Academic literature on the topic 'Exceptio doli generali'

O presente trabalho tem por escopo demonstrar como o princípio da boa-fé é subtraído do formalismo no qual esteve mergulhado sob a égide do positivismo jurídico do século XIX, e torna-se objeto de criação jurisprudencial, mas sem se libertar completamente dos laços de uma racionalidade positivista. Restrito aos parâmetros do formalismo, mostrou-se impreciso demais para ser aplicado pelo modo de pensar silogístico, o que demandou esforços da metodologia jurídica diante da técnica legislativa das cláusulas gerais, standards e princípios jurídicos, com vistas a delimitar seu domínio de aplicação. Eis o que foi alcançado pelas cortes germânicas do Segundo Pós-guerra; a concretização da cláusula geral da boa-fé em figuras típicas, que restam inadmissíveis em seu exercício: exceptio doli generalis, venire contra factum proprium, Verwirkung, tu quoque, inalegabilidade de nulidades formais e o exercício desequilibrado de direitos. Delimitado o tema do presente trabalho à função de controle da boa-fé no exercício de prerrogativas individuais, seu percurso encontrou tradução em outros sistemas jurídicos, nos quais ainda predominava o vazio de seu conteúdo. Elegendo-se como espaço de tradução da boa-fé a jurisprudência brasileira, submetem-se seus resultados a uma leitura crítica, revelando a especificidade da tradição jurídico-europeia no direito pátrio. Por fim, indagam-se os limites de uma boa-fé “prêt-à-porter”, para a manutenção do positivismo jurídico.

In the 1950s plastics were hailed as a material for the modern home, whether in the form of Tupperware containers (early 1950s) or a vinyl Barbie doll (1959). However, modernism was traditionally built on the so-called "new" materials of glass, steel and concrete (all well known in one form or another to the Ancient Romans) with no mention of plastics. The 1950s saw plastics, their development boosted by World War II, enter the building industry, albeit often hidden in the form of glues and pipes. Attempts were made to produce the all-plastic house, such as the Smithsons' 1956 "House of the Future" for the Ideal Home Exhibition in London, which used plastic interiors within a more conventional shell, and Goody and Hamilton's 1957 Monsanto "House of the Future" made of fibre glass panels. This paper investigates these buildings and the attempts made to introduce plastics into 1950s homes in New Zealand, with an emphasis on advertising in Home and Building. It concludes by suggesting that plastics, with the exception of laminates, mostly remain hidden in the modern dwelling. It also suggests that New Zealand architects of the 1950s were reluctant to embrace the new materials, preferring an architecture based on natural, and preferably home sourced, materials.

Il presente studio si propone di analizzare, in una prospettiva funzionale, i nuovi requisiti di forma del contratto introdotti dalla legislazione speciale e di settore, unitamente al correlato rimedio della nullità di protezione. Nella disciplina dei rapporti connotati da disparità di forza negoziale, il legislatore ha inteso recepire le esigenze del mutato contesto economico, caratterizzato non più dalla centralità della proprietà fondiaria, ma dal dinamismo di un mercato concorrenziale di prodotti e di servizi – di consumo, bancari, finanziari – ove impera la contrattazione asimmetrica; in questo contesto, il bene giuridico più rilevante è l’informazione detenuta dal contraente c.d. forte, nei cui confronti l’altra parte si trova in posizione di strutturale e fisiologica debolezza. La forma diviene così, da vestimentum della dichiarazione negoziale teso a garantire – anzitutto – esigenze di certezza nella circolazione dei beni immobili, uno strumento per ridurre le asimmetrie informative e garantire la trasparenza del contenuto contrattuale, promuovendo, di riflesso, l’ordine, l’efficienza e la competitività del mercato di riferimento. La medesima ratio di tutela del contraente debole ispira la previsione della nullità protettiva, che limita il diritto di azione alla sola parte debole del rapporto. Forma e nullità “di protezione” si prestano così a uno studio congiunto e interconnesso, condotto con specifico riguardo al settore dell’intermediazione finanziaria, che rappresenta un fecondo campo di indagine per l’esame delle criticità connesse al raccordo tra normativa speciale e disciplina generale codicistica. Questa analisi, demandata al formante dottrinale, procede di pari passo con il processo di progressiva rimeditazione delle categorie generali del diritto civile. In questa prospettiva – avallata anche dal recente orientamento della Suprema Corte, che sembra porsi nel solco di una rinnovata giurisprudenza degli interessi – ci si propone di indagare come la valorizzazione, in chiave ermeneutica, del dato funzionale consenta di superare una pretesa intangibilità e immutabilità dei concetti, affinché gli stessi possano arricchirsi di nuovi significati, così da fornire risposte adeguate ai problemi posti dalla moderna realtà economica. Queste riflessioni prendono le mosse dallo studio dell’evoluzione, in senso funzionale, del requisito di forma del contratto, oggetto del primo capitolo. Il secondo capitolo è dedicato all’approfondimento della forma dei contratti finanziari, svolto analizzando i presupposti e i limiti della tutela formale in subiecta materia, nonché l’integrazione della stessa mediante la previsione di specifici obblighi di informazione e di condotta in capo agli intermediari; tra le questioni problematiche sollevate dal requisito di forma, particolare attenzione è dedicata a quella della validità del contratto quadro di investimento recante la sottoscrizione del solo investitore. Il terzo capitolo è incentrato sulla nullità di protezione prevista in relazione ai contratti di investimento: si affronta, in particolare, il tema dei possibili abusi della posizione di vantaggio accordata dall’ordinamento, con specifico riguardo alle azioni di nullità c.d. “selettiva”, cercando di prospettare soluzioni interpretative tese ad evitare che la normativa di protezione finisca per essere piegata disfunzionalmente, nel perseguimento di scopi ulteriori e diversi da quelli che il legislatore ha ritenuto meritevoli di tutela. La valorizzazione della specifica ratio della normativa speciale si rivela idonea, da un lato, a garantire una coerente interpretazione evolutiva degli istituti tradizionali della forma e della nullità; e, dall’altro lato, a prevenire un ricorso opportunistico alla normativa di tutela del contraente debole, suscettibile di produrre effetti distorsivi non solo sul singolo rapporto, ma sul sistema nel suo complesso. Nella specifica materia dell’intermediazione finanziaria, dette considerazioni inducono a ritenere non meritevoli di accoglimento le azioni fondate sulla nullità del contratto quadro, ove esercitate in assenza di un reale vulnus informativo, al solo fine di ottenere la restituzione delle somme impiegate per investimenti rivelatisi svantaggiosi, a prescindere da vizi intrinseci degli stessi sul piano dell’informazione e dell’adeguatezza al profilo di rischio del cliente. L’analisi svolta permette infine di offrire un contributo allo studio dei limiti della tutela formale-informativa, soprattutto nei settori connotati, come quello finanziario, da un’intrinseca ed elevata complessità dei prodotti e dei servizi offerti. Come testimoniato dall’evoluzione normativa e regolamentare, la trasparenza informativa veicolata dal documento contrattuale, ancorché necessaria, non è sufficiente a garantire una tutela sostanziale del contraente debole, che passa necessariamente per l’effettivo rispetto dei doveri di comportamento che gravano sulla controparte professionale.
This study aims to analyze the new formal requirements of contracts introduced by special legislation, together with the connected remedy of “protective nullity”, in the perspective of their respective functions. Through the regulation of relationships with disparity of contractual power, the legislator acknowledged the needs emerging from the changed economic context, where real estate property is no longer central, given the rise of a dynamic, competitive market of products and services, where asymmetric contracts prevail; in this context, the most relevant asset is information, held by the “strong” professional party, towards which the other party is in a position of structural weakness. In this situation, the form of the contract is no longer only aimed at guaranteeing certainty in the circulation of property: it becomes an instrument for reducing information asymmetries and ensuring the transparency of the contractual contents, with consequent promotion of the order, the efficiency and the competitiveness of the relevant market. The same protection purpose inspires the nullity provision, which limits the right of action to the weaker party only. Therefore, the “protective” form and nullity of the contract will be analyzed in a joint and interconnected study, carried out with specific reference to the financial sector, which represents a fertile field of investigation for the examination of the critical issues regarding the connection between special legislation and general rules set forth under the Italian Civil Code. This analysis, to be carried out by doctrine, proceeds together with the process of gradual review of the general categories of civil law. In such perspective, this study investigates how the enhancement of the function of law can contribute to evolve legal categories, in order to provide adequate answers to the problems arising in the modern economic reality. This approach is also endorsed by a recent ruling of the Italian Supreme Court, which seems an expression of a renewed “jurisprudence of interests”. The above-mentioned analysis starts from the study, in the first chapter, of the evolution of the functions of the form of contract. The second chapter is dedicated to the in-depth study of the form of financial contracts, carried out by analyzing the characteristics and limits of formal protection in such field, as well as its integration through the provision of specific information and conduct duties of financial intermediaries. Among the issues which arise from the formal requirement, particular attention is paid to the validity of financial contracts signed only by the investor. The third chapter focuses on the protective nullity provided for investment contracts; it is dedicated, in particular, to the issue of possible abuses of the advantages granted by the legal system to the weaker party, with specific regard to the so-called “selective” claims. The study tries to suggest solutions aimed at avoiding a dysfunctional use of the protective legislation, which occurs when such rules are exploited for purposes other than those envisaged by the legislator. On the one hand, the enhancement of the specific functions of special legislation is useful in order to guarantee a consistent interpretation and a renovation of the traditional legal categories of form and nullity of the contract; on the other hand, such approach allows to prevent an opportunistic use of the rules aimed at protecting the weaker party, which would have disruptive effects not only on individual contractual relationships, but also on the system as a whole. In the specific field of financial intermediation, the considerations above demonstrate the unfairness of legal actions based on the nullity of the financial contract, when proposed in the absence of a real information harm, for the sole purpose of obtaining the return of the sums used for disadvantageous investment transactions, regardless of an actual lack of information or inadequacy to the investor’s risk profile. Lastly, the analysis carried out offers a contribution to the study of the limits of formal protection, especially in sectors such as the financial one, characterized by an intrinsic high complexity of the products and services under offer. In light of the evolution of legislation and regulation, it is now clear that information transparency, conveyed by the contractual document, is necessary but not sufficient to ensure a substantial protection of the weaker party. This outcome inevitably requires the effective compliance with the behavioural duties of the professional party.

An overview of the concept of unequal bargaining power in the realm of contract law and if, when bargaining power is abused, the exceptio doli generalise offered an acceptable remedy.
Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoriua, 2019.
Private Law
LLM
Unrestricted

The historical legal exception, the exceptio doli generalis was widely applied and accepted in the South African law of contract as a justifiable defence by a defendant to recind unfair contracts or contractual terms during the twentieth century. Our courts implemented openended or abstract values of equity and fairness in the substantive law in order to allow a defendant to counter claim for the enforcement of an unfair contract. In spite of the wide application of this defence by our courts, it was put to an end in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas in 1988. The outcome of this judgment created a lacuna in our law for court to consider criteria of fairness and equity in their deliberations when delivering judgments. The universal doctrine of unconscionability which advocates considerations of fairness and equity appeared to have influenced a move towards consumer legislation on a global scale and ultimately to the enactments of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), introduced in 2008 and operational since 31 March 2011. The CPA contains several provisions which appear to revive the application of defences akin to the abolished exceptio doli generalis such as the codification of the consumer's right to "fair and honest dealing" and the right to "fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions" to name but a few. The question that arises and which is explored herein is whether the rights afforded by the CPA constitute the revival of the principles that used to apply in terms of the exceptio doli generalis.
Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2015.
Private Law
LLM
Unrestricted

The exceptio doli generalis, which is the Roman law defence of “bad” faith, in the general form, has , until the decision of Bank of Lisbon and South Africa (SA) (Pty) Ltd, been one of the mechanisms that has been utilised by South African courts to apply abstract values of fairness and equity into the South African substantive law. The exceptio dolis generalis was available to a party in circumstances where the act of bringing the action by the other party constituted an act of “bad” faith. The court in the Bank of Lisbon and South Africa case decided that the exceptio doli generalis had never been received into Roman Dutch law and didn’t accept it as a defence that could be utilised and applied in South African law. After the decision in the Bank of Lisbon case there have been many differing views on whether the exceptio doli generalis can and should still be applied in South African law and concern in legal circles regarding the “gap” that the decision left in our law and the need to develop other means of ensuring greater fairness in the operation of the law of contract through possibly legislative intervention which at a stage was being investigated by the Law Commission. With the introduction of the Consumer Protection Act, Act 68 of 2008, the question which now comes to the fore is whether the Consumer Protection Act is a reintroduction of the exceptio doli generalis or whether the Act is merely a codification of the common law principles and abstract values of public policy/interest and good faith, which could mean one and the same thing. In order for this question to be answered an in depth investigation and study of theexceptio doli generalis, its applicability and development in South African law is required. Such a study is of importance in order for the aim and purpose of the defence to be properly understood. It is also necessary in order to understand how such a defence ties in and is closely linked with the abstract values and concepts of good faith and public policy/interest, which we have seen courts recognise in decisions subsequent to the Bank of Lisbon and South Africa case. Once this question is answered, attention will be turned to the Consumer Protection Act, its provisions and the effect thereof, and whether such provisions amount to the reintroduction of the exceptio dolis generalis but in an indirect way by the codification of the concepts of public policy/interest and good faith, which in turn could be the exceptio dolis generalis just called by a different name. The answer to this research question is very relevant and of extreme significance. It could mean that the South African legislature eventually got to doing what the legal profession has been asking of it for years and that is to put clarity on the defence of the exceptio doli generalis.
Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013.
Private Law
unrestricted

This dissertation considers the impact of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (hereafter ‘CPA’) on contractual claims, and specifically whether the exceptio doli generalis is being reintroduced in the South African legal system. This dissertation illustrates that although the CPA improves the position of the consumer in many ways, the legislature should have drafted some provisions more carefully which could have resulted in clarifying some vital issues. Many terms and principles introduced by the CPA are foreign to the South African legal system. Although practice and precedent will eventually provide solutions to many of the practical difficulties currently experienced, it will take time and money to do so. It is therefore submitted that some areas should be reconsidered for amendment by the legislature in order to allow this significant piece of legislation to operate optimally Ultimately, two sets of conclusions can be drawn in this dissertation. Firstly, the general conclusions relating to whether the defence of the exceptio doli generalis has been reintroduced in the South African legal system by the CPA and, secondly, whether the exceptio doli generalis is in line with our constitutional values and in line with the current rules for the interpretation of contracts. Although the Courts have abolished the defence ofexceptio doli generalis, it seems as if the CPA has reintroduced this defence.
Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013.
Private Law
unrestricted

A landmark moment in the history of South African contract law was the emphatic interment of the exceptio doli generalis by Joubert JA in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA580 (A). Throughout most of the twentieth century, the exceptio doli generalis had been viewed as an equitable defence that allowed a defendant to resist a claim for performance under a contract when there was something unconscionable about the plaintiff's seeking to enforce the contract (or a clause thereof) in the specific circumstances of that case (see A J Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 637ff; P J Aronstam 'Unconscionable contracts: The South African solution?' (1979) 42 THRHR 21; P van Warmelo 'Exceptio doli' 1981 De Jure 202).

The question to which this study will attempt to find a satisfactory answer, is whether the new Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA) has revived the abolished exceptio doli generalis. The exceptio doli was introduced in about 66 BC by the praetor Gaius Aquilius Gallus. An exceptio was a legal defence to a claim. The exceptio doli required the judge to take account of the fraud of which the plaintiff had been guilty of at the time of concluding the transaction, or of the dolus of which the plaintiff was guilty in actually instituting the action. It appears that the provisions of sections 40, 41 and 48 of the CPA reaffirm the existence of the exceptio doli generalis in the South African law of contract, since these provisions provide the same function and outcome that defence did. The section that speaks to the heart of the exceptio doli generalis, is section 40(1) which provides that a supplier or an agent of the supplier must not use physical force, coercion, undue influence, pressure, duress or harassment, unfair tactics or any other similar conduct, in connection with the supply of services to a consumer and also in the negotiation, conclusion, execution or enforcement of an agreement. Section 52 of the Act deals with contraventions of sections 40, 41 and 48 of the Act. It grants the ordinary courts the power to declare agreements, in whole or in part, unfair or unconscionable. That only the ordinary courts would have jurisdiction in respect of unfair contract terms, is not stated unequivocally, but is implicit in the absence of any reference to the NCT or provincial consumer courts in section 52. It is a well-known fact that the costs, risks and effort of court action are just too high for ordinary consumers, including middle class consumers. For this reason it is unlikely that this legislation in its current form will have a real impact on the eradication of unfair contract enforcement. What is suggested, is an amendment to section 52 in order to bestow jurisdiction on the NCT and the consumer courts as well may also make any further order it considers just and As an alternative to the amendment of section 52, it is submitted that the legislature should create a statutory rule, because it seems that the exceptio doli generalis as well as the CPA are not up to the task. What is suggested, is legislation that deals specifically and exclusively with unreasonableness, unconscionableness and oppressiveness in contracts or terms of contract. The enactment of legislation dealing specifically with the problems previously dealt with by applying the exceptio doli generalis, will ensure that legal certainty is created as to the availability of a remedy in circumstances where the enforcement of a contract is unfair. This is in accordance with the proposal made by the South African Law Commission’s Project 47.
Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012.
Private Law
LLM
Unrestricted

The title 50.17 of Justinian’s Digest lists many juristic rules (regulae iuris). One of these juristic rules, which can be found in D. 50.17.173.3, reads as follows: dolo facit, qui petit quod redditurus est. An application of this rule is described in D. 44.4.8.1, which deals with a problem in the context of the law of succession. Due to the rule’s character as a general rule, there must have been more cases in which an exceptio doli was granted because of dolo facit, qui petit quod redditurus est. However, it is difficult to find other cases of dolo facit, qui petit quod redditurus est, as no further direct evidence was cited in the Digest of Justinian. In this paper, I examine whether or not the exceptio doli referred to in D. 21.2.73 is a consequence of dolo facit, qui petit quod redditurus est.