Academic literature on the topic 'Financial advice, agent'

Due to the increase in virtual humans as a pedagogical agent, this study investigates how perceptions of virtual humans are affected by voice quality in understanding a budgeting scenario where trust is essential to learning and application. Eighty-six participants were randomly assigned to three conditions where voice quality for a virtual human varied (human voice, low quality text-to-speech, high quality text-to-speech) when narrating a financial literacy course. Measures of trust and course comprehension were collected. Results of the learning assessment suggest no difference in comprehension based on voice quality of a virtual human. No differences were observed between the voice quality groups in participants' perception of trust, the abilities to facilitate learning, credibility of the agent, human-likeness of the agent, or how engaging the agent was. This is possibly due to the lower age demographic who have become increasingly exposed to virtual human voices through popular platforms such as Tik-Tok.).

The unexplained and inconsistent behavior of financial markets provides the motivation to engage interdisciplinary approaches to understand its intricacies better. A proven approach is to consider investors as heterogeneous interacting agents who form information networks to inform their investment decisions. The rationale is that the topology of these networks has contributed to a better understanding of the erratic behavior of financial markets. Introducing investor heterogeneity also allows researchers to identify the characteristics of higher performing investors and the implications of investors exhibiting short-termism, a feature recognized by some as detrimental to the performance of the economy. To address these topics, an agent-based artificial stock market is implemented, where investors utilize various information sources, including advice from investors in their network, to inform their investment decisions. Over time investors update their trust in their information sources and evolve their network by connecting to outperforming investors—Oracles—and discarding poor advisers, thereby simulating the evolution of an investor network. The model’s most significant finding is uncovering how the market’s behavior is materially affected by the time-horizon of investors, with short-term behavior resulting in greater volatility in the market. Another finding is the reason why short-term investors generally outperform their long-term counterparts, particularly in more volatile environments. By providing significant insights into the formation of an investor network and its ramifications for market volatility and wealth creation (destruction), this paper provides crucial clues regarding the empirical data that needs to be collected, assessed, and tracked to ensure policymakers and investors better understand the dynamics of financial markets.

The introduction of auto-enrolment (AE) into workplace pensions in 2012 requires employers to enrol workers into a pension. Employers have significant discretion in this process and rely on the financial services industry to ensure compliance with AE minimum standards. Employers may not always have pension expertise and will engage pension providers for advice on establishing compliant pension arrangements or modifying existing schemes to use for AE. Whilst this policy benefits many, there are a number of negative consequences flowing from the introduction of AE. Examples include employers choosing poorly performing schemes, insufficient protection of free choice and poor default positions replacing active decision making, all of which result in poor value for some employees. The parties' interests may not always be aligned. Despite the minimum criteria, there can be significant variations between fund costs and scheme quality as private sector pensions are frequently used for compliance. Whilst the ability of employees to opt-out provides legitimacy for the regime, the form of implementation and use of defaults erodes the exercise of choice and there are no provisions to encourage engagement and active decision-making by individuals. In addition to this, inadequate advice impacts on the effects of AE for many. For some this means that they pay in less overall than they would have if they had voluntarily chosen to contribute to a plan. This article explores whether further statutory change to the AE regime is required or whether existing private law remedies, with a focus on Scots law, afford sufficient remedies for those suffering loss. If fiduciary, agency, contractual or delictual obligations arise from the AE relationship then this may provide adequate remedies. This article will consider whether fiduciary duties are owed to employees, particularly by the employer (as an agent) to the employee, and the extent of duties owed under the contract of employment.

e16570 Background: Gestational trophoblastic disease (GTD) is potentially curable disease. Its incidence varies in different countries with high incidence reported in Japan (2/1000 pregnancies) and Mexico (2.5/1000 pregnancies). No studies have been reported regarding epidemiology, management and outcome of GTD in Nepal. Methods: The study was a descriptive case series. Case records of GTD patients attending B.P. Koirala Memorial Cancer Hospital, Nepal from 2001 to 2007 were analyzed. The main outcomes were measured in terms of duration, antecedent pregnancy, investigations, treatment and follow-up. Results: A total of 45 cases of gestational trophoblastic disease (GTD) were received from 26 districts of Nepal. The age of the patients ranged from 16 to 50 years with a mean age of 29.1 years (SD 9.4 years). Out of 45 cases 19 (43%) were of Tibeto-Burmese ethnic group and 15 (33%) belonged to Indo-Aryan ethnic group. There were 17 cases (37.8%) of hydatidiform mole, 6 were invasive mole (13.35%), 4 of persistent gestational trophoblastic tumour (8.8%) and 22 patients (48.8%) of choriocarcinoma. In 7 cases (15.5%) molar pregnancy had occurred in the first conception, another 7 cases (15.5%) had previous molar pregnancy and in 16 (35.5%) cases GTD had occurred following abortion. The most common presenting symptom was vaginal bleeding and 26 (57.8%) patients had anaemia. Theca Leuteal cyst was present in 11 (24.5%), 17 (37.8%) cases had lung metastasis, 4 (8.9%) had brain metastasis and another 4 (8.9%) had disseminated disease detecteted radiologically. Among the 45 cases 6 (13.3%) were treated with suction evacuation only; 9 (20%) underwent hysterectomy for uterine perforation, excessive hemorrhage and invasive mole. 28 (62.2%) cases underwent adjuvant chemotherapy among which 12 (26.6%) received single agent chemotherapy and 15 (33.3%) received EMA-CO regimen. Brain irradiation was required in a case with brain metastasis. Five (11.1%) cases with disseminated disease and high WHO risk score left the hospital against medical advice. There were 3 (6.7%) mortalities. 37 (82.1%) cases are in remission and follow-up. Conclusions: Early diagnosis of disease and proper management strongly influences the outcome of GTD. Even in disseminated state GTD can be cured. No significant financial relationships to disclose.

<p>Insurance agents globally struggle with clients who do not understand the importance of disciplined savings and of meeting with them at least once a year to make necessary adjustments to their financial plans. The purpose of the study was to provide assistance to these agents and explore trust and commitment as mediators of the relationship between quality advice and customer loyalty. The context of the study was clients of independent insurance agents (N=242), and self-administered surveys were used to test the research hypotheses formulated. It appears imperative for insurance agents providing clients with quality advice to focus strongly on building trust and commitment. These mediating variables contribute to a 27% change in the adjusted R² value, and resulted in a much higher R² value of 0.77 in the final model. The findings of the study could also assist larger organisations focusing on consultative selling practices and help them create solid client relationships with the potential to deliver great profit. </p>

The phenomenon of financial innovation (FI) found, in the fast-contemporary technological advance, the possibility of disseminating solutions that are intended to fill market gaps, promoting profound changes in the traditional financial structure. This finding can be explained by the perceptible movement of different agents interested in exploring the applications of blockchain technology in recent years. Considering this scenario of changes and expectations the present work aims to analyze perceptions of financial market agents about the possibility of blockchain technology influence in the creation of FI solutions. From the point of view of the research strategy, it constitutes a field research. We operated through interviews with the participation of twelve managers of institutions that operate in the financial environment. The results point to blockchain impacting the financial environment of organizations, whether in its technology platforms, investments, internal structures, people, governance, business conceptions. Likewise, by the existence of opportunities to solve market problems, affecting, through deeper changes in the financial system, from the disintermediation. It reveals the emergence of new business models and the possibility of consumers and managers less dependent on a centralized financial environment.

The phenomenon of financial innovation (FI) found, in the fast-contemporary technological advance, the possibility of disseminating solutions that are intended to fill market gaps, promoting profound changes in the traditional financial structure. This finding can be explained by the perceptible movement of different agents interested in exploring the applications of blockchain technology in recent years. Considering this scenario of changes and expectations the present work aims to analyze perceptions of financial market agents about the possibility of blockchain technology influence in the creation of FI solutions. From the point of view of the research strategy, it constitutes a field research. We operated through interviews with the participation of twelve managers of institutions that operate in the financial environment. The results point to blockchain impacting the financial environment of organizations, whether in its technology platforms, investments, internal structures, people, governance, business conceptions. Likewise, by the existence of opportunities to solve market problems, affecting, through deeper changes in the financial system, from the disintermediation. It reveals the emergence of new business models and the possibility of consumers and managers less dependent on a centralized financial environment.

Personalisation of products and services is fast becoming the driver of success in banking and commerce. Machine learning holds the promise of gaining a deeper understanding of and tailoring to customers’ needs and preferences. Whereas traditional solutions to financial decision problems frequently rely on model assumptions, reinforcement learning is able to exploit large amounts of data to improve customer modelling and decision-making in complex financial environments with fewer assumptions. Model explainability and interpretability present challenges from a regulatory perspective which demands transparency for acceptance; they also offer the opportunity for improved insight into and understanding of customers. Post-hoc approaches are typically used for explaining pretrained reinforcement learning models. Based on our previous modeling of customer spending behaviour, we adapt our recent reinforcement learning algorithm that intrinsically characterizes desirable behaviours and we transition to the problem of prosperity management. We train inherently interpretable reinforcement learning agents to give investment advice that is aligned with prototype financial personality traits which are combined to make a final recommendation. We observe that the trained agents’ advice adheres to their intended characteristics, they learn the value of compound growth, and, without any explicit reference, the notion of risk as well as improved policy convergence.

AbstractPredominant models of financial regulation based on representative agents—in both the public interest and public choice traditions—assume that competitive pressures in financial markets undermine prudential behavior by firms in the absence of regulation. One empirical expectation of these models is behavioral: firms should adjust their risk-taking behaviors in response to the regulatory environment they face but should not over-comply with regulations. That is, the central tendency of bank behaviors should hew closely to regulatory minima and the variance should be small. I first demonstrate that this expectation is not borne out by the empirical record and then advance a theoretical argument that does not rely on a representative agent model. I argue that firms face a range of incentives from markets and governments that condition their risk-taking behaviors, and firms choose a “preferred habitat” within a market structure. Some of these incentives are towards greater risk-taking, while others are in the direction of greater prudence. This framework provides opportunities for examining financial market actors in a realistic context, and offers ways to unify micro-level and structural analyses of the political economy of global finance.

COVID-19 pandemic challenges the sustainability of the modern financial system. International central bankers claim that banks are solid. They have accumulated significant capital buffers. Those buffers should be further more augmented by 2027 in line with Basel III reforms. However, disregarding such a consecutive rise in the banking capital adequacy requirements, the US financial authorities undertook an unprecedented step. First time in the country history they lowered the reserve requirement to zero at the end of March 2020. Friedrich von Hayek demonstrated the fragility of the modern fractional reserve banking systems. Together with Ludwig von Mises (von Mises, 1978) he was thus able to predict the Great Depression of 1929 and explain its mechanics much in advance. Thus, we wish to utilize the agent-based modeling technique to extend von Hayek’s rationale to the previously unstudied interaction of capital adequacy and reserve requirement regulation. We find that the full reserve requirement regime even without capital adequacy regulation provides more stable financial environment than the existing one. Rise in capital adequacy adds to modern banking sustainability, but it still preserves the system remarkably fragile compared to the full reserve requirement. We also prove that capital adequacy regulation is redundant when the latter environment is in place. We discuss our findings application to the potential Central Bank Digital Currencies regulation.

This work gives another fundamental explanation for the stylized fact of active management underperformance. I develop a model of delegated portfolio management with adverse selection, where the preferences of investor and advisor are misaligned. The information structure I focus on is intermediate between the cases of private and public information: the advisor can distort the observed sharpe ratio at some cost. I show that investor may strictly prefer the contract that induces falsification as it helps him to manipulate the information rents of the agent. Within the model I show that investor prefers to deal with the advisors that have higher partisan objective as it leads to higher expected utility. I study how optimal contract and welfare changes when the information structure changes from private to public. The relation between the social welfare and the degree of information publicness is non-monotonic: although social welfare is maximum under pure public information, increasing the publicness of information may decrease the welfare.

Bakgrund: Den tredje januari 2018 trädde EU-direktivet Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) i kraft. Direktivet ämnar öka investerarskyddet genom att eliminera informationsasymmetri och intressekonflikter på finansmarknaden, och samtidigt harmonisera reglerna mellan EU-länder. Inom investeringsrådgivning innebär det nya regelverket ökad dokumentation, ett större fokus på att försäkra sig om att investerarna förstår risker, hårdare krav på hur avgifter kommuniceras och striktare regler kring incitament. Allt detta för att skydda investerarna, som ofta visat sig ha en bristfällig finansiell kunskap och ett lågt intresse för privatekonomi. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att utifrån värdepappersföretagens perspektiv skapa förståelse för vilken påverkan EU-direktivet MiFID II har haft på principal-agent problem som uppstår vid investeringsrådgivning. Genomförande: Uppsatsen är en kvalitativ fallstudie. Vidare har ett fenomenologiskt forskningsperspektiv använts, med en abduktiv ansats. Det empiriska materialet har samlats in genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med sammanlagt sju respondenter som alla jobbar på värdepappersföretag, vilka valdes ut med ett målstyrt bekvämlighetsurval. Resultat: Uppsatsen kommer fram till att principal-agent problemen inom investeringsrådgivning inte har eliminerats. Informations- asymmetrin är enligt vår tolkning av de traditionella teorierna närmast obefintlig, men utgör fortfarande ett stort problem på grund av investerarnas ointresse och relativt låga förmåga att ta till sig informationen. Vi argumenterar därav att dessa dimensioner bör inkluderas i teorin för vilka trösklar som kan orsaka informationsasymmetrin. Intressekonflikterna har reducerats, men finns till viss mån fortfarande kvar. Motivationen att agera i ett egenintresse har dock inte påverkats. Uppsatsen visar således på att MiFID II inte har förflyttat principal-agent relationen till en stewardship relation. Kunskapsbidrag: Det teoretiska bidraget gällande informationsasymmetri utmanar antagandet om att principalen vill ha information som är relevant för denne. Uppsatsen visar att så inte alltid är fallet. Förutom att det uppstår informationsasymmetri om det är kostsamt eller svårt att ta reda på agentens handlingar, kan det även uppstå i situationer där principalen är ointresserad av, eller oförmögen att ta till sig av informationen enligt vår mening. Vidare har MiFID II inneburit att det är svårare för agenten att tillgodose sitt egenintresse om detta strider mot principalens. Däremot har direktivet inte inneburit att den interna motivationen ändrats och det går därför inte att förutsätta att ett kontraktsförhållande som haft en principal-agent relation övergår till en stewardship relation när dessa problem elimineras. Genom en ökad förståelse för hur tvingande lagstiftningar påverkar principal-agent problem kan det empiriska bidraget hjälpa tillsynsmyndigheter i sitt arbete att hantera principal-agent problem. Uppsatsen skulle således kunna underlätta vidareutveckling av regleringen som finns idag, likväl som utformningen av framtida direktiv och lagar. Med ett utomstående perspektiv på vilka intressekonflikter som kan uppstå vid investeringsrådgivning skulle det empiriska bidraget också kunna vara gynnsamt för värdepappersföretag och deras arbete för att hantera intressekonflikter.
Background: On January 3, 2018, the EU directive Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) came into effect. The directive is intended to expand investor protection through eliminating information asymmetry and conflicts of interest in the financial market, while also harmonizing the regulations between nations within the EU. For investment advising, the directive results in more extensive documentation and stricter regulation of how fees and risks are communicated, as well as how incentives are handled; all with the aim of protecting investors. At the same time, the general public shows low interest in personal finance, as well as inadequate financial knowledge. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to further the understanding of how the introduction of the EU directive MiFID II has affected the principal-agent problem that arises during investment advising, from an investment firm perspective. Completion: This is a qualitative case-study which utilizes a phenomenological research perspective and an abductive approach. The empirical material has been collected through semi-structured interviews at investment firms with a total of seven respondents, whom were selected through goal-oriented convenience sampling.  Conclusion: The study concludes that the principal-agent problems in investment advising have not been eliminated. According to our interpretation of the traditional theories, information asymmetry is nearly non-existent. Yet it remains a significant problem due to lack of interest and an inability to assimilate the information. Thus, we argue that the theoretical framework should be revised to include these barriers, as they may lead to information asymmetry. Conflicts of interest have been reduced, but still remain to some extent. Furthermore, the motivation to act based on self-interest still remain. Hence, the study shows that MiFID II has not turned the principal-agent relationship into a stewardship relationship. Contribution: The theoretical contribution to information asymmetry challenges the assumption that the principal is interested in all the information that is of relevance for them. The study show that this is not always the case. Apart from information asymmetry arising when ascertaining the actions of the agent is expensive or difficult, it can also arise due to the principal’s lack of interest or inability to assimilate the information. Moreover, MiFID II has made it more difficult for the agent to act in their own self-interest, should it deviate from the interest of the principal. The directive has not, however, affected the intrinsic motivation of the agent. Thus, we cannot assume that the elimination of these problems causes a principal-agent relationship to transform into a stewardship relationship. Through an increased understanding of how binding legislation affects principal-agent problems, the empirical contribution can help regulatory bodies in their work to mitigate the aforementioned problems. Hence, the study may help to not only expand existing legislation, but also in the development of future legislation and directives. By providing an outside perspective of what conflicts of interests could arise in investment advising, the empirical contribution could also be of use for investment firms in their work to identify and manage conflicts of interest

Cette thèse traite des interactions entre les sphères financière et réelle de l'économie. Elle se compose de quatre chapitres. Dans les deux premiers chapitres, nous étudions l'existence et les fluctuations d'une bulle spéculative rationnelle, comme source de la volatilité des prix d'actifs, en prenant en compte les imperfections financières dans la modélisation des choix des ménages. L'existence d'un choix de portefeuille et de frictions financières favorisent l'émergence des fluctuations d'une bulle et des cycles économiques endogènes. Dans un tel contexte, nous analysons le rôle stabilisateur des politiques fiscales et/ou monétaires. Dans le chapitre 1, nous montrons qu'une politique monétaire répondant aux prix des actifs permet de stabiliser l'économie dans son ensemble. Dans le chapitre 2, nous comparons les vertus stabilisatrices d'un impôt progressif sur le revenu de capital à celles d'une politique monétaire régie par une règle de Taylor. Nous montrons qu'un impôt progressif sur le capital permet de stabiliser l'économie en réduisant la probabilité d'apparition des fluctuations endogènes, alors qu'une règle de Taylor a des vertus stabilisatrices mitigées. Nous étudions, dans le chapitre 3, l'existence de bulles rationnelles dans une économie ouverte à deux pays et la transmission internationale de leur éclatement. L'éclatement de la bulle dans un pays se transmet nécessairement à l'autre pays. L'effet de l'éclatement peut être positif ou négatif sur l'autre pays. Dans le chapitre 4, nous analysons le rôle de l'hétérogénéité sur la dynamique des prix d'actifs et les inégalités lorsque les agents ont des préférences pour la richesse
This thesis deals with the interplay between the financial and real sectors of the economy. This thesis consists of four chapters. In the first two chapters, we study the existence and endogenous fluctuations of rational speculative bubbles, as a source of volatility in asset prices, taking into account the financial imperfections at the household level. We argue that the existence of a portfolio choice and financial frictions promote the emergence of bubble fluctuations and endogenous business cycles. In this context, we analyze the stabilizing role of fiscal and/or monetary policies. In Chapter 1, we show that a monetary policy responding to asset prices can stabilize the economy as a whole. In Chapter 2, we compare the stabilizing virtues of a progressive taxation on capital income with those of a monetary policy managed by a Taylor rule. We show that a progressive taxation on capital may rule out endogenous fluctuations, whereas a monetary policy under a Taylor rule has a mitigated stabilizing role. In Chapter 3, we study, the existence of rational bubbles in a two-country economy, and the international transmission of their bursting. A bubble bursting in a country necessarily transmits to the othercountry. The effect of a bubble crash in one country onthe bubble issued by the other country can be positive or negative. In Chapter 4, we analyze the role of heterogeneity on the dynamics of asset prices and inequalities when economic agents have preferences for wealth. Heterogeneity in preferences, but also in income, can heighten social inequalities and increase the asset price in the long run, but also promote asset price volatility in the short run

碩士
世新大學
企業管理研究所(含碩專班)
107
With the increasing amount of big data, third party payment, and AI. Every bank is turning its operation to digital finance 3.0. Wealth Management is the latest focus that stood out amount all bank, it is what everyone cares the most about and compete the most about. The core of Wealth Management is focus on customers; well allocating customers’ assets and income. Not only considering accumulating their wealth but securing it. Extension to individual wealth management and proper assets management. The differences between Wealth Management and General Finance Services are: A. The nature of Wealth Management is focus on customers. Its purpose is to design an overall financial plan for customers to satisfy their financial needs. Whereas General Financial Services are focus on the company’s products, purpose is to increase sales. B. From the main body of the services provided, Wealth Management services are more mature and advanced financial services. They are not limited to banks, many non-bank financial institutes are launching wealth management services to their customers. General Financial Business are limited to traditional services and intermediary businesses provided by commercial banks. C. From the service clients stand point, Wealth Management is not limiting its services to individual clients, it could also include assets managements for business entities and organizations. It is servicing wider range of different types of customers. Whereas traditional financial services, which falls in early development of financial services and a type of finance products launch by our commercial banks, focus on individual human being with personal financial service product packages. With the upcoming era of new technology, many places introduced Robo-Adviser (a method to automate the asset allocation of investments via a computer algorithm,) along with wealth management. However, traditional financial services are deeply rooted in most of all, general public tend to be more confident with the investment products provided by “real human.” If we told the customers to give us money to invest without worries because we have a Robo-Adviser that is suggesting steady profit, the customers reactions could be confused, or disbelieve, or even against the ideas. These are the hurdles we need to face and go through.

Reshaping Women’s History: Voices of Nontraditional Women Historians is a collection of eighteen essays written by “nontraditional” women historians, all of whom have won the prestigious Catherine Prelinger Award. The contributors reflect on connections among their lived experiences, their scholarship, the field of women’s and gender history, and women’s professional lives. Key themes include the significance of mentorship; the fragility of financial stability; the persistence of gendered family demands, biases, and expectations; the anxiety of having to explain gaps in CVs as women endeavor to advance from one career stage to the next. Contributors offer vital lessons into challenges as well as rewards that women encounter as they pursue a life of the mind. They also have much to say about the commitment not only to writing histories of women but also preserving their voices in archives and the importance of financial support that the Prelinger Award provided. Motivated by life experiences and their personal philosophies to be change agents in their families, their workplaces, and in society, all of the contributors have written about and engaged in feminist and social justice activism. Finally, these diverse essays point to instructive and essential realities about women’s lives, the field of women.

AbstractRecent advances in Big Data and Artificial Intelligence have created new opportunities for AI-based agents, referred to as Robo-Advisors, to provide financial advice and recommendations to investors. In this chapter, we will introduce the concept of investment recommendation and describe how automated services for this task can be developed and tested. In particular, this chapter covers the following core topics: (1) the legal landscape for investment recommendation systems, (2) what financial asset recommendation is and what data it needs to function, (3) how to clean and curate that data, (4) approaches to build/train asset recommendation models and (5) how to evaluate such systems prior to putting them into production.

This chapter focuses on the impact of the ICT on the travel industry with a focus on the New Zealand travel agent (TA) sector. We present key findings from a longitudinal study of TA businesses conducted during 2000-2004. These findings are compared and contrasted with information gathered from in-depth interviews with consumers. The study explores major pressure factors on TA businesses: direct airline-consumers sale, introduction of the Internet, and the emergence of the well-informed consumer. The research also establishes that there is great variation in the extent to which travel agents use the advantages associated with new technology and how New Zealand travel agents perceive ICT. We argue that in such a crucial moment of disintermediation and the fight for the consumer, TA will need to implement more aggressive advertising policies with a strong emphasis on their professional advice, personal financial reliability, and time-saving attributes for clients.

Traditionally, the Australian travel agency sector has operated as the premium intermediary in a relatively simple distribution chain that can be depicted as follows: In such a system, it is estimated that travel agents have traditionally handled over 85% of consumer transactions (Wilde & Rosen, 2000). The advance of online technologies and ICT-based distribution systems has changed the dominant role of travel agents in the distribution and supply of travel products. This has impacted on their relevance, returns, and individual financial viability.

Traditionally, the Australian travel agency sector has operated as the premium intermediary in a relatively simple distribution chain that can be depicted as follows: In such a system, it is estimated that travel agents have traditionally handled over 85% of consumer transactions (Wilde & Rosen, 2000). The advance of online technologies and ICT-based distribution systems has changed the dominant role of travel agents in the distribution and supply of travel products. This has impacted on their relevance, returns, and individual financial viability.

This chapter establishes the Madam C. J. Walker Manufacturing Company of Indiana as a “race company,” one organized by and for the benefit of African Americans. It was the institutional manifestation of Walker’s moral imagination and philanthropic commitments. Its structure and operations blended Walker’s commercial and philanthropic goals to provide the gift of opportunity to black women through employment despite the larger constraints of low-wage, exclusionary Jim Crow labor markets. Thousands of black women became financially independent, cared for their families, and gave back to their communities in the quest for freedom through their employment in the company as sales agents, beauty culturists, or salon owners. This approach was grounded in black self-help ideology and the health and hygiene work of black clubwomen. The chapter explains that the Walker Company effectively became a third “C” that Walker added to the church and the club as platforms for black women’s racial uplift activities. The chapter addresses critiques of the company related to women’s standards of beauty and multilevel marketing business strategies. It explores Walker’s business and familial-like relationship with key trusted adviser Freeman B. Ransom, a black corporate attorney, whom she employed to help run the company. He gave organization to her vision, ran daily operations, and administered her philanthropic giving while she traveled promoting the company. The chapter reveals their partnership in operating the company for both commercial gain and philanthropic uplift as the hub for implementing her gospel of giving.