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Journal articles on the topic 'Free will and determinism'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 31 July 2024

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1

BERNSTEIN, SARA, and JESSICA WILSON. "Free Will and Mental Quausation." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2, no. 2 (2016): 310–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.7.

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ABSTRACT:The questions of how to understand free will and mental causation are clearly connected, for events of seemingly free choosing are mental events that appear to be efficacious vis-à-vis other events. Nonetheless, the free will and mental causation debates have proceeded largely independently of each other. Here we aim to make progress in determining the mutual bearing of these debates. We first argue that the problems of free will and of mental causation can be seen as special cases of a more general problem of mental ‘quausation’, concerning whether and how mental events of a given type can be efficacious qua the types they are—qualitative, intentional, freely deliberative—given reasons to think such events are causally irrelevant. We go on to identify parallels between hard determinism and eliminativist physicalism and between soft determinism and nonreductive physicalism, and we use these parallels to identify a new argument against hard determinism and to reveal and motivate a common strategy underlying apparently diverse soft determinist accounts.

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2

Bhat, Abdur Rashid. "Free Will and Determinism." Journal of Islamic Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2006): 7–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/islamicphil2006215.

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3

FREMLIN, J. H. "Free will and determinism." Nature 319, no. 6052 (January 1986): 352. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/319352a0.

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4

ROBINSON, JOSEPH D. "Free will and determinism." Nature 319, no. 6052 (January 1986): 352. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/319352c0.

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5

Nichols, Shaun. "Folk Intuitions on Free Will." Journal of Cognition and Culture 6, no. 1-2 (2006): 57–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853706776931385.

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AbstractThis paper relies on experimental methods to explore the psychological underpinnings of folk intuitions about free will and responsibility. In different conditions, people give conflicting responses about agency and responsibility. In some contexts, people treat agency as indeterminist; in other contexts, they treat agency as determinist. Furthermore, in some contexts people treat responsibility as incompatible with determinism, and in other contexts people treat responsibility as compatible with determinism. The paper considers possible accounts of the psychological mechanisms that underlie these conflicting responses.

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6

Zanetti, Luca. "Determinism and Judgment." European journal of analytic philosophy 15, no. 2 (December 12, 2019): 33–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.2.

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In a recent book entitled Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom, Robert Lockie argues that the belief in determinism is self-defeating. Lockie’s argument hinges on the contention that we are bound to assess whether our beliefs are justified by relying on an internalist deontological conception of justification. However, the determinist denies the existence of the free will that is required in order to form justified beliefs according to such deontological conception of justification. As a result, by the determinist’s own lights, the very belief in determinism cannot count as justified. On this ground Lockie argues that we are bound to act and believe on the presupposition that we are free. In this paper I discuss and reject Lockie’s transcendental argument for freedom. Lockie’s argument relies on the assumption that in judging that determinism is true the determinist is committed to take it that there are epistemic obligations – e.g., the obligation to believe that determinism is true, or the obligation to aim to believe the truth about determinism. I argue that this assumption rests on a wrong conception of the interplay between judgments and commitments.

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7

HAYNES, SANDRA D. "FREE WILL, DETERMINISM, AND PUNISHMENT." Psychological Reports 93, no. 7 (2003): 1013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.93.7.1013-1021.

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8

HAYNES, SANDRA D. "FREE WILL, DETERMINISM, AND PUNISHMENT." Psychological Reports 93, no. 8 (2003): 1013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.93.8.1013-1021.

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9

KyungsukChoi. "Free Will and Neural Determinism." Korean Journal of Medical Ethics 16, no. 2 (August 2013): 249–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.35301/ksme.2013.16.2.249.

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10

Rossi, Ernest Lawrence. "Chaos, determinism, and free will." Psychological Perspectives 20, no. 1 (January 1989): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00332928908407754.

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11

Cobb, Jeffrey. "DETERMINISM, AFFIRMATION, AND FREE CHOICE." Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (March 1986): 9–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb00433.x.

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12

Haynes, Sandra D., Don Rojas, and Wayne Viney. "Free Will, Determinism, and Punishment." Psychological Reports 93, no. 3_suppl (December 2003): 1013–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.2003.93.3f.1013.

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Determinists were compared with weak, moderate, and strong libertarians with respect to philosophy of punishment. Data provided support for the contention that determinists are less punitive than libertarians.

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13

Bernier, Paul. "Causation and Free Will in Early Buddhist Philosophy." Buddhist Studies Review 36, no. 2 (March 19, 2020): 191–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/bsr.36779.

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Free will and determinism have recently attracted the attention of Buddhist scholars who have defended conflicting views on this issue. I argue that there is no reason to think that this problem cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy, since there are two senses of ‘free will’ that are compatible with the doctrine of non-self. I propose a reconstruction of a problem of free will and determinism in Early Buddhism, given a) the assumption that Buddhist causation entails universal causal determinism, and b) a crucial passage (A I 173–175) suggesting that Early Buddhism is committed to the principle of alternative possibilities which is arguably incompatible with a determinist interpretation of causation. This passage suggests that Early Buddhism must leave room for a robust, incompatibilist form of free will, and that a conception of indeterminist free will in the spirit of Robert Kane’s theory allows us to make sense of that notion.

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14

Cain, James. "Free Will, Resiliency and Flip-flopping." Southwest Philosophy Review 35, no. 1 (2019): 91–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20193519.

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Many philosophers accept with certainty that we are morally responsible but take it to be an open question whether determinism holds. They treat determinism as epistemically compatible with responsibility. Should one who accepts this form of epistemic compatibilism also hold that determinism is metaphysically compatible with responsibility—that it is metaphysically possible for determinism and responsibility to coexist? John Martin Fischer gives two arguments that appear to favor an affirmative answer to this question. He argues that accounts of responsibility, such as his, that are neutral with respect to whether responsible actions are determined have a “resiliency” that counts in their favor. Furthermore, he criticizes libertarians who argue on a priori grounds that determinism cannot coexist with responsibility and who admit that they would retract their argument if determinism were shown to hold; this “metaphysical fl ip-flopping” is said to render their positions implausible. I assess the merits of these arguments.

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15

Sennett, James F. "The Free Will Defense and Determinism." Faith and Philosophy 8, no. 3 (1991): 340–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil19918325.

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16

Junseong Park S.J. "Problems of Free Will and Determinism." Theology and Philosophy ll, no. 26 (May 2015): 141–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.16936/theoph..26.201505.141.

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17

Ferraiolo, Bill. "Free Will, Determinism, and Stoic Counsel." Ars Disputandi 6, no. 1 (January 2006): 204–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2006.10819927.

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18

Timmins, David B. "Free Agency, Determinism, and Chaos Theory." Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 28, no. 3 (October 1, 1995): 163–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/45226120.

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19

LICHTENBERG, JAMES W. "Free Will and Determinism: A Story." Journal of Counseling & Development 63, no. 9 (May 1985): 583–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-6676.1985.tb00688.x.

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20

Sa'diyah, Futikatus, and Azwar Sani. "Doktrin Qadar Dalam Islam: Memahami Dinamika antara Free Will dan Determinisme." ISME : Journal of Islamic Studies and Multidisciplinary Research 1, no. 2 (December 31, 2023): 11–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.61683/isme.vol12.2023.11-23.

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Dinamika antara kebebasan kehendak dan determinisme dalam doktrin Qadar dalam Islam memunculkan perdebatan panjang. Konsep Qadar mencakup elemen-elemen deterministik yang kuat, seperti ketetapan Allah, takdir, pengujian, dan pengetahuan Allah tentang masa depan Ini menciptakan keseimbangan unik antara determinisme dan kebebasan manusia dalam Islam. Pemikiran kontemporer tentang Qadar mencerminkan keragaman pandangan, termasuk perdebatan antara tradisionalis dan modernis, serta pertanyaan tentang sejauh mana determinisme mempengaruhi kebebasan manusia. Berbagai pendekatan interpretatif terhadap Qadar dalam Islam mencerminkan keragaman budaya, sosial, dan intelektual dalam dunia Muslim. Diskusi tentang kebebasan kehendak dan determinisme dalam konteks Qadar adalah isu yang kompleks dan mendalam dalam pemikiran Islam. Konsep Qadar mencakup elemen deterministik yang kuat, tetapi juga mengakui kebebasan manusia dalam membuat pilihan. Penelitian ini mengadopsi pendekatan kualitatif yang mendalam dan berfokus pada analisis literatur. Sebagian besar data diperoleh dari karya-karya cendekiawan dan pemikir terkemuka yang membahas konsep Qadar dalam Islam. Penelitian ini dapat diklasifikasikan sebagai penelitian kepustakaan (Library Research). Data sekunder juga diambil dari buku-buku kalam dan jurnal yang relevan. Pendekatan eksploratif-fenomenologis digunakan untuk mendalamkan pemahaman tentang konsep Qadar dalam konteks Islam. Kata Kunci: Kebebasan Kehendak; Determinisme; Qadar; Islam. The dynamics between free will and determinism in the doctrine of Qadar in Islam have sparked lengthy debates. The concept of Qadar encompasses strong deterministic elements, such as Allah's decree, destiny, testing, and Allah's knowledge of the future. This creates a unique balance between determinism and human freedom in Islam. Contemporary thinking on Qadar reflects a diversity of perspectives, including debates between traditionalists and modernists, as well as questions about the extent to which determinism influences human freedom. Various interpretative approaches to Qadar in Islam reflect cultural, social, and intellectual diversity within the Muslim world. Discussions about free will and determinism in the context of Qadar are complex and profound issues in Islamic thought. The concept of Qadar includes strong deterministic elements but also acknowledges human freedom in making choices. This research adopts a deep qualitative approach focusing on literature analysis. Most of the data are derived from the works of scholars and leading thinkers who discuss the concept of Qadar in Islam. This research can be classified as library research. Secondary data are also drawn from relevant philosophy books and journals. An exploratory-phenomenological approach is used to deepen the understanding of the concept of Qadar in the context of Islam. Keywords: Free Will; Determinism; Qadar; Islam.

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21

Selleri, Andrea. "Free Will." Victorian Literature and Culture 51, no. 3 (2023): 411–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1060150323000323.

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22

Tartaglia, James. "Free will and believing in determinism [English original]." Laboratorium Mentis 1, no. 1 (December 20, 2023): 40–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.52097/lm.8153.

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The article addresses the issue of free will and determinism through a discussion of Newcomb’s paradox, presented as a dialogue between the spirits of Lady Luck and Fate. I argue that commitment to determinism, which is suggested by materialist metaphysics, is in contradiction with our experience of freedom of choice. Newcomb’s paradox describes the dilemma of choosing between either one or two boxes in order to maximise the quantity of money these boxes contain, which has been determined by the machine predicting what your decision will be. The character of Heather, faced with this dilemma, symbolizes humanity grappling with the issue of free will in the face of determinism. I claim that our experience of freedom prevents us from believing that determinism is true when we properly reflect on the issue, just as Heather could not believe in determinism when she had to make the choice in the situation described in the paradox.

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23

Bishop, Robert C. "Free will in absentia: Dennett on free will and determinism." Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23, no. 2 (2003): 168–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0091233.

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24

Lycan, William G. "Free Will and the Burden of Proof." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53 (September 2003): 107–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008298.

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Here are some things that are widely believed about free will and determinism.(1) Free will is prima facie incompatible with determinism.(2) The incompatibility is logical or at least conceptual or a priori.(3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defence of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyse such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into eventcausation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven't done this, and if all the same you do believe such things as that I raised my arm and that Jolns [sic] killed his uncle, and if moreover you still think it's a joke to talk about the agent as cause, then, I'm afraid, the joke is entirely on you.’)(4) Free will is not impugned by quantum indeterminism, at least not in the same decisive way that it is impugned by determinism. To reconcile free will with quantum indeterminism takes work, but the work comes under the heading of metaphysical business-as-usual; to reconcile free will with determinism requires a conceptual breakthrough.And listen to Laura Waddell Ekstrom on the burden of proof.

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25

Steward, Helen, and Stephen Law. "Free Will: Helen Steward Interviewed by Stephen Law." Think 22, no. 65 (2023): 5–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175623000167.

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AbstractDo we have free will? In this interview, Helen Steward explains part of her very distinctive approach to the philosophical puzzle concerning free will vs determinism. Steward rejects determinism, but not because she denies that we are not material beings (because, for example, we have Cartesian, immaterial souls that have physical effects). Her reasons for rejecting determinism are very different.

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26

Wilkinson, Stephen, and Ted Honderich. "How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem." Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 179 (April 1995): 249. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220430.

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27

Syrov, Vasily N. "Historical Responsibility: Beyond Free Will and Determinism." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, politologiya, no. 57 (October 1, 2020): 108–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/57/11.

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28

Riel, Raphael Van. "Free Will and Two Types of Determinism." Review of Metaphysics 76, no. 1 (September 2022): 95–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2022.0046.

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29

Startup, Richard. "Free Will and Determinism: Resolving the Tension." Open Journal of Philosophy 11, no. 04 (2021): 482–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2021.114032.

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30

Murray, Andrew. "Book Review: Free Will, Predestination and Determinism." Pacifica: Australasian Theological Studies 22, no. 3 (October 2009): 358–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1030570x0902200314.

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31

Kirsch, Irving, and Michael E. Hyland. "Methodological determinism and the free will hypothesis." Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 4, no. 3 (September 2017): 321–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000135.

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32

Arseculeratne, SN. "The problem of free-will versus determinism." Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences 31, no. 1-2 (April 26, 2013): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.4038/sljss.v31i1-2.5459.

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33

Ellis, Albert. "Free Will and Determinism: A Second Stay." Journal of Counseling & Development 64, no. 4 (December 1985): 286. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-6676.1985.tb01106.x.

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34

Derbak, V. V. "The essence of punishment in the context of the theory of determinism." Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence, no. 3 (July 18, 2023): 451–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2788-6018.2023.03.82.

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The article explores the essence of punishment in the context of determinism theory, which excludes the existence of free will, also known as “hard determinism”. The main tenets of determinism theory are revealed, and arguments for why free will does not exist are explained. The two main theories of punishment, retributivism and consequentialism, are explained, their defining characteristics are highlighted, and their relationship with the deterministic worldview is discussed. Approaches to understanding the concept of guilt in the absence of free will are formulated, and the correlation between the notion of guilt, which is contained in Ukrainian legislation, and determinism theory, which excludes free will, is analyzed. The article explains why punishment should be imposed and why individuals should generally be held responsible, thus determining the purpose and content of punishment in the absence of free will. The purpose of punishment, as enshrined in Article 50(2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, is also analyzed, and recommendations for its improvement are provided. Examples from legal practice and natural sciences, particularly in the fields of medicine and biology, are presented to confirm the positive role of determinism theory in the context of punishment and approach to free will as an illusion. The advantages and disadvantages of implementing punishment measures that correspond to the deterministic worldview in society are highlighted. The importance of identifying and researching the causes of unlawful behavior for the prevention of crimes, rehabilitation, and reintegration of offenders is justified. Emphasis is placed on the role of research in natural sciences such as neurobiology in promoting the deterministic theory and the idea that free will is an illusion, as well as the crucial role of scientific research in understanding the causes of human behavior. The belief in free will is critically analyzed, and negative aspects of such a belief are noted.

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35

Ahn, Jaekyung, and Yimoon Choi. "The Validation of Korean Version of Free Will and Determinism Plus Scale." KOREAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 11, no. 2 (July 31, 2020): 191–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.53302/kjfp.2020.07.11.2.191.

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36

Mackie, Penelope. "Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Chance." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (July 2018): 265–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000140.

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AbstractMany contemporary compatibilists about free will and determinism are agnostic about whether determinism is true, yet do not doubt that we have free will. They are thus committed to the thesis that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. This paper explores the prospects for this version of compatibilism, including its response to the argument (traditionally employed against incompatibilist accounts of free will) that indeterminism would introduce an element of randomness or chance or luck that is inimical to free will and moral responsibility.

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37

Collier, William G., and Xinyan Shi. "Mindfulness, Meditation, and Belief in Free Will/Determinism." Psychological Reports 123, no. 5 (December 8, 2019): 1724–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0033294119892884.

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Two experiments investigated the influence of mindfulness, meditation, and type of induction (free will, determinism, or neutral) on affect and beliefs in free will/determinism. In Experiment 1, it was found that high mindful participants reported experiencing more positive affect and less negative affect than low mindful participants. In the determinism induction condition in Experiment 2, high mindful participants scored higher on free will beliefs after they meditated, whereas low mindful participants scored lower on free will beliefs after they meditated. So it would seem that mindfulness can have differential effects for high and low mindful individuals. It was also found that high mindful participants (depending on the task and induction condition) sometimes had longer reaction times than low mindful participants. This could be an indication of high mindful participants having a higher decision boundary for some tasks or simply an indication that high mindful participants enjoyed some tasks more than others (i.e., processing fluency). In addition, the internal consistency of the questionnaires was compared to the internal consistency found for those questionnaires in previous research.

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38

Feldman, Gilad, and Subramanya Prasad Chandrashekar. "Laypersons’ Beliefs and Intuitions About Free Will and Determinism." Social Psychological and Personality Science 9, no. 5 (July 25, 2017): 539–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550617713254.

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We linked between the social psychology and experimental philosophy paradigms for the study of folk intuitions and beliefs regarding the concept of free will to answer three questions: (1) What intuitions do people have about free will and determinism? (2) Do free will beliefs predict differences in free will and determinism intuitions? and (3) Is there more to free will and determinism than experiencing certainty or uncertainty about the nature of the universe? Overall, laypersons viewed the universe as allowing for human indeterminism, and they did so with certainty. Examining intuitions of prosociality, future orientation, learning, meaningfulness, human uniqueness, and well-being, ratings were highest in the indeterministic universe condition and lowest in the deterministic universe condition, both significantly different from the uncertain universe condition. Participants’ free will beliefs had only weak impact on realism, happiness, and learning intuitions but did not reverse the general intuition favoring indeterminism and showed no impact on other intuitions.

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39

Johannsen, Kyle. "Free Will and Determinism: Political, Not Just Metaphysical." AJOB Neuroscience 4, no. 4 (October 2013): 65–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2013.827281.

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40

Kenny, Hamill. "Free Will, Determinism, and The Names of Places." Names 33, no. 1-2 (June 1985): 68–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/nam.1985.33.1-2.68.

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41

Strawson, Galen. "Consciousness, free will, and the unimportance of determinism." Inquiry 32, no. 1 (January 1989): 3–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602175.

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42

Karwasz, Grzegorz. "On Determinism, Causality, and Free Will: Contribution from Physics." Roczniki Filozoficzne 69, no. 4 (December 6, 2021): 5–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf21694-1.

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Determinism, causality, chance, free will and divine providence form a class of interlaced problems lying in three domains: philosophy, theology, and physics. Recent article by Dariusz Łukasiewicz in Roczniki Filozoficzne (no. 3, 2020) is a great example. Classical physics, that of Newton and Laplace, may lead to deism: God created the world, but then it goes like a mechanical clock. Quantum mechanics brought some “hope” for a rather naïve theology: God acts in gaps between quanta of indetermination. Obviously, any strict determinism jeopardizes the existence of free will. Yes, but only if human mind follows the laws of physics and only if nothing exists outside the physical limits of space and time. We argue that human action lies in-between two worlds: “earth” and “heavens” using the language of Genesis. In that immaterial world, outside time and space constraints, there is no place for the chain of deterministic events. We discuss, in turn, that the principle of causality, a superior law even in physics, reigns also in the non-material world. Though, determinism in the material universe and causality in both worlds seem to be sufficient conditions, to eliminate “chaotic”, or probabilistic causes from human (and divine) action.

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43

JUDISCH, NEAL. "Theological determinism and the problem of evil." Religious Studies 44, no. 2 (May 2, 2008): 165–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412508009384.

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AbstractI argue that the free-will defence need not presuppose a libertarian conception of freedom and therefore need not beg the question against compatibilists. I present three versions of theological determinism, each of which is inconsistent with freedom on compatibilist-friendly principles, and then argue that what generates the inconsistency – viz, that (1) God intentionally necessitates all human actions, and (2) no human has it within her power to influence causally God's will – is entailed by any version of theological determinism. Contrary to widespread opinion, therefore, the viability of the free-will defence does not depend upon the viability of libertarianism per se but on the falsity of theological determinism.

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44

Mrazek, Benedikt. "Towards the intellectual compatibilism." Journal of the ASB Society 4, no. 1 (December 6, 2023): 16–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.51337/jasb20231206002.

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In present thesis, the author deals with the problem of free will and the possibility of its existence. He discovers the falsity of libertarianism radically conceived, according to which (radical) indeterminism is required for free will. But if we show that radical indeterminism is false, and if we deny any type of compatibilism as well, a logical dilemma once called an "Ancient Dilemma" enters the scene: If neither determinism nor indeterminism is consistent with free will, then free will simply cannot exist. The author provides a solution for this dilemma, while attempting to prove human freedom consistent. As he believes, however, this cannot be done until some important distinctions are provided, especially between External and Internal Determinism. While the author refutes External Determinism (and External Compatibilism), he defends Internal (or Intellectual) Determinism (as well as respective compatibilism). In the ending passage of his treatment, the author compares his philosophical solution of the free will problem with some recent scientific theories, especially with the physicalistically concieved Law of Conservation of Energy.

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45

Smith, Noel W. "THE INTERBEHAVIORAL ALTERNATIVE TO FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM CONSTRUCTS." CONDUCTUAL 4, no. 2 (May 31, 2016): 151–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.59792/uknc3412.

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A review of various approaches to the old debate of determinism vs. free will shows little progress toward resolving the puzzle by any of the approaches. It is argued here that this is due to the failure to recognize that both free will and determinism are not things or events but imposed constructs, abstractions. Consequently, they cannot have causal or explanatory power. When we turn to observable events it brings us to a multiplex of things and conditions with which the individual interacts in the choosing event. This is an interbehavioral approach in which the interaction consists of this multiplex of events and constitutes the choosing. The interbehavioral resolution of this old conundrum has application in psychotherapy and criminal justice.

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46

Wolt, Daniel. "Kant on Free Will and Theoretical Rationality." Ideas y Valores 67, no. 166 (January 4, 2018): 181–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v67n166.62775.

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The focus of this essay is Kant’s argument in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) III that regarding oneself as rational implies regarding oneself as free. After setting out an interpretation of how the argument is meant to go (§§1-2), I argue that Kant fails to show that regarding oneself as free is incompatible with accepting universal causal determinism (§3). However, I argue that the argument succeeds in showing that regarding oneself as rational is inconsistent with accepting universal causal determinism if one accepts a certain, plausible view of the explanation of events (§4).

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Elzein, Nadine, and Tuomas K. Pernu. "Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock." Disputatio 9, no. 45 (October 26, 2017): 219–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0005.

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Abstract Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subvening physical level. It seems as if this approach has the potential to break the longstanding deadlock in the free will debate, since it concedes to the traditional incompatibilist that agents can only do otherwise if they can do so in their actual circumstances, holding the past and the laws constant, while nonetheless arguing that this ability is compatible with physical determinism. However, we argue that supervenient libertarianism faces some serious problems, and that it fails to break us free from this deadlock within the free will debate.

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Evers, Kathinka. "Variable Determinism in Social Applications: Translating Science to Society." Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive 75, no. 2 (2021): 73–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/intel.2021.2001.

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The debate over whether the belief in possessing a “ free will” can be maintained in the light of modern science, in particular neuroscience, has often been presented as a choice between two extremes. On the one hand, we have the conception of strict determinism excluding free will ; on the other hand, we have a conception of freedom of choice excluding determinism. Neither position, I claim, is scientifically realistic. The introduction in neuroscience of “ variable determinism” suggests that we can be simultaneously determined and “ free”. The important questions before us rather concern how to understand this balance and how to structure our societies accordingly. In this article, I focus on the doxastic and normative questions about the possible role of free will in our belief systems and social structures and on the role of neuroscience in challenging, or supporting, different positions. In line with a previously developed theoretical framework, I argue that the variability theorem, if correct, may offer empirical support for the compatibility of free will and causality, thus allowing for a rational belief in free will understood as a non-zero capacity to influence the causal processes of states and behaviour. So long as there is contingency in the causal relations (i. e. determinism including variability), there may be a fundamental dimension of voluntary influence in our choices. This measure of variability and control is sufficient to safeguard the possibility of “ free will” under these particular aspects, leaving open the extent of the freedom that we actually possess. De facto, our capacity for choice is strongly influenced by a variety of causal mechanisms and antecedent events over which we in reality have no or very limited influence : our natural, social and cultural environments all shape us. This variable determinism is also important to understand in terms of social applications, and the aim of this article is to translate this aspect of science and philosophy to society. In that endeavour, we need to be aware both of the freedom bestowed us by the variable determinism revealed by neuroscience and philosophy, and of the limits of this freedom. Understanding of this balance and its broader contexts should become more deeply integrated not only into our general world-views but also into our social structures shaping our legal and educational systems, child-care and moral upbringing favouring tolerance and respect of human rights.

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Goto, Takayuki, Yuya Ishibashi, Shogo Kajimura, Ryunosuke Oka, and Takashi Kusumi. "Development of free will and determinism scale in Japanese." Japanese journal of psychology 86, no. 1 (2015): 32–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.4992/jjpsy.86.13233.

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Megger, Dawid. "Determinism, free will, and the Austrian School of Economics." Journal of Economic Methodology 28, no. 3 (May 12, 2021): 304–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178x.2021.1926528.

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