Academic literature on the topic 'Foetal rights'

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that, although South Africa has permissive termination-of-pregnancy legislation, to the extent that women can terminate first- and second-trimester pregnancies on demand and for socio-economic reasons, foetal interests are in fact taken into account. The system of female reproductive rights progressively shelters foetal interests, albeit to a limited extent. South Africa is in the process of successfully balancing the conflicting notions of female reproductive rights and foetal interests. The article discusses the "right to terminate a pregnancy" with reference to the Constitution, the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 and relevant case law. On the topic of foetal interests, the article looks at the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act as legislative recognition of foetal interests since a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is progressively limited as the pregnancy advances beyond the second trimester. The value of dignity justifies the recognition of foetal interests. Further, accepting that the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act limitedly protects foetal interests based on the value of dignity, the article questions why South Africa permits elective second trimester termination of pregnancies? Research indicates a need for second trimester terminations and the article discusses the position of a number of women seeking second trimester terminations. The article draws to an end by looking at the case of S v Mshumpa as an example of the balancing process that is needed when dealing with female reproductive rights and foetal interests. This article demonstrates the constitutional setting of women's termination-of-pregnancy rights on the one hand, and foetal interests on the other. Further, it illustrates that these conflicting positions, rather than being deepened, are in fact balanced by legislation and relevant case law.

The right to life is one of the fundamental rights. There are many moral and legal debates on the right to life of embryos and fetuses. Aside from the debates on whether the embryo/fetus can be considered a human and person, determining the moment when the fetus acquired the legal capacity and personality is important for the legal protection of the embryo/fetus. In addition to the crimes and abortion, with the technological developments in biology, the violations of the right to life of the fetus have increased. Especially with the implementation of assisted reproductive treatment methods, new debates arose about the right to life of IVF embryos. Besides that, genetic diagnostic test applications, spare and research embryos have revealed the importance of determining the legal status of the embryo/fetus. The legal status of the embryo and fetus within the national legislation is still unclear. In the decisions given by the ECHR, it hasn’t reached a definite judgment about when the right to life begins. ECHR, in most of its decisions, didn’t discuss the right to life of the embryo/fetus. When the court found the issue worth discussing, it concluded that the fetus didn’t have the right to life before birth.

Abstract Abortion has been a controversial topic in Irish law and one which the Government has been forced to address following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in A, B and C v. Ireland. The Working Group established to make recommendations have specifically been instructed to deal only with the issues raised in the A, B and C judgment and legislate on the basic of the ‘X case’. This restricted approach calls for legalisation of abortion only where the life of the mother is at risk, a position unique only to Ireland and Andorra within Europe. The vast majority of member states to the European Convention on Human Rights allow for legal abortion on the basis of foetal abnormality and with this emerging consensus the margin of appreciation hitherto afforded by the European Court to member states is diminishing. The advancement and availability of non-invasive genetic tests that can determine foetal abnormalities together with the ruling in R. R. v. Poland leaves Ireland in a precarious position for omitting any reference to foetal abnormalities in any proposed legislation.

In Life's Dominion Ronald Dworkin argues that disagreement over the morality ofabortion is about how best to respect the intrinsic value of human life, rather than about foetal rights as many people mistakenly suppose. Dworkin argues that the state should be neutral indebates about intrinsic value and thus it should be neutral in the abortion debate. Through a consideration of the notion of intrinsic value, it is argued in this article that Dworkin'sargument fails. On the interpretation of ‘intrinsic value’ which Dworkin seems to favour, it is shown to be implausible that such a notion accounts for different views about the value of human life. On an alternative interpretation of ‘intrinsic value’ it is argued that the state is not usually neutral on such matters, and thus there is no reason why it should be in the case of abortion.

This article traces the history of moral arguments for abortion care. Prior to the legalization of abortion, clergy members and physicians who participated in the Clergy Consultation Service constructed a clear moral framework for abortion as they referred women to underground abortion services. With the legalization of abortion in 1973, supporters of legal abortion turned from arguments that articulated the morality of abortion to language that emphasized women’s privacy and rights. Moral arguments receded to the background, to be taken up by anti-abortion activists who argued that abortion was immoral. With the rise of the religious right, the stigma surrounding abortion increased significantly. Fearing that ending their pregnancy was immoral, patients frequently struggled with their abortion decision. Beginning in the 1990s, abortion clinics began to address questions of foetal life and death head-on. By doing so, they offered patients the opportunity to explore topics previously considered too politically sensitive—questions concerning the value of life, the meaning of foetal death, religious beliefs, and frameworks as they related to the abortion decision. Patients and abortion providers asserted that their decisions were moral decisions and drew on their religious beliefs to guide their choices in favour of abortion.

AbstractOn 22 October 2020, the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland ruled that an abortion due to foetal impairment was unconstitutional. This article discusses the context of this controversial ruling as well as its main tenets, focusing on the interpretation of the human rights proffered by the Tribunal and on the rule of law concerns raised by the Tribunal’s decision. Against the backdrop of a brief history of the legal regulation of abortion in Poland since 1945, the article offers a critical assessment of the human rights framework used in the Polish abortion debate. Based on a close reading of the Tribunal’s ruling and the dissenting opinions, the article points out the particularities in the Tribunal’s engagement with international law and human rights jurisprudence. The article argues that the Tribunal’s decision is yet another symptom of the crisis in which the rule of law in Poland has found itself since 2015. It bears evidence to the closing of the jurisprudential horizon caused by the political change which has been taking place in Poland since 2015, consisting of the reduction of the role of international human rights debates as a reference in Polish constitutional jurisprudence. The ruling is therefore a portent of Poland’s future compliance with its international commitments in human rights matters.

Camilla Pickles’ Pregnancy Law in South Africa. Between Reproductive Autonomy and Foetal Interests (Pregnancy Law) aims at providing a less adversarial angle related to the pregnant woman and the unborn within her, by moving away from the pregnant woman as a single entity (including the unborn within her) as well as from viewing the pregnant woman and the unborn within her as two separate entities of distinctive value and separate needs. This applies to four categories addressed by Pregnancy Law, namely foetal personhood, violence against pregnant women that terminates pregnancies, substance abuse during pregnancy, and termination of pregnancy for especially the South African context. Pregnancy Law positions its argument on a relational model that emphasises the context of pregnancy as signifying a connection between the pregnant woman (with rights) and the unborn (with interests) inside of her, the unborn being fully dependent on the pregnant woman’s body. This in turn is blended with what is referred to as a not-one/not-two approach. Bearing this in mind, Pregnancy Law claims to provide a compromise, middle ground and third approach regarding what is perceived to be the extremes of the single-entity and separate-entities approaches. Bearing this in mind, this article comprises a critical appraisal directed at Pregnancy Law’s claims as alluded to in the above with specific focus on the status of the unborn against the background of abortion (which in turn has implications for matters related to foetal personhood, violence against pregnant women that terminates pregnancies and substance abuse during pregnancy).

This paper evaluates the role being adopted by the European Court of Human Rights when confronted with claims arising from the extreme restriction of access to abortion services in certain Member States. It will be argued that in response to such claims the Court has been prepared to find that the suffering of the applicants can be captured as forms of rights violation, but it has sought to avoid taking a stance as to foetal life, leading it to adopt a highly deferential approach and to avoid the substantive issues at stake, of protection for female reproductive health, dignity and autonomy, in favour of focusing mainly on procedural ones. Having considered such issues as the missing gender-based aspects of the abortion jurisprudence, this paper concludes that its restrained and largely procedural stance has enabled the Court to provide some limited protection for women, on healthcare grounds, but that the opportunity to recognise that highly restrictive abortion regimes systematically and persistently create especially invidious discrimination based on gender has so far been missed.

The aim of this study has been to analyse the ways Mexican states articulates the actions of women undergoing an abortion and the effects it has on criminal sanctions specified for women. This study analyses the criminal code of Mexico City which decriminalised abortion in 2007, the criminal code of Jalisco reformed in 2009 and the criminal code of Yucatán reformed in 2009. The discrimination of women had been the major concern of International Human Rights Law as well as feminist jurisprudence. This research has attempted to problematise and highlight different aspects of discrimination taking place in Mexican law. Feminist liberal theory and radical feminism had been placed to analyse the criminal codes governing Mexican abortion law. Thus, in this thesis, the problems of women to access legal abortion had been discussed as a problem of discrimination based on sex. Therefore, this study does not touch upon tensions between the foetus and the mother but the conflict that emerges in the ways the law thinks of women.

Романюк Х. І. Кримінальна відповідальність за незаконне проведення аборту: дисертація на здобуття наукового ступеня кандидата юридичних наук за спеціальністю 12.00.08 – кримінальне право та кримінологія; кримінально-виконавче право / Романюк Христина Ігорівна. – Львів: Львівський державний університет внутрішніх справ МВС України, 2019. - 230 с.
Дисертаційна робота є комплексним монографічним дослідженням невирішених питань або таких, щодо яких немає одностайності в науці та правозастосовній практиці, стосовно відповідальності за незаконне проведення аборту. Вивчено зміст поняття «незаконне проведення операцій штучного переривання вагітності (аборту)», розглянуто кримінальну відповідальність за цей злочин в історії вітчизняного кримінального законодавства, здійснено порівняльний аналіз відповідальності за незаконне проведення аборту у зарубіжному кримінальному законодавстві, окреслено межі кримінальноправової охорони ненародженого життя, охоронюваного нормами кримінального права України, встановлено співвідношення складів злочинів, які забезпечують охорону ненародженого життя, між собою і з іншими складами злочинів; узагальнено особливості караності та кваліфікації незаконного проведення аборту. Наведено пропозиції щодо вдосконалення законодавства, стосовно відповідальності за незаконне проведення аборту. Доведено, що з позицій правової ідеології запровадження кримінальної відповідальності за незаконний аборт виступає діалектичним способом захисту правових інтересів соціуму (демографічної безпеки), ненародженого життя (право на життя плоду після 22 тижня розвитку), здоров’я (зокрема репродуктивного) вагітної жінки та права на свободу формування репродуктивного вибору жінки. Зазначено, що у сучасній українській юридичній науці навколо предмета незаконного проведення аборту розгорнулась гостра, логічно аргументована дискусія. В результаті цього у теорії основних прав людини досі не сформоване одностайне ставлення до питання необхідності охорони ненародженого життя. Запропоноване визначення незаконного переривання вагітності як застосування медикаментозних та інших засобів, які спрямовані на штучне переривання вагітності, що здійснюються з порушенням установлених законодавчих норм і медичних стандартів щодо: особи вагітної (врахування протипоказань, віку, способу, строку вагітності), місця проведення (лікувальна установа), суб’єкта здійснення медичного втручання (його кваліфікація, освіта, фахова підготовка). Наголошено, що в історичному контексті саме більшовицька революція початку ХХ століття та подальший період класової боротьби, соціальних конфліктів і війн, і одночасно із періодом науково-технічної революції, фемінізації та зниження рівня впливовості церкви у Західній цивілізації призвели до загострення проблематики вчинення абортів, зокрема незаконних. Визначено, що родовим об’єктом незаконного проведення аборту необхідно вважати суспільні відносини щодо кримінально-правової охорони забезпечення здоров’я жінки, зокрема репродуктивного, її життя, життя ембріона (плоду) людини, як основу забезпечення права на життя майбутньої дитини, відносини забезпечення демографічної безпеки та порядку надання медичної допомоги. Об’єкт незаконного проведення аборту – це суспільні відносини щодо захисту життя та здоров’я жінки та встановлений порядок надання медичної допомоги у частині здійснення операції аборту. Суспільно-небезпечні наслідки під час незаконного аборту можуть виявлятися у таких площинах: спричинення шкоди репродуктивному здоров’ю жінки (основним безпосереднім об’єктом згідно з частиною третьою чинної редакції норми); завдання шкоди суспільним відносинам щодо порядку, встановленого у частині організації надання медичної допомоги (основним безпосереднім об’єктом згідно з частиною першою чинної редакції норми); спричинення смерті жінки (додатковим безпосереднім об’єктом згідно з частиною третьою чинної редакції норми); спричинення смерті ембріона (плоду) людини (є фактичним наслідком, не охопленим кримінально-правовим захистом). Запропоновано викласти диспозицію ч. 1 ст. 134 КК України у такій редакції «Проведення штучного переривання вагітності (аборту) особою, яка не має спеціальної медичної освіти, або інше незаконне штучне переривання вагітності, - карається …». Зазначено, що жінка, яка вчинила самоаборт кримінальну відповідальність не несе (навіть, якщо така жінка виношувала чужу вагітність як сурогатна мати, відповідно до договору про виношування чужої вагітності). Проте, якщо ускладнити структуру безпосереднього об’єкту незаконного проведення аборту включенням до неї ненародженого життя – висновок щодо кримінальної відповідальності за самоаборт має бути протилежним. Жінка, яка штучно перериває власну вагітність посягає вже не лише на власне здоров’я, а й заподіює шкоду іншому об’єктові кримінальноправової охорони – життю ненародженої дитини. У цьому випадку, відповідно до світоглядної позиції «pro life» у кримінальне законодавство доцільно включити положення про кримінальну відповідальність за самоаборт. Така норма могла б виглядати так: «Умисне вчинення жінкою штучного переривання власної вагітності, - карається…». У дисертаційному дослідженні наголошено, що формулювання «примушення до аборту, до стерилізації без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи» є некоректним, оскільки застосування поняття «примушування» у редакції цієї статті КК України вже вказує на те, що відсутня згода особи на вчинення щодо неї відповідних дій. У зв’язку із цим, а також із іншими аргументами, пропонуємо викласти ч.2 та ч.4 ст. 134 КК України у такій редакції відповідно: «2. Примушування до надання згоди на проведення аборту, - карається… 3. Примушування до надання згоди на стерилізацію, - карається…». Фактична реалізація мети примушування без згоди потерпілої особи на нинішньої редакції ст. 121 КК України повинно оцінюватися власне як умисне тяжке тілесне ушкодження за ознакою в першому випадку – переривання вагітності, у другому – втрата будь-якого органу або його функції. Важливим при цьому зберегти саме конструкцію усіченого складу, оскільки таке формулювання відповідатиме суспільній небезпеці вчиненого. Аналіз європейського досвіду щодо регулювання питань із кримінальної відповідальності за незаконне проведення абортів підкреслює особливу увагу вчених до норм кримінально-правового характеру, що пов’язані із прийняттям і оформленням рішення про здійснення аборту і попереднім консультуванням вагітної, як умови правомірності діяння. Особливою характеристикою багатьох кримінально-правових актів є наявність у них спеціальних норм, котрі не містять опису складу злочинного діяння, а встановлюють, у яких випадках переривання вагітності не є караним. Зокрема, йдеться про ситуацію крайньої необхідності або медичних показів тощо. Досвід правового регулювання кримінальної відповідальності у сфері незаконного вчинення абортів країн азійського регіону демонструє суттєві відмінності, обумовлені культурними, релігійними і соціальними факторами. Особливої уваги у контексті порівняльно-правового дослідження заслуговують норми, пов’язані із засадами кримінально-правової відповідальності вагітної за вчинення аборту та співучасть у ньому третіх осіб. Особливою рисою багатьох кримінально-правових актів є наявність спеціальних вимог до опису складу злочинного діяння, вчиненого представниками медичного персоналу. Йдеться про критерії освіти, професійні функції або окремі посади. Також важливим елементом складу злочину виступає наявність або відсутність згоди жінки на вчинення аборту. Досконало досліджено зарубіжний й вітчизняний досвід пеналізації незаконного проведення аборту, на підставі чого зроблено висновок, що питання про кримінально-правову санкцію за цей злочин в кримінальному законодавстві України, крім ч. 1 ст. 134 КК України, вирішено відносно традиційним способом, зі значно вужчими можливостями для диференціації покарання за нього порівняно із законодавством більшості зарубіжних країн. Також система передбачених кримінальним законодавством покарань за злочин є набагато м’якшою у порівнянні з зарубіжними країнами. Урахування кримінально-правового аналізу відповідальності за незаконне проведення аборту у законодавстві України та окремих країн, практики його застосування та теоретичних напрацювань кримінально-правової науки у частині складу злочину зумовило необхідність створення проекту концепції охорони демографічної безпеки, репродуктивного здоров’я та ненародженого життя на основі комплексного аналізу законодавства України, дослідження кримінально-правового захисту права на життя, вивчення іноземного досвіду охорони права на життя, а також узагальнення практики застосування правових норм. The thesis is a comprehensive monographic study of unsolved issues, or those for which there is no unanimity in the science and law practice, such as responsibility for illegal abortion. The content of the concept of «illegal performance of operations of artificial termination of pregnancy (abortion)» has been studied, the criminal liability for this crime in the history of domestic criminal legislation has been examined, the comparative analysis of the responsibility for illegal performance of abortion in foreign criminal law has been made, the limits of criminal-legal protection of an unborn life specified by criminal law of Ukraine have been outlined. In addition, the ratio of crimes among themselves and other crimes which provide protection of an unborn life is established; the features of punishment and qualification of illegal abortion are generalized. Suggestions are made to improve the legislation on liability for illegal abortion. It has been proved that from the standpoint of legal ideology the introduction of criminal responsibility for illegal abortion is a dialectical way of protecting the legal interests of the society (demographic security), of an unborn life (the right to life of a foetus after 22 weeks of development), health (including reproductive) of a pregnant woman and the right to freedom to form a woman’s reproductive choice. It is noted that in the Ukrainian legal science today there has been a heated, logically justified debate around the subject of illegal abortion. As a result, the theory of fundamental human rights has not yet formed a unanimous attitude to the need to protect an unborn life. The definition of illegal termination of pregnancy is suggested as the use of medicines and other means aimed at artificial termination of pregnancy, performed as the result of the violation of the established legal norms and medical standards for: a pregnant woman (taking into account contraindications, age, method, term of pregnancy), the place of treatment (medical institution) ), the subject of medical intervention (his qualification, education, professional training). It is emphasized that in the historical context it was the Bolshevik revolution of the beginning of the twentieth century and the subsequent period of class struggle, social conflicts and wars together with the period of scientific and technological revolution, feminization and decrease of the level of influence of the church in Western civilizalization led to the intensification of the problem of illegal abortion. It is determined that the generic object of an illegal abortion should is connected with public relations on criminal protection of woman’s health, in particular reproductive, her life, life of a human embryo (foetus) as a basis for securing the right to life of a future child as well as relationships in demographic security and health care delivery. The object of an unlawful abortion should be social relationships as for the protection of the the life and health of a woman and the procedure for providing medical assistance in the part of performing an abortion. Socially dangerous consequences of illegal abortion can be manifested in the following areas: causing harm to a woman’s reproductive health (by the main direct object according to part three of the current version of the norm); causing harm to public relations regarding the order established in the part of the organization of the provision of medical care (by the main direct object according to part one of the first valid version of the norm); causing death of a woman (by an additional direct object in accordance with part three of the current version of the norm); causing death of a human embryo (foetus) (a factual consequence not covered by criminal justice). It is proposed to lay out the disposition of Part 1 of Art. 134 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine in the following wording «Conducting an artificial abortion by a person without a special medical education or another illegal artificial abortion is punishable…». It is noted that the woman who committed self-abortion does not bear criminal responsibility (even if such a woman conceived another’s pregnancy as a surrogate mother, in accordance with the contract on the pregnancy of another’s pregnancy). However, if we complicate the structure of a direct object of an illegal abortion by including an unborn life, the conclusion regarding criminal responsibility for selfabortion should be the opposite. A woman who artificially terminates her pregnancy does not only endanger her own health, but also causes harm to another object of criminal protection - the life of her unborn child. In this case, in line with the pro-life outlook, it is advisable to include provisions on criminal liability for self-abortion. Such norm might look like this: «Deliberate committment of an artificial termination of pregnancy by a woman is punishable ...». The research emphasizes that the wording «compulsion to abortion, to sterilization without a voluntary consent of a victim» is incorrect, since the use of the term «compulsion» in the wording of this article of the Criminal Code of Ukraine already indicates itself that there is no consent of a person to commit appropriate actions. In connection with this, as well as with other arguments, we propose to deliver Part 2 and Part 4 of Art. 134 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine as follows: «2. Forcing consent to abortion is punishable… 3. Forcing to consent to sterilization is punishable… «. Actual realization of the purpose of a compulsion without the consent of a victim on the current edition of Art. 121 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine should be considered as an intentional grievous bodily harm, firstly, on the basis of termination of pregnancy, and secondly, due to the loss of any organ or its function. At the same time, it is important to preserve the construction of the truncated composition, since such formulation will correspond to public danger of an offence. The analysis of the European experience in the regulation of criminal liability for illegal abortions draws special attention of scientists to the rules of criminal law, which are connected with the adoption and execution of the decision on abortion and preliminary consultation of a pregnant woman as a condition of legality of an action. A special feature of many criminal-legal acts is the existence of special rules, which do not contain a description of the corpus delicti, but determine in which cases the termination of pregnancy is not punishable. In particular, the question is about an emergency or medical evidence. The experience of legal regulation of criminal liability in the area of illegal abortion in Asian countries shows significant differences due to cultural, religious and social factors. Particular attention in the context of comparative legal research should be paid to the rules related to the principles of criminal liability of a pregnant woman for abortion and the third party complicity in it. A special feature of many criminal acts is the existence of special requirements to the description of the corpus delicti committed by medical personnel. These are education criteria, professional functions, or individual positions. An important element of the corpus delicti is the presence or absence of a woman’s consent to abortion. The foreign and domestic experience of penalizing illegal abortion has been thoroughly researched, which lead to the conclusion that the issue of criminal sanction for this crime under criminal legislation of Ukraine, except Part 1 of Art. 134 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is settled in a relatively traditional way, with much narrower possibilities for differentiation of punishment for it compared to the legislation of most foreign countries. In addition, the system of criminal penalties provided for by criminal law is much softer than in foreign countries. Taking into account the criminal law analysis of responsibility for illegal abortion under legislation of Ukraine and individual countries, the practice of its application and theoretical knowledge of criminal law in terms of the corpus delicti necessitated the creation of a draft concept of the demographic security protection, reproductive health and unborn life on the basis of the complex analysis of Ukrainian legislation, research in the field of the protection of the right to life, the study of foreign experience in the protection of the right to life, and the generalization of the practice of applying legal rules.

Text in English
Cow size influences biological efficiency of individual animals, which influences herd composition and stock flow. This in turn influences the economic efficiency of the herd. This research followed the thread from animal size, to biological efficiency, to economic efficiency for beef cattle production under a typical production system in semi-arid South Africa. Cattle were grouped into three groups namely small, medium and large cattle, with mature weights of 300kg, 450kg and 600kg respectively. The net energy requirements of individual cattle were calculated for maintenance, growth, lactation and foetal production, for each of the three sizes. Growth rates, milk yield, reproduction rates, and management practices were assumed from existing research. Next the stock flow for a herd of small, medium and large cattle were calculated from the above. Income and expenses as commonly used in the research area were calculated from the stock flow. Gross profit above allocated costs were subsequently calculated for the three herds under the above-mentioned conditions. When assuming similar reproduction and growth rates for small, medium and large mature cattle, the following results were obtained: more heads of small cattle could be held on a set resource base, but the total live weight of a herd of large cattle that could be held on the same resource base was greater. This was mostly due to proportionately lower maintenance energy requirements in the herd of large cattle. In the simulation in this study, maintenance energy requirements for the herd of large cattle was 71.2%, compared to 72.0% for the herd of medium cattle and 73.1% for the herd of small cattle. Income from the herd of small cattle was the lowest, as less kilograms of beef were available to sell. Allocated costs for the herd of small cattle were the highest, due to a large number of expenses being charged per head of cattle. As a result, the herd of large cattle were more economically efficient than their smaller counterparts. Income above allocated costs for the herds of large, medium and small cattle were R1,182,865, R1,085,116 and R946,012 respectively. Larger cattle generally have a lower reproduction rate under similar conditions. No equation exists that directly links size to reproduction rates, especially considering the vast number of variables that influences reproduction rates. However, in the form of scenarios, it could be calculated that, given a reproduction rate of 80% for mature small cattle, when reproduction rates of large cattle were 24.7% lower than that of small cattle and the reproduction rates of medium cattle were 15.4% lower than that of small cattle, the large and medium herds became less profitable than the small herd. Smaller cattle mature faster than larger cattle which provides the opportunity for early breeding. When small cattle were bred early, at 15 months, at a calving rate of only 44.5% it was more profitable than when the same cows were bred at 24 months. When medium cattle were bred at 15 months, a calving rate of 37.0% was needed to be more profitable than when they were bred at 24 months. Even when the herd of small cattle were bred at 15 months with a reproduction rate of 100%, it could still not match the profitability of the herd of large cattle bred at 24 months given the reproduction rates of all other classes of animals were similar. When the herd of medium cattle were bred at 15 months, at a calving rate of 53.7%, it matched the profit of the herd of large cattle that were bred at 24 months, when the reproduction rates of other classes were equal. Scenarios were considered were feed intake was limited. When feed was limited to a specific amount, smaller cattle were more biologically efficient and cattle with potential for small mature sizes would grow to a larger size than cattle with potential for medium and large mature sizes. When feed was limited by a factor of the calculated energy requirements of small, medium and large cattle, large cattle were more effective. This is because large cattle use proportionately less energy for maintenance, which allows more energy to be allocated to growth, lactation and foetal production. When energy was limited to an amount per unit of metabolic weight, small cattle were more efficient than medium and larger cattle in the growth and production phases. Small, medium and large cattle were equally efficient (or inefficient) in the maintenance and lactation phases. Energy requirements of cattle in South Africa are commonly calculated using the Large Stock Unit (LSU). The LSU typically overestimates energy requirements for cattle, except in the lactation phase. When using the LSU to match small, medium or large cattle to a resource base, the LSU overestimates energy requirements of large cattle proportionately more than that of small and medium cattle. This is excluding the lactation phase, where energy requirements for all three sizes are underestimated and that of large cattle underestimated proportionately more. There are more considerations when matching cow size to managerial practices. A smaller body size is a natural adaptation to a semi-arid environment and this adaptation can be expressed in different ways. The number of animals on a resource base has implications on management practices. Having more heads of cattle on a resource base increases genetic variation of the herd, allowing for genetic progress to be made faster than in herd of fewer cattle.
Agriculture and  Animal Health
M.Sc. (Agriculture)

Thesis: Abortion in the light of case law of European Court of Human Rights This thesis focuses on the legal regulation of abortion in selected European countries in order to find single European standard. It concentrates primarily on issues of assessing violations of particular articles of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by the European Court of Human Rights or former European Commission of Human Rights in relation to specific cases associated with abortion. Abortion means the deliberate termination of pregnancy by means of surgery or administration of drugs to induce abortion. Abortion is a major ethical issue that raises number of discussions and disputes. The complexity of the problem is due to the fact that on the one hand there is the mother's right to freely decide to terminate or continue the pregnancy and on the other hand, there is considerable right of the embryo/foetus to life. The whole text of the thesis is interwoven with finding a balance between these competing interests of women and the unborn child based on my own opinion or the opinion of the international judicial body. It analyzes two main approaches, which are pro-choice approach in favour of women's freedom of choice, and pro- life approach arguing that the foetus has right to life. Both approaches...

Psalm 139 has been used by pro-lifers and gay rights activists to argue for foetal rights and LGBT rights, respectively. The poet speaks of God’s surveillance from the womb, but why is God’s surveillance so valued by interpreters, rather than dreaded (as in the book of Job)? This essay explores why this Psalm is so politically potent, using a metonymic feminist reading strategy to interrogate the ways in which scripture is used to confer rights. Spinoza’s comment on Psalm 139 leads to a consideration of scripture in relation to bodies and affect. The Psalm’s surveillance produces bodily experiences of threat and bodily fragmentation, while also ameliorating that threat by providing a sense of security through time. The results are the positive emotions of allegiance to God and appreciation of surveillance. Identifying readers gain a feeling of agency, a model for rights-bearing political subjectivity as interior, fixed, and known by God.

Scotus’ estimate of the female gender is shaped by his view that Mary is pre-eminent among merely human saints. Because Mary must be a real mother, he rejects the Aristotelian view that mothers are merely passive causes in reproduction. Christ’s most perfect saving act preserves Mary for immaculate conception, freedom from original sin, not just from birth but from the moment of foetal animation. Gender-justice is important in the marriage contract, even though God never dispenses from life-long indissoluble monogamy to allow polyandry or to permit women to divorce. The Franciscan distinction between dominion and use allows Mary and Joseph to be really married even though both vowed chastity. Gender-justice means that right reason would never permit merely human institutions from restricting ordination to men. The command must come from Christ himself.

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter is concerned with the statutory provisions governing abortion and prenatal harm. It considers the offence of abortion under sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and section 1(1) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, and defences available prior to the Abortion Act 1967. It discusses the ethical debates concerning abortion, exploring ‘right-to-life’ arguments and rights of parties such as the foetus and the father. It also looks at the court’s approach towards adult women who lack capacity before concluding with an analysis of actions for prenatal harm, namely, wrongful birth, wrongful conception, prenatal injury, and wrongful life. Relevant court cases are cited.

AbstractThis book is the product of an international and interdisciplinary conference that was held at the University of Sussex, UK, in 2018. The primary aim of the conference was to have a closer look at the reasons and impacts of numerous problematic legislation and policies that have been adopted across the world over the last decade and which had a destabilising effect on gender equality and justice. There have been some notable examples in this regard: Poland has reintroduced restriction on women’s right to abortion in 2020 (Calkin & Kaminska, 2020); the debate over the so-called foetal “heartbeat” bills in Taiwan (Liu, 2020) and the ephemeral unconstitutional anti-abortion state laws have been heated in the US and internationally since 2019 (Bakst, 2019; Evans & Narasimhan, 2020); Russia has partially decriminalised domestic violence in 2016, despite the outcry from activists and victims (Semukhina, 2020). As a pandemic swept Europe (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017), the mobilisation of “anti-gender”, anti-feminist and misogynist discourse in the political and policy domains has its global resonance in, for instance, Brazil (Hunter & Power, 2019), India (Rothermel, 2020) and South Korea (Kim, 2021). In this light, it would not be an exaggeration to contend that the last decade marks a global crisis of gender equality.

This chapter examines a range of ethico-legal issues as the impact on children. The focus is one consent of mature minors, and the limits therefore, and also on the range of rights and responsibilities relating to children concerning protection of the ir personal data. The chapter then discusses ethical and legal aspects of non-therapeutic research on children; therapeutic research on children; foetal research and experimentation; and embryos and embryonic stem cell research.

This chapter explores UK abortion debates in the 21st century. It describes new anti-abortion strategies which emerged in the 2000s and went beyond the familiar attacks on abortion providers. It demonstrates how issues such as foetal viability and calls for changes in pre-abortion counselling provision evolved as a consequence both of past anti-abortion activity and how pro-choice feminist actors have made their arguments. The chapter argues that counselling amendments are proposed because they undermine the association between a ‘right to choose’ and feminist politics and call into question the medical authority on which the Abortion Act 1967 was based.

This chapter is concerned with the statutory provisions governing abortion and prenatal harm. It considers the offence of abortion under sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and section 1(1) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 and the defences available prior to the Abortion Act 1967. It discusses the ethical debates concerning abortion, exploring ‘right-to-life’ arguments and rights of parties such as the foetus and the father. It also looks at the court’s approach towards adult women who lack capacity, before concluding with an analysis of actions for prenatal harm, namely, wrongful birth, wrongful conception, prenatal injury, and wrongful life. Relevant cases are cited.

Abstract Several female patients visit the hospital in which the narrator is on duty. She thinks about each of them: a teenage pregnant girl, a thin and frail pregnant woman who is hesitant to abort her foetus, and a dead body of a married woman – the physical and mental conditions of these patients persuade her to contemplate the status and the rights of woman in society. Narrated by a lady doctor, Jeelani Bano’s poignant short story "A Day in the Labour Room" deals with an ordinary day in the narrator's life. It focuses on themes of the physical and mental health of women and raises questions pertaining to pregnancy, abortion, and the rights of women over their bodies.

Abstract Many objections to virtue theory as a moral theory on a level with deontology and utilitarianism can be dismissed when its structure is properly understood and it is clear what has to be assumed by any moral theory. Applied to issues of abortion, an approach in terms of the virtues takes account of all aspects of pregnancy and related biological and social issues, instead of focusing only on the moral status of the foetus and/or the rights of the woman, both approaches which are inadequate to the seriousness of the issue and also lead to unsettlable disputes.

Congenital atrioventricular block (CAVB) is a cardiac conduction disorder that is diagnosed in utero, at birth, or within the first month of life. When it is diagnosed between the first month and the 18th year of life, it is defined as childhood atrioventricular (AV) block. CAVB may occur in association with concomitant congenital heart disease, or be isolated, in a structurally normal heart (e.g. immune-mediated, inherited, or idiopathic CAVB). The majority of isolated CAVB is an immune-mediated AV block, due to transplacental passage of maternal autoantibodies, damaging the fetal cardiac conduction system. Only in a third of infants with immune-mediated CAVB is a well-defined autoimmune disease known in the mother. During fetal life, fetal echocardiography still represents the gold standard for the diagnosis of CAVB. Two major negative prognostic markers are low ventricular rate and the appearance of foetal hydrops. As regards prognosis, a risk for heart failure, syncope, and sudden death is present both during fetal and postnatal life. Dilated cardiomyopathy represents another complication in CAVB history, with different possible aetiologies (right ventricular permanent pacing, reactivation of autoimmune myocarditis). The indications for pacemaker implantation in patients with CAVB are similar to those for acquired heart disease, with some special technical considerations due to young age (epicardial versus endocardial systems, pacing site, etc.). As a future perspective, leadless cardiac stimulation in children with CAVB may represent a definitive solution and an answer to many questions.

The article presents selected issues related to constitutional guarantees for the legal protection of a child's life in the prenatal period in the event of a collision of rights. The author analyses the problem concerning the legal status of a child in the prenatal phase of life, as well as acceptability and bounds of terminating pregnancy. The author examines the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland of 22 October 2020 held that prenatal examinations or other medical data indicate a high probability of serious and irreversible disability of the foetus or an incurable life-threatening disease, was contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.