Journal articles: 'Fideism'

1

Brenner, William. "Wittgensteinian Fideism?" Ars Disputandi 7, no. 1 (January 2007): 109–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2007.10819952.

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Smith, Nicholas. "How To Hang A Door: Picking Hinges for Quasi-Fideism." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13, no. 1 (March 31, 2021): 51–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v13i1.3059.

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Abstract: In the epistemology of the late Wittgenstein, a central place is given to the notion of the hinge: an arational commitment that provides a foundation of some sort for the rest of our beliefs. Quasi-fideism is an approach to the epistemology of religion that argues that religious belief is on an epistemic par with other sorts of belief inasmuch as religious and non-religious beliefs all rely on hinges. I consider in this paper what it takes to find the appropriate hinge for a quasi-fideist approach to the epistemology of religion.

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de Ridder, Jeroen. "Against Quasi-Fideism." Faith and Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2019): 223–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201951123.

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Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly conflicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: (a) that it is, at least at some level, a matter of ungrounded faith, but also (b) that it can be epistemically rationally grounded. In this paper, I argue that quasi-fideism fails. Its central tenets either have unattractive consequences or are implausible.

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CARROLL, THOMAS D. "The traditions of fideism." Religious Studies 44, no. 1 (January 11, 2008): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412507009250.

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AbstractPhilosophers and theologians acknowledge that ‘fideism’ is difficult to define but rarely agree on what the best characterization of the term is. In this article, I investigate the history of use of ‘fideism’ to explore why its meaning has been so contested and thus why it has not always been helpful for resolving philosophical problems. I trace the use of the term from its origins in French theology to its current uses in philosophy and theology, concluding that ‘fideism’ is helpful in resolving philosophical problems only when philosophers scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use that informs their understanding of the word.

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Grant, Colin. "Is Kai Nielsen becoming a Wittgensteinian fideist?" Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 30, no. 3-4 (September 2001): 365–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000842980103000308.

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In his recourse to a later Wittgensteinian or postmodern social focus, Kai Nielsen relinquishes the analytic argument he once took to be supportive of his naturalistic outlook. This shift raises the question of how he can continue to demand rationality of theistic visions that he no longer expects for his own naturalistic outlook. Rather than a rational naturalism and a fideistic theism, what seems to be involved are two coherent visions that are seen to be rational by different people. If the visions are this basic and comprehensive, however, what we come to ultimately, it would seem, is a basic faith, fideism. This is not the arbitrary fideism that Nielsen dismissed as Wittgensteinian fideism; it is a fideism that defines what it is to be rational, but it does this for Nielsen's naturalism as well as for religious visions. In this way, Nielsen's recourse to the social in the wake of the failure of positivism exposes his own fideistic base.

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TILLEY, TERRENCE W. "INCOMMENSURABILITY, INTRATEXTUALITY, AND FIDEISM." Modern Theology 5, no. 2 (January 1989): 87–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0025.1989.tb00185.x.

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Al-Azmeh, Aziz. "Orthodoxy and Hanbalite Fideism." Arabica 35, no. 3 (1988): 253–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157005888x00026.

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Hwang Sul Joong. "Pyrrhonism and Modern Fideism." CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas ll, no. 28 (May 2008): 243–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.15750/chss..28.200805.008.

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Schönbaumsfeld, Genia. "Wittgenstein and the 'Factorization Model' of Religious Belief." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6, no. 1 (March 21, 2014): 93–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v6i1.193.

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In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a ‘factorization model’ which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent ‘factors’ – the belief’s content and the belief-attitude – appears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In this article I will argue that such a ‘factorization model’ severely distorts Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief.

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Gall, Robert S. "Fideism or Faith in Doubt?" Philosophy Today 57, no. 4 (2013): 358–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday201357430.

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Pritchard, Duncan. "Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 3 (September 17, 2018): 51–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i3.2605.

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It is argued that standard accounts of the epistemology of religious commitmentfail to be properly sensitive to certain important features of the nature of religious conviction. Once one takes these features of religious conviction seriously, then it becomes clear that we are not to conceive of the epistemology of religious conviction along completely rational lines.But the moral to extract from this is not fideism, or even a more moderate proposal (such as reformed epistemology) that casts the epistemic standing of basic religious beliefs along nonrational lines. Rather, one needs to recognise that in an important sense religious convictions are not beliefs at all, but that this is compatible with the idea that many other religious commitments are beliefs. This picture of the nature of religious commitment is shown to fit snugly with the Wittgensteinian account of hinge commitments, such that all rational belief essentially presupposes certain basic arational hinge commitments, along lines originally suggested by John Henry Newman. We are thus able to marshal a parity-style argument in defence of religious commitment. Although religious belief presupposes basic arational religious convictions, it is not on this score epistemically amiss since all belief presupposes basic arational convictions, or hinge commitments. The resulting view of the epistemology of religious commitment is a position I call quasi-fideism.

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12

Askew, Richard. "On fideism and Alvin Plantinga." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 23, no. 1 (1988): 3–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00139084.

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13

Smith, Michael A. "Beyond Fideism and Anti-Rationalism: Some Reflections on Fides et Ratio." Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 4, no. 4 (2001): 112–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/log.2001.0047.

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14

Miller, John N. "Fideism vs. Allegory in "Rappaccini's Daughter"." Nineteenth-Century Literature 46, no. 2 (September 1991): 223–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3045192.

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Miller, John N. "Fideism vs. Allegory in "Rappaccini's Daughter"." Nineteenth-Century Literature 46, no. 2 (September 1991): 223–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ncl.1991.46.2.99p0378q.

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16

Levchenko, Tetyana. "Rationalism and fideism in the discourse of Ukrainian Protestantism." Ukrainian Religious Studies, no. 91 (September 11, 2020): 151–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/2020.91.2138.

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The article analyzes the forms of rationalism and fideism proposed by Ukrainian Protestant theologians at the beginning of the XXI century. It turns out that these forms of rationalism and fideism were made possible by overcoming the anti-intellectualism that was characteristic of Protestantism in Soviet times. The opposition of tendencies to rationalism and fideism is connected with the positioning of Ukrainian Protestants in the postmodern times. Proponents of de facto rationalism propose to reconstruct the modern religious worldview, re-synthesizing elements of liberal and fundamentalist concepts. The study shows that hopes for the restoration of the modern worldview in the face of the challenges of the early XXI century contain elements of utopianism. Proponents of Fideism suggest taking full account of the real state of affairs in the postmodern era and recognizing the impossibility for Christians to use modern rationalism in all its forms. At the same time, faith acquires special significance as an expression of the personal relations of the holy people with God. Ukrainian Protestant rationalism in the article is analyzed on the example of the work of Sergei Golovin as the most consistent expression of this worldview. It has been proven that his ideas depend on the concepts of Norman Geisler, a prominent Protestant theologian. Golovin, imitating Geisler, believes that the Christian worldview should be the final superstructure over the foundation of classical logical rationalism and the ontology of being. This logic comes from classical Thomism. Golovin's rationalism is the rationalism of formal logic. Golovin's first controversial proposal is to reduce the paradoxes and contradictions contained in the Bible. Such a reduction contradicts the biblical studies of the beginning of the 21st century, and therefore can no longer be convincing for professional theologians. For ordinary believers, this reduction is an obscure rationalization of the image of God they have in reading the Scriptures. The second controversial proposition is to convert people first to logical rationality as the ideological foundation of humanity, and then to their conversion to Christianity. Such a proposal is largely outdated, because in the twentieth century it became clear that rationality in itself can be an instrument of any worldview and does not ensure the preservation or rehabilitation of humanity. By comparing it with theological practices of restoring humanity through the ethics of accepting another, the author argues that the restoration of humanity is possible through recourse to the potential of existentialist spirituality, theology of interpersonal communication, and other practical strategies of Christian theology. The biggest shortcoming of Sergei Golovin's rationalism is the proposal to build his own "scientific creationism", which denies the basic scientific theories of today. The most successful element of Golovin's system was social ethics, which offers the idea of a modern state governed by the rule of law as one that can be deduced from the spirit and letter of the biblical commandments. The fideism of Ukrainian Protestant theology is born from the understanding that the ethical acceptance of others and love for them is possible only on the basis of personal faith. The challenges of the beginning of the 21st century require the acceptance of another, but individuals and communities lack the natural strength to accept such. And only faith and faith-generated love help to be open to others. Also, the post-capitalist economy of mutual gift, proposed by theologians and Christian communities, is based only on personal faith. It has been proven that the fideism of Ukrainian Protestant theology is closer to the ideas of postconservatism than the concepts of postliberalism. It has been found that radical protection of individual rights and humane treatment of others is common to the rationalism and fideism of modern Ukrainian Protestant theology. It is these ideas that are important for understanding what humanity is, which should be a prerequisite for being a true Christian.

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17

Ribeiro, Brian. "Skeptical Fideism in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum." Logos & Episteme 10, no. 1 (2019): 95–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20191017.

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18

Labbé, Yves. "Kai Nielsen et D.Z. Phillips, Wittgensteinian Fideism ?" Revue des sciences religieuses, no. 81/2 (April 5, 2007): 273–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/rsr.601.

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19

Fritz, Peter Joseph. "Speculative Realism and Theology - or, Faithless Fideism." Heythrop Journal 59, no. 2 (February 20, 2018): 290–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12837.

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20

Tkacz, Michael W. "Faith, Science and the Error of Fideism." Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 5, no. 1 (2002): 139–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/log.2002.0013.

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21

Radenović, Ljiljana, and Slaviša Kostić. "Religious hinge commitments: Developing Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism." Belgrade Philosophical Annual, no. 30 (2017): 235–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bpa1730235r.

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22

Odell, D. W. "Young's Night Thoughts: Christian Rationalism or Fideism?" English Language Notes 43, no. 1 (September 1, 2005): 48–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00138282-43.1.48.

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23

Fadeeva, Yuliya. "Wittgenstein on Understanding Religious Beliefs." Wittgenstein-Studien 11, no. 1 (January 20, 2020): 53–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2020-0004.

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AbstractWittgenstein’s writings on religious and magical beliefs, especially the “Lectures on Religious Belief” and “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough” are taken to imply semantic incommensurability and inaccessibility by the Wittgensteinian Fideism and, in part, the expressivist interpretation. According to these interpretations, religious and non-religious discourses are self-contained, closed, and not intertranslatable. Wittgenstein is taken to deny mutual understanding between believers and non-believers with respect to religious and magical discourse. I argue against such interpretations and support readings by Kusch, Schroeder, and Tripodi that are optimistic of the possibility of mutual understanding. Nevertheless, there is a danger of scepticism for such optimistic readings when they refer to a special attitude that is needed to understand religious belief and speech. I offer a reply to this problem and suggest to see Wittgenstein’s stance on understanding religious discourse in a greater proximity to his general views about language in his later writings. Then, however, any fideist view of the religious (and magical) form of life as self-contained and isolated from the non-religious has to be repudiated.

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24

Sweet, William, and Colin O’Connell. "Empiricism, fideism and the nature of religious belief." Sophia 31, no. 3 (October 1992): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02772483.

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25

Helms, Eleanor. "The Objectivity of Faith: Kierkegaard's Critique of Fideism." Res Philosophica 90, no. 4 (2013): 439–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2013.90.4.1.

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26

Brown, Stuart. "Christian Averroism, Fideism and the ‘Two-fold Truth’." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 25 (March 1989): 207–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00011330.

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The man generally known as Averroes—Muhammad Ibn Ahmad (c. 1126–98)—was a Muslim scholar from southern Spain who came to be regarded as one of the great authorities on Aristotle's philosophy. Medieval and even later philosophers in the Scholastic tradition referred to him simply as ‘the Commentator’ just as they referred to Aristotle himself as ‘the Philosopher’. Averroes' authority as an expositor was never wholly unchallenged and, in a purely historical context, the term ‘Averroist’ should strictly be reserved for those Aristotelians who followed the interpretations of Averroes rather than those of, say, Avicenna. Some of these interpretations, however, suggested beliefs that were inconsistent with acceptance of a Creator of the material world or with belief in a last judgment at which individual souls would be punished or rewarded for their life on earth. They suggested, rather, that the material world was eternal and that individual souls did not survive bodily death. This raised a general problem about what to say in the face of a conflict between faith and reason, between the teachings of the Church and the teachings of philosophy. Averroism became associated with a particular problem and with what was known as the ‘twofold truth’, according to which it is possible to admit the conflict and continue to profess a religious faith without abandoning or abridging one's commitment to philosophy.

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27

Stoker, W. "De Rationaliteit van de Religieuze ervaring fideïsme en geloofsverantwoording." Verbum et Ecclesia 25, no. 2 (October 6, 2004): 691–710. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/ve.v25i2.294.

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This article defends the rational nature of the religious experience of Transcendence. This is done by replacing the notion of the intentionality of experience advocated in Husserl’s phenomenology by that of the trans-intentionality of experience suggested by authors like Schleiermacher, Levinas and Marion and by refuting the accusation of fideism levelled against this latter approach.

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28

Viertbauer, Klaus. "Jürgen Habermas on the Way to a Postmetaphysical Reading of Kierkegaard." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 4 (December 20, 2019): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v11i4.3038.

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Habermas’s postmetaphysical reading of Kierkegaard is paradigmatic for his understanding of religion. It shows, why Habermas reduces religion to fideism. Therefore the paper reconstructs Habermas’s reception of Kierkegaard and compares it with the accounts of Dieter Henrich and Michael Theunissen. Furthermore it demonstrates how Habermas makes use of Kierkegaard’s dialectics of existence to formulate his postmetaphysical thesis of a cooperative venture.

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29

Braiterman, Zachary. "Fideism Redux: Emil Fackenheim and the State of Israel." Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, and Society 4, no. 1 (October 1997): 105–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/jss.1997.4.1.105.

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30

Kallenberg, Brad J. "Wittgensteinian Fideism? ? By Kai Nielsen and D. Z. Phillips." Modern Theology 23, no. 3 (July 2007): 469–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0025.2007.00395.x.

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31

LEWIS, KEVIN. "THE USE OF BLAKE AND THE RECOVERY OF FIDEISM." Journal of the American Academy of Religion LIV, no. 4 (1986): 741–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/liv.4.741.

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32

Crutcher, Timothy. "Wittgensteinian Fideism? By Kai Nielsen and D. Z. Phillips." Heythrop Journal 50, no. 3 (May 2009): 548–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2009.00484_35.x.

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33

Harvey, Van A. "Wittgensteinian Fideism? ? By Kai Nielsen and D. Z. Phillips." Philosophical Investigations 30, no. 3 (July 2007): 319–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2007.00325_1.x.

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34

Kallenberg, Brad J. "Rethinking fideism through the lens of Wittgenstein’s engineering outlook." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71, no. 1 (November 29, 2011): 55–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9327-0.

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35

Cottrell, Jonathan. "Hume’s Answer to Bayle on the Vacuum." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 101, no. 2 (June 28, 2019): 205–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2019-2003.

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Abstract Hume’s discussion of space in the Treatise addresses two main topics: divisibility and vacuum. It is widely recognized that his discussion of divisibility contains an answer to Bayle, whose Dictionary article “Zeno of Elea” presents arguments about divisibility as support for fideism. It is not so widely recognized that, elsewhere in the same article, Bayle presents arguments about vacuum as further support for fideism. This paper aims to show that Hume’s discussion of vacuum contains an answer to these vacuum-based fideistic arguments. Key to this answer is a distinction between two ways in which vacuum was conceived in the early modern period: i) as a genuine thing that has spatial properties, and yet is immobile, indivisible, and penetrable (positive vacuum); ii) as a mere absence of spatial things (privative vacuum). This paper also aims to provide a novel defense of Hume against the long-standing objection that he is inconsistent in denying that we can conceive of a vacuum, while allowing that we can conceive of “invisible and intangible distance.” As I interpret him, Hume consistently denies that we can conceive of a positive vacuum, while allowing that we can conceive of two or more objects’ being arranged so as to have privative vacuum between them.

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36

Visala, Aku. "Olli-Pekka Vainio. Beyond Fideism: Negotiable Religious Identities. Ashgate, 2010." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4, no. 1 (March 21, 2012): 265–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v4i1.319.

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37

Talmor, Ezra. "God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism (review)." Journal of the History of Philosophy 25, no. 2 (1987): 299–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.1987.0016.

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38

Treanor, Brian. "The Anatheistic Wager: faith after Faith." Religion and the Arts 14, no. 5 (2010): 546–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852910x529322.

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AbstractThe hermeneutic wager described in Richard Kearney’s Anatheism seems to share a number of characteristics with both agnosticism and other postmodern religious wagers. All these approaches maintain a certain epistemological humility with respect to what we can and cannot know about God. Nevertheless, the anatheistic wager includes an existential aspect that risks commitment even in the uncertainty of epistemological uncertainty. The fivefold motion of imagination, humility, commitment, discernment, and hospitality circumscribes a wager that is neither the blind leap of fideism nor safe assurance of certainty.

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39

Gaginsky, Alexey. "Between Evidentialism And Fideism. On Ethics of Belief and Mystical Experience." Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics III, no. 3 (September 30, 2019): 78–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/2587-8719-2019-3-78-94.

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40

Mori, Gianluca. "Bayle, Saint-Evremond, and Fideism: A Reply to Thomas M. Lennon." Journal of the History of Ideas 65, no. 2 (2004): 323–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jhi.2004.0030.

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41

Diller, Jeanine. "Response to Bishop’s “How a Modest Fideism May Constrain Theistic Commitments”." Philosophia 35, no. 3-4 (August 21, 2007): 403–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9072-x.

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42

Diller, Kevin. "Does contemporary theology require a postfoundationalist way of knowing?" Scottish Journal of Theology 60, no. 3 (August 2007): 271–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930607003286.

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AbstractIn hisThe Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, F. LeRon Shults recommendspostfoundationalismas avia mediabetween modernist foundationalism and postmodernist antifoundationalism. He advocates postfoundationalism as an epistemological approach which avoids the pitfalls on either side and provides the best way forward for constructive theological work. In this article I attempt to assess how well Shults's proposal treats Christian theological knowing. I begin by entertaining a Barthian theological concern which might be employed as soft criteria for an assessment of any proposed theological epistemology. This concern stipulates that an epistemology in the service of Christian theology must respect a commitment to the objective reality of God who, as Word become flesh, makes himself known through the human experience of reality to his church, while recognising the fallibility of human knowing, presupposing a knowledge of God accessible through experience always only by the prevenient, self-giving action of God. I then turn to a brief analysis of the Shults–van Huyssteen case against foundationalism and nonfoundationalism, focusing particularly on the postfoundationalist critiques of foundationalism and fideism in dialogue with Barth. The article concludes with an appraisal of the postfoundationalist recommendation. I argue that Shults's approach maps well to the theological concern for critical realism and a recognition of the social embeddedness of human knowing. Postfoundationalism's underlying commitments, however, leave it closed to an external source of warrant, and as a consequence repudiate afrom aboveview of theological knowing. I suggest instead that only atheofoundationalist epistemology avoids the pitfalls sketched by Shults in a way that maintains proper epistemic humility without entering the ghettos of fideism or scepticism.

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MORGAN, TERESA J. "Response to my commentators." Religious Studies 54, no. 4 (October 26, 2018): 592–604. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412517000464.

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AbstractResponding to key questions raised by the other three, this article discusses the factors which led to the development of Christian fideism and why Christians were seen as a threat to wider society. It considers whether early Christian discourses always represent (of characters in narratives), or demand, belief alongside trust and other relational aspects of pistis, and argues that it is sometimes possible to have effective pistis without having right beliefs. It discusses the variable relationship between belief and doubt in New Testament texts, and suggests how the faith of St Teresa of Calcutta might have been viewed by early Christians.

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44

Krasevac, Edward. "Review Article: Between Fideism and Reductionism: Jean Porter on the Natural Law." Irish Theological Quarterly 68, no. 2 (June 2003): 163–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002114000306800205.

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45

Wawrzonkowski, Krzysztof. "Antoni Szwed, Fideizm Kalwina i bunt angielskich racjonalistów [Calvin’s Fideism and the defiance of English rationalists], Marek Derewiecki Publishing, Kęty 2016, pp. 373." Studia z Historii Filozofii 8, no. 3 (October 17, 2017): 129. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2017.036.

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46

Cottingham, John. "Robert MacSwain: Solved by sacrifice: Austin Farrer, fideism, and the evidence of faith." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77, no. 1 (September 6, 2014): 75–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9480-3.

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47

Taliaferro, Charles. "Book Review: Solved by Sacrifice: Austin Farrer, Fideism, and the Evidence of Faith." Anglican Theological Review 97, no. 1 (December 2015): 162–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000332861509700129.

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48

Pritchard, Duncan. "Faith and Reason." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (October 2017): 101–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135824611700025x.

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AbstractA novel account of the rationality of religious belief is offered, called quasi-fideism. According to this proposal, we are neither to think of religious belief as completely immune to rational evaluation nor are we to deny that it involves fundamental commitments which are arational. Moreover, a parity argument is presented to the effect that religious belief is no different from ordinary rational belief in presupposing such fundamental arational commitments. This proposal is shown to be rooted in Wittgenstein's remarks on hinge commitments in On Certainty, remarks which it is claimed were in turn influenced by John Henry Newman's treatment of the rationality of religious belief in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.

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49

Hebblethwaite, Brian. "Solved by Sacrifice: Austin Farrer, Fideism, and the Evidence of Faith, by Robert MacSwain." Faith and Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2014): 490–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201431420.

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50

Bishop, John. "How a Modest Fideism may Constrain Theistic Commitments: Exploring an Alternative to Classical Theism." Philosophia 35, no. 3-4 (June 27, 2007): 387–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9071-y.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Fideism'

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