Academic literature on the topic 'Fiscal announcements'

This paper investigates the effects of fiscal consolidation announcements on sovereign spreads in a panel of 21 emerging market economies during 2000-18. We construct a novel dataset using a global news database to identify the precise announcement date of fiscal consolidation actions. Our results show that sovereign spreads decline significantly following news that austerity measures have been approved by the legislature (congress or parliament), in periods of high sovereign spreads or in countries under an IMF program. In addition, consolidation announcements are less contractionary when sovereign spreads decline, with the reduction in output being half of the counterfactual case in which spreads do not respond to announcements. These results constitute direct evidence that confidence effects, in the form of lower sovereign spreads, are an important transmission channel of fiscal shocks. We also find that the role of confidence effects increases with the level of spreads such that countries with high spread levels stand to benefit the most from putting in place credible austerity packages.

Abstract In order to fight the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, monetary and fiscal policymakers announced a large variety of support packages which are often unprecedented in size. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the responses of European financial markets to these policy announcements in the spring of 2020. We assemble a granular set of more than 400 policy announcements, both at the national and the European level. We also differentiate between the first announcement in a series of policies and the subsequent announcements because the initial steps were often seen as bad news about the state of the economy. In a panel model, we find that monetary policy, in particular, through asset purchases, is effective in easing the pressure on governmental finances. Stock prices are particularly sensitive to the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact. Fiscal policy becomes more effective when monetary announcements fall on the same day. We also find sizable cross-border effects of policy announcements.

We relate the informativeness of earnings and dividend announcements to their timing relative to the fiscal quarter end to which the earnings pertain. Evidence is provided that the information content of earnings decreases as the timing of its announcement relative to the fiscal quarter end increases, and that such information erosion is more pronounced for smaller firms. Evidence is also provided that the information content of dividend announcements increases as its timing relative to the fiscal quarter end increases, and that such information enhancement is relatively more pronounced for larger firms. The results suggest that preannouncement information precision and announced information precision have offsetting effects on the informativeness of financial information, and that the nature of the offset depends on the type of information and firm size. More specifically, the predisclosure information effect is more pronounced for earnings and small firms, whereas the announced (new) information effect is more pronounced for dividends and large firms.

The study examines the stock returns and trading volume reaction to quarterly earnings announcements using the event analysis methodology. Ten commercial banks with 313 earnings announcements are considered between the fiscal year 2010/11 and 2017/18. The observations are portioned into 225 earning-increased (good-news) sub-samples and 88 earning-decreased (bad-news) sub-samples. This paper finds that the Nepalese stock market is inefficient at a semi-strong level, but there is a strong linkage between quarterly earnings announcement and trading volume. Similarly, the study provides evidence of existence of information content hypothesis in the Nepalese stock market.

Abstract We explore how fiscal consolidations affect private sector confidence, a possible channel for the transmission of fiscal policy that has received particular attention recently as a result of governments embarking on austerity trajectories in the aftermath of the crisis. Panel regressions based on the annual action-based datasets of Devries et al. (2011) and Alesina et al. (2014a) show that consolidations, and in particular their unanticipated components, affect confidence negatively. To obtain a more accurate picture of how consolidations affect confidence, we construct a monthly dataset of consolidation announcements, so that we can investigate the confidence effects in real time using an event study. The results suggest that consumer confidence falls around announcements of consolidation measures, an effect likely driven by revenue-based measures. Moreover, these effects are highly relevant for European countries with weak institutional arrangements, as measured by the tightness of fiscal rules or budgetary transparency. The effects on producer confidence are generally similar, but weaker than for consumer confidence. Long-term interest rates, as a measure of confidence in the sovereign, tend to fall around spending-based consolidation announcements. We have no evidence that the confidence effects of consolidation announcements are worse in slumps than in booms. Generally, strengthening institutional arrangements may help in mitigating adverse confidence effects of consolidations.

This paper measures unexpected dividend changes in testing the free cash flow and information/signaling hypotheses using the Bar–Yosef/Sarig method. The empirical findings reveal the following: (i) The association between announcement period abnormal returns and the cash level is significantly positive for low q firms; (ii) The positive association between announcement period, abnormal returns, and the cash level is stronger in low q than in high q firms for most regressions; (iii) Low q firms reduce their capital and research and development (R&D) expenditures during the four fiscal years following dividend increase announcements. Our results are consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis.

Unconventional fiscal policy uses announcements of future increases in consumption taxes to generate inflation expectations and accelerate consumption expenditure. It is budget neutral and time consistent. We provide preliminary evidence for the effectiveness of such policies using changes in value-added tax (VAT) and household survey data for Poland. We find households increased their inflation expectations and willingness to purchase durables before the increase in VAT. Future research has to ensure income, wealth effects, or intratemporal substitution channels cannot explain these results and ideally exploit exogenous variation in VAT in a fixed nominal interest rate environment.

Abstract We establish a link between firms managing investors’ performance expectations, earnings announcement premiums, and cyclical patterns (i.e., seasonalities) in returns. Firms that are more likely to manage expectations toward beatable levels predictably earn lower returns before, and higher returns during, their earnings announcements. This pattern repeats across firms’ fiscal quarters, suggesting firms manufacture positive “surprises” by negatively biasing investors’ expectations ahead of announcing earnings. We corroborate these findings using non-price-based outcomes indicative of expectations management. Together, our findings are consistent with the pressure for firms to meet earnings targets shaping the cross-section of firms’ stock returns.

Cette thèse s'inscrit dans le champ général de la macroéconomie financière internationale et plus spécifiquement de l'économie bancaire et financière internationale. Son objectif est d'analyser l'allocation des dettes et actifs bancaires en accordant une attention toute particulière à la politique monétaire. Dans notre premier chapitre, nous documentons d'abord le processus de mondialisation du secteur bancaire en mettant en évidence l'envol des activités bancaires transfrontières depuis les années 1980. Nous montrons ensuite que les OFC, qui représentent une part négligeable du PIB mondial, détiennent plus de 20% des actifs bancaires transfrontaliers, ce qui fait d'eux le plus large système bancaire au monde. En mobilisant, pour la première fois, des données internationales sur ces territoires, nous sommes en mesure de montrer combien la localisation géographique des encours intragroupes transfrontaliers n’est ni aléatoire, ni fondée sur les échanges économiques sous-jacents. Nous présentons notamment des éléments indiquant le poids disproportionné de quelques juridictions dans la localisation des encours intragroupes transfrontaliers des grands systèmes bancaires: cette disproportion se mesure en comparant la distribution des encours intragroupes par quintiles de taux de taxation du créditeur avec la distribution des encours intergroupes. Nous dégageons ainsi la spécificité des activités bancaires vis-à-vis de ces territoires, à savoir le recours important aux dettes internes, et ce particulièrement quand le débiteur est fortement taxé. Notre deuxième chapitre se propose de documenter l'évolution des encours internationaux entre la Chine et Hong Kong, témoins de leur intégration bancaire. À travers une variété de variables de politique monétaire, nous évaluons l'impact des chocs monétaires chinois sur les prêts transfrontaliers hongkongais. Nos résultats indiquent qu'une grande partie de la baisse du niveau d'encours, observée dès 2015, peut être attribuée à la politique monétaire accommodante de la Banque Populaire de Chine et à sa conséquence directe : la réduction de l'écart entre les taux chinois et ceux des pays avancés. Nous expliquons cette évolution par un comportement de recherche de rendement de la part des banques internationales résidant à Hong Kong. Par ailleurs, en accord avec la littérature récente sur la transmission de la politique monétaire chinoise, nous montrons que cette dernière opère désormais pleinement dans une logique de taux d'intérêt de marché et non plus à travers des instruments purement quantitatifs (quotas, contrôle du crédit et quantité de réserves obligatoires), qui étaient sa marque de fabrique dans les années 1990 et le début des années 2000. Enfin, par souci d'exhaustivité, nous comparons ces résultats à la transmission de la politique monétaire de l'hégémon, les États-Unis. Ces derniers indiquent que l'effet de la politique monétaire chinoise sur les actifs bancaires internationaux hongkongais est plus fort que celui de la politique de la Fed. Dans notre 3e chapitre, nous nous proposons d'appliquer l’idée de la forward guidance budgétaire au cadre français et de mesurer l'effet des annonces du président Emmanuel Macron pendant la crise du COVID sur les marchés financiers français. En distinguant l'effet des communiqués ou des fuites dans la presse à propos de futures annonces et les effets propres aux annonces elles-mêmes, nous montrons comment chacune impacte i) le marché des actions français et ii) l'écart de taux souverains entre la France et l'Allemagne. Nous montrons aussi que les adresses et l'annonce de ces adresses ont des effets mixtes sur la volatilité de nos deux indicateurs. Nos résultats suggèrent que la communication des décideurs de la politique budgétaire a un effet globalement positif et peut aider à rassurer les marchés financiers, tout en favorisant des politiques fortes de soutien fiscal en période d'incertitude
This thesis is part of the general field of international financial macroeconomics, and more specifically of international banking and financial economics. Its aim is to analyze the allocation of bank debt and assets, with a particular focus on monetary policy. In this way, we highlight the specific nature of banking activities in these territories, namely the extensive use of internal debt, particularly when the debtor is highly taxed.In our first chapter, we first document the process of banking globalization, highlighting the surge in cross-border banking activities since the 1980s. We then show that OFCs, which account for a negligible share of global GDP, hold over 20% of cross-border banking assets, making them the largest banking system in the world. By mobilizing international data on these territories for the first time, we are able to show how the geographical location of cross-border intra-group outstandings is neither random, nor based on underlying economic exchanges. In particular, we present evidence of the disproportionate weight of certain jurisdictions in the location of cross-border intra-group outstandings of major banking systems: this disproportion is measured by comparing the distribution of intra-group outstandings by creditor tax rate quintiles with the distribution of inter-group outstandings.Our second chapter documents the evolution of international amount outstandings between China and Hong Kong, reflecting their banking integration. Through a variety of monetary policy variables, we assess the impact of Chinese monetary shocks on Hong Kong cross-border create loans. Our results indicate that a large part of the decline in the level of outstandings, observed as early as 2015, can be attributed to the People's Bank of China's accommodative monetary policy and its direct consequence: the narrowing of the spread between Chinese rates and those of advanced countries. We explain this development by yield-seeking behavior on the part of international banks resident in Hong Kong. Furthermore, in line with recent literature on the transmission of Chinese monetary policy, we show that the latter now operates fully within a market interest rate logic and no longer through purely quantitative instruments (quotas, credit control and reserve requirements), which were its hallmark in the 1990s and early 2000s. Finally, we compare these results with the monetary policy transmission of the hegemon, the United States. The latter indicate that the effect of Chinese monetary policy on Hong Kong's international banking assets is stronger than that of Fed policy.In our 3rd chapter, we propose to apply the idea of fiscal forward guidance to the French framework and measure the effect of President Emmanuel Macron's announcements during the COVID crisis on French financial markets. Distinguishing between the effect of press releases or leaks about future announcements and the effects specific to the announcements themselves, we show how each impacts i) the French equity market and ii) the sovereign spreads between France and Germany. We also show that the addresses and the announcement of those addresses have mixed effects on the volatility of our two indicators. Our results suggest that communication by fiscal policy-makers has an overall positive effect and can help reassure financial markets, while promoting strong fiscal support policies in times of uncertainty

We assess the effects of austerity announcements on investors' perception of the government's solvency across the financial cycle. To do so, we construct a unique news dataset utilizing a newswire database which consists of governmental and parliamentary approvals of austerity measures for 11 European countries. We also follow more regular statements of governmental representatives towards austerity measures. The effects are studied on 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany during the period 01:2000-12:2019. Implementing pooled OLS regressions, we find significant decreasing effects in the pre-crisis period especially for the GIIPSH group (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Hungary) and decreasing although not significant effects in the post-crisis period. The crisis period manifests itself with increased surprise effects of announcements. The markets adopted announcements of the GIIPSH group as signals of deteriorating solvency which led to further increases of yield spreads. On the other hand, prudent countries (Czechia, France, Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia) enjoyed a low sensitivity to their announcements across the cycle. Finally, we find that markets react rather on final announcements of austerity measures than to comments expressed by national representatives....

Abstract The grim picture painted by GDP numbers during the Covid-19 outbreak had begun ringing alarm bells for policy-makers and the Government machinery alike. There was an outcry by economists for a stimulus package along the lines provided by Governments of advanced economies running into trillions of dollars. While the Government of India ably responded to the need of the hour and provided a stimulus package to the tune of Rs. 20 lakh crores (equivalent to 10% of GDP), many deliberations post this announcement were pointing towards the fact that the stimulus was inadequate for reviving the Indian economy, and the Government must pull out all stops to get the economy back on track. The point that was being missed out here and what the chapter delves into was that the hands of the Government were tied due to the availability of limited fiscal space. The question that all of us need to answer is: In times of an unprecedented situation such as a health pandemic, is it the whole sole responsibility of the Government alone to step forward and take action in such difficult times OR should Corporates and citizens join hands with the Government and work towards nation building especially during a crisis in hand? Should not the wealthy and citizens with deep pockets rise to the occasion and be a partner in the Government’s efforts in bringing back the situation to normalcy? Given the health emergency and crisis situation, cash- rich corporates and wealthy individuals with deep pockets should co- create their CSR and philanthropic strategies as an effective response to the virus outbreak.

Abstract The global energy sector is shifting towards a more sustainable, environmentally friendly production, and consumption of all energy sources. Climate change and ESG (Environment, Social, and Governance) topics are opening important debates about its challenges towards energy transition, management of a wide range of stakeholders, as well as benefits and opportunities, reflected on the long-term prospects of a company, which takes into consideration environmental concerns, businesses’ financial performance, resilience, and the ability to sustain their operations & business continuity during adverse situations with appropriate and effective governance frameworks. The objective of this paper is to examine the potential of green corridors (‘GC’) as a solution to reduce emissions in the shipping and logistics sector and how it aligns with the decarbonization strategy of the UAE. The scope of the proposed paper includes a pre-feasibility assessment of two locations, potential decarbonization clusters, or ports that include technical, economic, regulatory, and government aspects (e.g., consortium or JV structures). Our study will employ a mixed-methods approach, which includes a literature review, data analysis, stakeholder mapping, and expert interviews. The literature review will examine current research on decarbonization efforts in the shipping and logistics sector, with a focus on initiatives aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions as a tool to support the energy transition. The data analysis will be used to evaluate the pre-feasibility of implementing a GC, assessing one location and potential clusters, including project baselining for corridors, value chain mapping, screening criteria (selection framework and justification), and stakeholders’ mapping including regulatory bodies and governments. Expert interviews will be conducted with stakeholders in the shipping industry and governmental entities to gain insights into their perspectives on the potential of GC as a decarbonization pathway. GCs are increasingly seen as an essential part of the solution, viewed as catalysts to the transition toward zero-carbon shipping. Whilst there have been announcements to implement, there is no GC in full operation today, which enhances the novelty of this topic. GCs are expected to be built with decarbonization hubs to address the company's Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) by providing carbon-free options between ports and with an end-to-end centric approach, where financing options, alternative fuels, and collaboration among sectors are essential. Moreover, GCs are expected to lower risks, increase stakeholder confidence in investing, and align on a roadmap for a multisector approach and governance structure feasible for meeting decarbonization targets and timelines. Shipping and logistics sectors represent 5-10% of direct emissions and a relevant proportion of scope 3 for the upstream & downstream sectors. Emissions and stakeholders need to be assessed, quantified, and mapped at the ports or hubs, including storage facilities, and routes. Nevertheless, identifying green policies could help close the gap in fuel costs (e.g., carbon exchanges, carbon credits, tax and fiscal policies, CCS, alternative fuel, and infrastructure incentives/subsidies, etc.), cargo sensitivity, and technology developments. The results of the paper are expected to indicate that GCs have the potential to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in the shipping and logistics sector and support the UAE's position as a "first mover" nation in terms of decarbonization. The UAE sustainability plans, and International Maritime Organization's (IMO) stricter regulations are incentivizing the sector to meet ambitious goals by 2030 and 2050, guiding more efforts to promote more collaboration across its hydrocarbon value chain. However, it will also require a significant investment in infrastructure and technology, as well as cooperation among multiple stakeholders, including government, industry, and the international community. Also, governance models and clear roadmaps linked with government policies and incentives would be important to make it successful.

Banco de la República is celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2023. This is a very significant anniversary and one that provides an opportunity to highlight the contribution the Bank has made to the country’s development. Its track record as guarantor of monetary stability has established it as the one independent state institution that generates the greatest confidence among Colombians due to its transparency, management capabilities, and effective compliance with the central banking and cultural responsibilities entrusted to it by the Constitution and the Law. On a date as important as this, the Board of Directors of Banco de la República (BDBR) pays tribute to the generations of governors and officers whose commitment and dedication have contributed to the growth of this institution.1 Banco de la República’s mandate was confirmed in the National Constitutional Assembly of 1991 where the citizens had the opportunity to elect the seventy people who would have the task of drafting a new constitution. The leaders of the three political movements with the most votes were elected as chairs to the Assembly, and this tripartite presidency reflected the plurality and the need for consensus among the different political groups to move the reform forward. Among the issues considered, the National Constitutional Assembly gave special importance to monetary stability. That is why they decided to include central banking and to provide Banco de la República with the necessary autonomy to use the instruments for which they are responsible without interference from other authorities. The constituent members understood that ensuring price stability is a state duty and that the entity responsible for this task must be enshrined in the Constitution and have the technical capability and institutional autonomy necessary to adopt the decisions they deem appropriate to achieve this fundamental objective in coordination with the general economic policy. In particular, Article 373 established that “the State, through Banco de la República, shall ensure the maintenance of the purchasing power of the currency,” a provision that coincided with the central banking system adopted by countries that have been successful in controlling inflation. In 1999, in Ruling 481, the Constitutional Court stated that “the duty to maintain the purchasing power of the currency applies to not only the monetary, credit, and exchange authority, i.e., the Board of Banco de la República, but also those who have responsibilities in the formulation and implementation of the general economic policy of the country” and that “the basic constitutional purpose of Banco de la República is the protection of a sound currency. However, this authority must take the other economic objectives of state intervention such as full employment into consideration in their decisions since these functions must be coordinated with the general economic policy.” The reforms to Banco de la República agreed upon in the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 and in Act 31/1992 can be summarized in the following aspects: i) the Bank was assigned a specific mandate: to maintain the purchasing power of the currency in coordination with the general economic policy; ii) the BDBR was designatedas the monetary, foreign exchange, and credit authority; iii) the Bank and its Board of Directors were granted a significant degree of independence from the government; iv) the Bank was prohibited from granting credit to the private sector except in the case of the financial sector; v) established that in order to grant credit to the government, the unanimous vote of its Board of Directors was required except in the case of open market transactions; vi) determined that the legislature may, in no case, order credit quotas in favor of the State or individuals; vii) Congress was appointed, on behalf of society, as the main addressee of the Bank’s reporting exercise; and viii) the responsibility for inspection, surveillance, and control over Banco de la República was delegated to the President of the Republic. The members of the National Constitutional Assembly clearly understood that the benefits of low and stable inflation extend to the whole of society and contribute mto the smooth functioning of the economic system. Among the most important of these is that low inflation promotes the efficient use of productive resources by allowing relative prices to better guide the allocation of resources since this promotes economic growth and increases the welfare of the population. Likewise, low inflation reduces uncertainty about the expected return on investment and future asset prices. This increases the confidence of economic agents, facilitates long-term financing, and stimulates investment. Since the low-income population is unable to protect itself from inflation by diversifying its assets, and a high proportion of its income is concentrated in the purchase of food and other basic goods that are generally the most affected by inflationary shocks, low inflation avoids arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth.2 Moreover, low inflation facilitates wage negotiations, creates a good labor climate, and reduces the volatility of employment levels. Finally, low inflation helps to make the tax system more transparent and equitable by avoiding the distortions that inflation introduces into the value of assets and income that make up the tax base. From the monetary authority’s point of view, one of the most relevant benefits of low inflation is the credibility that economic agents acquire in inflation targeting, which turns it into an effective nominal anchor on price levels. Upon receiving its mandate, and using its autonomy, Banco de la República began to announce specific annual inflation targets as of 1992. Although the proposed inflation targets were not met precisely during this first stage, a downward trend in inflation was achieved that took it from 32.4% in 1990 to 16.7% in 1998. At that time, the exchange rate was kept within a band. This limited the effectiveness of monetary policy, which simultaneously sought to meet an inflation target and an exchange rate target. The Asian crisis spread to emerging economies and significantly affected the Colombian economy. The exchange rate came under strong pressure to depreciate as access to foreign financing was cut off under conditions of a high foreign imbalance. This, together with the lack of exchange rate flexibility, prevented a countercyclical monetary policy and led to a 4.2% contraction in GDP that year. In this context of economic slowdown, annual inflation fell to 9.2% at the end of 1999, thus falling below the 15% target set for that year. This episode fully revealed how costly it could be, in terms of economic activity, to have inflation and exchange rate targets simultaneously. Towards the end of 1999, Banco de la República announced the adoption of a new monetary policy regime called the Inflation Targeting Plan. This regime, known internationally as ‘Inflation Targeting,’ has been gaining increasing acceptance in developed countries, having been adopted in 1991 by New Zealand, Canada, and England, among others, and has achieved significant advances in the management of inflation without incurring costs in terms of economic activity. In Latin America, Brazil and Chile also adopted it in 1999. In the case of Colombia, the last remaining requirement to be fulfilled in order to adopt said policy was exchange rate flexibility. This was realized around September 1999, when the BDBR decided to abandon the exchange-rate bands to allow the exchange rate to be freely determined in the market.Consistent with the constitutional mandate, the fundamental objective of this new policy approach was “the achievement of an inflation target that contributes to maintaining output growth around its potential.”3 This potential capacity was understood as the GDP growth that the economy can obtain if it fully utilizes its productive resources. To meet this objective, monetary policy must of necessity play a countercyclical role in the economy. This is because when economic activity is below its potential and there are idle resources, the monetary authority can reduce the interest rate in the absence of inflationary pressure to stimulate the economy and, when output exceeds its potential capacity, raise it. This policy principle, which is immersed in the models for guiding the monetary policy stance, makes the following two objectives fully compatible in the medium term: meeting the inflation target and achieving a level of economic activity that is consistent with its productive capacity. To achieve this purpose, the inflation targeting system uses the money market interest rate (at which the central bank supplies primary liquidity to commercial banks) as the primary policy instrument. This replaced the quantity of money as an intermediate monetary policy target that Banco de la República, like several other central banks, had used for a long time. In the case of Colombia, the objective of the new monetary policy approach implied, in practical terms, that the recovery of the economy after the 1999 contraction should be achieved while complying with the decreasing inflation targets established by the BDBR. The accomplishment of this purpose was remarkable. In the first half of the first decade of the 2000s, economic activity recovered significantly and reached a growth rate of 6.8% in 2006. Meanwhile, inflation gradually declined in line with inflation targets. That was how the inflation rate went from 9.2% in 1999 to 4.5% in 2006, thus meeting the inflation target established for that year while GDP reached its potential level. After this balance was achieved in 2006, inflation rebounded to 5.7% in 2007, above the 4.0% target for that year due to the fact that the 7.5% GDP growth exceeded the potential capacity of the economy.4 After proving the effectiveness of the inflation targeting system in its first years of operation, this policy regime continued to consolidate as the BDBR and the technical staff gained experience in its management and state-of-the-art economic models were incorporated to diagnose the present and future state of the economy and to assess the persistence of inflation deviations and expectations with respect to the inflation target. Beginning in 2010, the BDBR established the long-term 3.0% annual inflation target, which remains in effect today. Lower inflation has contributed to making the macroeconomic environment more stable, and this has favored sustained economic growth, financial stability, capital market development, and the functioning of payment systems. As a result, reductions in the inflationary risk premia and lower TES and credit interest rates were achieved. At the same time, the duration of public domestic debt increased significantly going from 2.27 years in December 2002 to 5.86 years in December 2022, and financial deepening, measured as the level of the portfolio as a percentage of GDP, went from around 20% in the mid-1990s to values above 45% in recent years in a healthy context for credit institutions.Having been granted autonomy by the Constitution to fulfill the mandate of preserving the purchasing power of the currency, the tangible achievements made by Banco de la República in managing inflation together with the significant benefits derived from the process of bringing inflation to its long-term target, make the BDBR’s current challenge to return inflation to the 3.0% target even more demanding and pressing. As is well known, starting in 2021, and especially in 2022, inflation in Colombia once again became a serious economic problem with high welfare costs. The inflationary phenomenon has not been exclusive to Colombia and many other developed and emerging countries have seen their inflation rates move away from the targets proposed by their central banks.5 The reasons for this phenomenon have been analyzed in recent Reports to Congress, and this new edition delves deeper into the subject with updated information. The solid institutional and technical base that supports the inflation targeting approach under which the monetary policy strategy operates gives the BDBR the necessary elements to face this difficult challenge with confidence. In this regard, the BDBR reiterated its commitment to the 3.0% inflation target in its November 25 communiqué and expects it to be reached by the end of 2024.6 Monetary policy will continue to focus on meeting this objective while ensuring the sustainability of economic activity, as mandated by the Constitution. Analyst surveys done in March showed a significant increase (from 32.3% in January to 48.5% in March) in the percentage of responses placing inflation expectations two years or more ahead in a range between 3.0% and 4.0%. This is a clear indication of the recovery of credibility in the medium-term inflation target and is consistent with the BDBR’s announcement made in November 2022. The moderation of the upward trend in inflation seen in January, and especially in February, will help to reinforce this revision of inflation expectations and will help to meet the proposed targets. After reaching 5.6% at the end of 2021, inflation maintained an upward trend throughout 2022 due to inflationary pressures from both external sources, associated with the aftermath of the pandemic and the consequences of the war in Ukraine, and domestic sources, resulting from: strengthening of local demand; price indexation processes stimulated by the increase in inflation expectations; the impact on food production caused by the mid-2021 strike; and the pass-through of depreciation to prices. The 10% increase in the minimum wage in 2021 and the 16% increase in 2022, both of which exceeded the actual inflation and the increase in productivity, accentuated the indexation processes by establishing a high nominal adjustment benchmark. Thus, total inflation went to 13.1% by the end of 2022. The annual change in food prices, which went from 17.2% to 27.8% between those two years, was the most influential factor in the surge in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Another segment that contributed significantly to price increases was regulated products, which saw the annual change go from 7.1% in December 2021 to 11.8% by the end of 2022. The measure of core inflation excluding food and regulated items, in turn, went from 2.5% to 9.5% between the end of 2021 and the end of 2022. The substantial increase in core inflation shows that inflationary pressure has spread to most of the items in the household basket, which is characteristic of inflationary processes with generalized price indexation as is the case in Colombia. Monetary policy began to react early to this inflationary pressure. Thus, starting with its September 2021 session, the BDBR began a progressive change in the monetary policy stance moving away from the historical low of a 1.75% policy rate that had intended to stimulate the recovery of the economy. This adjustment process continued without interruption throughout 2022 and into the beginning of 2023 when the monetary policy rate reached 12.75% last January, thus accumulating an increase of 11 percentage points (pp). The public and the markets have been surprised that inflation continued to rise despite significant interest rate increases. However, as the BDBR has explained in its various communiqués, monetary policy works with a lag. Just as in 2022 economic activity recovered to a level above the pre-pandemic level, driven, along with other factors, by the monetary stimulus granted during the pandemic period and subsequent months, so too the effects of the current restrictive monetary policy will gradually take effect. This will allow us to expect the inflation rate to converge to 3.0% by the end of 2024 as is the BDBR’s purpose.Inflation results for January and February of this year showed declining marginal increases (13 bp and 3 bp respectively) compared to the change seen in December (59 bp). This suggests that a turning point in the inflation trend is approaching. In other Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil, Perú, and Mexico, inflation has peaked and has begun to decline slowly, albeit with some ups and downs. It is to be expected that a similar process will take place in Colombia in the coming months. The expected decline in inflation in 2023 will be due, along with other factors, to lower cost pressure from abroad as a result of the gradual normalization of supply chains, the overcoming of supply shocks caused by the weather, and road blockades in previous years. This will be reflected in lower adjustments in food prices, as has already been seen in the first two months of the year and, of course, the lagged effect of monetary policy. The process of inflation convergence to the target will be gradual and will extend beyond 2023. This process will be facilitated if devaluation pressure is reversed. To this end, it is essential to continue consolidating fiscal sustainability and avoid messages on different public policy fronts that generate uncertainty and distrust. 1 This Report to Congress includes Box 1, which summarizes the trajectory of Banco de la República over the past 100 years. In addition, under the Bank’s auspices, several books that delve into various aspects of the history of this institution have been published in recent years. See, for example: Historia del Banco de la República 1923-2015; Tres banqueros centrales; Junta Directiva del Banco de la República: grandes episodios en 30 años de historia; Banco de la República: 90 años de la banca central en Colombia. 2 This is why lower inflation has been reflected in a reduction of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient that went from 58.7 in 1998 to 51.3 in the year prior to the pandemic. 3 See Gómez Javier, Uribe José Darío, Vargas Hernando (2002). “The Implementation of Inflation Targeting in Colombia”. Borradores de Economía, No. 202, March, available at: https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5220 4 See López-Enciso Enrique A.; Vargas-Herrera Hernando and Rodríguez-Niño Norberto (2016). “The inflation targeting strategy in Colombia. An historical view.” Borradores de Economía, No. 952. https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/6263 5 According to the IMF, the percentage change in consumer prices between 2021 and 2022 went from 3.1% to 7.3% for advanced economies, and from 5.9% to 9.9% for emerging market and developing economies. 6 https://www.banrep.gov.co/es/noticias/junta-directiva-banco-republica-reitera-meta-inflacion-3