Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Freedom and responsibility'
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Macdonald, B. J. "Freedom, responsibility, and Frankfurt-style cases." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2014. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1435550/.
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In this thesis I consider an argument against the claim that an agent is responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style cases are proposed as scenarios in which an agent is responsible for what they have done, despite having been unable to do otherwise. A successful Frankfurt-style case would render the question of the compatibility of the ability to do otherwise and determinism or indeterminism irrelevant to the question of the compatibility of responsibility and determinism or indeterminism. My aim is to assess whether this style of argument succeeds. I begin by considering a strategy employed by some „leeway compatibilists‟ who have argued, via a modified conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise, that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case could, in fact, have done otherwise in some relevant sense. I argue that these views fail to establish that the agent could have done otherwise in a sense relevant to accounting for that agent‟s responsibility. I suggest that, for all that these views show, Frankfurt‟s challenge may stand against leeway compatibilism. I go on to argue that, insofar as Frankfurt-style cases are proposed to count against „leeway incompatibilism‟, determinism must not be assumed, and the counterfactual intervener or intervening mechanism must be equipped to pre-empt the agent‟s acts of will. I suggest that no dialectically effective Frankfurt-style case can be constructed which would show that the agent could not have done otherwise, in some relevant sense, if it is granted that the agent has the power to determine, without prior determination, their own acts of will. Leeway incompatibilism must be rejected only if there is independent reason to suppose that this ability is unnecessary for responsibility. I conclude that Frankfurt-style cases, in isolation, do not count decisively against leeway incompatibilism.
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Evans, Blake W. S. "Determined Freedom: On Moral Responsibility Between Chance and Necessitation." Ohio University Honors Tutorial College / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ouhonors1619724559950428.
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Hildebrand, Carl H. "Kant and Moral Responsibility." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/20641.
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This project is primarily exegetical in nature and aims to provide a rational reconstruction of the concept of moral responsibility in the work of Immanuel Kant, specifically in his Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GR), and Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR). It consists of three chapters – the first chapter interprets the concept of freedom that follows from the resolution to the Third Antinomy in the CPR. It argues that Kant is best understood here to be providing an unusual but cogent, compatibilist account of freedom that the author terms meta-compatibilism. The second chapter examines the GR and CPrR to interpret the theory of practical reason and moral agency that Kant develops in these works. This chapter concludes by evaluating what has been established about Kant’s ideas of freedom and moral agency at that point in the project, identifying some problems and objections in addition to providing some suggestions for how Kantian ethics might be adapted within a consequentialist framework. The third chapter argues that, for Kant, there are two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (in addition to a compatibilist definition of freedom) that must obtain for an individual to qualify as responsible for her actions.
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Bürgler, Lilian. "Speak: what ought I to ________? freedom revealed in radical inquiry /." Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/686.
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Kelsey, E. Benjamin. "Freedom and forfeiture responding to Galen Strawson's basic argument /." unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08152008-154026/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008.Title from file title page. Eddy Nahmias, committee chair; Sebastian Rand, Timothy O'Keefe, committee members. Electronic text (58 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 8, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 58).
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Lustila, Getty L. "Hume on the Nature of Moral Freedom." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/118.
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Paul Russell argues that the interpretation of Hume as a classical compatibilist is misguided. Russell defends a naturalistic reading of Humean freedom and moral responsibility. On this account, Hume holds two theses: that moral responsibility is a product of our moral sentiments, and that our concept of moral freedom is derived from our considerations of moral responsibility. Russell claims that Hume’s theory of the passions is non-cognitivist, and thus that his account of moral judgment fails to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions or qualities of mind. He concludes that Hume’s account of moral responsibility is inadequate. I argue that Hume has a cognitivist account of the passions. For Hume, our character is judged to be a proper object of praise or censure on account of our ability to partake in a moral community with our fellows. I conclude that Hume does not naturalize freedom and moral responsibility, but socializes it.
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van, Zwol Erik. "Responsibility, spontaneity and liberty." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Humanities, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/5763.
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Isaiah Berlin maintains that there are two distinct forms of freedom or liberty: negative and positive. Berlin’s principal claim is that negative liberty does not require that the self be somehow separate from the empirical world (causally aloof, or an originator of causal chains). My principal claim is that to be an agent is to be committed to a separation of self in this sense, thus that the self for its very being requires to possess a species of positive liberty. This conception proceeds in part from Immanuel Kant’s claim that there is a separation between spontaneity and receptivity. Commitment to this assertion allows there to be an understood distinction between the self as a spontaneous self-active agent that makes choices, and the self as a mere reactionary brute that does what it does by biological imperatives. In this thesis, I defend the view that negative liberty is subsumed under positive liberty: you cannot have the former without the latter. I am therefore taking a rationalist stance towards Berlin’s thinking. My methodology is to bring into consideration two perspectives upon the underlying normative principles within the space of reason. The first is of Kant’s understanding of the principle of responsibility and the activity of spontaneity; the second is John McDowell’s understanding of that principle and activity. The key claim of this thesis is that Berlin misunderstands what it is to be a chooser. To be a chooser is to be raised under the idea that one is an efficient cause; human children are brought up being held responsible for their reasons for acting. This principle allows mere animal being to be raised into the space of reason, where we live out a second nature in terms of reason. Using their conclusions I further investigate Berlin’s understanding of conceptual frameworks, taking particular interest in historic ‘universal’ conceptions that shape human lives. He too finds that that we are choosers is necessary for what it is to be human. I take his conclusion, and suggest that if he had had a clear understanding of the space of reason, the historic claim that we have choice would find a more solid footing in the principle of that space, in that we are responsible for our actions. I conclude that the upshot of understanding the ‘I’ as an originating efficient cause is that we treat ourselves as free from a universal determinism that Berlin himself disparages; and that the cost to Berlin is that all choice is necessarily the activity of a higher choosing self. It is part of a Liberal society’s valuing, by their societal commitment to, the ideology of raising our children to understand themselves as choosers, that we have choice at all. This is irrespective of whether that which fetters choice is internal or external to the agent, or of whether having self-conscious itself requires such a cultural emergence of second nature.
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Enehammar, Agnes. "Freedom with responsibility : The path to equivalence and fairness in upper secondary education?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för pedagogik, didaktik och utbildningsstudier, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-146013.
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The overall aim of this study is to investigate the attitudes of teachers of English and Modern languages towards assessment and the grading process. The inspiration comes from the notion that grades are not set on an equivalent basis in upper secondary schools. The syllabi for the subjects are formulated in a way that enables interpretation, and they have been constructed this way in order for the goals to be re-written on a local basis to better suit the needs of the specific students. This step in the process, formulating a local work plan from the national syllabus, is however often omitted and many teachers have no local work plan to base their teaching on and instead use the generalized syllabi as a base, which in turn are interpreted subjectively. This leads to the situation where there is a lack of equivalence in both education and assessment. In anticipation of the new Education Act including new syllabi and grading criteria teachers have also been asked their opinions and expectations on these, and if they think things will change. The results and analysis conclude that the only way equivalence in grading can be reached is through extensive cooperation between teachers, which would lead to greater objectivity.
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Wendel, Philipp. "State responsibility for interferences with the freedom of navigation in public international law /." Berlin [u.a.] : Springer, 2007. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2991082&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Kelsey, Eli Benjamin. "Freedom and Forfeiture: Responding to Galen Strawson's Basic Argument." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2008. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/46.
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Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is an attempt to prove that no agent can meet the demands for true moral responsibility. The Basic Argument proceeds on the assumption that, in order for an agent to be truly morally responsible for her actions, she must be truly responsible for her reasons for performing those actions, which Strawson contends is impossible since it requires an infinite regress of truly responsible decisions to have the reasons one has. In my thesis, I take issue with the Basic Argument. I argue that, contrary to Strawson’s claims, the Basic Argument is not persuasive to those who reject that one’s reasons cause one’s actions. For those who are willing to overlook this shortcoming, I then argue that it is possible for an agent to evade the threat of infinite regress, particularly in situations where two simultaneous choices (at least partially) explain each other.
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Stasytytė, Indrė. "Laisvės ir atsakomybės sampratos formavimas pradinėse klasėse." Master's thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2006. http://vddb.library.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2006~D_20060602_133511-37021.
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Development of independence and responsibility in primary education constitutes an important issue both in respect of a maturing person, and from the State point of view. Only people who are capable of independent thinking, have a free soul, but are aware of responsibility and its significance, can create wellbeing not only for themselves, but for society as well. In this process a special role must be granted to pedagogue, school, family, and other factors of educational process. The analysis has showed that many pupils fail to understand the close link between independence and responsibility, and the pedagogues lack motivation to form the concept of independence and responsibility in primary education. Public spirit means that society educates and strengthens the spirit of freedom and responsibility. Only conscious and free citizens with responsibility for the fate of their country and entire world can jointly create the common good. Therefore, the formation of freedom and responsibility should be emphasised in primary education.
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Mohd, Sani Mohd Azizuddin Bin. "Social responsibility' and the theory and practice of freedom of political speech in Malaysia." Thesis, Keele University, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.436194.
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Willey, Susan Gzehoviak. "Religion news and social responsibility : the Dallas Morning News experience /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p9951134.
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Miller, Maggie. "A Preference for Freedom: Kantian Implications for an Incompatibilist Will and Practical Accountability." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1228.
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This thesis aims to provide a coherent account of free will and practical grounds to prefer it. Its goal is to develop a pragmatic understanding of agency by which to hold individuals morally accountable. The paper begins with a critique of P.F. Strawson, whose seminal paper “Freedom and Resentment” bypasses the question of free will altogether in its claims about morality. Subsequently, it proceeds to a defense of incompatibilism that traces an argument through the existing literature. From this position, it claims that neither Strawson nor traditional compatibilists can provide an account of morality that is reliable or well enough defined to play the role required of it.
Instead of being left with hard determinism, however, Kant opens the door to a metaphysics that exists outside of our epistemological limits. Rather then derive an account based on this metaphysics, the necessary characteristics of a free will are derived from an account of morality and proven to be possible using Kantian epistemology. The paper concludes by positing three distinct reasons to prefer a free will framework to a deterministic framework, provided our inability to answer the question empirically. These draw on Pascal’s Wager, William James’ “The Will to Believe,” and inference to the best explanation.
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Knob, Benjamin B. "The way to freedom in existential philosophy." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2009. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/1291.
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This item is only available in print in the UCF Libraries. If this is your Honors Thesis, you can help us make it available online for use by researchers around the world by following the instructions on the distribution consent form at http://library.ucf.edu/Systems/DigitalInitiatives/DigitalCollections/InternetDistributionConsentAgreementForm.pdf You may also contact the project coordinator, Kerri Bottorff, at kerri.bottorff@ucf.edu for more information.Bachelors
Arts and Humanities
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Campos, Heber Carlos de. "The Arminian libertarian doctrines of freedom and responsibility evaluated according to biblical-reformed doctrine of sin." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1992. http://www.tren.com.
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Aslam, Muhammad Wali. "Operation Iraqi Freedom : the United States and the idea of 'great power responsibility' in international society." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2007. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/199/.
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This thesis is a normative analysis of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 (codenamed Operation Iraqi Freedom). It examines whether Operation Iraqi Freedom could be described as a responsible action by the United States, acting as a great power. The normative perspective and its attendant framework are based on the theoretical approach propounded by the English School of International Relations. The basis of this non-native framework is rooted in the pluralist conception of the English School. The pluralist wing of the English School emphasises the importance of international order and declares that the great powers have a responsibility to protect this order. The threat posed to international order by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was cited by the Administration of US President George W Bush as the main reason for invading Iraq. The action makes the pluralist conception a logical starting point from which to analyse this act. Therefore, the normative framework of this thesis states that, although a great power has a responsibility to act in order to counter a threat to international order, it has an obligation to act according to certain norms. The normative framework established in this thesis points to three obligations of great powers, relating to the norms of legality, legitimacy and prudence. Addressing the issue of legality is the first step this thesis takes towards assessing Operation Iraqi Freedom as a responsible action. From this perspective, the thesis argues that it is not possible to define the American-led invasion of Iraq as a legal act. However, in a situation in which a great power may not be able to act according to legal norms, given a consensus regarding an overwhelming threat to international order, this power would have a moral responsibility to act. Such an action may not fall within the commonly accepted norms of law but the presence of consensus would give legitimacy to this great power's actions. Hence, examining Operation Iraqi Freedom from the viewpoint of legitimacy emerges as the second step by which this thesis evaluates it as a responsible action. The analysis from this perspective reveals that, through the perspective of legitimacy, it is not possible to declare the American invasion of Iraq as a responsible action by a great power. Though a great power has a responsibility to act legally and legitimately, in the case of a clear threat to international order, this power may not think it in the common interest to wait for legal and diplomatic processes to take their course. In such a situation, a great power may choose to act - but under the obligation to act prudently. The third step employed by this thesis is thus to analyse and discuss whether Operation Iraqi Freedom could be described as a prudent action. The examination of the invasion from this perspective determines that it is not possible to class the American invasion of Iraq as a responsible action according to the principles of prudence. Hence this thesis affirms that Operation Iraqi Freedom could not be described as a responsible action according to the normative criteria outlined above. In the run-up to the invasion and in its initiation, the United States did not fulfil the three obligations (relating to legality, legitimacy and prudence) necessary for a great power to fulfil while combating a threat to international order. Thus, seen from the pluralist perspective of the English School, this thesis argues that Operation Iraqi Freedom was an irresponsible action by the US acting as a great power.
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Choy, Emmett. "Hong Kong's Economic Freedom and Income Inequality." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/718.
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Hong Kong is considered to be the most economically free country in the world, but also has the highest amount of income inequality of any developed country. The Hong Kong government is able to sustain laissez faire policies due to its monopoly on land supply. Maintaining high property values allows the government to maximize revenue from property tax, which acts as a hidden tax. A major contributor to income inequality is the formation of oligopolies in Hong Kong that creates an anticompetitive environment. The interests of the government and oligarchs are aligned as both obtain significant portions of revenue from the property sector. As globalization makes Hong Kong even more vulnerable to external shocks, the government faces the challenges of increasing competition, diversifying its revenue streams, and closing the income gap while standing by its principles in order maintain regional competitiveness as an international business hub.
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Wennerberg, Karin. ""Du kan väl säga till mig lite schysstare" : En essä om ansvar och frihet." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Lärarutbildningen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-30239.
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Syftet med denna essä är att undersöka ansvarsbegreppet, främst vad det gäller barns personliga ansvar. Detta genom att gestalta två egenupplevda händelser och använda dessa berättelser som utgångspunkt för att pröva mina erfarenheter gentemot, för mig, nya perspektiv. Mina frågeställningar är: Vad är ansvar? Vad är det för ansvar eleverna ska utveckla enligt styrdokument och forskning? Hur kan jag hitta ett fungerande förhållningssätt till mina elever vad det gäller deras personliga och individuella ansvarsutveckling? Hur kan ansvar tolkas i förhållande till begreppet mentalisering? Hur kan jag förstå ansvarsdiskursen i ett samtida ideologiskt perspektiv? De perspektiv och teorier jag använt mig av är bland andra psykoterapeuten Jesper Juuls distinktion mellan personligt och socialt ansvar, mentalisering, filosoferna Jean-Paul Sartre och Ann Heberleins existentialistiska grepp på ansvar i förhållande till individens frihet. Vad jag kommit fram till är bland annat att dagens samhälle ställer höga krav på människans förmåga att navigera och handla i ansvarighet. Jag som lärare ställs inför att stärka elevernas förmåga till mentalisering, agens och stötta dem i utvecklingen mot framtidens samhällsborgare.The purpose of this essay is to examine the concept of responsibility, mainly in terms of human responsibility among primary school children. Through two narratives based on my experience working as a teacher at leisure-time centers for school children, I am analyzing the concept of responsibility and what it means to me in my daily work. The perspectives and theories I have used include psychotherapist Jesper Juul's distinction between personal and social responsibility, mentalization and the philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and Ann Heberleins existentialist approach. My conclusions are that the world of today places high demands on the human ability to navigate as moral beings. As a teacher I am faced with the task to strengthen the students' ability of mentalization and agency and support them in their development to become future citizens.
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Takayashiki, Masahito. "Autonomy in Modern Japanese Literature." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/4021.
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This dissertation aims to examine the manner in which the concept of autonomy (jiritsu) is treated in modern and contemporary Japanese literature. This examination will be performed by analysing the autonomous attitude of a contemporary Japanese writer Nakagami Kenji (1946–1992). This dissertation focuses on examining Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing. We will explore the manner in which his act of writing appears to be a paradox between self-identification and the integration into the collective. Then, we will observe the possibility in which Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude is extended to cover Maruyama Masao’s relative definition of autonomy and Karatani Kōjin’s interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s notion of freedom and responsibility. Nakagami’s attempt is certainly not confined to only his works. The notion of autonomy may be applied to perceive a similar thought that was represented by previous writers. We will also examine various never-ending autonomous attempts expressed by Sakaguchi Ango, Miyazawa Kenji and Nakahara Chūya. Moreover, we will analyse how Nakagami’s distrust of the modern Japanese language and his admiration of the body as an undeniable object are reflected in his major novels in detail and attempt to extend this observation into the works of the theatrical artists in the 1960s such as Betsuyaku Minoru, Kara Jūrō, Hijikata Tatsumi and Terayama Shūji and contemporary women writers such as Tsushima Yūko, Takamura Kaoru, Tawada Yōko and Yoshimoto Banana. These writers and artists struggled to establish their autonomous freedom as they encountered the conflict between their individual bodies that personifies their personal autonomy and the modern Japanese language that confines them in the fixed and submissive roles in present-day Japan. In this dissertation, I would like to conclude that Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing can be an eternal self-legislation, that is, his endless attempt to establish autonomous freedom, which evolves from the paradox between the individual (body) and the collective (language).
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Takayashiki, Masahito. "Autonomy in Modern Japanese Literature." University of Sydney, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/4021.
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Doctor of Philosophy(PhD)This dissertation aims to examine the manner in which the concept of autonomy (jiritsu) is treated in modern and contemporary Japanese literature. This examination will be performed by analysing the autonomous attitude of a contemporary Japanese writer Nakagami Kenji (1946–1992). This dissertation focuses on examining Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing. We will explore the manner in which his act of writing appears to be a paradox between self-identification and the integration into the collective. Then, we will observe the possibility in which Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude is extended to cover Maruyama Masao’s relative definition of autonomy and Karatani Kōjin’s interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s notion of freedom and responsibility. Nakagami’s attempt is certainly not confined to only his works. The notion of autonomy may be applied to perceive a similar thought that was represented by previous writers. We will also examine various never-ending autonomous attempts expressed by Sakaguchi Ango, Miyazawa Kenji and Nakahara Chūya. Moreover, we will analyse how Nakagami’s distrust of the modern Japanese language and his admiration of the body as an undeniable object are reflected in his major novels in detail and attempt to extend this observation into the works of the theatrical artists in the 1960s such as Betsuyaku Minoru, Kara Jūrō, Hijikata Tatsumi and Terayama Shūji and contemporary women writers such as Tsushima Yūko, Takamura Kaoru, Tawada Yōko and Yoshimoto Banana. These writers and artists struggled to establish their autonomous freedom as they encountered the conflict between their individual bodies that personifies their personal autonomy and the modern Japanese language that confines them in the fixed and submissive roles in present-day Japan. In this dissertation, I would like to conclude that Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing can be an eternal self-legislation, that is, his endless attempt to establish autonomous freedom, which evolves from the paradox between the individual (body) and the collective (language).
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Gosal, Vladislava. "Common-sense knowledge of social changes in Ukraine : social representations of freedom and responsibility in the public and private spheres." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.615808.
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Gibbs, Alexis P. S. "A critical study of international higher education development : capital, capability, and a dialogical proposal for academic freedom as a responsibility." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/20054.
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This thesis sets out to critically examine the field of higher education development, as one which is focused on socio-economic inequality and welfare, and determines educational purpose in poorer, or ‘developing’, countries accordingly. My question is whether mainstream development approaches to higher education are really contributing to the provision of more equal education services, or whether they risk reintroducing inequality by treating the priorities of poorer countries differently. To investigate whether there are educational values or purposes common to universities globally irrespective of socio-economic imperatives, I begin the study with a historiographical look at their growth in terms of both ideas of its purpose, and how purpose is realised in actuality. I then trace the emergence of the discourse of international development, and the role that higher education has come to play within it, showing how the field of international higher education development has simplified the notion of university purpose for its own devices. The thesis then looks at underlying assumptions about human nature, defined as the problem of humanism, common to both transcendent ideas of university purpose as well as the development discourse. To avoid the limitations of these assumptions, I argue that a theoretical approach is required that can engage with questions of hybridity and multiplicity in both the history and future of universities, without reducing those questions to abstract ideas. The approach I propose draws upon the dialogism of Mikhail Bakhtin, whose multi-layered understanding of language prevents any one understanding of another person, or of human nature more generally, being considered final. The educational implications for such an approach are finally explored in the concept of academic freedom, which is traditionally conceived of as a right, but is here reconceptualised also as a responsibility.
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Angeli, Oliviero. "Freedom of Movement and Emigration Pressures: A Defence of Immigration Fees." De Gruyter, 2016. https://tud.qucosa.de/id/qucosa%3A71068.
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The article addresses the prospective responsibility of states to protect citizens from emigration pressures. After establishing the moral weight of theinterest in staying, the article proceeds to explain why the interest to stay is comparatively more resistant to restrictions than the interest in exercising freedom of movement across borders. On this basis, the argument is then advanced that immigration fees can be charged on (well-off) immigrants as a means to protect economically vulnerable residents in recipient countries from emigration pressures. The argument that I will advance is in at least one sense nonconsequentialist: it accounts for the need for immigration fees without relying on (problematic) assumptions about the consequences of immigration. Furthermore, the argument is also realistic in so far as it accepts that states have the right to restrict immigration.
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Романинець, М. Р., and M. R. Romanynets. "Ґенеза ідеї відповідальності в праві: філософсько-правовий вимір: дисертація." Thesis, ЛьвДУВС, 2012. http://dspace.lvduvs.edu.ua/handle/1234567890/786.
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Романинець М.Р. Ґенеза ідеї відповідальності в праві: філософсько-правовий вимір: дисертація на здобуття наукового ступеня кандидата юридичних наук за спеціальністю 12.00.12 – філософія права / Романинець Марта Романівна. – Львів: ЛьвДУВС, 2012. - 195 с.Філософсько-правове розуміння ґенези ідеї відповідальності в праві осмислено на тлі становлення і розвитку філософсько-правової думки, в контексті різних інтерпретацій відповідальності з урахуванням історичних особливостей еволюції права та акцентуванням на сутнісних характеристиках відповідальності та її співвідношенні із свободою й справедливістю. Правова відповідальність розглядається як зумовлена історичними, соціальними та культурно-світоглядними умовами усвідомлена необхідність суб’єкта права виконувати вимоги правових норм, яка забезпечує йому гарантовану суспільством і державою можливість безперешкодної реалізації свободи. Вихідною точкою у формуванні правової відповідальності є особа, суб’єкт права, яка реалізує її однаково і через права, і через обов’язки у конкретних правовідносинах. Результати дослідження засвідчують, що право є мірою відповідальності особи, забезпечуючи кожному суб’єкту права рівну міру свободи і відповідальності, що розкриває ідею справедливості права. The philosophical and legal understanding of the genesis of the idea of responsibility in law interpreted against the background of the formation and development of philosophical and legal thought in the context of different interpretations of responsibility with regard to historical features of the evolution of law and its focus on the essential characteristics of responsibility and its relationship with freedom and justice. Legal liability is considered as due to historical, social and cultural-attitudinal terms of perceived need to comply with the subject of the law, which provides him guaranteed by the state and society without hindrance of freedom. The starting point in shaping the legal liability is a person, entity that implements it, as by law, so by the specific legal responsibility. The results show that law is largely the responsibility of the person providing each entity the right to equal degree of freedom and responsibility, which reveals the idea of justice law.
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Morad, Iris. "Freiheit und Verantwortung : Überlegungen im Anschluss an Peter Bieri." Phd thesis, Universität Potsdam, 2013. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2014/6921/.
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In der Diskussion über Freiheit und Verantwortung vertritt die Hirnforschung die These, dass wir determiniert sind und unser Gehirn es ist, das denkt und entscheidet. Aus diesem Grunde könne uns für unsere Entscheidungen und Handlungen auch keine Verantwortung zugewiesen werden. Die Philosophie versucht in dieser Diskussion zu klären, ob wir trotz Determiniertheit für unsere Entscheidungen und Urteile verantwortlich sind oder ob Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Determinismus grundsätzlich nicht möglich ist.
Diese Fragen stellt diese Untersuchung über Freiheit und Verantwortung nicht. In dieser Untersuchung wird ein gewisses Maß an Freiheit vorausgesetzt, weil diese Annahme der erste Schritt für unsere Freiheit ist. In dieser Arbeit geht es um die Verbindung von Freiheit und Verantwortung und was diese Verbindung in unserem Menschsein und Miteinander bedeutet. Ziel ist es, zu zeigen, dass wir uns zusätzliche Freiheit aneignen können, dass Bildung für unsere Freiheit nötig und dass Freiheit ohne Verantwortung nicht möglich ist.
Die Untersuchung schließt sich Peter Bieris Thesen an, dass Aneignung von Freiheit und Bildung, die weder als Schul- noch als Ausbildung zu verstehen ist, möglich und nötig sind, um verantwortlich entscheiden und handeln zu können, lehnt jedoch Peter Bieris These ab, dass bedingte Freiheit Voraussetzung für unsere Freiheit ist. Zudem geht diese Arbeit über Peter Bieri hinaus, indem sie eine Lösungsmöglichkeit für unsere Freiheit und der damit verbundenen Verantwortlichkeit anbietet. Als Lösung wird eine Bildung vorgeschlagen, die uns die Verbundenheit mit den anderen und die Abhängigkeit von den anderen zeigt und die die Rechte und Bedürfnisse der anderen ebenso anerkennen lässt wie unsere eigenen. Es ist eine Bildung, die nicht nur Wissen, sondern auch bestimmte rationale und emotionale Kompetenzen beinhaltet. Es ist eine Bildung, die als lern- und lehrbar angesehen wird.
Um diese Bildung als eine Notwendigkeit für unsere Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit uns und den anderen gegenüber vermitteln zu können, ist es wichtig, uns in unserem Wesen verstehen. Deshalb werden in dieser Arbeit Faktoren dargestellt, die auf uns wirken und die uns als Menschen ausmachen. Es sind Faktoren, die auf unsere Freiheit und Verantwortung Einfluss nehmen, indem sie unsere Entscheidungen, unser Urteilsvermögen und in diesem Sinne auch unsere Handlungen ermöglichen oder einschränken. Durch die Darstellung dieser Faktoren werden wir auf unsere Möglichkeiten hingewiesen, die uns unser Leben in Selbstverantwortung und in Verantwortlichkeit den anderen gegenüber gestalten lassen.
In dieser Untersuchung wird gezeigt, dass Freiheit ohne Verantwortung nicht möglich ist und es wird gezeigt, dass wir, wenn wir unsere Verantwortung abgeben, unsere Freiheit verlieren.In the discussion on free will and responsibility, brain research supports the belief that humans are determined and that deliberation and decision-making take place in the brain. We can therefore not be held responsible for our decisions and actions. The role of philosophy in this discussion is to determine if we are responsible for our decisions and judgments in spite of being determined or if free will and determinism principally exclude each other. However, these are not the questions asked in this paper on free will and responsibility. It is based on the assumption that a certain degree of freedom exists because this assumption constitutes the first step towards freedom. This paper is about the connection between free will and responsibility and what it means for us as individuals and as members of a community of people. The goal is to show that we are able to acquire additional freedom, that freedom needs education and cannot exist without responsibility. The study supports Peter Bieri´s hypothesis that it is possible and necessary to develop freedom and education – not in the sense of schooling or formation – for making responsible decisions and taking responsible actions; however, it rejects Bieri´s hypothesis that conditional freedom is a prerequisite for free will. In addition, this work goes beyond the approach taken by Peter Bieri by offering a possible solution for our freedom and the related issue of responsibility. The suggested solution lies in an education that lets us understand our mutual connectedness and interdependence and leads us to acknowledge the rights and needs of others in the same way as our own. It is a type of education which is not just knowledge-driven but also includes certain rational and emotional skills. It is an education considered as learnable and teachable. To be able to impart this education as a necessary prerequisite for our freedom and responsibility towards ourselves and others, it is important that we understand our true being. The study therefore presents factors affecting us and shaping us as human beings. These factors influence our free will and responsibility by supporting or limiting our decisions, our judgment and, hence, our actions. The presentation of these factors outlines our options to design a self-responsible life in which we are responsible to others. The paper shows that freedom is impossible without responsibility and that, by abdicating our responsibility, we are loosing our freedom.
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Suddes, Thomas. "The National News Council, 1973-1984 : a history /." View abstract, 2009. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3360317.
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Favero, Roberto Carlos. "Humanismo: uma releitura existencial de Albert Camus e Jean Paul Sartre." Universidade do Vale do Rio do Sinos, 2006. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/2014.
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Humanismo, uma releitura existencial de Albert Camus e de Jean-Paul Sartre é o tema da presente dissertação, que consiste no exercício filosófico de criar um mundo possível nessa vida. Acreditar no mundo e no verdadeiro humanismo é o que nos falta. Nós perdemos, completamente, o senso de valorizar, respeitar e dar condições necessárias, para que o ser humano se realize na sua plenitude e com referenciais éticos. O racional tornou-se o irracional; o humano, o inumano. Acreditar no homem significa, principalmente, suscitar acontecimentos, atitudes, ainda que corriqueiras, mas que visem a redescobrir a essência do humanismo. É necessário, pois, urgentemente, uma redefinição em nosso próprio conceito de humanismo que nos impulsione a um compromisso humanizador.A proposição básica dos filósofos, Camus e Sartre, é que: como é impossível salvar tudo, salve-se, ao menos, o corpo de cada indivíduo. Que homem algum seja vítima, carrasco e omisso perante o próprio homem. Ambos nos pedem um mundo, onde não se mate, onde
Humanism, an existential rereading of Albert Camus and Jean-.Paul Sartre, is the subject of this presentation, which consist of a philosophical pratice of creating a possible world in this life. Believing in the humanism, is what is missing for us. We have los completely, meaning that, valuing, respecting and giving the necessary conditions for the human being became inhumane. Beliving in humanity means maily rousing humanism. Therefore, it is urgently necessary to redefine our own concept of humanism which compels us to a humanising compromise.The basic propositions of the philosophers, Camus and Sartre, as it is impossible for us to save everything, unless each individual body can be saved. That the man is a victim or cruel and not neglectin before the humanity itself. Both require a world in which crimes against humanity and at least evil, terrorism, violence, social exclusion, and prejudices will be outlawed.Sartre introduces to us freedom and an absolute value. The existentialism puts the humanity befor
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Favero, Roberto Carlos. "Perspectivas éticas a partir de O ser e o nada em Sartre." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2015. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/3688.
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A presente tese tem por objetivo mostrar a amplitude e as derivações do conceito de liberdade em O Ser e o Nada de Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Nessa perspectiva, trata-se de uma análise que visa investigar as condições de possibilidade do conceito de liberdade sartreana como fundamento para um compromisso ético-moral que se traduza em responsabilidade para com a sociedade. Essa abordagem se justifica na medida em que o conceito de liberdade em Sartre é contestado pela tradição filosófica como um conceito destituído de qualquer compromisso ou implicação moral,sendo assim, a liberdade sartreana passou a ser tomada como sinônimo de liberdade total ou absoluta. Assim, para alcançar o objetivo, investigou-se a ideia de liberdade em Sartre. A questão central que norteia esse estudo apresenta-se na obra O Ser e o Nada, na qual o autor constrói argumentos para o estudo fenomenológico do ser e do aparecer do ser, a consciência da qual se pode esperar uma perspectiva ética. A pergunta que orienta a pesquisa está assim formulada: é possível deduzir um compromisso ético-moral de uma obra cuja intenção principal é realizar um tratado sobre a ontologia fenomenológica? Demonstra-se que, para Sartre, a liberdade é a condição própria do homem e que, se o autor tivesse o propósito de construir uma Filosofia Moral, conclui-se que essa teria por base a atitude de engajamento. Depois analisam-seas implicações éticas da filosofia sartreana, que se tornam mais evidentes à medida que o homem se dá conta de suas limitações e, sobretudo, de sua situação existencial, que é marcada por um estado de angústia, acrescido pelas dificuldades geradas no convívio humano, no qual aparece a má-fé.O último capítulo, no qual é apresentado o argumento maior da tese, identifica a ideia de liberdade em Sartre associada à ideia de responsabilidade, que é igualmente radical na condição humana. Nesse sentido, o existencialismo sartreano está afastado de qualquer relativismo. A partir de O Ser e o Nada,fundamenta-se e redimensiona-se uma ética que, de forma absoluta, realiza-secomo liberdade. Assim, nessa conclusão, mostra-se que os conceitos liberdade-responsabilidade, na compreensão sartreana, são indissociáveis e permitem inferir uma ética humanista.
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the breadth and the derivations of the concept of freedom in Being and Nothingness of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). This is an examination designed to investigate the conditions of possibility of Sartre's concept of freedom as the foundation for an ethical-moral commitment, which expresses itself in responsibility towards the society. This approach is justified as far as the concept of freedom in Sartre is contradicted by the philosophical tradition as a concept devoid of any commitment or moral implication. Thus, the Sartrean freedom came to be as synonymous with complete or absolute freedom. To achieve the aim, we investigated the idea of freedom in Sartre. The central question guiding this study is presented in the book Being and Nothingness, in which the author constructs arguments for the phenomenological study of being or appearing to be, the conscience of that can be expected an ethical perspective. The question that guides the search is thus formulated: it is possible to deduce an ethical-moral commitment to a work whose main intention is undertake a treatise on phenomenological ontology? We demonstrate that, for Sartre, freedom is the very condition of men and if the author had intended to build a Moral Philosophy, this would be based on the attitude of engagement. In the following chapter we deal with the ethical implications of Sartre's philosophy, which become more apparent as the men realizes his limitations and, above all, his existential situation, which is marked by a state of anguish, increased by the difficulties generated in human society, in which the bad faith appears. The final chapter, where we present the main argument of the thesis identifies the idea of freedom in Sartre associated with the idea of responsibility, which is also radical in the human condition. The Sartrean existentialism is away from relativism. From Being and Nothingness is rooted in and resizes an ethic that, in absolute terms, as freedom is realized. In our conclusion, we show that the concepts freedom-responsibility in Sartre's understanding are inseparable and allows us to infer a humanistic ethics.
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Mawhinney, A. J. "Non-state service provision and state responsibility : international human rights standards and protection of the freedom of religion in the primary school system in the Republic of Ireland." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.432652.
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Wännström, Sanna. "Transparency. Accountability. Democracy : Access to EU Documents between Ideal and Reality." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för ABM, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-296627.
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The overarching aim of this master’s thesis is to investigate what role the accessibility of EU documents plays for the democracy in the EU. A three-pillar approach was adopted, consisting of a text analysis of the Regulation 1049/2001, which promotes transparency, and an analytical induction analysis of the cases where access to EU documents was denied despite the European Ombudsman’s recommendation to the contrary. The third pillar refers to the interplay between the two first; a contested field with ideals on the one side and the political reality on the other. The main findings are that the positive picture of openness presented in the Regulation does not correspond with the cases. Although openness is used as a rhetorical tool in the Regulation, the case material shows that the EU has tried to restrain the development towards openness. The study suggests that although the EU officially promotes accountability through openness, its unofficial attitudes rather reminds of the concept of responsibility (Lewin 2007) that enables a more restrictive approach to transparency. Thus, both the legal frameworks and the informal factors play a role in determining the accessibility of the EU archives and its role for European democracy. This is a two years master’s thesis in Archive, Library and Museum Studies with special focus on Archival Science.Den här masteruppsatsen behandlar tillgänglighetsfrågor i samband med EU:s arkiv- och dokumenthantering och dess roll och betydelse för demokratin inom EU. Först undersöktes förordning 1049/2001 med hjälp av en textanalys för att ta reda på hur EU värderar öppenhet. Därefter vändes fokus till de fall där tillgång till dokument nekats, trots Europeiska Ombudsmannens råd. Slutligen sammanfördes dessa komponenter för att skapa en bild av spänningsfältet mellan ideal och realitet. Studien visar att öppenhet framställs mycket positivt i förordningen. Emellertid stämmer den bilden inte överens med fallmaterialet. Detta visar hur EU i de enskilda fallen försökt motverka utvecklingen mot ökad öppenhet. En trolig slutsats vore att EU stödjer koncepten öppenhet och ansvarsskyldighet i teorin, men att attityden i praktiken snarare ligger nära begreppet ”responsibility” (Lewin 2007), som möjliggör en mer restriktiv inställning till öppenhet. Det lagliga ramverket är därmed inte den enda faktorn som påverkar hur tillgängliga EU:s handlingar verkligen är och vilken roll de spelar för demokratin inom unionen. Denna masteruppsats är skriven inom mastersprogrammet i ABM (arkiv, bibliotek, museum), inriktning arkivvetenskap.
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Gonzalez, Ariel. "The Incompatibility of Freedom of the Will and Anthropological Physicalism." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2014. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/1591.
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Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally
responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form)
cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework.
Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free
will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of
agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.B.A.
Bachelors
Philosophy
Arts and Humanities
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Lindström, Leo Ingrid. "Scribo ergo sum : Aspectos existenciales en tres novelas tardías de Carmen Martín Gaite." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Institutionen för spanska, portugisiska och latinamerikastudier, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-8399.
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This dissertation examines three of Carmen Martín Gaite’s later novels, identifying existential issues that are presented through the narrative. It aims to unravel issues pertaining to personal identity, freedom, communication and ethical stances in a postmodern context. The thesis is divided into three studies, one for each novel examined. The corpus of novels includes Nubosidad variable (1992), La reina de las nieves (1994) and Lo raro es vivir (1996). The Introduction and the General Conclusions cover all three studies. The first examines the epistolary nature of Nubosidad variable, presenting the subjective and dialogical aspects of the texts in question. The protagonists’ quest for true identity, concealed beneath acquired social roles, elicits a search for authenticity. The second study analyses the intertextual character of La reina de las nieves, identifying the existential issues that are imbedded in the intertexts and the narrative. The third study looks into the importance of communication in a self-exploratory process in which death and life-giving issues are discussed. Identity is understood as a combination of ipse, selfhood, and idem, sameness and narrative identity as a narrative formation of discourse in which human experience is articulated and subject to change over time (Ricoeur). Freedom, responsibility, authenticity and subjectivity are viewed in light of theoretical considerations offered, inter alia, by Sartre and Kierkegaard. The study concludes that the main idea of these novels is that the act of writing gives purpose or meaning to life. Although death is ever-present, emphasis is placed on life challenges and the subject’s existential sense of direction. As regards ethical inclinations in the novels, there is an appraisal of the effort to acquire self-knowledge and self-fulfilment, assuming personal responsibility for choices made in life.
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Рувін, О. Г., and O. H. Ruvin. "Принцип свободи у державотворенні: філософсько-правовий вимір: дисертація." Thesis, ЛьвДУВС, 2010. http://dspace.lvduvs.edu.ua/handle/1234567890/787.
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Рувін О. Г. Принцип свободи у державотворенні: філософсько-правовий вимір: дисертація на здобуття наукового ступеня кандидата юридичних наук за спеціальністю 12.00.12 – філософія права / Рувін Олександр Григорович. – Львів: ЛьвДУВС, 2010. - 177 с.Дисертацію присвячено дослідженню особливостей реалізації принципу свободи у державотворенні на основі залучення трьох способів аналізу: філософсько-правового, теоретико-правового, нормативно-правового. У роботі обґрунтовано, що свобода особи як ознака її правового статусу включає два аспекти: об’єктивний (зовнішня свобода) і суб’єктивний (внутрішня свобода), де зовнішня свобода – зміст права, тоді як внутрішня − умова існування права; єдність обох аспектів свободи особи зумовлює і єдність правоохоронних інтересів та об’єктивних інтересів кожної конкретної особи. Констатовано стратегічні підходи щодо дослідження поняття і структури законодавчого регулювання свободи особи та громадянина, що зумовлює наявність суб’єктивного аспекту правового регулювання; виокремивши ознаки поняття «зловживання свободою особи та громадянина», запропоновано методи усунення такого зловживання і проведено структуризацію правового механізму забезпечення свободи у державі. Dissertation is devoted research of features of realization of principle of freedom in creation of the state on the basis of bringing in of three methods of analysis: philosophical-legal, teoretyko-legal, normatively legal. It is well-proven that forming process democratically legal the states characterized providing and constitutional defense of freedom of person and citizen on the basic defending of their rights and freedoms. On the basis of research of freedom in the system of other constitutionally confirmed concepts, principles, norms, in their intercommunication and influence grounded two aspects interpretation of freedom of person in a right enplaned it objective and subjective display In-process grounded, that freedom of person as sign of it legal status includes two aspects: objective (external freedom) and subjective (internal freedom), where external freedom is maintenance of right, while internal the condition of existence of right; unity of both aspects of freedom of person is predetermined by unity of law-enforcement interests and objective interests of every concrete person. Strategic approaches are formulated in relation to research of concept and structure of the legislative adjusting and its value in providing of freedom of person and citizen which stipulates the presence of subjective aspect of the legal adjusting; selecting the signs of concept «abuse of freedom of person and citizen», the methods of removal of such abuse are offered and conducted it is conducted in a structure of legal mechanism of providing of freedom in the state.
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McGowan, Wayne S. "Thinking about the responsible parent : freedom and educating the child in Western Australia." University of Western Australia. Graduate School of Education, 2004. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2005.0014.
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This study is concerned with how educational legislation shapes and uses freedom for the purpose of governing the parent. The key question guiding the study was: How does the Act constitute the ‘parent’ as a subject position responsible for schooling the child? Central to the work is an examination of the School Education Act 1999 (the Act) using Foucault’s thinking on governmentality. This is prefaced by historical accounts that bring together freedom and childhood as contrived styles of conduct that provide the governmental logic behind the Act. The study reveals how the Act shapes and uses the truth of freedom/childhood to construct the responsible parent as a style of conduct pegged to a neo-liberal political rationality of government. It is this political rationality that provides the node or point of encounter between the technologies of power and the self within the Act which forms the ‘responsible’ identity of the parent as an active self-governing entrepreneur made more visible by the political construction of ‘others.’ This is a legal-political subjectivity centred on the truth of freedom/childhood and a neo-liberal rationality of government that believes that any change to our current ethical way of being in relation to educating the child would ruin the very freedoms upon which our civilised lifestyle depends. In essence, the Act relies on the production of ‘others’ as the poor, Aboriginal and radical who must be regulated and made autonomous to constitute the ‘parent’ as an active consumer whose autonomous educational choices are an expression of responsibility in relation to schooling the child
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Afagnon, Alexis Dossa. "Gnose et totalitarisme : le problème du mal et la responsabilité." Thesis, Strasbourg, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018STRAC002/document.
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Quelle qualification morale peut-on attribuer aux criminels nazis ? Sont-ils des fous ? Peut-on leur imputer sans réserve la responsabilité de leurs actes ? Si on ne peut rendre le mal totalitaire imputable comme le mal gnostique, l’assimilation du totalitarisme à une récidive gnostique par Eric Voegelin invite à réfléchir à nouveaux frais à la problématique de la responsabilité des criminels de masse. D’une part, le "situationnisme", qui implique que c’est la situation qui transforme des individus en meurtriers de masse et le "dispositionnisme" qui désigne l’importance que peuvent revêtir les dispositions individuelles chez les criminels de masse, et d’autre part l’illusion et l’idéologie caractérisées, l’une et l’autre par la mise à l’écart de la réalité, rendent complexe la question de l’imputation des criminels génocidaires. Si ces derniers ne peuvent être disculpés, la complexité de la question de leur imputation est indéniable. Cette complexité est peut-être une invite à reconsidérer la cause sous-jacente à ce type de mal : le dualisme gnostique du bien et du mal dont le propre est de vouloir en finir avec le mal. Or la rage d’en finir avec le mal conduit souvent à la barbarieWhat moral qualification can be attributed to Nazi criminals? Are they crazy? Can we blame them unreservedly for their actions? If we can not make totalitarian evil imputable like the gnostic evil, the assimilation of totalitarianism to a Gnostic recidivism by Eric Voegelin invites us to think freshly about the problem of the responsibility of mass criminals. On the one hand, "situationism", which implies that it is the situation that transforms individuals into mass murderers and "dispositionalism" that designates the importance that individual dispositions can have for mass criminals, and On the other hand, the illusion and the ideology characterized, both by the exclusion of reality, make the question of the imputation of genocidal criminals complex. If the latter can not be exculpated, the complexity of the question of their imputation is undeniable. This complexity is perhaps an invitation to reconsider the underlying cause of this type of evil: the gnostic dualism of good and evil, whose own is to want to put an end to evil. But the rage to end evil leads often to barbarism
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Sternschein, Ruben Gerardo. "A natureza humana e a liberdade no pensamento de S. R. Hirsch." Universidade de São Paulo, 2017. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8158/tde-08022018-110121/.
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O projeto de pesquisa consiste na análise dos diversos escritos de Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888) a fim de descobrir o sistema de pensamento que sustentou suas diversas posturas controversas, com especial ênfase no tema do livre-arbítrio. Baseando-nos na hipótese de existir um sistema coerente, investigamos a ideia do livre-arbítrio em sua obra e buscamos analisar qual seu grau de consistência no conjunto dos escritos, qual seu grau de coerência interna e qual sua relação com outros temas por ele abordados. De acordo com nossa hipótese, a ideia de liberdade humana sustentada por Hirsch resume-se da seguinte forma: todos os indivíduos encontram-se limitados e determinados tanto pela informação genética quanto pela história pessoal vivida. Entretanto, esses fatores não impõem apenas uma atitude em cada circunstância nova, senão delimitam um contexto de opções. Uma dentre todas as opções é a divina e, portanto, aquela que mais condiz com a essência e a missão da pessoa. Apenas essa opção é escolhida em plena liberdade, sem influências ou determinantes limitadores. Assim, a heteronomia divina se configura, retrospectivamente, como a essência da autonomia humana. Os fatores circunstanciais mencionados são percebidos como ferramentas para o desenvolvimento do propósito divino, que se revela como a realização mais autêntica do indivíduo. Para refletir sobre isso, identificamos alguns tópicos recorrentes (Psicologia e Epistemologia; a Natureza e a Matéria; a História e o Tempo; e a Política). Estes temas acionam a discussão sobre a liberdade em sua obra e, por isso, intitulam os capítulos da presente tese de doutorado. Também confrontamos as percepções de Hirsch com as dos principais autores que se debruçaram sobre o mesmo tema. Revisamos essas ideias à luz das pesquisas sobre Hirsch e, finalmente, no contexto histórico e filosófico no qual ele atuou.This research project consists of an analysis of the several works by Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888) in order to ascertain the system of thought upon which many of his controversial conclusions are based, with special emphasis on the topic of free will. Relying on the hypothesis that a coherent system exists, I have investigated how Hirschs work approached the idea of free will, the degree of consistency in said approach, its internal coherence and its relationship with other topics discussed by the author. According to the hypothesis, Hirsch\'s idea of human freedom is summarized as follows: all individuals are limited and determined by both genetic information and personal history. However, those factors do not impose one single attitude for each new circumstance, but rather delimit a context of options. One of all such options is the divine option, the one that most matches the essence and mission of a given person. Only this option is chosen in full freedom, devoid of influences or limiting determinants. Thus, divine heteronomy is, retrospectively, the essence of human autonomy. The circumstantial factors mentioned above are perceived as tools for the development of the divine purpose, which reveals itself as the most authentic fulfillment of the individual. In order to reflect better on the issue, I identified a few relevant and recurring topics for a more detailed analysis (Psychology and Epistemology, Nature and Matter, History and Time, and Politics). Those issues are the bases used for the discussion in this work about freedom in Hirschs work, and as such the chapters that compose the thesis were named accordingly. I have also compared Hirsch\'s perceptions with those of the main authors who have delved on the same topic. These ideas are reviewed in light of existing research on Hirsch, and, finally, of the historical and philosophical context under which he produced his works.
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Pequeno, Marcos Antônio Pimentel. "Entre biocentrismo e antropocentrismo: uma ecologia democrática para o enfrentamento da questão ambiental." Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2014. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/5664.
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Previous issue date: 2014-03-27Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
The ecological issue is one of the most disturbing and complex problems of our time because it calls into question the future of humanity. This research is the result of a reflection on the philosophical dimension of environmental issues. It has been guided by the central thesis that a democratic ecology is the political option most indicated to create the conditions that can agglutinate some needed alternatives to the confrontation of the above question. Accordingly, the general objective aims to reflect on the range and limits of a democratic ecology with a liberal nature. To accomplish this, we face as central axis of the thesis the controversy between anthropocentrism and biocentrism and its impact on various fields that characterize the complex human-nature relationship, especially in ethical and political levels. The course of this work began, in the first chapter, with a study of the theoretical assumptions of the ecological problem, which sent us to an analysis of the foundations of modernity, exposing its dualistic and anthropocentric face governed by the categoris reason and freedom.Then, the research was directed to the current ecological debate that can be synthesized around the existing controversy between biocentrism and anthropocentrism. Therefore, in Chapter2, we exposed the main authors and environmental trends that can be defined as biocentric. In Chapter3, we presented the "moderate anthropocentric" proposal with democratic and liberal nature contained in the texts of Luc Ferry, Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus. Finally, in the fourth chapter, it was made a reflection on the various dimensions of the ecological problem: ontological, ethic-political, legal, technological, sociocultural and educational; aiming to demonstrate the validity of our central thesis that recognizes the responsibility as a fundamental ethical category and the importance of education, awareness, the state's role as an environmental manager, and of the technology as auxiliary tools for coping with the afore mentioned problem. We hope, thereby, that our choice of a philosophical reflection, grounded in the perspective of a democratic ecology with a moderate anthropocentric nature, can contribute to the current ecological debate in Brazil, wich is still dominated by a largely biocentric stance.
A questão ecológica é um dos mais inquietantes e complexos problemas de nosso tempo porque põe em xeque o futuro da humanidade. Esta pesquisa é o resultado de uma reflexão acerca da dimensão filosófica da questão ambiental. Foi norteada pela tese central de que uma ecologia democrática é a opção política mais bem indicada para criar as condições que possam aglutinar algumas alternativas necessárias para o enfrentamento da referida questão. Nesse sentido, o objetivo geral visa refletir acerca dos alcances e dos limites de uma ecologia democrática de cunho liberal. Para alcançar este objetivo, enfrentamos como eixo central da tese a polêmica entre antropocentrismo e biocentrismo e suas repercussões nos vários âmbitos que caracterizam a complexa relação homem-natureza, principalmente nos níveis ético e político. O percurso deste trabalho iniciou-se, no primeiro capítulo, com um estudo dos pressupostos teóricos do problema ecológico, o que nos remeteu a uma análise dos fundamentos da Modernidade expondo a sua face dualista e antropocêntrica regida pelas categorias razão e liberdade. Em seguida, a pesquisa foi direcionada ao debate ecológico atual que pode ser sintetizado em torno da polêmica existente entre biocentrismo e antropocentrismo. Nesse sentido, no capítulo 2, expusemos os principais autores e correntes ambientais que podem ser definidos como biocêntricos. No capítulo 3, apresentamos a proposta antropocêntrica moderada de cunho democrático e liberal contida nos textos de Luc Ferry, Michael Shellenberger e Ted Nordhaus. Por fim, no quarto capítulo, foi efetuada uma reflexão acerca das várias dimensões do problema ecológico: ontológica, eticopolítica, jurídica, tecnológica, sociocultural e educacional; visando demonstrar a validade de nossa tese central que reconhece a responsabilidade como categoria ética fundamental e a importância da educação, da sensibilização, do papel do Estado como gestor ambiental, e da tecnologia como instrumentos auxiliares de enfrentamento do supracitado problema. Esperamos assim que a nossa opção por uma reflexão filosófica, assentada numa perspectiva de ecologia democrática de cunho antropocêntrico moderado, possa contribuir com o debate ecológico atual no Brasil, ainda dominado por uma postura majoritariamente biocêntrica.
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Silva, Paulo Cesar Gondim da. "O conceito de liberdade em o ser e o nada de Jean-Paul Sartre." Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, 2010. http://repositorio.ufrn.br:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/16480.
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Previous issue date: 2010-11-19This dissertation aims to address the concept of freedom from the perspective of the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre with reference to the main work Being and Nothingness. After presenting the concept of freedom we will try to show that it is related to the notion of responsibility, which will lead, ultimately, to define the Sartrean philosophy as a philosophy of action. In the first chapter we will present in passing the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, philosopher from which Sartre will develop his concept of freedom. The Husserlian notion of consciousness (intentionality) is the way to develop his analysis of Sartre phenomenon of being. From this analysis Sartre submits their concepts of being in-itself and being for-itself. Being initself is defined as the things of the world devoid of consciousness, are the things that surround us. The In-itself has as its main brand positivity: it is what it is, is all that can be said about him. In turn being For-itself is the very being of man, which differs radically from the In-itself. The For-itself has as its main intentionality, ie, its ability to project outside itself in existence. That's when Sartre shows that this type of being realizes its existence on the basis of a constant nihilation. Here comes the notion of anything. Among the relations of the For-itself with the surrounding world stands a very special: relationship between consciousnesses. It is when we discuss the issue of another. Intersubjectivity, through sartrean analysis of look, show that the For-itself assumes a new existential dimension: the being-for others. That's when Sartre will emphasize his notion of conflict. The conflict in intersubjectivity would come from the fact that you want to take another- For-itself as an object. Given this we will analyze what Sartre called the concrete relations with others. The philosopher submit such relations in the form of ducts and conduits assimilation of ownership. In the first my-self to try to "get lost" in the consciousness of another, ownership of my conduct in-itself tries to "take ownership" of the subjectivity of the other and try to treat others as things, as objects. In this sense Sartre examines the experiences of love, masochism, indifference, desire and sadism. Following this route we will enter the land of freedom itself, which is the major theme of our work. Since Sartre defines the For-itself as a being that is projected to create your way of being, it can only define it as freedom. The freedom of the For-itself is taken in terms of autonomy of choice. Once the For-itself has no way of being a thing as being in-itself, it just may be picking up, that is, making your being. Here Sartre speaks of the anguish that would be the symptom of freedom itself. The fact that the For-itself have to choose on whether the call as one being distressed. However, in most cases the For-itself tries to escape from the anguish of freedom and takes refuge in bad faith. After setting the man (For-itself) as freedom Sartre defends that he is totally responsible for what he does of himself. Once the philosopher holds that man is not predetermined, ie, does not have an a priori essence, his philosophy has as its basic assumption the action. If Sartre argues that the For-itself must constantly choose your way of being, the action is the basis on which man will exercise his own freedom. In this sense we conclude the work with an approach to work Existentialism is a Humanism, which represent the entry of the philosopher on the practical aspects of life
A presente disserta??o tem por objetivo abordar o conceito de liberdade sob a ?tica do fil?sofo franc?s Jean-paul Sartre tendo como refer?ncia principal a obra O Ser e o Nada. Ap?s a apresenta??o do conceito de liberdade iremos tentar mostrar que o mesmo est? relacionado com a no??o de responsabilidade, o que nos levar?, em ?ltima an?lise, a definir a filosofia sartreana como uma filosofia da a??o. No primeiro cap?tulo iremos apresentar en passant a fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl, fil?sofo a partir do qual Sartre ir? desenvolver seu conceito de liberdade. A no??o husserliana de consci?ncia (intencionalidade) ser? o caminho para Sartre desenvolver sua an?lise do fen?meno de ser. Dessa an?lise Sartre apresentar? seus conceitos de ser Em-si e ser Para-si. O ser Em-si ? definido como as coisas do mundo desprovidas de consci?ncia; s?o as coisas que nos circundam. O Em-si tem como marca principal a positividade: ele ? o que ?; ? tudo que pode ser dito a respeito dele. Por sua vez o ser Para-si ? o pr?prio ser do homem, o qual difere radicalmente do Em-si. O Para-si tem como marca principal a intencionalidade, isto ?, sua capacidade de se projetar para fora de si na exist?ncia. ? quando Sartre mostrar? que esse tipo de ser realiza sua exist?ncia na base de uma nadifica??o constante. Aqui surgir? a no??o de nada. Dentre as rela??es do Para-si com o mundo circundante destaca-se uma muito especial: a rela??o entre consci?ncias. ? quando abordaremos a quest?o do outro. Na intersubjetividade, atrav?s da an?lise sartreana do olhar, mostraremos que o Para-si assume uma nova dimens?o existencial: o ser-para-outro. ? quando Sartre ir? enfatizar sua no??o de conflito. O conflito na intersubjetividade viria do fato de o Para-si querer tomar o outro Para-si como objeto. Diante disso analisaremos aquilo que Sartre chamar? de rela??es concretas com o outro. O fil?sofo apresentar? essas rela??es na forma de condutas de assimila??o e condutas de apropria??o. Nas primeiras meu Para-si tenta perder-se na consci?ncia do outro; nas condutas de apropria??o meu Para-si tenta apropriar-se da subjetividade do outro bem como tenta tratar os outros como coisas, como objetos. Nesse sentido Sartre analisar? as experi?ncias do amor, do masoquismo, da indiferen?a, do desejo e do sadismo. Ap?s esse percurso entraremos no terreno da pr?pria liberdade, que ? o tema maior de nosso trabalho. Uma vez que Sartre define o Para-si como um ser que se projeta para criar o seu modo de ser, s? lhe resta defini-lo como liberdade. A liberdade do Para-si ? tomada em termos de autonomia de escolha. Uma vez que o Para-si n?o tem o modo de ser de uma coisa, como o ser Em-si, ele s? pode existir escolhendo-se, isto ?, fazendo seu ser. Aqui Sartre falar? da ang?stia, que seria o sintoma da pr?pria liberdade. O fato de o Para-si escolher-se na exist?ncia o p?e como um ser angustiado. Contudo, na maioria das vezes o Para-si tenta fugir da ang?stia da liberdade e se refugia na m?-f?. Ap?s definir o homem (Para-si) como liberdade Sartre defender? que ele ? totalmente respons?vel por aquilo que fizer de si. Uma vez que o fil?sofo defende que o homem n?o ? pr?-determinado, isto ?, n?o possui uma ess?ncia dada a priori, sua filosofia ter? como pressuposto b?sico a a??o. Se Sartre defende que o Para-si deve escolher constantemente o seu modo de ser, a a??o ser? a base sobre a qual o homem ir? exercitar sua pr?pria liberdade. Nesse sentido concluiremos o trabalho com uma abordagem ? obra O Existencialismo ? um Humanismo, a qual representar? a entrada do fil?sofo nas quest?es pr?ticas da vida
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Ковальова, О. В., and O. V. Kovalova. "Філософсько-правові засади реалізації принципів справедливості і відповідальності у діяльності органів внутрішніх справ: дисертація." Thesis, ЛьвДУВС, 2014. http://dspace.lvduvs.edu.ua/handle/1234567890/750.
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Ковальова О. В. Філософсько-правові засади реалізації принципів справедливості і відповідальності у діяльності органів внутрішніх справ: дисертація на здобуття наукового ступеня кандидата юридичних наук зі спеціальності 12.00.12 – філософія права / Ковальова Олена Володимирівна. - Львів: ЛьвДУВС, 2014. - 174 с.У дисертації здійснено першу у вітчизняній науці спробу комплексно дослідити філософсько-правовий вимір фундаментальних засад реалізації принципів справедливості та відповідальності в діяльності органів внутрішніх справ. Обґрунтовано методологічний потенціал філософсько-правової науки, що дозволило досліджувати реалізацію принципів справедливості та відповідальності в діяльності органів внутрішніх справ крізь призму онтологічного, гносеологічного, аксіологічного, праксеологічного, герменевтичного та антропологічного аспектів. Запропоновано визначення понять «справедливість» та «відповідальність» як філософсько-правових полідисциплінарних категорій, що, перебуваючи в когерентному зв’язку, відображають конкретно-історичні уявлення про міру належного (моральний аспект), міру відповідності різних соціальних явищ та вчинків (соціальний аспект), трактування цієї міри у свідомості особи (психологічний аспект), закріплення в нормах права (правовий аспект), відображення в гуманітарній політиці держави (політичний аспект), актуалізації в системі загальносуспільних ідей, поглядів (ідеологічний аспект). The thesis presents a first attempt in science research complex philosophical and legal aspects of implementing the principles of fundamental principles of justice and accountability in the work of the police. The methodological potential philosophical and legal doctrine which allowed studying the implementation of the principles of justice and accountability in the activities of internal affairs in the light of the ontological, epistemological, axiological, praxeological, hermeneutic and anthropological aspects. A definition of «fairness» and «responsibility» as a philosophical and multidisciplinary legal categories, while in coherent communications reflect specific historical understanding of the proper measure (moral dimension), as compliance of various social phenomena and behavior (social aspect), the interpretation of this measure in the mind of the person (psychological aspect), enshrined in law (legal aspects), reflected in the humanitarian policy of the state (the political aspect), updating the system general public ideas, beliefs (ideological dimension).
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Fonseca, Tania Schneider da. "Uma teoria semicompatibilista sobre responsabilidade moral : John Fischer e o controle de direcionamento." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2018. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/7397.
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CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
Quais são as condições necessárias e suficientes para responsabilizar moralmente o comportamento do agente? Várias respostas a essa pergunta têm sido dadas na história recente da filosofia. De um lado, diversos filósofos acreditam que o critério especificando essas condições poderia ser compatível com a tese determinista. Por outro lado, há aqueles que negam que esse critério possa conciliar-se com a visão de um mundo determinista. Tradicionalmente, a liberdade enquanto uma capacidade para agir de outro modo é defendida como uma condição necessária para a responsabilidade moral. Com o seu artigo de 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Harry Frankfurt mudou o curso do debate sobre o problema da vontade livre. Ele forneceu exemplos hipotéticos, por meio de experimentos de pensamento, de agentes que, conforme ele argumentou, embora não pudessem ter agido de outro modo, ainda assim seriam moralmente responsáveis pelas suas ações. O artigo de Frankfurt entusiasmou muitos filósofos, destacadamente John Fischer, a repensar o problema da responsabilidade moral. Para Fischer, Frankfurt teria mostrado que o debate não diz mais respeito ao problema de demonstrar a compatibilidade entre liberdade e determinismo, mas, sim, à questão da compatibilidade da responsabilidade moral com o determinismo. Para lidar com essa questão, e qualificar a posição de Frankfurt, Fischer desenvolve o que ele denomina de uma posição semicompatibilista. Essa posição responderia às objeções incompatibilistas, assim mostrando a compatibilidade da responsabilidade moral com o determinismo. Esse trabalho é dedicado a um estudo dessa posição. A tese defendida é a de que o semicompatibilismo proposto por Fischer de fato responde às principais objeções dos incompatibilistas, e é mais vantajosa se comparada à posição compatibilista tradicional, que defende que a capacidade para agir de outro modo seria uma condição necessária para a responsabilidade moral.
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the moral responsible agency? Many answers to this question have been given in the recent history of philosophy. On the one side, some philosophers believe that the criterion specifying these conditions could be compatible with the determinist’s worldview. On the other side, there are those who deny that this criterion and the determinist’s position could be ever reconciliated. Traditionally, freedom as a capacity to do otherwise has been defended as a necessary condition for moral responsibility. In 1969, when “Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (1969) was published, Harry Frankfurt changed the course of the discussion about the free will problem. Frankfurt showed, through some thought experiments, agents that, he argued, were moral responsible for their actions even though they could not have acted otherwise. Frankfurt’s essay pushed several philosophers, remarkably John Fischer, to rethink the problem of moral responsibility. For Fischer, Frankfurt showed that the debate should not be about the compatibility between freedom and determinism, but rather should address the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. To deal with this problem, and to further qualify Frankfurt’s position, Fischer develops, as he calls it, a semicompatibilist position. This position, he claims, successfully address the objections from the incompatibilists, thus showing that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. This study is an investigation of this position. The thesis defended is that the semicompatibilism proposed by Fischer does indeed answers the main incompatibilist’s objections, and it is better than the traditional compatibilist position, which argues that the capacity to do otherwise is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
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Ladeira, Fernando de Oliveira Domingues. "Regulação estatal e assistência privada à saúde: liberdade de iniciativa e responsabilidade social na saúde suplementar." Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie, 2011. http://tede.mackenzie.br/jspui/handle/tede/1009.
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Previous issue date: 2011-02-25Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa
The Brazilian State is featured by the incorporation of several social rights as well as values and goals to be implemented. The quest for a social reality transformation through the implementation of social justice and through the construction of a free and sympathizing society has not only the State as an actor, but also the individuals. Although the freedom of economic initiative is recognized as a principle, an act detached from constitutional goals and disconnected from legitimate values of economic activities is not authorized. This private social responsibility recognition from individual acting indispensability as an actor, and not as a simple spectator of social transformation justifies the State performance through regulation tools in order to have economic activities comply with constitutional goals being, therefore, in the implementation of social transformation sought by constitutional guidelines, the legitimacy to impose the behaviors to be accomplished by individuals. Nevertheless, it is in health insurance where the indispensability of the State action is shown, from the observation that the market has not enough tools to avoid the practice of misuses in detriment of consumers. At the same time constitutional recognition of public relevance for private health insurance indicates the requirement for a sharpest regulation, in view of the rights involved. Therefore, the public relevance for private health insurance, the evidence of market insufficiency as a control tool for the sector and the need of private agents to take over an active role in social transformation legitimate the State action. This recognition allows the conclusion that initiative freedom does not set impediment to State control and regulation of private activities. This paper, therefore, aims to investigate the initiative freedom of health insurance companies to its social responsibilities as an explanation for the narrow state control of health insurance agreements.
O Estado brasileiro caracteriza-se pela incorporação de inúmeros direitos sociais, assim como valores e objetivos a serem implementados. A busca da transformação da realidade social pela implementação da justiça social e construção de uma sociedade livre e solidária tem como atores não só o Estado, mas também os particulares. Ainda que seja reconhecida a liberdade de iniciativa econômica como princípio, não está autorizado um agir desvinculado dos objetivos constitucionais e desconectado dos valores legitimadores das atividades econômicas. Esse reconhecimento da responsabilidade social privada, a partir da imprescindibilidade do agir individual como ator, e não mero expectador, da transformação social, justifica a atuação do Estado por meio de instrumentos de regulação para conformar as atividades econômicas aos objetivos constitucionais, estando, pois, na implementação da transformação social buscada pelas diretrizes constitucionais, a legitimidade para imposição de comportamentos a serem realizados pelos particulares. Mas é na saúde suplementar que se evidencia a imprescindibilidade da atuação do Estado, a partir da constatação de que o mercado não possui instrumentos suficientes para evitar a prática de condutas abusivas em detrimento dos consumidores. Ao mesmo tempo, o reconhecimento constitucional da relevância pública da assistência privada à saúde indica a exigência de regulação mais contundente, ante a sensibilidade dos direitos envolvidos. Assim, a relevância pública da assistência privada à saúde, a evidência da insuficiência do mercado como mecanismo de controle do setor e a necessidade de assunção pelos agentes privados de papel ativo na transformação social legitimam a atuação do Estado. Esse reconhecimento permite a conclusão de que a liberdade de iniciativa não configura óbice para a fiscalização e regulação estatal das atividades privadas. Busca-se, portanto, por meio desse trabalho, a conformação da liberdade de iniciativa das operadoras de planos de saúde à sua responsabilidade social como justificativa para o estreito controle estatal dos contratos de planos de saúde.
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Puşcaşu, Carmen Gina. "La notion de "juridiction" au sens de l'article 1er de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme." Thesis, Montpellier 1, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013MON10012.
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La notion de « juridiction » au sens de l'art. 1 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales est directement liée au problème plus ample de la mise en cause de la responsabilité des Etats contractants et, implicitement, au problème d'ordre procédural de la compétence de la Cour de Strasbourg. L'interdépendance de ces trois éléments a mené à une interprétation jurisprudentielle autonome du concept de «juridiction», qui reflète les efforts de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme de concilier les différents rôles dans lesquelles l'Etat évolue sur la scène internationale. Vu que la mission de la Cour est celle de protéger les droits individuels, le défit auquel l'instance de Strasbourg doit répondre est celui de privilégier le rôle de « garant des droits de l'homme » de l'Etat, sans provoquer un déséquilibre fonctionnel ou relationnel des Etats parties à la Convention. La frontière entre équilibre et déséquilibre n'étant pas fixe, le concept de « juridiction » fonctionne en tant qu'axe élastique d'orientation du comportement des Etats, théoriquement gouverné par le principe de la liberté d'action, mais pratiquement encadré par l'obligation de garantir les droits consacrés par la ConventionThe « jurisdiction » concept as provided by Art. 1 of the European convention for human rights is directly connected to the more complex topic of attracting the responsibility of the States - party to such Convention and, implicitly, to the procedural matter of Strasbourg Court's competence. The interconnection between these elements has lead to an autonomous case-law interpretation of the « jurisdiction » concept, evidencing the efforts of the European court for human rights to conciliate the various roles played by the States on the international scene. Taking into account that the mission of the Court is to protect individual rights, the challenge that the Strasbourg court is facing consists in emphasizing the State's role of « human rights guarantor » without creating functional or relational misbalances for the States – party to the Convention. Since the borderline between balance and misbalance is not a fix one, the « jurisdiction » concept functions as a variable orientation axis for the State's conduct, theoretically governed by the freedom of action principle, which in practice is bordered by the general obligation to guarantee the rights established in the Convention
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Sund, Kasper, and Emil Johansson. "Schemalagt eget arbetes inverkan på studiemotivation i skolan : Hur elevers motivation påverkas av att de själva får bestämma vad de ska arbeta med på skoltid." Thesis, KTH, Lärande, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-232037.
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denna studie undersöks hur elever påverkas av att arbeta under friare former, med avseende på studiemotivation. Studien är gjord på en gymnasieskola i Stockholm med schemalagt eget arbete där eleverna själv får välja vad de vill arbeta med. En kvalitativ undersökning gjordes med hjälp av fokusgrupper för att utröna elevers, lärares och rektorers uppfattningar om studiemotivationen för eleverna under dessa lektionstillfällen. Studien tar sin utgångspunkt i Ryan & Decis’ självbestämmandeteori (SDT) och teorier om ansvar och kontroll. Resultatet visar att valfriheten gör att en del av eleverna upplever dessa lektionstillfällen som fördelaktiga för sin studiemotivation. De andra eleverna upplever att valfriheten påverkar dem negativt då de inte kan ta det ansvar som krävs för skolgången. Gemensamt för alla eleverna är att trots det egna valet genereras inte den inre motivationen, som enligt SDT skall bildas då eleverna får vara autonoma i sin planering och arbetsfördelning. Vidare tyder resultaten på att merparten av eleverna inte ännu är rustade för att agera inom en normativ styrfilosofi trots skolans vision om detta.The aim of the study is to examine how pupils are affected by working under free forms, with respect to student motivation. The study took place in a high school in Stockholm with free study time scheduled, where the pupils are able to choose to work with whatever they find suitable. A qualitative study was carried out with focus groups to explore the opinions of students, teachers and principals regarding the student motivation during these classes. The theoretical framework of this study draws on Ryan & Decis’ Self Determination theory (SDT) and other theories concerning responsibility and control. The results show that a large amount of freedom makes some of the pupils regard these classes as an advantage for their motivation. Some other pupils perceived that freedom of choice affects them negatively as they cannot take responsibility for their schooling. Common for all pupils is that despite their own choice, the intrinsic motivation is not generated. Furthermore, the results indicate that the majority of the pupils are not prepared to act within a normative governance philosophy despite the school's vision regarding this.
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Lööv, Sofia. "Framtidens energieffektiva förskola : Gestaltning och formgivning av en naturförskola i passivhusteknik." Thesis, KTH, Byggteknik och design, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-126095.
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Daggkåpan är en förskola som projekterats i passivhusteknik. Förskolan är en naturförskola, vilket främst innebär att i stort sett all verksamhet bedrivs utomhus. Byggnaden är i två plan vilket gör att tomtarean kan utnyttjas till mer utomhusvistelse. Förutsättningar för att bedriva verksamheten inomhus finns även. Utomhusmiljön och inomhusmiljön hos Daggkåpan smälter samman och barnen kan lätt ta ett steg ut till naturen från sina hemvister. Detta innebär att antalet utgångar ökar. En solcellsanläggning genererar all elektricitet och gör byggnaden självförsörjande. Byggnadens varmvatten och värme står solfångare för. I takt med bostadsutvecklingen blir även behovet av förskolor större. Att skaffa kunskap och erfarenheter om energieffektivt byggande är idag en god idé eftersom alla byggnader på sikt måste vara så energieffektiva som möjligt. En av hörnpelarna med att bygga passivhus är att låta ett genomtänkt och energieffektivt byggnadsskal ersätta ett konventionellt värmeförsörjningssystem. Genom att förbättra konstruktioner och hålla koll på byggprocessen kan andra delar av byggnaden förenklas och i vissa fall helt ersättas. Det som fördyrar i ena änden kan leda till en god investering i den andra. Utmaningen med passivhus är att systematisera, se helheter och sammanhang och framför allt eftersträva det enkla. Enkla system ger låga drift- och underhållningskostnader och risken för driftstörningar minskar. Den största delen av värmen är gratis. Den kommer från instrålande sol, värme från människor och spillvärme från apparater och matlagning. Grundkravet är att byggnaden har ett värmeeffektbehov under 10 W per kvadratmeter vid +20ºC inomhus på årets kallaste dag, definierat av dimensionerande utetemperatur. Byggnaden får max läcka 0,3 l/s, m² oms vid +/- 50 Pa tryckskillnad. För att uppnå god komfort krävs välisolerade väggar, solavskärmningar, energieffektiva fönster och dörrar, små köldbryggor och ett bra ventilationssystem där värmen från insidan av huset återvinns. Antalet passivhus i Sverige ökar snabbt, men det är fortfarande småhusen som dominerar. Att bygga en förskola som passivhus är en god idé ur flera synvinklar; Bland annat för att de täta och välisolerade väggarna stänger ute buller och oljud. Även mellanväggar isoleras och bidrar till en extra tyst byggnad. Dessutom blir barnen miljömedvetna eftersom de får vara delaktiga i energieffektivisering. -En viktig aspekt för framtiden. Barnen bidrar själva till uppvärmning av lokalerna genom kroppsvärmen. Undersökningar har bland annat visat att barn som får vistas utomhus är friskare, mer självgående, mer kreativa och klokare. Det ultimata är att använda sig av utemiljöer som ett extra rum för förskolan. Detta leder till minskad byggnadsarea och mindre byggmaterial krävs. Pedagogiken Reggio Emilia använder sig just utav detta begreppet "Uterummet som ett extra rum för verksamheten". Barnen får därmed röra sig fritt i utemiljö, utveckla sina sinnen i en rik fantasivärld, inspireras och samverka med natur och hållbarhet.Daggkåpan is a preschool projected in passive house technology. The preschool is a nature preschool, which means the activity is mainly out door. It is a two floor building which gives conditions to use the area for more outdoor activities. Conditions for drive the preschool indoors is possible as well. The garden and the inside rooms are connected to each other by the exterior rooms and it is easy for the children just to take a step out to the garden from their residences. A solar cell system generates electricity to the building and makes it self-supplied. The residential development leads to the need of preschools. To obtain knowledge of energy effective constructions is a good idea as the buildings in the future have to be as energy effective as possible. One of the most important things by use the passive house technology is letting a well measured and energy- effective building shell replace a conventional heat supply. By improvement of the construction and focus on the process other parts of the building can be simplified and some can be replaced. What is expensive in one end can lead to a good investment in the other. The challenges with passive house are to systematize, see whole parts and contexts and especially to seek after the simple. Easy systems give low operations- and service-costs and reduce fear of disruptions. Most of the heat is for free. It comes from insulation, human heat and heat from cooking and technologies. Basic requirements for this type of building is a need of heat-output under 10 W per square-meter at an indoor temperature of 20 degrees on the coldest day of the year, defined of the dimensioned outdoor- temperature. The maximum of leak is 0,3 liters per second and square meter at +/- 50 Pa. To receive high comfort it claims well-isolated walls, shadings, energy-effective windows and doors, small thermal bridges and a good ventilation-system where the indoor heat recycles. The number of Passive houses increases, dominated of small houses. Building a preschool as a passive house is a good idea from several perspective; the well-isolated walls leaves out the noise, even the intermediate walls isolates and contributes to a silent building. The children get environmentally conscious as well and take notes of the energy- effectively. - A very important aspect for the future. The children contributes them self of heat to the building by their body heat. Investigations has been shown that outdoor playing children is more healthy, self-propelled, more creative and more clever. The most ultimate is so use patios as an extra room for the preschool activities. The pedagogy Reggio Emilia uses this concept. The children can consequently feel free staying outside, developing their minds in an imaginative environment, inspired of the interaction of the nature and sustainability.
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Ndiaye, Ibrahima. "Enjeux éthiques et écologiques de la responsabilité : vers une approche de la co-responsabilité." Thesis, Poitiers, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014POIT5021.
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Nombreuses sont les exigences qui s'adressent à nous, non pas seulement parce que nous sommes des sujets moraux, mais aussi en tant que citoyens, membres d'un corps politique dont il faut observer les règles pour en garantir la pérennité. Aussi notre responsabilité est-elle doublement convoquée tant bien sur le champ éthique que politique. En effet, le péril écologique nous rappelle notre devoir moral envers la postérité, pour le maintien d'un environnement viable. La menace d'une rupture du lien social, engendrée par un individualisme exacerbé, exige de trouver un nouveau contenu au concept de responsabilité, contenu qui devra être à la hauteur des enjeux de la situation. Seulement, le besoin de consommation frénétique, et la volonté de satisfaction immédiate de désirs, souvent frivoles, s'opposent à cet appel à concevoir une nouvelle forme de responsabilité, que nous définirons comme co-responsabilité. Un régime de sacrifices et une certaine disposition de l'esprit d'abnégation seront nécessaires compte tenu de l'urgence du moment. Mais hélas ! Ces renoncements sont occultés par des préoccupations égoïstes sans lendemain. Aussi, l'enquête menée ici, s'est-elle donnée comme objectif d'examiner les leviers susceptibles de mobiliser les ressources suffisamment persuasives pour accomplir une telle entreprise. C'est la raison pour laquelle nous nous sommes appuyés sur l'analyse de la notion de responsabilité tant dans son application politique, que dans sa rhétorique éthique. Selon Rousseau, l'espèce ne s'est élevée au-dessus de son caractère strictement biologique qu'en cessant d'obéir uniquement à ses pulsions. C'est dans la même veine que Kant affirmera l'autonomie du sujet qui assoira sa responsabilité morale. Mais l'anatomie du concept à laquelle nous avons procédée a permis de trouver à la responsabilité une fondation qui rompt avec tout volontarisme moral. En effet, la dialectique entre liberté et responsabilité a donné lieu à une conception plus féconde de la responsabilité, éthiquement parlant, du moins. En effet, il ne fait pas de doute que le responsable est au sens juridique, l'auteur d'une action accomplie en parfaite connaissance de causes. Ce qui implique la présence, chez cet auteur, d'une conscience à la fois psychologique et moral, d'un libre arbitre, d'une volonté libre. C'est ce que l'analyse de la liberté a permis de réaffirmer ici. Mais ce type de responsabilité formelle de n'importe quel acteur à l'égard de son action n'épuise pas la richesse des responsabilités qui nous incombent. Notre responsabilité ne découle pas exclusivement de notre liberté. Au contraire, elle la déborde et la contient, au niveau politique, mais surtout éthique. Une telle conception de la responsabilité sonne ou plutôt ré-sonne comme un appel à une responsabilité solidaire et collective. Elle ré-sonne, car cette forme de responsabilité qui consiste au secours que nous devons aux êtres vulnérables, condamnés à périr sans notre intervention a reçu ses lettres de noblesse sous la plume de Hans Jonas, dans son œuvre majeure : Le principe responsabilité. Cependant, c'est à Emmanuel Levinas que nous devons cette conception de la responsabilité que nous avons à l'égard des autres êtres. Responsabilité éthique orientée vers l'irréductible inquiétude pour l'Autre « dans la nudité de son visage » jusqu'à la substitution. À une époque où les rapports humains sont dé-réalisés parce que informatisés et numérisés, du fait du développement spectaculaire des nouveaux outils scientifiques et technologiques entraînant l'abrasion de l'empathie et de la sensibilité, il est important de réfléchir à nouveaux frais sur une vision quasi religieuse du progrès ignorant l'humain et la nature qu'il exploite. Aussi, militant pour la sauvegarde de conditions humainement viables, avons-nous cherché à replacer l'Homme et son avenir au cœur de toutes préoccupationsThus, the present investigation aims at examining the tools that can generate sufficiently persuasive resources in order to accomplish such a task. That's the reason why we relied on the analysis of the notion of responsibility as much in its political application as in its ethical rhetoric. According to Rousseau, mankind was able to rise above her strictly biological nature only by putting a stop to her drives. It is in the same vein that Kant will claim the autonomy of the subject who will be able to establish her moral responsibility. But the analysis of the concept we have undertaken has allowed us to claim that responsibility has a foundation that breaks with any moral voluntarism. Indeed, the dialectics between freedom and responsibility has brought about a more fertile conception of responsibility, at least ethically speaking. There is no doubt that one can be held legally responsible for something only when one accomplishes an action in full knowledge of the facts. This implies that the very person (subject) has a psychological and moral conscience, a free will, and a free volition. This is what the analysis of freedom has enabled to reaffirm here. But this kind of formal responsibility does not exhaust the richness of responsibilities that are incumbent upon us. Our responsibility does not spring exclusively from our freedom. On the contrary, it extends beyond it and contains it, on the political level, but above all on the ethical level. Such a conception of freedom rings or rather resonates as a call for an integral and collective responsibility. It resonates because this form of responsibility which consists in helping vulnerable beings who are condemned to perish without our intervention, has won its spurs with Hans Jonas, in his masterpiece: The Imperative of Responsibility. But, it is Emmanuel Levinas that we owe this conception of responsibility that we have towards other beings. An ethical responsibility concentrated on the irreducible concern for the Other "in the nakedness of his face" till the substitution. In a time when human relationships are being undone because they are being computerized and digitized through the dramatic development of new scientific and technological tools leading to the abrasion of empathy and sensitivity, it is crucial to reflect freshly upon a quasi-religious vision of progress that shrugs off the human being and the nature she uses. As activist for the preservation of humanly viable conditions, we have then attempted to replace the Human and her future in the centre of all concerns. Convinced that neither the absolute saint or the absolute devil exist, we aim at mobilizing all resources from the noble part of the Human Being in order to enable everyone to provide an appropriate answer to human distress and plays her role in expressing an immense and profound solidarity of souls…
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Sanguineti, Raymond Wilfredo, Landaburu María Katia García, and Ponce Milagros Vivas. "Effects of multinational companies’ Corporate Social Responbility (CSE) commitments of the Peruvian labor market: the experience of Topy Top." Economía, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/118322.
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This paper studies the impact that the social responsibility commitments of multinational companies are can have in the settlement of labor disputes that arise in its supply chain through a landmark case that occurred in Peru. There, the en masse dismissal of union members and their representatives by the textiles company Topy Top was resolved through the intervention of two international brands that were clients of that company. This intervention not only enabled the reinstatement of the workers, but also generated a series of instruments designed to develop a mature system of industrial relations. Through an analysis of the agreements and instruments adopted and the way the relationship between the company and the union developed thereafter, we evaluate the role that multinational companies can assume to ensure the compliance of fundamental labor rights.El presente trabajo estudia la incidencia que son capaces de tener los compromisos de responsabilidad social de las empresas multinacionales en la solución de conflictos laborales suscitados en sus cadenas de producción, a través de un caso emblemático que se produjo en el Perú, como consecuencia del cese masivo de representantes y afiliados sindicales por parte de la empresa Topy Top, que se solucionó a través de la intervención de dos marcas internacionales que eran clientes de dicha empresa. Esa intervención no solamente permitió la reposición de los trabajadores, sino que generó una serie de instrumentos que tenían por objeto desarrollar un sistema de relaciones industriales maduro. A través del análisis de los acuerdos e instrumentos adoptados y la forma cómo se desarrollaron las relaciones entre la empresa y el sindicato posteriormente, se evalúa el rol de garantía del cumplimiento de derechos laborales fundamentales que pueden asumir las empresas multinacionales.
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Robichaud, Anne. "L’animation : un moyen de développer les déterminants de l'autonomie des personnes âgées." Thesis, Lyon 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LYO20048.
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Le pourcentage important de personnes âgées dans nos pays est compensé par le fait qu'elles ont une validité et des capacités physiques et mentales qui diffèrent assez peu de celles des plus jeunes générations. Mais il faudrait que ce processus soit utilisé comme il le mérite et que les capacités de ces générations soient employées au mieux et au minimum et que leur rôle dans la société ne soit pas découragé.Louis Ploton écrit que «la démarche d'autonomisation passe par un préalable méthodologique consistant à renoncer à regarder nos interlocuteurs âgés comme des sujets ayant perdu quelque chose, pour les considérer comme ayant recours à d'autres mécanismes, d'autres façons de faire, d'autres modalités relationnelles dans un contexte donné».Nous partons de l’hypothèse que le degré d’autonomie des personnes âgées (à niveau de santé égal) s’inscrit dans une interaction avec l’exercice d’un «leadership» suffisant, de leur degré de motivation et de la qualité de leur insertion sociale.C’est pourquoi nous présenterons un programme de recherche-action, entrepris dans le cadre des clubs de personnes âgées (dits clubs de l’âge d’or), dans une province canadienne, visant à passer par le canal du «leadership» des aînés pour accroitre leur motivation, améliorer leur insertion sociale et leur autonomie. Nous nous attachons ainsi à proposer l’animation, prise en main par les aînés, comme levier pouvant agir positivement, de manière globale, sur les déterminants de l'autonomie en particulier la motivation et l'insertion sociale. Cela reposera sur une démarche argumentative, faute de pouvoir apporter des preuves expérimentales formelles, en l’absence de moyens de mesure satisfaisants des phénomènes en interactionsThe important percentage of elderly persons in our countries is compensated by the fact that they keep a validity and physical and mental capacities that are little different from those of younger generations. But this process should be used as it deserves to be and the capacities of these generations should be used to the best and to a minimum and their role in society should not be downplayed.Louis Ploton writes that «the process of developing autonomy goes through a preliminary methodological stage that consists in refusing to view our elderly persons, with whom we are engaged in a conversation, as subjects who have lost something, to consider them as people that resort to other mechanisms, to other ways of doing things, that use other relational modalities in a given context».We start from the hypothesis that the degree of autonomy of elderly persons (their level of health being the same) is part of an interaction in the exercise of an adequate «leadership», of their degree of motivation and of the quality of their social insertion.That is why we are presenting to you a research-action program, set up within the framework of the clubs of elderly persons (that is Golden Age clubs), in a Canadian province, aiming to use the channel of the «leadership» of the elderly to increase their motivation, to improve their social insertion and their autonomy. We are keen on proposing the animation, on having the elderly take matters into their hands, as a lever that can act positively, in a global way, on the determining factors of autonomy, particularly on motivation and social insertion. That will be based on an argumentative initiative, for the lack of being able to offer formal experimental proofs, in the absence of satisfactory means of measuring the phenomena in interactions
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Jeppsson, Sofia. "Practical Perspective Compatibilism." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-72975.
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In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions. The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that we can view the world from either a theoretical or a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective is that of causal explanation and prediction, whereas the practical perspective is that of choosing what to do and how to act. We see that we are free when we view things from a practical perspective. Determinism cannot threaten our practical freedom, since from a practical perspective we must choose what to do even if everything ultimately is determined. I argue that practical freedom is sufficient freedom-wise for moral agency and moral responsibility because morality is action-guiding. Right and wrong are concepts to be employed in deliberation and advice. This is a strong reason to regard factors irrelevant to deliberators and advisers as irrelevant when making judgements of right and wrong, and whether somebody had some other kind of freedom than practical freedom is irrelevant to deliberators and advisers. There are also prima facie reasons to regard moral responsibility as tied to rightness and wrongness, so that agents are blameworthy when they did wrong (or subjectively wrong, or what would have been wrong given their state of information and so on) and praiseworthy when they did right (subjectively right and so on). I also show that no classic arguments for incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility work when directed against practical perspective compatibilism. Finally, this thesis discusses metaethics in relation to compatibilism. Since competing theories imply the falsity of some respected metaethical positions, metaethical considerations lend further support to practical perspective compatibilism.I den här avhandlingen argumenterar jag för en tes som jag kallar “praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism”. Enligt praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är det så att en agent med praktisk frihet är tillräckligt fri för att vara en moralisk agent och moraliskt ansvarig. Praktisk frihet är ett koncept vi ursprungligen hittar hos Kant. Det används också av en del nutida Kantianer. Kant argumenterade för att vi kan betrakta världen från antingen ett praktiskt eller ett teoretiskt perspektiv. Det teoretiska perspektivet är det vi har när vi gör förutsägelser och hittar kausala förklaringar, medan det praktiska är det vi har när vi väljer och handlar. Vi kan se att vi är fria när vi ser på tillvaron ur det praktiska perspektivet. Determinismen kan inte hota vår praktiska frihet, för vi måste välja våra handlingar oavsett om allting i slutändan är determinerat. I denna avhandling definierar jag praktisk frihet på följande sätt: En agent har minimal praktisk frihet om och endast om han måste välja sina handlingar, och han tror att hans vilja är effektiv när det gäller att realisera de handlingsalternativ han funderat över och väljer mellan. En agent har maximal praktisk frihet om och endast om han har minimal praktisk frihet, hans vilja verkligen är effektiv, han har full information om de alternativ han funderar över, och alla alternativ han inte tänkt på är sådana att hans egna värderingar inte ger honom ett övervägande skäl att välja ett av dessa alternativ snarare än det han faktiskt väljer. Jag argumenterar för att praktisk frihet så definierat är tillräckligt med frihet för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar eftersom moralen är handlingsvägledande. Det betyder att rätt och fel är koncept som ska användas i övervägning av olika handlingsalternativ och rådgivning. Tredje-persons-omdömen om ifall någon handlade rätt eller fel måste vara sådana att de hypotetiskt sett skulle kunna fungera som råd; egenskapen att vara rätt eller fel kan inte förändras beroende på om vi ger råd eller bara faller omdömen. Detta är ett starkt skäl för att betrakta faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare som irrelevanta när man faller omdömen om rätt och fel, och ifall någon hade en annan sorts frihet än den praktiska är irrelevant för övervägare och rådgivare. Vi har också prima facie skäl att betrakta moraliskt ansvar som knutet till rätt och fel, så att agenter är klandervärda när de gjorde fel (eller subjektivt fel, eller vad som skulle ha varit fel givet den information agenten hade osv) och berömvärda när de gjorde rätt (subjektivt rätt osv). Att det finns prima facie skäl för att betrakta praktisk frihet som tillräckligt för moraliskt ansvar utesluter förstås inte att det finns övervägande skäl för den motsatta ståndpunkten. Jag visar dock att inga klassiska argument för inkompatibilism om determinism och moraliskt ansvar fungerar när man riktar dem mot praktisk-perpsektiv-kompatibilism. Alla sådana argument förutsätter vad som skulle bevisas, nämligen att faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare är moraliskt relevanta, och att pålitliga moraliska intuitioner uppstår när vi betraktar agenter från ett teoretiskt snarare än praktiskt perspektiv. Slutligen diskuterar denna avhandling relationen mellan metaetik och kompatibilism. Praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är kompatibel med samtliga metaetiska teorier, medan det finns flera metaetiska teorier som implicerar att inkompatibilismen är falsk, och åtminstone en som implicerar att vissa kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Enligt en speciell Kantiansk konstruktivistisk teori så finns det rätt- och felaktiga handlingar och moraliskt ansvar på grund av att det finns praktisk frihet. Om detta är den sanna metaetiska teorin, så följer det att praktisk frihet är tillräckligt för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar, och att inte bara inkompatibilism men andra kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Beroende på vilken metaetisk teori som är den sanna, kan det alltså vara så att de föregående argumenten är överflödiga för att bevisa praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism. Det kan vara så att denna tes helt enkelt följer från den sanna metaetiska teorin.
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Senate, University of Arizona Faculty. "Faculty Senate Minutes November 3, 2014." University of Arizona Faculty Senate (Tucson, AZ), 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/336522.
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