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1
Rahwan, Talal, Tomasz Michalak, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jacek Sroka, Michael Wooldridge, and Nicholas Jennings. "Constrained Coalition Formation." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 25, no. 1 (August 4, 2011): 719–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7888.
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The conventional model of coalition formation considers every possible subset of agents as a potential coalition. However, in many real-world applications, there are inherent constraints on feasible coalitions: for instance, certain agents may be prohibited from being in the same coalition, or the coalition structure may be required to consist of coalitions of the same size. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of constrained coalition formation (CCF). We propose a general framework for this problem, and identify an important class of CCF settings, where the constraints specify which groups of agents should/should not work together. We describe a procedure that transforms such constraints into a structured input that allows coalition formation algorithms to identify, without any redundant computations, all the feasible coalitions. We then use this procedure to develop an algorithm for generating an optimal (welfare-maximizing) constrained coalition structure, and show that it outperforms existing state-of-the-art approaches by several orders of magnitude.
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Dutta, Bhaskar, and Hannu Vartiainen. "Coalition formation and history dependence." Theoretical Economics 15, no. 1 (2020): 159–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te2947.
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Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance, by Harsanyi and Ray and Vohra, have typically been based on the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional “moves” in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. Dutta and Vohra point out that these solution concepts do not require coalitions to make optimal moves. Hence, these solution concepts can yield unreasonable predictions. Dutta and Vohra restricted coalitions to hold common, history‐independent expectations that incorporate optimality regarding the continuation path. This paper extends the Dutta–Vohra analysis by allowing for history‐dependent expectations. The paper provides characterization results for two solution concepts that correspond to two versions of optimality. It demonstrates the power of history dependence by establishing nonemptyness results for all finite games as well as transferable utility partition function games. The paper also provides partial comparisons of the solution concepts to other solutions.
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GOLDER, SONA NADENICHEK. "Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies." British Journal of Political Science 36, no. 2 (March 9, 2006): 193–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123406000123.
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Political parties that wish to exercise executive power in parliamentary democracies are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to election or they can compete independently and form a government coalition afterwards. While there is a vast literature on government coalitions, little is known about pre-electoral coalitions. A systematic analysis of these coalitions using a new dataset constructed by the author and presented here contains information on all potential pre-electoral coalition dyads in twenty industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Finally, they are more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.
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CURRARINI, SERGIO, and MARCO A. MARINI. "COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES." International Game Theory Review 08, no. 01 (March 2006): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000813.
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This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2003). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs of the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated by the formation of coalitions, a stable coalition structure always exists provided that players are symmetric and either the game exhibits strategic complementarity or, if strategies are substitutes, the best reply functions are contractions.
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Singhal, Shiksha, and Veeraruna Kavitha. "Coalition Formation Resource Sharing Games in Networks." ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 49, no. 3 (March 22, 2022): 57–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3529113.3529132.
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Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several players (willing to cooperate) and a possible adamant player (unwilling to cooperate) involved in resource-sharing. Here, the strategy of a player is the set of players with whom it wants to form a coalition. Given a strategy profile, an appropriate partition of coalitions is formed; players in each coalition maximize their collective utilities leading to a non-cooperative resource-sharing game among the coalitions, the (unique) utilities at the resulting equilibrium are shared via Shapley-value; these shares define the utilities of players for the given strategy profile in the coalition-formation game. We also consider the utilitarian solution to derive the price of anarchy.
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OWEN, GUILLERMO. "ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS." International Game Theory Review 10, no. 04 (December 2008): 461–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908002047.
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We develop a model of coalition formation based on personal proximities among the players of an n-person game. Several examples are worked out in detail, showing that certain coalitions are much more stable than others, and/or much more likely to form than others. We also consider the dynamics of such coalition-formation. By a numerical example, we show that small changes in the initial conditions can lead to very different results in the coalitions formed in a given game.
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BEJAN, CAMELIA, and JUAN CAMILO GÓMEZ. "USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION." International Game Theory Review 14, no. 01 (March 2012): 1250004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500041.
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This work uses the defining principles of the core solution concept to determine not only payoffs but also coalition formation. Given a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game, we propose two noncooperative procedures that in equilibrium deliver a natural and nonempty core extension, the aspiration core, together with the supporting coalitions it implies. As expected, if the cooperative game is balanced, the grand coalition forms. However, if the core is empty, other coalitions arise. Following the aspiration literature, not only partitions but also overlapping coalition configurations are allowed. Our procedures interpret this fact in different ways. The first game allows players to participate with a fraction of their time in more than one coalition, while the second assigns probabilities to the formation of potentially overlapping coalitions. We use the strong Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concepts.
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Shi, Yuanyuan, Gang Zhu, Siyu Lin, Jianwen Ding, and Shengfeng Xu. "Coalitional Game Theory for Cooperative Interference Management in Femtocell Networks." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2015 (2015): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/767649.
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Dense deployment of femtocells can cause serious intra-tier interference in femtocell networks. In this paper, a new cooperative interference management approach which allows the femtocell user equipment (FUE) to merge into cooperative groups, that is, coalitions, for the uplink transmissions in a femtocell network is proposed, so as to reduce the intra-tier interference and improve the system performance. Taking into account the power cost for cooperation, we claim that all the FUEs are impossible to merge together, and we formulate the proposed cooperative problem as a coalitional game in partition form with an externality due to the interference between the formed coalitions. To get the solution, a novel distributed coalition formation algorithm that takes advantage of the characteristics of femtocell network and allows the FUEs to interact and individually decide on which coalitions to participate in is proposed. Furthermore, we analyze the convergence and stability of the proposed algorithm. Simulations are conducted to illustrate the behavior and the performance of the proposed coalition formation algorithm among FUEs. Results show that the proposed algorithm can improve the system performance with much lower complexity than some previously proposed coalition formation algorithms.
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MARTIN, LANNY W., and RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON. "The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation." American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 503–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055410000213.
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Previous research on coalition politics has found an “incumbency advantage” in government formation, but it has provided no clear explanation as to why this advantage exists. We classify existing theories as either preference-based or institutions-based explanations for why incumbent coalitions might be likely to form again, and we integrate these explanations into a coherent theoretical argument. We also claim that it is possible, to some extent, to distinguish these explanations empirically by taking into account the “historical context” of coalition bargaining. Using a comprehensive new data set on coalition bargaining in Europe, we show that coalitions, in general, are more likely to form if the parties comprising them have worked together in the recent past, and that incumbent coalitions are more likely to re-form if partners have not experienced a severe public conflict while in office together or suffered a recent setback at the polls. The incumbency advantage disappears completely if partners have become mired in conflict or have lost legislative seats (even after accounting for the impact of seat share on coalition size). Moreover, in certain circumstances, institutional rules that grant incumbents an advantage in coalition bargaining greatly enhance their ability to remain in office.
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Kong, XiangLong, XiangRong Tong, and YingJie Wang. "Min- k -Cut Coalition Structure Generation on Trust-Utility Relationship Graph." Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2021 (April 14, 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8834879.
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Trust relationships have an important effect on coalition formation. In many real scenarios, agents usually cooperate with others in their trusted social networks to form coalitions. Therefore, the trust value between agents should constrain the utility of forming coalitions when cooperating. At the same time, most studies ignore the impact of the number of coalitions in coalition structure. In this paper, the coalition formation of trust-utility relationship in social networks is researched. Each node represents an agent, and the trust-utility networks that connect the agents constrain coalition formation. To solve the task assignment problem, this paper proposes a greedy algorithm which is based on the edge contraction. Under the premise of ensuring the agent’s individually rationality, this algorithm simulates the formation process of coalitions between agents through continuous edge contraction and constrains the number of forming coalitions to k to solve the problem of coalition structure. Finally, the simulation results show that our algorithm has great scalability because of the ability of solving the coalition structure on a large-scale agent set. It can meet the growing demand for data intensive applications in the Internet of things and artificial intelligence era. The quality of the solution is much higher than other algorithms, and the running time is negligible.
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Chitnis, Rajesh, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, and Vahid Liaghat. "Parameterized Complexity of Problems in Coalitional Resource Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 25, no. 1 (August 4, 2011): 620–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7887.
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Coalition formation is a key topic in multi-agent systems. Coalitions enable agents to achieve goals that they may nothave been able to achieve on their own. Previous work hasshown problems in coalition games to be computationally hard. Wooldridge and Dunne (Artifi. Intell. 2006) studied the classical computational complexity of several natural decision problems in Coalitional Resource Games (CRG) - games in which each agent is endowed with a set of resources and coalitions can bring about a set of goals if they are collectively endowed with the necessary amount of resources. The input of coalitional resource games bundles together several elements, e.g., the agent set Ag, the goal set G, the resource set R, etc. Shrot et al. (AAMAS 2009) examine coalition formation problems in the CRG model using the theory of Parameterized Complexity. Their refined analysis shows that not all parts of input act equal - some instances of the problem are indeed tractable while others still remain intractable.We answer an important question left open by Shrot, Aumann,and Kraus by showing that the SC Problem (checking whether a Coalition is Successful) is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the size of the coalition. Then via a single theme of reduction from SC, we are able to show that various problems related to resources, resource bounds, and resource conflicts introduced by Wooldridge et al. are (i) W[1]-hard or co-W[1]-hard w.r.t the size of the coalition; and (ii) Para-NP hard or co-Para-NP-hard w.r.t |R|. When parameterized by |G| or |R| + |Ag|, we give a general algorithm which proves that these problems are indeed tractable.
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Chalkiadakis, G., E. Elkind, E. Markakis, M. Polukarov, and N. R. Jennings. "Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 39 (September 24, 2010): 179–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.3075.
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In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle such scenarios, we introduce a model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitionsor overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games. We then explore the issue of stability in this setting. In particular, we introduce a notion of the core, which generalizes the corresponding notion in the traditional (non-overlapping) scenario. Then, under some quite general conditions, we characterize the elements of the core, and show that any element of the core maximizes the social welfare. We also introduce a concept of balancedness for overlapping coalitional games, and use it to characterize coalition structures that can be extended to elements of the core. Finally, we generalize the notion of convexity to our setting, and show that under some natural assumptions convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we introduce two alternative notions of stability in OCF that allow a wider range of deviations, and explore the relationships among the corresponding definitions of the core, as well as the classic (non-overlapping) core and the Aubin core. We illustrate the general properties of the three cores, and also study them from a computational perspective, thus obtaining additional insights into their fundamental structure.
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Faia, Ricardo, Tiago Pinto, Fernando Lezama, Zita Vale, and Juan Manuel Corchado. "Optimisation for Coalitions Formation Considering the Fairness in Flexibility Market Participation." E3S Web of Conferences 239 (2021): 00016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202123900016.
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This paper proposes a coalitional game-theoretical model for consumers’ flexibility coalition formation, supported by an optimization model based on differential evolution. Traditionally, the participation in conventional electricity markets used to be limited to large producers and consumers. The final end-users contract their energy supply with retailers, since due to the smaller quantity available for trading, they cannot participate in electricity market transactions. Nowadays, the growing concept of local electricity market brings many advantages to the end-users. The flexibility negotiation considering local areas is an important procedure for network operators and it is incorporating a local electricity market opportunity. A coalition formation model to facilitate small players participation in the flexibility market proposed by the network operator is addressed in this work. The inclusion of Shapley value in the proposed model enables finding the best coalition structures considering the fairness of the coalitions in addition to the potential income achieved by the consumers when selling their flexibility. An optimization model based on differential evolution is also proposed as the way to find the optimal coalition structures based on the multi-criteria specifications.
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Malik, Sumbal, Manzoor Ahmed Khan, Hesham El-Sayed, and M. Jalal Khan. "Should Autonomous Vehicles Collaborate in a Complex Urban Environment or Not?" Smart Cities 6, no. 5 (September 20, 2023): 2447–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/smartcities6050111.
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A specialized version of collaborative driving is convoy driving. It is referred to as the practice of driving more than one vehicle consecutively in the same lane with a small inter-vehicle distance, maintaining the same speed. Extensive research has been conducted on convoys of heavy-duty trucks on the highway; however, limited research has studied convoy driving in an urban environment. The complex dynamics of an urban environment require short-lived collaboration with varying numbers of vehicles rather than collaborating over hours. The motivation of this research is to investigate how convoy driving can be realized to address the challenges of an urban environment and achieve the benefits of autonomous driving such as reduced fuel consumption, travel time, improved safety, and ride comfort. In this work, the best-fitted coalitional game framework is utilized to formulate the convoy driving problem as a coalition formation game in an urban environment. A hypothesis is formulated that traveling in a coalition is more beneficial for a vehicle than traveling alone. In connection with this, a coalitional game and an all-comprehensive utility function are designed, modeled, and implemented to facilitate the formation of autonomous vehicle coalitions for convoy driving. Multiple solution concepts, such as the Shapley allocation, the Nucleolus, and the Core, are implemented to solve and analyze the proposed convoy driving game. Furthermore, several coalition formation strategies such as traveling mode selection, selecting optimal coalitions, and making decisions about coalition merging are developed to analyze the behavior of the vehicles. In addition to this, extensive numerical experiments with different settings are conducted to evaluate and validate the performance of the proposed study. The experimental results proved the hypothesis that traveling in a convoy is significantly more beneficial than traveling alone. We conclude that traveling in a convoy is beneficial for coalition sizes of two to four vehicles with an inter-vehicle spacing of less than 4 m considering the limitations of an urban environment. Traveling in a coalition allows vehicles to save on fuel, minimize travel time and enhance safety and comfort. Furthermore, the findings of this research state that achieving the enormous benefits of traveling in a coalition requires finding the right balance between inter-vehicle distance and coalition size. In the future, we plan to extend this work by studying the evolving dynamics of the coalitions and the environment.
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Gravdahl, Hans Petter. "Consensual Coalitions? Coalition Formation in Norwegian Municipalities." Scandinavian Political Studies 21, no. 4 (November 1998): 307–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.1998.tb00017.x.
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Bullinger, Martin, and René Romen. "Stability in Online Coalition Formation." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38, no. 9 (March 24, 2024): 9537–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28809.
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Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work, we consider an online variant of the problem, where agents arrive in sequence and whenever an agent arrives, they have to be assigned to a coalition immediately and irrevocably. The scarce existing literature on online coalition formation has focused on the objective of maximizing social welfare, a demanding requirement, even in the offline setting. Instead, we seek to achieve stable coalition structures in an online setting, and focus on stability concepts based on deviations by single agents. We present a comprehensive picture in additively separable hedonic games, leading to dichotomies, where positive results are obtained by deterministic algorithms and negative results even hold for randomized algorithms.
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Miyata, Mayuko, and Shao-Chin Sung. "Coalition Formation Based Staffing Strategy Development." Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics 16, no. 3 (May 20, 2012): 430–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/jaciii.2012.p0430.
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In this paper, we propose game theoretical models for developing staffing strategies, i.e., strategies which support managers’ decision making on hiring, head hunting, staff reassignment, and implementation of staff development policy in enterprises. Our staffing models are hedonic coalition formation games with newly proposed stability concepts calledinvitation based stabilities, in which players’ activities of changing their coalitions are motivated based on invitation from other coalitions. These stabilities capture behaviors of managers, employees, and contractors depending on the balance of power in business situations. We analyze the existence of stable coalition structures under invitation based stabilities, and provide several sufficient conditions with natural interpretations as staffing strategies.
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TAVITS, MARGIT. "The Role of Parties' Past Behavior in Coalition Formation." American Political Science Review 102, no. 4 (November 2008): 495–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055408080362.
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This study considers whether and to what extent defections from a government coalition are punished. The study employs data on coalitions in eastern and western Europe from 1950 through 2006. The results show that if a coalition breaks due to conflict between partners or if one party withdraws from it, subsequent inclusion of the conflicting parties in the same coalition becomes less likely. Additional tests demonstrate that this effect occurs because defectors are punished by their former coalition partners. Another extension of the main analysis shows that rather than becoming pariah parties, defectors lose credibility only in the eyes of their former coalition partners.
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Jenkins, Garrett J., Brittany Rhoades Cooper, Angie Funaiole, and Laura G. Hill. "Which aspects of coalition functioning are key at different stages of coalition development? A qualitative comparative analysis." Implementation Research and Practice 3 (January 2022): 263348952211126. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/26334895221112694.
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Background Coalitions are increasingly utilized to promote positive community health outcomes. Typically, coalitions produce more desirable outcomes when coalition functioning is strong and the coalition model is implemented with fidelity. Although theory indicates that coalitions proceed through predictable stages of development, minimal research explicitly examines functioning and fidelity at these different stages. Method Within a larger evaluation of Washington State Community Prevention and Wellness Initiative, this cross-sectional study employs qualitative comparative analysis to illuminate the coalition functioning conditions necessary and sufficient to produce high model fidelity at different stages of development in 43 substance misuse prevention coalitions in one state. Results In the formation stage, only the presence of high levels of coalition leadership was sufficient to produce high model fidelity. In the maintenance stage, three combinations of conditions were sufficient: (1) sustainability planning if, and only if, accompanied by the absence of coalition participation costs, (2) coordinator leadership, and (3) a combination of coalition leadership and team cohesion. In the institutionalization stage, two solutions were sufficient: (1) coalition leadership if, and only if, accompanied by the absence of sustainability planning, and (2) sustainability planning if, and only if, accompanied by the absence of coordinator leadership. Conclusions This study illustrates several tangible steps technical assistance providers may take to increase the likelihood of achieving model fidelity. In the formation stage, skillful and inclusive coalition leadership is important. In the maintenance stage, technical assistance should focus on reducing participant-perceived costs; increasing sustainability planning; enhancing coordinator-specific leadership; and developing team cohesion and coalition leadership. For coalitions in the institutionalization stage, coalition leadership and sustainability planning may be prime targets for technical assistance. Plain Language Summary: Community coalition approaches to addressing social problems are common and have some evidence of producing positive community outcomes. Research shows that coalitions produce more desirable outcomes when coalition functioning is strong and the coalition model is implemented as it was designed. Although theory suggests that coalitions proceed through predictable stages of development, few studies look at which supports are most needed, at each stage, to improve coalition functioning and implementation. This study aims to help answer that question by determining which aspects of coalition functioning, in which combinations, are key to strong, well-functioning coalitions at different developmental stages in a sample of prevention coalitions in Washington State focused on youth substance misuse. The results suggest that having a strong coalition leadership team is key for all coalitions, regardless of development stage. For coalitions earlier in their formation, this was especially true. For coalitions further into their development, the combination of strong coordinator leadership and strong team cohesion was particularly important. Finally, for the most well-established coalitions, if sustainability planning was weak, strong coalition team leadership was key; but if coordinator leadership was weak, strong sustainability planning was critical to offset the lack of strong leadership. The results can be used to inform the types of technical assistance provided to support coalitions at different developmental stages.
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Rauscher. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: Large Coalitions that Achieve Little." Games 10, no. 4 (November 8, 2019): 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10040047.
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A standard result of coalition formation games is that stable coalitions are very small if the coalition plays Nash vis-à-vis the rest of the world and if abatement costs are quadratic. It has been shown that larger coalitions and even the grand coalition are possible if the marginal abatement cost is concave. The paper confirms this result, but shows that abatement activities by large coalitions smaller than the grand coalition can be very small. This can be ‘repaired’ only by assuming that the marginal abatement cost curve changes its curvature extremely once the stable coalition has been reached.
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Hall, Michael G. "Coalition Formation and Models of Capitalism." Business and Politics 8, no. 3 (December 2006): 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1150.
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Why do different industrial democracies employ different processes in determining trade policy and different models of capitalism? Two variables account for the nature of the decision-making process for trade policy. First, the level of inter-industry factor mobility determines if class or sectoral coalitions predominate. Second, the size of policy coalitions depends on which branch of government dominates trade policy. Legislatures favor minimum winning coalitions, while executives favor maximal coalitions. These two variables condition different patterns of coalition making: partisan, pluralist, corporatist, and interventionist. I illustrate this theory analyzing the development of policymaking concerning trade in France and Sweden.
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HAJDUKOVÁ, JANA. "COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY." International Game Theory Review 08, no. 04 (December 2006): 613–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001144.
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In this paper we give an overview of various methods used to study cooperation within a set of players. Besides the classical games with transferable utility and games without transferable utility, recently new models have been proposed: the coalition formation games. In these, each player has his own preferences over coalitions to which he could belong and the quality of a coalition structure is evaluated according to its stability. We review various definitions of stability and restrictions of preferences ensuring the existence of a partition stable with respect to a particular stability definition. Further, we stress the importance of preferences over sets of players derived from preferences over individuals and review the known algorithmic results for special types of preferences derived from the best and/or the worst player of a coalition.
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Wolff, Torge, and Astrid Nieße. "Dynamic Overlapping Coalition Formation in Electricity Markets: An Extended Formal Model." Energies 16, no. 17 (August 29, 2023): 6289. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en16176289.
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The future power system will be characterized by many small decentralized power plants—so-called distributed energy resources (DERs). The integration of these DERs is vital from an economic and grid operation point of view. One approach to this is the aggregation of such DERs. The formation of coalitions as an aggregation method has already been examined in the literature and applied in virtual power plants, active distribution networks, and microgrids. The spread of DERs also increases the need for flexibility and dynamics in the power grid. One approach to address this can be overlapping coalitions. Therefore, in this paper, we first performed an analysis of related work and, in this context, found no work on overlapping coalitions for energy use cases in the literature. We then described a method for dynamic coalition formation, called dynamic coalition in electricity markets (DYCE), and analyzed how DYCE would need to be extended to include overlapping coalition formation. The extension includes the phases of product portfolio optimization and the actual coalition formation. Our analysis of DYCE shows that the methods used for the optimization of the DYCE sub-tasks are not suitable for overlapping coalitions and would have to be replaced by other methods in order to be able to form overlapping coalitions.
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Yao, Changhua, Lei Zhu, Yongxing Jia, and Lei Wang. "Demand-aware traffic cooperation for self-organizing cognitive small-cell networks." International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 15, no. 1 (January 2019): 155014771881728. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1550147718817289.
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This article investigates the problem of efficient spectrum access for traffic demands of self-organizing cognitive small-cell networks, using the coalitional game approach. In particular, we propose a novel spectrum and time two-dimensional Traffic Cooperation Coalitional Game model which aims to improve the network throughput. The main motivation is to complete the data traffics of users, and the main idea is to make use of spectrum resource efficiently by reducing mutual interference in the spectrum dimension and considering cooperative data transmission in the time dimension at the same time. With the approach of coalition formation, compared with the traditional binary order in most existing coalition formation algorithms, the proposed functional order indicates a more flexibly preferring action which is a functional value determined by the environment information. To solve the distributed self-organizing traffic cooperation coalition formation problem, we propose three coalition formation algorithms: the first one is the Binary Preferring Traffic Cooperation Coalition Formation Algorithm based on the traditional Binary Preferring order; the second one is the Best Selection Traffic Cooperation Coalition Formation Algorithm based on the functional Best Selection order to improve the converging speed; and the third one is the Probabilistic Decision Traffic Cooperation Coalition Formation Algorithm based on the functional Probabilistic Decision order to improve the performance of the formed coalition. The proposed three algorithms are proved to converge to Nash-stable coalition structure. Simulation results verify the theoretic analysis and the proposed approaches.
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McCammon, Holly, and Karen Campbell. "Allies On the Road to Victory: Coalition Formation Between The Suffragists and The Woman's Christian Temperance Union." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 7, no. 3 (October 1, 2002): 231–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.17813/maiq.7.3.p61v81l7914865qv.
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Social movement organizations frequently enter into coalitions with other movement groups. Yet few movement scholars have investigated the circumstances that foster coalition work. This article analyzes both the contextual and organizational factors that spurred coalitions between women's suffrage organizations and Woman's Christian Temperance Unions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as they worked to win voting rights for women. We find that circumstances that threatened the goals of these organizations led to coalitions, while political opportunities did not produce coalition work. In addition, organizational resources and ideologies also influenced the likelihood of the emergence of a coalition.
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GARRATT, ROD, JAMES E. PARCO, CHENG-ZHONG QIN, and AMNON RAPOPORT. "POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION." International Game Theory Review 07, no. 04 (December 2005): 407–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000612.
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A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that non-minimal winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy positions of the parties is small relative to the value of forming the government. These conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of the time, respectively. In the remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform with potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the observed Nash equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. Other solution concepts including iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and strong/coalition-proof Nash equilibrium are also tested.
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Falcó-Gimeno, Albert, and Pablo Fernandez-Vazquez. "Choices that matter: Coalition formation and parties’ ideological reputations." Political Science Research and Methods 8, no. 2 (January 15, 2019): 285–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2018.63.
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AbstractThis paper examines how a party’s decision to enter a coalition government affects voter perceptions of the party’s policy position. We argue that, for the decision to change voter beliefs, it must be at odds with voters’ prior opinions about the party. Specifically, the party must join a coalition that is not the one voters perceive as the ideologically closest option. Otherwise, the party’s action simply confirms voters’ pre-existing beliefs. Hence, whether or not joining a coalition alters voter attitudes depends on the type of alternative coalitions the party could enter. We test the hypothesis using three complementary empirical strategies: a cross-country analysis of party reputations in five coalition-prone European countries, individual panel data, and a quasi-experimental test. All three empirical tests provide support for our claim. This paper contributes to our understanding of voter information processing, coalition politics, and party competition.
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Groseclose, Tim, and James M. Snyder. "Buying Supermajorities." American Political Science Review 90, no. 2 (June 1996): 303–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082886.
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Minimal winning coalitions have appeared as a key prediction or as an essential assumption of virtually all formal models of coalition formation, vote buying, and logrolling. Notwithstanding this research, we provide a model showing that supermajority coalitions may be cheaper than minimal winning coalitions. Specifically, if vote buyers move sequentially, and if the losing vote buyer is always granted a last chance to attack the winner's coalition, then minimal winning coalitions will generally not be cheapest, and equilibrium coalitions will generally not be minimal winning. We provide results relating equilibrium coalition size with preferences of the legislators and vote buyers, and we show that minimal winning coalitions should occur in only rare cases. We discuss these results in light of empirical work on coalition size and suggest other possible avenues for testing our model.
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Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha, and Mandar Oak. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation." Games 13, no. 4 (June 21, 2022): 48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13040048.
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We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties’ seat shares, the size of the rents from holding office and their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be ‘disconnected’. We then look at how the coalition formation game affects the incentives for party formation. In particular, we show that when the rents from office are low, the median citizen stands unopposed, and when rents are high, there is more political entry. For intermediate rents, we show that strategic dropouts can happen to influence the final policy. We show that the incentives for strategic dropout can be higher under proportional representation than plurality voting, contrary to Duverger’s law. Our model explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and integrates models of political entry with models of coalitional bargaining.
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Barberà, Salvador, and Anke Gerber. "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures." Mathematical Social Sciences 45, no. 2 (April 2003): 185–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00025-8.
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Chen, Shao Bai, Zhao Di Hu, and Man Zhang. "The Feasible Coalitional Structures in the Weighted Cooperative Games." Applied Mechanics and Materials 713-715 (January 2015): 1963–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.713-715.1963.
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In cooperative games, the formation of coalitional structure and their allocation are important problems. This paper firstly for participants with different position or itself by the relative inseparable coalition composition, put forward weighted cooperative game. The formations of feasible coalition structure are presented. On the basis of the revenues in all feasible coalition structures for every participant, their allocation indexes are determined and based on the allocation indexes, the revenue of the biggest coalitional structure be assigned to each participant. This method's reasonability represents that the participants' allocation indexes are from the competition among individuals and maximizing the overall revenue reflects all participants' cooperation.
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Kegler, Michelle C., Ana Dekanosidze, Arevik Torosyan, Lilit Grigoryan, Shaheen Rana, Varduhi Hayrumyan, Zhanna Sargsyan, and Carla J. Berg. "Community coalitions for smoke-free environments in Armenia and Georgia: A mixed methods analysis of coalition formation, implementation and perceived effectiveness." PLOS ONE 18, no. 8 (August 3, 2023): e0289149. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0289149.
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Effective models for aligning public health and civil society at the local level have the potential to impact various global health issues, including tobacco. Georgia and Armenia Teams for Healthy Environments and Research (GATHER) is a collaboration between Armenia, Georgia and U.S. researchers involving a community randomized trial testing the impact of community coalitions to promote smoke-free policy adoption and compliance in various settings. Community Coalition Action Theory (CCAT) was used to guide and describe coalition formation, implementation and effectiveness. Mixed methods were used to evaluate 14 municipality-based coalitions in Georgia and Armenia, including semi-structured interviews (n = 42) with coalition leaders and active members, coalition member surveys at two timepoints (n = 85 and n = 83), and review of action plans and progress reports. Results indicated successful creation of 14 multi-sectoral coalitions, most commonly representing education, public health, health care, and municipal administration. Half of the coalitions created at least one smoke-free policy in specific settings (e.g., factories, parks), and all 14 promoted compliance with existing policies through no-smoking signage and stickers. The majority also conducted awareness events in school, health care, and community settings, in addition to educating the public about COVID and the dangers of tobacco use. Consistent with CCAT, coalition processes (e.g., communication) were associated with member engagement and collaborative synergy which, in turn, correlated with perceived community impact, skills gained by coalition members, and interest in sustainability. Findings suggest that community coalitions can be formed in varied sociopolitical contexts and facilitate locally-driven, multi-sectoral collaborations to promote health. Despite major contextual challenges (e.g., national legislation, global pandemic, war), coalitions were resilient, nimble and remained active. Additionally, CCAT propositions appear to be generalizable, suggesting that coalition-building guidance may be relevant for local public health in at least some global contexts.
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Elkind, Edith, Abheek Ghosh, and Paul Goldberg. "Complexity of Deliberative Coalition Formation." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 36, no. 5 (June 28, 2022): 4975–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20428.
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Elkind et al. (AAAI'21) introduced a model for deliberative coalition formation, where a community wishes to identify a strongly supported proposal from a space of alternatives, in order to change the status quo. In their model, agents and proposals are points in a metric space, agents' preferences are determined by distances, and agents deliberate by dynamically forming coalitions around proposals that they prefer over the status quo. The deliberation process operates via k-compromise transitions, where agents from k (current) coalitions come together to form a larger coalition in order to support a (perhaps new) proposal, possibly leaving behind some of the dissenting agents from their old coalitions. A deliberation succeeds if it terminates by identifying a proposal with the largest possible support. For deliberation in d dimensions, Elkind et al. consider two variants of their model: in the Euclidean model, proposals and agent locations are points in R^d and the distance is measured according to ||...||_2; and in the hypercube model, proposals and agent locations are vertices of the d-dimensional hypercube and the metric is the Hamming distance. They show that in the Euclidean model 2-compromises are guaranteed to succeed, but in the hypercube model for deliberation to succeed it may be necessary to use k-compromises with k >= d. We complement their analysis by (1) proving that in both models it is hard to find a proposal with a high degree of support, and even a 2-compromise transition may be hard to compute; (2) showing that a sequence of 2-compromise transitions may be exponentially long; (3) strengthening the lower bound on the size of the compromise for the d-hypercube model from d to 2^Ω(d).
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Xie, Bing, Shaofei Chen, Jing Chen, and LinCheng Shen. "A mutual-selecting market-based mechanism for dynamic coalition formation." International Journal of Advanced Robotic Systems 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): 172988141875584. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1729881418755840.
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This article presents a novel market-based mechanism for a dynamic coalition formation problem backgrounded under real-time task allocation. Specifically, we first analyze the main factors of the real-time task allocation problem, and formulate the problem based on the coalition game theory. Then, we employ a social network for communication among distributed agents in this problem, and propose a negotiation mechanism for agents forming coalitions on timely emerging tasks. In this mechanism, we utilize an auction algorithm for real-time agent assignment on coalitions, and then design a mutual-selecting method to acquire better performance on agent utilization rate and task completion rate. And finally, our experimental results demonstrate that our market-based mechanism has a comparable performance in task completion rate to a decentralized approach (within 25% better on average) and a centralized dynamic coalition formation method (within 10% less on average performance).
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PINTASSILGO, PEDRO, and MARKO LINDROOS. "COALITION FORMATION IN STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES: A PARTITION FUNCTION APPROACH." International Game Theory Review 10, no. 03 (September 2008): 303–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908001959.
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In this paper the management of straddling fish stocks is approached through a coalition game in partition function form. A two-stage game is applied, assuming ex ante symmetric players and the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the game is characterized by positive externalities — the merger of coalitions increases the payoffs of players who belong to other coalitions. A key result is that, apart from the case of two players, the grand coalition is not a Nash equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, in the case of three or more players the only Nash equilibrium coalition structure is the one formed by singletons. The results indicate that the prospects of cooperation in straddling stock fisheries are low if players can free ride cooperative agreements. Thus, in order to protect cooperation, under the aegis of regional fishery management organizations, unregulated fishing must be prevented.
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Beiser-McGrath, Janina, and Nils W. Metternich. "Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes." Comparative Political Studies 54, no. 1 (June 3, 2020): 144–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414020920656.
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Why do authoritarian governments exclude ethnic groups if this jeopardizes their regime survival? We generalize existing arguments that attribute exclusion dynamics to ethnic coalition formation. We argue that a mutual commitment problem, between the ethnic ruling group and potential coalition members, leads to power-balanced ethnic coalitions. However, authoritarian regimes with institutions that mitigate credible commitment problems facilitate the formation of coalitions that are less balanced in power. We test our arguments with a k-adic conditional logit approach, using data on ethnic groups and their power status. We demonstrate that in autocracies, the ruling ethnic group is more likely to form and maintain coalitions that balance population sizes among all coalition members. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the extent to which balancing occurs is conditional on authoritarian regime type.
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Whitford, Andrew B. "The Structures of Interest Coalitions: Evidence from Environmental Litigation." Business and Politics 5, no. 01 (April 2003): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1046.
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This paper addresses the intersection of coalition formation, judicial strategies, and regulatory politics. Coalitions are a low-cost means for assembling minority interests into more powerful blocs. However, in most cases in regulatory politics, judicial strategies are high cost efforts. I argue that coalitions among interests form one basis for judicial participation, but that participation manifests in an array of coalition “microstructures.” For any one event, the microstructure of the interest group coalition varies, but across events the coalitions take on general forms. The paper offers evidence for a variety of coalition microstructures in interest group participation as amici curiae (“friends of the court”) in cases before the United States Supreme Court. The evidence is drawn from the case of the Group of Ten, a stable, long-term coalition of environmental interest groups that operated from 1981 to 1991.
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Bissonnette, Annie, Susan Perry, Louise Barrett, John C. Mitani, Mark Flinn, Sergey Gavrilets, and Frans B. M. de Waal. "Coalitions in theory and reality: a review of pertinent variables and processes." Behaviour 152, no. 1 (2015): 1–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568539x-00003241.
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Coalitions and alliances are ubiquitous in humans and many other mammals, being part of the fabric of complex social systems. Field biologists and ethologists have accumulated a vast amount of data on coalition and alliance formation, while theoretical biologists have developed modelling approaches. With the accumulation of empirical data and sophisticated theory, we are now potentially able to answer a host of questions about how coalitions emerge and are maintained in a population over time, and how the psychology of this type of cooperation evolved. Progress can only be achieved, however, by effectively bridging the communication gap that currently exists between empiricists and theoreticians. In this paper, we aim to do so by asking three questions: (1) What are the primary questions addressed by theoreticians interested in coalition formation, and what are the main building blocks of their models? (2) Do empirical observations support the assumptions of current models, and if not, how can we improve this situation? (3) Has theoretical work led to a better understanding of coalition formation, and what are the most profitable lines of inquiry for the future? Our overarching goal is to promote the integration of theoretical and field biology by motivating empirical scientists to collect data on aspects of coalition formation that are currently poorly quantified and to encourage theoreticians to develop a comprehensive theory of coalition formation that is testable under real-world conditions.
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Christiansen, Nels, Sotiris Georganas, and John H. Kagel. "Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 182–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.182.
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We experimentally investigate the Jackson and Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold with the introduction of private goods, including “strange bedfellow” coalitions. Private goods help to secure legislative compromise and increase the likelihood of proposals passing, an outcome not predicted by the theory but a staple of the applied political economy literature. Coalition formation is better characterized by an “efficient equal split” between coalition partners than the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction, which has implications for stable political party formation. (JEL C78, D72, H41)
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Young, Christopher, Oliver Schülke, and Julia Ostner. "How males form coalitions against group rivals and the Pandit/van Schaik coalition model." Behaviour 151, no. 7 (2014): 907–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568539x-00003166.
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In group living animals, there is pronounced variation in the formation and function of cooperation between males via coalitionary aggression. Pandit, van Schaik and colleagues developed a mathematical model to predict the evolution of different coalition types in group-living male primates, the PvS model. Coalitions are classified into five types dependent on the ranks of the participants and the function of the aggression. The main factor determining the coalition types expected to evolve is contest potential, an estimate of female monopolisability by individual males. We examined the model using groups of Assamese (Macaca assamensis) and Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) to gain a full range of contest potentials. We observed, across groups, 393 coalitions during 3645 h of data collection. We measured contest potential on a species-specific basis dependent on the information males can infer about female reproductive state. By examining coalition formation in different populations and species, but also in the same groups over time, we showed the strengths and weaknesses of the PvS model. We discuss why our results do not fully fit the model’s predictions, including differing costs/benefits of coalition formation, such as delayed benefits via increased status, making rank-changing coalitions viable at mid–low contest potential. Alternative factors not considered by the model include the effect of male social bonds on coalition partner choice and the effect of female mate-choice on coalition target selection. Finally, we suggest possible improvements to the model and provide information on how best to test the current predictions of the PvS model.
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Albala, Adrián. "Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities: A configurational analysis of the coalition formation and duration processes." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 4 (September 6, 2017): 735–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148117727440.
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For too long, scholars have studied coalitions under presidential regimes as they did under parliamentarism: assuming that the executive needed to look for allies in only one chamber. However, symmetric bicameralism has made such assumption untenable. As a matter of fact, bicameralism, particularly symmetrical bicameralism, as it operates under presidential regimes, may entail significant constraints for policymaking and coalition duration. Indeed, controlling one of the two chambers may not be sufficient for the president to ensure policy approvals. This article focuses on the 28 coalition cabinets with a bicameral framework in Latin America since the return of democracy. I show that bicameralism dramatically affects the composition of the coalitions as the absence of a majority in both chambers engenders a post-electoral agreement round. Moreover, I show that when a coalition holds some kind of majority in both houses, the coalition agreement lasts longer.
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FUNAKI, YUKIHIKO, and TAKEHIKO YAMATO. "STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES." International Game Theory Review 16, no. 03 (May 6, 2014): 1450006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198914500066.
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In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games.
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ESPINOSA, M. P., and E. INARRA. "VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS IN A COURNOT MERGER SYSTEM." International Game Theory Review 02, no. 01 (March 2000): 29–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198900000068.
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We address the problem of endogenous coalition formation in Cournot oligopoly markets. The formation of coalitions is formalised as an abstract system where the elements of the abstract set are derived from a valuation function and the dominance relation specifies the rules of coalition formation. We focus on a particular instance of this approach: Market structure determination under Cournot competition, and in the resulting Cournot merger system we find von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets.
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Tsebelis, George, and Eunyoung Ha. "Coalition theory: a veto players’ approach." European Political Science Review 6, no. 3 (September 24, 2013): 331–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773913000106.
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Coalition theories have produced arguments about the importance of party positions for participation in government coalitions, but have not connected the existing government institutions (in particular agenda setting) with the coalition government that will be formed. This article presents a veto players’ approach to coalition formation, which pushes the logic of non-cooperative game-theoretic models one step further: we argue that policy positions play a significant role in coalition formation because governments in parliamentary systems control the agenda of the policymaking process. As a result, the institutions that regulate this policymaking process affect coalition formation. In particular, positional advantages that a government may have (central policy position offormateur, fewer parties, and small policy distances among coalition partners) will become more necessary as a government has fewer institutional agenda setting advantages at its disposal. The empirical tests presented in this paper corroborate these expectations by explicitly accounting for the conditional effects of policy positions and institutional agenda setting rules on one another in a set of multilevel logit models.
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Filippova, E. "Factors of Coalitional Governments Formation Between Regionalist and Nationwide Political Parties in Regions of Spain." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 4 (2021): 71–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-4-71-79.
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Received 09.09.2020. The paper focuses on one of the most significant arenas of multi-level politics – the interaction between regionalist and state-wide parties in the creation and functioning of government coalitions at the regional level. The research is aimed at determining the factors influencing the creation of such coalitions in which regionalist parties act as coalition partners with a specific agenda. Spain provides significant empirical material for research on this issue, where regionalist parties function in most regions, and state-wide parties often enter government coalitions with them at the level of autonomous communities. A comparative analysis of the practices of concluding coalition agreements between statewide and regionalist political parties in the regions of Spain during the democratic period is a key research method. The theoretical part of the article provides an overview of the theories of party coalitions accumulated by Political Science since the 1950s and updated by researchers due to actualization of new circumstances in the context of multilevel politics. The empirical part of the article examines the influence of three categories of factors on the construction of coalition deals between regionalist and state-wide political parties in the Spanish autonomous communities, including: the size of the coalition, the ideological inter-party distance (comprising the regionalist-ideological dimension) and correspondence of the alignments of party forces at the regional and national levels. The research demonstrates that the factor of coalition size is fundamental for transactions between regionalist and state-wide political parties, while the other two categories of factors manifest themselves situationally. Acknowledgements. The research was carried out at the expense of a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 19-18-00053 " Subnational regionalism and dynamics of multilevel politics (Russian and European practices)") at the Perm Federal Research Center of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
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Ahn, Jeongeun. "Formation and Prospects of the Coalition of North Korea, China, and Russia: Is It an Inevitable Consequence of the New Cold War? Is It a Temporary Adhesion?" East and West Studies 36, no. 1 (March 20, 2024): 147–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.29274/ews.2024.36.1.147.
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This study analyzes the North Korea, China, and Russia coalition amidst complex global crises like the US-China strategic competition, the US-Russia crisis, and the North Korean nuclear issue, using coordination games and problems as analytical tools. In the ‘New Cold War’ context, they identify a focal point, form coalitions, and coordinate strategies based on reactive anti-US policies and confrontations with coalitions involving ROK, the US, and Japan. However, differing perspectives on the ‘New Cold War’ and external factors leading to divergent focal points resulted in strategic uncertainty. Forming a stable grand coalition as an institution is challenging, and there is a risk of abandonment when forming a specific coalition based on interests. Moreover, the emergence of spoilers within the coalition breeds apprehension among other nations, rendering the coalition unsustainable. Consequently, the sustainability of the North Korea-China-Russia coalition diminishes, fostering ongoing non-cooperative behavior amidst a temporary phase of adhesion.
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Bikakis, Antonis, and Patrice Caire. "Contextual and Possibilistic Reasoning for Coalition Formation." AI 1, no. 3 (September 19, 2020): 389–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ai1030026.
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In multi-agent systems, agents often need to cooperate and form coalitions to fulfil their goals, for example by carrying out certain actions together or by sharing their resources. In such situations, some questions that may arise are: Which agent(s) to cooperate with? What are the potential coalitions in which agents can achieve their goals? As the number of possibilities is potentially quite large, how to automate the process? And then, how to select the most appropriate coalition, taking into account the uncertainty in the agents’ abilities to carry out certain tasks? In this article, we address the question of how to identify and evaluate the potential agent coalitions, while taking into consideration the uncertainty around the agents’ actions. Our methodology is the following: We model multi-agent systems as Multi-Context Systems, by representing agents as contexts and the dependencies among agents as bridge rules. Using methods and tools for contextual reasoning, we compute all possible coalitions with which the agents can fulfil their goals. Finally, we evaluate the coalitions using appropriate metrics, each corresponding to a different requirement. To demonstrate our approach, we use an example from robotics.
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Biswas, Tuhin Kumar, Avisek Gupta, Narayan Changder, Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Samiran Chattopadhyay, and Animesh Dutta. "Coalition Formation for Task Allocation Using Multiple Distance Metrics (Student Abstract)." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38, no. 21 (March 24, 2024): 23443–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i21.30421.
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Simultaneous Coalition Structure Generation and Assignment (SCSGA) is an important research problem in multi-agent systems. Given n agents and m tasks, the aim of SCSGA is to form m disjoint coalitions of n agents such that between the coalitions and tasks there is a one-to-one mapping, which ensures each coalition is capable of accomplishing the assigned task. SCSGA with Multi-dimensional Features (SCSGA-MF) extends the problem by introducing a d-dimensional vector for each agent and task. We propose a heuristic algorithm called Multiple Distance Metric (MDM) approach to solve SCSGA-MF. Experimental results confirm that MDM produces near optimal solutions, while being feasible for large-scale inputs within a reasonable time frame.
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Feldman, M., and T. Tamir. "Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 36 (November 30, 2009): 387–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2892.
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A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile resilient to unilateral deviations, and is predominantly used in the analysis of multiagent systems. A downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet, as we show in this paper, in some cases, NE does exhibit stability against coalitional deviations, in that the benefits from a joint deviation are bounded. In this sense, NE approximates strong equilibrium. Coalition formation is a key issue in multiagent systems. We provide a framework for quantifying the stability and the performance of various assignment policies and solution concepts in the face of coalitional deviations. Within this framework we evaluate a given configuration according to three measures: (i) IR_min: the maximal number alpha, such that there exists a coalition in which the minimal improvement ratio among the coalition members is alpha, (ii) IR_max: the maximal number alpha, such that there exists a coalition in which the maximal improvement ratio among the coalition members is alpha, and (iii) DR_max: the maximal possible damage ratio of an agent outside the coalition. We analyze these measures in job scheduling games on identical machines. In particular, we provide upper and lower bounds for the above three measures for both NE and the well-known assignment rule Longest Processing Time (LPT). Our results indicate that LPT performs better than a general NE. However, LPT is not the best possible approximation. In particular, we present a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the makespan minimization problem which provides a schedule with IR_min of 1+epsilon for any given epsilon. With respect to computational complexity, we show that given an NE on m >= 3 identical machines or m >= 2 unrelated machines, it is NP-hard to determine whether a given coalition can deviate such that every member decreases its cost.
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Acosta, Andrés Mejía, and John Polga-Hecimovich. "Coalition Erosion and Presidential Instability in Ecuador." Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 2 (2011): 87–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00118.x.
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AbstractThis article advances the idea that coalition formation and maintenance in highly fragmented presidential regimes is not only crucial to overcoming policy deadlock, but in some cases, critical to ensuring government survival. To advance this argument, the article looks at the formation and demise of legislative coalitions in Ecuador between 1979 and 2006. The empirical data suggest that paradoxically, government coalitions became more difficult to sustain after the adoption of institutional reforms intended to strengthen the president's legislative powers. The adoption of those reforms, it is argued, undermined the legislative incentives to cooperate with the government and helped to accelerate coalition erosion. Not only did the reforms fail significantly to avoid policy deadlock, but in some cases they contributed to the early termination of presidential mandates. This article contributes to the study of coalition survival and how it is linked to policymaking.