Journal articles on the topic 'Executive transparency'
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1
Hogan, Brian, and Gregory A. Jonas. "The Association between Executive Pay Structure and the Transparency of Restatement Disclosures." Accounting Horizons 30, no. 3 (March 1, 2016): 307–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-51454.
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SYNOPSIS Restatement disclosures have evolved into two basic categories: reissuances (Big “R”) and revisions (little “r”). A reissuance restatement requires an 8-K filing, whereas a revision restatement can be disclosed in less transparent ways. The high-transparency of a reissuance restatement disclosure (8-K) results in a greater likelihood of negative effects on companies, executives, and auditors (e.g., Plumlee and Yohn 2008; Burks 2010). Determining whether an 8-K filing is required involves judgment regarding materiality of the restatement, thus creating ambiguity as to the correct disclosure method. Such judgment also introduces the potential to opportunistically choose the method of disclosure. We study the restatement disclosure choices of companies to examine whether executive pay structure is associated with disclosure transparency. Using a sample of 1,178 restatements from the years 2004 through 2013, our results show that as the equity proportion of executive pay increases, the likelihood of a high-transparency disclosure decreases. However, as the difference in pay structure between the CEO and CFO increases, the likelihood of a high-transparency disclosure increases. Overall, our results suggest that executive pay structure influences disclosure choice and that pay structure differences between the CEO and CFO may mitigate such influence. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified in the paper.
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Carvalhal da Silva, Andre, and Pedro Cochrane. "Transparency in executive compensation and corporate governance in Brazil." Corporate Ownership and Control 8, no. 3 (2011): 396–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i3c3p4.
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Studies regarding executive compensation are still recent in Brazil, and are predominantly focused on qualitative surveys. Usually the reason given to justify the lack of studies in this area is the absence of available data, or the level of quality and transparency when the data exist. This study analyzes the relationship between governance practices and transparency in disclosure of executive compensation data by Brazilian companies. One of the contributions of this study to existing literature is the creation of an original transparency index for executive compensation. Using the listing of ADRs in the U.S. and on the “Novo Mercado” of the Brazilian stock exchange (BM&FBovespa) as proxy variables for good governance practices, the results show that companies with ADRs tend to be more transparent regarding executive compensation. On the other hand, there is no significant relation between executive compensation transparency and listing on Novo Mercado. This conclusion makes sense, given that the U.S. law includes detailed guidelines for information on executive compensation, whereas the Novo Mercado does not contain specific rules regarding disclosure of executive compensation.
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Hunton, James E., Robert Libby, and Cheri L. Mazza. "Financial Reporting Transparency and Earnings Management (Retracted)." Accounting Review 81, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 135–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2006.81.1.135.
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Prior research indicates that greater transparency in reporting formats facilitates the detection of earnings management. The current study hypothesizes and demonstrates that greater transparency in comprehensive income reporting also reduces the likelihood that managers will engage in earnings management in the area of increased transparency. In our experiment, 62 financial executives and chief executive officers decide which available-for-sale security to sell from a portfolio. We manipulate the transparency of comprehensive income reporting and the relationship of projected earnings to the consensus forecast in a 2×2 between-subjects design. When projected earnings are below (above) the consensus forecast, participants sell securities that increase (decrease) earnings. However, the rarely used, more transparent format for reporting comprehensive income significantly reduces both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. Participants in the less transparent setting indicate that earnings management attempts will not be obvious to readers, will improve stock prices, and have no effect on management's reputation for reporting integrity. Conversely, respondents in the more transparent condition suggest that earnings management will be obvious to readers, harmful to stock prices, and damaging to reporting reputation. Results of this study suggest that more transparent reporting requirements will reduce earnings management in the area of increased transparency or change the focus of earnings management to less visible methods.
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Spitzer, Robert J. "Kitrosser, Heidi.Reclaiming Accountability: Transparency, Executive." Congress & the Presidency 42, no. 3 (September 2, 2015): 368–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2015.1073544.
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Ben-Amar, Walid, Nadia Smaili, and Eustache Ebondo Wa Mandzila. "Corporate Social Responsibility And The Quality Of Executive Compensation Disclosures." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 30, no. 2 (February 27, 2014): 625. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v30i2.8433.
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This paper examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility and executive compensation disclosure quality. We test whether socially responsible firms disclose more transparent and detailed information about their executive compensation packages than firms that are less committed to social responsibility initiatives. Using a sample of 187 publicly listed Canadian firms, we find a positive relation between CSR and executive compensation disclosure quality. We also document a positive (negative) association between firm size (ownership concentration) and executive compensation disclosure. These findings support the conclusion that increased disclosure transparency reflects a companys social engagement towards its stakeholders.
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Ioannou, Ioannis, and George Serafeim. "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE POWER OF TRANSPARENCY." Business Strategy Review 22, no. 3 (August 28, 2011): 76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8616.2011.00780.x.
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Wong, Michael, and Davey Yeung. "Permission-based Leadership and Change Management in Hong Kong's Nongovernment Organisations." Nang Yan Business Journal 3, no. 1 (December 1, 2014): 67–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nybj-2015-0006.
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Abstract This study addresses the management of transformational change by chief executives in nongovernment organisations (NGOs) in Hong Kong. The study takes an exploratory approach with interviews of 18 chief executives from a cross section of Hong Kong's NGOs. The findings indicate that organisational transformation is driven by increasing competition within the NGO sector and from commercial firms, by a demand for greater transparency and by internal forces. These factors are countered by structural inertia. Leadership of the organisational transformation of an NGO is permission-based; agreement from the various stakeholders must be gained to execute a successful transformation. The chief executive should have a humanistic style and be visionary, ethical and participative. Constant communication and involvement facilitate this process. Through this approach, followers will have a greater commitment to the organisational transformation. Organisational change is a combination of planned and emergent processes. The chief executive should relax control and foster a nurturing environment for transformation. This research suggests a leadership style, behavioural approach and model for managing change that will provide chief executives and senior leaders with useful considerations and insights.
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Novak, Andrew. "Transparency and Comparative Executive Clemency: Global Lessons for Pardon Reform in the United States." University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, no. 49.4 (2016): 817. http://dx.doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.49.4.transparency.
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This Article argues for transparency in the clemency process and contends that the concept of clemency as a benign sovereign’s “act of grace” is no longer appropriate in the modern world where executive action is subordinate to principles of constitutional due process and administrative equity. Despite calls for federal clemency reform in the United States, little comparative research examines clemency elsewhere in the common law world. This Article compares common law countries’ constitutional clemency mechanisms designed to promote openness, public and victim participation, and rational decision-making. In addition, this Article proposes four reforms to the U.S. pardon system that other English-speaking countries use, which will be explored in the four parts that follow: implementing an open decision-making structure (Part I); allowing judicial review of clemency decisions (Part II); applying freedom of information laws and reporting and publication requirements to clemency deliberations (Part III); and creating a role for victims and communities in the decision-making process (Part IV).
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Costa Junior, Milton Paulino, Gabriel Depoli Guimarães, João Octávio de Vargas Martins, and Sayonara Maria de Moraes Pinheiro. "Analysis of the construction process of masonry in ceramic blocks from the perspective of lean construction." Semina: Ciências Exatas e Tecnológicas 42, no. 2 (November 3, 2021): 169. http://dx.doi.org/10.5433/1679-0375.2021v42n2p169.
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The construction industry has historically been seen as a sector permeated by numerous deficiencies within its production process. In order to mitigate this problem, we have the philosophy of Lean Construction (LC), where the progress of the construction sector can only be achieved through the continuous identification and elimination of activities that do not add value. The present study analyzes the influence of one of LC concepts, the principle of increasing transparency, on the performance of the constructive step of executing seals on ceramic blocks. A case study was carried out in a residential building, where the degree of knowledge of the employees regarding the activities they perform and the executive methodology used for the execution of masonry in ceramic blocks was analyzed, highlighting the impacts caused by the existence or the lack of techniques for increasing transparency. Through the case study, it was concluded that the low level of transparency of the case-unit promoted a work environment with scarce information flow, causing a production process without standardization, with a high level of uncertainties and with countless wastes.
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Silkin, V. "Transparency of executive power in digital epoch." Russian Juridical Journal, no. 4 (2021): 20–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.34076/20713797_2021_4_20.
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de Vaan, Mathijs, Benjamin Elbers, and Thomas A. DiPrete. "Obscured Transparency? Compensation Benchmarking and the Biasing of Executive Pay." Management Science 65, no. 9 (September 2019): 4299–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3151.
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The disclosure of compensation peer groups is argued to provide shareholders with valuable information that can be used to scrutinize chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. However, research suggests that there are substantial incentives for executives and directors to bias the compensation peer group upward such that the CEO can extract additional rent. We leverage the idea that reciprocated peer nominations are unlikely to be biased to construct counterfactual peer groups that allow us to measure the bias of disclosed peer groups. Analyses of 11 years of comprehensive data on compensation peer groups demonstrate that the average firm uses an upwardly biased peer group. The size of the bias increases when incentives and opportunities to do so are more pronounced. Specifically, results show that bias is larger when financial targets are not met and when exercising discretion in the selection of peer firms is justifiable. More importantly, upward bias in compensation peer groups is highly predictive of an increase in CEO compensation, suggesting that there is a strong incentive for CEOs to strategically select peers. Finally, although average peer group bias has gone down in recent years, the predictive effect of bias on pay has gone up. These findings call into question the practical impact of recent efforts to introduce greater transparency into the process for determining executive compensation. This paper was accepted by Olav Sorenson, organizations.
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Mynenko, Serhii, and Oleksii Lyulyov. "The Impact of Digitalization on the Transparency of Public Authorities." Business Ethics and Leadership 6, no. 2 (2022): 103–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/103-115.2022.
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Transparency of public power is one of the main aspects of civil society. The actions of public administration bodies must be transparent, open, and ensure citizens’ legitimate rights and interests. Large-scale digitalization of society also affects public authorities, opening up new opportunities for improving the transparency of public administration and creating risks at various levels of public administration. The study is devoted to the issue of transparency of public authorities under the influence of digitalization. The normative legal acts of Ukraine, the Strategy of digital development, scientific achievements of domestic and foreign scientists are analyzed. The main elements of transparency of public authorities are identified: transparency, openness, and publicity. The level of digitalization penetration into the bodies of legislative, executive and judicial branches of power is characterized. The main functions that digitalization can perform in relation to public authorities are identified. The main achievements of Ukraine in terms of the public power digitalization, which has increased its transparency level, are described. They include a network of web portals of legislative, executive and judicial authorities, which provide public information in the form of messages, files, open data sets, photo and video information. Another important achievement is the service of providing services online and the introduction in Ukraine of full-fledged digital documents, which are analogs of physical. The main indicators of digitalization and characteristics of public authorities are identified: Digital Development Level, IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking, ICT goods exports, ICT goods imports, ICT service exports, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption. A canonical analysis of digitalization impact on the transparency of public authorities quantitatively shows that public authorities are closely linked to digitalization and influenced by it.
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Mynenko, Serhii, and Oleksii Lyulyov. "The Impact of Digitalization on the Transparency of Public Authorities." Business Ethics and Leadership 6, no. 2 (2022): 103–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/bel.6(2).103-115.2022.
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Transparency of public power is one of the main aspects of civil society. The actions of public administration bodies must be transparent, open, and ensure citizens’ legitimate rights and interests. Large-scale digitalization of society also affects public authorities, opening up new opportunities for improving the transparency of public administration and creating risks at various levels of public administration. The study is devoted to the issue of transparency of public authorities under the influence of digitalization. The normative legal acts of Ukraine, the Strategy of digital development, scientific achievements of domestic and foreign scientists are analyzed. The main elements of transparency of public authorities are identified: transparency, openness, and publicity. The level of digitalization penetration into the bodies of legislative, executive and judicial branches of power is characterized. The main functions that digitalization can perform in relation to public authorities are identified. The main achievements of Ukraine in terms of the public power digitalization, which has increased its transparency level, are described. They include a network of web portals of legislative, executive and judicial authorities, which provide public information in the form of messages, files, open data sets, photo and video information. Another important achievement is the service of providing services online and the introduction in Ukraine of full-fledged digital documents, which are analogs of physical. The main indicators of digitalization and characteristics of public authorities are identified: Digital Development Level, IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking, ICT goods exports, ICT goods imports, ICT service exports, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption. A canonical analysis of digitalization impact on the transparency of public authorities quantitatively shows that public authorities are closely linked to digitalization and influenced by it.
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Fattorusso, Jay, Rodion Skovoroda, Trevor Buck, and Alistair Bruce. "UK Executive Bonuses and Transparency ? A Research Note." British Journal of Industrial Relations 45, no. 3 (September 2007): 518–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2007.00626.x.
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Noe, Thomas H. "Tunnel-Proofing the Executive Suite: Transparency, Temptation, and the Design of Executive Compensation." Review of Financial Studies 22, no. 12 (March 4, 2009): 4849–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp002.
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Luo, Le, Hongjun Wu, and Chuyue Zhang. "CEO Compensation, Incentive Alignment, and Carbon Transparency." Journal of International Accounting Research 20, no. 2 (June 1, 2021): 111–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jiar-2020-032.
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ABSTRACT We examine whether chief executive officer compensation aligned with stakeholders' interests is associated with enhanced corporate carbon transparency. Using an international sample obtained from the CDP, we find that corporate carbon transparency—as measured by both the propensity to voluntarily disclose carbon information and the quality and comprehensiveness of the disclosure—is greater when managers' compensation contracts are better aligned with stakeholder interests. Further analyses indicate that this positive relationship is stronger in countries or regions with a code law legal system, with an inefficient rule of law, that show strong social norms toward climate change, that feature collectivist societies, and that have a long-term orientation. These findings indicate that the stakeholder agency problem of voluntary carbon disclosure can be addressed through executive incentives that are aligned with stakeholders' interests.
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Syamsul, Syamsul, and Irwan Taufiq Ritonga. "PENGARUH TATA KELOLA PEMERINTAH DAERAH TERHADAPTRANSPARANSI PENGELOLAAN KEUANGAN DAERAH: BUKTI EMPIRIS PADA PEMERINTAH PROVINSI DI INDONESIA." Jurnal Akuntansi 21, no. 3 (November 2, 2017): 448. http://dx.doi.org/10.24912/ja.v21i3.251.
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This study developed a research Beekes and Brown (2006) who found that corporate governance makes companies more informative (more transparent). This study aims to prove whether the same results were also found in environmental governance in Indonesia. The theory is used to achieve the goal of this research is the theory of agency. This research was conducted in 32 local governments in Indonesia. Based on a simple regression model, this study shows that local governance affects positively the transparency of local financial management. Such findings reinforce previous research. The findings of this study provide a useful contribution to government officials (executive and legislative), in demonstrating the important role of local governance in encouraging the transparency of local financial management. In addition, the findings of this study can be used as the basis for further research related to the topic of local governance and transparency of local financial management.
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Felo, Andrew J. "Audit committee composition, compensation committee composition, and compensation transparency." Corporate Ownership and Control 9, no. 1 (2011): 477–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv9i1c4art5.
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The increase in executive and director compensation in recent years has resulted in increased scrutiny of corporate compensation practices. Similarly, a recent survey indicates that 75 percent of directors and 75 percent of institutional investors believe that the manner in which executive pay is determined in the US is damaging to the image of corporate America (Perkins 2008). Investors, regulators, and other stakeholders have called on firms to provide greater transparency concerning these practices. My results from a sample of US firms indicate that compensation committee composition plays a greater role in the transparency of compensation practices than does audit committee composition. In addition, the independence of committee members is more important than their financial expertise. Investors, regulators, and other stakeholders outside of the US looking to increase the transparency of corporate compensation practices should look to increase the independence of compensation committees as one possible way to increase the transparency of corporate compensation practices.
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Laidler, Paweł. "How Republicans and Democrats Strengthen Secret Surveillance in the United States." Political Preferences, no. 25 (January 28, 2020): 5–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.31261/polpre.2019.25.5-20.
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The purpose of the paper is to assess the relationship between secrecy and transparency in the pre- and post-Snowden eras in the United States. The Author analyzes, from both political and legal perspectives, the sources and outcomes of the U.S. politics of national security with a special focus on domestic and intelligence surveillance measures. The core argument of the paper is that, due to the role of the executive which has always promoted the culture of secrecy, there is no chance for the demanded transparency in national security surveillance, despite the controlling powers of the legislative and judiciary. As the analysis proves, the United States in the post-Snowden era seems to be the most transparent and secretive state, at the same time.
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Wang, Isabel Yanyan, Xue Wang, and Daniel Wangerin. "Consequences of Increased Compensation Disclosure Transparency: Evidence From CEO Pay in Acquiring Firms." Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 35, no. 4 (January 23, 2018): 667–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558x17752815.
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We investigate the consequences of increased compensation disclosure transparency on the pay for chief executive officers (CEOs) in firms that are more prone to a misalignment between manager and shareholder interests. Prior research documents that acquiring CEOs’ pay is insensitive to poor post-deal performance after firms complete large acquisitions. Using the 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) compensation disclosure regulation as our empirical setting, we find that this result disappears after firms begin to provide more transparent compensation disclosure. Our cross-sectional analyses show that acquiring firms with higher quality compensation disclosure exhibit greater CEO pay sensitivity to poor post-deal performance after 2006. Our findings indicate that increased compensation disclosure transparency helps strengthen the relation between CEO pay and poor performance in acquiring firms.
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Baranenko, D., and H. Didkivska. "Transparency of central executive bodies: administrative and legal aspect." “International Humanitarian University Herald. Jurisprudence”, no. 48 (2020): 4–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.32841/2307-1745.2020.48.1.
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Ben‐Amar, Walid, and Daniel Zeghal. "Board of directors' independence and executive compensation disclosure transparency." Journal of Applied Accounting Research 12, no. 1 (May 31, 2011): 43–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09675421111130603.
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Eom, Seok-Jin. "Improving Governmental Transparency in Korea: Toward Institutionalized and ICT-Enabled Transparency." Korean Journal of Policy Studies 29, no. 1 (April 30, 2014): 69–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.52372/kjps29104.
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The main purpose of this study is to examine how governmental transparency has improved in Korea. To this end, the author examines the periodic characteristics of governmental transparency while also analyzing the information that each administration in Korea has produced. Also investigated are institutional arrangements for accessing this information and the adoption of ICTs in government. It was not until the democratic transition of 1987 that the transparency of the government began to improve in Korea. The key characteristic of the transparency policy after democratization was the pursuit of the simultaneous progress of institutionalized and ICT-enabled governmental transparency. Citizens’ accessibility to and the disclosure of public information were institutionalized. Furthermore, ICTs enable citizens to access such information more efficiently through nonstop operations and one-click services. In the course of establishing the institutions to improve governmental transparency, however, executive dominance and bureaucrats’ resistance to governmental transparency were the major challenges.
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Saparov, Elmurod. "WAYS TO ENSURE TRANSPARENCY IN THE FINANCING OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE REGIONS." INNOVATIONS IN ECONOMY 4, no. 9 (September 30, 2021): 12–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.26739/2181-9491-2021-9-2.
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This article describes reforms aimed at ensuring openness and transparency of the budget in Uzbekistan based on the Action Strategy for 2017-2021. Suggestions and recommendations were made to increase the transparency of the process of financing regional programs of socio-economic development.The purpose of the study is to analyze the current situation with the transparency of financing programs for the socio-economic development of regions, to develop proposals and recommendations for the effective use of local budgets in the future by increasing transparency.Scientific novelty of the research:1. The need to increase the role of mass media in strengthening public control over the spending of budget funds at the national level, ensuring the effective implementation of regional (regional, district and city) budgets;2. It is proposed to achieve the focus on financing the planned activities for socio-economic development of the regions by strengthening the activity of citizens in monitoring the implementation of budgets;3. In order to ensure the transparency of budget processes, it is necessary to regularly publish indicators related to budget execution on the official websites and periodicals of territorial (regional, district and city) executive bodies.Keywords. State budget, local budgets, budget funding, budget process, budget process transparency, funding of regional programs
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Tamimi, Nabil, and Rose Sebastianelli. "Transparency among S&P 500 companies: an analysis of ESG disclosure scores." Management Decision 55, no. 8 (September 18, 2017): 1660–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-01-2017-0018.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the state of S&P 500 companies’ transparency by analyzing their Bloomberg ESG (Environmental-Social-Governance) disclosure scores. Additionally, the effects of industry sector, firm size, and governance practices on transparency are examined. Design/methodology/approach Data were retrieved from Bloomberg using the financial analysis environmental, social and governance function for companies comprising the S&P 500 index. Descriptive statistics are provided on each of the three components separately (ESG). Nonparametric procedures are used to test for significant differences in transparency within each of these three areas based on industry sector. Additionally, nonparametric tests are used to determine the impact of firm size (market capitalization) and governance factors (board size, board gender diversity, chief executive officer (CEO) duality, and linking executive compensation to ESG disclosure) on the composite ESG score. Findings Descriptive statistics reveal that S&P 500 companies differ in their level of disclosure across the three areas (ESG). The highest level of transparency is found on Governance and the lowest on Environmental. Moreover, there is much variability in the percentage of S&P 500 companies disclosing information about specific Social policies (e.g. child labor). Significant differences in transparency on both the Social and Governance dimensions are found between certain industry sectors. The results also reveal that large-cap companies have significantly higher ESG disclosure scores than mid-cap companies and that governance factors impact ESG disclosure. Significantly, higher ESG disclosure scores are observed for S&P 500 firms with larger boards of directors, with boards that are more gender diverse, that allow CEO duality, and that link executive compensation to ESG scores. Originality/value This study focuses on corporate transparency through a granular analysis of ESG disclosure scores when most other studies have been primarily conducted at the macro level. Stakeholders, analysts, and shareholders are increasingly scrutinizing firms’ sustainability disclosures in their assessment of management quality, as it reflects on the practices/policies that are employed to improve firms’ environmental and social footprints.
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Kulava, Mariіa Konstantinovna. "PRINCIPLES OF STATE REGULATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF BODIES OF THE STATE EXECUTIVE SERVICE AND PRIVATE EXECUTORS." UKRAINIAN ASSEMBLY OF DOCTORS OF SCIENCES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1, no. 13 (August 27, 2018): 69–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.31618/vadnd.v1i13.135.
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Within the presented article, taking into account already existing achievements of scientists, the concept, the main features of the principles of state administration of the executive system of Ukraine are defined. The principles of activity of executive bodies bodies according to the current legislation of Ukraine are determined. A brief description of the principles is presented, namely: the rule of law, legality, compulsory, independence, justice, impartiality and objectivity, discretion, transparency and openness of executive proceedings and its fixation by technical means, the reasonableness of the time limits for enforcement proceedings, the proportionality of enforcement measures and the amount of claims for decisions, the right to appeal decisions, actions or omissions of state executives, private performers. It is established that in general the principles of executive proceedings in the investigated normative acts are duplicated, in addition to the principles of independence and the right to appeal decisions, actions or inaction of state executives, private performers. The actual vision of the principles of public administration of the executive system of Ukraine is determined. The opinion on the need to supplement the list of principles with the following: the principle of equal competition between state and private performers through the balance between them; the principle of responsibility of the executive system bodies, their officials and private executors for damage caused as a result of violations of regulatory requirements; the principle of introducing effective incentives for voluntary implementation of decisions; the principle of professionalism and competence. Also, within the submitted article, it is stated that the use of the terms “principles” and “principles” in the Laws of Ukraine “On Bodies and Officials Performing Enforcement of Court Decisions and Decisions of Other Bodies”, “On Enforcement Proceedings”, which are adopted simultaneously and regulated, are unjustified, identical social relations.
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Chau, Alexander. "The wrong perspective on executive pay." Corporate Board role duties and composition 11, no. 1 (2016): 6–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv11i1art1.
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Controversial commentaries as brought on by the financial crisis of 2008 regarding corporate remuneration policies give misplaced priority to political considerations over the governance considerations of capitalist orthodoxy. Executive pay rules during the crisis reflected the market’s sense of low risk that was prevalent at the time. The existing pay-for-performance model as applied demonstrates that the agency problem is not widespread and more a matter of transparency than one of systemic corporate graft. The wrong perspective involves pushing for social equality, rather than business efficacy, as the ultimate driver of reforms in executive remuneration.
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Repetska, Anastasiia. "Political Communication of Legislative and Executive Branches of Power in Ukraine: Modern Realities." Mediaforum : Analytics, Forecasts, Information Management, no. 7 (December 23, 2019): 305–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mediaforum.2019.7.305-317.
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The structure of Legislative and Executive branches in the system of political communication in Ukraine, despite the comprehensive information resource of its institutions, is still lacking in its resonance of political rhetoric effectiveness at the stage of social articulation of social problems. The subjects of this structure are the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers and the President of Ukraine. The reference to the functional feature of the government is a fairly common explanation of the process when the content of the concept of “Executive power” implies pragmatic actions. After all, the nature of technological operations of professionals in the fields of public administration models certain conditions for the emergence of political discourse. In the developed democracies, including Ukraine, to achieve maximum openness and transparency in the activities of the Legislative and Executive branches, predictable and effective mechanisms are functioning: political, regulatory, organizational, institutional, information and educational. Thus the transparency of the government must be properly ensured by the operation of the public dialogue at all of the decision-making stages, there should be a regular access to full, fair, accurate, understandable information about the actions of public authorities and its officials. In any democratic state, the effectiveness of public administration depends on the level of transparency and the quality of communication to the public on the work of its organs.
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Drehmer, Amanda Finck, and Fabiano Maury Raupp. "As plataformas de informação dos poderes estaduais brasileiros contribuem para a construção da transparência passiva?" Revista de Administração da UFSM 13, no. 1 (March 29, 2020): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.5902/1983465927933.
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The objective of the article was to investigate the contributions of the information platforms of the branches of governments of Brazilian states to build passive transparency. A descriptive study was carried out, through documentary research, with a predominantly qualitative approach. The object of investigation comprises the executive, legislative and judicial branches of governments of Brazilian states. The data were collected in February 2017 using the structured observation technique, through a protocol for recording information. The data obtained were analyzed using the descriptive analysis technique. The indicators for evaluation of the platforms were ‘communication’, ‘login and receipts’ and ‘barriers’, and they presented different configurations in each of the branches. In terms of ‘communication’ and ‘login and receipts’, in general, the state executive branch received better scores compared to the judiciary and legislative branches. On the other hand, the indicator ‘barriers’, was better evaluated in the judiciary and legislative branches. From the results obtained, it is not yet possible to confirm whether the platforms of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the Brazilian states contribute to build passive transparency.
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Li, Feifei, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. "Executive compensation and investor clientele." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 4 (2009): 272–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i4c2p2.
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We provide a setting where due to a lack of sophistication, possibly arising from high opportunity costs of learning about accounting conventions and financial markets, nave (unsophisticated) investors are unable to decipher true executive compensation accurately. Expected compensation is therefore higher when such investors form a more significant clientele in the market for a firm’s stock. Our model further suggests that increased information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders may deter the entry of uninformed investors and keep executive compensation in check. Technologies that lower the cost of trading facilitate entry of relatively unsophisticated investors and raise expected compensation. In general, such compensation can be reduced through requirements that increase disclosure transparency. Empirical tests provide support to the key implication of the model that indirect executive compensation is higher in stocks with higher liquidity, which are likely to have greater unsophisticated investor participation.
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Bart, Chris. "An exploration into the content of the compensation discussion & analysis document." Corporate Board role duties and composition 5, no. 2 (2009): 6–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv5i2art1.
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This paper presents the results of a survey of Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) documents from 32 publicly listed U.S. companies. Our aim was to probe the extent to which companies are providing investors, through the CD&A, with an easy to understand and complete assessment of the compensation provided to their highest paid executives. Using a detailed content analysis, the results show that while companies are complying somewhat with regulatory requirements, they are failing to meet the intent of the CD&A, which is, to provide completeness, transparency and understanding regarding a firm’s executive compensation. A number of recommendations for change is also proposed.
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Udalova, Larysa, Anton Chubenko, Filip Pronin, Olena Sokurenko, and Yuliia Kozlova. "Legal support for improving transparency of the asset recovery and management agency’s activities." Revista Amazonia Investiga 11, no. 52 (May 29, 2022): 55–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.34069/ai/2022.52.04.6.
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The purpose of the article is to study the legal basis for ARMA and submit the proposals to improve the transparency of this agency. The subject of the study is the activities of ARMA from the standpoint of transparency. Methodology. Methodological tools for the study are selected according to objectives, specifics of the object and subject matter of the research: dialectical method, system and structural method, dogmatic and legal method, comparative and legal method; logical and legal method; method of generalization. Research results. The article analyzes the legal provision of transparency of ARMA’s activities. The problematic issues are identified and the areas for improvement in the legal framework for ARMA’s transparency are suggested. The analysis of current normative and legal regulation of ARMA interaction with other executive bodies is performed. Practical meaning. The author’s definition of transparency of ARMA’s activity is proposed. Value / originality. The ways to improve the transparency of ARMA’s activities in Ukraine are proposed.
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Wehner, Joachim, and Paolo de Renzio. "Citizens, Legislators, and Executive Disclosure: The Political Determinants of Fiscal Transparency." World Development 41 (January 2013): 96–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.06.005.
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Bertelli, Anthony M. "Credible Governance? Transparency, Political Control, the Personal Vote and British Quangos." Political Studies 56, no. 4 (December 2008): 807–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00713.x.
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This article claims that special-purpose independent agencies such as quangos provide an avenue for understanding the ‘personal vote’ and political control of administrative policy making in Britain. Quangos make policies that directly influence particularistic concerns in an MP's constituency, generating incentives for MPs to meddle with their independence in order to capture the personal vote. A division of labor within the governing party relies on back-bench MPs to sound ‘fire alarms’ when their constituents find fault with quango activities. Once the alarms are sounded, the government has the incentive to manipulate quangos' independence, for example, by making their decision making transparent to provide information for the fire alarm mechanism in the future. This manipulation draws from the government's stock of political capital gained from a supportive electorate. Statistical analysis of transparency in British executive non-departmental public bodies from 2002 to 2005 suggests that increases in back-bench salience (personal vote) and public satisfaction with government (government strength) increase the transparency by which quangos make decisions, thus decreasing their independence. Public satisfaction with the status quo of public service provision, by contrast, decreases transparency, increasing independence. These results suggest that far from being fully independent, quasi-governmental organizations are subject to political control.
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Tsene, Chryssoula E. "The Greek paradigm of corporate governance and board of directors." Corporate Law and Governance Review 3, no. 2 (2021): 8–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/clgrv3i2p1.
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Corporate governance encompasses a multidisciplinary approach, which includes the internal and external factors that affect the interests of a company’s stakeholders. The Greek corporate governance framework of listed companies has initially been established in accordance with EU regulation and soft law recommendations, in order to enhance board accountability and transparency, empower shareholders’ activism and promote financial disclosure. In that regard, it has recently been reformed by the provisions of Law 4706/2020, aiming mainly: to empower the strategic and supervisory role of the board of directors, by introducing a clear description of the obligations of non-executive and independent non-executive directors and by including the establishment of an “adequacy (internal fit-and-proper) policy” for the appointment of board members. Accordingly, two new compulsory committees are added, the nomination and the remuneration committee, which should entirely be composed by non-executive members and are invested with an advisory role in determining the remuneration policy and proposing board candidates. Furthermore, the adoption of a Corporate Governance Code is rendered substantial for all listed companies. These provisions illustrate specifically the reform of the internal corporate governance structures, which should be implemented having regard to the general principles of transparency and proportionality
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MARTYNETS, N. "Mechanisms of interaction between the government and the public in the electronic governance system." INFORMATION AND LAW, no. 3(3) (October 21, 2011): 111–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.37750/2616-6798.2011.3(3).271668.
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About alteration of link of electronic government a “government is a citizen” for informative and technological support of processes of openness and transparency of activity of organs of executive power, creation of possibilities for more wide participation of citizens in the processes of making and acceptance of administrative decisions.
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Frost, Amanda. "Restoring Faith in Government: Transparency Reform in the United States and the European Union." European Public Law 9, Issue 1 (March 1, 2003): 87–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2003007.
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On the surface, the transparency reform movements in the United States and the European Union appear to have much in common: both the US and the EU have embraced transparency as a means of bolstering public confidence in governance, and the EU's recently issued access regulation shares many features with the US Freedom of Information Act. The similarities end there, however. The goals of the EU reform movement are far more ambitious than those of the US. US reformers hoped that sunlight would put an end to the corruption and abuse of power that plagued the executive branch in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but they did not seek to change the decision-making process itself. In contrast, the EU has latched onto transparency reform as a means of democratizing and legitimizing EU governance. Unfortunately, reformers in the EU have yet to link transparency reforms with democratization of the legislative process. Although transparency is an invaluable tool with which the public can monitor EU governance, transparency alone, without concomitant increases in public opportunities to influence EU decision-making, cannot ameliorate the EU's infamous `democratic deficit'. Increased transparency must be coupled with public participation rights before reformers can accomplish their ambitious goal of bringing EU decision-making closer to Europeans.
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Shkolnyk, I., O. Miroshnichenko, Yu Havrysh, and A. Ivanchenko. "CURRENT STATE OF TRANSPARENCY OF PUBLIC FINANCES OF UKRAINE." Vìsnik Sumsʹkogo deržavnogo unìversitetu, no. 3 (2020): 182–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/1817-9215.2020.3-20.
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Transparency in public finances is one of the main features of a mature democratic society, as well as one of the main tools for reducing corruption in the country. The level of transparency in the formation and use of budget funds at the state and local levels affects the effectiveness of financial policy in the country. Therefore, the purpose of the study is to determine the current state of transparency in the formation of the state budget of Ukraine. The article conducted a comprehensive study of the level of transparency of public finances at the macro level. The dynamics of changes in the qualitative level of transparency of legislative and executive bodies during the period of Ukraine's participation in the international organization of monitoring the publicity of the government before the public is analyzed. In particular, the authors analyzed the dynamics of the budget openness index in comparison with other countries and the integrated assessment of budget transparency for the period from 2008 to 2019. In addition, the level of public participation in budget formation at different stages of the budget process was studied. There is a positive trend of improving the level of openness of public authorities in Ukraine in the formation and use of public finances. This, in turn, is part of a global trend. The article presents a description of the main documents that serve as indicators of informing the public about the state of the budget, the level of its implementation, the formation of the budget for future periods and the budget process in general. It is determined that the system of transparent and accessible public accountability for the formation and use of public finances has not been formed yet. The results of the study can be the basis for developing measures to increase the level of transparency of public authorities in Ukraine. According to the study, a high level of transparency becomes the basis for public support for the government, provided that the government does not abuse its powers, or conversely becomes an incentive for active public participation in political and economic life to improve or change government. According to the results of the research, a system of measures of priority importance is proposed.
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Almada, Maria Paula, Paula Karini Amorim, Maria Dominguez C. Pinho, and Claudia Regina de Sousa e. Silva. "A transparência do Executivo Federal brasileiro: uma comparação entre os governos Dilma Rousseff e Jair Bolsonaro." Opinião Pública 28, no. 1 (March 2022): 169–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1807-01912022281169.
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O presente artigo tem como objetivo comparar a transparência online das contas públicas nos portais do governo brasileiro durante as gestões de Dilma Rousseff e Jair Bolsonaro. Considerando que as agendas e políticas adotadas pelos diferentes governos podem refletir na transparência, nossa hipótese é a de que o nível da transparência online do governo Dilma Rousseff é maior que o do governo Jair Bolsonaro. Aplicou-se, em 2016 e em 2020, uma metodologia de pesquisa voltada para a análise qualitativa, quantitativa e comparativa da transparência online das contas públicas. O estudo revelou que, na gestão Rousseff, o nível de transparência do Executivo brasileiro foi considerado avançado (97%), ao passo que, durante o governo Bolsonaro, esse nível de transparência brasileiro é moderado (73%). Os resultados são discutidos a partir de fatores contextuais e normativos brasileiros.
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Zaman, Hasan. "Finance, Islamic Fiancé: Theoretical Analysis." Australian Finance & Banking Review 4, no. 1 (December 17, 2020): 45–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.46281/afbr.v4i1.914.
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The paper discusses the steps to be taken to strengthen the efficiency and transparency of the Board and management. Increasing shareholders and depositors to play a more important role in protecting their own interests. The article then describes some of the popular resources available to enhance the effectiveness and responsibility of the Board and the Executive.
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Suzuki, Yoshihisa, and Anh Tho To. "The change in board independence in the presence of firm risk and regulation." Contaduría y Administración 64, no. 4 (May 24, 2019): 139. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fca.24488410e.2020.2233.
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The purpose of the paper is to explore the impact of firm risk on board independence, typically the proportion of non-executive directors. Our sample is based on a panel data of publicly listed firms on Vietnamese stock markets over a ten-year period (2007-2016). By applying dynamic generalized method of moments estimators, the results are robust to endogeneity issues and highlight the U-shaped nonlinear impact of firm risk on non-executive director ratio. In addition, because the lack of information transparency in Vietnamese enterprises caused many risks for investors, the government issued the Circular 121/2012/TT-BTC dated July 26, 2012 on corporate governance applicable to public companies, which enhanced changes in the board structure of listed companies. Under the pressure of this regulation, high-risk companies increased the proportion of non-executive directors.
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Razinova, Elena. "Managing budgetary openness of public services." SHS Web of Conferences 116 (2021): 00055. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202111600055.
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The analysis of the aspects of information transparency of public finance in terms of public services (lists of public services, government assignments and information on subsidies for financial support of government assignments, cost standards for the provision of public services) at the federal and regional levels. Regulatory legal acts of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, official websites of executive authorities and specialized federal resources for publishing budget data are considered. In accordance with the identified contradictions, the information objects published at the federal and regional levels were ranked according to the level of budgetary openness, and areas of improvement associated with increasing the level of accessibility and transparency of public finance data were identified.
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Mari-Isabella Stan, Mihaela Rus, and Tanase Tasente. "Young people's perception of the measures taken by the authorities in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic." Technium Social Sciences Journal 7 (May 3, 2020): 18–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.47577/tssj.v7i1.516.
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Transparency is generally defined by political scientists as the principle of allowing the public to obtain information about the operations and structures of a given entity (Etzioni, 2014). Transparency symbolizes a mechanism for promoting good governance and public confidence in a modern and democratic public administration (Jashari and Pepaj, 2018). The theory of open public administration gives the individual a greater role in the adoption of the executive regulations and greater transparency in the operations of the public administration (Bugaric, 2004). A fully transparent administration, either at central level or at local level, involves informing and participating citizens in the decision-making process, becoming an indispensable principle of the rule of law. On the other hand, democratic citizenship involves obtaining information about the problems that affect you and working with others to influence how society will solve those problems (Portelli and Solomon, 2001). The objectives of the study are: (1) Identification of the degree of knowledge of the concept of decision-making transparency in public administration; (2) Analysis of the perception regarding the degree of decision-making transparency and communication of the local and central public administrations in the context of the crisis generated by the Covid-19 pandemic; (3) Analysis of the degree of confidence the crisis management generated by the new Coronavirus by public institutions. The questionnaire, which included 10 items, was applied, on a sample consisting of 200 students and graduates of the Faculty of Law and Administrative Sciences - “Ovidius” University of Constanța (Romania, European Union). The period of application of the questionnaire was April 4-10, 2020. Of these, 80.77% are female, and 19.23% are male, with an average age of 27.5 years. Most of the respondents (56.41%) are undergraduate students, and the remaining 43.59% are study participants are graduates or masters of the same Faculty. At the same time, 71.79% of the study participants come from urban areas, and 28.21% from rural areas.
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Manona, W. W. "Critical Analysis of the Oversight Role of the Education Portfolio Committee in Parliament of South Africa." Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review 3, no. 3 (September 1, 2015): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/apsdpr.v3i3.90.
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There is a prevalent assumption in South Africa that Parliament is guided by the ideals of democracy, accountability, transparency and accessibility. However, there are still gaps and challenges as far as theoversight role of Parliament is concerned, despite the presence of committees that have been established to oversee the executive and relevant structures of government, government activities and public finances. There is widespread maladministration and misuse of government expenditure in government departments. This paper investigates the oversight role of parliamentary committees to determine their relative influence on accountability and democracy in the execution of functions by public functionaries. The aim of the paper is to provide an understanding into inherent problems in the oversight role of Parliament in the democratic dispensation in South Africa, which seems not to have been given serious attention in the academia, considering the pivotal role Parliament plays in the lives of citizens of the country. These oversight committees have selectively held Senior Executives or Ministers accountable for their ineffectiveness, misuse of government expenditure and maladministration. This could be attributed to the fact that oversight in South Africa does not seem to be properly understood and implemented as it should be. Moreover, the influence of the majoritarian authority of the ruling party in committees seems to be colluding with the executive. Failure to take action against cases of omission brings questions on the effectiveness and efficiency of the oversight role of Parliament. The adverse consequence is the delay in the provision of good quality services to poor communities. This paper employed the theoretical approach as a method of data collection. Conclusions have been drawn that the shortcomings of the parliamentary committees compromise accountability and good governance in service delivery.
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Erickson, Jeanette Ives, Marianne Ditomassi, Theresa Gallivan, Keith Perleberg, and Mary Jane Costa. "A case study: A leader's commitment to transparency and accountability through a serious reportable event." Journal of Hospital Administration 2, no. 3 (February 4, 2013): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/jha.v2n3p1.
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Analysis reveals that most preventable adverse events result from systemic causes, not human error. The senior patient care executive at a leading hospital recounts the unnecessary death of a patient and the investigation that followed. Citing the critical importance of a “just culture,” this case study offers a blueprint for managing a serious reportable event.
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Azani, Achuzia Somuawine, Mei Yu, and Osita Chukwulobelu. "Corporate governance compliance and its effectiveness in the Nigerian banking industry." Corporate Ownership and Control 10, no. 3 (2013): 63–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i3art6.
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This paper examines the extent of compliance to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 2006 Corporate Governance Code by 24 Nigerian commercial banks and reveals a compliance level of 76.6%. The major non-compliance areas include non-constitution of a board committee consisting of non-executive directors, that regulates the compensation for executive directors, and the non-inclusion of independent directors on the main boards of many banks. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the benefits resulting from the changes for compliance outweigh the additional layers of supervisory checks and bureaucratic overbearing associated with the Code. The Code has brought about more effective corporate governance, accountability and greater transparency despite a low frequency of supervision and examination of the banks by the CBN.
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WARD, PETER M., and VICTORIA E. RODRÍGUEZ. "New Federalism, Intra-governmental Relations and Co-governance in Mexico." Journal of Latin American Studies 31, no. 3 (October 1999): 673–710. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x99005404.
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Evidence from six Mexican states is analyzed about changes in government organisation and performance arising from decentralisation and the recasting of federalism structures. Spurred by rising pluralism, greater electoral transparency, alternancia, and willingness of the Centre to ‘let go’, a more genuine structure of shared powers is emerging between the executive (governors), the legislature and the judiciary. The government bureaucracy is undergoing modernisation, and governors are seeking to share power with legislatures as a means of sharing the responsibilities of statecraft. Local congresses are exercising greater ‘checks’ and ‘balances’ vis-à-vis the executive branch. Finally, the judiciary is beginning to be reorganised, particularly at the national (Supreme Court) level, where it is starting to develop jurisprudence relating to inter- and intra-governmental relations.
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AKUBO, Aduku A., and Kolapo Quadri ABAYOMI. "NIGERIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY’S LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, THE POWERS OF SUMMONS AND APPOINTMENTS’ RATIFICATION." Caleb Journal of Social and Management Sciences 06, no. 01 (August 31, 2021): 26–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.26772/cjsms2021060102.
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The legislature as First Estate of the realm represents citizens and sovereignty. It makes the law, serve as checks on the activities of the executive (oversight) and represent the citizens in constituencies. The responsibility of the Parliaments is to guarantee that accountability and transparency of government activities are maintained in order to curb misuse of public funds, corruption, while effecting good practices. It also scrutinizes the nominees for top government positions by the executive arm while it ensures that the requests sent by the executive are properly examined in order to avoid inefficiency and non-performance. However, the paper relying on secondary research method and data gathering discover that limited political will by legislators, inadequate funds, deteriorating infrastructural facilities, pressure from the Executive, predominance of inexperience legislators in the art of lawmaking and the tendency to place a higher premium of personal and pecuniary interests at the expense of public interests are antithetical to the effective legislative power of summons and appointment ratification in the National Assembly. Therefore, the paper recommended that there is a need for legislators to shun mediocrity and rise above pecuniary, sectional and party interests in favour of the protection of democracy and its practices.
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Velte, Patrick, and Marc Eulerich. "Determinants of executive board remuneration new insights from Germany." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 4 (2014): 96–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i4p7.
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Board remuneration in German listed companies becomes more and more subject of public and political discussion, concerning the presumed lack of transparency and too short-term orientation. Besides the increasing regulatory activity, the arrangement of board compensation constitutes a focal economic issue of current empirical corporate governance research. The purpose of our analysis is to identify factors determining the amount and the structure of board compensation in Germany. Our study of 128 German listed companies for the business year 2011 investigates the impact of company-, performance and corporate governance-related factors on board remuneration by means of a multivariate-regression analysis. The analysis indicates that company size has a positive impact and leverage a negative on management board compensation. Furthermore, ROE and return on total capital, as indicators for performance-related variables, both have a positive impact on the average level of management remuneration. However, the corporate governance-related characteristics as ownership concentration and size of the supervisory board have no significant impact on management board remuneration.
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Wijaya, Andy Fefta. "Peningkatan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan yang Bersih dan Bebas KKN dan Indikator-Indikator Hasilnya." Jurnal Desentralisasi 10, no. 2 (December 31, 2012): 231–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.37378/jd.2912.2.231-240.
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This paper presents this new perspective of public management (NPM) and governance in administrative sciences and explains the differences between them. NPM risk leaving the public service function for the poor and marginalized, therefore improving governance perspective NPM movement's weakness. New Public Management Paradigm with no accountability (accountability) would risk leaving the public interest. Accountability as a fundamental pillar of good governance paradigm can improve the weaknesses found in the paradigm previously thought. A major component to the success of public accountability is a system of information transparency. Transparency of information is authorized to be used for public sector performance evaluation measures and for evaluating public sector executive accountability for all decisions and actions, ie to what extent the results/outcomes and impacts resulting from beneficial to the public.