Books on the topic 'First century Roman political situation'

This first English translation of Le Roman de Waldef makes a significant representative of the French literature of medieval England accessible for the first time. Its wide-ranging content provides an ideal introduction to a number of themes in medieval literature, making it suitable for a variety of undergraduate and graduate courses. The fast-moving romance plot of this early thirteenth-century tale recounts the ancestry and exploits of Waldef and his two sons, set against a history of pre-Conquest England. The narrative shares themes and incident types with other important insular romances, including the Lai of Haveloc, Boeve de Haumtone, and Gui de Warewic. Waldef’s scope, interest in battle, and political stratagems bear reading alongside medieval chronicles, while secret love affairs connect it with other romance literature of the period, and adventures across a wide area of the known world provide affinities with medieval travel narrative.

This book is a regional history of Lesbos and the Troad from the seventh century BC to the first century AD which examines the extent to which this geographical region became politically, economically, and culturally integrated over this extended timeframe. The case studies in each chapter examine the various human and geographical factors which promoted regional integration, but also consider the political and identity-based considerations which limited integration and curtailed co-operation in particular areas. It is argued that this produced a situation in which an economically well-integrated region nevertheless remained politically fragmented and was only capable of unified action at moments of crisis. The book is split into two halves, with the first examining both the human and geographical factors which contributed to regional integration in the Troad and the politics of this process and the second examining the insular identity of Lesbos, the extent to which it was integrated into the mainland, and the consequences of this integration for the internal dynamic of the island. Cross-cutting these regional dynamics are the various imperial systems (Persian, Athenian, Macedonian, Attalid, Roman) which ruled this region and shaped its internal dynamics both through direct interventions in regional politics and through the pressures and incentives which these imperial systems created for local communities.

South Arabian kingdoms based their wealth and power on agriculture and the export of incense and other aromatics so much appreciated in the ancient world. After Aelius Gallus’ campaign against Arabia Felix in 25–24 BC, Roman trade by sea with the region greatly increased compared to the overland caravan routes. This chapter summarizes the political situation in Arabia Felix in those times through the analysis of archaeological, historical, and numismatic evidence and focuses on the harbours and mooring places along the Yemenite and Omani coasts. Italian underwater research at Qanaʾ discovered the ancient anchorage, with ceramics dating between the first and the end of the sixth century AD, with a higher percentage before the fourth century AD. Typological and petrological study suggests the close involvement of the Arabian Peninsula in the web of trade routes that connected the Roman world via the Red Sea with India, and the Persian Gulf.

This book offers an analysis of Roman political culture in Italy from the first to the sixth century AD on the basis of seven case studies. Its main contention is that, during the period in which Italy was subject to single rule, Italy’s political culture had a specific form. It was the product of the continued existence of two traditional political institutions: the senate in the city of Rome and the local city councils in the rest of Italy. Under single rule, the position of both institutions was increasingly weakened and they became part of a much wider institutional landscape. Nevertheless, they continued functioning until the end of the sixth century AD. Their longevity must imply that they retained meaning for their members, even when society was undergoing significant changes. As their powers and prerogatives shrank considerably, their significance became social rather than political: they allowed elites to enact and negotiate their own position in society. The tension between the fact that the institutions were at heart participatory in nature, but that their power was restricted, generated complex social dynamics. On the one hand, participants became locked in mutual expectations about each other’s behaviour and were enacting social roles, while on the other hand they retained a degree of agency. They were encapsulated in an honorific language and in a set of conventions that regulated their behaviour, but that at the same time offered them some room for manoeuvre.

This is a study of the translation and reception of the Roman historian Livy in early-modern England. The work examines the four Tudor translations of Livy’s history of Rome, the Ab Urbe Condita, into the English vernacular during the sixteenth century and their engagements with the most pressing political and cultural debates of the day, from Henrician appropriations of Hannibal to arguments over the status of women. The first chapter examines Livy’s initial reception into print in Europe, outlining the attempts of his earliest editors to impose a critical order onto his enormous work. The subsequent chapters consider the respective translations undertaken by Anthony Cope, William Thomas, William Painter, and Philemon Holland, situating them among the wider trends in Classical Reception during the early-modern era. Each translation is compared in detail with the Latin original, highlighting the changes Livy’s history experienced in the process of translation. The study considers how these translations responded to and were shaped by the most recent developments in European scholarship on Livy’s history and classical historiography more generally. So too the study examines Livy’s impact on more popular forms of English literature during the Renaissance, especially the works of Shakespeare. Ultimately this research demonstrates that Livy played a fundamental though underexplored role in the development of vernacular literature, historiography, and political thought in early-modern England.

This chapter gives a rapid overview of the history of Roman public and private institutions, from their early beginning in the semi-legendary age of the kings to the later developments of the Imperial age. A turning point has been the passage from the kingdom to the republic and the new foundation of citizenship on family wealth, instead of the exclusiveness of clan and lineages. But still more important has been the approval of the written legislation of the XII Tables giving to all citizens a sufficient knowledge of the Roman legal body of consuetudinary laws. From that moment, Roman citizenship was identified with personal freedom and the rule of law. Following political and military success, between the end of IV and the first half of III century bce Rome was capable of imposing herself as the central power in Italy and the western Mediterranean. From that moment Roman hegemony was exercised on a growing number of cities and local populations, organized in the form of Roman of Latin colonies or as Roman municipia. Only in the last century bce were these different statutes unified with the grant of Roman citizenship to all Italians. In this same period the Roman civil law, which was applied to private litigants by the Roman praetors, had become a very complex and sophisticated system of rules. With the empire the system did not change abruptly, although the Princeps did concentrate in his hands the last power of the judiciary and became the unique source of new legislation. In that way, for the first time, the Roman legal system was founded on rational and coherent schemes, becoming a model, which Antiquity transmitted to the late medieval Europe.

During the centuries between the date of the mythical founding of Rome and the first decades of the sixth century AD when Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis was enacted, the legal condition of women underwent substantial transformation. To understand this process it is necessary to recall that during the first centuries of its history Rome was a patriarchal society, where only patres familias enjoyed full civil and political rights. Other members of the family enjoyed only certain rights, and some did not enjoy any at all. Over the centuries paternal authority underwent important changes, which in different ways limited it. Rome had grown from a small village of peasants and shepherds to a metropolis that ruled the world. Political, social, economic conditions (not to say mentalities and religious beliefs and practices) changed the way of thinking of the Romans, their way of life and their attitude and behaviour towards women.

The later ninth-century interest in court circles at Constantinople in reaffirming the Roman credentials of the eastern Roman state—most obvious in imperially sponsored codifications of law—is now generally understood to have been, at least in part, a response to challenges set up by the papacy, and in particular followed on from the exchange of letters between popes and emperors or their advisors in the second half of the ninth century. But there were other consequences of this process, many of which can be summed up in the phrase ‘Macedonian renaissance’. More radically, however, it can be argued that medieval eastern Roman attitudes to Islam were also bound up with these changes, entailing not only an attempt to understand aspects of Islamic belief and praxis, but for the first time perceiving Islam as an existential threat to the moral as well as the political universe of Christianity.

This article discusses findings from excavations at Sardis. Settlement at Sardis has existed for three-and-a-half millennia, from ca. 1500 BCE to the present; it may have existed even earlier, in the third millennium BCE (perhaps even before that). During its long existence, the settlement hosted many cultures: western Anatolian, Lydian, Persian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, and Turkish. Contemporaneous cultures typically merged (e.g., Anatolian and Greek, Byzantine and Turkish), and earlier cultural traditions affected later ones. In the first half of the first millennium BCE, Sardis was the capital of an independent state created by the Lydians, a western Anatolian people who inhabited valleys of the Hermus, Kayster, and Maeander Rivers and adjacent highlands and mountains, and who had distinctive cultural traditions; the Lydian language, an Anatolian sub-branch of Indo-European, is known from a relatively small number of alphabetic texts. The nature and extent of settlement has fluctuated between the extremes of a large prosperous city and a modest hamlet or group of hamlets, sometimes coexisting with transhumant populations. From the seventh century BCE to the seventh century CE, Sardis was a large city of major political and cultural importance, occupying at maximum extent an estimated 200 ha of land.

This chapter provides an iconographic overview on how the universities of the Holy Roman Empire displayed their authority. It will focus on two aspects. The first is the development of iconographic formulae that can convey the constitution and activity of a university or one of its faculties; and the second is the role of coats of arms or other political signs that indicate the relation between the university and the rulers of the territory in which it was situated. A seventeenth-century legal treatise on insignia gives a long list of the signs of the head of a university: maces (Sceptra), robe (Epomis), register (Matricula), the presence of bedells, seals, books of statutes and privileges, and the keys to consistory and prison. Of these objects, only the two that regularly bear images is discussed in this chapter: the seals and the maces.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.

This chapter describes how Raymond Bellour in the twenty-first century enters into the on-going debates about the end of cinema that commenced in France in the late 1980s. The chapter underlines how he focuses largely on the changing shape and nature of the dispositif (or viewing situation, including the assumptions that a spectator brings to the viewing experience) in response to new technologies, with an emphasis on moving-image installation art shown in the museum or gallery. Whereas some scholars, such as Francesco Casetti, among others, have claimed that digital technologies and the proliferation of diverse viewing platforms mark a further development, a continuation of what was once cinema (and perhaps even the nineteenth century novel, the photo-roman, the comic book. etc.), Bellour sees these changes as constituting a fundamental break, an ontological shift in the nature of the medium. For Bellour, the dispositif – the apparatus, or physical setting and its technological and psychic potentiality for interaction, as well as the codes that inform this interaction, within which the viewer confronts and makes meaning out of a narrative, visual or otherwise – is fundamental to the experience of cinema and the ideas that it generates. This section offers an exploration Bellour’s understanding of these crucial changes, the implications of which animate discussions about contemporary media across the disciplines.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, two new actors made their appearance in the political life of the communes: the factions and the Societas Populi. This chapter focuses on the political language and culture of these two elements, highlighting the tendency of various social actors to consistently represent the unity of the political body. This was the supreme value which neither the factions nor the Popolo would renounce, even when they were alone in power: on the contrary, in fact, it was very much in that kind of situation that the parties tended to represent themselves as ‘the whole’. The chapter then goes on to examine the role that both the factions and the Societas Populi played in fostering the first experiences of lordly government in the city.

The ‘return of religion’ in the public sphere and the emergence of postsecular societies have propelled the discourse of political theology into the centre of contemporary democratic theory. This situation calls forth the question addressed in this book: Is a democratic political theology possible? Carl Schmitt first developed the idea of the Christian theological foundations of modern legal and political concepts in order to criticize the secular basis of liberal democracy. He employed political theology to argue for the continued legitimacy of the absolute sovereignty of the state against the claims raised by pluralist and globalized civil society. This book shows how, after Schmitt, some of the main political theorists of the 20th century, from Jacques Maritain to Jürgen Habermas, sought to establish an affirmative connection between Christian political theology, popular sovereignty, and the legitimacy of democratic government. In so doing, the political representation of God in the world was no longer placed in the hands of hierarchical and sovereign lieutenants (Church, Empire, Nation), but in a series of democratic institutions, practices and conceptions like direct representation, constitutionalism, universal human rights, and public reason that reject the primacy of sovereignty.

This chapter examines the semantic range of the concept of pax, considering its place in the Roman imaginary alongside ‘associated concepts’ (particularly concordia, otium, bellum, and victoria). The traditional Republican meaning and uses of the term pax are examined in a variety of contexts (contemporary prose, poetry, historical writings, numismatics, and religious dimensions) in order to establish more precisely the conceptualization and meaning of pax within the conventional political language of the Republic. Whilst pax was used to describe a usually unequal relationship of power with either the gods or other civic entities, as well as interpersonal relations, it did not conventionally have a strong political presence in Roman thought prior to the first century BC.

Parallel administrative, financial, and ideological features in Roman and Chinese imperialism may reflect a ‘first great convergence’ at more or less opposite ends of the Eurasian landmass between about 1000 BC, and the late sixth century AD, when the tendency towards political polycentrism in the Mediterranean west and the periodic restoration of imperial unity in East Asia come to constitute separate trajectories....

Existing from the early third century BC to 63 BC, the Mithridatic kingdom of Pontos was one of the most powerful entities in the Mediterranean world. Under a series of vigorous kings and queens, it expanded from a fortress in the mountainous territory of northern Asia Minor to rule almost all the Black Sea perimeter. This is the first study in English of this kingdom in its entirety, from its origins under King Mithridates I around 280 BC until its last and greatest king, the erudite and cultured Mithridates VI the Great, fell victim to the expanding ambitions of the Roman Republic in 63 BC. Through a series of astute marriage alliances (one of which produced the ancestors of Cleopatra of Egypt), political acumen, and military ability, the Pontic rulers (most of whom were named Mithridates) dominated the culture and politics of the Black Sea region for over two hundred years. This book is a thorough exploration of the internal dynamics of the kingdom as well as its relations with the rest of the Mediterranean world, especially the ever-expanding Roman Republic.

The gospels and ancient historians agree: Jesus was sentenced to death by Pontius Pilate, the Roman imperial prefect in Jerusalem. To this day, Christians of all churches confess that Jesus died 'under Pontius Pilate'. But what exactly does that mean? Within decades of Jesus' death, Christians began suggesting that it was the Judaean authorities who had crucified Jesus—a notion later echoed in the Qur'an. In the third century, one philosopher raised the notion that, although Pilate had condemned Jesus, he'd done so justly; this idea survives in one of the main strands of modern New Testament criticism. So what is the truth of the matter? And what is the history of that truth? David Lloyd Dusenbury reveals Pilate's 'innocence' as not only a neglected theological question, but a recurring theme in the history of European political thought. He argues that Jesus' interrogation by Pilate, and Augustine of Hippo's African sermon on that trial, led to the concept of secularity and the logic of tolerance emerging in early modern Europe. Without the Roman trial of Jesus, and the arguments over Pilate's innocence, the history of empire—from the first century to the twenty-first—would have been radically different.

This book is the first monograph in English about Demades, an influential Athenian politician from the fourth century B.C. An orator whose fame outlived him for hundreds of years, he was an acquaintance of and a collaborator with many political and military leaders of classical Greece, including the Macedonian king Philip II, his son and successor Alexander III (the Great), and the orator Demosthenes. However, an overwhelming portion of the available evidence on Demades dates to at least three centuries after his death and, often, much later. Contextualizing the sources within their historical and cultural framework, The Orator Demades delineates how later rhetorical practices and social norms transformed his image to better reflect the educational needs and political realities of the Roman imperial and Byzantine periods. Using the specific example of Demades as a rhetorical construct that eventually replaced its historical prototype for later generations, the book raises a general question about the problematic foundations of our knowledge of classical Greece. The evolving image of Demades illustrates the role played by rhetoric, as the basis of education and edification during the Roman and Byzantine Empires, in creating an alternate, inauthentic vision of the classical past—a vision that continues to dominate modern scholarship and popular culture.

This historical commentary examines books 79(78)–80(80) of Cassius Dio’s Roman History, which cover the period from the death of Caracalla in 217 B.C. to the reign of Severus Alexander and Cassius Dio’s retirement from political life in A.D. 229 Cassius Dio, a Roman senator, provides a valuable eyewitness account of this turbulent period, which was marked by the assassination of Caracalla; the rise of Macrinus, Rome’s first equestrian emperor, and his subsequent overthrow; the tempestuous, and by all accounts peculiar, reign of Elagabalus; and the continuation of the Severan dynasty under the young Severus Alexander. In addition to elucidating important passages from these books, this study assesses Cassius Dio’s political life and its relationship to his literary career; his call to history and time of composition; his historical method; and his attitude toward and subsequent presentation of the later Severan dynasty. In its investigation of books 79(78)–80(79), the work assesses an important stretch of Dio’s actual text, which for other parts has been preserved largely in epitome and excerpts. Finally, the work aims to fill a gap in scholarship, as no commentary on these books of Cassius Dio’s history has been produced since the nineteenth century, and its publication coincides with a renewed interest in the history and historiography of the Severan period.

Through case studies of archaeological materials from local contexts, Archaeology and the Letters of Paul illuminates the social, political, economic, and religious lives of those whom the apostle Paul addressed. Roman Ephesos, a likely setting for the household of Philemon, provides evidence of the slave trade. An inscription from Galatia seeks to restrain traveling Roman officials, illuminating how the travels of Paul, Cephas, and others may have disrupted communities. At Philippi, a donation list from a Silvanus cult provides evidence of abundant giving amid economic limitations, paralleling practices of local Christ followers. In Corinth, a landscape of grief includes monuments and bones, a context that illumines Corinthian practices of baptism on behalf of the dead and the provocative idea that one could live “as if not” mourning. Rome and the Letter to the Romans are the grounds to investigate ideas of time and race not only in the first century, when we find an Egyptian obelisk inserted as a timepiece into Augustus’s mausoleum complex, but also of Mussolini’s new Rome. Thessalonikē demonstrates how letters, legend, and cult are invented out of a love for Paul, after his death. The book articulates a method for bringing together biblical texts with archaeological remains in order to reconstruct the lives of the many adelphoi—brothers and sisters—whom Paul and his co-writers address. It is informed by feminist historiography and gains inspiration from thinkers like Claudia Rankine, Judith Butler, Giorgio Agamben, Wendy Brown, and Katie Lofton.

This chapter examines the affirmation of the commune in the context of the urban political scene: first as one of the many forces present in the city (together with the bishop and certain aristocratic families endowed with specific rights and powers), then as a single hegemonic force. In less than a century, the communal citizen passed from an extra legem condition to one of full recognition as a public power—something that took place thanks to a complex conceptual work of elaboration that owed much to the clash with Barbarossa and even more to the encounter with the Roman legal tradition. The chapter shows that it was, in fact, on this terrain that the doctores built the legal foundations of citizen autonomy: a process which, while slow and non-linear, gave rise to exceptional results.

This chapter shifts the focus to the Eastern empire, examining the evolution of perceptions of tyranny in Byzantium from the late Roman period to the eighth century. The chapter shows that these constitute the inverse of crucial concepts in Byzantine imperial ideology, particularly with regard to issues of religious orthodoxy, moral integrity, military efficiency, and administrative competence. Furthermore, it argues that the nature and scope of these perceptions can be better understood when examined in conjunction with the discourse of tyrannicide and usurpation as deployed in a broad spectrum of historical, hagiographic, and propagandistic works. The discussions commonly surrounding cases of legally precarious coups d’état offer insights into when, how, and why political actors came to be considered as tyrants in the first centuries of the Byzantine millennium.

For more than a century, scholars have believed that Italian humanism was predominantly ‘civic’ in outlook. Often serving in communal government, fourteenth-century humanists like Albertino Mussato and Coluccio Salutati are said to have derived from their reading of the Latin classics a rhetoric of republican liberty that was opposed to the ‘tyranny’ of neighbouring signori and of the German emperors. In this groundbreaking study, Alexander Lee challenges this long-held belief. From the death of Frederick II in 1250 to the failure of Rupert of the Palatinate’s ill-fated expedition in 1402, Lee argues, the humanists nurtured a consistent and powerful affection for the Holy Roman Empire. Though this was articulated in a variety of different ways, it was nevertheless driven more by political conviction than by cultural concerns. Surrounded by endless conflict—both within and between city states—the humanists eagerly embraced the Empire as the surest guarantee of peace and liberty, and lost no opportunity to invoke its protection. Indeed, as Lee shows, the most ardent appeals to imperial authority were made not by ‘signorial’ humanists, but by humanists in the service of communal regimes. The first comprehensive, synoptic study of humanistic ideas of Empire in the period c.1250–1402, this volume offers a radically new interpretation of fourteenth-century political thought, and raises wide-ranging questions about the foundations of modern constitutional ideas. As such, it is essential reading not just for students of Renaissance Italy and the history of political thought, but for all those interested in understanding the origins of liberty.

The City of God, written in the aftermath of the Gothic sack of Rome in AD 410, is the most influential of Augustine’s works. It has played a decisive role in the formation of the culture of the Christian West. Gerard O’Daly’s book remains the most comprehensive modern guide to it in any language. The City of God has a wide scope, including cosmology, psychology, political thought, anti-pagan polemic, Christian apologetic, theory of history, biblical interpretation, and apocalyptic themes. This book, therefore, is about a single literary masterpiece, yet at the same time it surveys Augustine’s developing views through the whole range of his thought. It provides a running commentary on each part of the work. Further chapters elucidate the early fifth-century political, social, historical, and literary background, the works’s sources, and its place in Augustine’s writings. This new and extensively revised edition takes into account the abundant work, in Augustine studies and in research on late antiquity generally, in the twenty years since its first publication, while retaining the book’s focus on Augustine as writer and thinker in the Latin tradition, active at a time of rapid Christianization in a radically changing Roman Empire. It includes chapter-by-chapter suggestions for further reading, an extensive summary of the work’s contents, and a brief bibliographical guide to research on its reception. All Greek and Latin texts are translated. The book is aimed at readers of Augustine, and at the same time at a wider readership among students of late antiquity, theologians, philosophers, medievalists, Renaissance scholars, and historians of art and iconography.