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1
Lynch, Frances M. B. "De Gaulle's First Veto: France, the Rueff Plan and the Free Trade Area." Contemporary European History 9, no. 1 (March 2000): 111–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777300001053.
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Within one week of his election to the presidency of the Fifth Republic de Gaulle had taken a number of decisions which were to lay the basis for the foreign and economic policies pursued throughout his tenure of office. Contrary to all expectations de Gaulle confirmed his support for the European Economic Community, against the initial advice of his ministers he devalued the franc, and at variance with his partners in the EEC he vetoed Britain's plans to set up a free trade area in Europe. This article examines the reasons for de Gaulle's critical policy choices.
2
Bajrektarevic, Anis. "Future of the global south: some critical foreign policy considerations." AEI Insights: An International journal of Asia-Europe relations 6, no. 1 (January 30, 2020): 23–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.37353/aei-insights.vol6.issue1.2.
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Economic downturn, recession of plans and initiatives, systematically ignored calls for a fiscal and monetary justice for all, €-crisis, Brexit and irredentism in the UK, Spain, Belgium, France, Denmark and Italy, lasting instability in the Euro-Med theatre (debt crisis of the Europe’s south – countries scrutinized and ridiculed under the nickname PIGS, coupled with the failed states all over the MENA), terrorism, historic low with Russia along with a historic trans-Atlantic blow with Trump, influx of predominantly Muslim refugees from Levant in numbers and configurations unprecedented since the WWII exoduses, consequential growth of far-right parties who – by peddling reductive messages and comparisons – are exploiting fears of otherness, that are now amplified with already urging labour and social justice concerns, generational unemployment and socio-cultural anxieties, in ricochet of the Sino-US trade wars, while rifting in a dilemma to either let Bolivarism or support Monroeism. The very fundaments of Europe are shaking. Strikingly, there is a very little public debate enhanced in Europe about it. What is even more worrying is the fact that any self-assessing questioning of Europe’s involvement and past policies in the Middle East, and Europe’s East is off-agenda. Immaculacy of Brussels and the Atlantic-Central Europe-led EU is unquestionable. Corresponding with realities or complying with a dogma?
3
Arslan, Gizem. "AN OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN PROFILE FOR LANGUAGE TEACHER EDUCATION ON THE LANGUAGE TEACHER EDUCATION REFORMS IN TURKEY." Near East University Online Journal of Education 3, no. 1 (January 29, 2020): 37–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.32955/neuje.v3i1.181.
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English language is now the most commonly used lingua franca all over the world and has become an international language. Consequently, learning English is an important objective in the education system in every country as well as the EU member countries. This status of English language results in some fundamental changes in the foreign language education and foreign language teacher education policies of almost every country globally. This paper addresses the question whether the European Profile for language teacher education affects the foreign language teacher education policies and reforms in Turkey. The study also focuses on the general European profile for foreign language teacher education on Turkey contexts as well as the influence of the European profile for language teacher education on the foreign language teacher education reforms in Turkey.
Keywords: English language, foreign language education, language teacher education profile in Europe, language teacher education reform in Turkey
4
Gheciu, Alexandra. "Remembering France's glory, securing Europe in the age of Trump." European Journal of International Security 5, no. 1 (October 24, 2019): 25–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/eis.2019.24.
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AbstractThese days, when we hear the slogan ‘let's make our country great again’ we almost automatically assume the state concerned is the US, and the leader uttering the slogan is President Trump. This article invites readers to explore the discourse and practices through which another national leader is seeking to restore his country's ‘greatness’ and promote national and international security. The leader concerned is France's Emmanuel Macron. Why focus on the French president? Because since his election he has become the most dynamic European leader, on a mission to enhance France's international stature, and to do so via a broader process of protecting and empowering the EU. More broadly, France stands out as a country whose political leadership has long been committed to the goal of playing a global role. As Pernille Rieker reminds us, ‘Since 1945, French foreign policy has been dominated by the explicit ambition of restoring the country's greatness [la grandeur de la France], justified in terms of French exceptionalism’.1Macron has cast his vision of national/European greatness, security, and international order in opposition to the isolationist, rigidly nationalist visions articulated by his domestic opponents and, internationally, by President Trump. In his view, France and Europe can only be secure if they defeat the illiberal ideas advocated by the increasingly vocal political forces, particularly far-right movements, seeking to undermine the core values and multilateral principles of the post-1945 international order. Under these circumstances, an analysis of Macron's policies and practices of grandeur can help us gain a better understanding of the competition between liberal and illiberal worldviews – a competition that is increasingly pronounced within the Western world.
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Laforcade, Geoffroy de. "‘Foreigners’, Nationalism and the ‘Colonial Fracture’." International Journal of Comparative Sociology 47, no. 3-4 (August 2006): 217–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020715206066165.
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The riots that shook the French banlieues in 2005, while unique in their geographic extension and political resonance, are but the most recent manifestation of an ongoing escalation of violence and repression that has periodically rocked the economically devastated, socially fractured and highly cosmopolitan cityscape of post-industrial France. The stigmatization of unemployed youths and outcast working-class families as ‘foreign’ is a complex and multi-layered phenomenon. This article traces the history of the so-called ‘immigrant problem’, and of policy responses to it, from the time of the Algerian war to the republican nationalist backlash against multiculturalism over the past two decades. The trauma of decolonization, increased visibility of Maghrebi, West African, Antillian and other communities with origins outside of Europe, fears of ‘islamicization’, and political/ideological controversies over how the nation's history should be remembered and taught to future generations, have weighed heavily on the representation of immigrants and their descendants as unassimilated threats to national cohesion. Far from limiting their agency to criminality and random social violence, the youths of the banlieues have played an active role in redefining the terms in which citizenship and national identity, as well as the colonial heritage of France, are cast in the arena of public debate, challenging state policies and well-entrenched historical myths in the process.
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Lymar, Marharyta. "Transformations of the US European Policy in the 2nd Half of the 20th Century." American History & Politics Scientific edition, no. 8 (2019): 9–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2019.08.01.
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The article deals with the European aspects of the US foreign policy in the 2nd half of the 20th century. It also includes studies of the transatlantic relations of the described period and the exploration of an American influence on European integration processes. It is determined that the United States has demonstrated itself as a partner of the Western governments in the post-war reconstruction and further creation of an area of US security and prosperity. At the same time, it is noted that the American presidents have differently shaped their administrations’ policies towards Europe. The greatest supporter of the European integration processes was President Eisenhower. Among other things, the US President believed that Europe would become a key ally of the United States, thus, he considered the union of Sweden, Greece, Spain and Yugoslavia as a solid foundation for building a “United States of Europe”. After Eisenhower administration, European affairs, to a lesser extent, were taken up by such Presidents as Johnson, Carter, Reagan and Clinton. Showing no personal interest, Kennedy, Nixon and Bush-Sr. were forced to support the transatlantic dialogue, understanding the inevitability of European integration and the need for the United States to cooperate with the new consolidated actor. The United States aimed to strengthen its position in the European space, moving to that purpose by using NATO mechanisms and applying the policies of American protectionism against the communist threat. The main competitor of the United States for strengthening national positions in Europe was France led by General de Gaulle, who believed that the affairs of Europe should be resolved by European governments without the American intervention. However, NATO continued to serve as a springboard for the U.S. involvement in European affairs. At the end of the 20th century, through the close links between the EU and NATO, the USA received new allies from Central and Eastern European countries. It is concluded that after the end of World War II, Europe needed an assistance that the United States willingly provided in exchange for the ability to participate in European issues, solving and partly controlling the integration processes. The study found that, despite the varying degree of the American interest in transatlantic affairs, Europe has consistently been remaining a zone of national interest for the United States.
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Johnson, Karin. "21st Century International Higher Education Hotspots." Journal of International Students 10, no. 1 (February 15, 2020): v—viii. http://dx.doi.org/10.32674/jis.v10i1.1851.
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The Institute of International Education (IIE) 2018 Open Doors report highlighted that the United States is the leading international education destination, having hosted about 1.1 million international students in 2017 (IIE, 2018a). Despite year over year increases, U.S. Department of State (USDOS, 2018) data show that for a third year in a row, international student visa issuance is down. This is not the first decline. Student visa issuance for long-term academic students on F visas also significantly dropped following the 9/11 attacks (Johnson, 2018). The fall in issuances recovered within 5 years of 2001 and continued to steadily increase until the drop in 2016.
Taken together, the drops in international student numbers indicate a softening of the U.S. international education market. In 2001, the United States hosted one out of every three globally mobile students, but by 2018 it hosted just one of five (IIE, 2018b). This suggests that over the past 20 years, the United States has lost a share of mobile students in the international education market because they’re enrolled elsewhere.
The Rise of Nontraditional Education Destination Countries
Unlike the United States, the percentage of inbound students to other traditional destinations such as Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, has remained stable since the turn of the 21st century. Meanwhile, nontraditional countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia are garnering more students and rising as educational hotspots (Knight, 2013). The UAE and Russia annually welcome thousands of foreign students, respectively hosting over 53,000 and 194,000 inbound international university students in 2017 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2019). This is not happenstance. In the past 5 years, these two countries, among others, have adopted higher education internationalization policies, immigration reforms, and academic excellence initiatives to attract foreign students from around the world.
The UAE is one of six self-identified international education hubs in the world (Knight, 2013) and with 42 international universities located across the emirates, it has the most international branch campuses (IBCs) worldwide (Cross-Border Education Research Team, 2017). Being a country composed of nearly 90% immigrants, IBCs allow the UAE to offer quality higher education to its non-Emirati population and to attract students from across the Arab region and broader Muslim world. National policy and open regulations not only encourage foreign universities to establish IBCs, they alsoattract international student mobility (Ilieva, 2017). For example, on November 24, 2018, the national government updated immigration policy to allow foreign students to apply for 5-year visas (Government.ae, 2018). The Centennial 2071 strategic development plan aims for the UAE to become a regional and world leader in innovation, research, and education (Government.ae, 2019), with the long-term goal of creating the conditions necessary to attract foreign talent.
Russia’s strategic agenda also intends to gain a greater competitive advantage in the world economy by improving its higher education and research capacity. Russia currently has two higher education internationalization policies: “5-100-2020” and “Export Education.” The academic excellence project, known as “5-100-2020,” funds leading institutions with the goal to advance five Russian universities into the top 100 globally by 2020 (Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation, 2018). The “Export Education” initiative mandates that all universities double or triple the number of enrolled foreign students to over half a million by 2025 (Government.ru, 2017). These policies are explicitly motivated by boosting the Russian higher education system and making it more open to foreigners. Another growing area is international cooperation. Unlike the UAE, Russia has few IBCs, but at present, Russian universities partner with European and Asian administrators and government delegates to create dual degree and short-term programs. Historically, Russia has been a leading destination for work and education migrants from soviet republics in the region, but new internationalization policies are meant to propel the country into the international education market and to attract international students beyond Asia and Europe.
Future Trends in 21st Century International Education
Emerging destination hotspots like the UAE and Russia are vying to become more competitive in the global international higher education market by offering quality education at lower tuition rates in safe, welcoming locations closer to home. As suggested by the softening of the U.S. higher education market, international students may find these points attractive when considering where to study. Sociopolitical shifts that result from events such as 9/11 or the election of Donald Trump in combination with student mobility recruitment initiatives in emerging destinations may disrupt the status quo for traditional countries by rerouting international student enrollment to burgeoning educational hotspots over the coming decades.
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Dalton-Puffer, Christiane. "Content-and-Language Integrated Learning: From Practice to Principles?" Annual Review of Applied Linguistics 31 (March 2011): 182–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0267190511000092.
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This article surveys recent work on content-and-language integrated learning (CLIL). Related to both content-based instruction and immersion education by virtue of its dual focus on language and content, CLIL is here understood as an educational model for contexts where the classroom provides the only site for learners’ interaction in the target language. That is, CLIL is about either foreign languages or lingua francas. The discussion foregrounds a prototypical CLIL context (Europe) but also refers to work done elsewhere. The first part of the discussion focuses on policy issues, describing how CLIL practice operates in a tension between grassroots decisions and higher order policymaking, an area where European multi- and plurilingual policies and the strong impact of English as a lingua franca play a particularly interesting role. The latter is, of course, of definite relevance also in other parts of the world. The second part of the article synthesizes research on learning outcomes in CLIL. Here, the absence of standardized content testing means that the main focus is on language-learning outcomes. The third section deals with classroom-based CLIL research and participants’ use of their language resources for learning and teaching, including such diverse perspectives as discourse pragmatics, speech acts, academic language functions, and genre. The final part of the article discusses theoretical underpinnings of CLIL, delineating their current state of elaboration as applied linguistic research in the area is gaining momentum.
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Wesseling, H. L. "France, Germany and Europe." European Review 10, no. 3 (July 2002): 301–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1062798702000224.
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In 1999, a book appeared in Paris with the rather alarming title De la prochaine guerre avec l'Allemagne (‘On the future war with Germany’). It had not been written by some sensationalist science-fiction writer, but by none other than Philippe Delmas, a former aid to Roland Dumas, who was twice minister of Foreign Affairs under the Mitterrand administration.
10
Abboud, Samer. "Analysing Middle East Foreign Policies: The Relationship With Europe." Journal of International Relations and Development 11, no. 1 (March 2008): 83–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jird.2008.2.
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Hampson, Fen. "Review: Atlantic Foreign Policies: The Conventional Defense of Europe." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 42, no. 1 (March 1987): 237–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002070208704200120.
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Esposito, John L. "Moderate Muslims." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 11–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.465.
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The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.
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Esposito, John L. "Moderate Muslims." American Journal of Islam and Society 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 11–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.465.
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The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.
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Lefebvre, Bruno. "Posted workers in France." Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 12, no. 2 (May 2006): 197–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/102425890601200207.
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This contribution presents ongoing research that sets out to assess for the first time the situation of the foreign workers, from Europe and beyond, who work in France, in various economic sectors, as a result of the operation of networks of subcontractors. It appears that neither the legal framework nor the obligations of the foreign firms employing these workers are clear, in terms either of relations with government departments or of the legal arguments that may legitimately be invoked for the settlement of disputes. Trade unions, citizens' associations, locally elected officials and civil servants alike are strikingly ill-prepared to deal with this new phenomenon of the movement of workers in Europe.
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Gnedina, Elena. "‘Multi-Vector’ Foreign Policies in Europe: Balancing, Bandwagoning or Bargaining?" Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 7 (August 9, 2015): 1007–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2015.1066313.
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Iosifidis, Petros. "Public television policies in Europe: The cases of France and Greece." International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics 4, no. 3 (December 8, 2008): 349–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/macp.4.3.349_1.
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Kacarska, Simonida. "The foreign policies of post-Yugoslav states: from Yugoslavia to Europe." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 18, no. 1 (November 7, 2017): 146–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2017.1397971.
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Georgiadou, Stella. "The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States. From Yugoslavia to Europe." Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 8 (September 14, 2015): 1341–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2015.1076115.
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Bourmaud, Daniel. "France in Africa: African Politics and French Foreign Policy." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 23, no. 2 (1995): 58–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0047160700502054.
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French policy in Africa is at a crossroads. Forced to consider among choices that appeared entrenched in the past, France now hesitates to implement essential reforms. The reluctance to carve out a new conception of French-African relations is in part tied to the magnitude of the changes which have affected African states south of the Sahara since 1989, but it is also tied to the generalized failure of French aid policies since the Second World War. The result has been a conceptual vacuum in French policy towards Africa, reflected in the oscillation between the old practices, including very controversial ones, and the structural adjustments in which France is little more than an interested observer.
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Spits, Jos, Barrie Needham, Toine Smits, and Twan Brinkhof. "Reframing Floods: Consequences for Urban Riverfront Developments in Northwest Europe." Nature and Culture 5, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 49–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/nc.2010.050104.
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Many historical cities are built alongside rivers. Floodplains were attractive sites for urban expansion. However, the flood events since the 1990's have shown that many urban settlements are under flood risk. This research investigates how flood management and land use planning policies have changed after high water and (near)floods in the Netherlands, Germany, and France. In particular, it investigates how changing policies affect the development of urban riverfronts. Policy documents have been analyzed from all three countries and case studies illustrate the impact of changing policies on concrete developments.
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HOLLIFIELD, JAMES F. "Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 485, no. 1 (May 1986): 113–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716286485001010.
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This article looks at the successes and failures of immigration policy in France and Germany. Particular attention is given to comparing immigration and foreign-worker policies—outputs—and the results of these policies—outcomes—in each state since the suspension of immigration in the mid-1970s. The analysis of the French and German experiences suggests that the gap between outputs and outcomes results from the inability of the state fully to control the migratory process. Inevitably, many foreign workers will choose to settle in the country in which they work. Stopping the movement of workers into and out of the country and suspending immigration tends to speed up the process of settlement and increase family and seasonal immigration. The principal lesson for other industrial democracies is that suspending immigration and exporting workers is not an effective way to solve employment problems.
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James, W. P. T., A. Ralph, and M. Bellizzi. "Nutrition Policies in Western Europe: National Policies in Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Ireland, and the United Kingdom." Nutrition Reviews 55, no. 11 (April 27, 2009): S4—S20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1753-4887.1997.tb01573.x.
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SCHMITT, François. "LES INCIDENCES DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE DE LA SLOVAQUIE SUR LES PROGRAMMES SCOLAIRES SLOVAQUES D’ENSEIGNEMENT DES LANGUES ÉTRANGÈRES." FRANCISOLA 1, no. 2 (March 1, 2017): 122. http://dx.doi.org/10.17509/francisola.v1i2.5550.
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RÉSUMÉ. L’influence du contexte national et de la politique linguistique educative de l’Etat sur l’enseignement des langues etrangeres est particulierement marquee. En Europe, les politiques linguistiques educatives ont aujourd’hui tendance a se conformer aux orientations du Conseil de l’Europe et de l’Union europeenne qui ont mis en place des politiques linguistiques educatives en phase avec les evolutions recentes de la mondialisation. Cette incidence des politiques linguistiques educatives europeennes est particulierement visible dans les modifications apportees au programme d’enseignement public des langues etrangeres slovaque de 2007 par rapport a celui de 1997. Mots-clés : conseil de l’Europe, enseignement des langues etrangeres, politique linguistique educative, Union europeenne. ABSTRACT. Domestic political situation and domestic linguistic educational policy widely influence foreign languages teaching. Nowadays linguistic educational policies in Europe tend to comply with the Council of Europe and the European Union political guidelines. These institutions have set up linguistic educational policies in line with recent evolutions of globalisation. The modifications made to the Slovak curriculum of foreign languages between 1997 and 2007 clearly show how deep can be the influence of the European linguistic educational policy on domestic linguistic educational policies Keywords: council of Europe, European Union, foreign languages teaching, linguistic educational policy.
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Spire, Alexis. "Discretionary power as a political weapon against foreigners." Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, no. 2 (December 21, 2020): 89–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.5324/eip.v14i2.3479.
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The administrative practices of officials who process the admission of immigrants show severe variations in the ways in which migration policy is enforced on the ground. For the author, inequality of treatment lies in the very hierarchy of tasks and services of what he dubs, following Pierre Bourdieu, the immigration "field". According to the author, the governments’ securitizing priorities favour the sort of suspicion towards foreigners that the media then reproduces, thus authorizing so-called street-level bureaucrats to act with great leeway with regard to immigrants. Under pressure, governments implement what the author calls a "trompe-l’oeil policy" that explores the ambivalence between international and domestic law: while the state enforces repressive laws that apparently comply with fundamental human rights, it leaves to low-ranking civil servants enough discretion to make those rights ineffective. This point is the author’s central contention. The arbitrariness of these officials is neither contingent nor accidental: it actually constitutes a purposive "front-line policy" to enlarge the discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats in charge of regulating admissions. Unequal treatment comes in three flavours in this context. First, officials are asked to ensure that each right granted to a foreigner will not threaten the national order, which means the economic, social and political order. They are therefore in a position to judge the suitability of each application in view of their own arbitrary interpretation of what such "threats" consist of. The question of discretionary power is in this way intimately linked to the problem of equality before the law. Second, the scarcity of material and human resources allocated to services in charge of welcoming migrants starkly contrasts with the expenditure incurred to deport foreigners. Inequality also arises from how agents perceive users and the leeway they have to implement the law. Third, inequality is related to foreigners’ abilities and means to challenge discretionary power, especially through the legal tools they use or through legal intermediaries. The author thus concludes that such "front-line policy" has increasingly been used as a weapon against migrants, especially since the early 2000s, when immigration and detention policies were generalized in France. More broadly, in Europe as well as in United States, immigration reforms have made greater use of detention and focused on enforcement rather than on hosting programs and services for asylum seekers. But they have also strengthened the role of legal intermediaries. Hence the need to investigate how discretionary power is challenged as it sheds light on the power relations between states and migrants. Keywords: foreigners, discretion, sociology, participant observation, front-line policy, illegalism, jobs, insecurity, legal intermediaries
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Morgan, Kimberly J. "The Politics of Mothers' Employment: France in Comparative Perspective." World Politics 55, no. 2 (January 2003): 259–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2003.0013.
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Contemporary theories and typologies of welfare states in Western Europe assume that social democratic parties are the engine behind progressive policies on gender roles and on the participation of women in the labor force. The French case challenges these assumptions—this conservative welfare state, surprisingly, provides an extensive system of public day care along with other forms of support that facilitate mothers' employment. This article explains the existence of the French system through a comparative historical analysis of child care policy in France and other European welfare states. The mainfindingsconcern the role of organized religion in shaping contemporary public day care policies. In contrast to most conservative welfare regimes, the French welfare state has been shaped not by clericalism and Christian democracy but by secularism and republican nationalism—forces that influenced some of the earliest public policies for the education of young children in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that later affected the founding of the contemporary day care system in the 1970s. In that latter period of propitious economic circumstances, pragmatic policy elites eschewed moralizing critiques of mothers' employment and established a system of financing that has enabled the long-term expansion of public day care. These findings have implications for our understanding of gender politics and welfare regimes in Western Europe. The secularization of political life—not social democratic power—best explains why public policies in France and in many Scandinavian countries have promoted the demise of the traditional family model.
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Walther, Fridolin M. R. "The Swiss Legal System A Guide for Foreign Researchers." International Journal of Legal Information 29, no. 1 (2001): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0731126500000834.
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Switzerland is a federal state that lies in the heart of Europe and is bordered by Germany (to the north), Austria and the Principality of Liechtenstein (to the east), Italy (to the south) and France (to the west).
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Ribakova, Elina, Balázs Horváth, Dimitri G. Demekas, and Yi Wu. "Foreign Direct Investment in Southeastern Europe: How (And How Much) Can Policies Help?" IMF Working Papers 05, no. 110 (2005): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451861297.001.
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Ray, Laurel. "Review: Atlantic Foreign Policies: The Peace Movements in Europe & the United States." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 42, no. 1 (March 1987): 236–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002070208704200119.
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Clavin, Patricia. "Book review: German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer." German History 17, no. 3 (July 1999): 437–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/026635549901700329.
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Clavin, P. "Book review: German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer." German History 17, no. 3 (July 1, 1999): 437–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/026635549901700329.
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Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi. "The Ambivalence of Turkish Soft Power in Southeast Europe." Border Crossing 10, no. 2 (July 16, 2020): 111–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/bc.v10i2.1050.
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With the instrumentalisation of Islam via the state apparatuses in foreign policy, Sunni Islam has become both an instrument and a purpose of the repressive Justice and Development Party and Turkey has started to be one of the front runners of countries who are increasingly competing for using Islam as a foreign policy tool. This relatively new role of Turkey has created various diverging ideas among the host countries where Turkey is active. While some countries are rather content with Turkey’s religiously fueled policies and humanitarian aid, and define Turkey as one of the most influential actors which can use religion as a soft power tool, others refuse to define Turkey’s policies within the boundaries of religious soft power due to its extra-territorial authoritarian practices and instrumentalisation of religion for these. Under these circumstances, this study defines Turkey’s religious soft power as an ambivalent one and scrutinises the reasons behind this ambiguity via exploring some country cases from Southeast Europe.
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Block, Laura, and Saskia Bonjour. "Fortress Europe or Europe of Rights? The Europeanisation of Family Migration Policies in France, Germany and the Netherlands." European Journal of Migration and Law 15, no. 2 (2013): 203–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718166-12342031.
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Abstract Are the restrictive reforms of family migration policy recently implemented in France, Germany and the Netherlands a result of the introduction of the Family Reunification Directive in 2003? Most existing literature on the Europeanisation of migration policies suggests that restriction-minded national governments shift decision-making to the EU level to escape domestic political and judicial constraints. However, as the Treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon have empowered the Commission and Court to constrain restrictive reform, this perspective is losing analytical validity. Also, this perspective fails to capture the intensifying processes of policy transfer among Member States, which have inadequately been labelled ‘horizontal’ Europeanisation. We therefore propose a new, actor-centred analytical framework of Europeanisation. We show that contrasting yet parallel dynamics of Europeanisation may emanate from a single legislative instrument and may constrain and empower national governments at the same time.
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Rial-Sebbag, Emmanuelle, and Anna Pigeon. "Regulation of Biobanks in France." Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 43, no. 4 (2015): 754–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jlme.12317.
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France, a country with nearly 66 million inhabitants, contributed greatly to the construction of the European Union (EU) as one of the founder states. In 1957, the treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in Rome. Today, they are referred to as the “Treaties of Rome.” The French contribution to the EU has strongly influenced the political views on the development of Europe, notably pushing for a large contribution of member states to the decision making processes and to the orientation of the EU policies.
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SAYARI, SABRI. "Migration Policies of Sending Countries: Perspectives on the Turkish Experience." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 485, no. 1 (May 1986): 87–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716286485001008.
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During the 1960s and early 1970s, Turkey participated heavily in the process of labor migration from the Mediterranean basin to Western Europe. In addition to the policy preferences of advanced industrial European states and the demand for jobs in Europe by large numbers of Turks, Turkey's migration policies played a significant role in the expansion of the migratory flow. Turkish policymakers sought to use labor migration abroad to fulfill several objectives such as reducing unemployment and increasing the volume of foreign-exchange reserves through remittances. The migration of Turkish workers to Western Europe produced some significant results concerning these primary objectives. The policy of exporting workers, however, has also had important unintended consequences and problems for Turkey.
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Amara, Kifah. "THE ROLE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING IN ENHANCING STUDENTS’ INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE." Near East University Online Journal of Education 3, no. 1 (January 29, 2020): 22–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.32955/neuje.v3i1.177.
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This study emphasizes the critical role of foreign language teaching in enhancing students’ intercultural competence, as a means of expanding their future opportunities in an increasingly multicultural and diverse world. Foreign language classes may provide unique opportunities for delivering a plurilingual, multicultural setting utilizing the cultural elements in the course content and course materials as well as the personal experiences of the teacher in the classroom. To that end, more attention is needed to foreign language teacher preparation and training. As multiculturalism is a significant feature of European communities, this study sought to investigate and analyze the related policies, strategies and practices in Europe, since Paris declaration 2015, in order to determine actions have been taken to address those needs. This qualitative study is based on document analysis of the European Educational Policy documents released mainly by the European Commission and the Council of Europe. The results of the analysis showed that foreign language education has presented along with intercultural education in the vast majority of European educational policies as a dominant component within the context of integration and promote social cohesion, as well as increase competitiveness and employability. The study has implied a number of implications highlighted some potential gaps that may be diminish the effectiveness of these policies, pushing towards more empirical research on the influence of EU policies on national level actions.
Keywords: Foreign language Teaching, Intercultural competence, multilingual competence, plurilingual, multicultural setting, European documents, European Education Policy.
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Laitin, David. "Rational Islamophobia in Europe." European Journal of Sociology 51, no. 3 (December 2010): 429–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003975610000202.
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Social and political relations between Europe and the Muslim world are politically fractious. Attacks in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005), and the riots in suburban Paris in November 2005 and November 2007, have all been attributed to “Muslims”. Political parties in Europe (for example the Front National in France, which placed second in the presidential elections of 2002), have mobilized opinion against a Muslim threat to Europe. Relations between the countries and societies of the European Union and the Muslim World have therefore become politically consequential on a number of dimensions – foreign policy in regard to the Middle East; new membership into the EU; and the vast migration of Muslim populations into EU states.
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Vascik, George, and Robert Mark Spaulding. "Ostpolitik and Osthandel. German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer." German Studies Review 22, no. 1 (February 1999): 157. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1431622.
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Pravda, Alex. "The new foreign policies of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe." Diplomacy & Statecraft 5, no. 3 (November 1994): 494–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592299408405941.
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Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés, and Callum Wilkie. "Context and the role of policies to attract foreign R&D in Europe." European Planning Studies 24, no. 11 (September 20, 2016): 2014–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09654313.2016.1226783.
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Oppermann, Kai, Ryan Beasley, and Juliet Kaarbo. "British foreign policy after Brexit: losing Europe and finding a role." International Relations 34, no. 2 (July 17, 2019): 133–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117819864421.
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British foreign policy stands at a turning point following the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum. Drawing on role theory, we trace the United Kingdom’s efforts to establish new foreign policy roles as it interacts with the concerned international actors. We find that the pro-Brexit desire to ‘take back control’ has not yet translated into a cogent foreign policy direction. In its efforts to avoid adopting the role of isolate, the United Kingdom has projected a disoriented foreign policy containing elements of partially incompatible roles such as great power, global trading state, leader of the Commonwealth, regional partner to the European Union (EU) and faithful ally to the United States. The international community has, through processes of socialisation and alter-casting, largely rejected these efforts. These role conflicts between the United Kingdom and international actors, as well as conflicts among its different role aspirations, have pressed UK policies towards its unwanted isolationist role, potentially shaping its long-term foreign policy orientation post-Brexit.
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Maull, Hanns W. "What German Responsibility Means." Security and Human Rights 26, no. 1 (December 29, 2015): 11–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18750230-02601012.
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“Responsibility” has long been a key political concept in German foreign policy since 1949. It reflects the shadow cast by Germany over Europe during the first half of the last century, and therefore implies a determination to pursue, at home and abroad, policies that are diametrically opposed to those pursued by Berlin under Emperor Wilhelm ii and Nazi Germany. In today’s context, German foreign policy “responsibility” has to deal with the breakdown of the pan-European order of Paris. The article argues that Berlin against this background should assume a leadership role within the osce along three major lines: new initiatives to launch co-operative security policies; long-term energy co-operation; and co-operative efforts to enhance the very fragile foundations of governance throughout Eastern Europe.
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Yusuf, Hakeem. "S.A.S v France." International Human Rights Law Review 3, no. 2 (November 19, 2014): 277–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22131035-00302006.
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The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has upheld the French law which prohibits the concealment of one’s face in public places. The law is directed principally at prohibiting Muslim women covering their faces in public spaces in France. The decision of the Strasbourg Court is premised on the French notion of ‘le vivre ensemble’; ‘living together.’ This critical analysis of the judgment contends that the decision is flawed and retrogressive for women’s rights in particular and undermines the socio-cultural rights and freedoms of individuals who belong to minority groups in general. On wider implications of the decision, it is worrisome that the decision appears to pander to dangerous political leanings currently growing in many parts of Europe and beyond. The Court risks promoting forced assimilation policies against minorities in various parts of the world. To illustrate its implications, the article highlights the experience of the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.
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Taran, Alina, R. M. Ammar Zahid, and Marilena Mironiuc. "Foreign Ownership and Financial Disclosure in Central and Eastern Europe." Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business 10, no. 2 (December 1, 2017): 151–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/tjeb-2017-0010.
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AbstractIt is recognized that multinational corporations (MNC) have played a significant role in the recent worldwide accounting reform. This study analyses the influence of foreign ownership, and MNC on financial disclosure practices of listed companies from Central and Eastern European countries (CEE). The possible reverse effect is also considered, and thus, the role of disclosure in attracting foreign investments is investigated. Fixed effects panel analysis has been conducted for 2005-2015 period, in the context of partial IFRS adoption in CEE. Contrary to hypothesized expectations, the influence of foreign ownership on the extent of disclosure is negative. As foreign investors in CEE are dominantly corporations, it seems they impose their own reporting policies or report detailed group information, which may diminish the disclosure of foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, it was found that foreign investors are not sensitive to changes of items in reported information. This evidence raises questions regarding the purpose, and the impact of disclosure on financial markets. Overall, this study gives a signal to standard-setters about reporting practices at regional level, and adds an original empirical contribution to reporting behavior and corporate transparency literature. Moreover, it invites to further research on reporting practices of companies with foreign ownership.
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Héjj, Dominik. "The Three Seas Initiative in the foreign affairs policy of Hungary." Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 17, no. 3 (December 2019): 116–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.36874/riesw.2019.3.7.
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The Three Seas Initiative (TSI) constitutes a project involving the cooperation of twelve European countries. Poland and Croatia, the founders of the TSI, are especially active in this respect. Even though Hungary seems the closest political ally of Poland, the country rarely participates in TSI actions. In addition, when pursuing its politics, Hungary remains in contradiction to the principles of the TSI- chiefly regarding energy policies. The paper aims to offer answers to questions concerning the significance of the TSI in Hungary’s foreign affairs policies and the country’s perception of such a form of cooperation in Europe.
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Kistaubayeva, А. K. "Labor immigration of Kazakhs to France." BULLETIN of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University. Historical sciences. Philosophy. Religion Series 133, no. 4 (2020): 77–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.32523/2616-7255-2020-133-4-77-86.
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This article examines the state of labor immigration of the Kazakh Diaspora, as well as studying the possibilities of conditions for economic adaptation of Kazakhs in developed capitalist countries. The purpose of this study is to identify the causes of labor migration of Kazakhs to France. Based on this goal, the study solves the following tasks aimed at studying the history and current situation of Kazakhs living in France, in the focus of analyzing the policy of the French government in relation to immigration workers and employees in the 1945- 1980-ies; the reasons for labor immigration of Kazakhs to France. Western Europe has become a center of attraction for foreign workers coming here, primarily from the less developed countries of the continent, as well as from Turkey. In the last ten years, inter-state migration of workers in Western Europe has grown to unprecedented proportions. Every year, more than a million workers were sent from one European country to another in search of work. The reasons lay in the political and economic crisis, the increase in the unemployment rate, which was the result of an increase in the number of migrants among Kazakhs in France. The post-war economic situation caused the demand for workers to restore the economy destroyed by the war, and led to an increase in the level of tariffs (wages). Scientists believe that the active replenishment of the French labor market with cheap foreign labor from other countries is due to the convenient location of France.
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Dyson, Kenneth, and Peter Humphreys. "Satellite Broadcasting Policies and the Question of Sovereignty in Western Europe." Journal of Public Policy 6, no. 1 (January 1986): 73–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x0000386x.
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AbstractThe article examines the manner in which public-policy for satellite broadcasting has been made in West Germany and France, the two countries currently leading developments in satellite broadcasting technology in Western Europe. A special theme of the two case studies is that of the complex relations and potential contradictions between industrial/technological policy and broadcasting policy, between the wider economics of satellite broadcasting and its cultural dimension. The article demonstrates a common pattern, as policy makers in both countries have been constrained to develop a broker role between competing aims and between national/regional pressures and international pressures. Nevertheless, both ideological and structural differences remained of enduring importance in establishing the parameters of policy making, and produced different, as well as similar, policy outcomes in the two countries. The question of ‘sovereignty’ is also set within the wider European context and the article examines responses at this latter level, in particular the European Community.
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Majeed, Fareeha. "IMPACT OF TRUMP POLICIES ON US-EU PARTNERSHIP IN CURRENT AND PROJECTED TIMEFRAME." Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 56, no. 2 (December 31, 2017): 145–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.46568/jssh.v56i2.52.
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After the American elections of 2016, an upset occurred with the victory of Donald Trump as the president of United States of America. From day one, he was in lime light due to his controversial polices and extremist behaviour towards Muslims and other countries of the world. Similarly, he had a very odd behaviour towards European Union and its member countries or in other words it would be accurate to say that he wanted to demolish European Union. In current scenario, EU is facing multidimensional problems in the form refugee crisis from many parts of the world, Russian aggressive policies towards EU, ethnic movements in Europe, and above all critical elections in Italy, France and the Netherlands. Currently, it seems that the whole Europe is at stake and all these circumstances are leading EU towards a huge crisis. It seems that EU is facing the most difficult time period since its emergence. Critics are clearly indicating that EU could only survive with the active participation of France and Germany and that Europe needs serious changes by hearing the voice of the people and can gain its strength back by solving the major issues such as immigration problems and increased terrorism.
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Guliyev, I. "Oil Transport Networks in Europe." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 4(37) (August 28, 2014): 68–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-4-37-68-72.
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The author examines the problems and prospects of crude oil and petroleum products transportation market on the European continent. Particular attention is paid to the possibilities of the planned pipeline routes and new supplies of oil and petroleum products. European Union countries have large reserves of hydrocarbons, but it is not enough to fully satisfy domestic consumption. Improved pipeline infrastructure both within the EU and oil pipelines from other countries is an important economic and social factor. Recent developments of this year especially emphasize the importance of strengthening the energy security in the foreign policy of the state. For transporting fuel energy in Europe used the following types of transport: marine (sea and river), truck, railway, and pipeline. It seems necessary to mention the fact that the role of pipeline transport is particularly high in the oil and gas industry. Pipeline transport has an important impact on the formation and developmen t of the fuel and energy complex of the state, as well as regions, as its integral part. An effective system of crude oil and petroleum products pipelines is an important tool for the implementation of public policies, policies at the EU level, allowing the country to regulate the supply of crude oil and petroleum products to the overseas and domestic markets.
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Kim, Seongjin. "Mixed Movements and Refugee Policies in Europe: Cases of France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK." Journal of Political Science & Communication 23, no. 2 (June 30, 2020): 89–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.15617/psc.2020.6.30.2.89.
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Podkaminer, Leon. "Central and Eastern Europe: Trapped in integration?" Acta Oeconomica 65, s1 (December 2015): 83–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/032.65.2015.s1.6.
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The Central and Eastern European new Member States of the European Union (CEECs) went through the transition process following the commandments of the Washington Consensus, which gradually evolved into the “integrative growth model”. External liberalisation exposed the CEECs to recurring problems over external imbalances, bubbles driven by capital inflows, and resulting growth instabilities. Large foreign direct investment inflows attracted by repressed wages and low taxes do not accelerate growth. Arguably, real convergence would be much faster under a system with built-in limitations to free trade, free capital movements – and with more scope for traditional industrial, trade, incomes, and fiscal policies.