Relevant bibliographies by topics / Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms

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Academic literature on the topic 'Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 6 September 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms"

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ZAGGL, MICHAEL A. "Eleven mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation." Journal of Institutional Economics 10, no. 2 (December 23, 2013): 197–230. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137413000374.

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Abstract:Cooperation is one of the basic elements of social life. It is essential for emergent social phenomena, such as the formation of families, groups, and societies. However, evolutionary forces counter cooperation. The trait of supporting others is dominated by selfish behavior. In the last few decades scientists, in particular biologists, achieved extraordinary progress regarding the question of how cooperation is possible despite of evolutionary forces. This produced an enormous amount of literature. This paper identifies and reviews the known solutions explaining cooperation under evolutionary forces. Using bibliometric methods in combination with extant review articles and traditional reviewing of original literature, it is possible to isolate 11 mechanisms of cooperation under the conditions of evolution. Developing a categorization of the mechanisms according to shared characteristics establishes a fundamental framework for institutional and mechanism design activities. Implications for future research paths are identified, in particular for the mechanism of indirect reciprocity.
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Yan, Jinyuan, Hilary Monaco, and Joao B. Xavier. "The Ultimate Guide to Bacterial Swarming: An Experimental Model to Study the Evolution of Cooperative Behavior." Annual Review of Microbiology 73, no. 1 (September 8, 2019): 293–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-micro-020518-120033.

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Cooperation has fascinated biologists since Darwin. How did cooperative behaviors evolve despite the fitness cost to the cooperator? Bacteria have cooperative behaviors that make excellent models to take on this age-old problem from both proximate (molecular) and ultimate (evolutionary) angles. We delve into Pseudomonas aeruginosa swarming, a phenomenon where billions of bacteria move cooperatively across distances of centimeters in a matter of a few hours. Experiments with swarming have unveiled a strategy called metabolic prudence that stabilizes cooperation, have showed the importance of spatial structure, and have revealed a regulatory network that integrates environmental stimuli and direct cooperative behavior, similar to a machine learning algorithm. The study of swarming elucidates more than proximate mechanisms: It exposes ultimate mechanisms valid to all scales, from cells in cancerous tumors to animals in large communities.
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Salimi Sartakhti, Javad, and Fatemeh Stodt. "Ecological Dynamics and Evolution of Cooperation in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks." Telecom 4, no. 2 (April 25, 2023): 236–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/telecom4020014.

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In Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), promoting cooperative behavior is a challenging problem for mechanism designers. Cooperative actions, such as disseminating data, can seem at odds with rationality and may benefit other vehicles at a cost to oneself. Without additional mechanisms, it is expected that cooperative behavior in the population will decrease and eventually disappear. Classical game theoretical models for cooperation, such as the public goods game, predict this outcome, but they assume fixed population sizes and overlook the ecological dynamics of the interacting vehicles. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary public goods game that incorporates VANET ecological dynamics and offers new insights for promoting cooperation. Our model considers free spaces, population density, departure rates of vehicles, and randomly composed groups for each data sender. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that higher population densities and departure rates, due to minimum differences between pay-offs of vehicles, promote cooperative behavior. This feedback between ecological dynamics and evolutionary game dynamics leads to interesting results. Our proposed model demonstrates a new extension of evolutionary dynamics to vehicles of varying densities. We show that it is possible to promote cooperation in VANETs without the need for any supporting mechanisms. Future research can investigate the potential for using this model in practical settings.
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Brosnan, Sarah F., and Redouan Bshary. "Cooperation and deception: from evolution to mechanisms." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365, no. 1553 (September 12, 2010): 2593–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0155.

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Nature is full of struggle, as predicted by the theory of evolution through natural selection, yet there are also paramount examples where individuals help each other. These instances of helping have been difficult to reconcile with Darwin's theory because it is not always obvious how individuals are working for their own direct benefit. Consequently, initial publications that offered solutions to subsets of the observed cases of helping, such as kin selection or reciprocity, are among the most influential and most cited papers in evolution/behavioural ecology. During the last few years, a wave of new studies and concepts has considerably advanced our understanding of the conditions under which individuals are selected to help others. On the empirical side, advances are due to stronger incorporation of the natural history of each study species and an emphasis on proximate questions regarding decision-making processes. In parallel, theorists have provided more realistic models together with an increased exploration of the importance of life history and ecology in understanding cooperation. The ideas presented by the authors of this volume represent, in many ways, the revolutionary new approach to studying behaviour which is currently underway.
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Iyer, Swami, and Timothy Killingback. "Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Assortative Interactions." Games 11, no. 4 (September 23, 2020): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g11040041.

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Cooperation in social dilemmas plays a pivotal role in the formation of systems at all levels of complexity, from replicating molecules to multi-cellular organisms to human and animal societies. In spite of its ubiquity, the origin and stability of cooperation pose an evolutionary conundrum, since cooperation, though beneficial to others, is costly to the individual cooperator. Thus natural selection would be expected to favor selfish behavior in which individuals reap the benefits of cooperation without bearing the costs of cooperating themselves. Many proximate mechanisms have been proposed to account for the origin and maintenance of cooperation, including kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and evolution in structured populations. Despite the apparent diversity of these approaches they all share a unified underlying logic: namely, each mechanism results in assortative interactions in which individuals using the same strategy interact with a higher probability than they would at random. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in both discrete strategy and continuous strategy social dilemmas with assortative interactions. For the sake of tractability, assortativity is modeled by an individual interacting with another of the same type with probability r and interacting with a random individual in the population with probability 1−r, where r is a parameter that characterizes the degree of assortativity in the system. For discrete strategy social dilemmas we use both a generalization of replicator dynamics and individual-based simulations to elucidate the donation, snowdrift, and sculling games with assortative interactions, and determine the analogs of Hamilton’s rule, which govern the evolution of cooperation in these games. For continuous strategy social dilemmas we employ both a generalization of deterministic adaptive dynamics and individual-based simulations to study the donation, snowdrift, and tragedy of the commons games, and determine the effect of assortativity on the emergence and stability of cooperation.
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Uchida, Satoshi, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada, and Tatsuya Sasaki. "Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory." Games 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2019): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10010011.

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Social dilemmas are among the most puzzling issues in the biological and social sciences. Extensive theoretical efforts have been made in various realms such as economics, biology, mathematics, and even physics to figure out solution mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional punishment, have been exploited as effective mechanisms. So far, mechanisms that enable peer punishment to function as a solution to the social dilemma remain unclear. In this paper, we propose a theoretical way for peer punishment to work as a solution mechanism for the dilemma by incorporating prospect theory into evolutionary game theory. Prospect theory models human beings as agents that estimate small probabilities and loss of profit as greater than they actually are; thus, those agents feel that punishments are more frequent and harsher than they really are. We show that this kind of cognitive distortion makes players decide to cooperate to avoid being punished and that the cooperative state achieved by this mechanism is globally stable as well as evolutionarily stable in a wide range of parameter values.
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Campennì, Marco, and Gabriele Schino. "Symmetry-based reciprocity: evolutionary constraints on a proximate mechanism." PeerJ 4 (March 15, 2016): e1812. http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj.1812.

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Background.While the evolution of reciprocal cooperation has attracted an enormous attention, the proximate mechanisms underlying the ability of animals to cooperate reciprocally are comparatively neglected. Symmetry-based reciprocity is a hypothetical proximate mechanism that has been suggested to be widespread among cognitively unsophisticated animals.Methods.We developed two agent-based models of symmetry-based reciprocity (one relying on an arbitrary tag and the other on interindividual proximity) and tested their ability both to reproduce significant emergent features of cooperation in group living animals and to promote the evolution of cooperation.Results.Populations formed by agents adopting symmetry-based reciprocity showed differentiated “social relationships” and a positive correlation between cooperation given and received: two common aspects of animal cooperation. However, when reproduction and selection across multiple generations were added to the models, agents adopting symmetry-based reciprocity were outcompeted by selfish agents that never cooperated.Discussion.In order to evolve, hypothetical proximate mechanisms must be able to stand competition from alternative strategies. While the results of our simulations require confirmation using analytical methods, we provisionally suggest symmetry-based reciprocity is to be abandoned as a possible proximate mechanism underlying the ability of animals to reciprocate cooperative interactions.
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Gilby, Ian C. "Cooperation in primates and humans: Mechanisms and evolution." American Journal of Physical Anthropology 132, no. 3 (March 2007): 486–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajpa.20523.

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van den Berg, Pieter, and Franz J. Weissing. "The importance of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 282, no. 1813 (August 22, 2015): 20151382. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.1382.

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Studies aimed at explaining the evolution of phenotypic traits have often solely focused on fitness considerations, ignoring underlying mechanisms. In recent years, there has been an increasing call for integrating mechanistic perspectives in evolutionary considerations, but it is not clear whether and how mechanisms affect the course and outcome of evolution. To study this, we compare four mechanistic implementations of two well-studied models for the evolution of cooperation, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game and the Iterated Snowdrift (ISD) game. Behavioural strategies are either implemented by a 1 : 1 genotype–phenotype mapping or by a simple neural network. Moreover, we consider two different scenarios for the effect of mutations. The same set of strategies is feasible in all four implementations, but the probability that a given strategy arises owing to mutation is largely dependent on the behavioural and genetic architecture. Our individual-based simulations show that this has major implications for the evolutionary outcome. In the ISD, different evolutionarily stable strategies are predominant in the four implementations, while in the IPD each implementation creates a characteristic dynamical pattern. As a consequence, the evolved average level of cooperation is also strongly dependent on the underlying mechanism. We argue that our findings are of general relevance for the evolution of social behaviour, pleading for the integration of a mechanistic perspective in models of social evolution.
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White, Stephan. "The Evolution of Morality." PARADIGMI, no. 1 (May 2012): 173–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2012-001010.

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It seems clear that cooperation when cheating would go undetected - for example, in many-person prisoner's dilemmas or "tragedy of the commons" cases - is a precondition of the functioning of modern social institutions. Such cooperation seems difficult to explain in evolutionary terms, however, since those who are disposed to cheat seem to enjoy a systematic advantage relative to those who are not. Further- more, the appeal to mechanisms for the detection and punishment of noncooperation, since those mechanisms themselves presuppose cooperation, merely pushes the problem one step back. In this paper I argue that morality plays an ineliminable role in the explanation of the forms of cooperation in question. Moreover, I provide a schema for the evolution of morality in the face of the advantages that those disposed to cheat apparently enjoy.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms"

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Dong, Lu. "Behavioural mechanisms of cooperation and coordination." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2017. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44618/.

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This thesis consists of three independent chapters investigating behavioural mechanisms of cooperation and coordination. In particular, chapter 1 analyses a voluntary contribution game and proposes a simple behavioural mechanism to achieve social efficiency. Specifically, in this mechanism, each player can costlessly assign a share of the pie to each of the other players, after observing the contributions, and the final distribution of the pie is determined by these assignments. In a controlled laboratory experiment, I find that participants assign the reward based on others' relative contributions in most cases and that the contribution rates improve substantially and almost immediately with 80 percent of players contribute fully. Chapter 2 studies the effects of costly monitoring and heterogeneous social identities on an equity principle of reward allocation. The investigation is based on the mechanism proposed in chapter 2. I hypothesised that the equity principle may be violated when participants bear a personal cost to monitor others' contributions, or when heterogeneous social identities are present in reward allocations. The experimental results show that almost half of the allocators are willing to sacrifice their own resources to enforce the social norm of equity principle. Likewise, with the presence of heterogeneous social identities, though a few participants give more to their in-group member, the majority of them still follow the equity principle to allocate. Chapter 3 explores the behavioural mechanism of communication and leadership in coordination problems. Specifically, I consider two types of leaders: cheap-talk leaders who suggest an effort level, and first-mover leaders who lead by example. I use experimental methods to show the limits of these two mechanisms in avoiding coordination failure in a challenging minimum effort game, with low benefits of coordination relative to the effort cost. The results suggest that both types of leadership have some ability to increase effort in groups with no history, but are insufficient in groups with a history of low effort.
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Wang, Tzai-Der. "The evolution of cooperation in artificial communities." Thesis, University of the West of Scotland, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.395688.

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El, Mouden Claire M. "The evolution of cooperation, especially in humans." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2ebc0b15-d745-48d8-bb5a-a4d83b3304ed.

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I develop social evolution theory to study the evolution of cooperation as follows: (1) Many organisms undergo a dispersal phase prior to breeding; I demonstrate that knowing ones dispersal status aids the evolution of helping (by non-dispersers) and harming (by dispersers). (2) Policing driven by group-benefits may be selected to enforce cooperation in human and animal societies. I extend existing theory to show that policing may be harder to evolve that previously thought, but that it is maintained more readily than it evolves. (3) Archeological and anthropological evidence suggests that warfare was prevalent during our evolution. I show that, contrary to previous suggestions, between-group competition can favour any social behaviour (pro-social or anti-social) so long as it helps the group compete, and that such traits can be altruistic or mutually beneficial. (4) Reproductive leveling is analogous to policing; in the human literature there is doubt as to whether it can evolve. I extend my previous work to consider the coevolution of culturally and genetically inherited traits for reproductive leveling and selfishness. I find that cooperation can evolve between non-kin if they share the same culture. (5) Monogamy is thought to favour the evolution of cooperative breeding. I show that in the simplest case, because of the cost of competition between non-dispersing siblings, the level of promiscuity has little or no effect on the evolution of cooperation. (6) Spatial structure (limited dispersal) is thought to favour the evolution of inter-specific mutualisms as it aligns the partners’ interests. I consider the case of plant-fungi mutualisms and show that spatial structure can disfavour cooperation if it limits the potential fungal partners available to the plant.
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O'Neill, Moira Patricia. "Evolution and Cooperation in the Youngstown Area." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1564599603688389.

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Hooper, L. "International cooperation : A role for institutional mechanisms." Thesis, University of Essex, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.381237.

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LEWIS-ROBERTS, BRITTANY KIRSTEN. "COOPERATION AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS: ASSESSING FOUR COUNTRIES." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/190666.

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Kiers, Erica Tobyn. "Evolution of cooperation in the legume-rhizobium symbiosis /." For electronic version search Digital dissertations database. Restricted to UC campuses. Access is free to UC campus dissertations, 2005. http://uclibs.org/PID/11984.

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Eckert, Daniel, Wolfgang Janko, and Johann Mitlöhner. "Evolution of cooperation and discrimination in software development." Institut für Informationsverarbeitung und Informationswirtschaft, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2004. http://epub.wu.ac.at/1672/1/document.pdf.

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Software development projects typically involve repeated interactions among several groups of people. This setting seems well suited for an analysis by means of the standard-model of the evolution of cooperation, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Computer simulations of a population of stochastic reactive strategies show that the existence of intergroup discrimination can be modeled endogeneously as a result of noise due to misperception of the opponent's move. (author's abstract)
Series: Working Papers on Information Systems, Information Business and Operations
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Trubenova, Barbora. "Indirect genetic effects and the evolution of cooperation." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2014. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/indirect-genetic-effects-and-the-evolution-of-cooperation(cac253c8-500d-4f5e-91ff-878f6ead4c0e).html.

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The evolution of social behaviour has been studied using different frameworks based on game theory and quantitative genetics. While both approaches provide a conceptually clear explanation of evolution of social behaviour, both have been limited in their applicability to empirical systems, mainly due to difficulties in measuring model parameters. Here, I develop a new quantitative genetics approach to the study of the evolution of social behaviours based on indirect genetic effects (IGEs), which parameters can be readily determined by empirical studies. IGEs describe effects of an individual's genotype on phenotypes of social partners, which may indirectly affect their fitness. Unlike traditional quantitative genetics assuming a non-genetical, non-heritable environment, IGE models assume that part of the environment is social, provided by parents and other interacting partners, thus has a genetic basic and can be heritable. In this study I explore the effects of IGEs on the magnitude and range of phenotypic values in a focal individual. I show that social interactions may not only cause indirect genetic effects but can also modify direct genetic effects. I demonstrate that interactions can substantially alter group mean phenotype and variance. This may lead to scenarios in which between group phenotypic variation is much higher than within group variation despite similar underlying genetic properties of different groups. Further, I analyse how IGEs influence levels of selection and predictions about evolutionary trajectories. I show that IGEs can create selection pressure at the group level, leading to evolution of behaviours that would not evolve otherwise. Moreover, I demonstrate that IGEs may lead to differences in the direction of evolutionary response between genotypes and phenotypes. Building on these results, I show that IGE models can be translated to and are fully compatible with traditional kin and multilevel selection models. I express costs and benefits in IGE parameters and determine the conditions under which social interactions lead to the evolution of cooperative or harmful behaviours. Therefore, the model I propose combines the conceptual clarity of kin and multilevel selection models with the applicability of IGE models, which parameters can be empirically determined, facilitating the testing of model predictions. Finally, I show that the use of IGE models is strongly limited by the underlying assumption of linearity. I prove that the modelling of interaction dynamics leads to steady state solutions found by IGE models only under limited conditions. In this light, I discuss the relevance of results published previously and propose a solution of how this problem can be addressed.
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Lamba, S. "The evolution of large-scale cooperation in human populations." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2011. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1317770/.

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Large-scale cooperation between unrelated humans is a major evolutionary puzzle. Natural selection should favour traits benefiting the self, whereas cooperation entails a cost to self to benefit another. The work presented in this thesis makes an empirical contribution towards understanding the evolution of large-scale cooperation in humans. Theory posits that large-scale cooperation evolves via selection acting on populations amongst which variation is maintained by cultural transmission. While cross-cultural variation in cooperation is taken as evidence in support of this theory, most studies confound cultural and environmental differences between populations. I test and find support for the hypothesis that variation in levels of cooperation between populations is driven by differences in demography and ecology rather than culture. I use economic games and a new ‘real-world’ measure of cooperation to demonstrate significant variation in levels of cooperation across 21 villages of the same small-scale, forager society, the Pahari Korwa of central India. Demographic factors explain part of this variation. Variation between populations of the same cultural group in this study is comparable in magnitude to that found between different cultural groups in previous studies. Experiments conducted in 14 of the villages demonstrate that the majority of individuals do not employ social learning in the context of a cooperative dilemma. Frequency of social learning varies considerably across populations; I identify demographic factors associated with the learning strategy individuals employ. My findings empirically challenge cultural group selection models of large-scale cooperation; behavioural variation driven by demographic and ecological factors is unlikely to maintain stable differences essential for selection at the population-level. This calls for re-interpretation of cross-cultural data sampled from few populations per society; behavioural variation attributed to ‘cultural norms’ may reflect environmental variation. The work presented in this thesis emphasises the central role of demography and ecology in shaping human social behaviour.
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Books on the topic "Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms"

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Brosnan, Sarah F., and Redouan Bshary. Cooperation and deception: From evolution to mechanisms : papers of a theme issue. London: Royal Society, 2010.

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Mechanisms of Evolution. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2019.

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Rampelotto, Pabulo H., ed. Molecular Mechanisms of Microbial Evolution. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69078-0.

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Kappeler, Peter, ed. Animal Behaviour: Evolution and Mechanisms. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02624-9.

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service), SpringerLink (Online, ed. Animal Behaviour: Evolution and Mechanisms. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.

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Drickamer, Lee C. Animal behavior: Mechanisms, ecology, evolution. 4th ed. Dubuque, IA: Wm. C. Brown Publishers, 1996.

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Michael, Akam, ed. The evolution of developmental mechanisms. Cambridge: Company of Biologists, 1994.

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Codon evolution: Mechanisms and models. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

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The evolution of cooperation. London: Penguin Books, 1990.

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Cooperation and its evolution. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2013.

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Book chapters on the topic "Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms"

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Trillmich, Fritz. "Parental care: adjustments to conflict and cooperation." In Animal Behaviour: Evolution and Mechanisms, 267–98. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02624-9_10.

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Bshary, Redouan. "Cooperation between unrelated individuals – a game theoretic approach." In Animal Behaviour: Evolution and Mechanisms, 213–40. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02624-9_8.

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Komdeur, Jan, David S. Richardson, and Ben Hatchwell. "Kin-Recognition Mechanisms in Cooperative Breeding Systems: Ecological Causes and Behavioral Consequences of Variation." In Ecology of Social Evolution, 175–93. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75957-7_8.

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Cheng, Ge. "Cooperation Mechanisms." In The Routledge Handbook of the Belt and Road, 141–45. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003286202-28.

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Nielsen, Anne-Grethe. "Cooperation Mechanisms." In International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges, 405–26. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-473-8_23.

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Cheng, Ge. "Cooperation mechanisms." In Routledge Handbook of the Belt and Road, 131–35. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Routledge international handbooks: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429203039-24.

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Zschaler, Gerd, Arne Traulsen, and Thilo Gross. "A Dynamical Mechanism for the Evolution and Breakdown of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game in Adaptive Networks." In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 521–22. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32615-8_50.

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Barrera, Davide. "Mechanisms of cooperation." In Analytical Sociology, 169–95. Chichester, United Kingdom: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118762707.ch07.

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Hallam, Richard. "Cooperation." In The Evolution of Human Cleverness, 127–29. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003165507-57.

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Evans, Martin. "Evolution of Cooperation." In International Handbook of Organizational Teamwork and Cooperative Working, 45–54. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470696712.ch3.

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Conference papers on the topic "Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms"

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Rajagopalan, Padmini, Aditya Rawal, Risto Miikkulainen, Marc A. Wiseman, and Kay E. Holekamp. "The role of reward structure, coordination mechanism and net return in the evolution of cooperation." In 2011 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2011.6032015.

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Ignat, Vasileciprian. "IMPROVING NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES THROUGH GAMES AND SIMULATIONS." In eLSE 2017. Carol I National Defence University Publishing House, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.12753/2066-026x-17-009.

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The biggest threat to the existence of the entire human race is a large-scale nuclear war. The perspective of this kind of confrontation was a major concern during the Cold War. After the collapse of Soviet Union seemed that the world entered in new of stage and former US President Barrack Obama’s vision – “a world without nuclear weapons” was getting closer. However the recent events on the international scene are meant to make us reconsider Obama’s vision. The posture of Russian Federation and United States of America regarding the nuclear disarmament, especially after the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea can be the considered a sign of second Cold War. Many strategists, scientists, historians and even politicians had developed many scenarios regarding the evolution, possible consequences, doctrines, procedures and had brought for their interpretation new concepts related to a possible nuclear crisis. How can we better understand the behaviour of the nuclear state leaders? How can we calculate and bring closer to reality the effects of their decisions? Learning through games and simulations might be the solution. Through both methods, great results were achieved in comprehend abstract concepts as conflict, anarchy or cooperation. Searching for the mechanisms behind nuclear crisis management can offer us solutions for in case of a nuclear confrontation. The students in universities or military academies should be seen as the leaders of tomorrow. For that purpose is mandatory to invest in their education, using the best tools that we poses because preparing them for high responsibility positions, investing our resources in their knowledge, ultimately we invest in our peace and security.
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Krastev, Dragomir. "MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST CYBERCRIME." In 15 YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN BULGARIA - PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES. University publishing house "Science and Economics", University of Economics - Varna, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.36997/ppdd2022.70.

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The manuscript examines specific issues related to international cooperation in the investigation of cybercrime. Emphasis is placed on the current regulatory framework of international organizations and individual countries that have extensive experience and practice in this area in the fight against crime.
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Ebadi, Toktam, Maryam Purvis, and Martin Purvis. "Partner Selection Mechanisms for Agent Cooperation." In 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology. IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wiiat.2008.294.

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NACCACHE, ALBERT F. H. "HOMININ COOPERATION AND LANGUAGE EVOLUTION." In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference (EVOLANG9). WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814401500_0033.

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Fairey, Jason, and Terence Soule. "Evolution of communication and cooperation." In GECCO '14: Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2576768.2598377.

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Shivshankar, Smitha, Yaozhou Ma, and Abbas Jamalipour. "A correlative study of cooperation enforcement mechanisms." In 2011 Australasian Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (ATNAC 2011). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/atnac.2011.6096640.

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Wakamiya, Naoki, and Masayuki Murata. "Overlay Network Symbiosis: Evolution and Cooperation." In 2006 1st Bio-Inspired Models of Network, Information and Computing Systems. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/bimnics.2006.361823.

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Wang, Yufeng, and Akihiro Nakao. "On Evolution of Cooperative Overlay Network Based on Group Selection Mechanism." In 2008 9th International Conference for Young Computer Scientists (ICYCS). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icycs.2008.9.

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Botta, Rocio, Gerardo Blanco, and Christian E. Schaerer. "Evolutionary games and the evolution of cooperation." In 2013 Latin American Computing Conference (CLEI). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/clei.2013.6670629.

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Reports on the topic "Evolution of Cooperation - Mechanisms"

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Enke, Benjamin. Kinship, Cooperation, and the Evolution of Moral Systems. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23499.

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Ornston, L. N. Evolution of Regulatory Mechanisms in Bacteria. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada417800.

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Naglis, Eriks. The Evolution of European Security: From Confrontation to Cooperation. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, March 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada589292.

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Perkins, Archibald. Mechanisms of Murine Mammary Tumorigenesis: Cooperation Between Tyrosine kinase Receptors and Mutant p53. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, August 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada366921.

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Perkins, Archibald. Mechanisms of Murine Mammary Tumorigenesis: Cooperation Between Tyrosine Kinase Receptors and Mutant p53. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, August 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada335188.

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Perkins, Archibald. Mechanisms of Marine Mammary Tumorigenesis Cooperation Between Tyrosine Kinase Receptors and Mutant p53. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, July 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada384021.

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Couper, Samantha. Texture Evolution & Plasticity Modeling of High Pressure Deformation Mechanisms in Earth Materials & Metals. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), December 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1906009.

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Kibris, Arzu, and Resul Cesur. War Does not Foster Cooperation when Neoclassical Mechanisms are Absent! Evidence from a Natural Experiment among Turkish Conscripts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30674.

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Ayele, Seife, Wei Shen, Frangton Chiyemura, and Jing Gu. Enhancing China–Africa Cooperation in the Renewable Energy Sector. Institute of Development Studies, March 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ids.2021.028.

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Abstract:
Access to affordable and sustainable electricity is of fundamental importance to development in much of Africa. But, while access to electricity is improving, contributions from non-hydropower renewable energy sources remain small. At the same time, China – the powerhouse of solar energy technologies – has made limited contribution to harnessing Africa’s renewable energy. Combining insights from recent webinars and research, this Policy Briefing discusses how China–Africa cooperation on renewable energy could lead to improvements in access to and supply of affordable and sustainable energy in Africa. Recommendations for African and Chinese policymakers and businesses include the adoption of transparent, competitive, and locally inclusive energy procurement and use mechanisms.
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Taheri, Mitra L. Linking the Codependence of Grain Boundary Structure and Density to Defect Evolution Mechanisms during Radiation Damage. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), August 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1547399.

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