Relevant bibliographies by topics / Executive (CEO and Board)

Academic literature on the topic 'Executive (CEO and Board)'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Executive (CEO and Board)"

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Hitt, Michael, and Katalin Takacs Haynes. "CEO overpayment and underpayment: executives, governance and institutions." Management Research: Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management 16, no. 1 (April 9, 2018): 38–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mrjiam-09-2017-0781.

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Purpose Based on the findings of Aguinis et al. (2018) that only a few executives are properly compensated, the purpose of this paper is to examine potential causes and consequences of CEO overpayment and underpayment. Ineffective compensation of the CEO represents a governance failure by the board of directors. Better understanding the reasons for such failures may help boards to correct their processes and to enact more effective governance. Boards must look beyond the normally constrained focus of agency theory to examine executive characteristics and motivation. Thus, tailoring compensation plans and governance to the executive and organizational context requires attention to a broader set of theoretical notions. Design/methodology/approach Using the Aguinis et al. (2018) work, this paper conceptually identifies and explains the causes and consequences of CEO overpayment and underpayment along with their implications for governance and future research. Findings This paper identifies potential reasons for CEO overpayment and underpayment. For example, in addition to poor hiring decisions and inadequately designed compensation plans, CEO overpayment can occur because of executive hubris and greed. Alternatively, CEO underpayment may occur because of a poorly designed plan, inadequate information about the external labor market and the executive’s interests in non-pecuniary benefits (e.g. socio-emotional wealth, altruism). Without proper monitoring and oversight by the board, firm performance commonly suffers. Originality/value This work extends our understanding of why CEOs may be overpaid (e.g. hubris, greed) and why some executives may accept underpayment (e.g. desire for non-pecuniary benefits from SEW or altruism). This paper explains the consequences of ineffective corporate governance practices that allow inefficient CEO compensation. Finally, this paper explores several contingencies that can affect the governance practices and research needed to enhance our knowledge of this important area.
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Meng, Xiaojing, and Jie Joyce Tian. "Board Expertise and Executive Incentives." Management Science 66, no. 11 (November 2020): 5448–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3355.

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We investigate how board expertise affects chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and firm value. The CEO engages in a sequence of tasks: first acquiring information to evaluate a potential project, then reporting his or her assessment of the project to the board, and finally implementing the project if it is adopted. We demonstrate that the CEO receives higher compensation when the board agrees with the CEO on the assessment of the project. Board expertise leads to (weakly) better investment decisions and helps motivate the CEO's evaluation effort; however, it may induce underreporting and reduce the CEO's incentives to properly implement the project. Consequently, if motivating the CEO to evaluate projects is the major concern (e.g., innovative industries), board expertise exhibits an overall positive effect on firm value; however, if motivating the CEO to implement projects is the major concern (e.g., mature industries), board expertise can harm firm value. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.
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Shin, Taekjin. "The Gender Gap in Executive Compensation." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 639, no. 1 (December 15, 2011): 258–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716211421119.

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While many studies have explored the issue of women’s representation among top management, little is known about the gender gap in compensation among those who reached the top. Using data on 7,711 executives at 831 U.S. firms, this study investigates social-psychological factors that explain the gender gap in executive compensation. Consistent with theories on social identity and demographic similarity effects, the gender gap in executive pay is smaller when a greater number of women sit on the compensation committee of the board, which is the group responsible for setting executive compensation. However, the presence of a female chief executive officer (CEO) is not associated with the compensation of female non-CEO executives working under the female boss. The findings highlight the need to study women’s representation on corporate boards.
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Feng, Nancy Chun, Xiaoting Hao, and Daniel Neely. "Board Chair–CEO Relationship, Board Chair Characteristics, and Nonprofit Executive Compensation." Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs 8, no. 1 (February 14, 2022): 78–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.20899/jpna.8.1.78-95.

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We examine the associations between board chair–CEO relationship, board chair characteristics, and top executive compensation in U.S. nonprofit organizations. Using a sample of 2,153 organization-year observations in our empirical tests, we find a significant positive association between board chair–CEO relationship and top executive compensation. We find that board chair characteristics such as tenure and gender are not significantly associated with top executive compensation. The supplementary analyses suggest that board chair–CEO relationships are positively associated with executive compensation but for only organizations with larger revenues, a bigger board, and a lower change in percentage of program expenses. The findings should be helpful in enhancing the understanding of influencing factors on nonprofit executive compensation.
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Lafuente, Esteban, and Miguel Angel García-Cestona. "Managerial turnover and performance in outside boards: Ownership makes the difference." Tec Empresarial 13, no. 3 (November 4, 2019): 2–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.18845/te.v13i3.4471.

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We examine the relationship between CEO, board and Chairman turnovers and future performance in banks with fully outside boards. Using a rich dataset on executive turnovers from Costa Rica, we find that ownership moderates the effect that control mechanisms have on performance. Our results indicate that executive turnovers followed by the appointment of outside executives (CEO and Chairman) have a positive impact on performance. On the contrary, large board replacements create organisational costs and these negatively affect performance. These results mainly hold for shareholder-oriented banks where managers and owners are more likely to be aligned. Finally, these results underline the importance of examining the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in emerging economies. More detailed information about ownership, legal framework and executive replacements can make a difference when it comes to evaluate the effectiveness of governance mechanisms.
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Petra, Steven T., and Nina T. Dorata. "Corporate governance and chief executive officer compensation." Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society 8, no. 2 (April 11, 2008): 141–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14720700810863779.

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PurposeThis paper aims to examine whether there is an association between the level of performance‐based incentives offered to CEOs and the composition of firms' boards of directors and the compensation committee.Design/methodology/approachUnivariate tests are used to test the relation between the level of performance‐based incentives and corporate governance structures. A logistic regression analysis is used to predict the probability of CEOs receiving low performance‐based incentives when various characteristics of firms' boards of directors and compensation committees exist.FindingsThe authors find the presence of CEO duality reduces the likelihood of lower levels of performance‐based incentives offered to CEOs. Additionally, the authors find CEOs are more likely to receive lower levels of performance‐based incentives when the majority of the compensation committee members serve on less than three other boards, and when the size of the board is less than or equal to nine members.Research limitations/implicationsThis study is limited by the fact that the sample may not be representative of the general population of companies in the US.Practical implicationsShareholders who desire to keep CEO compensation levels low may consider supporting the separation of the positions of CEO and Chairperson of the Board, as well as supporting limiting the number of other boards directors may serve, and reducing or keeping the size of the board to a maximum of nine members.Originality/valueThe authors have documented an association between board structure and CEO compensation. It appears that company boards are able to monitor and control the compensation level offered to CEOs.
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Stone, Debra. "Type Of Board And Sustainability Reporting." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 36, no. 5 (September 1, 2020): 229–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v36i5.10361.

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The research examined the relationship between BODT (board of director type) and CSR (corporate sustainability reporting), annual report disclosure and performance by using a sampling of companies listed on the S&P 500 for 2015. The data came from annual reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Global Reporting Initiative. The study considered the relationship between BODT with emphasis on CEO (Chief Executive officer)-only and non-CEO-only boards and corporate sustainability reporting. Past research has found the CEO-only board relates to lower corporate performance and has seen significant use since the advent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Law that required boards that are more independent. The CEO-only board is an elaboration of an independent board or directors, whose only management member of the board is the CEO. The study used CEO-duality, another powerful influencer of boards, as a theoretical proxy for the CEO-only board. Regulators and investors are demanding higher level CSR reporting and information; therefore, the findings are of interest to both companies considering board of director type and regulators and investors. The quantitative categorical research study found a significant relationship between CEO-only boards and higher levels of disclosure and reporting. No significant relationship between CEO-only board and greater ROA was found. A possible reason for the differences in outcomes between the past research regarding independent boards that did not consider the CEO-only member and CSR reporting and the research presented in this study was the role of the lead independent director as a member of the CEO-only board not considered in this study.
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Nulla, Yusuf Mohammed. "Board influence and CEO power to executive compensation system in American SMEs." Corporate Board role duties and composition 11, no. 2 (2015): 132–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv11i2art11.

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This study investigated the board influence and CEO power towards determining the CEO compensation system in the American SMEs from 2005 to 2010. The quantitative research method was selected for this research study. The forty small to medium-sized companies were selected through a stratified sampling method. The research question for this research study was: what relationship is there between the board influence, CEO power, and CEO cash compensation, in the American SMEs. The results found that, there was a relationship between the board influence, CEO power, and CEO salary. However, the results also found that there was no relationship between the board influence, CEO power, and bonus. The correlations between the board influence, CEO power, CEO salary were characterized as weak, indication of the complexity of the executive compensation factors and external and internal environments surrounding the American SMEs.
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Hao, Qian, Nan Hu, Ling Liu, and Lee J. Yao. "Board interlock networks and the use of relative performance evaluation." International Journal of Accounting & Information Management 22, no. 3 (July 29, 2014): 237–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijaim-06-2013-0039.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore how networks of boards of directors affect relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Design/methodology/approach – In this study, the authors propose that an interlocking network is an important inter-corporate setting, which has a bearing on whether boards decide to use RPE in CEO compensation. They adopt four typical graph measures to depict the centrality/position of each board in the interlock network: degree, betweenness, eigenvector and closeness, and study their impacts on RPE use. Findings – The authors find that firms that have more connected board members and whose board members are connected to better connected firms are more likely to reward their CEOs contingent on their peers’ performance, indicating that information transmission along the board interlock network facilitates the adoption of RPE. This result is robust to alternative measures for board interlock networks and various types of CEO compensation. It highlights the role of interlocking directorates in disseminating information and practice of RPE use along board network. Originality/value – The authors use social network analysis to measure the relationships and flows between the connected nodes and study the impact on executive compensation design.
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Ben Ali, Chiraz, and Frédéric Teulon. "CEO Monitoring and Board Effectiveness: Resolving the CEO Compensation Issue." Management international 21, no. 2 (October 16, 2018): 123–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1052692ar.

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This study examines the impact of board governance mechanisms on the pay of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) using a sample of major French listed companies for the 2009–2011 period. The results show that CEO pay is negatively associated with the presence of a family CEO and positively associated with board size, busy directors, board meetings, and compensation committee independence. We provide further evidence that CEO compensation increases with firm size, and both present and past performance. Our study casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal board attributes in constraining CEO compensation.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Executive (CEO and Board)"

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Toscano, Roberta. "Board members’ attitudes to CEO arrogance." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/23055.

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As a CEO assumes an important role in an organization, his or her personality, with emphasis on arrogance, may affect a multitude of board members’ attitudes. This study gauges the effect of CEO arrogance on board members’ attitudes, which includes the engagement; cohesiveness; collaboration; job satisfaction; consensual decision making and desirability of the CEO. This investigation drew from existing literature that personality traits affect a leaders’ effectiveness in terms of group performance and followers’ satisfaction (Avolio, Gardner, Walumbwa, Luthans&May, 2004). Through experimental design, actual board meetings were simulated and CEO arrogance was manipulated, mainly by adapting the indicators from the Arrogance Scale in the Workplace developed by Johnson et al. (2010). Experiments were conducted in samples of MBA students and senior management consultants of roughly similar demographics. The findings confirmed that CEO arrogance has a detrimental effect on all the board members’ attitude. Arrogance accounted for almost 60 per cent of the board members’ attitudes ratings. This study is confirms that an arrogant CEO negatively affects the board member dynamics which are essential in maintaining an effective board. This urges the organizations to acquire non-arrogant CEOs to improve the organisation’s productivity. Alternatively, an organization can consider alternatives to dilute a CEO’s arrogance.
Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012.
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
unrestricted
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Žilková, Alena. "Corporate Governance." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2009. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-11230.

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Definition and basic theoretic information about Corporate Governance of big industry company Description and Analyse of corporate Management, the functions of Top Management Members, their role in relationship to owners / shareholders (describtion of used tools for internal control of government, investment and tools for financial analyses)
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Ellingson, Dee Ann Hetland. "Board composition and the use of accounting measures : the effect on the relation between CEO compensation and firm performance /." Diss., This resource online, 1996. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-06062008-154716/.

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Markham, James. "CEO entrenchment versus boards of directors performance is not all that matters to turnover /." Access to citation, abstract and download form provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company; downloadable PDF file, 172 p, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1654492691&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=8331&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

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Goldblatt, Dana. "An investigation into the determinants and moderators of women attaining and retaining CEO positions." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2017. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/an-investigation-into-the-determinants-and-moderators-of-women-attaining-and-retaining-ceo-positions(14efa949-3f2d-4b71-bc40-aba358315ea2).html.

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This thesis explores gender-related barriers in CEO successions. Only 4% of Fortune 500 CEOs are female despite the fact that women have held the majority of college degrees in the US since the late 1990's and now comprise almost half of the workforce and the majority of managerial positions. Their representation is low even in comparison to the other two top management positions from which CEOs are typically sourced. It is less than one-third of the percentage of both female executive officers (15%) and board directors (17%). A holistic and qualitative research approach was utilized. Data were gathered on societal, individual and organizational factors through one-on-one, semi-structured interviews with board directors, executive search consultants and female CEOs, and analyzed using computer-assisted coding software. This thesis challenges the perception that women's individual barriers are the main reason why there are so few female CEOs. While all three types of barriers were found, organizational barriers appear to be the most important. The convergence of predominately male board directors, CEOs and top executive search consultants with informal, subjective, secretive and disparate talent management and CEO successions programs effectively results in the CEO position being a better fit for men than women. While moderating factors were beneficial to the women who have become CEOs, many factors were found for why they cannot be relied upon to greatly increase the number of female CEOs. A deliberate and comprehensive effort by society, individuals and organizations is required.
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Bathula, Hanoku. "Board characteristics and firm performance evidence from New Zealand : a thesis submitted to Auckland University of Technology in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), 2008 / Hanoku Bathula." Full thesis Abstract, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10292/376.

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Due to various corporate scandals and failures, there has been a renewed interest on the role of boards in the performance of firms. This thesis examines the relationship between the key board characteristics and firm performance. Unlike most studies on boards which predominantly use only financial variables affecting governance, I take a different approach by combining them with non-financial variables. This combined set of variables is used for theoretical and empirical modelling. Based on the extant literature, I develop a conceptual framework and a set of hypotheses to examine the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance. Board characteristics considered in this research include board size, director ownership, CEO duality, gender diversity, educational qualification of board members and number of board meetings. Additionally, I use board size as a moderating variable to examine how the effect of other board characteristics is contingent on board size. Firm performance is measured by return on assets. I test my hypotheses on a longitudinal sample of 156 firms over a four year period from 2004 to 2007. My sample includes all firms listed on New Zealand stock exchange as on November 2007. Empirical analysis is undertaken using Generalised Least Squares analyses. The findings of the study show that board characteristics such as board size, CEO duality and gender diversity were positively related with firm performance, where as director ownership, board meetings and the number of board members with PhD level education was found to be negatively related. Board size was found to be moderating some of these relationships, indicating the critical role being played by board size in the design and role of corporate boards. The findings also provide partial evidence to different governance theories, further indicating the need for theoretical pluralism to gain insights into boards’ functioning. The study contributes to the understanding of board-performance link by examining both the traditional variables such as board size, CEO duality, and number of board meetings as well as other organisational attributes such as gender diversity and competence variables represented by women and PhD holders, respectively. The theoretical framework and the findings of my thesis are expected to stimulate scholars for further research to identify the contingency conditions upon which the board characteristics and firm performance may be dependent.
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Wang, Yan. "The influence of board of director networks and corporate governance on firm performance and CEO compensation." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/13022.

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This thesis comprises three empirical studies that investigate the effects of director networks and corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance and CEO compensation. The first empirical study (chapter three) describes the extent of board networks among non-financial FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during 2007-2010. We use the concept of the “centrality” from social network analysis to examine whether board networks are related to firm performance. We find that firms whose directors are more central in a network are associated with better financial performance. Consistent with the “Reputation Hypothesis” (Fama and Jensen, 1983), the number of director connections may proxy for director reputation. Directors are motivated to improve their reputation since they can use their directorships to signal to the market that they are good at decision-making, and at providing advice and monitoring management. The second empirical study (chapter four) investigates the effects of director networks on CEO compensation among non-financial FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange between 2007 and 2010, while controlling for CEO characteristics, corporate governance characteristics and firm characteristics. We first examine the impact of CEO networks (individual level) and second board networks (firm level) comprising all board members. We examine not only the total remuneration of the CEO but also two important components of the remuneration package, i.e. basic salary, and long term incentive plans (LTIPs). At the individual level, we find that a well-connected CEO measured by “centrality” receives higher total compensation. Although we find a positive relationship between basic salary and CEO networks, we do not find evidence of a relationship between LTIP compensation and CEO networks. The relationship between board networks and CEO compensation is also examined at the firm level. The results show that board networks have a positive and significant effect on total compensation and LTIP compensation but not on basic salary compensation. The third empirical study (chapter five) examines the effects of directors’ business networks, directors’ social networks and corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. Previous studies have considered only business networks (directorships), while this study explores both business networks and social networks, such as current and past employment, education background, and other types of social activities (membership of golf clubs, membership of charity organizations, universities alumni, etc). We find that well-connected directors seem to use their networks to improve firm performance and in line with the interest of their shareholders. We further split the effects of board networks into business and social networks. We find that social networks play a more important role than business networks in improving firm performance, consistent with social capital theory (Coleman, 1990) which argues that networks of social connections can provide firms with valuable resources and information. Overall, this thesis provides empirical evidence that director networks and corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in affecting CEO remuneration and firm financial performance. The findings of this thesis suggest that regulators, firms and individuals should not only pay attention to business networks but also to social networks.
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Schalka, Beatriz. "Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/9916.

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Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title 'Novo Mercado' refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.
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Al-Ramahi, Fatima, and Ehsan Alkhatib. "Gender diversity and corporate sustainability disclosures in Swedish listed companies : A quantitative study examining female representation on boards and in the CEO role and their effects on corporate sustainability disclosures." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-447593.

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This study investigates the relationship between female representation, women as chief executive officers, and corporate sustainability disclosures in Swedish listed companies. The used data was collected from the Swedish listed companies in Nasdaq Stockholm for the period 2017-2020. The specific research period is due to the new amendments of the Swedish Annual Accounts Act (Årsredovisningslagen) which came into force 2017. To investigate the effect female representation, and women as chief executive officers have on the legally issued corporate sustainability disclosures, this study applies content analysis and quantitative methods. By estimating multiple regression models, the results revealed a non-significant relationship of female representation on the board of directors and of women as chief executive officers, on the quality of corporate sustainability disclosures. For the critical mass of at least three women, a non-significant impact is detected. Lastly, an additional test for reversed causality has been conducted, however no significant relationship was documented.
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Fong, Eric Alan. "Chief executive officer (ceo) responses to ceo compensation equity." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2004. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0004160.

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Books on the topic "Executive (CEO and Board)"

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Bankston, Karen. Optimizing the CEO/board relationship. Madison, WI: Credit Uniton Executives Society, 2006.

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Carver, John. Board assessment of the CEO. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997.

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CEO: Consultant to the board. Chicago: Health Administration Press, 2009.

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Balasubramanian, Bala N. Influence of board diversity and characteristics on CEO compensation: Contingent effects of concentrated ownership. Ahmedabad: Indian Institute of Management, 2015.

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The CEO, the chairman and the board: Trevor Eastwood. Prahran, Vic: Hardie Grant Books, 2009.

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Berenbeim, Ronald. Corporate boards: CEO selection, evaluation and succession. New York, N.Y: Conference Board, 1995.

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Berenbeim, Ronald. Corporate boards: CEO selection, evaluation and succession. New York, NY: Conference Board, 1995.

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Mayhew, Carver Miriam, ed. Evaluating CEO and board performance: A Carver policy governance guide. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2009.

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Kaplan, Steven N. How has CEO turnover changed?: Increasingly performance sensitive boards and increasingly uneasy CEOs. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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Carver, John. The Policy Governance Model and the Role of the Board Member, Evaluating CEO and Board Performance, Volume 5. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2009.

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Book chapters on the topic "Executive (CEO and Board)"

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Kallasvuo, Olli-Pekka. "President, CEO and Group Executive Board Chairman Nokia." In Innovating at the Top, 133–49. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230595248_9.

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Larcker, David F., and Brian Tayan. "CEO Succession Planning." In The Handbook of Board Governance, 141–58. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119245445.ch7.

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García-Ramos, Rebeca, and Belén Díaz Díaz. "Chief Executive Officer (CEO Duality)." In Encyclopedia of Sustainable Management, 1–4. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02006-4_489-1.

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Lawrence, Ian. "The chief executive officer (CEO)." In Football Club Management, 29–41. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, [2018] | Series: Routledge research in football; 4: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315519173-3.

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Lindgren, Ulf. "Chairman and CEO: tandem at the top." In All Above Board, 29–39. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137264268_4.

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Zec, Ronald F., Randolph W. Parks, Janice Gambach, and Sandra Vicari. "The Executive Board System." In Handbook of Head Trauma, 219–30. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0706-6_13.

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B. Nadler, Mark. "CEO Succession : An Owner's Guide for Directors." In The Handbook of Board Governance, 120–40. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119245445.ch6.

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Mohanty, Soumendra, and Sachin Vyas. "Board to CEO: “What’s Your AI Strategy?”." In How to Compete in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 75–90. Berkeley, CA: Apress, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-3808-0_3.

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Obholzer, Anton. "The board, the CEO, and the management." In Workplace Intelligence, 103–4. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429275630-33.

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Wright, Lance. "Coaching the CEO and the Executive Team." In HR in the Boardroom, 141–59. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137450913_8.

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Conference papers on the topic "Executive (CEO and Board)"

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Tjondro, Elisa, Savira Kristiany, and Christy Novelia Sanjaya. "Women on the Executive Board and Woman CEO: Indonesia‘s Financial Firm." In 5th International Conference on Tourism, Economics, Accounting, Management and Social Science (TEAMS 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.201212.053.

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Galavotti, Ilaria, and Carlotta D’Este. "Acquisition propensity in family firms: The multifaceted role of family involvement." In Corporate governance: Theory and practice. Virtus Interpress, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cgtapp17.

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Building on behavioral agency theory, we explore the role played by corporate governance characteristics of family firms in affecting their acquisition propensity. Specifically, we investigate family members’ ownership stake and their appointment to the board of directors as predictors of the likelihood to execute acquisitions. Furthermore, we explore the effect of having a family chief executive officer (CEO) and the generational step. Using a sample of 207 acquisitions executed by 93 Italian listed family firms in the 2014–2020 period, we find evidence that the extent of family ownership does not affect acquisitions propensity. Additionally, while family members on the board are negatively associated with acquisitions, the opposite emerges in case of a family CEO. Finally, the propensity to acquire does not appear to be driven by whether the firm is still in its founding generation or later generations
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Zhang, Long, and Lijun Liu. "The Relationship between CEO-Executive Demographic Dissimilarity and Non-CEO Executive Turnover: The Chinese Case." In 2010 International Conference on E-Product E-Service and E-Entertainment (ICEEE 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iceee.2010.5660773.

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"Executive board." In 2011 IEEE Industry Applications Society Annual Meeting. IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ias.2011.6074478.

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"Executive board." In 2014 IEEE Industry Applications Society Annual Meeting. IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ias.2014.6978509.

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"Executive board." In 2015 IEEE Industry Applications Society Annual Meeting. IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ias.2015.7356957.

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"Executive board members." In 2010 36th Annual Northeast Bioengineering Conference. IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/nebc.2010.5458286.

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"2007 IAS Executive Board." In 2007 IEEE Industry Applications Conference - Forty-Second IAS Annual Meeting. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/07ias.2007.15.

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"IAS 2010 Executive Board." In 2010 IEEE Industry Applications Society Annual Meeting. IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ias.2010.5616780.

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"2005 Society executive board." In Conference Record of the 2005 IEEE Industry Applications Conference Fortieth IAS Annual Meeting. IEEE, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ias.2005.1518772.

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Reports on the topic "Executive (CEO and Board)"

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Graham, John, Hyunseob Kim, and Mark Leary. CEO-Board Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26004.

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Kaplan, Steven, Morten Sorensen, and Anastasia Zakolyukina. What Is CEO Overconfidence? Evidence from Executive Assessments. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27853.

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Rose, Nancy, and Andrea Shepard. Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4723.

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Rose, Nancy, and Catherine Wolfram. Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7842.

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Marshak, Ronni. Corporate Executive Board Responds to Customers' Request for Increased Collaboration. Boston, MA: Patricia Seybold Group, April 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1571/i04-03-08cc.

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Poste, George, Roger Hagengruber, Larry Wright, Ruth David, and Pete Marino. Protecting the Homeland, Report of the Defense Science Board, 2000 Summer Study Executive Summary. Volume 1. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, February 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada385255.

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Fields, Craig, and Richard Haver. Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. National Interests. Volume 1: Executive Summary (Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study). Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada495353.

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Course, Grant P., Grant R. Pasco, Ashley Royston, and Richard Ayers. Scottish Inshore Fisheries Integrated Data System (SIFIDS): work package 8A final report: on-board observers. Edited by Mark James and Hannah Ladd-Jones. Marine Alliance for Science and Technology for Scotland (MASTS), 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.15664/10023.23454.

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[Extract from Executive Summary] The Scottish Inshore Fisheries Integrated Data System (SIFIDS) project aims to build on the success of a previous project called “Evidence Gathering in Support of Sustainable Scottish Inshore Fisheries”, which utilised temporal and spatial data collected from commercial fishing vessels in cooperation with the fishing industry. The On-Board Observer work package (WP8A) aimed to collect the raw data that could be used by the other work packages (WPs) by sending observers to sea. SeaScope Fisheries Research Ltd was tasked with providing trained observers and a total of 131 volunteer vessels were recruited to the project by the Facilitators (WP7) and observers.
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Rose, Jonathan, Josette Arévalo, Thaís Soares, and Andreia Barcellos. Approach Paper: Evaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance. Inter-American Development Bank, February 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003043.

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This approach paper defines the objectives, scope, and methodology for the Office of Evaluation and Oversight's (OVE) evaluation of the governance of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The evaluation is included in OVE's 2020-2021 work program (document RE-543) in response to a request by the Board of Executive Directors to evaluate the IDB's governance arrangements. Drawing from similar evaluations, these aspects will be evaluated in four dimensions: effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and transparency, and voice.
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Rose, Jonathan, Josette Arévalo, Thaís Soares, Andreia Barcellos, Ruben Lamdany, and Dennis Leech. Evaluation of the Inter-American Development Bank's Governance. Inter-American Development Bank, September 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004486.

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The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was founded in 1959 as an initiative of Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries and the United States to support the development of the region through an institution in which LAC countries would play a leading role through their majority capital and voting shares but with significant participation of the United States. The Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank (the Agreement; IDB 1959/1996) articulated the desired balance of responsibilities and power between LAC and the United States. It also provided that the IDB's governance would center around three governing bodies: the Board of Governors (BOG), the Board of Executive Directors (EXD), and Senior Management. The objective of this evaluation, requested by the EXD, was to assess the extent to which existing institutional arrangements at the IDB allow it to operate effectively and efficiently while providing sufficient accountability, transparency, and stakeholder voice in decision making. The evaluation focused on four dimensions: (1) effectiveness--the extent to which the IDB's governance arrangements allow the institution to effectively set strategic objectives, provide means to attain those objectives, and monitor performance; (2) efficiency--the degree to which the costs (in both money and time) of the IDB's governing bodies to perform their assigned roles and responsibilities are consistent with their priorities; (3) accountability and transparency--the extent to which the IDB's governance arrangements render the IDB governing bodies accountable to its shareholders for the responsibilities delegated to them, and the ability of secondary stakeholders, such as civil society, project beneficiaries, and private sector entities, to access information; and (4) voice--the extent to which the IDB's governance arrangements provide the shareholders and secondary stakeholders with an adequate voice in decision making.
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