Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Executive (CEO and Board)'
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Toscano, Roberta. "Board members’ attitudes to CEO arrogance." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/23055.
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As a CEO assumes an important role in an organization, his or her personality, with emphasis on arrogance, may affect a multitude of board members’ attitudes. This study gauges the effect of CEO arrogance on board members’ attitudes, which includes the engagement; cohesiveness; collaboration; job satisfaction; consensual decision making and desirability of the CEO. This investigation drew from existing literature that personality traits affect a leaders’ effectiveness in terms of group performance and followers’ satisfaction (Avolio, Gardner, Walumbwa, Luthans&May, 2004). Through experimental design, actual board meetings were simulated and CEO arrogance was manipulated, mainly by adapting the indicators from the Arrogance Scale in the Workplace developed by Johnson et al. (2010). Experiments were conducted in samples of MBA students and senior management consultants of roughly similar demographics. The findings confirmed that CEO arrogance has a detrimental effect on all the board members’ attitude. Arrogance accounted for almost 60 per cent of the board members’ attitudes ratings. This study is confirms that an arrogant CEO negatively affects the board member dynamics which are essential in maintaining an effective board. This urges the organizations to acquire non-arrogant CEOs to improve the organisation’s productivity. Alternatively, an organization can consider alternatives to dilute a CEO’s arrogance.Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012.
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
unrestricted
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Žilková, Alena. "Corporate Governance." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2009. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-11230.
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Definition and basic theoretic information about Corporate Governance of big industry company Description and Analyse of corporate Management, the functions of Top Management Members, their role in relationship to owners / shareholders (describtion of used tools for internal control of government, investment and tools for financial analyses)
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Ellingson, Dee Ann Hetland. "Board composition and the use of accounting measures : the effect on the relation between CEO compensation and firm performance /." Diss., This resource online, 1996. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-06062008-154716/.
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Markham, James. "CEO entrenchment versus boards of directors performance is not all that matters to turnover /." Access to citation, abstract and download form provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company; downloadable PDF file, 172 p, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1654492691&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=8331&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Goldblatt, Dana. "An investigation into the determinants and moderators of women attaining and retaining CEO positions." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2017. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/an-investigation-into-the-determinants-and-moderators-of-women-attaining-and-retaining-ceo-positions(14efa949-3f2d-4b71-bc40-aba358315ea2).html.
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This thesis explores gender-related barriers in CEO successions. Only 4% of Fortune 500 CEOs are female despite the fact that women have held the majority of college degrees in the US since the late 1990's and now comprise almost half of the workforce and the majority of managerial positions. Their representation is low even in comparison to the other two top management positions from which CEOs are typically sourced. It is less than one-third of the percentage of both female executive officers (15%) and board directors (17%). A holistic and qualitative research approach was utilized. Data were gathered on societal, individual and organizational factors through one-on-one, semi-structured interviews with board directors, executive search consultants and female CEOs, and analyzed using computer-assisted coding software. This thesis challenges the perception that women's individual barriers are the main reason why there are so few female CEOs. While all three types of barriers were found, organizational barriers appear to be the most important. The convergence of predominately male board directors, CEOs and top executive search consultants with informal, subjective, secretive and disparate talent management and CEO successions programs effectively results in the CEO position being a better fit for men than women. While moderating factors were beneficial to the women who have become CEOs, many factors were found for why they cannot be relied upon to greatly increase the number of female CEOs. A deliberate and comprehensive effort by society, individuals and organizations is required.
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Bathula, Hanoku. "Board characteristics and firm performance evidence from New Zealand : a thesis submitted to Auckland University of Technology in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), 2008 / Hanoku Bathula." Full thesis Abstract, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10292/376.
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Due to various corporate scandals and failures, there has been a renewed interest on the role of boards in the performance of firms. This thesis examines the relationship between the key board characteristics and firm performance. Unlike most studies on boards which predominantly use only financial variables affecting governance, I take a different approach by combining them with non-financial variables. This combined set of variables is used for theoretical and empirical modelling. Based on the extant literature, I develop a conceptual framework and a set of hypotheses to examine the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance. Board characteristics considered in this research include board size, director ownership, CEO duality, gender diversity, educational qualification of board members and number of board meetings. Additionally, I use board size as a moderating variable to examine how the effect of other board characteristics is contingent on board size. Firm performance is measured by return on assets. I test my hypotheses on a longitudinal sample of 156 firms over a four year period from 2004 to 2007. My sample includes all firms listed on New Zealand stock exchange as on November 2007. Empirical analysis is undertaken using Generalised Least Squares analyses. The findings of the study show that board characteristics such as board size, CEO duality and gender diversity were positively related with firm performance, where as director ownership, board meetings and the number of board members with PhD level education was found to be negatively related. Board size was found to be moderating some of these relationships, indicating the critical role being played by board size in the design and role of corporate boards. The findings also provide partial evidence to different governance theories, further indicating the need for theoretical pluralism to gain insights into boards’ functioning. The study contributes to the understanding of board-performance link by examining both the traditional variables such as board size, CEO duality, and number of board meetings as well as other organisational attributes such as gender diversity and competence variables represented by women and PhD holders, respectively. The theoretical framework and the findings of my thesis are expected to stimulate scholars for further research to identify the contingency conditions upon which the board characteristics and firm performance may be dependent.
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Wang, Yan. "The influence of board of director networks and corporate governance on firm performance and CEO compensation." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/13022.
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This thesis comprises three empirical studies that investigate the effects of director networks and corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance and CEO compensation. The first empirical study (chapter three) describes the extent of board networks among non-financial FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during 2007-2010. We use the concept of the “centrality” from social network analysis to examine whether board networks are related to firm performance. We find that firms whose directors are more central in a network are associated with better financial performance. Consistent with the “Reputation Hypothesis” (Fama and Jensen, 1983), the number of director connections may proxy for director reputation. Directors are motivated to improve their reputation since they can use their directorships to signal to the market that they are good at decision-making, and at providing advice and monitoring management. The second empirical study (chapter four) investigates the effects of director networks on CEO compensation among non-financial FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange between 2007 and 2010, while controlling for CEO characteristics, corporate governance characteristics and firm characteristics. We first examine the impact of CEO networks (individual level) and second board networks (firm level) comprising all board members. We examine not only the total remuneration of the CEO but also two important components of the remuneration package, i.e. basic salary, and long term incentive plans (LTIPs). At the individual level, we find that a well-connected CEO measured by “centrality” receives higher total compensation. Although we find a positive relationship between basic salary and CEO networks, we do not find evidence of a relationship between LTIP compensation and CEO networks. The relationship between board networks and CEO compensation is also examined at the firm level. The results show that board networks have a positive and significant effect on total compensation and LTIP compensation but not on basic salary compensation. The third empirical study (chapter five) examines the effects of directors’ business networks, directors’ social networks and corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. Previous studies have considered only business networks (directorships), while this study explores both business networks and social networks, such as current and past employment, education background, and other types of social activities (membership of golf clubs, membership of charity organizations, universities alumni, etc). We find that well-connected directors seem to use their networks to improve firm performance and in line with the interest of their shareholders. We further split the effects of board networks into business and social networks. We find that social networks play a more important role than business networks in improving firm performance, consistent with social capital theory (Coleman, 1990) which argues that networks of social connections can provide firms with valuable resources and information. Overall, this thesis provides empirical evidence that director networks and corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in affecting CEO remuneration and firm financial performance. The findings of this thesis suggest that regulators, firms and individuals should not only pay attention to business networks but also to social networks.
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Schalka, Beatriz. "Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/9916.
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Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title 'Novo Mercado' refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.
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Al-Ramahi, Fatima, and Ehsan Alkhatib. "Gender diversity and corporate sustainability disclosures in Swedish listed companies : A quantitative study examining female representation on boards and in the CEO role and their effects on corporate sustainability disclosures." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-447593.
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This study investigates the relationship between female representation, women as chief executive officers, and corporate sustainability disclosures in Swedish listed companies. The used data was collected from the Swedish listed companies in Nasdaq Stockholm for the period 2017-2020. The specific research period is due to the new amendments of the Swedish Annual Accounts Act (Årsredovisningslagen) which came into force 2017. To investigate the effect female representation, and women as chief executive officers have on the legally issued corporate sustainability disclosures, this study applies content analysis and quantitative methods. By estimating multiple regression models, the results revealed a non-significant relationship of female representation on the board of directors and of women as chief executive officers, on the quality of corporate sustainability disclosures. For the critical mass of at least three women, a non-significant impact is detected. Lastly, an additional test for reversed causality has been conducted, however no significant relationship was documented.
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Fong, Eric Alan. "Chief executive officer (ceo) responses to ceo compensation equity." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2004. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0004160.
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Bian, Huan. "Executive ownership, CEO over-confidence and firm policies." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2018. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/8566/.
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Executive ownership and CEO over-confidence can affect the issue of firm policies. The thesis examines the influence of executive ownership on the firm accounting strategy and the dividend payout policy in China. The thesis also examines the influence of CEO over-confidence on the cash policy and the cash adjustment speed in the U.S. Firstly, I investigate the relationship between the executive ownership and accounting conservatism in China. The results show that accounting conservatism has a U shape relationship with the executive ownership. I further find that any deviations from the optimal executive ownership can increase accounting conservatism level in the firms. Secondly, I examine the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling behaviour in China. The results show that the increase of executive ownership can increase the dividend tunnelling behaviour. Thirdly, I investigate the relationship between CEO over-confidence and cash adjustment speed to make the cash reverse to the target cash level. The results show that the over-confident CEOs have the intentions to store more cash. Therefore, they reduce the cash adjustment speed when there is excess cash in the firm.
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Julian, Amanda Lynn. "IDENTIFYING THE TRAITS THAT DIFFERENTIATE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PERFORMANCE LEVELS." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1126033649.
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MA, Yiu Chung. "CEO compensation and loan contracting." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2011. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/econ_etd/3.
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The agency theory literature implies the pay-performance based managerial compensation can relieve the agency problem between shareholders and managers. As the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned, managers have incentive to invest in best projects and hence to improve firms’ performance. While the use of equity compensation to managers may reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders, its impact on agency cost of debts is ambiguous. On the one hand, a large portion of equity compensation discourages risk-averse managers to invest in risky investment and hence reduce the credit risk. On the other hand, while the equity compensation brings the interests of managers in alignment to shareholder it may encourage managers to take opportunistic corporate strategies and to exploit the wealth of creditors. As a result, creditors may response to the CEO compensation package by imposing different covenant restrictions according to their perception of the credit risk.
Supported with empirical evidence, this research finds that loan agreement contains more restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of option compensation to the total compensation, but contains less restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of stock compensation to the total compensation. It implies that creditors view that the increase in the use of option compensation would increase the credit risk of the firm, while the increase in the use of stock compensation would decrease the credit risk. This research also investigates the relation between the CEO option compensation and some specific financial covenants. The finding shows that the use of liquidity covenant and minimum net worth covenant is positively related to the CEO option compensation.
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Mackey, Alison. "Dynamics in executive labor markets CEO effects, executive-firm matching, and rent sharing /." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1148305593.
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Coxbill, Amanda Lynn. "Stock market reaction to a gender change in CEO." Laramie, Wyo. : University of Wyoming, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1605143711&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=18949&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Rescigno, Elizabeth. "Relationship Between Chief Executive Officer Compensation, Duality, and Return on Equity." ScholarWorks, 2018. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/6097.
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Poor decisions and conflicts of interest by members of company boards of directors have been a factor in the dramatic rise in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, resulting in a lower return on equity (ROE) for shareholders. The purpose of this correlational study was to examine the relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size, as measured by total assets. Agency theory was the theoretical framework for this study. The study examined whether a statistically significant relationship existed between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. Archival data were collected and analyzed from a sample of publicly traded firms in the United States listed on the 2016 Standard & Poor's 500 Index. Hierarchical multiple regression techniques were used to test the relationship between variables. The results indicated that there was not a statistically significant relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The study may contribute to positive social change by increasing the potential for board of directors' members to implement best practices, contributing to reduced shareholder conflicts, less litigation, higher ROE, and enhanced investor confidence benefiting emerging economies and local communities.
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Nílsson, David, and Myhre Mauritz Smedensjö. "CEO Power, Discretion and Firm Performance : The Moderating Role of Formal CEO Board Membership." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för nationalekonomi och statistik (NS), 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-106068.
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Background: Formal CEO board membership is a unique feature of Swedishboards. The share of firms having Formal CEO board membership hassignificantly decreased in the last 20 years and thus, this feature might haveevolved to be used as a signal of high CEO quality. CEO quality is in turnlikely to, through Formal CEO board membership, serve as a moderator of therelationship that both CEO power and CEO discretion has to firm performancewhich has previously been somewhat ambiguous. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain how the CEO’s power anddiscretion is related to firm performance and if this relation is moderated byFormal CEO board membership. Method: To fulfill the purpose of this thesis, a deductive research approachwas used. The theoretical model used is built on four theories namely,Stewardship theory, CEO power, CEO discretion and Signaling theory. With a five-year interval stretching between 1998 to 2018, the quantitative empiricalmethod relies on compensation and financial data from Swedish firms. Conclusion: The results indicate that the relation that both CEO power andCEO discretion have to firm performance, consistent with the theoreticalmodel, is positive. The results further indicate that Formal CEO boardmembership as a signal of CEO quality can moderate these relationships. Thisfinding is, however, exclusive to the years after 2008.
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Neyland, Jordan Bradley. "Wealth Shocks and Executive Compensation: Evidence from CEO Divorce." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/145400.
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To empirically test the impact of CEOs' outside wealth on their compensation, I use spousal divorce as a proxy for an exogenous, negative shock to a CEO's outside wealth. I hypothesize that this shock decreases a CEO's risk tolerance. I also expect that the board of directors responds to this decrease by raising the CEO's cash compensation and by increasing the sensitivity of the CEO's compensation to changes in firm value. I find that cash bonuses, restricted stock grants, and option grants increase following a CEO's divorce, consistent with boards reacting to changes in CEOs' outside wealth and risk incentives. I also find that firms' total risk and idiosyncratic risk significantly drop during the year of a CEO's divorce, consistent with a drop in the CEO's risk tolerance. Overconfident CEOs, who are more risk tolerant, do not receive the same increases in compensation following divorce. I find little support for the relation between divorce and compensation being endogenously determined by performance or by poor corporate governance. Overall, the results support predictions that the board of directors takes the CEO's wealth into account when setting compensation and that outside wealth impacts the CEO's risk preferences.
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Stancill, Alan Jonathan. "CEO Severance Agreements and Tax Avoidance." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77862.
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This study investigates the association between CEO severance agreements and corporate tax avoidance. Severance agreements, by providing executives with additional compensation when there is a change in employment status, should serve to encourage additional risk-taking, as reflected by increased tax avoidance activities. Using a large sample of aggregate compensation data, I find some evidence of a relation between the presence of a CEO severance agreement and tax avoidance. Using a smaller sample of hand-collected data, I find a significant negative relation between the magnitude of cash severance pay and tax avoidance and a significant positive relation between the magnitude of equity severance pay and tax avoidance. Overall, this study provides evidence that the structure and magnitude of severance agreements are related to tax avoidance.Ph. D.
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Peng, Yan. "Accounting system quality and CEO compensation /." view abstract or download file of text, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3181120.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2005.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-71). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Tepe, Mete. "Two Essays on Executive Compensation." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78706.
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This dissertation consists of two essays, both co-authored with Ugur Lel. The first essay (Chapter 1) examines whether high CEO pay inequality (CPI), the share of total managerial pay captured by the CEO, is an outcome of poor corporate governance, and its implications for shareholder wealth. We exploit the 2002 NYSE and NASDAQ governance reforms that mandated firms to have majority independent boards as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in the internal governance environment of firms. Results show that CPI decreases following the passage of these exchange listing regulations, but only in firms with entrenched CEOs affected by the exchange listing regulations. Firm value also increases for these firms. These results are robust to a variety of robustness checks such as a matched sample analysis and placebo tests. Overall, our results suggest that poor governance environments are associated with high managerial pay differences and consequently lower firm valuations, supporting the view that high CEO pay inequality reflects managerial entrenchment.
The second essay (Chapter 2) examines whether shareholders use executive compensation channel to align managerial horizon with their investment horizon. We utilize a newly emerged empirical measure, pay duration, to measure managerial horizon. For shareholder horizon, we use the fraction of long-term institutional ownership in the firm. Results show that there is a positive association between long-term institutional ownership and CEO pay duration, suggesting that shareholder horizon is a determining factor in compensation contracts. We address reverse causality using indexer institutions. We also establish a causal link from investor horizon to CEO pay duration using institution mergers as a source of exogenous variation in investor horizon of the firm. We extend our results to hedge fund activism and document a negative relation between hedge fund activism and pay duration, which is consistent with our argument. Overall our results suggest that shareholders structure CEO pay in a way that is consistent with their investment horizon.Ph. D.
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Perez, Rebeca. "Individual Executive Characteristics and Firm Performance: Evidence from CEO Narcissism." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22658.
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Narcissism refers to persistent feelings of grandiosity, a need for admiration, and a lack of empathy (American Psychiatric Association 2013). The literature has found narcissism to be associated with individuals making decisions for a firm that fulfill their egos rather than maximize firm value. The literature in psychology, however, suggests that when firms face financial distress, narcissism could be a desirable trait in an individual, enabling the CEO to take the necessary risks and make the necessary decisions for the firm to recover. I study the context under which a firm may benefit from a narcissistic CEO. In this study, I use two measures from prior literature (CEO photo prominence in the annual report and a CEO’s use of first-person personal pronouns) to form a combination measure to investigate whether firms in financial distress are more likely to appoint a CEO with more narcissistic traits. I find some evidence to support this hypothesis. I also examine whether the association between narcissism and future firm performance is affected by the economic conditions of a firm and the visibility of the firm. I find results consistent with firm financial distress increasing a narcissistic CEO’s effect on firm performance in low-visibility firms.
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Mäkinen, Mikko. "Essays on stock option schemes and CEO compensation /." Helsinki : Helsinki School of Economics, 2007. http://aleph.unisg.ch/hsgscan/hm00180229.pdf.
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Monteiro, Suse Filipa dos Santos. "Caracteristicas individuais do CEO e Turnover." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/12439.
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Mestrado em Contabilidade, Fiscalidade e Finanças EmpresariaisO objetivo do presente estudo é a identificação dos fatores determinantes do turnover dos CEOs (Chief Executive Officers), focando nas suas características individuais, como idade, tempo de permanência no cargo, dualidade e género, tendo sido estas as variáveis analisadas. A análise foi efetuada para um período compreendido entre os anos 2000 e 2012, sendo a amostra do estudo composta por 2.508 CEOs pertencentes a 1.552 empresas cotadas europeias. Para a análise estatística destes dados usaram-se modelos de regressão logística, tendo-se concluído que as características individuais dos CEOs são efetivamente determinantes relevantes do seu turnover. De acordo com os resultados, são os CEOs mais velhos, com menor tempo de permanência no cargo, não sendo presidentes do conselho de administração, assim como os CEOs femininos, aqueles que têm maior propensão para o turnover.
This paper aims to identify the factors that determine CEO's (Chief Executive Officers) turnover, focusing on their individual characteristics such as age, tenure, duality and gender, that were the variables analyzed. The study covers the period between 2000 and 2012, covering 1.552 European listed companies, and 2.508 CEOS. Using a logistic regression models, the results show that the individual characteristics of the CEOs are in fact determinant for their turnover. According to the results the older CEOs, with shorter tenure, that are not presidents of the board, as well as the female CEOs, are the ones that are more likely to turnover.
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Tran, Quan. "A study of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in Vietnam : the link between firm performance and CEO turnover." Thesis, Cardiff Metropolitan University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10369/6412.
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In general, CEO turnover has been researched widely following numerous studies in developed countries. Nevertheless, the determinants of CEO turnover are still unclear in transition countries of which the legal and regulatory framework are weak and financial systems and corporate governance are underdeveloped. Therefore, examining determinants of CEO turnover in Vietnam, a transition country, helps to provide more evidence on the efficiency and effectiveness of corporate governance in transition countries. Furthermore, the examination helps to define weaknesses, and it, therefore, could provide guidance to improve corporate governance in Vietnamese enterprises. Particularly, the thesis investigates the CEO turnover in Vietnam following the research philosophy of positivism paradigms and deductive approach. Further, it implied logistics regression in order to evaluate the influences of factors on CEO turnover in Vietnamese-listed enterprises. The sample of the thesis, including 156 listed firms at the end of 2006 in Hanoi and HoChiMinh Securities Centres, 780 firm-year observations have been conducted. Among 780 observations, there are 88 CEO turnovers occurred during the observed period from 2006 to 2010. The main findings of the thesis show that firm performance had significant inverse relationship with the likelihood of CEO turnover. Meanwhile, the influence of ownership structure on CEO turnover was insignificant. Interestingly, aged CEOs in Vietnamese-listed enterprises were more likely to be dismissed than young CEOs. Additionally, the probability of CEO turnover significantly increased when CEOs reached the ages of 59-61. The certain age also reduced the influence of CEO duality on CEO turnover. Together, CEO ownership negatively influenced the sensitivities of the link between firm performance and CEO turnover, although the influence is insignificant when CEOs own less than 5% of firm shares. Importantly, the thesis provides the significant and positive relationship between the percentage of independent directors and CEO turnover. Based on those findings, the thesis concludes that the efficiency of corporate governance and effectiveness of management are able to improve by increasing the independence of the Board of Management rather than other factors.
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Bouvier, Anthony. "The Effect of Age upon CEO Compensation: A Cross-Industry Study." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2010. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/11.
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The compensation of CEO’s has been at the forefront of the public’s mind for the past few years. During the recession, one could not go a day without hearing about the atrocious salaries and bonuses that executives were being paid. Although it only recently became an explosive topic, academics have been researching all aspects of compensation for many years. One of the earliest looked at the idea of pay for performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990), and the field has taken off from there. Many studies have been done on the determinants of compensation, and I was interested in how age relates to compensation. I created a model for determining compensation, but also took it one step further and looked at the compensation structure across different industries as well. I found that age did indeed influence compensation levels, but that it only had some effect on pay structure and only in certain industries.
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Wang, Lingling. "CEO employment history and risk-taking in firm policies." unrestricted, 2009. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-04292009-150418/.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2009.Title from file title page. Harley E. Ryan, committee chair; Conrad Ciccotello, Omesh Kini, Jayant Kale, committee members. Description based on contents viewed July 1, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 72-74).
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Wang, Hui. "CEO leadership attributes and organizational effectiveness : the role of situational uncertainty and organizational culture /." View Abstract or Full-Text, 2002. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?MGTO%202002%20WANG.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2002.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-122). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.
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Chen, Huirong. "Board characteristics, ownership structure and executive remuneration in China." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2006. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/54091/.
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This thesis not only contributes to the literature on corporate governance, but also has important implications and recommendations for policy makers and corporate practitioners in transitional economic and political contexts.
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Tariq, Usman. "CEO Compensation : Relationship with Performance and Influence of Board of Directors." Thesis, Gotland University, School of the Humanities and Social Science, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hgo:diva-644.
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This paper tries to find the relationship between the compensation given to the chief executive officer and the performance of the company. Further, it tries to determine the influence of the size of the Board members on the pay scale of the executive. The data consisted of the largest thirty companies in Sweden for the period of 2004-2008. After controlling for firm size and growth opportunities, I find a negative and insignificant relationship between pay and performance. Contradictory to previous studies no correlation between large board size and chief executive officers compensation was found. This paper adds more empirical evidence to the idea of chief executives pay being independent of his performance.
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Roberts, Helen, and n/a. "Executive compensation in New Zealand : 1997-2002." University of Otago. Department of Finance and Quantitative Analysis, 2007. http://adt.otago.ac.nz./public/adt-NZDU20070803.113949.
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This study investigates the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, the asymmetric nature of pay-performance sensitivity, and the effect of CEO participation on the pay-setting process, for publicly-listed New Zealand firms during 1997 to 2002. The research is conducted using a unique hand-collected panel data set containing information about executive compensation, firm performance, ownership, firm governance and CEO participation in the pay-setting process. The sample covers the six-year period following the introduction of mandatory disclosure requirements that were imposed on executive and director compensation in 1997.
An initial descriptive analysis of the data reveals a large pay difference between worker and CEO pay. In addition, pay-performance indexes for the highest and lowest paid CEOs document differences between the change in pay relative to real shareholder returns. An examination of the sensitivity between growth in CEO pay, and contemporaneous and lagged firm performance using a firm fixed-effects model, shows that not only is pay significantly related to firm size and performance but also board size, compensation risk and director share ownership.
Models of the relationship between growth in CEO compensation and firm performance indicate the pay-performance sensitivity generated by cash and the change in the value of stock option holdings is reported to be three-times the magnitude of the sensitivity due to salary and bonus payments alone. In addition, growth in CEO compensation is asymmetrically related to changes in firm performance. CEO cash compensation is positively related to increases in firm value only. Total compensation is related to contemporaneous returns and positive lagged returns. Change in CEO wealth is positively related to contemporaneous returns but is more sensitive to losses. However, change in wealth also increases when lagged returns are positive and negative, implying that CEOs are able to extract pay in excess of that which is optimal under the contracting view of executive compensation.
Furthermore, firms in which CEOs demonstrate a low level of participation in the pay-setting process earn higher levels of pay, which also grows at significantly greater rates than their high-participation counterparts. In particular, growth in low-participation wealth is more sensitive to positive and negative contemporaneous returns as well as being negatively related to negative lagged excess returns. This finding is opposite to theoretical predictions and can be explained by the tightly held nature of the high-participation firms which typically have fewer directors, are exposed to higher return volatility and have greater director and CEO beneficial share ownership.
Consistent with the trickle-down effect, there is a positive relationship between growth in the non-performance related cash compensation awarded to CEOs and the growth in pay earned by their executive directors and employees. In addition, growth in non-CEO executive pay is not related to firm performance when there is an overpayment effect and CEOs exercise a high level of participation in the pay-setting process. Consistent with the contracting view, growth in non-CEO executive pay is positively related to firm performance with no benefits from CEO overpayments when stock option awards are included in the CEO pay contract.
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Siagian, Ferdinand Tumindi. "Earnings manipulation and the association between CEO bonus and accounting earnings /." view abstract or download file of text, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3061966.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 58-59). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Almeida, Ana Margarida Martins de. "When do startups hire a CEO?" Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/13235.
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Mestrado em FinançasEste estudo avalia os fatores que levam um fundador a contratar um Director Geral (Gestor Profissional) para a sua empresa. A literatura anterior tem vindo a estudar os Directores Gerais e as startups separadamente, sendo o tema de estudo ignorado. Pretendemos contribuir para a literatura ao pesquisar em que momento as startups decidem contratar um Gestor Profissional e as transformações que daí ocorrerão. A revisão da literatura refere: se as startups contratam ou não um Gestor Profissional, quais os determinantes para o contratar e, por fim, quais as características de um Gestor Profissional. Para esclarecer esta investigação, utilizamos dados recolhidos através de uma entrevista semi-estruturada e complementa-mo-la com fontes secundárias. A nossa amostra inclui startups incubadas na região de Lisboa, que contrataram um Gestor Profissional ou que permaneceram com os fundadores iniciais no papel de CEO (Gestor Fundador). A nossa principal conclusão indica que o Gestor Fundador tem habilidades de liderança incomparáveis e ao ser crucial na vida de uma startup, a longo prazo, as empresas geralmente permanecem com estes no papel de Director Geral.
This study evaluates the factors that drive a founder to hire a Chief Executive Officer (Professional CEO) for its start-up. Previous literature have studied CEOs and start-ups, separately, being the study topic itself ignored. We aim to contribute to the literature by researching in which moment the startups decide to hire a Professional CEO and the transformations that from there will occur. The literature review refers to: startups hire or not a Professional-CEO, which are the determinants to hire him/her and finally, which are the characteristics of a Professional-CEO. To enlighten this investigation, we use data collected through a semi-structured interview and complement it with secondary sources. Our sample includes startups incubated in the region of Lisbon, which hired a Professional CEO or remained with the initial founders in the role of CEO (Founder-CEO). Our major findings indicate that as Founder-CEO have unmatched leadership skills and are crucial in the life of a startup, in the long-term, the ventures usually remain with them in the role of Chief Executive Officers.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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Xu, Xiumin. "The association between CEO compensation structure and firm decision." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2003. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/475.
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Sandahl, Carl, and Fredrik Tinglöf. "The purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations : A qualitative study of CEO compensation in sports organisations from both a board perspective and a CEO perspective." Thesis, Jönköping University, Internationella Handelshögskolan, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-52731.
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Background: CEO compensation as a phenomenon is a well explored topic in both forprofit and non-profit organisations but limited research is made on sports organisations. Due to the important social role that sports organisations entails, one can argue for the need to investigate the purpose of CEO compensation in these organisations as well. Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to explore the purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations. The purpose of executive compensation will further be studied from both a CEO perspective as well as from the board perspective. Method: This thesis has an abductive research approach and proceeds from previous theories within corporate governance to investigate the purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations. The empirical part consists of a qualitative interview study to investigate if previous theories are applicable to explain the purpose of CEO compensation in these organisations or if there exists other, unexplored purposes. ii Findings: The findings of the study suggests that the view on the purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations is different from the board perspective and the CEO perspective. From the board perspective, the purpose appears to be to control the behaviour of the CEO, to gain organisational legitimacy, to make the organisation more business-oriented and to attract individuals with shared interests. On the other hand, from the CEO perspective, the purposes appear to be to increase the motivation and to attain individual legitimacy.
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Bartlett, Jessica. "A Compensation Comparison: Determinants of Compensation for Chief Executive Officers and University Presidents." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/525.
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The compensation of chief executive officers has long been an alluring and controversial topic, especially in light of the rapid rise in CEO earnings over the past several decades, which has provoked discussion on the manner in which CEOs are monetarily rewarded. Recently, university presidents have joined company CEOs in the public spotlight, as increasing levels of compensation for college presidents have also sparked scrutiny and debate. This paper examines the determinants behind CEO compensation and investigates the extent to which insights on these factors compare to the compensation determinants of chief executives at universities. Ultimately, this study finds similarities between the determinants of compensation for these two executive groups, specifically in the significance of organization size, type, and performance, as well as personal executive characteristics such as gender and tenure. The findings therefore suggest that these executives have similar job responsibilities, and the results also possess important insights and applications to relevant issues regarding executive compensation.
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Noguera, Magdy Carolina. "CEO incentive-based compensation and REIT performance." Diss., Mississippi State : Mississippi State University, 2007. http://sun.library.msstate.edu/ETD-db/ETD-browse/browse.
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Rosser, Manda Hays. "Chief executive officers: their mentoring relationships." Texas A&M University, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/1474.
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The majority of mentoring research has explored mentoring from the vantage
point of protégé perceptions, reactions, experiences, and development (Wanberg et al.
2003; Kram, 1988). Participants in mentoring studies have commonly been employees,
college students, or mid-level managers. Little is known regarding the impact of
mentoring roles in relation to top executives who are, over the span of their careers,
likely to participate in developmental relationships as both mentor and protégé. In fact,
accessing people who are active CEOs has been extremely problematic for a majority of
interested researchers (Thomas, 1995). Limited research on mentoring and especially
that on CEOs is used to inform the current Human Resource Development (HRD)
scholarship and practice. The current study will inform HRD and provide insight into
how mentoring relationships can be used to develop individuals in organizations.
Key findings from this study were reported from a qualitative study (Moustakas,
1994) involving twelve CEOs of large for-profit US corporations who detailed their
experiences as both mentors and protégés. Emerging themes from the larger study
overlap, in part, with key mentoring functions as identified by Kram (1988). In addition
to reinforcing and informing the work of Kram (1988), key CEOs provided insight
regarding their experiences in long-term (several years or more) mentoring relationships.
The combined themes resulted in a framework demonstrating the development of
mentoring relationships.
In addition to a general discussion of a mentoring framework, I focused the study
primarily on CEO perceptions regarding the impact of their mentoring related
experiences on 1) how their mentors have impacted their development; 2) how they
mentor others; and 3) the relational elements in mentoring relationships. Because a
rarely assessed population was studied, scholars and practitioners in HRD will gain a
unique understanding and greater insight into how mentoring relationships develop
professionals, particularly CEOs.
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Quartin, Rosana Inês Hipólito. "The impact of SFAS 123R on CEO equity compensation." Master's thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/9644.
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and EconomicsIn December of 2004, FASB released SFAS 123R, mandating the expensing of executive stock options. This paper studies the changes that occurred in CEO equity compensation in the period of 2000 to 2006. Complementary, I analyze the relevance of performance conditions in this form of compensation. There are two main findings: (i) in the post-SFAS 123R period executive stock options determinants become different (ii) the use of performance equity grants contributes to the decrease of traditional stock options, since the use of these type of grants has a statistically impact in the decrease of traditional stock options grants between 2006 and 2003. There are also two side-results: (i) before SFAS 123R stock options drivers were explaining CEO total compensation, in the post-rule period total compensation drivers became less similar to stock options ones (ii) there is a significant difference between stock options and restricted stock drivers, that persist even after SFAS 123R be introduced.
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Govender, Ashley. "The extent to which CEO risk appetite influences company performance." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/29677.
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The crucial decisions that impact the performance of an organisation are usually taken by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). However, little is known about the impact that a CEO's risk appetite has on the decision making processes and its ultimate impact on company performance. A greater understanding of the relationship between CEO risk appetite and organisational performance will facilitate the improvement of strategy formulation for the purpose of managing risk appetite at an executive level.A qualitative exploration into the factors that have been acknowledged as contributory aspects in the development of executive risk appetites highlighted the aspects which had the greatest association to the formation of CEO risk appetite. These aspects were utilised in the formation of an interview schedule that evaluated the perceptions of seven CEOs regarding their risk appetite preferences.Using the findings of the CEO interviews, a model was formulated to quantify CEO risk appetite and test its relationship with company performance, which had been calculated via a quantitative analysis of company financial records.The findings of the analysis into the relationship between CEO risk appetite and company performance indicated a positive linear relationship between the two variables. The research findings regarding the factors contributing to CEO risk appetite also proved consistent with the majority of the literature on the subject.The implication of the findings for South African organisations will be an improved understanding of the relationship between CEO risk appetite and organisational performance and the ability to develop strategy around managing this relationship.Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012.
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
unrestricted
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Voulgaris, Georgios. "Essays on executive pay." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2011. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/essays-on-executive-pay(87065b51-30b2-412a-bbb2-cdd413d0b2a1).html.
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The aim of this thesis is to investigate the effect of two specific external, to the principal-agent relationship, influences on executive pay practices in the UK, namely pay consultants and the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, I examine the role of pay consultants in UK CEO pay practices. The results illustrate that their role is not consistent with the predictions of the managerial power theory. More specifically, pay consultants do not try to help managers towards the expropriation of shareholders' wealth; on the contrary I show strong indications that pay consultants urge firms towards the adoption of more incentive based CEO compensation. Moreover, I report that economic characteristics (e.g. firm size, complexity of the contract) rather than CEO power explain the firm's choice to hire a compensation consultant. These results are robust to selection bias controls. The results of this essay indicate that pay consultants play a less "sinister" role than what the managerial power theory suggests and that their advice and expertise can assist firms design an optimal executive pay contract. In the second essay, I examine the existence of managerial opportunism at the switch from UK GAAP to IFRS. I find strong indications that the restatements from UK GAAP to IFRS have not been manipulated by managers. I examine the existence of such behaviour under different specifications and for different types of CEOs that one would expect to engage in opportunistic behaviour to maximise the expected personal wealth. The research design that I adopt makes the results less prone to methodological issues common in studies in this area. Positive Accounting Theory literature has established that managerial opportunism seriously affects accounting choice. The results of this essay imply that with respect to IFRS restatements, where managers had strong incentives to manage future earnings, I find no signs of manipulation. This essay thus puts into question the Positive Accounting Theory Paradigm. In the third essay, I examine the effect of IFRS on the use of performance measures for evaluating and rewarding managers. This essay illustrates that firms make less use of accounting based performance measures due to the introduction of IFRS. I explain these results based on the predictions of optimal contacting theory. I claim that IFRS adds unnecessary "noise" to accounting numbers not relevant to the managers' actions. This is mainly due to the adoption of "fair value" accounting, which makes accounting earnings more value relevant and therefore useful for firm valuation purposes; however, "fair value" accounting also makes accounting numbers more volatile and sensitive to market movements. If this increase in volatility is related to events outside the managers' control, this makes the use of accounting based performance measures less useful for evaluating and rewarding managers. The results of this essay imply that IFRS might have made accounting earnings more useful for stock market purposes, e.g. firm valuation, but this has happened at the expense of other purposes that accounting serves, e.g. contracting.
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Alexander, David. "THE IMPACT OF THREE BOARD CHARACTERISTICS, MODERATED BY CEO ATTRIBUTES, ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT." NSUWorks, 2010. http://nsuworks.nova.edu/hsbe_etd/7.
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Earnings management has had consequence in financial disasters, such as Enron, WorldCom and Nortel. More recently, it is alleged in the Lehman bankruptcy, which ushered in a global financial meltdown. Yet despite increased regulation and focus on governance and auditing, researchers find that earnings management remains a common practice.
Accounting academics have responded to the earnings management problem by conducting studies using secondary data for governance variables and financial models to measure earnings management indirectly. Meanwhile, governance variables measured with secondary data now show little variability because of improved best practice and regulation, and there is strong evidence that the agency causal model and the earnings management measures are seriously flawed. This study uses a mixed-mode research model based on agency and stewardship theory to explain earnings management, and uses a more direct measure of its occurrence, namely the level of board information asymmetries and board monitoring and control actions, as a proxy for earnings management. Primary data is used to provide direct measures of important governance variables, which produce mixed results relative to earnings management using secondary data.
In a survey of 245 Canadian public company directors, this study finds that an independent chair, less busy directors, and a smaller board does reduce earnings management, but that this impact is strongly moderated by the CEO's attributes. A CEO with stewardship attributes reduces earnings management, and a CEO with agency attributes increases earnings management. There also is evidence in the study that agency conflict variables improve governance outcomes, in this case, reducing the level of earnings management, and that board processes around monitoring and control actions could be a problem.
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Weber, Catherine Krueger. "The impact of CEO option grants on firm value: determinants of the effectiveness of option grants." Texas A&M University, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/5011.
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The significance of stock options as a component of executive compensation
has fluctuated dramatically over the past decade. The purpose of this study is to investigate
determinants of the effectiveness of stock option grants. These option grants are
considered to be effective if they accomplish their intended role of enhancing firm
value by inducing risk-taking behavior.
Using data from 2,349 firms that granted stock options to their Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) between 1992 and 2001, the relationship between the options granted
and subsequent firm value was examined. This study found no universal positive association
between option grants and firm value. However, CEO incentive equilibrium,
defined as stability in the CEOâÂÂs stock and option portfolio sensitivity to stock price,
was found to influence the association between stock option grants and firm value. The
positive association between grants and firm value was evidenced for the sub-sample
of firms that demonstrate disequilibrium in CEO incentives. This was not the case,
however, for the CEO incentive equilibrium sub-sample. This finding indicates that the positive valuation impact of stock option grants is highest for those firms that demonstrate
a trend of increasing CEO portfolio sensitivity to stock price.
High CEO portfolio sensitivity to equity risk was not found to interact with
grant sensitivity to equity risk in a manner that reduces firm value. Thus, this study did
not find support for the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, grants further reduce CEO diversification,
and interact with portfolio sensitivity to reduce incentives for risk-taking.
Consistent with Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991), however, a high level of uncorrelated
wealth is found to interact with grant sensitivity to equity risk so as to increase
the positive impact of grant sensitivity on firm value.
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Chen, Jing. "Executive compensation, managerial ownership and board characteristics in Chinese listed companies." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2009. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/55863/.
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Empirical research on executive compensation in China is very small compared to western countries, despite the fact that China is already the largest emerging economy. Moreover, most studies on executive compensation in China focus on the agency theory model and have produced mixed results. Little research on executive compensation has been done using alternative perspectives. This thesis explores management incentive issues by examining executive compensation in Chinese listed companies from three under-researched perspectives: the managerial power model, tournament model and simultaneous model. All three models have been adapted to the Chinese context. The managerial power model tests executive compensation from the managerial power perspective. A new power dimension - political power - is added to Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia's (2002) managerial power model in order to test the political influence on executive compensation in Chinese listed companies. The research findings support the hypothesis that political duality, which refers to Chairman/Party Secretary duality, is positively related to executive compensation in Chinese listed companies. The tournament model examines the organizational incentive structures. It studies the pay differences between organizational levels instead of studying the absolute level of pay, which provides an alternative incentive design other than the pay for performance mechanism. It is found that government ownership can weaken the tournament incentive in Chinese listed companies. Finally, the endogenous nature of executive compensation has been largely neglected by previous studies. This study contributes to the literature by examining executive compensation, managerial ownership, board characteristics and firm value in Chinese listed companies in a simultaneous model. The research findings show that executive compensation, managerial ownership and board characteristics are jointly determined in Chinese listed companies. Specifically, small boards help to control Highest Paid Director (HPD) compensation, to align the interests between HPD and the company and to increase firm value. Independent directors also help to align the interest between the HPD and the company and to increase firm value. Political duality (Chairman/Party Secretary duality) fails to control HPD compensation but it helps to control board size.
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Erickson, Merideth McCallick. "Executive Director Experiences with Consumer Operated Service Provider Governing Board Members." ScholarWorks, 2017. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/3441.
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Consumer Operated Service Providers (COSPs) are programs that are directed and administratively controlled by mental health consumers for their peers. As such, many mental health consumers have been placed in the position of serving on a COSP and often with unclear descriptions and no training. As a result, there is often a disconnect between the will of the board and the vision of the executive director, leading to tension and the possibility of failed mission. Using servant leadership as the guide, the goal of this case study was to explore the experiences of executive directors who operate Consumer Operated Service Providers (COSPs) in Texas that specialize in mental health recovery support services to better understand how they work with mental health consumers serving as their governing board members. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 7 executive directors of COSPs in Texas. Interview data were inductively coded, then subjected to a thematic analysis procedure. Findings revealed that the concept of servant leadership is commonly used to empower board members and create healthy working relationships between boards and executive directors, particularly around the area of motivating board members to engage with the organization. It was also revealed that the existence of COSPs, in conjunction with traditional governing boards, provides a good balance and perspective relative to strategic planning activities and fundraising. Positive social change implications include recommendations to executives of COSPs to more adequately mobilize and train consumer board members in order to achieve organizational goals that often include consumer focused care and treatment for a wide range of mental health issues.
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Imes, Matthew Douglas. "Essays In Executive Incentives." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2019. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/596467.
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Business Administration/FinancePh.D.
My dissertation consists of three chapters which explores various aspects of executive incentives. In the first chapter, I examine the relation between executive equity pay and stock returns. By compensating CEOs and CFOs differently, shareholders can create incentive conflicts between the firms’ top two managers that potentially affects shareholder wealth. On the one hand, incentive conflict potentially benefits shareholders by improving information exchange and establishing checks and balances in decisions made jointly by the CEO and CFO but alternatively, can harm shareholders by increasing risk through impeding the decision-making processes. I examine the relation between CEO-CFO incentive conflict and stock returns. The analysis indicates that an investor who routinely buy firms with the least incentive conflict and shorts firms with the greatest incentive conflict between CEO and CFOs will outperform the market by 475 basis points per year. I investigate whether risk, firm performance, or market inefficiency explain the excess returns and provide evidence that shareholders demand higher returns for bearing risk associated with CEO-CFO incentive similarities. Next, I explore the impact of executive incentives on bondholder wealth through looking at bond yields. Firms compensate managers to maximize shareholder value, yet these same incentives affect bondholder risk. I investigate the relation between executive equity pay and the cost of debt. My findings indicate a “u-shaped” relation between bond yields and equity pay. These results are consistent with the notion that bondholders prefer a moderate amount of executive equity pay and above or below that level, bondholders increase yields to protect their interests. Instrumenting equity pay using CEO heritage, I find support for a curvilinear relation. These findings suggest that moderate levels of equity pay mitigate the agency costs between firm shareholders and bondholders. Finally, I study the affect of board gender diversity on CEO and director compensation. Females occupy only about 12% of director positions on corporate boards. I find that boards with more female’s onboard tend to give CEOs larger fractions of equity in their compensation packages while incentivizing directors with lower fractions of equity pay. This evidence is consistent with the notion that female board members are superior monitors yet also possess greater risk-aversion than male board members.
Temple University--Theses
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Minhat, Marizah. "Three essays on CEO compensation in the UK." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/2300.
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This thesis comprises three studies on CEO compensation in the UK. It specifically examines the role of CEO defined-benefit pensions, compensation consultants and CEO stock options. Firstly, research on the role of executive pensions is still at a stage of infancy due to data difficulties (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). By taking advantage of better disclosure requirements with the introduction of Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (DRRR) in 2002, this thesis examines the determinants and effects of CEO defined-benefit pensions. Consistent with rent extraction hypothesis (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Kalyta and Magnan, 2008), it finds that pensions are largely determined by CEO power over boards of directors. There is no evidence that pensions reduce the agency cost of debt as suggested by Edmans (2008) and Sundaram and Yermack (2007). Instead they increase the agency cost of equity by discouraging CEO risk-taking and reducing pay-performance relationship. Consistent with the argument in Gustman et al. (1994), Ippolito (1991) and Lazear (1990), this thesis also finds that pensions do bond a CEO to the firm she manages. Secondly, because of the lack of disclosure regarding compensation consultants used by companies, the empirical evidence is so far limited on how the practice of employing compensation consultants influences CEO pay. By taking advantage of better disclosure requirements since the publication of the DRRR (2002), this thesis examines the effect of using compensation consultants on CEO pay. Unlike Murphy and Sandino (2008), this thesis finds no evidence that firms use multiple pay consultants to justify or legitimize higher CEO pay. In light of the managerial power theory, this thesis instead finds that pay consultants are more concerned with the risk of losing business with their client firms. This latter finding explains why the use of pay consultants is associated with greater executive pay (see Armstrong, Ittner and Larcker, 2008; Cadman, Carter and Hillegeist, in press; Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2009; Murphy and Sandino, 2008; Voulgaris, Stathopoulos and Walker, 2009). Thirdly, despite the importance of the issue, the existence of a link between the CEO stock options and earnings management is currently understudied in the UK. The UK context is appealing because of two distinctive corporate governance features that limit opportunistic earnings management. These are the absence of CEO duality in general (Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008) and the increased outside director’s membership on boards since the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) (Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2000). By examining earnings management prior to stock option grant and exercise periods, this thesis adds to the study of Kuang (2008) that examines earnings management during stock option vesting periods. Overall, some evidence has been found that earnings are managed downwards prior to stock option grant periods. Consistent with the US-based studies, this thesis finds strong evidence of upward earnings management prior to a stock option exercise period. It shows that the UK’s distinctive governance features have not restrained opportunistic earnings management prior to stock option grants and exercises. In brief, this thesis provides some empirical evidence that the use of two pay components in the CEO pay package, namely, the defined-benefit pensions and stock options, do not necessarily promote CEO-shareholder interest alignment. The use of pay consultants in CEO pay-setting is also fraught with managerial influence. In support of the managerial power theory, I therefore suggest that these three factors can be abused by CEOs to extract excess compensation at the expense of shareholders. In this context, these three factors can themselves be considered as the sources of the agency cost. Future research might examine the mechanisms that can be deployed to govern the use of defined-benefit pensions, stock options and pay consultants in CEO pay design.
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Lahlou, Ismail. "Corporate board of directors : structure and efficiency." Thesis, Rennes 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014REN1G022.
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Cette thèse a pour objectif principal d’apporter une contribution à la littérature concernant la structure et l’efficacité du conseil d’administration (CA). Elle s’articule autour de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre est une revue de la littérature, tandis que les trois autres portent sur des questions de recherche distinctes. La première étude présentée dans le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier les déterminants de la taille du CA, de l'indépendance de ses membres et de la dualité des fonctions de direction et de présidence du CA. Les principaux apports de cette étude peuvent être résumés comme suit : tout d'abord, nos résultats sont fondés sur l'analyse d'un des plus grands échantillons utilisés dans ce domaine, avec à peu près 16000 observations (entreprises-années) pour près de 2300 entreprises américaines observées de 1997 à 2010. De plus, sur le plan méthodologique, une batterie de tests statistiques a été réalisée afin de vérifier la robustesse de nos résultats, notamment des tests tenant compte des biais d'hétérogénéité et de simultanéité. Enfin, cette étude est probablement la première à démontrer que le passage de la loi SOX a limité la capacité des dirigeants à influencer la composition du CA. La deuxième étude s’attache à analyser les deux principales fonctions du CA, qui sont le conseil au chef d'entreprise et le contrôle de ses activités. Ainsi, comprendre la capacité du CA à remplir ces fonctions est une question fondamentale que nous nous proposons d’approfondir. Cette étude vient enrichir la littérature émergente sur la fonction consultative du CA en fournissant de nouveaux éléments de preuves sur l'importance de cette fonction dans la création de valeur de l'entreprise. Ces résultats apportent également des éclairages sur le conflit potentiel existant entre les deux principales fonctions du CA. Enfin, cette étude s'inscrit dans le courant de pensée qui cherche à évaluer l'impact des caractéristiques des entreprises sur l'efficacité de leurs structures de gouvernance. Le principal objectif de la troisième étude présentée dans le dernier chapitre de cette thèse est de déterminer si la rémunération à base d’actions des administrateurs peut affecter les décisions futures en matière d'acquisition, et le cas échéant, comment. Les résultats de cette étude apportent un nouvel éclairage concernant la rémunération des administrateurs. Cette étude met en exergue l'importance des pratiques de rémunération incitative sous forme d’actions et d’options pour les membres du CA. Par ailleurs, bien que de nombreuses études aient été réalisées afin d'analyser la relation existante entre les mesures incitatives à destination des administrateurs et la performance de l'entreprise, notre étude est l'une des premières à explorer les mécanismes à travers lesquels ces mesures peuvent influencer la valeur de l'entrepriseThis thesis aims at providing contributions to the existing literature on the structure and effectiveness of corporate boards. It comprises three essays that address distinct research questions. The first study examines the trends and determinants of corporate board structure using a panel data sample. This study extends the existing literature on the determinants of board structure in three important ways. First, our results are based on one of the largest samples used in this area, with almost 16,000 firm-year observations for nearly 2,300 firms observed from 1997 to 2010. Second, in terms of methodology, a set of statistical tests was performed in order to check the robustness of our findings, including tests that account for heterogeneity and simultaneity. Finally, this is probably the first study to show that the enactment of SOX has reduced the ability of CEOs in influencing board composition. Specifically, while SOX does not fundamentally alter the economic determinants of board structure, our results show that the documented negative impact of well performing CEOs on board independence in the pre-SOX era is no longer significant post-SOX. In the second study, the principal objective is to investigate the effects of advisory directors' presence on the board and monitoring intensity on the board's overall effectiveness in value creation. This study makes some significant contributions to the literature. First, it complements and extends the growing literature on the board's advisory function by providing strong new evidence on the importance of this board function in value creation. Second, it also provides some evidence on the potential conflict between the two primary functions of corporate boards. Finally, this study adds to the literature that attempts to assess the impact of firm and industry characteristics on the effectiveness of specific governance structures. The last study has as main objective to examine the relation between director compensation structure and shareholder interests in the context of acquisitions. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the recent but burgeoning literature that deals with the determinants of director compensation. Guided by theoretical work in this area, we show that director compensation is mainly consistent with firm's needs for monitoring and advising. Second, we extend the body of research that highlights the importance of equity-based compensation by providing evidence that the use of incentive-based compensation schemes to reward directors also matters. Finally, although many studies have examined the relation between directors' incentives and firm performance, this work is one of the first to examine the channels through which directors' equity-based pay affects shareholders' value
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Uygur, Ozge. "CEO POLITICAL DONATIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2010. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/100132.
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Business Administration/FinancePh.D.
This dissertation studies the association between CEO ability and various aspects of corporate governance, specifically firm performance, executive compensation contracts and firm opacity. In the first essay of this dissertation (Chapter 2), I examine the effect of CEO ability on firm performance. My analysis uses a unique instrument of CEO ability that is based on a CEO's commitment decisions in US presidential elections. Intuitively, CEO ability is measured based on how well they forecast US presidential elections, one year prior to the race, relative to the candidates expected chances of winning. I find that this instrument of CEO ability is positively related to firm performance. Interestingly, I find that high ability CEOs have a greater impact on Tobin's q in small firms than in large firms. Yet, high ability CEOs have the greatest dollar impact on shareholder value in large firms. In addition, CEO ability appears to be quite important to outside shareholders in high growth firms. Lastly, I find that CEO ability is positively associated to merger announcement returns, which implies that higher ability CEOs engage in value-creating merger activities. The results are robust to industry and time controls, as well as various tests that consider an alternative explanation focusing on political influence. The second essay (Chapter 3) explores the effect of CEO ability on the structure and level of compensation contracts. I find that CEO ability is positively associated with total compensation level. CEOs in the highest quartile of the ability proxy earn almost $2.2 million more than CEOs in the lowest quartile of CEO ability. Further analysis indicates that CEO compensation structure differs markedly between the highest and lowest ability CEOs. Specifically, I find that the high ability CEOs receive 2.1% more stock based incentives than low ability CEOs. Thus, the low ability CEOs receive more of their pay in the form of cash compensation than do high ability CEOs. Further tests indicate that high ability CEOs have significantly greater variance in their pay than low ability CEOs, specifically due to the higher variance in stock based incentives. Overall, I provide evidence that CEO pay is associated with CEO ability and that CEO ability appears a key issue in designing CEO compensation contracts. In the third essay (Chapter 4), I examine whether CEO ability is related to corporate opacity. I argue that high-ability CEOs may seek to create greater transparency to convey their ability to the market. Simultaneously, low-ability CEOs may be signal-jamming the market's inferences about their talent by limiting the available information. An alternative aspect is that the results are driven by low-ability CEOs who seek to work in opaque firms. My analysis indicates that firms with high-ability CEOs are significantly less opaque than firms with low-ability CEOs. These findings are also robust to using a propensity score matched sample. Finally, I show that the deteriorating impact of corporate opacity on firm performance decreases when the decision belongs to a high-ability CEO, suggesting that opacity is not necessarily value-destructing decision for corporations. Overall, my analysis suggests that CEO ability is an important factor for corporate opacity.
Temple University--Theses
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Lam, Henry G. "Board composition and financial performance of Hong Kong listed property companies." Thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.13/939766.
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Professional Doctorate - Doctor of Business Administration (DBA)In the last decade, the global financial crisis, triggered by bankruptcy of poorly governed companies such as Enron, AIG, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch led the U.S. and other nations including Hong Kong to introduce stricter corporate governance rules and regulations in order to protect the interests of stakeholders. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing (HKEX) Main Board Listing Rules Appendix 14, issues a number of changes to Code of corporate governance in January 2005, covering five major areas. The main area that attracts the most attention from people is the number of Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs) in the new Code of corporate governance practices (HKEX, 2005). This Code takes into consideration the latest development in corporate governance, and is benchmarked against the revised UK Combined Code. In Hong Kong, prior to 1st January 2005, the Code of corporate governance on board composition only requires a listed company to have at least two Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs). However, with effect from 1st January 2005, the new Code of corporate governance requires a balanced composition of INEDs and Non-INEDs so that there is a strong and effective leadership. As a result, the new Code requires listed companies to include at least three INEDs or one-third INEDs on the board. Furthermore, the roles of Chairman and CEO should be separate and should not be performed by the same individual (HKEX, 2005). One of the driving factors, which forces Hong Kong to adopt a new Code is that poor corporate governance weakens a company’s financial performance and causes financial difficulties and even fraud (OECD, 2004b). It is widely believed that good corporate governance adds value to a company. A good corporate governance practice is a necessary condition but not a pre-condition to better financial performance. Since board composition plays a vital role in corporate governance (Brennan, 2006), the aim of this study is to answer two major questions: Does board composition affect financial performance in Hong Kong listed companies? The general view is that corporate governance in Hong Kong is easy to comply with, just like another “box ticking” exercise to check compliance simply to meet the regulators’ requirement. This leads to the second question of the study: Does compliance with the Code of corporate governance on board composition improve financial performance of Hong Kong listed companies? These two questions are addressed by using a sample of Hong Kong listed property companies on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The study examines: (a) the correlation between board composition and financial performance in Hong Kong listed property companies; and (b) the correlation between compliance with the Code of corporate governance on board composition and financial performance in Hong Kong listed property companies. The board composition in this study includes four key elements: board size, percentage of INEDs on the board, CEO-duality and percentage of women on the board. The sample consists of 66 out of a total of 108 Hong Kong listed companies under the “Properties” industry classification on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK) over the period 1999-2010 (approximately 792 firm years). The results of the study confirm that there is a positive association between board size and financial performance. There is a positive association between the percentage of INEDs on the board and financial performance. There is no association between CEO-duality and financial performance. There is no association between the percentage of women on the board and financial performance. And finally, there is no association between compliance with the Code of corporate governance on board composition and financial performance in Hong Kong listed property companies. In the Hong Kong context, there are a few studies on corporate board practices and corporate governance. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and performance of family-controlled companies in Hong Kong (Ho, 2003). A recent study finds more than 90 percent of the property companies listed on the Main Board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange is under family control (Jordan, 2008). This study extends the literature on board composition and financial performance by providing empirical evidence from Hong Kong listed property companies over the period 1999-2010.