Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Executive transparency'

I investigate the relation between firm risk and firm transparency over the period 1992-2006 and find that the level of firm transparency and the level of firm risk are negatively related. I also find that higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) works to mitigate this inverse relationship. This result is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) who suggest that managers reduce risk to protect their pay and performance evaluations under higher levels of firm transparency. I further find that firms in high technology industries are more likely to increase risk relative to firms in other industries when transparency is high. Finally, I develop an additional proxy for transparency based on the Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Score. Results using this proxy are generally consistent with my findings that there is an inverse relationship between risk and transparency and that CEO pay-performance sensitivity lessens this relationship.

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Ao mesmo tempo que estudos sobre modelos de remuneração executiva que alinhem os interesses de acionistas e administradores são crescentes no Brasil, as boas práticas de governança corporativa sugerem uma maior transparência na divulgação da remuneração dos executivos ao mercado. Este trabalho objetivou primariamente analisar o nível de transparência na divulgação da remuneração executiva em momentos distintos da economia brasileira, em período de estabilidade e de crise econômica e adicionalmente, com base nos dados levantados, compreender a proporção da remuneração variável nos diferentes períodos, imaginando observar se a parcela de remuneração variável paga aos administradores seria menor no período de maior dificuldade econômica. Para uma melhor análise comparativa, selecionamos três segmentos relevantes e distintos, incluindo setores regulados e não regulados, sendo eles os segmentos de alimentos, de bancos e de energia elétrica. Com base nos principais indicadores econômicos, selecionamos os anos de 2012 e 2015, onde consideramos o ano de 2012 um ano de estabilidade econômica no Brasil e o ano de 2015, ano de crise. Os resultados indicaram que mesmo em 2015, alguns segmentos analisados apresentaram boas performances em seus resultados, em comparação a 2012. O eventual declínio nos níveis de divulgação da remuneração executiva, que poderiam ser esperados, mostraram-se bastante estáveis para ambos os anos. Mesmo com resultados adversos entre os segmentos em 2015, foi possível observar que a remuneração variável de curto prazo deixou de ser utilizada como ferramenta de remuneração por parte das empresas no segundo ano analisado. Uma certa migração da remuneração variável de curto prazo para a remuneração baseada em ações foi constatada, com aumento expressivo nos valores médios pagos através desse tipo de incentivo em dois dos três segmentos analisados. O comportamento observado ilustra vários estudos sobre o assunto e as boas práticas de governança corporativa ao mostrar a busca pelo alinhamento dos interesses dos acionistas e gestores e balanceamento de metas entre curto e longo prazos, principalmente em época de maior dificuldade econômica.
While studies on executive compensation models that align the interests of shareholders and managers are increasing in Brazil, good corporate governance practices suggest greater transparency in the disclosure of executive compensation to the stakeholders. This paper aimed primarily at analyzing the level of transparency in the disclosure of executive remuneration at different moments of the Brazilian economy, in a period of stability and economic crisis and additionally, based on the data collected, understand the proportion of variable remuneration in different periods, figuring to observe if the variable remuneration paid to managers would be lower in the period of greatest economic difficulty. For a better comparative analysis, we selected three relevant, distinct, regulated and unregulated segments, such as food, banking and electric energy. Based on the main economic indicators, we selected the years 2012 and 2015, where we consider 2012 a year of economic stability in Brazil and 2015, a year of crisis. The results indicated that even in 2015, some segments analyzed showed a good performance in their results compared to 2012. The eventual decline in levels of disclosure of executive compensation, which could be expected, proved to be quite stable for both years. Even with adverse results among the segments in 2015, it was possible to observe that short term variable compensation was no longer used as a remuneration by some companies in the second year analyzed. A certain migration from short-term variable compensation to share based compensation was observed, and a significant increase in the average values paid through this type of incentive in two of the three segments analyzed. The observed behavior illustrates several studies on the subject and the good practices of corporate governance in showing the search for the alignment of the interests of the shareholders and managers and balance of goals between short and long term, especially in times of greater economic difficulty.

The CEO bonus of banking companies has become a hot media topic around the world accelerated by the recent financial crisis of 2007-2008 where the excessive pay and risk-taking in the banking sector were recognized. This has raised public concerns around executive remuneration and the transparency of the companies. According to the regulations, the bonus of the CEO is indexed to the firm´s performance. However, the compensation of many CEO’s has been paid out during the financial crisis although the firms have lost money. This has consequently led to rigorous regulations of the financial institutions with the attempt to ensure long-term focus and consider outstanding risk through variable remuneration payments.   Although the remuneration, and specifically annual bonus, has caught a lot of attention by the public and the media, it has been mostly overlooked by regulatory authorities and academics up until today. This research represents the first attempt to examine the disclosure and transparency of CEO annual bonus plans of twenty leading EU banks through the employment of in-depth and descriptive approach.. The purpose of this study is to explore the issue of CEO annual bonus plan with respect to the disclosure of the information provided in the banking companies’ financial reports of 2011. The level of transparency of the companies are scrutinized and measured accordingly to five bonus features, which may contribute to the transparency of annual bonus plans. The bonus plan is regarded as transparent if the majority of the following bonus criteria are fulfilled by the companies; (1) the application of simple targets through a single performance condition; (2) the application of published targets accessible to shareholders; (3) the disclosure of methods applied in order for shareholders and other stakeholders to determine whether the given performance target(s) has been fulfilled; (4) bonus payments in form of cash; (5) the disclosure of annual bonus cap.   The findings of this study show that a significant part of the banks can be considered as non-transparent due to the failure of fulfilling the given bonus plan features, meaning that the issue of disclosure and transparency of annual bonus plans should raise concern for shareholders and regulators, both on the EU-level and nationally. This study evidently shows that the level of information disclosed as to bonus plans of CEO various tremendously between the countries and sometimes also between the companies in the same country, which indicate the issue of disclosure and transparency of annual bonus plans need to be enhanced through regulations.

Syftet med vår studie är att kartlägga och förklara hur transparenta svenska börsbolag är vid redovisningen av utfallet samt bakgrunden till kortsiktig rörlig ersättning för den verkställande direktören, samt att identifiera potentiella förklaringar och bakomliggande orsaker till transparensen. Vi har valt att studera de 29 bolag som representerar de 30 mest omsatta aktierna på Stockholmsbörsens Large Cap lista (OMXS30). Metodmässigt kan studien delas in i två huvudsakliga delar. I den ena delen av studien använder vi en kvantitativ ansats och tillämpar ett positivistiskt synsätt. I den andra delen av studien använder vi en kvalitativ ansats och tillämpar ett hermeneutiskt synsätt. Vid insamlingen av datamaterialet har vi inspirerats av en tvärsnittsdesign där huvudsakliga syftet har varit att samla in relevant information för att kunna bedöma transparensen utifrån en egen framtagen modell. Modellen utgörs av fem kriterier inspirerade av Ersättningsakademiens riktlinjer för rapportering av ersättning och syftar till att ge en samlad bedömning av de studerade bolagens transparens. Vi har även identifierat ett antal potentiella förklarande variabler utifrån vilka vi har studerat orsakssamband till transparensen. Vi har dessutom analyserat kommunikationen utifrån ett legitimitetsperspektiv med avsikt att få en förståelse för bolagens val av rapportering. Utifrån resultatet av vår studie kan vi finna stöd till den kritik som riktats mot en bristande transparens vid rapportering av rörlig ersättning till verkställande direktören. Vi kan även se tendenser till att det orsakssamband som tidigare studier belyst mellan transparens och styrelsens oberoende, kan gälla även för svenska börsnoterade bolag.
The purpose of this study is to describe and explain the transparency of Swedish public companies when it comes to the reporting of short term bonus payment to the chief executive officer. Furthermore we intend to identify possible explanations and underlying causes regarding the transparency. We have selected the 29 companies that represent the 30 most traded stocks on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (OMXS30). Methodology, the study can be divided into two primary parts. In the first part of the study we use a quantitative approach and apply a positivistic view. In the second part of the study we use a qualitative approach and apply a hermeneutic view. When it comes to collecting data we have been inspired by a cross section design and the primary focus has been to collect relevant information to allow an assessment of the transparency with a model we have developed. This model consists of five criteria inspired by the Ersättningsakademiens (Compensation Academy) guidelines regarding the reporting of compensation and is designed to provide an overall assessment of the studied company’s transparency. We have also identified a number of possible explanatory variables from which we have studied underlying causes to the transparency. Furthermore we have analyzed the communication from a perspective of legitimacy with the intent to obtain an understanding regarding the company’s choice of reporting. From the result of the study we find support to previous criticism regarding lacking transparency on the matter of the reporting of short term bonus payments to the CEO. We can also see tendencies to the fact that the causation that previous studies pointed out between transparency and the independence of the board, may exist in Swedish publicly traded companies as well.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
A remuneração executiva por meio de Opções de Ações tem sido considerada um mecanismo capaz de alinhar os interesses dos gestores aos objetivos de longo prazo dos acionistas. Entretanto, estudos têm investigado possíveis problemas associados ao seu uso, corroborando a idéia de que a remuneração executiva não é apenas um mecanismo de incentivo, mas também parte do problema de agência em si. As fraudes contábeis ocorridas no mercado norte-americano geraram ainda maior cautela quanto à sua utilização e, internacionalmente, refletiram-se no aumento do número de requisitos para a divulgação desses planos. Entre os anos de 2006 e 2007 cresceu significativamente o número de empresas listadas no Brasil que passaram a utilizar planos de Opções de Ações para remunerar seus executivos, mas a regulamentação da divulgação de informações ou evidenciação (disclosure) desses planos não acompanhou tal crescimento. Até o final do ano de 2007, apenas o Ofício-Circular nº 01/2007 da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) identifi
Executive compensation through Stock Options has been considered a mechanism capable of aligning the interests of managers and the long-term objectives of shareholders. Nevertheless, studies into possible problems associated with the use of stock options in executive compensation have corroborated the idea that executive compensation is not merely an incentive mechanism, but also part of the agency problem in itself. The accounting frauds that have occurred in the North-American market have produced even greater caution in relation to its use and, internationally, this is reflected an increase in the number of demands for disclosure of such plans. Between the years 2006 and 2007 the number of listed companies in Brazil that used Stock Options plans to compensate their executives grew significantly, but the regulations regarding the disclosure of such plans failed to accompany that growth. Until the end of 2007, only Notification nr. 01/2007 from the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission (Comissão de Val

Thesis (Ph. D. (Public Administration)) --University of Limpopo, 2019
South Africa continues to experiment with democracy after 23 years since its rebirth in 1994. The country‘s democracy is still developing towards greater transparency, full participation and accountability. Development depends on the existence of strong and vibrant institutions of accountability in the face of the challenges that threaten to reverse the gains made since the advent of democracy. Among such institutions is the legislature, which is the focus of this study. The study probes the oversight role of legislatures in South Africa. Oversight has become a subject of interest in the field of Public Administration as it is viewed as the mandate of legislatures to hold the government to account for managing public resources in the course of conducting public affairs. This study broadens the understanding of oversight by examining crucial relations between the legislature and the executive, and by providing insight into the legislature‘s ability and capacity to carry out the oversight mandate. This is mainly because in most developing countries, the legislative sector, and particularly African legislatures have been categorised as weak. They are generally censured to have institutional weaknesses and limited decision-making role. There are, however, common challenges, including but not limited to lack of capacity, the dominance of the executive and its reluctance to cooperate, and lack of political will attributed to various factors. These challenges are intensified by the legislature‘s perceived inability to deal with emerging issues. Studies previously conducted in the Gauteng Legislature have affirmed some of these challenges, including among others, lack of independence and capacity issues when exercising its oversight role. However, the literature pointed to increased oversight activities in democratic legislatures over the years. Although increase in oversight activities is acknowledged in the study, literature on oversight effectiveness is scant. From the foregoing, the aim of the study was to examine whether the oversight role of legislatures has effects in terms of the promotion of good governance, particularly executive transparency and accountability as well as public involvement. In addition to focusing on the relationship between the executive and the legislature, ability and capacity of the legislature, the study also set out to determine the extent to which the public participates in oversight processes of legislatures. The study concentrated on the Gauteng Legislature, and focused on the work of Portfolio Committees as they are responsible for the day to day oversight work of legislatures. The literature reviewed points out to the complex nature of the legislative oversight setting based on the systems of governance adopted in a country, which has an influence on the relationship between the executive and the legislature, and in turn, on oversight. The study has employed a qualitative approach, with the data collected utilising semistructured in-depth personal interviews, participant observation and document analysis. Semi-structured personal interviews were the main data collection tool utilised to collect primary data from the participants. The participants were selected utilising non-probability (purposive) sampling to target participants with knowledge and experience on the subject matter to attain the objectives of the study. In addition, the participant observation and document analysis were used to collect both primary and secondary data to supplement the interviews with the respondents. This was mainly to respond to the contention of this study. The study argues that the legislature through its oversight role has the ability and capacity to promote transparency and accountability as well as public involvement. The findings of this study suggest that to a certain extent, the oversight role might have positive effects on promoting executive transparency and accountability. However, the findings have pointed out some serious shortcomings regarding the extent to which the public participates in the oversight work of the legislature. This is regardless of the efforts made by the legislature to establish platforms to ensure that the public participates in the oversight role to hold the executive accountable. Furthermore, the study has found that Portfolio Committees are a suitable mechanism to hold the executive to account as among others, the Members of the Provincial Legislature (MPLs) work well together. There are improved relations between the Gauteng government departments and committees. The departments are responsive; yet there are still challenges leading to the elusion of accountability, with limited or no consequences. The study recommends inter alia, follow-up on oversight activities; committee action against the executive‘s reluctance; strengthening the role of research; and regular interactions between the executive and the legislature. Keywords Accountability, Committees, Democracy, Executive, Government, Governance, Good Governance, Legislature, Performance, Public Participation, Service Delivery, Transparency, Political Parties, and Oversight.

Software testing is an expensive and time-consuming process, often involving the manual creation of comprehensive regression test suites. Current testing methodologies, however, do not take full advantage of these tests. In this thesis, we present two techniques for amplifying the effect of existing test suites using a lightweight symbolic execution mechanism. We approach the problem from two complementary perspectives: first, we aim to execute the code that was never executed by the regression tests by combining the existing tests, symbolic execution and a set of heuristics based on program analysis. Second, we thoroughly check all sensitive operations (e.g., pointer dereferences) executed by the test suite for errors, and explore additional paths around sensitive operations. We have implemented these approaches into two tools - katch and zesti - which we have used to test a large body of open-source code. We have applied katch to all the patches written in a combined period of approximately six years for nineteen mature programs from the popular GNU diffutils, GNU binutils and GNU findutils application suites, which are shipped with virtually all UNIX-based distributions. Our results show that katch can automatically synthesise inputs that significantly increase the patch coverage achieved by the existing manual test suites, and find bugs at the moment they are introduced. We have applied zesti to three open-source code bases - GNU Coreutils, libdwarf and readelf - where it found 52 previously unknown bugs, many of which are out of reach of standard symbolic execution. Our technique works transparently to the tester, requiring no additional human effort or changes to source code or tests. Furthermore, we have conducted a systematic empirical study to examine how code and tests co-evolve in six popular open-source systems and assess the applicability of katch and zesti to other systems.

Este trabalho analisa a criação da Lei de Acesso à Informação Pública no Brasil, sob a lente da literatura de formação da agenda da área de políticas públicas. Com isso, buscou-se identificar quem foram os atores na arena política decisória e quais eram seus interesses na pauta do direito à informação. A partir das investigações realizadas por meio de documentos públicos e entrevistas, constatou-se uma particularidade interessante do caso brasileiro: o envolvimento ativo de um corpo burocrático, formado por funcionários do alto escalão da Controladoria Geral da União, que liderou esta agenda pelo Executivo. A tese colocada neste trabalho é a de que uma das motivações da CGU em propor esta agenda foi garantir a abertura de documentos públicos, a fim de obter acesso a documentos e informações fundamentais para o controle interno desempenhado pelo órgão. Nesta lógica, a Lei de Acesso à Informação, de certa forma, contribui para a burocracia controlar a própria burocracia. Este trabalho tem um recorte temporal bastante delimitado: o estudo parte de 2003, data da primeira proposição de projeto de lei para regulamentando o acesso à informação, pela Câmara dos Deputados, até a sanção do projeto de lei elaborado pelo Executivo, em 2011. Ao longo destes nove anos, houve disputas em torno do que seria o direito à informação pública, a quem serviriam tais informações e quem conduziria esta pauta na agenda governamental. Como veremos, o Executivo foi o ator com mais recursos e poder de influência no campo decisório
This Dissertation sought to analyse the passage of the Freedom of Information Law in Brazil, known as Access to Public Information Law, through the lens of agenda-setting literature in public policy. The aim of this study is to identify the players at the political arena and their role in designing and negotiating a bill that guarantees access to public information and to their interest in advocating for the right to information and for the public transparency. From the investigations carried out by analysing public documents and interviews, it was found an interesting feature of the Brazilian case: the active involvement of a bureaucratic body composed of senior officials of the Federal Comptroller General (CGU), who led this agenda by the Executive. The thesis of this research is that one of the main motivation of the CGU in this agenda was to ensure the opening of public documents in order to gain access to documents and to key information about the transfer of federal government resources and funds to states and municipalities for internal control purposes. The Brazilian Access to Public Information Law, somehow, allows the state bureaucracy to control bureaucracy itself. This work comprises a delimited period: it starts in 2003, when the first proposal of a bill to regulate access to information was presented at the Chamber of Deputies, by a member of the Parliament, until the sanction of the bill that was made by the Executive, in 2011. During these nine years, there were disputes over what should be the right to public information, to whom such information would be useful and for what purpose and who would lead this agenda. As we shall see, the Executive, represented by CGU was the actor with more resources and power to bargain in favour of this agenda at the decision-making arena

A administração pública apresenta vários problemas, que vão desde a ausência de avaliações quanto aos aspectos de eficiência, eficácia e efetividade na utilização de recursos e das políticas públicas adotadas, até a prática perversa da corrupção em suas diversas formas. Grande parte destes problemas decorre da falta de mecanismos de controle e acompanhamento para saber se as ações promovidas pelos gestores públicos estão de acordo com os objetivos da sociedade. Os problemas que decorrem desta relação de conflito de interesses entre aqueles que delegam a administração de suas organizações e aqueles que recebem esta delegação e administram, são chamados de problemas da relação entre principal e agente. No setor público pode-se considerar que agente é o gestor público (recebe a delegação e administra) e principal é o cidadão ou a própria sociedade (que delega). Estes conceitos têm origem na teoria da agência. Esta teoria é um dos fundamentos da governança, seja no setor privado ou no setor público. E a governança adota princípios como a transparência e a accountability para propor práticas de controle e acompanhamento da administração, a fim de evitar os problemas da relação agente e principal. Deste modo, a presente pesquisa tem por objetivo avaliar se os relatórios de gestão do Poder Executivo municipal são aderentes aos princípios e padrões de boas práticas de governança para o setor público acerca da transparência e da accountability na utilização dos recursos, bem como dos resultados gerados em decorrência das políticas públicas adotadas. Para tanto, a metodologia utilizada neste trabalho foi a seguinte: através da pesquisa bibliográfica, identificou-se na literatura quais os princípios e padrões de boas práticas de governança para a administração pública, e criou-se um quadro-síntese para servir de base para avaliação dos relatórios de gestão quanto aos aspectos de transparência e accountability; através da pesquisa documental foram selecionados os relatórios de gestão da Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro a serem analisados, que foi a cidade escolhida para realização da pesquisa pela proximidade com o autor e pela disponibilização de diversos documentos em seu sítio eletrônico; a seguir, pela análise de conteúdo, fez-se a avaliação dos documentos utilizando-se o quadrosíntese produzido. Os resultados da pesquisa demonstraram que os relatórios de gestão analisados possuem pouca aderência aos princípios e padrões de boa governança, evidenciando-se uma aderência de apenas 37,71% em relação aos elementos estabelecidos no quadro-síntese. Assim, apontou claramente para o fato de que há pouca transparência nos relatórios de gestão, fato este que prejudica a accountability na administração pública.
The public administration has several problems, ranging from the lack of reviews on the aspects of efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness in use of resource and public policies adopted, to the evil practice of corruption in its different ways. Most of these problems derive from the lack of control mechanisms and monitoring to determine whether the actions taken by public managers are in line with the goals of society. The problems arising from that relationship conflict of interest between those who delegate the management of their businesses and those who receive this delegation and manage the business are called problems of the relationship between principal and agent. In the public sector can be considered that the agent is the public manager (receiving the delegation and administrate) and principal is the citizen or the society itself (delegating). These principles have their origin in the agency theory. This theory is a cornerstone of governance, whether in private or in public sector. And adopts governance principles such as transparency and accountability to propose control practices and monitor the administration in order to avoid the problems of agent and principal relationship. So, this research aims to evaluate whether the annual reports of the Local Administration are adherents to the principles and standards of good governance practices for public sector about transparency and accountability in resource utilization as well as the results generated from public policies adopted. For that, the methodology used in this study were as follows: through the literature search, was identified in the literature what were the principles and standards of good governance practices for public administration, and created a summary table to serve as a basis for evaluation of management reports, about the aspects of transparency and accountability; through documentary research were selected the annual reports of the Rio de Janeiro City to be analyzed, which was the city chosen for the research by its proximity with the author and by the availability of several documents in the web site; following, the content analysis was done to evaluate the documents using of the summary table prepared. The research results showed that the annual reports studied have little adherence to the principles and standards of good governance, demonstrating an adherence of only 37.71% compared to the elements set out in the summary table. Thus, there remained clear that there is little transparency in the management reports, a fact which affect the accountability in public administration.

La transparence, à travers ses multiples applications par le juge européen, est érigée en principe général du droit de l’Union européenne. Ses fondements juridiques retentissent sur sa portée, impérative et supplétive, son champ d’application matériel et personnel ainsi que sur son extension progressive et sa limitation aux seuls rapports verticaux développés entre les autorités adjudicatrices et les opérateurs économiques. La transparence est rattachée directement aux libertés fondamentales des soumissionnaires potentiels dont elles assurent la protection juridique et indirectement au principe de libre concurrence par la suppression des obstacles privés à la libre circulation des activités économiques. Ainsi, au service d’une finalité immédiate, la transparence garantit l’accès à la commande publique et, au service d’une finalité médiate, elle protège les structures du marché de la commande publique. Le principe général de transparence donne alors naissance aux contrats relevant de la commande publique qui prennent le relais des contrats publics. Instrument d’intégration et élément structurel du marché intérieur, cette nouvelle génération des contrats matérialise l’accès à la commande publique qui constitue un secteur d’activité économique faisant partie du marché intérieur
Transparency, through its multiple applications by the european judge, has become a general principle of european law. Its legal basis resound its purview, imperative and suppletive, its personnal et material scope, as well as its progressive extension and its restriction to the vertical relationships developed between contracting authorities and economic operators. Transparency is attached directly to potential bidders fundamental freedoms whose its provides legal protection. It is attached indirectly to the principle of free competition by the elimination of private barriers to the free movement of economic activities. Thus, in the service of an immediate finality, transparency guarantees access to public procurements and, in the service of a mediate finality, it protects the market structures of public procurement. The general principle of transparency gives then rise to contracts of public order (contrats relevant de la commande publique) which take over public contracts. Instrument of integration and structural element of the internal market, this new generation of contracts materialize access to public order (commande publique), that constitutes a sector of economic activity as part of the internal market

O mercado de sistemas embarcados tem demandado uma variada gama de aplicações, aplicações estas cada vez mais complexas. Para atender tal demanda, visto o declínio da lei de Moore e os processadores chegando ao seu limite de dissipação térmica, os projetistas são pressionados a desenvolverem novas organizações computacionais. Para manter a compatibilidade binária, de forma que a grande quantidade de aplicativos e ferramentas já desenvolvidas possa ser reutilizada, as empresas desenvolvem seus produtos focando em melhorias de um dado processador que irá executar a mesma ISA (Instruction Set Architecture). Essa necessidade de compatibilidade de código impõe muitas restrições à equipe de projeto, haja vista as limitações impostas pela ISA legada. A Tradução Binária (TB) abre novas possibilidades aos projetistas, visto que permite a execução de códigos previamente compilados para uma determinada arquitetura em outra arquitetura. No entanto, a TB acrescenta mais uma camada entre o código e sua execução, trazendo perdas de desempenho. Este trabalho explora um novo mecanismo de tradução binária dinâmico de dois níveis que, ao trocar o primeiro nível, pode executar ISAs diferentes de forma totalmente transparente e ainda amortiza os custos de tradução. Da mesma forma ao trocar o segundo nível de tradução binária pode-se trocar a arquitetura alvo. Com base nesse tradutor de dois níveis, é apresentado como estudo de caso um sistema computacional composto por uma arquitetura reconfigurável capaz de executar códigos x86, ARM, PowerPC e MIPS de forma transparente, com compatibilidade binária e com ganhos de desempenho.
The embedded systems market is demanding a wide range of applications, and these applications are increasing in complexity. In order to meet this demand, since the decline of Moore’s law and processors reaching their thermal dissipation limits, designers are pushed to develop new computer organizations. In order to support binary compatibility, so that the large quantity of applications and tools already deployed can be reused, companies develop their products focusing on improvement of a given processor that will execute the same ISA (Instruction Set Architecture) as before. This need for code compatibility impose a lot of restrictions to the design team, considering the limitations imposed by the legacy ISA. Binary Translation (BT) open new possibilities for designers, since it allows the execution of a code previously compiled to a specific architecture in another architecture. However, BT adds another layer between code and actual execution, therefore bringing performance penalties. This work explores a dynamic two-level binary translation system that, by changing the first BT level, allows the execution of different ISAs in a transparent fashion and still amortizes translation costs. In the same way, it is possible to switch to another target architecture by only changing the second BT level. Based on this two-level translator this work presents, as a case study, a computational architecture comprising of an dynamic reconfigurable array that can execute x86, ARM, PowerPC and MIPS binary codes in a transparent way, maintaining binary compatibility with performance gains.

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The aim of this study is to propose guiding principles for the internal control system of the Executive Power in the state of Rio de Janeiro, in an effort to include activities that involve correction, transparency and corruption prevention, as well as its own ombudsman. Currently, this state system is ruled by Decree No. 43,463 of 14 February 2012, which did not cover the aforementioned activities. This study attempts to demonstrate the importance of integrating those activities in a single system, so as to develop and maintain permanent reporting of all information produced by each activity. Since the internal control is an instrument of accountability, such integration may promote transparency, thus contributing to the actions of social control. The premise for the guiding principles here proposed is the federal model, together with models applied in other states, where the internal control system of their Executive Power has already been structured in order to encompass internal control, correction, ombudsman and transparency and corruption prevention activities.
Este trabalho tem por objetivo propor diretrizes para o sistema de controle interno do Poder Executivo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, de forma a inserir atividades de correição, de ouvidorias e de transparência e prevenção à corrupção. O cenário atual deste sistema estadual é regido pelo Decreto 43.463, de 14 de fevereiro de 2012, e deixou de fora aquelas atividades. O trabalho contextualiza a importância de que tais atividades integrem um sistema único, a fim de desenvolver e manter permanente interlocução das informações produzidas por cada atividade. Como o controle interno é instrumento de accountability, tal integração pode fomentar a transparência, podendo contribuir para as ações do controle social. A premissa para a proposta de diretrizes do presente trabalho é o modelo federal e o modelo de alguns estados da federação, os quais já estruturaram seu sistema de controle interno do Poder Executivo, contemplando as atividades de controle interno, de correição, de ouvidorias e de transparência e prevenção à corrupção.

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A pesquisa foi realizada com o objetivo de analisar a observância de diretrizes da transparência ativa nos sítios da rede mundial de computadores (internet) dos três Poderes Públicos do Brasil (Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário), em três âmbitos da federação (União, Distrito Federal e Estados), com o advento da Lei de Acesso à Informação Pública (LAI) posta em vigor em 2011. Para isso, elaborou-se os padrões indicadores de transparência ativa, que foram reunidos em um quadro, utilizado como instrumento de coleta de dados, em seguida procedeu-se à coleta. Por meio da análise estatística, identificou-se que a unidade federativa que atende ao maior percentual de diretrizes ativas, conforme os padrões indicadores mínimos de transparência ativa estabelecidos, é o Rio Grande do Sul, com atendimento a 87,2%, enquanto a que menos atende é o Rio Grande do Norte, com 23,1%. Identificou-se ainda que o Poder Público que tem o maior cumprimento às diretrizes da LAI é o Executivo, e que dentre os padrões indicadores de transparência ativa elaborados, os mais cumpridos são “outros meios de comunicação” e “receitas e despesas”, enquanto os menos atendidos são “horário de atendimento” e “denúncia online”. A análise revelou que nenhuma unidade federativa cumpre a totalidades das diretrizes, de modo que todos precisam voltar-se para o atendimento à LAI.
This study aims to analyze the observance of active transparency guidelines in the World Wide Web (internet) sites from the Brazilian branches of government (Executive, Legislative and Judicial powers), considering three of Brazilian Federation spheres (Union, Federal District and States) in relation to the advent of the Access to Public Information Law (LAI), brought into force in 2011. In order to achieve this goal, first, it was created indicative patterns of active transparency, which were grouped in a table used as a data collection tool. Next, the data was collected. Then, through statistical analysis, it was identified that the federated state that meets the highest percentage of active guidelines, based on the minimum indicators of active transparency patterns elaborated, was Rio Grande do Sul, complying with 87.2% of the law guidelines, while the one that least meets it was Rio Grande do Norte, rating only 23.1% of observance. It was also found that the government branch that had the greater compliance with the guidelines of LAI was the Executive, and that among the indicative patterns of active transparency elaborated the most fulfilled were "other means of communication" and "income and expenditure", while the least accomplished were "office opening hours" and "online reporting". The analysis also revealed that no federative sphere follows the law guidelines as a whole, what shows that they all need to comply with the LAI requirements more effectively.

Les accords multilatéraux sur l’environnement sont généralement caractérisés par leur autorité normative atténuée en raison des difficultés pour les États de garantir leur application effective et efficace. La procédure de non-conformité, expérimentée pour la première fois par le Protocole de Montréal sur les substances qui appauvrissent la couche d’ozone et étendue depuis, tente d’apporter des solutions appropriées aux particularismes de cette branche du droit international public. L’étude de son développement, de son évolution et de sa sophistication à travers sa nature, sa place et sa fonction permet ainsi de déterminer si cette technique exécutive contribue au renforcement de l’autorité des accords multilatéraux sur l’environnement
Multilateral agreements on the environment are generally characterized by their normative authority diminished because of the difficulties for states to ensure their effective implementation and efficiency. The non-compliance procedure, for the first time experienced by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and extended since then, attempts to provide appropriate solutions to the peculiarities of this branch of public international law.The study of its development, its evolution and sophistication through its nature, its place and function and to determine whether this technique helps to strengthen executive authority of multilateral environmental agreements

碩士
僑光科技大學
財務金融研究所
105
Our paper explores the correlation between the executive diversity and the information transparency of corporate governance of listed electronics companies in 2014 and 2015. According to the agency theory, the executive may make the harm to the company or the shareholders because they pursuit of their own interests. Therefore, our study explores the relationship of information transparency and executive diversity. Use the corporate governance evaluation system as proxy variables of information transparency. The empirical results show that the higher diversity of executive seniority and education, the higher information transparency after considering the corporate governance variables. Independent director ratio is significant positive correlation with information transparency, means more independent directors have more objective comments also improve the company management system. The board size is significant positive correlation with information transparency, means the more of board directors, the better of supervision. Duality is significant negative correlation with information transparency. In control variables, firm size is significant positive with information transparency. The debt ratio is significant negative correlation with information transparency, means too much borrowing will brings potential risks. In addition, this study also found that the interaction between executive diversity(age, education, background) and corporate governance (ratio of independent directors and board size) positively affected the information transparency.

碩士
中國文化大學
會計學系
104
This study aims to explore the impact of firm performance and information transparency on excess executive compensation. To conduct this research, no-financial firms listing in the Taiwan and Taipei Stock Exchanges in the period from 2012 to 2014 are used as the sample. The results shows that firms with poor market and accounting performance tend to use excess compensation to motivate top managers. However, increasing information transparency may reduce underperformed companies’ intention in using either excess fixed or excess incentive compensation as an incentive tool.

Professional Doctorate - Doctor of Business Administration (DBA)
Many corporate scandals have broken out all over the world in the past decades. Researchers blame poor corporate governance (CG) as the major cause and study the relationship between the quality of CG, measured with a CG index (CGI), and corporations’ performance. Complicated CGIs have been developed but the research results vary from weak to non-existent or even inverse, leading to no consistent conclusion. This study takes an alternative approach by constructing a corporate governance disclosure (CGD) score system based on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) code on CG 2005. It attempts to measure CG disclosure, instead of the quality of CG. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether this CGD score can show a significant relationship to firms’ performance, work as a proxy to CG quality and function as a tool for investment decision making. 65 property and construction companies listed in HKEx in FY 2010-11 form the sample to test the new CGD score system. Companies under different groupings such as sizes, country of origin and familial control are analyzed for any significant differences in CGD scores using the statistical tool ANOVA. The following are analyzed with statistical tools such as Multiple Regression: the relationship between the CGD scores and firms’ performance; CGD scores and other independent variables such as INED percentage and firms’ size in term of market capitalization; and dummy variables like the appointment of a non-executive chairman, whether or not the company is a PRC one or trades as ADR. The CGD scores are found to have a significant positive relationship with firms’ performance, especially their market to book value (MTBV), and be comparable or even stronger than the results of similar studies with CGI. In other words, companies with higher CGD score are showing better financial performance. Bigger (in term of market capitalization) firms are displaying higher CGD scores. All the sample companies show weak scores in the optional disclosure items but still bigger companies are achieving higher scores. PRC companies are showing lower scores but companies with non-executive chairman and separate CEO are showing higher scores. CGD scores are not affected by factors like familial control or the percentage of INED, ROA, ROE, leverage, and dividend payout. Moreover, the length of the CG report is found to be positively related to the CGD scores. All the results indicate that a CGD score can serve as a proxy for CG quality, which means it establishes a positive relationship with corporate financial performance. In other words, CGD scores can serve as a tool for investors’ decision making support. This dissertation concludes with suggestions for further research and recommendations for the improvement of CG and CG disclosure for HKEx, focusing on practical reporting practice and improvement in inferability.

博士
國立中山大學
財務管理學系研究所
97
This dissertation consists of two essays on the execution cost of financial markets. In the first essay, we study impacts of new block trading rules on two kinds of large trades, block trades (BTs) and splitting order trades (STs). We find some results with policy implications. First, targets traded in the block trading market are illiquid. The proportion of BTs (STs) is the decreasing (increasing) function of stock liquidity. Second, large orders are mainly executed by STs except for illiquid stocks, but investors prefer to trade in block trading market at times when trade size is large, probability of informed trading is lower and price volatility is mild. Third, under the new system, the conditional execution costs of BTs (STs) decline (do not decline) and the percentage of BTs (STs) increases (decreases).Fourth, BTs are uninformed with motivations of tax minimization, general trades and ownership transfer trades, while STs are information based. BTs for tax minimization (general trades) incur the lowest (highest) execution costs. Uninformed BTs incur higher execution costs than informed STs, reflecting “premiums of trading with the specific counterparty” of BTs. Finally, simulation analyses confirm that the block trading market functions well especially for illiquid stocks. In the second essay, we attempt to provide evidence regarding the welfare effect of pre-trade transparency affected by investor and order types. In order to understand the effect of transparency on welfare, we need to explore investors’ behavior adjustments (aggressiveness and order size adjustments) reacted to transparency. We find both individual and institutional investors are more willing to supply liquidity after transparency enhancement. Individual investors behave more aggressively and submit larger order as they supply and demand liquidity, while institutional investors are relatively conservative and submit smaller order in an open environment. We measure welfare of investors in terms of implementation shortfall, which is weighted average of price impacts and opportunity costs. Our main result is, on average, institutional and individual investors who demand immediacy benefit from pre-trade transparency, especially for institutional investors, while traders who supply liquidity are worse off except institutional investors. Intraday analysis further notices individual investors providing liquidity near the end of day lose most from transparency enhancement, while institutional and individual investors demanding liquidity win most in close interval.