Journal articles: 'Executive power'

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Zhang, Liyan, and Chengzi Cao. "Control Power of Senior Executive, Business Environment and Entrepreneurship." International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning 15, no. 7 (November 13, 2020): 1127–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.18280/ijsdp.150717.

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Senior executives have the power to formulate and implement strategic decisions of their company. Entrepreneurship is the critical human capital owned by them. To stimulate entrepreneurship, it is important to ensure that the company is controlled by senior executives with entrepreneurial spirit. Taking China’s A-share listed companies in 2013-2018 as the objects, this paper discusses the influence of control power of senior executives (executive control) over entrepreneurship, and further explores how each dimension of business environment and their interactions affect executive control and entrepreneurship. The results show that executive control greatly promotes entrepreneurship; high legalization level and intense market competition are favorable for entrepreneurship. The incentive effect of executive control on entrepreneurship can be enhanced by government intervention and market competition, and greatly bolstered through the interaction between legalization level and government intervention, as well as the interaction between market competition and government intervention.

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Nzunga, Dennis Joseph. "Executive Reward Structure and Financial Performance of Listed Companies in the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya." Journal of Finance and Accounting 6, no. 3 (July 12, 2022): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.53819/81018102t4057.

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Studies have reported positive and significant relationship,that is, positive relationship between executive fixed pay, cash bonus, stock options and company’s financial performance; others negative and significant relationship, while others no significant relationship. In view of4this, the4 study4 sought4 to4 establish4 the4 relationship4 between4 executive4 reward4 structure4 and4 financial4 performance4 of4 listed4 companies4 at4 the4 Nairobi4 Securities4Exchange, Kenya. The investigation's precise goals were to establish the impact of executive base pay, bonuses, and non-cash incentives, as well as executive7 stock7options, on7 the7 financial7 performance7 of7 firms7listed7 on7the Nairobi Securities7Exchange7in7Kenya.The research also determined if the rate of inflation had a moderating influence on the association between CEO compensation and financial performance of Nairobi securities exchange-listed businesses. Stakeholder theory, agency theory, marginal productivity theory, and managerial power and governance theory were all used in this research. In this study, the positivist philosophy was applied, as well as a causal research design. The target population was all 65 listed businesses on the Nairobi Securities Exchange in Kenya, and a census was conducted. The research employed panel secondary data from annual financial statements of NSE-listed businesses. The study finding indicated that all the study variables except for inflation had a positive correlation with with financial performance of listed firms. However it is basic pay, bonuses and non cash benefits that had a positive and significant effect on the financial performance of listed firms. The effect of executive share options was positive but insignificant at 5% level of significance. Equally the effect of inflation was negative but insignificant. However, inflation has a signinificant effect as a moderator in the relationship7 between7 executive7 rewards7 and7 financial7 performance7 of7 listed7 firms7 at7 the7 Nairobi7 Securities7Exchange.Its is on the basis on of this findings that the study recommends that listed firms need to tailor their executive compensation and reward schemes to performance to encourage the top executives to continuous work hard and achieve their performance targets. Keywords: Executive reward structure, executive basic salary, executive bonuses, executive non-cash benefits, executive stock options, inflation rate, financial performance.

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Brass, Daniel J., and Suresh Srivastva. "Executive Power: How Executives Influence People and Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 33, no. 1 (March 1988): 140. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2392863.

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Scheuerman, William E. "Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy." Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 03 (2012): 743–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2012.01311.x.

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This article reexamines the question of how best to restrain executive power in a political and social context that seems to favor its dramatic expansion. Modern interventionist government amidst a dynamic social environment, where the executive faces a seemingly endless series of “crises” or “emergencies,” provides a heightened scope for executive discretion. At the same time, the US-style separation of powers, in which an independent president faces a potentially obstinate Congress, offers executives many incentives to exploit crises, real or otherwise. The works examined in this article confront, with varying degrees of success, the seemingly inexorable expansion of executive power within the US version of liberal democracy. We can only hope to deal with the many intellectual and political tasks posed by the symbiotic nexus between executive-centered and crisis-oriented government by confronting some tough questions about US constitutional design and the possibility of radical institutional reform. Unfortunately, even those scholars who provide plausible accounts of the US system's fragilities seem hesitant to do so.

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Ndzi, Ernestine Gheyoh. "Executive remuneration: the power and dominance of human greed." Journal of Financial Crime 26, no. 4 (October 7, 2019): 978–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-06-2017-0059.

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Purpose The paper aims to examine the role of human greed in the determination of executive remuneration in the UK. Design/methodology/approach The paper reviews the past and existing regulation and corporate governance recommendations on executive remuneration. Findings The paper demonstrates that the failure of regulatory mechanisms to curb excessive executive remuneration can be justified on the grounds of human greed. Greed is facilitated by the potential conflict of interest that exists as a result of the executives’ position in the company. The position of the law has given greed the opportunity to manifest, making it quite difficult for executive remuneration to be effectively regulated. Originality/value The paper adds to the existing debate on excessive executive remuneration by demonstrating that human greed is the basis of excessive executive remuneration on which limited literature exists.

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Aziz, Norazlina binti Abdul, and Rosa Ristawati. "The Constitutional Power Of The Executive in The Age of Rule of Law: A Comparative Study on Malaysia and Indonesia." Sociological Jurisprudence Journal 3, no. 2 (August 7, 2020): 75–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.22225/scj.3.2.1857.75-83.

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The rule of law sets as an important principle entrenched in the Constitution of Malaysia and Indonesia. This principle stand as a guardian against abuse of power by the government as nobody shall be above the law. This paper examines the practices of the executive power relating to decision-making policy, execution of power and enforcement activities in Malaysia and Indonesia. It also analyses how the executive branch perfoms the powers in accordance to the rule of law. It mainly focuses on the institutional framework of the head of the government and head of state. The analysis allows for identifications of issues and proposals on the enhancement of the executive branch in both countries that would increase the quality of state administration as well as promoting the rule of law. The study adopts a normative method where the fundamental discussions are based on normative approach with content analysis approach on the constitutional and legal provisions, legal cases, circular and directive. The data acquired through doctrinal study is supported by semi-structured interviews with respondents that have been selected through purposive approach. This article concludes that the executive branch plays important roles in promoting the rule of law in both countries. The Constitution, in this case, provides constitutional limitation for the institutional branch of the executive to perform its powers. In the age of rule of law, the executive powers has to be limited. There is no power without limits. The laws has to provide a clear legal direction and reliable mechanism of checks and balances to govern the exercise of the executive powers.

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Dahal, Gopal Prasad. "The Seperation of Power: An Experiment of Theory and Practice." Tribhuvan University Journal 28, no. 1-2 (December 2, 2013): 51–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/tuj.v28i1-2.26214.

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When the legislative and executive power united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ... Again, there is no liberty if the power of judging is not separated from the legislative and executive. If it were joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legislator. If they were joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end to everything, if the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or the people, where to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing public affairs, and that of trying crimes or individual causes. (Baron Montsquieu, 1989-1755).

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Gomes Schapiro, Mario. "A regulação executiva da moeda: a variedade institucional da regulação monetária brasileira na Nova República." Revista de Direito Administrativo 279, no. 2 (August 18, 2020): 141. http://dx.doi.org/10.12660/rda.v279.2020.82008.

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The presidential dominance in monetary regulation: the institutional variety of brazilian monetary regulation throughout the New Republic RESUMOO objetivo do trabalho é, a partir da literatura sobre “estado regulador”, caracterizar a variedade regulatória brasileira que se constituiu no sistema financeiro, entre 1988 e 2018. O principal argumento deste artigo é que, no sistema financeiro brasileiro, o Poder Executivo (e não o Congresso) foi o principal da delegação regulatória. Além disso, o Executivo, por meio do Conselho Monetário Nacional, empregou predominantemente mecanismos administrativos ex post para governar a máquina regulatória. Em outras palavras, no lugar de uma delegação ex ante por meio da legislação, o Executivo contou com ferramentas discricionárias para moldar as atividades regulatórias. Esse arranjo ocorreu dentro da cadeia de comando e controle do Poder Executivo, com pouca participação do Congresso. O artigo descreve essa variedade regulatória como regulação executiva da moeda. ABSTRACTDrawing on the literature on “regulatory state”, this paper aims at characterizing the variety of regulatory state that shaped the Brazilian financial system, between 1988 and 2018. The central claim of this paper is that, at the Brazilian financial system, the Executive branch (and not the Congress) was the principal. Moreover, the Executive, through the National Monetary Council, employed ex-post administrative mechanisms predominantly to govern the regulatory machine. In other words, instead of ex-ante delegation via legislation, the Executive relied on discretionary tools to shape regulatory activities. This arrangement took place within the command and control’s chain of the Executive Power, having little participation of the Congress. The article describes this regulatory variety as the presidential dominance in monetary regulation.

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Thomas, Paul E. J., and J. P. Lewis. "Executive Creep in Canadian Provincial Legislatures." Canadian Journal of Political Science 52, no. 2 (October 15, 2018): 363–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423918000781.

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AbstractStudies of parliamentary systems contend that backbench legislators are increasingly marginalized, with power being centralized in the executive. However, such research typically focuses on national legislatures, ignoring subnational jurisdictions. We extend this literature by exploring the process of “executive creep” in Canada's provinces; namely the tendency of executives to erode legislative independence by appointing backbenchers to quasi-executive positions or cabinet committees. We examine executive creep in all provinces since 1968, finding a clear trend towards the increased incorporation of backbenchers into the work of the executive. Moreover, these changes serve to strengthen the power of first ministers relative to their cabinets.

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Yi, Okyeon. "Befuddling Executive Power with Executive Unilateralism in the Unitary Executive." Journal of International Politics 16, no. 1 (March 31, 2011): 223. http://dx.doi.org/10.18031/jip.2011.03.16.1.223.

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Dalal, Rajbir Singh, and Ekta Chahal. "Ministers and Civil Servants Relations in India: An Evaluation." International Research Journal of Engineering, IT & Scientific Research 2, no. 3 (March 1, 2016): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.21744/irjeis.v2i3.39.

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In parliamentary form of government, like in India, there exists two types of executives i.e. political or elected and permanent executive. Political executive derives its power from people and enjoys the power by virtue of constitutional position, while permanent executive or civil servant is selected on merit basis and accumulate its power due to administrative position and technical expertise. System of a democratic government is based on the principle of popular sovereignty where in the supreme rests in people or their elected representative. Political executive or Minister is assisted by civil servant. A balanced relationship between them is essential for smooth and efficient functioning of government. Minister and civil servant act as two pillars of parliamentary form of government and weakness of any one of them will adversely affect the performance of government. Theoretically political and permanent executives perform different role in government but in practice their work is often overlapping and difficult to differentiate it.

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Cockerham, Alexandra G., and Robert E. Crew. "Factors Affecting Governors’ Decisions to Issue Executive Orders." State and Local Government Review 49, no. 1 (March 2017): 6–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0160323x17702702.

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Executive scholars suggest that unilateral action is used for two reasons: to circumvent a hostile legislature and in response to delegation from the legislature as a means of expediting action. Extant research on unilateral action focuses on one governmental setting, limiting our understanding of how chief executives with different degrees of formal power use unilateral action and about how legislatures of varying capacity respond. We examine the use of executive orders in a cross-sectional context (the U.S. states), thus providing a more comprehensive perspective of where unilateral action fits in relation to other executive powers and why it is used.

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Wei, Chengyan, and Shenxiang Wang. "Research on Improving the Executive Ability of University Administrators Based on Deep Learning." Computational and Mathematical Methods in Medicine 2022 (June 9, 2022): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/6354801.

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Over the years, experts have focused their research on ways to increase the executive capacity of university administrators. This is because only by improving the quality of execution of college and university administrative personnel can they actively execute various policies and measures, fully exploit their subjective initiative, and ensure the educational reform of colleges and universities. Increasing the executive capacity of administrative staff can help colleges and universities manage more effectively. Therefore, in the development process of higher education institutions, it is necessary to strengthen the execution of administrative staff, especially the need to adhere to the problem as the basic orientation. Take scientific and practical steps to strengthen administrative personnel’s executive ability in light of current issues with administrative management personnel’s executive power, and establish the groundwork for ensuring the quality of management work. Combining deep learning, this paper proposes a path to improve the executive power of college administrators based on deep learning. To begin, familiarize yourself with the deep noise reduction autoencoder model and support vector regression (SVR) theory and build the DDAE-SVR deep neural network (DNN) model. Then, input a small-scale feature index sample data set and a large-scale short-term traffic flow data set for experiments; then, assess the model’s parameters to achieve the optimal model. Finally, use performance indicators such as MSE and MAPE to compare with other shallow models to verify the effectiveness and advantages of the DDAE-SVR DNN model in the execution improvement path output of university administrators and large-scale data sets.

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Eckes, Christina. "Controlling the Most Dangerous Branchfrom Afar: Multilayered Counter-Terrorist Policies and the European Judiciary." European Journal of Risk Regulation 2, no. 4 (December 2011): 505–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1867299x00006589.

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Counter-terrorist sanctions against private individuals adopted by the EU and by the UN are an exceptionally illustrative example of the executive’s power grasp, where the dangers of counter-terrorist policies and of externalized rulemaking have mutually reinforced each other. This article (re-)considers the role of the judiciary in the face of extreme exercise of externalized executive powers, demonstrates that multilayered governance has extended the powers of courts, shows that the justified exercise of judicial power has led the EU institutions and the Member States into a self-inflicted catch-22, and makes an argument that the extended powers of the executive and of the judiciary should be contained and guided by a principled choice of the constituent power. Constitutional law should require the judiciary to take a substantive approach to multilayered governance that reflects the principle of separation of powers.

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İlham oğlu Səlimov, İbrahim. "AZƏRBAYCAN RESPUBLİKASINDA DÖVLƏT HAKİMİYYƏTİNİN REALİZƏSİ SAHƏSİNDƏ İCRA HAKİMİYYƏTİNİN YERİ VƏ DAXİLİ İYERARXİYASI." SCIENTIFIC WORK 51, no. 02 (February 28, 2020): 50–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.36719/aem/2007-2020/51/50-53.

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Kumarasingham, H. "Exporting Executive Accountability? Westminster Legacies of Executive Power." Parliamentary Affairs 66, no. 3 (April 13, 2012): 579–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gss008.

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Elgie, Robert. "Models of Executive Politics: A Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi-presidential Regimes." Political Studies 45, no. 2 (June 1997): 217–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00077.

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The study of executives politics has been characterized by dichotomous country-specific debates about whether there is, for example, prime ministerial or cabinet government. Recent work has established new terms for these debates leading to more pluralistic conceptualizations of executive politics. Nevertheless, this work has not created the conditions for rigorous cross-national comparison. This article establishes a framework to compare executive branch power relations. It identifies six models of executive politics comprising a comprehensive set of ways in which power may be distributed amongst chief executives, cabinets, ministers and bureaucrats. On the basis of this framework it is argued that it is necessary to engage in empirical observation to determine which models of government occur and to identify the reasons why these models emerge.

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Borghetto, Enrico, Julie Sevenans, and Emiliano Grossman. "(A falta de) Poder de definição de agenda do parlamento sobre a agenda de decisões executivas: evidências da Bélgica, França e Portugal." Revista de Administração Pública 54, no. 6 (December 2020): 1588–612. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-761220190352.

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Abstract One of the functions of parliamentary questions in modern legislatures is to pressure executives to pay attention to specific issues. But can these questions effectively influence executive decisions? There is surprisingly little empirical research in this area. Adopting an agenda-setting perspective, this article examines the extent to which issue attention in oral parliamentary questions influences the issues addressed in the weekly meetings of the Council of Ministers in three countries (Belgium, France and Portugal). Our findings suggest that the agenda-setting power of parliaments vis-à-vis the executive is usually weak in the contexts studied here. In Belgium, we find evidence that the executive does pick up on issues debated in parliament but that the media seems to play a crucial role in focusing attention. These conclusions testify to the dominance of the executive power in many Western democracies. The findings also demonstrate that agenda-setting patterns are more complex than single-country studies often suggest, and that comparative research is the way forward.

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Henderson, Melinda C. "Measuring Managerial Motivation: The Power Management Inventory." Journal of Nursing Measurement 1, no. 1 (January 1993): 67–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/1061-3749.1.1.67.

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Psychometric properties for Part I ofhe Power Management Inventory (Hawker & Hall, 1981) are presented following validation of the instrument with samples of nurse managers (N=54) and executives (N=92). The content validity indices were .85 for management issues (item stems), .65 for Personalized Power (PP), .75 for Socialized Power (SP), and .70 for Affiliative Motive (AM) scales. Internal consistency reliabilities were acceptable (.63 to .87). Test-Retest correlations (n = 19 managers) ranged from .74 to .85. Correlation of nurse manager (n = 50) scores with subordinate scores of managers were significant (p < .05) for PP (r = .32) and AM (r = .29). Correlation of nurse executive (n = 59) scores with chief executive officer scores of executives were significant for PP (r = .32, p < .01) and AM (r=.25,p< .05). Mean scores on PP, SP and AM failed to profile the motive pattern for “successful” managers. About 29% of the managers and 39% of the executives were categorized as having no power motive preference. Use of the PMI for career counseling/decisions in nursing is not recommended, however, its use as an organizational development tool is endorsed.

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Levinson, Sanford. "Confronting the Modern Executive: Four Perspectives." Perspectives on Politics 20, no. 2 (June 2022): 646–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592722000585.

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It is no secret that political power in the United States and elsewhere has, overall, shifted to “the executive” and away from legislatures. There may be debate about whether this is a product of willful “overreaching” by executives or whether, within the United States, Congress has instead willingly ceded power by engaging in what Justice Cardozo in 1935 called “delegation run riot.” The concern about executive power has perhaps become heightened in the aftermath of the Trump presidency—just as Boris Johnson, with his own defiance of some of the “conventions” that are essential to the British constitutional order, is provoking debate in Great Britain.

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Yu, Lina, and Hua Zhao. "Estimation of bargaining effect in the decision of monetary compensation of executive in investment bank: Evidence from China." PLOS ONE 18, no. 3 (March 30, 2023): e0283771. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0283771.

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Though numerous empirical and theoretical studies have been conducted on the determinants and effects of executive compensation, empirical evidence regarding the bargaining effect on the monetary compensation decisions of executives, especially in a large emerging economy such as China, remains scarce. In this study, a two-tier stochastic frontier and endogenous correction model was developed to quantitatively estimate the bargaining effect on the monetary compensation decisions of investment bank executives. Our study is the first to provide comprehensive empirical evidence that bargaining between investment banks and executives in China significantly affects the compensation decisions of executives. In the bargaining process, investment banks are more proficient than executives, and the comprehensive bargaining effect tends to lower the negotiated compensation of executives. The bargaining effect exhibited obvious heterogeneity in the characteristics of executives and investment banks. When these characteristics tend to augment the bargaining power of executives, the negotiated compensation exhibits a limited decrease; when these characteristics augment the bargaining power of investment banks, the negotiated compensation decreases substantially. Our results provide deep insight into factors that determine executive compensation and help compensation designers of investment banks better understand and design executive pay packages.

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Varshney, Dr Rahul, and Sachin Sharma. "Executive Legislation in India: Legality of Ordinance Making Power." Praxis International Journal of Social Science and Literature 6, no. 8 (August 25, 2023): 170–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.51879/pijssl/060819.

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Misuse of ordinance making power by executive is one of the major problems of parliamentary democracy in India. Indian constitution provisioned for ordinance to tackle the urgent situations created through exceptional circumstances but it has been exercised to trespass into the legislative functions of the state. In many cases legislature was replaced with the executive as many ordinances were re-promulgated repeatedly for years without even bringing before the legislature. This paper tries to analyze the basic traits of ordinance making power and its current practice by the different governments in state and center. It also summarizes the judicial attitude towards ordinance making power and its efforts to curb its abuse by scrutinizing legality of ordinances time to time.

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Pogorelova, Z. "Law-making authorities of executive government bodies as the legal basis of their law-making activity." Uzhhorod National University Herald. Series: Law 1, no. 75 (March 22, 2023): 47–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2022.75.1.7.

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The article examines the essence of the rule-making powers of the executive authorities, the limits of the independence of the executive authority in the exercise of its rule-making powers, the difference between the concept of «independence of the executive power in relation to other branches of government» and the concept of «operational independence of individual divisions of the executive authorities», as well as their interrelationships connection with rule-making activity. On the basis of the understanding of the rule-making powers of executive bodies as the powers to establish, change and cancel mandatory rules in the form of issuing bylaws, the conclusion that the rule-making powers of executive bodies are inseparable from their legal status is substantiated, the issue of their appointment as a means of implementation is considered by executive power bodies of their functions, tasks and powers, as well as the need for general control over the exercise of rule-making powers by executive power bodies from the legislative power. The question of the use of discretionary powers by the executive authorities is considered, as their powers to act at their own discretion, choosing from among several prescribed legal options for behavior the one that best meets the needs of achieving the management goal. The conclusion that the rule-making powers of executive authorities serve as the legal basis for rule-making activity and are carried out through rule-making activity is substantiated. By virtue of their importance and impact on social relations, on the rights and obligations of individuals, rule-making powers require the implementation of rule-making activities of executive authorities in a special legal procedural form, since for their rule-making activities it is important and necessary to observe the appropriate method, order and procedures of implementation , while observing the limits of competence. The need for regulatory regulation of the procedure for the implementation of rule-making activities of executive authorities, its high level of formalization, recording of its results, as an activity that is important for keeping executive authorities within their powers, observing the principle of the rule of law, protecting the rights and freedoms of the individual, is substantiated.

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Nemțoi, Gabriela. "Exceptional Measures Regarding the Powers of the President." European Journal of Law and Public Administration 10, no. 2 (December 20, 2023): 10–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.18662/eljpa/10.2/204.

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The presidential institution in the Romanian constitutional system has an important role in ensuring the guarantor of the . The President of Romania is part of the executive power and meets the essential prerogatives of this power. As a model for organizing the executive power, the Romanian constitution establishes the bicephalic model. According to this dualist model recipe, executive power is distributed evenly between the head of state and the Government. In this article we will try to establish the legitimacy of the President of Romania to undertake exceptional measures. As such, the competence of the president also extends to exceptional measures in exceptional cases. Establishing exceptional competences in the president’s duties ensures him a somewhat superior position in the executive’s dualistic complex.

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Fox, Justin, and Mattias Polborn. "On the separation of executive and legislative powers: Executive independence, liberty, and social welfare." Journal of Theoretical Politics 33, no. 4 (October 2021): 430–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09516298211043234.

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We explore the effects of a particular facet of separation of powers—namely, the executive’s independence from the legislature—on maintaining a norm of legislative restraint in which antagonistic factions refrain from passing laws that infringe on their rival’s liberties. Our main result establishes that executive independence may sometimes undermine and at other times facilitate legislative restraint, depending on the probabilities with which the factions hold legislative and executive power. Our results contribute to the larger game-theoretic literature exploring the effects of political institutions; our results also contribute to the literature exploring how institutions designed to protect liberty affect tacit cooperation among rival factions.

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Verma, Maansi. "Agenda Control in the Indian Parliament and the Impact on its Oversight Function – Analysis and Evidence." Socio-Legal Review 18, no. 1 (2022): 23–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.55496/oskr8423.

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Separation of powers is understood as the diffusion of powers among different branches of the government, with each branch acting as a check on the other. This principle is considered an anti-thesis to totalitarianism, preventing the absolute concentration of power and thus protecting liberty. The Cabinet-style parliamentary form of government, with its genesis in Britain, fused together the executive with the legislature. This resulted in powerful executives and weakened legislatures with limited oversight capabilities. As institutions evolved over time, internal rules and procedures also evolved both as constraints and enablers of executive dominance, by distributing the powers of agenda control. Agenda control, understood as the power to decide what gets on the agenda, is a contested notion between the executive and the legislature. While there have been studies exploring agenda control in the context of the United States Congress and parliaments in several European countries, a similar study in the context of the Indian Parliament is yet to emerge. This paper attempts to examine the rules and procedures of the Indian Parliament to determine who controls the agenda, and what impact this control has on the oversight function of Parliament. For this purpose, the paper will limit itself to procedures pertaining to convening and proroguing a session, deciding the time and agenda for legislative discourse, and controlling deliberations on financial matters. The paper ends by making some recommendations on the reform of these rules and procedures, so as to ensure a greater sharing of the power of agenda control between the executive and the legislature in India.

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Verma, Maansi. "Agenda Control in the Indian Parliament and the Impact on its Oversight Function – Analysis and Evidence." Socio-Legal Review 18, no. 1 (December 1, 2022): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.55496/zdjy7222.

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Separation of powers is understood as the diffusion of powers among different branches of the government, with each branch acting as a check on the other. This principle is considered an anti-thesis to totalitarianism, preventing the absolute concentration of power and thus protecting liberty. The Cabinet-style parliamentary form of government, with its genesis in Britain, fused together the executive with the legislature. This resulted in powerful executives and weakened legislatures with limited oversight capabilities. As institutions evolved over time, internal rules and procedures also evolved both as constraints and enablers of executive dominance, by distributing the powers of agenda control. Agenda control, understood as the power to decide what gets on the agenda, is a contested notion between the executive and the legislature. While there have been studies exploring agenda control in the context of the United States Congress and parliaments in several European countries, a similar study in the context of the Indian Parliament is yet to emerge. This paper attempts to examine the rules and procedures of the Indian Parliament to determine who controls the agenda, and what impact this control has on the oversight function of Parliament. For this purpose, the paper will limit itself to procedures pertaining to convening and proroguing a session, deciding the time and agenda for legislative discourse, and controlling deliberations on financial matters. The paper ends by making some recommendations on the reform of these rules and procedures, so as to ensure a greater sharing of the power of agenda control between the executive and the legislature in India.

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Flesch, Julian. "Reining in the Imperial Presidency." Brandeis University Law Journal 8, no. 1 (May 10, 2021): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.26812/bulj.v8i1.483.

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Over the years, the Executive branch, in particular the presidency, has become extremely powerful. In fact, it has far more power than the Constitution allows. What can be done to limit executive power as the Constitution intended? The powers and functions of the presidency, mainly found in Article II of the Constitution, are actually very limited, but public perception and legal theories have given the institution immense power. In particular, former President Trump and his administration have dangerously increased the power of the executive branch. This piece discusses the theories and actions that have led us to this point, and proposes necessary changes to curb executive power in accordance with the Constitution and founding principles.

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McCarty, Nolan M. "Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics." American Political Science Review 94, no. 1 (March 2000): 117–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586384.

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It is often argued that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending by the legislature. I argue that the effect of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptions about both the nature of executive preferences and the institutional structure of executive-legislative bargaining. To support these claims, I develop a model of distributive policymaking subject to an executive veto. This framework incorporates variation in presidential objectives and formal powers into a dynamic bargaining model. In equilibrium, stronger veto power leads to a lower level of distributive spending, but the effects are mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others. The model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers, including the effects of divided government, electoral rules, and term limitations for the executive.

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Repetska, Anastasia. "Cooperation of the legislative and executive state of the state authorities in the aspects of the modern political system of Ukraine." Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу, no. 39 (June 16, 2019): 192–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2019.39.192-197.

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One of the main characteristics of any political regime is the power correlation between the legislative and executive branches of state power. In a democratic environment, it should reflect a certain balance of branches of power.The Constitution of Ukraine has defined the principle of separation of power into legislative, executive and judicial (art. 6), each of them is independent from the other one and acts within its competence. Theoretically fixed in the Constitution principles of power separation aim between legislative and executive branches. However in the conditions of social-economic crisis, in which the country has been acting since 1990s, between multi-vectored political forces and striving of executive power for widening of its authorities, that is fixed in the Constitution, the presidential-parliamentary form of administration very often has led not only to constitutional cooperation of powers but to the competition between the President and executive power on the one hand, and Verhovna Rada, on the other hand. So, today the need for reconsideration of both the correlation of authorities and cooperation between branches of power in Ukraine has become obvious. Keywords: legislative branch of government, executive branch of government, cooperation, political system.

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31

Neill, Marlene S. "Beyond the c-suite: corporate communications’ power and influence." Journal of Communication Management 19, no. 2 (May 5, 2015): 118–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jcom-06-2013-0046.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine what formal executive-level committees senior corporate communications executives are members of and what value they contribute. Design/methodology/approach – The researcher conducted in-depth interviews with 30 senior executives at four US companies who discussed corporate communications’ involvement in eight strategic issues. Findings – The focus on the C-Suite is too narrow as strategic issues arise at the division level and in executive-level committees. Corporate communications is often in competition with marketing for influence and coveted seats in the board rooms. Corporate communications is most likely to be included in decision making when issues are perceived as falling within their domain, when the function has support from the CEO, when working in industries with frequent crises or those focussing on reputation management, and in companies that utilize integrated decision teams. Practical implications – Corporate communicators need to enhance their research skills and educate other colleagues about their domain beyond media relations. Originality/value – Study includes the perspectives of executives outside of corporate communications such as marketing, sales, human resources, investor relations, finance, and operations as well as division presidents.

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Dewally, Michaël, Susan Flaherty, and Daniel Singer. "Executive compensation, organizational culture and the glass ceiling." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 2 (2014): 239–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i2c1p7.

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This study examines the impact of organizational culture on executive compensation systems. Organizational culture is found to have a strong impact on the relationship between CEO equity compensation and organizational effectiveness. Compensation patterns found in traditional organizations are interpreted to reflect a Managerial Power Theory of executive compensation. In contrast, in positive organizations, the exercise of managerial power appears to be constrained by the internal values of that organization and the need for the leader to maintain his or her authenticity. Female executives who have penetrated the glass ceiling in both traditional and positive organizations are found to contribute to a culture in which executive compensation reflects an Optimal Contract approach to principle-agent relationships for CEOs and shareholders.

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33

Scott, William G., and Harvey C. Mansfield. "Intellectual History of Executive Power." Public Administration Review 50, no. 4 (July 1990): 462. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/977085.

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Bernard, Carole, Phelim Boyle, and Jit Seng Chen. "Power Options in Executive Compensation." Journal of Derivatives 23, no. 3 (February 29, 2016): 9–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jod.2016.23.3.009.

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Mayer, Kenneth R. "Executive Orders and Presidential Power." Journal of Politics 61, no. 2 (May 1999): 445–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2647511.

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Robertson, James Oliver. "The Failure of Executive Power." Canadian Review of American Studies 16, no. 4 (December 1985): 465–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cras-016-04-07.

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Gumbel, A. "Managerial Power and Executive Pay." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 219–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqi051.

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Smith, Pamela K., Nils B. Jostmann, Adam D. Galinsky, and Wilco W. van Dijk. "Lacking Power Impairs Executive Functions." Psychological Science 19, no. 5 (May 2008): 441–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02107.x.

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Locke, Edwwin A. "Executive Power: Leadership or Mush?" Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews 34, no. 3 (March 1989): 259–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/027780.

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Baker, Samuel H. "Why Executive Power Centralizes Government." Public Finance Review 33, no. 6 (November 2005): 747–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1091142105279066.

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Ponder, Stephen. "Presidential Publicity and Executive Power." American Journalism 11, no. 3 (July 1994): 257–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08821127.1994.10731637.

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Johnson, Gbemende. "Executive Power and Judicial Deference." Political Research Quarterly 68, no. 1 (December 2, 2014): 128–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912914561798.

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Carlin, Ryan E., and Shane P. Singh. "Executive Power and Economic Accountability." Journal of Politics 77, no. 4 (October 2015): 1031–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682235.

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Robinson-Walker, Catherine. "The Power of Executive Presence." Nurse Leader 12, no. 4 (August 2014): 12–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mnl.2014.05.015.

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WEAVER, WILLIAM G., and ROBERT M. PALLITTO. "State Secrets and Executive Power." Political Science Quarterly 120, no. 1 (March 2005): 85–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165x.2005.tb00539.x.

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Şaramet, Oana. "THE STRUCTURE OF EXECUTIVE POWER. THE STRUCTURE'S EVOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER IN ROMANIA." Agora International Journal of Juridical Sciences 8, no. 4 (November 23, 2014): 163–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.15837/aijjs.v8i4.1616.

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The monist or dualist character of the executive, a character determined by the structure of the executive, must not be mistaken for the monist or dualist character of the parliamentary regime, in which case the government is still at “the center of attention” but from a different perspective.

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Weisbach, Michael S. "Optimal Executive Compensation versus Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation." Journal of Economic Literature 45, no. 2 (May 1, 2007): 419–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.2.419.

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This essay reviews Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried's Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to maximize the shareholders' welfare. In contrast, Bebchuk and Fried argue that executive compensation is more consistent with executives who control their own boards and who maximize their own compensation subject to an “outrage constraint.” They provide a host of evidence consistent with this alternative viewpoint. The book can be evaluated from both positive and normative perspectives. From a positive perspective, much of the evidence they present, especially about the camouflage and risk-taking aspects of executive compensation systems, is fairly persuasive. However, from a normative perspective, the book conveys the idea that policy changes can dramatically improve executive compensation systems and consequently overall corporate performance. It is unclear to me how effective potential reforms designed to achieve such changes are likely to be in practice.

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FRYDMAN, CAROLA, and RAVEN MOLLOY. "Pay Cuts for the Boss: Executive Compensation in the 1940s." Journal of Economic History 72, no. 1 (March 12, 2012): 225–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002205071100249x.

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Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel data set on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. Government regulation—including explicit salary restrictions and taxation—had, at best, a modest effect on executive pay. By contrast, a decline in the returns to firm size and an increase in the power of labor unions contributed greatly to the reduction in executive compensation relative to other workers’ earnings from 1940 to 1946. The continued decrease in relative executive pay remains largely unexplained.

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Tichenor, Daniel J. "Historical Set Points and the Development of U.S. Presidential Emergency Power." Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 3 (September 2013): 769–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592713002132.

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The recent outpouring of work on executive power during emergencies, inspired by the post-9/11 era, has significantly enhanced our legal and theoretical understanding of this crucial subject. A key flaw in this literature, however, is that it is historically un-rooted, either dismissing or ignoring important analytical and empirical insights from presidential research and from APD and historical-institutionalist perspectives. In this article, I argue that we can better explain patterns and variations in the use of presidential emergency power by paying careful attention to shifting historical set points for executive choice and action during security crises. In particular, the findings here underscore the episodic growth of new precedents, resources, and expectations for the White House in perilous contexts. The development of presidential emergency power reflects the potential for early executive choices to be repeated and legitimated over time, laying dormant as a “loaded weapon” to be used by future executives in similarly urgent circumstances.

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Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, and Jesse M. Fried. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem." Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 3 (August 1, 2003): 71–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533003769204362.

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This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a “managerial power” approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is decoupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, stealth compensation, executive loans, payments to departing executives, retirement benefits, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Executive power'

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