Journal articles on the topic 'Foreign credential recognition'

Abstract A large body of empirical research has demonstrated that foreign education is a major cause of ethnic disadvantages in the labor market. However, there are few insights into how these disadvantages of foreign training can be effectively countered. To improve skilled immigrants’ access to positions commensurate with their foreign qualifications, several countries have introduced policies to officially recognize foreign educational credentials. In this study, we examine the extent to which having recognized foreign credentials improves immigrants’ chances of being hired. To identify the causal effect of foreign credential recognition on immigrants’ chances of accessing adequate jobs, we focus on employers’ hiring decisions. Using vignettes, we simulate a hiring process and show randomized profiles of applicants to employers who then rate how likely they are to invite the applicants to a job interview. Our central finding is that having recognized foreign credentials considerably narrows but does not completely close the gap in the hiring chances between foreign- and native-trained applicants. Moreover, we find that the extent to which applicants benefit from foreign credential recognition varies with their occupational experience but not with the quality of the educational system in which they were trained. We conclude that whereas foreign credential recognition is a promising tool to highlight immigrants’ skill potential and reduce the disadvantages of the foreign-trained in the labor market, it hardly harmonizes the hiring chances of native- and foreign-trained applicants.

Canada is a culturally diverse receiving country for transnational migration, and social workers are among the professional migrants who arrive in Canada each year. This article draws on findings from a four-year, grounded theory study on the professional adaptation processes and experiences of migrant social workers (n = 66) in the Canadian context. Study findings highlight a range of internal (personal) attributes and external (contextual) elements that interact to serve as either protective or vulnerabilizing factors during the pre-employment phase of professional adaptation. The focus of this article is to describe the interactions of protective and vulnerabilizing factors associated with the experience of obtaining recognition of foreign credentials and securing employment as a social worker in Canada. The findings demonstrate that migrant social workers in Canada face significant barriers in these two pre-employment phases of professional adaptation. A range of research and policy implications is identified. In particular, we highlight the disconnect that exists between Canada’s migration-friendly policies, and the lack of organizational and governmental supports and services to facilitate successful labour market integration of migrant social workers.

A provincial focus on immigration and improved foreign credential recognition has led to an investigation of best practices and subsequent recommendations for the development and implementation of a sustainable university-based bridging program for internationally educated dietitians in Atlantic Canada. Data were collected from various sources and used to inform program decisions and direction. An advisory framework was established through a core group representing dietetics education and regulation and internationalization. Subsequently, a key stakeholder group was formed. As a result of this collaboration and research, a dietetics bridging framework was developed and a program pilot tested. Lessons learned may inform similar endeavours and highlight the importance of collaborative leadership and collaboration among multiple stakeholders, and of creatively addressing program sustainability issues while keeping learners (internationally educated dietitians) at the centre.

This article studies USSRs unique experience in recognizing credentials issued by foreign educational institutions. It pays particular attention to the special circumstances of the countrys involvement in education internationally in this respect. Because its definitions of basic terms in higher education did not correspond with those of its Western partners, cooperation between the USSR and foreign countries was mostly limited to UNESCOs standards, as well as bilateral agreements with friendly states. In addition to analyzing the evolution of its legal aspects, the authors also study the evolution of the administrative apparatus for recognizing foreign degrees. Beginning in the 1970s, special units of Patrice Lumumba University and the Scientific Research Institute of Higher School Problems have made important contributions in this regard. The authors consider cooperation between the USSR and the leading international organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, as well. At the same time, they also study the Soviet Unions first steps in recognizing foreign educational standards in light of changes in the international political climate. In short, the article discusses the challenges of recognizing foreign higher education qualifications in the Soviet Union as well as the institutions charged with the task from 1950 to the early 1990s.

Abstract We analyze the effects of formal recognition of foreign higher education on employment probabilities and earnings for newly arrived immigrants in Sweden. Prior research has found that immigrants have lower returns on education if it was acquired in the country of origin than if it was acquired in the host country. One reason for this is that foreign credentials work poorly as productivity signals and risk-averse employers avoid employees with credentials they do not fully understand. A formal recognition statement can help overcome this problem by providing credible information about the foreign education, thus reducing uncertainty. Data consists of immigrants who, within the first ten years of residence in Sweden, had their foreign degree formally recognized during 2007–2011. Using fixed effects regressions, we estimate the treatment effect of official recognition to be 4.4 percentage points higher probability of being employed, and 13.9 log points higher wage for those with employment. We also find considerable treatment effect heterogeneity across subcategories of immigrants from different regions of origin, with different reasons for immigration and who obtained recognition during different economic conditions. Our conclusions are that the mechanism of employer uncertainty is real, and that recognition does reduce it. But as the signal of foreign education becomes better, other mechanisms such as human capital transferability problems and quality differences, and the ability to use foreign human capital, become more salient, leading to heterogeneous effects.

Like any number of American allies, Canada declined to recognize the revolutionary government of the People’s Republic of China, and helped exclude it from the United Nations in the 1950s. By the early 1960s, there were strong pressures for change. This article examines the efforts of Paul Martin, Sr., Canada’s foreign minister from 1963 to 1968, to respond to those pressures and modernize his country’s approach to the emerging Asian giant. After establishing Martin’s diplomatic credentials, the paper traces the evolution of his attitude toward Beijing during the 1950s as he accepted the logic and necessity of recognition. Opposed by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson and many of his cabinet colleagues, who feared U.S. retaliation, Martin persisted in trying to win over their backing. Progress, when it finally came in 1966, was incremental and much too late, prompting critical attacks on the minister’s reputation and his “hush puppy style.”

AbstractTraditional approach to the issue of “brain drain” and “brain gain” focuses on outflow and inflow of migration of academics and professionals between countries of origins and destinations. It is suggested that, in the international labor market, the developing countries have experienced the problem of brain drain while the developed countries have benefited from brain gain in the process of globalization and international mobility of talent. From this perspective, “brain drain” or “brain gain” is primarily measured by the number of talented people who have “moved in” or “moved out” of a country, but not the extent to which the “brain” has been utilized. This study redefines the notion of “brain drain” by focusing on the actual utilization of professional talents. Previous research findings show that despite attractive Canadian immigration policy and the increasing number of professional immigrants, Canada as a developed country has the problem of “brain waste” due to its systemic barriers such as the devaluation of foreign credentials and non-recognition of foreign work experience for professional Chinese immigrants. At the same time, China as a developing country has benefited from contributions made by highly educated professionals/students returning to their home country through its attractive and rewarding opportunities for those who have attained knowledge and skills from overseas. China has become a model of “brain gain” for developing countries by implementing a series of open and favorable policies to attract top-notch overseas Chinese and foreign talents to help promote the economic development and global competitiveness of the nation.

The article, based on the unpublished documents from the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, reveals for the first time details of a little-known episode in the history of the Russian diplomatic service – the mission of Empress' Elisabeth I minister plenipotentiary Count of Courland Hermann Karl von Keyserlingk to Frankfurt am Main and Regensburg during the War of the Austrian Succession. The mission's goal was to achieve recognition of the Russian imperial title from the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. The author managed to find out, it was Keyserlingk who had the idea to send the official representative of Russia to the election of the Emperor in Frankfurt in 1745 and then in 1746 to the Imperial Diet in Regensburg, which approved the election results. Keyserlingk proposed the most straightforward plan that did not damage the prestige of Elisabeth I – to transfer the credentials with the imperial title to the College of Electors and to receive a recreditive (leave-letter), trying to get the title included in the text. The same should have been done at the Imperial Diet. The main task of the diplomat was to prevent the issue of the title from becoming the subject of discussion at meetings of the College of Electors and at the Diet, since the details of the discussion would undoubtedly get into the official documents of these institutions and become public. The moment for solving this delicate issue turned out to be a good one: the continued hostilities forced the Imperial Estates to seek help from Russia. As a result, they were ready to do Elisabeth I a favor. This largely explains the success of Keyserlingk's mission, which enjoyed the support of imperial diplomats – representatives of the Electors of Mainz, Saxony, Bohemia and at the final stage – of the Elector of Brandenburg, King of Denmark and Emperor Franz I. The article also examines Keyserlingk's participation in recognizing the seventeen-year-old Grand Prince Peter as Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, a legal major a year early.

Competency-based assessment approaches to professional registration reflect the move by professions, both in Canada and around the world, away from traditional credentials-based assessments centred on a combination of academic achievements and supervised practice time. Entry to practice competencies are the abilities required to enable effective and safe entry-level practice in a profession. In 2012, Geoscientists Canada received funding from the Government of Canada’s Foreign Credentials Recognition Program. A central component of the funding involved the development of a competency profile to assist in assessment for licensing in the geoscience profession. Work concluded with the approval of the Competency Profile for Professional Geoscientists at Entry to Practice by Geoscientists Canada in November 2014. The Competency Profile comprises concise statements in plain language, setting out the skills and abilities that are required to be able to work as a geoscientist, in an effective and safe manner, independent of direct supervision. It covers competencies common to all geoscientists; competencies for the primary subdisciplines of geoscience (geology, environmental geoscience and geophysics); and a generic set of high level competences that can apply in any specific work context in geoscience. The paper is in two parts. Part 1 puts the concept of competencies in context and describes the approach taken to develop the profile, including: input from Subject Matter Experts (practising geoscientists representing a diverse sampling of the profession); extensive national consultation and refinement; and a validation procedure, including a survey of practising Canadian geoscientists. Part 2 introduces the profile, explains its structure, and provides examples of some of the competencies. The full competency profile can be obtained from the Geoscientists Canada website www.geoscientistscanada.ca. Future work will identify specific indicators of proficiency related to each competency and suggest appropriate methodologies to assess such competencies. It will also involve mapping the profile to the existing Canadian reference standard, Geoscience Knowledge and Experience Requirements for Professional Registration in Canada.RÉSUMÉLes approches d'évaluation basées sur les compétences en vue de l'inscription professionnelle reflètent l'abandon par les professions, tant au Canada que partout dans le monde, des évaluations classiques basées sur les titres de compétences et axées sur une combinaison de réalisations académiques et de temps de pratique supervisée. Les compétences au niveau débutant sont les capacités requises pour une pratique efficace et en toute sécurité audit niveau dans une profession. En 2012, Géoscientifiques Canada a reçu un financement du Programme de reconnaissance des titres de compétences étrangers du gouvernement du Canada. Une composante centrale du financement incluait l’élaboration d'un profil des compétences pour faciliter l'évaluation de la délivrance de permis dans la profession de géoscience. Ce travail a été conclu en novembre 2014 avec l'approbation par Géoscientifiques Canada du Profil des compétences pour les géoscientifiques professionnels au niveau débutant. Le profil des compétences comprend des déclarations concises dans un langage clair, définissant les compétences et les capacités requises pour exercer efficacement, en toute sécurité et indépendamment de toute supervision directe, en tant que géoscientifique. Il couvre les compétences communes à tous les géoscientifiques; les compétences pour les sous-disciplines primaires de la géoscience (géologie, géoscience environnementale et géophysique); et un ensemble générique de compétences de haut niveau pouvant s'appliquer dans tout contexte de travail spécifique en géoscience. Le document comporte deux parties. La 1ère partie met en contexte le concept de compétences et décrit l'approche adoptée pour élaborer le profil, y compris : les contributions d'experts dans le domaine (géoscientifiques professionnels représentant un échantillonnage diversifié de la profession); de vastes consultations et perfectionnements à l'échelle nationale; et une procédure de validation, incluant une enquête auprès des géoscientifiques professionnels canadiens. La 2ème partie présente le profil, explique sa structure et fournit des exemples pour certaines des compétences. Le profil des compétences complet est disponible sur le site web de Géoscientifiques Canada www.geoscientistscanada.ca. Les travaux futurs identifieront des indicateurs spécifiques d’aptitude liés à chaque compétence et suggèreront des méthodologies appropriées pour leur évaluation. Ils comprendront également la mise en correspondance du profil avec la norme de référence canadienne existante et les exigences en matière de Connaissances et expérience des géosciences requises pour l'inscription à titre professionnel au Canada.

With increasing immigration to Canada, governments are urging professional regulatory bodies to develop new licensing pathways to recognize foreign credentials of immigrant professionals more quickly and effectively. The Internationally-Educated Engineers Qualification Pilot Program was developed in response to such pressures. The objectives of this primarily qualitative research study were to document and understand the experiences and perceptions of the international engineering graduates in three program cohorts and to apply the findings to program development and evaluation. Data were obtained through focus groups and follow-up questionnaires administered to three cohorts. Findings indicated that program strengths, which are also aligned with program objectives, include its recognition as a licensing pathway, emphasis on cultural integration, and labour market access. Findings led to the development of a comprehensive support structure for participants. Keywords: international engineering graduate; foreign credentials recognition; qualitative research.

Since 2003, the Internationally Educated Engineers Qualification Program (IEEQ) at the University of Manitoba has provided a pathway for formal recognition of foreign credentials for internationally-educated engineers. This paper reviews the program model and outlines four critical perspectives embedded within the model. The program componentsinclude academic requirements, an authentic practice experience, sociolinguistic language and communication development, and socialization to the profession. The critical perspectives embedded in these components are a difference model, assimilation to the profession, principles of equity or substantive equality, and appropriate recognition for internationally-educated engineers.

This paper explores the ways in which government policy and public discourse have operated to enhance and maintain the liminal status of Somali women refugees in Canada, and the ways in which Somali Canadian women have resisted these efforts in order to create meaning and a place for themselves and their families in North America. The policies and practices that obliged many Somali women to wait three to five years to apply for permanent residency status, Eurocentric definitions of the family that constrain family unification strategies, and economic marginalization due to lack of recognition of foreign credentials have had cumulative adverse effects on the health and well-being of Somali women in Canada.

Drawing from data collected as part of a larger study, this paper focusses specifically on internationally-educated engineers’ (newcomers to Canada) insights and experiences of the social role and social responsibility inherent in the Canadian engineering profession. The study participants were individuals who had completed a formal foreign credentials recognition process through a qualifications recognition program at the University of Manitoba, and who have achieved professional licensure in Manitoba. Data were collected from 23 internationally-educated engineers through long one-on-one and group interviews over a period of two years. The work uses a conceptual framework of professional practice as the development of moral conscience. The data demonstrate that through engagement with the regulatory process including right-to-title, right-to-practice, and the Code of Ethics, and through one’s day to day engineering practice, participants assimilated an understanding of the practice of professional engineering in Canada as being rooted in a professional community with explicit and stable social responsibilities.

Refugees face significant barriers in the labor markets of western countries due to limited transferability of educational credentials. Post-migration education can increase refugees’ chances in the labor market, but little is known about the prevalence and underlying patterns of such post-secondary educational investments. I contribute to the literature by analyzing survey data from the Netherlands on post-migration education among more than 3,000 adult refugees who come from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, and Somalia. I find that refugees’ investments in schooling depend on both pre- and post-migration characteristics. Results show that post-migration schooling is more common among adult refugees who are higher educated, who arrived at a younger age, who have applied for recognition of their foreign education, and who have (successfully) participated in integration and/or language courses. When refugees are kept in an asylum center for a longer time, they are less likely to invest in post-migration education.

Abstract Organisations’ logics play a crucial role in the integration of immigrants. This article aims to contribute to the relatively unexplored field of immigrant integration in organisations by analysing the workplace integration of healthcare professionals in two Spanish hospitals. Analysis shows how the lack of an official integration strategy in Spain does not seem to have significantly affected inclusion mechanisms of healthcare migrant workers in two large Spanish hospitals. Organisations’ internal logics indeed represent a relevant variable to understanding the process of integration and how conflicts can be de-escalated in organisations. As interviews reveal, workplace integration is not perceived as a cultural problem to the extent that healthcare professionals adapt to the way of working and establishing relationships in each hospital. Differences among professional categories are more important than ethnic diversity since immigrant integration is considered a question of professional rather than cultural assimilation. Yet, major obstacles to immigrant integration seem to proceed from the existing barriers to permanent employment of third-country nationals and cumbersome administrative procedures for foreign credentials recognition.

The emergence of diplomatic protocol service within the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Estonia (1918–40) is a subject that has hitherto not been researched. This is illustrated by the fact that even the complete list of chiefs of protocol (chef du protocole) of the MFA of Estonia has been missing until now. The strengthening of Estonia’s statehood by its international recognition, the accreditation of foreign envoys, and the first state visits brought about the need for a thorough understanding of all nuances of diplomatic protocol and ceremonial. Nevertheless, the office of a separate chief of protocol was created in the structure of the MFA of Estonia only according to the new Foreign Service Act, decreed by the Head of State Konstantin Päts on 13 March 1936; i.e. more than 18 years after the declaration of Estonia’s independence. Prior to 1936, the functions of protocol officers were usually fulfilled by the head of the MFA’s administrative or political department. This article focuses on three core issues: 1) who were the chiefs of protocol? 2) their functions and how diplomatic protocol was regulated in the MFA; 3) the reason why a separate office of the chief of protocol was not created earlier than 1936. The key source for this research is the MFA collection in the Estonian National Archives (RA, ERA.957). There are no clear sources regarding the functions of the chief of protocol before 1922. The field was most probably shaped and shared by several officials, including the head of the political department Hermann Karl Hellat (1872–1953) and William Tomingas (1895–1972), the junior private secretary of Foreign Minister Jaan Tõnisson (1868–1941?). Everything connected to international practices was probably influenced by the most experienced diplomats of the young state, namely the members of Estonia’s foreign delegation, which had already been created in 1917. Another major influence was Foreign Minister Jaan Poska (1866–1920), who as a former mayor of Tallinn, the former governor of the autonomous Governorate of Estonia, and the head of Estonia’s delegation at the peace talks with Soviet Russia, had extensive experience in protocol-related matters. Hans Johannes (Johan) Ernst Markus (1884–1969) can be deemed the first chief of protocol to be mentioned in the hitherto known sources of the MFA. According to an MFA report to the Estonian government from July of 1922, Markus was the head of the MFA’s Western political department and performed the duties of ‘master of ceremonies’ as well. In January of 1923, Markus was appointed head of the MFA’s administrative department. He remained in this office until April of 1927, coordinating the state visits of the President of Latvia Jānis Čakste (February of 1924), the Secretary General of the League of Nations Eric Drummond (February of 1924), and the President of Finland Lauri Kristian Relander (May of 1925), as well as the state visits of Estonia’s Head of State, the presentation of credentials, and day-to-day work regarding diplomatic privileges and immunities. Since the chief of protocol was responsible for organising ceremonies connected to the Head of State (Riigivanem), Markus could be considered not only as a coordinator of the MFA’s protocol matters, but as the chief of state protocol. Markus certainly did not work alone. He could rely on the administrative department and basically the whole MFA in fulfilling his functions, while also counting on the support of the aide-de-camp to the Head of State. Nevertheless, it was Markus who laid the ’cornerstone’ for the best practices that could be systematised and used by his successors. In April of 1927, the functions of the chief of protocol were taken over by Johan Leppik (1894–1965), the former Envoy to Poland and Romania, and Chargé d’Affaires in Czechoslovakia. In August of 1927, Leppik was appointed head of the MFA’s political department. According to the MFA’s working arrangement, Leppik retained the functions of chef du protocole in his new office starting from January of 1928. Since the grand, first-ever state visit of a monarch to Estonia, by King Gustaf V of Sweden in June of 1929, and the visit of the President of Poland Ignacy Mościcki in August of 1930 (which were preceded by the state visits of Estonia’s Head of State to those countries) required extensive preparations, Leppik could rely on the work of his subordinate, the head of the political bureau and deputy chief of protocol Elmar-Johann Kirotar (1899–1985). In June of 1931, Leppik was succeeded by the director of the bureau of law Artur Haman (Tuldava) (1897–1942) in his office as chief of protocol. Haman (Tuldava) put great effort into systematising existing practices related to protocol (incl. Presentation of credentials, and receptions) into a comprehensive compendium, which has been preserved to this day. The efficient work of Kirotar and Tuldava was probably noted by Estonia’s leadership, since once the separaate office of the chief of protocol had been created within the structure of the MFA, the position was filled first by Kirotar (1936–9) and then by Tuldava (1939–40). The quest for stability was most probably connected to the strong presidential power that shaped Estonia’s political life in the latter half of the 1930s. The personal influence of the head of state became more important in filling high-ranking positions in the state structure. According to the Foreign Service Act adopted by Parliament (Riigikogu) on 30 May 1930, departmental directors were appointed by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Service Act decreed by the Head of State on 13 March 1936 changed this procedure. According to the latter, departmental directors (incl. the chief of protocol) were appointed and dismissed by the Head of State (upon taking into consideration proposals from the Foreign Minister). There is no clear answer to the question of why there was no separate office of the chief of protocol in the 1920s, since these functions needed to be fulfilled anyway. This was most probably connected to budgetary restrictions i.e. the need to avoid all kinds of ’unnecessary’ expenses. In the 1930s, the director of the administrative department Jaan Mölder (1880–1942, in office 1935–6) and the head of the consular bureau August Koern (1900–89, in office 1936) also briefly fulfilled the functions of the chief of protocol. The latter was especially involved in systematising the rules and regulations of diplomatic practices. Like his predecessors and successors, he sent numerous inquiries to Estonia’s representations abroad to collect information on matters connected to privileges and immunities, decorations, preseance, organisation of state funerals, etc. According to sources at the Estonian National Archives, Estonia’s MFA collected information on international diplomatic practice everywhere that it was represented by its missions abroad. Already during the first years of Estonia’s independence, the MFA possessed the popular Guide to Diplomatic Practice by Sir Ernest Mason Satow (first issued in 1917) and several protocol-related compendiums from Finland, the United States of America, Great Britain, etc. It can be concluded that without a rich heritage of diplomatic practice of its own, Estonia was quickly able to successfully adapt to the international environment in matters of diplomatic protocol.

Introduction In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it. These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals. The trajectory of his persona begins in the early days of his coming to power as a charismatic leader during a “time of distress” (Weber) and culminates in his bloody end next to a roadside drainage culvert. In between these points Qaddafi’s persona underwent refinement and reinvention. Coupled with the legacy he left on the Libyan political system, the journey of Muammar Qaddafi’s personas demonstrate how political personality can be the salvation or damnation of an entire state.Qaddafi: The Brotherly RevolutionaryCaptain Muammar Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969 at the age of just 27. He was the leader of a group of military officers who overthrew King Idris in a popular and relatively bloodless coup founded on an ideology of post-colonial Arab nationalism and a doing away with the endemic corruption and nepotism that were the hallmarks of the monarchy. With this revolutionary cause in mind and in an early indication that he recognised the power of political image, Qaddafi showed restraint in adopting the trappings of office. His modest promotion to the rank of Colonel was an obvious example of this, and despite the fact that in practical terms he was the supreme commander of Libya’s armed forces, he resisted the temptation to formally aggrandize himself with military titles for the ensuing 42 years of his rule.High military rank was in a way irrelevant to a man moving to change his persona from army officer to messianic national leader. Switching away from a reliance on military hierarchy as a basis for his authority allowed Qaddafi to re-cast himself as a leader with a broader mission. He began to utilise titles such as “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) and “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution.” The persona on display here was one of detached impartiality and almost reluctant leadership. There was the suggestion that Qaddafi was not really acting as a head of state, but merely an ordinary Libyan who, through popular acclaim, was being begged to lead his people. The attraction of this persona remained until the bitter end for Qaddafi, with his professed inability to step aside from a leadership role he insisted he did not formally occupy. This accords with the contention of Weber, who describes how an individual favoured with charisma can step forward at a time of crisis to complete a “mission.” Once in a position of authority, perpetuating that role of leadership and acclamation can become the mission itself:The holder, of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master—so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ himself. But he does not derive his ‘right’ from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader. (Weber 266-7)As his rule extended across the decades, Qaddafi fostered his revolutionary credentials via a typical cult of personality approach. His image appeared on everything from postage stamps to watches, bags, posters and billboards. Quotations from the Brother Leader were set to music and broadcast as pop songs. “Spontaneous” rallies of support would occur when crowds of loyalists would congregate to hear the Brotherly Leader speak. Although Qaddafi publicly claimed he did not like this level of public adoration he accepted it because the people wanted to adore him. It was widely known however that many of these crowds were paid to attend these rallies (Blundy and Lycett 16).Qaddafi: The Philosopher In developing his persona as a guide and a man who was sharing his natural gifts with the people, Qaddafi developed a post-colonial philosophy he called “Third Universal Theory.” This was published in volumes collectively known as The Green Book. This was mandatory reading for every Libyan and contained a distillation of Qaddafi’s thoughts and opinions on everything from sports to politics to religion to the differences between men and women. Whilst it may be tempting for outsiders to dismiss these writings as the scribbling of a dictator, the legacy of Qaddafi’s persona as political philosopher is worthy of some examination. For in offering his revelations to the Libyan people, Qaddafi extended his mandate beyond leader of a revolution and into the territory of “messianic reformer of a nation.”The Green Book was a three-part series. The first instalment was written in 1975 and focuses on the “problem of democracy” where Qaddafi proposes direct democracy as the best option for a progressive nation. The second instalment, published in 1977, focuses on economics and expounds socialism as the solution to all fiscal woes. (Direct popular action here was evidenced in the RCC making rental of real estate illegal, meaning that all tenants in the country suddenly found themselves granted ownership of the property they were occupying!) The final chapter, published in 1981, proposes the Third Universal Theory where Qaddafi outlines his unique solution for implementing direct democracy and socialism. Qaddafi coined a new term for his Islamically-inspired socialist utopia: Jamahiriya. This was defined as being a “state of the masses” and formed the blueprint for Libyan society which Qaddafi subsequently imposed.This model of direct democracy was part of the charismatic conceit Qaddafi cultivated: that the Libyan people were their own leaders and his role was merely as a benevolent agent acceding to their wishes. However the implementation of the Jamahiriya was anything but benevolent and its legacy has crippled post-Qaddafi Libya. Under this system, Libyans did have some control over their affairs at a very local level. Beyond this, an increasingly complex series of committees and regional groupings, over which the RCC had the right of veto, diluted the participation of ordinary citizens and their ability to coalesce around any individual leader. The banning of standard avenues of political organisation, such as parties and unions, coupled with a ruthless police state that detained and executed anyone offering even a hint of political dissent served to snuff out any opposition before it had a chance to gather pace. The result was that there were no Libyans with enough leadership experience or public profile to take over when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011.Qaddafi: The Liberator In a further plank of his revolutionary persona Qaddafi turned to the world beyond Libya to offer his brotherly guidance. This saw him champion any cause that claimed to be a liberation or resistance movement struggling against the shackles of colonialism. He tended to favour groups that had ideologies aligned with his own, namely Arab unity and the elimination of Israel, but ultimately was not consistent in this regard. Aside from Palestinian nationalists, financial support was offered to groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines), Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), ETA (Spain), the Polisario Front (Western Sahara), and even separatist indigenous Australians. This policy of backing revolutionary groups was certainly a projection of his persona as a charismatic enabler of the revolutionary mission. However, the reception of this mission in the wider world formed the basis for the image that Qaddafi most commonly occupied in Western eyes.In 1979 the ongoing Libyan support for groups pursuing violent action against Israel and the West saw the country designated a State-Sponsor of Terror by the US Department of State. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were severed and did not resume until 2004. At this point Qaddafi seemed to adopt a persona of “opponent of the West,” ostensibly on behalf of the world’s downtrodden colonial peoples. The support for revolutionary groups was changing to a more active use of them to strike at Western interests. At the same time Qaddafi stepped up his rhetoric against America and Britain, positioning himself as a champion of the Arab world, as the one leader who had the courage of his convictions and the only one who was squarely on the side of the ordinary citizenry (in contrast to other, more compliant Arab rulers). Here again there is evidence of the charismatic revolutionary persona, reluctantly taking up the burden of leadership on behalf of his brothers.Whatever his ideals, the result was that Qaddafi and his state became the focus of increasing Western ire. A series of incidents between the US and Libya in international waters added to the friction, as did Libyan orchestrated terror attacks in Berlin, Rome and Vienna. At the height of this tension in 1986, American aircraft bombed targets in Libya, narrowly missing Qaddafi himself. This role as public enemy of America led to Qaddafi being characterised by President Ronald Reagan (no stranger to the use of persona himself) as the “mad dog of the Middle East” and a “squalid criminal.” The enmity of the West made life difficult for ordinary Libyans dealing with crippling sanctions, but for Qaddafi, it helped bolster his persona as a committed revolutionary.Qaddafi: Leader of the Arab and African Worlds Related to his early revolutionary ideologies were Qaddafi’s aspirations as a pan-national leader. Inspired by Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser from a young age, the ideals of pan-Arab unity were always a cornerstone of Qaddafi’s beliefs. It is not therefore surprising that he developed ambitions of being the person to bring about and “guide” that unity. Once again the Weberian description of the charismatic leader is relevant, particularly the notion that such leadership does not respect conventional boundaries of functional jurisdictions or local bailiwicks; in this case, state boundaries.During the 1970s Qaddafi was involved in numerous attempts to broker Arab unions between Libya and states such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. All of these failed to materialise once the exact details of the mergers began to be discussed, in particular who would assume the mantle of leadership in these super-states. In line with his persona as the rightly-guided revolutionary, Qaddafi consistently blamed the failure of these unions on the other parties, souring his relationship with his fellow Arab leaders. His hardline stance on Israel also put him at odds with those peers more determined to find a compromise. Following the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981 Qaddafi praised the act as justified because of Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.Having given up on the hope of achieving pan-Arab Unity, Qaddafi sought to position himself as a leader of the African bloc. In 2009 he became Chairperson of the African Union and took to having himself introduced as “The King of Kings of Africa.” The level of dysfunction of the African Union was no less than that of the Arab League and Qaddafi’s grandiose plans for becoming the President of the United States of Africa failed to materialise.In both his pan-Arab and pan-Africa ambitions, we see a persona of Qaddafi that aims at leadership beyond his own state. Whilst there may be delusions of grandeur apparent in the practicalities of these goals, this image was nevertheless something that Qaddafi used to leverage the next phase of his political transformation.Qaddafi: The Post-9/11 Statesman However much he might be seen as erratic, Qaddafi’s innate intelligence could result in a political astuteness lacking in many of his Arab peers. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Qaddafi was the first international leader to condemn the attacks on America and pledge support in the War on Terror and the extermination of al-Qaeda. Despite his history as a supporter of terrorism overseas, Qaddafi had a long history of repressing it at home, just as with any other form of political opposition. The pan-Islamism of al-Qaeda was anathema to his key ideologies of direct democracy (guided by himself). This meant the United States and Libya were now finally on the same team. As part of this post-9/11 sniffing of the wind, Qaddafi abandoned his fledgling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and finally agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the Pan Am 107 flight downed over Lockerbie in 1987.This shift in Qaddafi’s policy did not altogether dispel his persona of brotherly leadership amongst African nations. As a bloc leader and an example of the possibility of ‘coming in from the cold’, Qaddafi and Libya were reintegrated into the world community. This included giving a speech at the United Nations in 2009. This event did little to add to his reputation as a statesman in the West. Given a 15-minute slot, the Libyan leader delivered a rambling address over 90 minutes long, which included him tearing up a copy of the UN Charter and turning his back to the audience whilst continuing to speak.Qaddafi: The Clown From the Western point of view, performances like this painted Qaddafi’s behaviour as increasingly bizarre. Particularly after Libya’s rapprochement with the West, the label of threatening terrorist supporter faded and was replaced with something along the lines of a harmless clown prince. Tales of the Libyan leader’s coterie of virgin female bodyguards were the subject of ridicule, as was his ardour for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Perhaps this behaviour was indicative of a leader increasingly divorced from reality. Surrounded by sycophants dependent on his regard for their tenure or physical survival, as well as Western leaders eager to contrast his amiability with that of Saddam Hussein, nobody was prepared to draw attention to the emperor’s new clothes.Indeed, elaborate and outlandish clothing played an increasing role in Qaddafi’s persona as the decades went on. His simple revolutionary fatigues of the early years were superseded by a vast array of military uniforms heavily decorated with medals and emblems; traditional African, Arab or Bedouin robes depending on the occasion; and in later years a penchant for outfits that included images of the African continent or pictures of dead martyrs. (In 2009 Vanity Fair did a tongue-in-cheek article on the fashion of Colonel Qaddafi entitled Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion. This spawned a number of similar features including one in TIME Magazine entitled Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.)The Bedouin theme was an aspect of persona that Qaddafi cultivated as an ascetic “man of the people” throughout his leadership. Despite having many palaces available he habitually slept in an elaborate tent, according once again with Weber’s description of the charismatic leader as one who eschews methodical material gain. This predisposition served him well in the 1986 United States bombing, when his residence in a military barracks was demolished, but Qaddafi escaped unscathed as he was in his tent at the time. He regularly entertained foreign dignitaries in tents when they visited Libya and he took one when travelling abroad, including pitching it in the gardens of a Parisian hotel during a state visit in 2007. (A request to camp in New York’s Central Park for his UN visit in 2009 was denied; “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi”).The role of such a clown was unlikely to have been an aim for Qaddafi, but was instead the product of his own increasing isolation. It will likely be his most enduring character in the Western memory of his rule. It should be noted though that clowns and fools do not maintain an iron grip on power for over 40 years.The Legacy of Qaddafi’s Many Personas Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was a clever and complex leader who exhibited many variations of persona during his four decades of rule. These personas were generally facets of the same core self-belief of a charismatic leader, but could be conflicting, and often confusing, to observers. His eccentricities often hid a layer of deeper cunning and ambition, but ultimately led to his marginalisation and an impression by world leaders that he was untrustworthy.His erratic performance at the UN in 2009 perhaps typifies the end stages of Qaddafi’s leadership: a man increasingly disconnected from his people and the realities of what was going on around him. His insistence that the 2011 Libyan revolution was variously a colonial or terrorist inspired piece of theatre belied the deep resentment of his rule. His role as opponent of the Western and Arab worlds alike meant that he was unsupported in his attempts to deal with the uprising. Indeed, the West’s rapid willingness to use their airpower was instrumental in speeding on the rebel forces.What cannot be disputed is the chaotic legacy this charismatic figure left for his country. Since the uprising climaxed in his on-camera lynching in October 2011, Libya has been plunged in to turmoil and shows no signs of this abating. One of the central reasons for this chaos is that Qaddafi’s supremacy, his political philosophies, and his use of messianic persona left Libya completely unprepared for rule by any other party.This ensuing chaos has been a cruel, if ironic, proof of Qaddafi’s own conceit: Libya could not survive without him.References Al-Gathafi, Muammar. The Green Book: The Solution to the Problem of Democracy; The Solution to the Economic Problem; The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory. 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