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Journal articles on the topic 'Executive accountability'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 29 January 2023

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1

Niedobitek, Matthias. "The German Bundesrat and Executive Federalism." Perspectives on Federalism 10, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 198–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pof-2018-0023.

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Abstract The German Basic Law constitutes federalism as a unique political system which is characterised by intertwined decision-making of the Federation (Bund) and the component units (Länder). The executives of the two federal tiers and the Länder executives within the Bundesrat play a major role in making joint decisions. They are forced to make decisions in the ‘joint-decision mode’ (Politikverflechtung) which is detrimental to accountability. Reform efforts were made to unbundle competences and to reduce the number of bills which require the Bundesrat’s consent. Due to the dominance of the executives and the distribution of powers between the federal tiers (legislation is dominated by the Bund, execution is dominated by the Länder), German federalism is rightly called ‘executive federalism’. German federalism can even be regarded as an embodiment of that concept since it covers all possible aspects of ‘executive federalism’. The Bundesrat has an important share in that classification.

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Katomero, Jesper, Robert Hoppe, and Anna Wesselink. "Tales of accountability: a Q-method study of discourses amongst Tanzanian members of parliament." Journal of Modern African Studies 55, no. 3 (August 11, 2017): 423–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x1700009x.

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ABSTRACTThe hallmark of accountability in a democracy centres on the way the elected parliament holds the executive to account. If the parliament does not perform its oversight role effectively, lower authorities would have fewer incentives to do the same vis-à-vis local executives. In this article we therefore ask whether or not different meanings of accountability can be discerned amongst Tanzanian Members of Parliament (MPs). In our Q-method research we found four clearly identifiable discourses on accountability amongst Tanzanian MPs:Partycrats;My Electorate's Advocates;Frustrated Account Holders; andPragmatic Account Holders.We understand MPs discourses within the broader context of political clientelism and we argue that this combination of discourses, or accountability culture, enables the executive to rule in semi-autocratic ways. Even if opposition parties would obtain a parliamentary majority, this accountability culture stands in the way of achieving greater democratic responsiveness.

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3

Kumarasingham, H. "Exporting Executive Accountability? Westminster Legacies of Executive Power." Parliamentary Affairs 66, no. 3 (April 13, 2012): 579–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gss008.

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Brennan, Niamh M., Collette E. Kirwan, and John Redmond. "Accountability processes in boardrooms." Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 29, no. 1 (January 18, 2016): 135–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aaaj-10-2013-1505.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand the influence of information and knowledge exchange and sharing between managers and non-executive directors is important in assessing the dynamic processes of accountability in boardrooms. By analysing information/knowledge at multiple levels, invoking the literature on implicit/tacit and explicit information/knowledge, the authors show that information asymmetry is a necessary condition for effective boards. The authors introduce a conceptual model of manager-non-executive director information asymmetry as an outcome of the interpretation of information/knowledge-sharing processes amongst board members. The model provides a more nuanced agenda of the management-board information asymmetry problem to enable a better understanding of the role of different types of information in practice. Design/methodology/approach – The analysis of information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation and the resultant conceptual model are based on the following elements: manager-non-executive director information/knowledge, management-board information/knowledge and board dynamics and reciprocal processes converting implicit/tacit into explicit information/knowledge. Findings – The paper provides new insights into the dynamics of information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation between managers and non-executive directors (individual level)/between management and boards (group level). The authors characterise this as a two-way process, back-and-forth between managers/executive directors and non-executive directors. The importance of relative/experienced “ignorance” of non-executive directors is revealed, which the authors term the “information asymmetry paradox”. Research limitations/implications – The authors set out key opportunities for developing a research agenda from the model based on prior research of knowledge conversion processes and how these may be applied in a boardroom setting. Practical implications – The model may assist directors in better understanding their roles and the division of labour between managers and non-executive directors from an information/knowledge perspective. Originality/value – The authors apply Ikujiro Nonaka’s knowledge conversion framework to consider the transitioning from individual implicit personal to explicit shared information/knowledge, to understand the subtle processes at play in boardrooms influencing information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation between managers and non-executive directors.

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Woods, Lorna, Lawrence McNamara, and Judith Townend. "Executive Accountability and National Security." Modern Law Review 84, no. 3 (February 22, 2021): 553–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12624.

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Spitzer, Robert J. "Kitrosser, Heidi.Reclaiming Accountability: Transparency, Executive." Congress & the Presidency 42, no. 3 (September 2, 2015): 368–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2015.1073544.

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Carlin, Ryan E., and Shane P. Singh. "Executive Power and Economic Accountability." Journal of Politics 77, no. 4 (October 2015): 1031–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682235.

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Goodman, Julia, Hayley Pearson, and Morris Mthombeni. "Sources of accountability inside the boardroom." European Business Review 33, no. 4 (January 18, 2021): 667–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ebr-05-2020-0119.

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Purpose Despite indications of scholarly interest, there are still gaps in the research of the concept of felt accountability, especially the felt accountability of board members. This paper aims to clarify the sources of accountability experienced by board members. Especially those in a non-executive capacity. How these sources can be accessed to enhance felt accountability and thereby governance effectiveness is explored. Design/methodology/approach Qualitative, exploratory research methods were used. In total, 15 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were completed with non-executive board members of Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed companies in South Africa. Thematic content analysis was used to analyse data. Findings The findings clarified the formal and informal sources of accountability experienced by non-executive board members. This included relational and structural mechanisms that can be used within corporate governance to enhance both types of accountability. Accessing the identified sources of accountability through appropriate mechanisms could increase the levels of felt accountability experienced by the individual non-executive board member, thereby strengthening accountability inside the boardroom and improving overall board effectiveness. The study also revealed a layer of implicit and explicit accountability. Research limitations/implications The study was conducted solely in South Africa, with non-executive board members of Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed companies. Originality/value There is limited research that clarifies the sources of accountability experienced by non-executive board members. This study aims to address this gap in the literature by providing techniques on how to enable the clarified sources of accountability to improve governance effectiveness.

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Cox, Gary W., and Barry R. Weingast. "Executive Constraint, Political Stability, and Economic Growth." Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 3 (August 25, 2017): 279–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414017710254.

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Previous studies have argued that democracy diminishes the extent to which leadership contests depress economic growth, by reducing the violence and uncertainty attendant on such contests. We reconsider the theoretical basis for this claim, highlighting the separate roles of executive constraint and electoral accountability. Exploiting panel data from 1850 to 2005, we show that the executive’s horizontal accountability to the legislature significantly moderates the economic downturns associated with leadership turnover, while its vertical accountability to the electorate does not. These results suggest that, in terms of moderating succession-related downturns and thereby promoting steadier economic growth, the health of legislatures is more important than the health of elections.

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Hyndman, Noel S., and Robert Anderson. "Performance Information, Accountability and Executive Agencies." Public Money & Management 18, no. 3 (July 1998): 23–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9302.00123.

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Enonchong, Laura-Stella Eposi. "Judicial Independence and Accountability in Cameroon: Balancing a Tenuous Relationship." African Journal of Legal Studies 5, no. 3 (2012): 313–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17087384-12342013.

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Abstract This article examines Cameroon’s approach to judicial accountability focusing on its political accountability to the executive. The article contends that the judiciary in Cameroon is excessively accountable to the executive, a position which has resulted to the absence of judicial independence. It also contends that a constitutional reform is necessary to restructure the relationship between the executive and the judiciary and to reform the institutions of judicial insulation in order to provide adequate balance between independence and accountability.

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Rozell, Mark, and Daniel Levin. "Executive Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy, and Accountability." Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 4 (December 2004): 893–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0360-4918.2004.230_2.x.

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Bussing, Austin, and Michael Pomirchy. "Congressional oversight and electoral accountability." Journal of Theoretical Politics 34, no. 1 (January 2022): 35–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09516298211061516.

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Legislative oversight allows Congress to investigate potential wrongdoing by executive branch actors. We present a model in which an incumbent exercises oversight and chooses to take corrective action against the executive before going up for reelection. We show that partisan types who prefer to take corrective action regardless of the probability of wrongdoing will always conduct oversight, but sincere types who only want to correct legitimate wrongdoing will exercise restraint to avoid appearing too partisan and losing reelection. The model also shows that oversight is increasing in the probability that the incumbent is partisan and the probability that the challenger is sincere. Finally, we present two case studies, the Elián González custody case and the attack on the Benghazi embassy, to illustrate our theory.

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Boughey, Janina. "Executive power in emergencies: Where is the accountability?" Alternative Law Journal 45, no. 3 (August 24, 2020): 168–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1037969x20950514.

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Australia’s system of law and government contains a range of mechanisms through which the executive branch is held to account for its actions. However, in emergencies, these accountability mechanisms are often significantly eroded in a range of ways. This article examines how the forms and types of powers that Australian governments have relied on to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic have avoided many of the political, legal and administrative accountability mechanisms that ordinarily apply to government decision-making. It looks at whether these accountability limits are justified and asks whether we ought to be concerned.

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Cummins, Jeff, and Thomas T. Holyoke. "Fiscal Accountability in Gubernatorial Elections." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 18, no. 4 (August 22, 2018): 395–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440018792260.

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Although significant research has been conducted on economic voting in gubernatorial elections, very few explore the impact of state fiscal conditions in these elections. The little that has been done yields conflicting results regarding the effects of state spending and found that governors are not held responsible for a state’s overall fiscal health. Our study examines the impact of spending and fiscal health on gubernatorial elections from 1982 to 2013. We find evidence that voters reward incumbent parties for fiscal health and spending growth and that unified government and stronger executive budget powers enhance fiscal accountability for these outcomes. These findings contradict previous research that suggests voters punish one or both parties for higher spending. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for the debate about the balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches.

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Lee, Young-joo, and Jiwon Suh. "Managerial Development Programs for Executive Directors and Accountability Practices in Nonprofit Organizations." Review of Public Personnel Administration 38, no. 4 (October 27, 2016): 431–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0734371x16674783.

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Facing the potential leadership deficit and mounting pressures for performance and accountability, government and nonprofit organizations have become more interested in providing training and development programs for their executives. However, existing research falls short in explaining the utility of managerial development programs in achieving performance and accountability in public and nonprofit contexts. This study examines how executives’ participation in various managerial development programs is associated with the adoption of organizational practices for financial, client-service, and performance accountability, using a survey of nonprofit human services organizations. The results reveal that organizations whose executives participated in managerial development programs are more likely to have such practices. In particular, the results show that participation in general management and administration training and regular mentoring is positively associated with accountability practices in all three areas. Overall, the findings suggest that providing incumbent executives with training and development opportunities is as important as recruiting qualified individuals in ensuring organizational accountability and performance.

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Suripatty, Petrus Izaach. "Analysing Factors Affecting the Nabire Regent's Accountability Report (LKPJ) Nabire Regency." Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 8, no. 8 (August 11, 2021): 18–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.88.10648.

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This study applied qualitative approach through the process of finding, understanding, explaining and obtaining an overview of social phenomena and public phenomena regarding the Synergy of Relations between the Legislative and Executive arms of regency government carrying out the authority of the Accountability Statement Report (LKPJ) of the Regent of Nabire Regency. Data collection techniques applied were; observation, interviews and questionnaires. The data analysis technique applied were qualitative data analysis technique to describe the facts obtained from the results of field studies and literature reviews to clarify the picture of the research results. The results of interviews related to the theory of institutional relations, found a negative and conflicting relationship existing between the two; legislative and executive parties, a position that build a political bargain that benefits each party so that it gives birth to political commitments and deals in the Regent's LKPJ agreement caused by the sectoral ego of each party. The executives consider themselves as having more understanding than the legislature and vice versa. Another problem is the lack of experience, education and the emergence of election winners as leaders/Chairmen of the Regional People's Representative Council which is a political party under the leadership of the executive/regent who has an emotional relationship in the form of family relations with the Regent. Suggestions from researchers from the executive side to carry out the Annual LKPJ to the Legislature on time and the need to strengthen the DPRD's supervisory function on the performance of local governments in order to create good governance. The Nabire DPRD critically and carefully supervises the LKPJ of the Regent of Nabire Regency based on the vision, mission, RPJM and RPPD in a transparent, responsive, efficient, effective, accountable, participatory, measurable, fair and sustainable manner. Publicization of the Regent's LKPJ document and strengthening of the legislative function through training, comparative studies, as well as the availability of funding to finance experts who can assist with legislative tasks is required.

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SHINDO, Mahito. "Ensuring Executive Accountability in Japanese Nuclear Emergency Response." TRENDS IN THE SCIENCES 25, no. 6 (June 1, 2020): 6_42–6_47. http://dx.doi.org/10.5363/tits.25.6_42.

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Miquel, Gerard Padró i., and Erik Snowberg. "The lesser evil: Executive accountability with partisan supporters." Journal of Theoretical Politics 24, no. 1 (November 14, 2011): 19–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629811420895.

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20

Turner, Royce. "Executive pay, accountability, and Training and Enterprise Councils." International Journal of Public Sector Management 9, no. 2 (April 1996): 65–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09513559610119573.

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Anderson, Leslie E. "The Authoritarian Executive? Horizontal and Vertical Accountability in Nicaragua." Latin American Politics and Society 48, no. 02 (2006): 141–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2006.tb00350.x.

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AbstractThis article uses empirical evidence from Nicaragua to examine Guillermo O'Donnell's argument that new democracies often become undemocratic delegative democracies and that vertical accountability is not enough to stop such encroaching authoritarianism. While events in the last five years have focused attention on illegal executive behavior by former president Alemán, Nicaragua's democracy actually has experienced authoritarian presidencies under all the major parties. Elections and popular mobilization have strengthened the independence of the legislature, however. Mechanisms of vertical accountability thereby have proven more effective than expected in restraining executive authoritarianism and fostering institutions of horizontal accountability. The case of Nicaragua shows that citizens can use the power balance and separate institutional mandate of presidential democracy to limit authoritarianism.

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Manona, W. W. "Critical Analysis of the Oversight Role of the Education Portfolio Committee in Parliament of South Africa." Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review 3, no. 3 (September 1, 2015): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/apsdpr.v3i3.90.

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There is a prevalent assumption in South Africa that Parliament is guided by the ideals of democracy, accountability, transparency and accessibility. However, there are still gaps and challenges as far as theoversight role of Parliament is concerned, despite the presence of committees that have been established to oversee the executive and relevant structures of government, government activities and public finances. There is widespread maladministration and misuse of government expenditure in government departments. This paper investigates the oversight role of parliamentary committees to determine their relative influence on accountability and democracy in the execution of functions by public functionaries. The aim of the paper is to provide an understanding into inherent problems in the oversight role of Parliament in the democratic dispensation in South Africa, which seems not to have been given serious attention in the academia, considering the pivotal role Parliament plays in the lives of citizens of the country. These oversight committees have selectively held Senior Executives or Ministers accountable for their ineffectiveness, misuse of government expenditure and maladministration. This could be attributed to the fact that oversight in South Africa does not seem to be properly understood and implemented as it should be. Moreover, the influence of the majoritarian authority of the ruling party in committees seems to be colluding with the executive. Failure to take action against cases of omission brings questions on the effectiveness and efficiency of the oversight role of Parliament. The adverse consequence is the delay in the provision of good quality services to poor communities. This paper employed the theoretical approach as a method of data collection. Conclusions have been drawn that the shortcomings of the parliamentary committees compromise accountability and good governance in service delivery.

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Beitz, Charles R. "Covert Intervention as a Moral Problem." Ethics & International Affairs 3 (March 1989): 45–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.1989.tb00211.x.

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Today's international community may well view covert action and democracy as mutually exclusive policies. This article examines the practice of covert action in American foreign policy in light of events of the mid-1970s and 1980s, focusing on the scandalous misuse of executive authority and lack of accountability associated with covert means. Often manipulative and sometimes anonymous, covert operations raise critical morality concerns in a democratic society. Whether “any form of accountability is likely to be sufficient to bring the unauthorized use of executive power under control” is the crucial issue to be addressed when examining the practicality of covert actions by the executive branch.

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Fagbadebo, Omololu, and Nirmala Dorasamy. "Judicial Review as an Accountability Mechanism in South Africa: A Discourse on the Nkandla Case." African Journal of Inter/Multidisciplinary Studies 4, no. 1 (2022): 126–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.51415/ajims.v4i1.993.

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Separation of powers among the three branches of government, in most Constitutional democracies, is a design to avert the tyranny of a personalized rule. With specific roles, in relationships characterized by separated but shared powers, each branch of government is a watchdog against the other in case of any abuse. In the South African governing system, the Constitution guarantees functional power relationships among the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary branches of the government. Nevertheless, the dominant party system, in practice, has weakened the legislative oversight and accountability powers to tame the excesses of the executive, contrary to the intendments of the drafters of the Constitution. Judicial review of the various legislative and executive actions, however, has created precedents that seek to reassert legislative capacity to hold the executive accountable. At one time or the other, the judiciary had indicted the legislature and the executive of dereliction of duties. Using primary and secondary data from judicial pronouncements, constitutional provisions, and other public documents, with extant literature, respectively, this paper reviewed the environment that prompted the activist posture of the South African judiciary. An entrenched culture of party loyalty and the incapacity of the legislature to enforce accountability have bolstered the need for assertive judicial review in ensuring accountability. The failure of the legislature to exercise its oversight power has provided the platform for the judiciary to rise as a formidable accountability instrument. Judicial independence, guaranteed by The Constitution, would continue to sustain the tenets of South African representative democracy.

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Longenecker, Clinton, and Mike McCartney. "The benefits of executive coaching: voices from the C-suite." Strategic HR Review 19, no. 1 (January 30, 2020): 22–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/shr-06-2019-0048.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide readers with research findings based on qualitative data that describe the benefits of executive coaching from a sample of 70 senior business executives, all of whom have a personal executive coach. In addition, the paper provides readers with specific questions concerning their organizations’ approach to executive leadership development and the application of these potential benefits to their enterprise. Design/methodology/approach The findings of this study are based on personal interviews with 30 executives and ten four-person focus groups in which both sets of participants were asked to describe personal and organizational benefits associated with their experiences in using executive coaches. Findings Interviews and focus group findings converged around a number of benefits associated with effective executive coaching. These benefits included improved executive focus, better alignment of key leadership behaviors, candid and ongoing feedback, accountability for appropriate leader behaviors, improved emotional intelligence and ego control and personal support and encouragement, among others. Research limitations/implications This qualitative study provides empirical evidence of the benefits of executive coaching from the perspective of senior business leaders. These findings provide researchers with specific criteria that can be tested and measured on a larger scale. The primary limitation of the study is the small sample size of only 70 executives. Practical implications The findings of this research provide a compelling set of benefit trends that individual executives, boards of directors and organizations need to consider in the development of their senior leaders. Specific questions are included to guide practitioner’s thinking concerning executive coaching and its role in their organizations. Social implications These findings make a compelling case that senior leaders can become more effective and can experience great benefits when they properly make use of an effective executive coach. The development of senior leaders using this tool can have a powerful impact on organizational performance and organization’s culture. Originality/value A review of the literature will reveal that anecdotal evidence abounds, but there is limited empirical research chronicling the true benefits of executive coaching.

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Rose-Ackerman, Susan. "Democracy and Executive Power: Administrative Policymaking in Comparative Perspective." Revista de Derecho Público: Teoría y método 6 (November 4, 2022): 155–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.37417/rpd/vol_6_2022_978.

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This essay on executive rulemaking procedures in the US, the UK, France, and Germany examines how administrative and constitutional law interact when the executive makes policy under delegated authority. Given their differing constitutional structures and legal frameworks, the political incentives for policymaking accountability differ. The US is a separation-of-powers presidential system. Germany and the UK are parliamentary systems with and without written constitutions. The common law underpins the UK’s unwritten constitution. France has a strong president with a relatively weak parliament. The US separation of powers generated statutory requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking. The legislatures in the German and UK parliamentary systems have little incentive to enact such constraints on their own cabinets. The French system lacks required procedures as well. However, even if political incentives suggest that sitting politicians will have little interest in such reform, the need for greater accountability to the public remains. This essay, drawing on the author’s recent book Democracy and executive power, describes these cross-country differences and argues for ways to produce more democratically responsible executive policymaking. Those concerned about the future of representative democracy should include reform of executive rulemaking procedures in their list of priorities. Structural issues linked to the openness and accountability of regulatory bodies and cabinet departments should not be ignored in the heat of day-to-day crises that soak up the headlines.

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Prasetianingsih, Rahayu. "Akuntabilitas Kekuasaan Kehakiman." Jurnal Konstitusi 8, no. 5 (May 20, 2016): 829. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk858.

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Accountability in Indonesia has been known the extent of the public administration within the executive power, while for representative bodies and judicial power is only in the system administration. Public demands for accountability from all over the government institution are no exception of judicial power. It’s triggered by “mafia peradilan” issue and other distrust so it needs judicial accountability. Problems arise when faced with the principles of accountability and independence and impartiality of the judiciary. But in fact these two principles is not the core problem of accountability judiciary, there’s many factors influence.

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Gerster, Richard. "Accountability of Executive Directors in the Bretton Woods Institutions." Journal of World Trade 27, Issue 6 (December 1, 1993): 87–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad1993038.

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Bogue, Richard J., and M. Lindell Joseph. "C-Suite Strategies for Nurse Empowerment and Executive Accountability." JONA: The Journal of Nursing Administration 49, no. 5 (May 2019): 266–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/nna.0000000000000749.

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Bowen, Jeff, and Susan Rose-Ackerman. "Partisan Politics and Executive Accountability: Argentina in Comparative Perspective." Supreme Court Economic Review 10 (January 2003): 157–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/scer.10.1147143.

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Rogowski, Jon C. "Symposium on Policy Making, Accountability, and Executive Action: Introduction." Presidential Studies Quarterly 50, no. 1 (January 31, 2020): 30–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/psq.12640.

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Anderson, Leslie (Leslie E. ). "The Authoritarian Executive? Horizontal and Vertical Accountability in Nicaragua." Latin American Politics & Society 48, no. 2 (2006): 141–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/lap.2006.0015.

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Relyea, Harold C. "Executive privilege: The dilemma of secrecy and democratic accountability." Government Information Quarterly 14, no. 3 (January 1997): 328–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0740-624x(97)90010-1.

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Abraham, A. "The Ombudsman and the Executive: The Road to Accountability." Parliamentary Affairs 61, no. 3 (March 1, 2008): 535–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsn020.

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Barker, Anne N. "Executive order no. 13,233: A threat to government accountability." Government Information Quarterly 22, no. 1 (January 2005): 4–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2004.10.002.

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Oktavianus Pasoloran, Fransiskus Randa,. "Testing Model Accountability in Public Sector Organization (Study On Goverment Regional Tana Toraja, South Sulawesi)." Psychology and Education Journal 58, no. 1 (February 12, 2021): 276–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.17762/pae.v58i1.771.

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This study aims to test the model of public accountability in local government. Testing is done by designing a questionnaire and distributing a questionnaire to all stakeholders including the executive, legislative and community leaders. The results of the data test show that the question items are valid and reliable. The result of model testing has been valid and shows that the built model puts seven dimensions as an element of accountability which includes legal accountability, honesty, process, program, policy, finance and result to society and two dimension becomes predictor variable to public accountability namely accountability mechanism and Musrenbang forum.

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Araya, Ignacio Arana. "Informal Institutions and Horizontal Accountability: Protocols in the Chilean Budgetary Process." Latin American Politics and Society 55, no. 04 (2013): 74–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2013.00215.x.

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Abstract Studies of executive-legislative relations are usually based only on the analysis of formal institutions, although informal institutions also shape interbranch behavior. This omission leads to questionable results when scholars examine the capacity of state institutions to audit other public agencies and branches of government. This article explores how the protocols, an informal institution that shapes the Chilean budgetary negotiations, have increasingly allowed the congress to have a more relevant budgetary role than what the constitution permits. It argues that protocols accommodate some of the undesired consequences of a charter that is strongly biased toward the central government, and describes how this institution has departed from its stringent budgetary focus to encompass broader executive-legislative agreements that enhance the legislature's capacity to oversee the executive.

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Hornbeck, Dustin, and Joel Malin. "State Auditors in Education Policy." Educational Policy 33, no. 7 (February 2, 2018): 1047–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0895904818755469.

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Contemporary education reform movements in the United States have emphasized accountability for student performance. Policy actors serving within the executive branch have arguably gained power in part to provide this accountability function. The present study, in which Ohio and Pennsylvania serve as state case contexts, examines the changing education policy role of executive-level state auditors. Findings indicate their powers have expanded considerably between 2005 and 2017, with expansion attributable to four main factors: the proliferation of brick-and-mortar and online charter schools, auditors’ political motivations, auditors’ ability to conduct performance audits, and state legislatures’ reliance on auditors to provide oversight.

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Scott, Ian. "Political Scandals and the Accountability of the Chief Executive in Hong Kong." Asian Survey 54, no. 5 (September 2014): 966–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2014.54.5.966.

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This article examines two political and constitutional issues arising from scandals concerning the past and present Hong Kong Chief Executive. These relate to whether existing measures are sufficient to ensure integrity in high office and to the role of the Chief Executive after the introduction of universal suffrage in 2017.

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Opata, Chukwudiebube Bede Abraham. "Regulatory Accountability in the Nigerian Telecommunications Sector." Journal of African Law 57, no. 2 (May 16, 2013): 283–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021855313000053.

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AbstractThis article addresses the issue of how the Nigerian Communications Commission, which is responsible for the independent regulation of the Nigerian telecommunications sector, could be made accountable. The need for accountability is relevant given the local context of pervasive corruption and lower expectations of accountability when compared with more mature democracies. The accountability question is analysed in terms of the traditional public accountability mechanisms of executive supervision, legislative oversight and judicial review, highlighting the limits and challenges facing the application of each traditional accountability mechanism to the commission. An extended notion of accountability, specifically the adoption of fair procedures in decision making and accountability to the public at large, are presented as feasibly complementary to traditional accountability mechanisms. Finally the article proposes an amendment to the pre-action conditions to judicial review to facilitate greater accountability.

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Shapiro, Brian P. "Accounting Science's Contribution to the Corporate Governance and Executive Accountability Problem." Accounting and the Public Interest 6, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 51–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/api.2006.6.1.51.

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Effective corporate governance and related accountability mechanisms are presumed to mitigate conflicts of interest and provide reasonable assurance that each party observes certain behavioral norms. Among the academic disciplines, one might expect that accounting would be well equipped to examine and prescribe improvements in accountability among agents in capitalist settings. But this article documents that the “top four” accounting journals in North America (The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, and Contemporary Accounting Research; hereafter, “top” journals), which reputedly publish premier scientific articles and weigh most heavily in tenure and promotion decisions at U.S. universities, did not publish systematic critiques of ineffective corporate governance practices in the decade before Sarbanes-Oxley (2002). To explain this phenomenon, this article presents arguments and evidence that the top journals' editorial ideology of scientism, fact-value separation, methodological exclusivity, and active denigration of critical and historical reflection have obstructed rather than promoted timely awareness of corporate governance and executive accountability problems. The article then explores post-Sarbanes-Oxley opportunities for critical, institutional, and historical research on corporate accountability and governance, and identifies how they differ from as well as complement traditional positive accounting analyses. The concluding section considers the changes in institutional values that would be necessary for the top accounting journals to adopt a more methodologically inclusive and socially responsible research agenda.

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Febri Arifiyanto, Dwi, and Taufik Kurrohman. "AKUNTABILITAS PENGELOLAAN ALOKASI DANA DESA DI KABUPATEN JEMBER." Jurnal Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan 2, no. 3 (April 27, 2014): 473. http://dx.doi.org/10.17509/jrak.v2i3.6598.

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This research focuses on the application of the system of accountability of managing the allocation of funds is a village in the District of Jember Regency Umbulsari. In order to know how the implementation of the accountability system of managing the allocation of funds is a village in the District of Jember Regency Umbulsari starting from the stage of planning, execution and accountability. This research is expected to be beneficial to Jember Regency Government in particular sub district of Umbulsari in an effort improve accountability of the management of the allocation of funds for the village. The study is done at villages in sub-districts umbulsari. As informants in this study certainly people who are directly involved and understand and can provide information about managing the allocation of funds for villages, namely the Government of the village as the village of peleksana and team empowerment Institute Executive team as the village community activities. The results of this research show that the planning and implementation of activities of the village Fund Allocations already indicates that management accountable and transparent. From the side of accountability both in terms of physical as well as the Administration is already showing the implementation of accountable and transparent.

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Fu, Youwei. "The Reflection on China's Financial Regulators' Supervising Legal System." Asian Journal of Social Science Studies 7, no. 3 (March 28, 2022): 134. http://dx.doi.org/10.20849/ajsss.v7i3.1052.

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China has not established a sound financial accounting system for regulators for years. The reasons for this problem could be listed in the following: the deficient accountability concept, unscientific financial supervision mechanism and the lack of public participation in the legal mechanism selection. Therefore, re-examining the concept of accountability of financial regulators, improving the main the main system of accountability based on perfecting the legislature, the ruling party, the executive, the judiciary, other stakeholders and international financial organizations and behavior have been become inevitable.

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Dunleavy, Patrick, G. W. Jones, Jane Burnham, Robert Elgie, and Peter Fysh. "Leaders, Politics and Institutional Change: The Decline of Prime Ministerial Accountability to the House of Commons, 1868–1990." British Journal of Political Science 23, no. 3 (July 1993): 267–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400006621.

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In the Westminster system the prime minister's active participation in parliamentary proceedings is a key mechanism for ensuring the accountability of the executive. We survey the evolution of the four main prime ministerial activities across the period 1868–1990. There has been a long-term decline in prime ministers' speeches in the Commons, a stepped decline in debating interventions and a significant decrease in question-answering from the late nineteenth century to the 1950s. But prime ministerial statement-making increased after 1940, ebbing away again in the 1980s. And the downward drift in question-answering was halted by procedural innovations since the 1960s, which standardized the frequency of prime ministers' appearances and lead to the dominance of ‘open’ questions. We trace the varied impacts of institutional changes and shorter-term political or personal influences. The direct accountability of the prime minister to Parliament has undoubtedly declined, a trend probably paralleled by decreasing indirect accountability. These findings raise fundamental questions about executive-legislature relations in the United Kingdom

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Tummers, Lars. "LEARNING WHILE GOVERNING: EXPERTISE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH." Public Administration 92, no. 4 (December 2014): 1106–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/padm.12095.

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Wille, Anchrit. "Political–Bureaucratic Accountability in the EU Commission: Modernising the Executive." West European Politics 33, no. 5 (August 10, 2010): 1093–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2010.486137.

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Blankenship, Michael B., Jerry B. Spargar, and W. Richard Janikowski. "Accountability v. Independence: Myths of Judicial Selection." Criminal Justice Policy Review 6, no. 1 (March 1992): 69–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/088740349200600105.

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The various methods of selecting state trial court judges continue to generate controversy. Partisan and nonpartisan elections, executive and legislative appointments, and the Missouri Plan represent a philosophy of judicial accountability versus judicial independence. The selection plans are described briefly; criticisms of the primary systems of judicial selection are presented. The authors conclude that appointive methods are no more effective than the elective process in placing qualified judges on the bench, while neither method is successful in fulfilling philosophical expectations.

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Jashari, Murat. "Political Accountability in the Republic of Kosovo." International Journal of Social Science Studies 5, no. 11 (October 18, 2017): 39. http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v5i11.2712.

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Political accountability is the most specific type of social accountability for the fact that it lacks a normative legal aspect and that it derives mainly from the behavior, not from an opportunistic attitude or disclosure of specific subject in relation to the expectations of the body or institution or the relevant electoral body. Political accountability is the conditio sine quo non (indispensable condition) to a democratic system of government. Hence the Kosovo Government on the merits of the constitutional aspect has accepted this institute. It is precisely this institute of political accountability that will be the topic of this paper taking into account the responsibilities of the executive government in relation to the legislative, as well as the political accountability of those elected in relation to the voters. The accountability of the President will be treated in the framework of constitutional accountability, and that of the Government in the framework of parliamentary accountability.

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Slater, Dan, and Aries A. Arugay. "Polarizing Figures: Executive Power and Institutional Conflict in Asian Democracies." American Behavioral Scientist 62, no. 1 (January 2018): 92–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764218759577.

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Polarization does not necessarily pit left against right, rich against poor, secular against religious, or ethnicity against ethnicity. Rather than polarizing along deep social or ideological cleavages, today’s democracies often polarize over the perceived abuse of power by popularly elected chief executives. We argue that such conflicts are built into the definition and design of democracy, which requires both vertical accountability (i.e., inclusivity) and horizontal accountability (i.e., constraints) and divides sovereignty into separate institutions. We illustrate our institutional theory of polarization through a comparative analysis of polarizing crises in five Asian democracies since 2000. What mattered most for these crises’ severity and eventual resolution was not the depth of social cleavages, but how the leading elite opponents of polarizing figures managed their removal from office.

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Wijaya, Andy Fefta. "Peningkatan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan yang Bersih dan Bebas KKN dan Indikator-Indikator Hasilnya." Jurnal Desentralisasi 10, no. 2 (December 31, 2012): 231–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.37378/jd.2912.2.231-240.

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This paper presents this new perspective of public management (NPM) and governance in administrative sciences and explains the differences between them. NPM risk leaving the public service function for the poor and marginalized, therefore improving governance perspective NPM movement's weakness. New Public Management Paradigm with no accountability (accountability) would risk leaving the public interest. Accountability as a fundamental pillar of good governance paradigm can improve the weaknesses found in the paradigm previously thought. A major component to the success of public accountability is a system of information transparency. Transparency of information is authorized to be used for public sector performance evaluation measures and for evaluating public sector executive accountability for all decisions and actions, ie to what extent the results/outcomes and impacts resulting from beneficial to the public.

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