Academic literature on the topic 'France – Foreign relations – 1643-1715'

This article examines the relaunch of European defense cooperation since 2016 from the perspective of neoclassical realism, a theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy which explores how domestic political and ideational factors shape national foreign policy responses to international systemic pressures. It argues that while Europe’s changing geostrategic and security environment has created incentives for increased defense cooperation, explaining the form and content of this cooperation requires understanding the preferences of key European states, especially France and Germany. The article focuses on two new forms of European defense cooperation: PESCO and the E21, the former inside the EU institutional framework and the latter outside of it. The article argues that these initiatives are explained by the contrast between French and German preferences on defense cooperation, which in turn reflect their divergent national security priorities but also their different strategic cultures, including their differing perspectives on European integration.

An analysis of Swiss, German and French biographical directories and previously published studies made it possible to summarize in the article the information about the Swiss units of the Military House of the King of France in the era of Louis XIV (1643–1715). This work may be useful to researchers, teachers, post graduates students, and students of humanitarian educational institutions studying such subjects as "General History", "Military History", "History of International Relations".

Between 1659 and 1689, northern Italy was generally at peace, having endured almost three decades of continuous war from the 1620s. The Peace of the Pyrenees of November 1659, between the French and Spanish crowns, seemed to offer the young Louis XIV an opportunity to gradually subvert Spanish influence over the small princely families of the Po valley. The Houses of Farnese, Este, and Gonzaga-Nevers, respective rulers of Parma, Modena, and Mantua-Monferrato, had all been allies of France at various points in the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659), but had gained scant reward for their willingness to jeopardise their own relationships with the king of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor, despite the promises of material and diplomatic support which Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin had extended to them. As a consequence, they were reluctant to agree to again participate in alliances with France. This thesis examines how Louis XIV gradually came to lose the friendship of these three ruling families, through his arrogant disregard of their interests and their ambitions, and also by his contempt for their capabilities and usefulness. This disregard was frequently born out of the French monarch's unwillingness to jeopardise or to undermine his own interests in Italy – in particular, the permanent retention of the fortress of Pinerolo, in Piedmont, as a porte onto the Po plain. But although the principi padani comprehended the reasons for Louis's unwillingness to act as a benevolent patron, they resented his all-too-palpable distrust of them; his entrenched belief that they were unreliable; and his obvious love of war. The rulers and élites of the Italian states believed that Louis would undoubtedly seek, at some point in his reign, to attack Spain's possessions in Italy, and dwelt in perpetual dread of that day. This thesis provides the account of French policy towards the small Italian states after 1659 which is still absent from the historiography of Louis XIV's foreign policies.

Les relations entre le Parlement de Paris et le Conseil du Roi de 1643 à 1653 présentent des aspects très contrastés. Les magistrats servaient dans les diverses sections du Conseil en tant que ministres d'état ou conseillers d'état et des membres du Conseil entraient au Parlement comme conseillers honoraires de la cour. Plusieurs familles avaient essaimé dans les deux organismes. Le roi disposait de la faculté de gratifier les magistrats et d'intervenir sur la carrière des officiers. Le Parlement enregistrait sans difficulté les actes royaux et un travail judiciaire commun était effectué avec le Conseil. Mais la minorité du roi et la régence qui suivirent la mort de Louis XIII provoquèrent des conflits entre les deux corps. De 1644 à 1647, les affaires du toise, des taxes des aises et du tarif montrèrent la volonté du Parlement de prendre connaissance des matières fiscales et les plaintes sur les évocations et les cassations indiquèrent le refus de la cour de voir diminuer ses attributions judiciaires. Durant l'année 1648, le Parlement, après avoir bloqué de nouvelles mesures fiscales, prit pour prétexte le renouvellement du droit annuel pour procéder à une réforme de l'administration, sanctionnée par la déclaration du 22 octobre 1648. Le Parlement veilla jalousement à son application et passa au second plan sur l'échiquier politique. A partir de 1651, il servit d'intermédiaire entre le gouvernement et les princes révoltés, sans se décider à soutenir l'un ou l'autre, tout en cherchant à obtenir l'éloignement définitif de Mazarin. Cette attitude dilatoire provoqua la suppression des réformes lors de la victoire du roi en octobre 1652, la soumission de la cour et le retour définitif de Mazarin en février 1653
The relations between the Parlement of Paris and the Royal Council from 1643 to 1653 present contrasted aspects. Judges served as secretary of state or counselor of state in the various sections of the council and members of the Council served as court honorary counselors in the Parlement. Several families had hived off in both organizations. The king had the power to reward the judges and to interfere in the officials'career. The Parlement willingly drafted the royal bills and worked with the Council on judicial matters. But, after Louis XIII's death, the king's minority and the regency triggered conflicts between the two corps. From 1644 to 1647 the affairs of the toise, the taxe des aises and the Paris tariff showed the Parlement's will to enquire into fiscal matters. And claims over the encroachment of the council marked the court's refusal to see its judicial powers diminish. In the year 1648, the Parlement, after obstructing the passage of new fiscal measures, made a pretext of the annual right renewal for a reform of the administration; sanctioned by the declaration of October 22 1648 the Parlement saw to its implementation. From 1651, unable to take sides, it acted as a go-between to the government and the rebelling princes, while trying to estrange Mazarin permanently from the political scene. This dilatory attitude led to the suppression of the reforms at the time of the king's victory in October 1652, the submission of the court and the permanent return of Mazarin in February 1653

L'objet de la thèse est de mettre en lumière la fonction royale de restauration de la paix qui, au XVIIe siècle, fait partie du rôle du souverain, au même titre que le pouvoir de faire la guerre. Les négociations pour rétablir la paix entre la France et l'Espagne, menées en même temps que la guerre de 1635 à 1659, sont la base événementielle de cette recherche. La thèse comporte deux parties. La première est une chronologie de ces négociations, établie à partir des sources françaises et espagnoles, avec pour objet l'élaboration lente et difficile de la paix des Pyrénées. L'étude détaillée des sources a permis de mettre en avant des aspects particuliers ou peu développés jusqu'à présent, de l'histoire des diverses tentatives de paix. La seconde partie développe plusieurs thèmes de réflexion : la paix face à l'antagonisme franco-espagnol aux multiples racines, l'obstination en Espagne à poursuivre la guerre malgré une prise de conscience de la crise de la monarchie catholique, les négociations et les négociateurs comme instruments de la fonction pacificatrice des souverains, la paix réelle et la paix selon les conceptions du temps. Le rôle du roi dans la restauration de la paix, donne son unité à la fois au parcours chronologique et aux réflexions thématiques
The purpose of this study is to focus on one of the major roles of a King in the 17th century : to restore the peace. The main idea is that peace, in the foreign affairs, was as major part of King's duty as was war. To illustrate this, a close analysis was performed of the various attempts of peace negotiation between France and Spain, that lasted all along the war, up to the Treaty of the Pyrenees (November 7, 1659). The first part of the document, which is basically a detailed chronology, aims to give a continuous and unified view of the of the negotiation events, in the prospective of the final peace. A large use of the French and Spanish sources allows to emphasize several previously lessened aspects of this long efforts toward peace. The second part consists of special studies on selected topics : the complexity of the antagonism between France and Spain; the reluctance in Spain to make peace in spite of the perception of a deep crisis of the monarchy; the practice of negotiation as seen from the various attempts of peace, the peace in the reality and in the mentalities of the first half of the 17th century. Each of these studies contributes to enlighten an aspect of the role of the King as a peace maker

Au début du XVIIIe siècle, la Hongrie et les Pays-Bas méridionaux sont l’objet de la convoitise de la diplomatie française. Ces provinces périphériques de l’Empire habsbourgeois s’opposent aux politiques de centralisation menées par Madrid et Vienne. Afin de réaliser ses ambitions dynastiques, Louis XIV utilise ce contexte pour déstabiliser ces territoires dans le cadre d’une guerre de Succession d’Espagne engendrée par le décès de Charles II d’Espagne, le premier novembre 1700. Le Roi-Soleil mobilise ses armées et ses diplomates, dans la continuité des alliances de revers forgées lors des siècles précédents. Le marquis des Alleurs et le président Pierre Rouillé de Marbeuf, agents de Louis XIV, mi-espions, mi-ambassadeurs, sont respectivement envoyés en Hongrie auprès du prince hongrois rebelle François Rakóczi et aux Pays-Bas méridionaux aux côtés du gouverneur général de la province et maître de l’Électorat de Bavière, Maximilien-Emmanuel de Wittelsbach. Loin du fracas des champs de bataille de la guerre de Succession d’Espagne, une guerre de l’ombre se fait plus dure. La quête du renseignement devient la préoccupation croissante des cours européennes. La confidentialité des correspondances épistolaires est l’objet de toutes les attentions. Cette étude a l’ambition de retracer le cadre des ambitions françaises en Hongrie et aux Pays-Bas méridionaux au début du XVIIIe siècle. Les alliances de revers et les manœuvres militaires de la guerre de Succession d’Espagne replacent ces deux pays d’Europe au cœur des luttes dynastiques, diplomatiques, et militaires opposant les Bourbons et les Habsbourg pour la domination de l’Europe
At the beginning of the 18th century, Hungary and the Southern Netherlands are coveted by the French diplomacy. Those peripheral provinces of The Habsburg Empire oppose the centralization policy lead by Madrid and Vienna. In order to realize his dynastic ambitions, Louis XIV uses this context to destabilize these territories during the War of the Spanish Succession triggered by the death of the last Habsburg King of Spain, Charles II, the first November 1700. Louis XIV mobilizes his army and his ambassadors in the continuity of the foreign alliances « Alliance de revers » that have been conducted during centuries. The marquis des Alleurs and the president Pierre Rouillé de Marbeuf, agents of Louis XIV, half spy, half ambassadors, are respectively send in Hungary nearby the rebel prince François Rakoczi and in the Southern Netherlands nearby the general governor of the province and Elector of Bavaria, Maximilien-Emmanuel de Wittelsbach. Far from the din of the battlefield of the Spanish Succession, another war hardens. The battle for information’s became the first preoccupation of European courts. The confidentiality of the epistolary correspondences is a crucial object of attention. The purpose of this study is to define the framework of the French ambitions in Hungary and the Southern Netherlands at the beginning of the 18th century. The « alliance de revers » and military moves during the War of the Spanish Succession replace those two European countries at the heart of dynastic, diplomatic and military conflicts opposing the Bourbon’s and the Habsburg’s for European hegemony

Defence date: 20 January 2006
Examining board: Prof. Giulia Calvi, European University Institute ; Prof. Gérard Delille, EUI et Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Supervisor) ; Prof. Marcello Fantoni, Kent University, Florence ; Prof. Gérard Sabatier, Université Mendés France, Grenoble
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

Defence date: 13 October 2006
Examining board: Prof. Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla (Supervisor, European University Institute) ; Prof. Antonella Romano (European University Institute) ; Prof. Ricardo García Cárcel (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona) ; Prof. Jean-Frédéric Schaub (École de Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017