To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms.
Journal articles on the topic 'Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
ZAGGL, MICHAEL A. "Eleven mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation." Journal of Institutional Economics 10, no. 2 (December 23, 2013): 197–230. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137413000374.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract:Cooperation is one of the basic elements of social life. It is essential for emergent social phenomena, such as the formation of families, groups, and societies. However, evolutionary forces counter cooperation. The trait of supporting others is dominated by selfish behavior. In the last few decades scientists, in particular biologists, achieved extraordinary progress regarding the question of how cooperation is possible despite of evolutionary forces. This produced an enormous amount of literature. This paper identifies and reviews the known solutions explaining cooperation under evolutionary forces. Using bibliometric methods in combination with extant review articles and traditional reviewing of original literature, it is possible to isolate 11 mechanisms of cooperation under the conditions of evolution. Developing a categorization of the mechanisms according to shared characteristics establishes a fundamental framework for institutional and mechanism design activities. Implications for future research paths are identified, in particular for the mechanism of indirect reciprocity.
2
Yan, Jinyuan, Hilary Monaco, and Joao B. Xavier. "The Ultimate Guide to Bacterial Swarming: An Experimental Model to Study the Evolution of Cooperative Behavior." Annual Review of Microbiology 73, no. 1 (September 8, 2019): 293–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-micro-020518-120033.
Full textAbstract:
Cooperation has fascinated biologists since Darwin. How did cooperative behaviors evolve despite the fitness cost to the cooperator? Bacteria have cooperative behaviors that make excellent models to take on this age-old problem from both proximate (molecular) and ultimate (evolutionary) angles. We delve into Pseudomonas aeruginosa swarming, a phenomenon where billions of bacteria move cooperatively across distances of centimeters in a matter of a few hours. Experiments with swarming have unveiled a strategy called metabolic prudence that stabilizes cooperation, have showed the importance of spatial structure, and have revealed a regulatory network that integrates environmental stimuli and direct cooperative behavior, similar to a machine learning algorithm. The study of swarming elucidates more than proximate mechanisms: It exposes ultimate mechanisms valid to all scales, from cells in cancerous tumors to animals in large communities.
3
Salimi Sartakhti, Javad, and Fatemeh Stodt. "Ecological Dynamics and Evolution of Cooperation in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks." Telecom 4, no. 2 (April 25, 2023): 236–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/telecom4020014.
Full textAbstract:
In Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), promoting cooperative behavior is a challenging problem for mechanism designers. Cooperative actions, such as disseminating data, can seem at odds with rationality and may benefit other vehicles at a cost to oneself. Without additional mechanisms, it is expected that cooperative behavior in the population will decrease and eventually disappear. Classical game theoretical models for cooperation, such as the public goods game, predict this outcome, but they assume fixed population sizes and overlook the ecological dynamics of the interacting vehicles. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary public goods game that incorporates VANET ecological dynamics and offers new insights for promoting cooperation. Our model considers free spaces, population density, departure rates of vehicles, and randomly composed groups for each data sender. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that higher population densities and departure rates, due to minimum differences between pay-offs of vehicles, promote cooperative behavior. This feedback between ecological dynamics and evolutionary game dynamics leads to interesting results. Our proposed model demonstrates a new extension of evolutionary dynamics to vehicles of varying densities. We show that it is possible to promote cooperation in VANETs without the need for any supporting mechanisms. Future research can investigate the potential for using this model in practical settings.
4
Brosnan, Sarah F., and Redouan Bshary. "Cooperation and deception: from evolution to mechanisms." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365, no. 1553 (September 12, 2010): 2593–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0155.
Full textAbstract:
Nature is full of struggle, as predicted by the theory of evolution through natural selection, yet there are also paramount examples where individuals help each other. These instances of helping have been difficult to reconcile with Darwin's theory because it is not always obvious how individuals are working for their own direct benefit. Consequently, initial publications that offered solutions to subsets of the observed cases of helping, such as kin selection or reciprocity, are among the most influential and most cited papers in evolution/behavioural ecology. During the last few years, a wave of new studies and concepts has considerably advanced our understanding of the conditions under which individuals are selected to help others. On the empirical side, advances are due to stronger incorporation of the natural history of each study species and an emphasis on proximate questions regarding decision-making processes. In parallel, theorists have provided more realistic models together with an increased exploration of the importance of life history and ecology in understanding cooperation. The ideas presented by the authors of this volume represent, in many ways, the revolutionary new approach to studying behaviour which is currently underway.
5
Iyer, Swami, and Timothy Killingback. "Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Assortative Interactions." Games 11, no. 4 (September 23, 2020): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g11040041.
Full textAbstract:
Cooperation in social dilemmas plays a pivotal role in the formation of systems at all levels of complexity, from replicating molecules to multi-cellular organisms to human and animal societies. In spite of its ubiquity, the origin and stability of cooperation pose an evolutionary conundrum, since cooperation, though beneficial to others, is costly to the individual cooperator. Thus natural selection would be expected to favor selfish behavior in which individuals reap the benefits of cooperation without bearing the costs of cooperating themselves. Many proximate mechanisms have been proposed to account for the origin and maintenance of cooperation, including kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and evolution in structured populations. Despite the apparent diversity of these approaches they all share a unified underlying logic: namely, each mechanism results in assortative interactions in which individuals using the same strategy interact with a higher probability than they would at random. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in both discrete strategy and continuous strategy social dilemmas with assortative interactions. For the sake of tractability, assortativity is modeled by an individual interacting with another of the same type with probability r and interacting with a random individual in the population with probability 1−r, where r is a parameter that characterizes the degree of assortativity in the system. For discrete strategy social dilemmas we use both a generalization of replicator dynamics and individual-based simulations to elucidate the donation, snowdrift, and sculling games with assortative interactions, and determine the analogs of Hamilton’s rule, which govern the evolution of cooperation in these games. For continuous strategy social dilemmas we employ both a generalization of deterministic adaptive dynamics and individual-based simulations to study the donation, snowdrift, and tragedy of the commons games, and determine the effect of assortativity on the emergence and stability of cooperation.
6
Uchida, Satoshi, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada, and Tatsuya Sasaki. "Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory." Games 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2019): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10010011.
Full textAbstract:
Social dilemmas are among the most puzzling issues in the biological and social sciences. Extensive theoretical efforts have been made in various realms such as economics, biology, mathematics, and even physics to figure out solution mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional punishment, have been exploited as effective mechanisms. So far, mechanisms that enable peer punishment to function as a solution to the social dilemma remain unclear. In this paper, we propose a theoretical way for peer punishment to work as a solution mechanism for the dilemma by incorporating prospect theory into evolutionary game theory. Prospect theory models human beings as agents that estimate small probabilities and loss of profit as greater than they actually are; thus, those agents feel that punishments are more frequent and harsher than they really are. We show that this kind of cognitive distortion makes players decide to cooperate to avoid being punished and that the cooperative state achieved by this mechanism is globally stable as well as evolutionarily stable in a wide range of parameter values.
7
Campennì, Marco, and Gabriele Schino. "Symmetry-based reciprocity: evolutionary constraints on a proximate mechanism." PeerJ 4 (March 15, 2016): e1812. http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj.1812.
Full textAbstract:
Background.While the evolution of reciprocal cooperation has attracted an enormous attention, the proximate mechanisms underlying the ability of animals to cooperate reciprocally are comparatively neglected. Symmetry-based reciprocity is a hypothetical proximate mechanism that has been suggested to be widespread among cognitively unsophisticated animals.Methods.We developed two agent-based models of symmetry-based reciprocity (one relying on an arbitrary tag and the other on interindividual proximity) and tested their ability both to reproduce significant emergent features of cooperation in group living animals and to promote the evolution of cooperation.Results.Populations formed by agents adopting symmetry-based reciprocity showed differentiated “social relationships” and a positive correlation between cooperation given and received: two common aspects of animal cooperation. However, when reproduction and selection across multiple generations were added to the models, agents adopting symmetry-based reciprocity were outcompeted by selfish agents that never cooperated.Discussion.In order to evolve, hypothetical proximate mechanisms must be able to stand competition from alternative strategies. While the results of our simulations require confirmation using analytical methods, we provisionally suggest symmetry-based reciprocity is to be abandoned as a possible proximate mechanism underlying the ability of animals to reciprocate cooperative interactions.
8
Gilby, Ian C. "Cooperation in primates and humans: Mechanisms and evolution." American Journal of Physical Anthropology 132, no. 3 (March 2007): 486–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajpa.20523.
Full text
9
van den Berg, Pieter, and Franz J. Weissing. "The importance of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 282, no. 1813 (August 22, 2015): 20151382. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.1382.
Full textAbstract:
Studies aimed at explaining the evolution of phenotypic traits have often solely focused on fitness considerations, ignoring underlying mechanisms. In recent years, there has been an increasing call for integrating mechanistic perspectives in evolutionary considerations, but it is not clear whether and how mechanisms affect the course and outcome of evolution. To study this, we compare four mechanistic implementations of two well-studied models for the evolution of cooperation, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game and the Iterated Snowdrift (ISD) game. Behavioural strategies are either implemented by a 1 : 1 genotype–phenotype mapping or by a simple neural network. Moreover, we consider two different scenarios for the effect of mutations. The same set of strategies is feasible in all four implementations, but the probability that a given strategy arises owing to mutation is largely dependent on the behavioural and genetic architecture. Our individual-based simulations show that this has major implications for the evolutionary outcome. In the ISD, different evolutionarily stable strategies are predominant in the four implementations, while in the IPD each implementation creates a characteristic dynamical pattern. As a consequence, the evolved average level of cooperation is also strongly dependent on the underlying mechanism. We argue that our findings are of general relevance for the evolution of social behaviour, pleading for the integration of a mechanistic perspective in models of social evolution.
10
White, Stephan. "The Evolution of Morality." PARADIGMI, no. 1 (May 2012): 173–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2012-001010.
Full textAbstract:
It seems clear that cooperation when cheating would go undetected - for example, in many-person prisoner's dilemmas or "tragedy of the commons" cases - is a precondition of the functioning of modern social institutions. Such cooperation seems difficult to explain in evolutionary terms, however, since those who are disposed to cheat seem to enjoy a systematic advantage relative to those who are not. Further- more, the appeal to mechanisms for the detection and punishment of noncooperation, since those mechanisms themselves presuppose cooperation, merely pushes the problem one step back. In this paper I argue that morality plays an ineliminable role in the explanation of the forms of cooperation in question. Moreover, I provide a schema for the evolution of morality in the face of the advantages that those disposed to cheat apparently enjoy.
11
Chomicki, Guillaume, Gijsbert D. A. Werner, Stuart A. West, and E. Toby Kiers. "Compartmentalization drives the evolution of symbiotic cooperation." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 375, no. 1808 (August 10, 2020): 20190602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0602.
Full textAbstract:
Across the tree of life, hosts have evolved mechanisms to control and mediate interactions with symbiotic partners. We suggest that the evolution of physical structures that allow hosts to spatially separate symbionts, termed compartmentalization, is a common mechanism used by hosts. Such compartmentalization allows hosts to: (i) isolate symbionts and control their reproduction; (ii) reward cooperative symbionts and punish or stop interactions with non-cooperative symbionts; and (iii) reduce direct conflict among different symbionts strains in a single host. Compartmentalization has allowed hosts to increase the benefits that they obtain from symbiotic partners across a diversity of interactions, including legumes and rhizobia, plants and fungi, squid and Vibrio , insects and nutrient provisioning bacteria, plants and insects, and the human microbiome. In cases where compartmentalization has not evolved, we ask why not. We argue that when partners interact in a competitive hierarchy, or when hosts engage in partnerships which are less costly, compartmentalization is less likely to evolve. We conclude that compartmentalization is key to understanding the evolution of symbiotic cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The role of the microbiome in host evolution’.
12
Okada, Isamu. "Evolution of cooperative study." Impact 2020, no. 8 (December 16, 2020): 76–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.21820/23987073.2020.8.76.
Full textAbstract:
Associate Professor Isamu Okada is based at the Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University in Japan, as well as a visiting professor of Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics and Business in Austria. Okada has dedicated his career to understanding more about the evolution of cooperation which is a strand of thought that falls under evolutionary biology. Academics around the world have long considered the issues relating to the evolution of cooperation. In these studies, cooperation is taken to mean providing benefits to others by paying some kind of cost, whether that be money, time, effort, etc. One of the most fascinating aspects of the theory is that rational thought holds a person has no incentive to cooperate. Indeed, despite decades of research and huge numbers of studies, a rational reason for cooperating has still not been cultivated properly. One of the mechanisms that lie behind cooperation are known as reciprocity and there are many different types. Three specific types have been studied in great detail; direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and network reciprocity. Okada's team has conducted investigations that shine new light on indirect reciprocity which could open up new directions for the field of evolutionary biology.
13
Ito, Hiromu, and Jun Tanimoto. "Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation." Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 8 (August 2020): 200891. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.200891.
Full textAbstract:
Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.
14
Li, Hui, Jing Xiao Zhang, and Tian Hua Zhou. "Partner Cooperation and Competition Game of Energy-Saving Chain in Building Engineering and Cooperation Promotion Mechanism." Advanced Materials Research 433-440 (January 2012): 6819–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.433-440.6819.
Full textAbstract:
By describing the relation between business partners in the energy-saving chain of building engineering, this paper revealed the formation and evolution of business partner relationship in the energy-saving chain of building engineering, proposed the selection method of business partner, and made discussion on the game model of cooperation and competition between participants when at least one party was active participant, and then put forward multiple feasible mechanisms to promote the cooperation in energy-saving chain of building, including reward and punishment mechanism, supervision mechanism, reputation mechanism and so on.
15
Dahanukar, Neelesh, and Milind Watve. "Group Selection and Reciprocity among Kin." Open Biology Journal 2, no. 1 (July 8, 2009): 66–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2174/1874196700902010066.
Full textAbstract:
The question how Darwinian mechanisms lead to the evolution of individually costly cooperative behavior has given rise to a number of hypotheses. However, attempts to build a synthesis where different types of mechanisms coexist and interact at different levels of selections are still scarce. Here we derive simple game theoretical models where the group level conflicts are resolved by group selection while simultaneously within group competition is resolved by kin selection and reciprocity. We show that none of the mechanisms, when alone, is as robust in evolving and maintaining cooperation as a synthesis of all. Furthermore, we show that initially within group conflicts can be overcome only by kin selection and not reciprocity. However, once common, different types of reciprocities can maintain high levels of cooperation even if average relatedness among individuals is lowered, groups become large, and the benefits of cooperation are reduced. Based on the synthesis we also propose a possible route to the evolution of social and eusocial systems.
16
Zhuang, Lei, Han Zhou, and Tingqiang Chen. "An Evolution Model of Fintech Supports Technology-Based SMEs Innovation and Growth." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2022 (April 18, 2022): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/6867404.
Full textAbstract:
The survival and growth of technology-based small and medium-sized enterprises are faced with a complex and changeable market environment. Introducing the role of fintech, the paper builds an evolutionary model for growth of technology-based SMEs and analyzes fintech incentive mechanisms to guide corporate growth strategies based on some cases by the simulation. The research results show that the evolutionary game strategy that SMEs are willing to adopt is {cooperation, cooperation}. And, under the incentive mechanism of fintech, the evolutionary game strategy adopted by SMEs and fintech institutions is {cooperation, cooperation, participation}. In the growth of fintech institutions serving technology-based SMEs, the selection strategy of SMEs is more sensitive to changes in fintech institutions’ willingness to participate in cooperation, cooperation costs, and cooperation benefits. The selection strategy of fintech institutions is more affected by changes in cooperation costs and incentive funds during the process of participating in cooperation.
17
YEUNG, DAVID W. K. "SOLUTION MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES." International Game Theory Review 08, no. 02 (June 2006): 309–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000916.
Full textAbstract:
Cooperative stochastic differential games constitute a highly complex form of decision making under uncertainty. In particular, interactions between strategic behaviors, dynamic evolution, stochastic elements and solution agreement have to be considered simultaneously. This complexity leads to great difficulties in the derivation of dynamically stable solutions. Despite urgent calls for cooperation in the global economy, the lack of formal analyses has precluded rigorous analysis of this problem. In this paper, mechanisms for the derivation of dynamically stable solutions to cooperative stochastic differential games are presented. Games with transferable payoffs and those with nontransferable payoffs are considered. Numerical illustrations are also provided.
18
Salahshour, Mohammad. "Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment." PLOS ONE 16, no. 8 (August 6, 2021): e0254860. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254860.
Full textAbstract:
A large body of empirical evidence suggests that altruistic punishment abounds in human societies. Based on such evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting cooperation in humans and possibly other species. However, as punishment is costly, its evolution is subject to the same problem that it tries to address. To suppress this so-called second-order free-rider problem, known theoretical models on the evolution of punishment resort to one of the few established mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. This leaves the question of whether altruistic punishment can evolve and give rise to the evolution of cooperation in the absence of such auxiliary cooperation-favoring mechanisms unaddressed. Here, by considering a population of individuals who play a public goods game, followed by a public punishing game, introduced here, we show that altruistic punishment indeed evolves and promotes cooperation in the absence of a cooperation-favoring mechanism. In our model, the punishment pool is considered a public resource whose resources are used for punishment. We show that the evolution of a punishing institution is facilitated when resources in the punishment pool, instead of being wasted, are used to reward punishers when there is nobody to punish. Besides, we show that higher returns to the public resource or punishment pool facilitate the evolution of prosocial instead of antisocial punishment. We also show that an optimal cost of investment in the punishment pool facilitates the evolution of prosocial punishment. Finally, our analysis shows that being close to a physical phase transition facilitates the evolution of altruistic punishment.
19
Stevens, Jeffrey R., Fiery A. Cushman, and Marc D. Hauser. "Evolving the Psychological Mechanisms for Cooperation." Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics 36, no. 1 (December 2005): 499–518. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ecolsys.36.113004.083814.
Full text
20
Bespakhotniy, Gennadiy V. "Evolution of organizational forms of integration and cooperation in agro-industrial complex." Economy of agricultural and processing enterprises, no. 12 (2021): 6–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.31442/0235-2494-2021-0-12-6-11.
Full textAbstract:
The article examines the features of integration processes in the agro-industrial complex of the Russian Federation at various stages of agricultural policy. The main models of integration and cooperative associations in the Soviet period and in the period of market reforms are analyzed. The forms of integration in modern Russia and the reasons for the insufficient development of cooperative forms are determined. The directions of improving the mechanisms for the development of cooperation and integration are proposed.
21
Sun, Peiyuan, Xuesong Liu, Enze Wang, Mingfeng He, and Qiuhui Pan. "Evolution of cooperation in a spatial structure with compensation mechanisms." Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 104 (November 2017): 503–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2017.09.011.
Full text
22
Soares, Marta C., Redouan Bshary, Leonida Fusani, Wolfgang Goymann, Michaela Hau, Katharina Hirschenhauser, and Rui F. Oliveira. "Hormonal mechanisms of cooperative behaviour." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365, no. 1553 (September 12, 2010): 2737–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0151.
Full textAbstract:
Research on the diversity, evolution and stability of cooperative behaviour has generated a considerable body of work. As concepts simplify the real world, theoretical solutions are typically also simple. Real behaviour, in contrast, is often much more diverse. Such diversity, which is increasingly acknowledged to help in stabilizing cooperative outcomes, warrants detailed research about the proximate mechanisms underlying decision-making. Our aim here is to focus on the potential role of neuroendocrine mechanisms on the regulation of the expression of cooperative behaviour in vertebrates. We first provide a brief introduction into the neuroendocrine basis of social behaviour. We then evaluate how hormones may influence known cognitive modules that are involved in decision-making processes that may lead to cooperative behaviour. Based on this evaluation, we will discuss specific examples of how hormones may contribute to the variability of cooperative behaviour at three different levels: (i) within an individual; (ii) between individuals and (iii) between species. We hope that these ideas spur increased research on the behavioural endocrinology of cooperation.
23
Shibasaki, Shota, and Masakazu Shimada. "Cyclic dominance emerges from the evolution of two inter-linked cooperative behaviours in the social amoeba." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 285, no. 1881 (June 20, 2018): 20180905. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.0905.
Full textAbstract:
Evolution of cooperation has been one of the most important problems in sociobiology, and many researchers have revealed mechanisms that can facilitate the evolution of cooperation. However, most studies deal only with one cooperative behaviour, even though some organisms perform two or more cooperative behaviours. The social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum performs two cooperative behaviours in starvation: fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. Here, we constructed a model that couples these two behaviours, and we found that the two behaviours are maintained because of the emergence of cyclic dominance, although cooperation cannot evolve if only either of the two behaviours is performed. The common chemoattractant cyclic adenosine 3′,5′-monophosphate (cAMP) is used in both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation, providing a biological context for this coupling. Cyclic dominance emerges regardless of the existence of mating types or spatial structure in the model. In addition, cooperation can re-emerge in the population even after it goes extinct. These results indicate that the two cooperative behaviours of the social amoeba are maintained because of the common chemical signal that underlies both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. We demonstrate the importance of coupling multiple games when the underlying behaviours are associated with one another.
24
Lewin-Epstein, Ohad, and Lilach Hadany. "Host–microbiome coevolution can promote cooperation in a rock–paper–scissors dynamics." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 287, no. 1920 (February 12, 2020): 20192754. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.2754.
Full textAbstract:
Cooperation is a fundamental behaviour observed in all forms of life. The evolution of cooperation has been widely studied, but almost all theories focused on the cooperating individual and its genes. We suggest a different approach, taking into account the microbes carried by the interacting individuals. Accumulating evidence reveals that microbes can affect their host's well-being and behaviour, yet hosts can evolve mechanisms to resist the manipulations of their microbes. We thus propose that coevolution of microbes with their hosts may favour microbes that induce their host to cooperate. Using computational modelling, we show that microbe-induced cooperation can evolve and be maintained in a wide range of conditions, including when facing hosts' resistance to the microbial effect. We find that host–microbe coevolution leads the population to a rock–paper–scissors dynamics that enables maintenance of cooperation in a polymorphic state. Our results suggest a mechanism for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation that may be relevant to a wide variety of organisms, including cases that are difficult to explain by current theories. This study provides a new perspective on the coevolution of hosts and their microbiome, emphasizing the potential role of microbes in shaping their host's behaviour.
25
Carlson, Christopher, Erol Akçay, and Bryce Morsky. "The evolution of partner specificity in mutualisms." Evolution 77, no. 3 (December 21, 2022): 881–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/evolut/qpac056.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Mutualistic species vary in their level of partner specificity, which has important evolutionary, ecological, and management implications. Yet, the evolutionary mechanisms which underpin partner specificity are not fully understood. Most work on specialization focuses on the trade-off between generalism and specialism, where specialists receive more benefits from preferred partners at the expense of benefits from non-preferred partners, while generalists receive similar benefits from all partners. Because all mutualisms involve some degree of both cooperation and conflict between partners, we highlight that specialization to a mutualistic partner can be cooperative, increasing benefit to a focal species and a partner, or antagonistic, increasing resource extraction by a focal species from a partner. We devise an evolutionary game theoretic model to assess the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative specialization, antagonistic specialization, and generalism. Our model shows that cooperative specialization leads to bistability: stable equilibria with a specialist host and its preferred partner excluding all others. We also show that under cooperative specialization with spatial effects, generalists can thrive at the boundaries between differing specialist patches. Under antagonistic specialization, generalism is evolutionarily stable. We provide predictions for how a cooperation-antagonism continuum may determine the patterns of partner specificity that develop within mutualistic relationships.
26
Ding, Yangke, Lei Ma, Ye Zhang, and Dingzhong Feng. "Analysis of Evolution Mechanism and Optimal Reward-Penalty Mechanism for Collection Strategies in Reverse Supply Chains: The Case of Waste Mobile Phones in China." Sustainability 10, no. 12 (December 12, 2018): 4744. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su10124744.
Full textAbstract:
The aim of this paper is to discuss the coopetition (cooperative competition) relationship between a manufacturer and a collector in the collection of waste mobile phones (WMPs) and examine the evolution mechanism and the internal reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) for their collection strategies. A coopetition evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory was developed to obtain their common and evolutional collection strategies. The pure-strategy Nash equilibriums of this model were obtained which showed their collection strategy choices of perfect competition or cooperation. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was obtained which revealed evolution trends and laws. In addition, the optimal RPM was obtained in the sensitivity analysis of related parameters. The example of WMPs in China was taken to examine the simulation of the RPM. Results show that (i) although the manufacturer and the collector may change their strategies of cooperation and competition over time, cooperation is their best choice to increase payoffs; (ii) the optimal RPM is beneficial to propel their cooperation tendency and then to increase their payoffs.
27
Hauert, Christoph, Miranda Holmes, and Michael Doebeli. "Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 273, no. 1600 (July 5, 2006): 2565–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2006.3600.
Full textAbstract:
The emergence and abundance of cooperation in nature poses a tenacious and challenging puzzle to evolutionary biology. Cooperative behaviour seems to contradict Darwinian evolution because altruistic individuals increase the fitness of other members of the population at a cost to themselves. Thus, in the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperation should decrease and vanish, as predicted by classical models for cooperation in evolutionary game theory, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Traditional approaches to studying the problem of cooperation assume constant population sizes and thus neglect the ecology of the interacting individuals. Here, we incorporate ecological dynamics into evolutionary games and reveal a new mechanism for maintaining cooperation. In public goods games, cooperation can gain a foothold if the population density depends on the average population payoff. Decreasing population densities, due to defection leading to small payoffs, results in smaller interaction group sizes in which cooperation can be favoured. This feedback between ecological dynamics and game dynamics can generate stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors in public goods games. However, this mechanism fails for pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma interactions and the population is driven to extinction. Our model represents natural extension of replicator dynamics to populations of varying densities.
28
Schweinfurth, Manon K., and Michael Taborsky. "Relatedness decreases and reciprocity increases cooperation in Norway rats." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 285, no. 1874 (March 7, 2018): 20180035. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.0035.
Full textAbstract:
Kin selection and reciprocity are two mechanisms underlying the evolution of cooperation, but the relative importance of kinship and reciprocity for decisions to cooperate are yet unclear for most cases of cooperation. Here, we experimentally tested the relative importance of relatedness and received cooperation for decisions to help a conspecific in wild-type Norway rats ( Rattus norvegicus ). Test rats provided more food to non-kin than to siblings, and they generally donated more food to previously helpful social partners than to those that had refused help. The rats thus applied reciprocal cooperation rules irrespective of relatedness, highlighting the importance of reciprocal help for cooperative interactions among both related and unrelated conspecifics.
29
Shirogane, Yuta, Shumpei Watanabe, and Yusuke Yanagi. "Cooperation: another mechanism of viral evolution." Trends in Microbiology 21, no. 7 (July 2013): 320–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tim.2013.05.004.
Full text
30
Hidetaka, Yoshimatsu. "Political Leadership, Informality, and Regional Integration in East Asia: The Evolution of Asean Plus Three." European Journal of East Asian Studies 4, no. 2 (2005): 205–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157006105774711477.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractSince the late 1990s, moves towards regional integration and cooperation have gained momentum in East Asia. The regional countries have expanded and deepened integration initiatives under the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework that consists of ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea. What factors have promoted the development of regional integration and economic cooperation in the region? This article addresses this question in terms of collectively shared norms and political leadership. Informality, a representative common norm, played a catalytic role in first nurturing communication for regional cooperation and inducing a reluctant state to join the cooperative framework. Importantly, the development of regional cooperation under the APT framework was accompanied by a shift in emphasis from informal to formal settings. Moreover, leadership shown by China and Japan has played a crucial role in promoting the regional integration initiatives. While China has taken the initiative in propelling regional free trade agreements and economic development and integration in the Indochina countries, Japan has taken the lead in developing financial and monetary architectures and other cooperative mechanisms. Rivalry for political leadership has induced the two countries to provide regional public goods in a positive-sum game manner.
31
Gerrish, Philip J., and Claudia P. Ferreira. "A thermodynamic limit constrains complexity and primitive social function." International Journal of Astrobiology 18, no. 4 (June 13, 2018): 329–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1473550418000149.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe evolutionary trend toward increasing complexity and social function is ultimately the result of natural selection's paradoxical tendency to foster cooperation through competition. Cooperating populations ranging from complex societies to somatic tissue are constantly under attack, however, by non-cooperating mutants or transformants, called ‘cheaters’. Structure in these populations promotes the formation of cooperating clusters whose competitive superiority can alone be sufficient to thwart outgrowths of cheaters and thereby maintain cooperation. But we find that when cheaters appear too frequently – exceeding a threshold mutation or transformation rate – their scattered outgrowths infiltrate and break up cooperating clusters, resulting in a cascading loss of social cohesiveness, a switch to net positive selection for cheaters and ultimately in the loss of cooperation. Our findings imply that a critically low mutation rate had to be achieved (perhaps through the advent of proofreading and repair mechanisms) before complex cooperative functions, such as those required for multicellularity and social behaviour, could have evolved and persisted. When mutation rate in our model is also allowed to evolve, the threshold is crossed spontaneously after thousands of generations, at which point cheaters rapidly invade. Probing extrapolations of these findings suggest: (1) in somatic tissue, it is neither social retro-evolution alone nor mutation rate evolution alone but the interplay between these two that ultimately leads to oncogenic transitions; the rate of this coevolution might thereby provide an indicator of lifespan of species, terrestrial or not; (2) the likelihood that extraterrestrial life can be expected to be multicellular and social should be affected by ultraviolet and other mutagenic factors.
32
Yu, Minggang, Ming He, Ziyu Ma, Mingguang Zou, Lei Wan, and Kai Kang. "Cooperative Evolution Mechanism of Unmanned Swarm within the Framework of Public Goods Game." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2021 (April 5, 2021): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5575815.
Full textAbstract:
One of the key advantages of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. When the communication is interrupted or the centralized control manner is lost, the cooperative operation can still be carried out orderly. This work proposed a cooperative evolution mechanism within the framework of multiplayer public goods game to solve the problem of autonomous collaboration of unmanned swarm in case of failure of centralized control. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous cooperation in unmanned swarm, and then, the evolutionary game model of multiplayer public goods based on aspiration-driven dynamics is established. On this basis, the average abundance function is constructed by theoretical derivation, and furthermore, the influence of cost, multiplication factor, and aspiration level on the average abundance is simulated. Finally, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via case study, and deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.
33
Bergmüller, Ralph, Roger Schürch, and Ian M. Hamilton. "Evolutionary causes and consequences of consistent individual variation in cooperative behaviour." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365, no. 1553 (September 12, 2010): 2751–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0124.
Full textAbstract:
Behaviour is typically regarded as among the most flexible of animal phenotypic traits. In particular, expression of cooperative behaviour is often assumed to be conditional upon the behaviours of others. This flexibility is a key component of many hypothesized mechanisms favouring the evolution of cooperative behaviour. However, evidence shows that cooperative behaviours are often less flexible than expected and that, in many species, individuals show consistent differences in the amount and type of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviours displayed. This phenomenon is known as ‘animal personality’ or a ‘behavioural syndrome’. Animal personality is evolutionarily relevant, as it typically shows heritable variation and can entail fitness consequences, and hence, is subject to evolutionary change. Here, we review the empirical evidence for individual variation in cooperative behaviour across taxa, we examine the evolutionary processes that have been invoked to explain the existence of individual variation in cooperative behaviour and we discuss the consequences of consistent individual differences on the evolutionary stability of cooperation. We highlight that consistent individual variation in cooperativeness can both stabilize or disrupt cooperation in populations. We conclude that recognizing the existence of consistent individual differences in cooperativeness is essential for an understanding of the evolution and prevalence of cooperation.
34
QIU, T., C. F. FU, and G. CHEN. "HERDING EFFECT FOR THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN THE SNOWDRIFT GAME." International Journal of Modern Physics B 22, no. 27 (October 30, 2008): 4909–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217979208049121.
Full textAbstract:
We study the herding mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game. By controlling the herding parameter a, which measures the herding behavior of players, we investigate the cooperative frequency fc on the payoff r. It is found that, for a small a, large clusters are formed and the system shows an intermediate level cooperation up to a big payoff r. However, as a increases, clusters become smaller, and cooperation decreases faster. When a is large, up to a critical value of about a* = 0.5, most players stay alone, each as a separate cluster, and no cooperation occurs. This phenomenon indicates that an individual favors defection, while group selection favors cooperation.
35
Wang, Qing’e, Wei Lai, Mengmeng Ding, and Qi Qiu. "Research on Cooperative Behavior of Green Technology Innovation in Construction Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game." Buildings 12, no. 1 (December 28, 2021): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/buildings12010019.
Full textAbstract:
The dynamic evolution game model is built by using evolutionary game theory, and the evolutionarily stable strategy is analyzed by matlab2018b software in this paper. The cooperation willingness, sharing level, income distribution, and punishment mechanism are comprehensively considered in this model, and numerical simulations of the influence of various influencing factors on the cooperation strategy selection of green technology innovation for construction enterprises are carried out. Then, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward. The results of evolutionary game analysis show that the cooperation willingness, sharing level, income distribution, and punishment mechanism have a significant impact on the cooperative evolution direction of green technology innovation for construction enterprises, separately. Stronger cooperation willingness or higher relative value of positive spillover, or reasonable income distribution can promote partners to adopt active cooperative strategies, while appropriately increasing punishment intensity can prevent opportunistic behaviors and improve the probability of success of cooperative innovation.
36
YE, YE, NENG-GANG XIE, LIN-GANG WANG, RUI MENG, and YU-WAN CEN. "STUDY OF BIOTIC EVOLUTIONARY MECHANISMS BASED ON THE MULTI-AGENT PARRONDO'S GAMES." Fluctuation and Noise Letters 11, no. 02 (June 2012): 1250012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219477512500125.
Full textAbstract:
The paper tries to explain the biological evolutionary mechanism based on Parrondo's games. The multi-agent Parrondo's games proposed include game A and game B. Game A, a zero-sum game, reflects the interactive relationship of competition or cooperation between individuals. A two-dimensional lattice network is used to represents the spatial carrier of interactive relationship. Game B, a negative-sum game, reflects the environmental effect on survival evolution of individuals. Three patterns which are based on individual survival states, on historical experience and on neighbors' environment are adopted to represent the mechanisms. The simulation results show that: (1) A zero-sum game (game A) and a losing game (game B) combined could produce a winning result. Improvement of the average fitness of the population represents the essence that Parrondo's paradox is counterintuitive. The special structure of game B reflects the ratcheting effect that natural environment has on biological evolution where both competition and cooperation are successful evolution directions. (2) The ratcheting effect of the environment-based pattern is the strongest. In the course of biological evolution, neighbors' environment usually uses an efficient mechanism to guide the evolution. Just because of the neighbors' environment-based guidance, a coevolution model is formed where individuals compose the population which composes the community and the community composes the ecosystem which composes the biosphere. (3) Competition can raise the average fitness of the population. Therefore, competition may be an adaptive behavior on the population level. (4) Research to-date has shown that the necessary condition of producing cooperation is that the cost is less than profit. While the results in this paper show that a zero-sum game can also give rise to cooperation, which can bring about positive gain for the whole population.
37
Singh, Manvir. "The Sympathetic Plot, Its Psychological Origins, and Implications for the Evolution of Fiction." Emotion Review 13, no. 3 (July 2021): 183–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17540739211022824.
Full textAbstract:
The sympathetic plot—featuring a goal-directed protagonist who confronts obstacles, overcomes them, and wins rewards—is ubiquitous. Here, I propose that it recurs because it entertains, engaging two sets of psychological mechanisms. First, it triggers mechanisms for learning about obstacles and how to overcome them. It builds interest by confronting a protagonist with a problem and induces satisfaction when the problem is solved. Second, it evokes sympathetic joy. It establishes the protagonist as an ideal cooperative partner pursuing a goal, appealing to mechanisms for helping. When the protagonist succeeds, they receive rewards, and audiences feel sympathetic joy, an emotion normally triggered when beneficiaries triumph. The capacities underlying the sympathetic plot evolved for learning and cooperation before being co-opted for entertainment.
38
Martinez-Vaquero, Luis A., Francisco C. Santos, and Vito Trianni. "Signalling boosts the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 17, no. 172 (November 2020): 20200635. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2020.0635.
Full textAbstract:
Many biological and social systems show significant levels of collective action. Several cooperation mechanisms have been proposed, yet they have been mostly studied independently. Among these, direct reciprocity supports cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions among individuals. Signals and quorum dynamics may also drive cooperation. Here, we resort to an evolutionary game-theoretical model to jointly analyse these two mechanisms and study the conditions in which evolution selects for direct reciprocity, signalling, or their combination. We show that signalling alone leads to higher levels of cooperation than when combined with reciprocity, while offering additional robustness against errors. Specifically, successful strategies in the realm of direct reciprocity are often not selected in the presence of signalling, and memory of past interactions is only exploited opportunistically in the case of earlier coordination failure. Differently, signalling always evolves, even when costly. In the light of these results, it may be easier to understand why direct reciprocity has been observed only in a limited number of cases among non-humans, whereas signalling is widespread at all levels of complexity.
39
WANG, XIAOYANG, YANG YI, HUIYOU CHANG, and YIBIN LIN. "USING PARTICLE SWARM OPTIMIZATION TO EVOLVE COOPERATION IN MULTIPLE CHOICES ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME." International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Applications 12, no. 03 (September 2013): 1350013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1469026813500132.
Full textAbstract:
Mechanisms of promoting the evolution of cooperation in two-player, two-strategy evolutionary games have been discussed in great detail over the past decades. Understanding the effects of repeated interactions in n-player with n-choice is a formidable challenge. This paper presents and investigates the application of co-evolutionary training techniques based on particle swarm optimization (PSO) to evolve cooperation for the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game with multiple choices. Several issues will be addressed, which include the evolution of cooperation and the evolutionary stability in the presence of multiple choices and noise. First is using PSO approach to evolve cooperation. The second is the consideration of real-dilemma between social cohesion and individual profit. Experimental results show that the PSO approach evolves the cooperation. Agents with stronger social cognition choose higher levels of cooperation. Finally the impact of noise on the evolution of cooperation is examined. Experiments show the noise has a negative impact on the evolution of cooperation.
40
Leimar, Olof, and Peter Hammerstein. "Cooperation for direct fitness benefits." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365, no. 1553 (September 12, 2010): 2619–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0116.
Full textAbstract:
Studies of the evolution of helping have traditionally used the explanatory frameworks of reciprocity and altruism towards relatives, but recently there has been an increasing interest in other kinds of explanations. We review the success or otherwise of work investigating alternative processes and mechanisms, most of which fall under the heading of cooperation for direct benefits. We evaluate to what extent concepts such as by-product benefits, pseudo-reciprocity, sanctions and partner choice, markets and the build-up of cross-species spatial trait correlations have contributed to the study of the evolution of cooperation. We conclude that these alternative ideas are successful and show potential to further increase our understanding of cooperation. We also bring up the origin and role of common interest in the evolution of cooperation, including the appearance of organisms. We note that there are still unresolved questions about the main processes contributing to the evolution of common interest. Commenting on the broader significance of the recent developments, we argue that they represent a justified balancing of the importance given to different major hypotheses for the evolution of cooperation. This balancing is beneficial because it widens considerably the range of phenomena addressed and, crucially, encourages empirical testing of important theoretical alternatives.
41
Aslanli, Kenan, and Birol Akgün. "Institutional Mechanisms of the Turkish Foreign Policy: The Case of Russia - Turkey High-Level Cooperation Council." Vestnik RUDN. International Relations 20, no. 4 (December 15, 2020): 791–804. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2020-20-4-791-804.
Full textAbstract:
The article aims to examine and explore with pros and cons of High-Level (“Strategic”) Cooperation Councils (HLSCC) mechanisms in Turkish foreign policy and evaluate its effectiveness in foreign trade, foreign policy cooperation, and crisis management capacity of Turkey concerning the relations with Russia. Turkey has already started to establish High-Level Cooperation Councils to build institutional infrastructure for strategic partnerships in foreign policy and strengthen institutional power in the bilateral cooperation after 2006. The study of Turkish foreign policy is an academically attractive topic mostly in terms of its geopolitical dimensions. The institutional mechanisms that enable the country to interact with other states in a dynamic regional and international environment remain less researched heretofore. The article attempts to highlight the evolution of Turkish foreign policy in terms of institutional changes in the bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. The article applies a case study method with descriptive analysis examining Councils’ functions such as foreign policy coordination and determination of collective commitments and official bilateral targets in the case of Russia - Turkey High-Level Cooperation Council. The article found out that these institutional mechanisms partly justified themselves as a coordination mechanism, but they were relatively weak for achieving the pledged commitments. The Councils were flexible and innovative cooperation mechanisms of the foreign policy to develop bilateral and multilateral ties in the age of the global power restructuring and the volatile conjuncture in world politics.
42
Sasaki, Tatsuya, Isamu Okada, and Yutaka Nakai. "Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment." Biology Letters 12, no. 7 (July 2016): 20160341. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2016.0341.
Full textAbstract:
Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to them being rejected by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the most leading social norms, we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes locally stable.
43
Wang, Shengxian, Linjie Liu, and Xiaojie Chen. "Incentive strategies for the evolution of cooperation: Analysis and optimization." Europhysics Letters 136, no. 6 (December 1, 2021): 68002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/ac3c8a.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract How to explain why cooperation can emerge in the real society is one of the most challenging scientific problems. In the past few years, in order to solve the evolutionary puzzle of cooperation, researchers have put forward a variety of solutions and accordingly proposed some mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Among them, the implementation of prosocial incentive strategy can increase the benefits of cooperators or reduce the benefits of defectors, which has been regarded as an effective measure to solve the cooperation problem. In this perspective, we provide a mini yet profound review of recent research efforts that explore the roles of incentive strategies in the evolution of cooperation and how to design the optimal incentive protocols to promote the evolution of cooperation more efficiently. Importantly, we show some crucial developments about incentive strategies which have been made in the field and meanwhile come up with some significant routes of further research.
44
Brosnan, Sarah F., and Redouan Bshary. "On potential links between inequity aversion and the structure of interactions for the evolution of cooperation." Behaviour 153, no. 9-11 (2016): 1267–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568539x-00003355.
Full textAbstract:
Despite the fact that most models of cooperation assume equal outcomes between individuals, in real life it is likely rare that this is the case. Does it make a difference for our understanding of the evolution of cooperation? Following a taxonomy of cooperation concepts that focuses on costs and benefits, we explore this question by considering the degree to which inequity aversion may provide one mechanism to stabilize cooperation. We suggest a key role for inequity aversion in some contexts in both biological markets and direct reciprocity, and highlight the potentially unique role of positive inequity aversion for human reputation games. Nevertheless, a key challenge is to determine how different animal species perceive the payoff structure of their interactions, how they see their interaction with their partners, and the degree to which simpler mechanisms, like contrast effects or the associative learning seen in optimal foraging, may produce similar outcomes.
45
LAIRD, ROBERT A. "EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY DYNAMICS FOR TAG-BASED COOPERATION AND DEFECTION IN THE SPATIAL AND ASPATIAL SNOWDRIFT GAME." International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 22, no. 11 (November 2012): 1230039. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021812741230039x.
Full textAbstract:
Cooperation is a costly behavior undertaken by one individual which benefits another individual. Since cooperators are easily exploited by defectors (those who receive the benefits of cooperation but do not cooperate themselves), the evolution and maintenance of cooperation rely on mechanisms that allow cooperators to interact with one another more frequently than would be predicted based on their relative abundance in a population. One simple mechanism is based on the recognition of "tags" — arbitrary, yet identifiable phenotypic traits. Tags allow for the existence of conditionally cooperative strategies; e.g. individuals could adopt a strategy whereby they cooperate with tag-mates but defect against non-tag-mates. Previous research has considered the tag and strategy dynamics of unconditional and conditional strategies engaged in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the paradigmatic framework for studying the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation, in which defection against a cooperator yields the greatest fitness payoff, followed by mutual cooperation, mutual defection, and cooperation with a defector. Here, using complementary spatial and aspatial lattice models, an alternative payoff structure is considered, based on the Snowdrift game, in which the rankings of the payoffs associated with mutual defection and cooperation with a defector are reversed relative to the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the absence of mutation, it is demonstrated that the aspatial two-tag game tends to collapse into the traditional, non-tag-based Snowdrift game, with the frequency of cooperators and defectors predicted precisely by evolutionary dynamics analysis. The spatial two-tag game, on the other hand, produces a richer variety of outcomes, whose occurrence depends on the cost-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation; these outcomes include the dominance of conditional cooperators, the dominance of unconditional defectors, and the cyclic (or noncyclic) coexistence of the two. These outcomes are then shown to be modified by mutation (which softens the transition boundaries between outcomes), and by the presence of more than two tags (which promotes nepotistic conditional cooperation).
46
Yevheniy Kodis, Anatoliy Kutsevol, Yevheniy Kodis, Anatoliy Kutsevol. "CRITERIA FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MECHANISMS IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES." Socio World-Social Research & Behavioral Sciences 05, no. 03 (June 17, 2021): 50–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.36962/swd05032021050.
Full textAbstract:
The article highlights the criteria for the effectiveness of the implementation of public administration mechanisms in the field of economic cooperation of the Eastern Partnership countries. The main criteria are relevance, cost-effectiveness and efficiency, as a result of which appropriate indicators are proposed. The correspondence of perspective mechanisms of public administration in the sphere of economic cooperation of the Eastern Partnership countries and stages of their realization is proved. Such mechanisms are proposed to include socio-political, legislative, institutional-administrative, financial-economic, information and communication. Accordingly, at the first stage, the priority is to involve effective institutional and administrative mechanisms in public administration in the field of economic cooperation of the Eastern Partnership countries. This will help to improve the clear interaction between the relevant public authorities and local governments. However, given the content of key reforms, all these mechanisms are relevant at this stage. In the second stage, the priority of mechanisms is constantly changing. Therefore, the progress of the observance of the provisions of the Association Agreement and the implementation of the European integration policy in general should be constantly monitored in order to determine the situational priority of the relevant mechanisms. At the third stage, the information and communication mechanism, which is responsible for the level of public awareness, promotes openness, transparency and accessibility of relevant information at various levels for public authorities, etc., becomes especially relevant. Keywords: economic cooperation, Eastern Partnership, public administration, public administration bodies, mechanisms, development.
47
Gonzalez, Juan-Carlos T., Ben C. Sheldon, and Joseph A. Tobias. "Environmental stability and the evolution of cooperative breeding in hornbills." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280, no. 1768 (October 7, 2013): 20131297. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.1297.
Full textAbstract:
Reproductive cooperation in social animals has been the focus of intensive research, yet the role of environmental factors in promoting such cooperation remains uncertain. A recent global analysis suggested that cooperative breeding in birds is a ‘bet-hedging’ strategy associated with climatic uncertainty, but it is unclear whether this mechanism applies generally or is restricted to the insectivorous passerines that predominate as cooperative breeders at the global scale. Here, we use a phylogenetic framework to assess the effect of climate on the evolution of cooperation in hornbills (Bucerotidae), an avian family characterized by frugivory and carnivory. We show that, in contrast to the global pattern, cooperative reproduction is positively associated with both inter- and intra-annual climatic stability. This reversed relationship implies that hornbills are relatively insensitive to climatic fluctuations, perhaps because of their dietary niche or increased body mass, both of which may remove the need for bet-hedging. We conclude that the relationship between climatic variability and cooperative breeding is inconsistent across taxa, and potentially mediated by life-history variation. These findings help to explain the mixed results of previous studies and highlight the likely shortcomings of global datasets inherently biased towards particular categories.
48
Gutnisky, D. A., and B. S. Zanutto. "Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Is Learned by Operant Conditioning Mechanisms." Artificial Life 10, no. 4 (September 2004): 433–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/1064546041766479.
Full textAbstract:
The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is the leading metaphor for the evolution of cooperative behavior in populations of selfish agents. Although cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) has been studied for over twenty years, most of this research has been focused on strategies that involve nonlearned behavior. Another approach is to suppose that players' selection of the preferred reply might be enforced in the same way as feeding animals track the best way to feed in changing nonstationary environments. Learning mechanisms such as operant conditioning enable animals to acquire relevant characteristics of their environment in order to get reinforcements and to avoid punishments. In this study, the role of operant conditioning in the learning of cooperation was evaluated in the PD. We found that operant mechanisms allow the learning of IPD play against other strategies. When random moves are allowed in the game, the operant learning model showed low sensitivity. On the basis of this evidence, it is suggested that operant learning might be involved in reciprocal altruism.
49
Zhang, Yun, and Yimeng Jia. "From Confrontation to Cooperation." Asian Survey 61, no. 4 (July 2021): 615–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2021.61.4.615.
Full textAbstract:
Why and how did the International Labor Organization and the military junta of Myanmar transform their relationship so dramatically, from confrontation to cooperation, between 2007 and 2010? What insights can be drawn from this case regarding the successful operation of an international organization in an authoritarian environment? By investigating the evolution of the military leadership’s perception, this article aims to demystify authoritarian decision-making and identify the interactive mechanisms operating between internal and external dynamics and between an authoritarian regime and an international organization. The qualitative fieldwork includes direct interviews with former top military government leaders, who provide valuable insights into the decision-making logic at the highest level.
50
Li, Jinsheng, Yi Shi, and Lu Xu. "Evolutionary Dynamics of Interfirm Cooperative System for Radical Innovation from Knowledge Collaboration Perspective." Complexity 2020 (August 13, 2020): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8253856.
Full textAbstract:
Interfirm cooperation can be seen as a significant and effective way for exploring radical innovation. In this article, a framework of interfirm cooperation, with a core manufacture and upstream counterparties in industry, and its evolving mechanism in the reverse-chain radical innovation are established from the perspective of the fundamental role played by knowledge collaboration. Then, an evolution model of interfirm cooperation is constructed on the theory of vibration mechanics, and its evolutionary dynamics is explored through numerical and simulation analysis mainly on the key factors of knowledge potential difference and knowledge rent-seeking behaviour within the firms. The findings show that, if there is no knowledge-based rent-seeking behaviour from the upstream firms, the probable innovative performance from the interfirm cooperation should vary for the knowledge potential difference between the cooperative firms, but can come to a certain equilibrium state. Meanwhile, if the knowledge rent-seeking behaviour does exist, knowledge potential difference would lead the innovative performance evolving ultimately in divergence. What’s more, the negative effect caused by the rent-seeking behaviour could be alleviated or weakened to some extent by the excitation mechanisms presented by the core firms in the cooperation system. Therefore, the drawn conclusions should be useful for the core manufactures’ implementing various strategies to maintain or enhance the cooperation for radical innovation in industry.