self as a legitimate moral and cultural agent by tapping into key Islamic notions. These findings have broad implications. Theoretically, they show that even in an area such as Islamic fashion, reduced by many as an oxymoron created by market forces, Muslim subjectivity formation goes beyond the choices of rejection of modernity or assimilation of Islam. Mapping these possibilities reveals greater insights into how religious groups engage modernity while remaining within the limits of orthodoxy, as well as their potent agency in challenging existing sources of self-formation and collective identity. Regarding policy, Muslimism illustrates a third way between fundamentalism and aggressive secularism that can negotiate tensions between religious orthodoxy and individual rights, the secular state and moral freedoms, and the West and Islam.
44
Marsden, L. "Freedom from Religion." Journal of Church and State 54, no. 3 (July 17, 2012): 455–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcs/css074.
Full text
45
Dorfman, Avihay. "Freedom of Religion." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 21, no. 2 (July 2008): 279–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900004434.
Full textAbstract:
Why it is that the principle of freedom of religion, rather than a more general principle such as liberty or liberty of conscience, figures so prominently in our lived experience and, in particular, in the constitutional commitment to the free exercise of religion? The Paper argues, negatively, that the most prominent answers offered thus far fall short; and positively, that the principle of freedom of religion arises out of a thicker understanding of the much neglected relationship between religious liberty and democracy. Indeed, a proper account of the legitimacy of the democratic process. I argue, dissolves the mystery surrounding freedom of religion, and thus allows for an adequate justification of this principle. The thesis of this paper is that freedom of religion is a remedy that redresses the (warranted) exclusion of certain religious arguments from the democratic process. The redress is grounded in a republican concern for political self-determination while exclusion is prescribed by a liberal ideal of political legitimation.
46
Sapir, Gidon, and Daniel Statman. "Why Freedom Of Religion Does Not Include Freedom From Religion." Law and Philosophy 24, no. 5 (September 2005): 467–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-004-2895-8.
Full text
47
Błaszczyk, Cezary. "Jineology: Kurdish “feminism” in the doctrine of democratic confederalism and the political system of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (Rojava)." Studia Iuridica, no. 90 (June 27, 2022): 74–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/2544-3135.si.2022-90.4.
Full textAbstract:
There can be no doubt that among many problems of the Middle East inadequate status of women is of paramount importance. It might come as a surprise, then, that the most radical doctrine of feminine emancipation was formulated by the Kurdish socialist freedom movement from Turkey and is being implemented in war-torn Syria in the de facto autonomy called the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, better known as “Rojava”. The doctrine is named jineology (in Kurdish jineolojî) and constitutes one of three pillars of democratic confederalism (together with libertarian democratic socialism and ecologism), the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan. Apo, as he is called, proposed a socialist revolution that would include women’s liberation and would take place in human hearts and minds rather than on the battlefields. First, the system of education needs to accept progressive methods and contents. Second, women ought to become active participants in the political, social, and economic life, especially in order to marginalize the state through creation of a multi-level self-government. Third, they need to be able to defend themselves (also physically) against men, nations-states waging wars, industrialists, and capitalists. The theoretical foundation of these changes is referred to as jineology, understood as a discipline belonging to social sciences, similar to gender studies. These are the ideals that are being implemented in Rojava and manifested in the Social Contract, the constitution of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria.
48
Astengo, Francesca. "Freedom of Religion Crucified?" Politique européenne 41, no. 3 (2013): 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/poeu.041.0012.
Full text
49
Idleman, S. C. "Equality, Freedom, and Religion." Journal of Church and State 55, no. 4 (September 26, 2013): 802–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcs/cst071.
Full text
50
Hillman, Arye L., and Niklas Potrafke. "Economic Freedom and Religion." Public Finance Review 46, no. 2 (September 21, 2016): 249–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1091142116665901.
Full textAbstract:
There has been much study of the consequences of economic freedom but, outside of the role of political institutions, there has been little study of the determinants of economic freedom. We investigate whether religion affects economic freedom. Our cross-sectional data set includes 137 countries averaged over the period 2001–2010. Simple correlations show that Protestantism is associated with economic freedom, Islam is not, with Catholicism in between. The Protestant ethic requires economic freedom. Our empirical estimates, which include religiosity, political institutions, and other explanatory variables, confirm that Protestantism is most conducive to economic freedom.