Journal articles: 'Evil'

1

Heller, Agnes. "On Evils, Evil, Radical Evil and the Demonic." Critical Horizons 12, no. 1 (January 12, 2011): 15–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/crit.v12i1.15.

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Gowramma, Y. S. "Evil." Artha - Journal of Social Sciences 2, no. 2 (November 11, 2004): 48. http://dx.doi.org/10.12724/ajss.4.5.

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Man's sense of Mystery -Emergence of the concept of evil in his life Definition of evil -Kinds of evil -Natural and Moral Evils -Origin of moral evil traced to psychological and metaphysical aspects -Atheist's argument for the dismissal of theist's views - Hume's skeptic views on Theist's conception -Theodicee's answer to the question - Freewill Theodicees -Greater good theodicees and best possible world theodicees -Evil as a discipline and necessary means to Good -Effect of the shock of Evil.

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Swinburne, Richard. "Does Theism Need a Theodicy?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (June 1988): 287–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1988.10717178.

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To many atheists the existence of evil seems to provide a conclusive argument against the existence of God. God is by definition omnipotent and perfectly good; a perfectly good being will remove evil in so far as he can, an omnipotent being can remove any evil he chooses, so if there is a God there will be no evil, but there is evil, hence there is no God. Theists normally challenge this argument by challenging the premiss that a perfectly good being will remove evil in so far as he can. The theistic defence is usually put as the defence that many evils are logically necessary conditions of greater goods, and hence a perfectly good being may allow them to occur in order to bring about the greater good; so a perfectly good being may well allow some evils to occur.

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KODAJ, DANIEL. "The problem of religious evil." Religious Studies 50, no. 4 (April 25, 2014): 425–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412514000122.

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AbstractThe article argues that evils perpetrated in the name of God (‘religious evils') generate a special version of the problem of evil, and a concomitant evidential argument, that cannot be solved by any of the current defences and theodicies. The article draws on historical examples to clarify the concept of religious evil, it shows that religious evil is a candidate defeater of theism, and it claims that the resulting evidential argument cannot be defused by defences and theodicies currently on offer. The last section outlines a solution.

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Reichenbach, Bruce R. "Assessing a Revised Compensation Theodicy." Religions 13, no. 11 (November 9, 2022): 1080. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13111080.

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Attempts to resolve the problem of evil often appeal to a greater good, according to which God’s permission of moral and natural evil is justified because (and just in case) the evil that is permitted is necessary for the realization of some greater good. In the extensive litany of greater good theodicies and defenses, the appeal to the greater good of an afterlife of infinite reward or pleasure has played a minor role in Christian thought but a more important role in Islamic thought. In a recent article, Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad invites us to reconsider the greater good theodicy of compensation. He contends that not only are all evils justified in that God compensates the sufferer in an afterlife, but because the evils experienced produce some good, God has reason for bringing about or allowing evils in the first place. In what follows, I argue that this modified compensation theodicy is flawed in its premises, faces serious problems with its concept of justice, treats people as means only and not as intrinsically valuable, and ultimately fails to show that an afterlife compensation, along with some good produced here and now by evil, justify God bringing about or allowing evil.

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Madere, Carol M. "Chemicals and Crazy People: The Evils of Batman’s World." World Journal of Social Science Research 5, no. 4 (November 1, 2018): 292. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/wjssr.v5n4p292.

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<em>Batman, the creation of Bob Kane and Bill Finger, who first appeared in DC Comics as a comic book superhero in May 1939, is not a classic superhero in the sense that he possesses supernatural abilities. Instead, he relies on his intellect, training, tools and determination. The villains he faces are different from the classic binary of good vs. evil as well. This paper examines how evil is portrayed in Batman’s world—evil as embodied by the villains he confronts and evils that result from hopes disappointed, opportunities denied and evil that does not even arise from evil intentions for personal gain, the evil of people who, as Alfred tells Batman, “just want to see the world burn”.</em>

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7

Yandell, Keith. "Gratuitous Evil and Divine Existence." Religious Studies 25, no. 1 (March 1989): 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500019697.

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God, who is an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent Creator and Providence, exists and There is evil are logically compatible claims. God exists, If God exists, then He has a morally sufficient reason for allowing any evil that He does allow, and There is evil is a consistent triad of propositions. Thus any pair from that triad is also consistent. Thus God exists and There is evil are logically compatible. But this does not settle the question as to whether the truth of There is evil in the world has such consequences for theism as making it highly improbable that God exists or making it unreasonable to believe that God exists. That propositions P and Q are logically compatible does not entail that one does not provide powerful evidence against the other. In particular, it has seemed that some actual evils are gratuitous or in some manner just could not fit into a God-made world. Thus the simple argument is offered that: (1) There are gratuitous evils; (2) If there are gratuitous evils, then there is no God; so: (3) There is no God. I will call this simple argument the ‘root argument’, for it is this argument and sophistications of it that will occupy us hereafter.

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MARING, LUKE. "A new problem of evil: authority and the duty of interference." Religious Studies 48, no. 4 (March 1, 2012): 497–514. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412511000321.

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AbstractThe traditional problem of evil sets theists the task of reconciling two things: God and evil. I argue that theists face the more difficult task of reconciling God and evils that God is specially obligated to prevent. Because of His authority, God's obligation to curtail evil goes far beyond our Samaritan duty to prevent evil when doing so isn't overly hard. Authorities owe their subjects a positive obligation to prevent certain evils; we have a right against our authorities that they protect us. God's apparent mistake is not merely the impersonal wrong of failing to do enough good – though it is that too. It is the highly personal wrong of failing to live up to a moral requirement that comes bundled with authority over persons. To make my argument, I use the resources of political philosophy and defend a novel change to the orthodox account of authority.

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Ngo, Minh Hien, and Thi Thu Huong Pham. "CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE NOVELS OF TA DUY ANH FROM CREATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS PERSPECTIVE." UED Journal of Social Sciences, Humanities and Education 10, Special (September 27, 2020): 36–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.47393/jshe.v10ispecial.860.

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By considering Crime and Punishment as the hidden principle of creating a hyperreality full of Evil, Ta Duy Anh has impressively posed and dealed with Crime and Punishment in his novels. Through revealing aspects of Evil and Crime, the writer has portrayed Evil, pointed out its nature and showed the difficulty in its both recognizing and eliminating. From seeing Crime as a sign of Evil to perceiving the bulge of a hidden protagonist in postmodern hyperreality, Ta Duy Anh has expressed his own conception and solution of Crime and Punishment. Explained from the creative consciousness of an artist and from Good - Evil and Good - Beauty, Ta Duy Anh has touched human aspiration, using Punishments, self-punishing with Repentance, or seeking the salvation of Beauty to eradicate evils.

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10

Ferguson, Kennan. "Naming Evil, Judging Evil." Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 03 (August 16, 2007): 605. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592707071629.

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Ali, Farhad, and Ahmad Hassan Khattak. "Islam, Atheism and Anti-natalism: A critical analysis." Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences (JHSMS) 2, no. 2 (December 30, 2021): 228–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.47264/idea.jhsms/2.2.17.

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The fact that every one of us in this life has to face difficulties, pain, sadness cannot be denied. Quran and Hadith also accept the presence of evil and calamities in this world. There comes the question in our mind that how is the evil present in this world although the world is created by Allah (S.W.T), and He is the merciful and controls everything in the universe. If somehow, the evil was present Allah (S.W.T) could have ended it, but we see that the reality is different. The existence of evil has been used by people as a justification for not believing in God since ages. In today’s world we see people who believe in Anti-natalism and consider life as an evil and in order to save ourselves from the evil they suggest that humans should not procreate. This article has been written after studying the arguments of people who do not believe in God and are the followers of Anti-natalism. The study concludes that evils, pains, and sadness are natural product of this world, and these evils are not a part of Allah’s (S.W.T) creations. Moreover, the changes are part of the existence of the universe and humans, and these calamities cannot be used as an excuse for not believing in God or justify believing in Anti-natalism.

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Walls, Jerry L. "Heaven and the Goodness of God." Religions 12, no. 5 (April 29, 2021): 316. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12050316.

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In this essay, I argue that we should take fully seriously the doctrine of heaven when dealing with the problem of evil in our world. The hope of heaven is integral to Christian theism so it cannot be neglected in any substantive discussion of the problem of evil. Indeed, heaven provides resources to respond to even the worst of evils and to fully redeem them in such a way that the victims of those evils can fully affirm the goodness of their lives. Anyone who achieves heaven will experience a good of such significance and value that the ultimate beauty and goodness of their life could not be questioned. The Christian doctrine of the afterlife also provides resources to make sense of ultimate accountability. The perpetrators of horrendous evil cannot escape and will be called to account for their actions. However, even those who have committed such evil evils can be fully transformed in such a way that they can be fully reconciled with their victims and heartily embraced by them. This shows the doctrine of heaven to be not only profoundly hopeful, but also starkly honest and realistic.

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Bozbuğa, Hande Nur. "Hannah Arendt’in Kötülük Algısının Din Felsefesinde Konumlandırılışı." TSBS Bildiriler Dergisi, no. 1 (August 21, 2021): 107–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.55709/tsbsbildirilerdergisi.1.7.

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Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) is a 20th-century scholar. Her analyzes of the problem of evil are based on the suffering of the Jewish race in Germany during the World War II. Her thoughts on political issues, which were shaped by the influence of the period she lived, have prepared the ground for very efficient discussions in many fields. Some of her philosophical thoughts that she developed in the context of her studies on the political administration of the period she lived in, in a sense, have a feature that can bring essential expansions to the problems the problem of evil in the philosophy of religion. In this paper, the problem of evil and its source will be examined according to Arendt. In doing so, the concepts of radical evil and the banality of evil used by Arendt regarding the issue of evil and the aspects where such an understanding of evil differs from the classical theories of the problem of evil will be analyzed. In addition, the adequacy of the idea of radical evil caused by the totalitarian rule on the philosophy of religion will be questioned. In addition, the adequacy of the idea of radical evil caused by the totalitarian rule on the philosophy of religion will be questioned. Arendt used two fundamental concepts regarding the issue of evil: radical evil and the banality of evil. These two conceptualizations present two dimensions of her perception of evil: The first is about the agent, and the second is about the result. We can categorize the former within the scope of moral evil in the literature of the philosophy of religion since the evil he envisions is realized based on human will. As a matter of fact, the radical evil that Arendt advocated was carried out by many rulers under her command, especially Hitler. The second dimension has brought the concept of evil to a form that goes beyond its context and content. According to her, the evils in question were performed by their perpetrators as a normal and ordinary act. We can say that this perspective brought by Arendt to the problem of evil has changed the perception of evil in the classical sense.

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14

MAWSON, T. J. "The possibility of a free-will defence for the problem of natural evil." Religious Studies 40, no. 1 (February 17, 2004): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412503006784.

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In this paper, I consider various arguments to the effect that natural evils are necessary for there to be created agents with free will of the sort that the traditional free-will defence for the problem of moral evil suggests we enjoy – arguments based on the idea that evil-doing requires the doer to use natural means in their agency. I conclude that, despite prima facie plausibility, these arguments do not, in fact, work. I provide my own argument for there being no possible world in which creatures enjoying this sort of freedom exist yet suffer no natural evil, and conclude that the way is thus open for extending the free-will defence to the problem of natural evil.

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Chlup, Radek. "Proclus' Theory of Evil: An Ethical Perspective." International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 3, no. 1 (2009): 26–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187254708x397405.

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AbstractWhile the metaphysical aspects of Proclus' theory of evil have recently been studied by a number of scholars, its ethical implications have largely been neglected. In my paper I am analysing the moral consequences that Proclus' concept of evil has, at the same time using the ethical perspective to throw more light on Proclus' ontology. Most importantly, I argue that the difference between bodily and psychic evil is much more substantial that it might seem from On the Existence of Evils alone. Though both kinds of evil are characterized by their 'parasitical existence' (parhypostasis), evil in bodies is unavoidable, resulting from a wide network of cosmic corporeal interactions that no partial being can ever have control of. Psychic evil, on the other hand, is a product of human choice and is independent of external circumstances, depending wholly on the soul's ability to keep its proper vertical hierarchy. In this regard it is evil in a much more serious sense of the word, being actively caused (though unintentionally) rather than just passively suffered. In the last section of my paper I throw further light on this more dangerous kind of evil, showing it as resulting from an essential bi-dimensionality of human beings.

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16

Hannagan, Claire. "See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil." PACEsetterS 5, no. 1 (January 2008): 6–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/01.jbi.0000393339.26639.05.

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17

Zitner, D. "Hear some evil, see some evil, report no evil." Canadian Medical Association Journal 182, no. 11 (August 9, 2010): 1214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.110-2080.

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18

Hrmo, Patrik. "Does the Analogy of an Ideal State Disprove God’s Existence? James Sterba’s Argument and a Thomistic Response." Religions 13, no. 10 (October 9, 2022): 931. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13100931.

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This paper provides an analysis of James Sterba’s argument from evil in the world and the author’s Thomistic counterargument. Many authors of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion discuss the concept of “horrendous evils”, which is a representative name for pointless evil and suffering in the world. Sterba claims that the existence of such evil is not logically compatible with the existence of the all-good theistic God. If such a God existed, according to Sterba, he would have intervened in time and prevented and not permitted horrendous evil consequences; in other words, he would have acted as an ideal state. The author of this paper argues that the analogy of an ideal state does not disprove the existence of God of theism. Furthermore, people would prefer if God was not like an ideal state. Applying the characteristics of an ideal state to a theistic God is not reasonable because it relies on anthropomorphism. Such anthropomorphism is incoherent with some basic theistic beliefs. The author of this paper applies Thomistic concepts to the problem of horrendous evils.

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COLLIN, JAMES HENRY. "What the argument from evil should, but cannot, be." Religious Studies 56, no. 3 (September 25, 2018): 333–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000598.

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AbstractMichael Tooley has developed a sophisticated evidential version of the argument from evil that aims to circumvent sceptical theist responses. Evidential arguments from evil depend on the plausibility of inductive inferences from premises about our inability to see morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils to conclusions about there being no morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils. Tooley's defence of this inductive step depends on the idea that the existence of unknown rightmaking properties is no more likely, a priori, than the existence of unknown wrongmaking properties. I argue that Tooley's argument begs the question against the theist, and, in doing so, commits an analogue of the base rate fallacy. I conclude with some reflections on what a successful argument from evil would have to establish.

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Horowitz, Amir. "What Can God Do? What Should God Do?" Religions 13, no. 12 (December 2, 2022): 1178. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13121178.

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The aim of this paper is to defend James Sterba’s version (2019) of the logical argument from evil against the existence of God from two objections that have been raised against it: that God cannot “logically” prevent all evils and that the moral requirements that the argument poses for God may not apply to God. I argue that these objections do not refute the claim that God can prevent and should prevent any evil and do not undermine Sterba’s argument from evil to the effect that God does not exist.

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Coetsee, Marilie. "In Answer to the Pauline Principle: Consent, Logical Constraints, and Free Will." Religions 14, no. 1 (December 23, 2022): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14010028.

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James Sterba uses the Pauline Principle to argue that the occurrence of significant, horrendous evils is logically incompatible with the existence of a good God. The Pauline Principle states that (as a rule) one must never do evil so that good may come from it, and according to Sterba, this principle implies that God may not permit significant evils even if that permission would be necessary to secure other, greater goods. By contrast, I argue that the occurrence of significant evils is logically compatible with the existence of a good God because victims of significant evils may themselves reasonably consent to their suffering. In particular, I argue that they may be able to accept their suffering if it turns out that there was no way for God to secure relevant greater goods (or prevent other, greater evils) except by way of allowing their suffering, and God also provides them with other compensating, heavenly comforts. After using this consent-based argument to address Sterba’s logical problem from evil, I briefly consider how this argument may also help address a related evidential problem from evil, which suggests that while it is possible that victims of significant evils would consent to their suffering, it is unlikely that they would do so. While I do not provide a definitive solution to this evidential problem of evil, I highlight one important example of a trade-off that God may need to make that would—along with the provision of compensating, heavenly comforts—potentially persuade victims of significant evils to consent to their suffering. Specifically, I argue that there may be a necessary trade-off that God needs to make between permitting significant evils (on the one hand) and protecting a certain, morally significant form of free will (on the other hand).

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Stob, Jennifer. "Evil is as Evil Does." Parallax 20, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 112–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13534645.2014.865326.

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23

Russell, Luke. "Evil-Revivalism Versus Evil-Skepticism." Journal of Value Inquiry 40, no. 1 (January 30, 2007): 89–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-005-1570-0.

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SWINBURNE, RICHARD. "Reply to Richard Gale." Religious Studies 36, no. 2 (June 2000): 221–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500005217.

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I am most grateful to Richard Gale for the detailed attention which he has paid to my detailed arguments, and for the kind remarks between which he sandwiches his hard-hitting criticisms. The first of the latter is that I ‘slosh back and forth’ (211) between different theses, Ss, Sw, and W. I hope not, but I agree that I may not have made the relation between these sufficiently clear. I am certainly committed to, and sought to argue for, the strong version of the strong thesis:Ss For every instance of evil, God is justified in allowing it.But I cannot examine every instance of evil in order to show that – I do not know of all the evils, let alone have time or space to discuss each of them. So I need to produce an inductive argument for Ss, and I seek to do so by considering the various kinds of evil, and trying to show that God is justified in allowing any evil of that kind. Hence I consider the evils of having bad desires, making wrong choices which cause suffering to oneself, making wrong choices which cause suffering to others, suffering occurring through natural processes, ignorance of God etc. I divide evils into kinds, in such a way that the morally significant differences between evils of a given kind is simply one of degree – different instances of suffering occurring through natural processes differ in respect of their intensity and the period of time they last.

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CLARK, STEPHEN R. L. "Progress and the argument from evil." Religious Studies 40, no. 2 (April 21, 2004): 181–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412503006851.

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The argument from evil, though it is the most effective rhetorical argument against orthodox theism, fails to demonstrate its conclusion, since we are unavoidably ignorant whether there is more evil than could possibly be justified. That same ignorance infects any claims to discern a divine purpose in nature, as well as recent attempts at a broadly Irenaean theodicy. Evolution is not, on neo-Darwinian theory, intellectually, morally, or spiritually progressive in the way that some religious thinkers have supposed. To suppose so, indeed, is to misidentify the evils we should fear. But though we should neither conceal the evils of the world nor offer any consequentialist justification of them, we may still reasonably maintain an orthodox theism. Evil is not created so that otherwise unattainable goods may come, but is an unavoidable byproduct of creation which it is – or may be – God's purpose to redeem.

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Pauley, John. "Faulkner’s Tragic Fiction and the Impossibility of Theodicy." Janus Head 12, no. 1 (2011): 292–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jh201112122.

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The details of evil will sink any attempt at theodicy. But details of evil are usually- or even necessarily- lost in the abstract discussions of evil in philosophical texts. Hence this essay looks at the details of tragic fiction, specifically in some stories by Faulkner. The initial analysis endeavors to show that fiction gets us closer to the reality of agency than philosophy and so it then gets us closer to the reality of the evils that haunt both individuals and cultures (the two cannot be adequately separated). Finally, the details of the evil analyzed reveal that human beings are actually capable of a self-destruction that annihilates the very grounds of human agency and identity: Faulkner’s tragic fiction reveals that self-destruction is written into the necessary components of agency and identity.

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Seregin, Andrei V. "Seneca’s Intentionalism and the Possibility of Social Morality in the Context of Stoic Ethics." History of Philosophy 25, no. 2 (2020): 5–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2020-25-2-5-15.

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Stoic ethical theory is “rigorist” in the sense that it regards all kinds of generally recognized non-moral goods and evils as “indifferents” that do not influence human happiness or misery. One of the problems with rigorism goes as follows: if non-moral evils experienced by the victims of various inhumane actions actually do them no harm and do not contribute to their being unhappy, then why regard the infliction of these evils as morally wrong? Seneca seems to be the only Stoic author in whose texts one can find some reaction to this problem. His reply is essentially intentionalist: in order to commit a moral evil towards others it is enough to have an intention to inflict an evil upon them without inflicting it in fact. But this thesis can be understood either in an objectivist or in a subjectivist sense. In the first case the intention in question is the intention to inflict what objectively is an evil. I argue that this implication would make Seneca’s argument blatantly false. In the second case it is the intention to inflict what the agent subjectively believes to be an evil. I show that there is some evidence in Seneca’s corpus according to which it is precisely subjectivist intentionalism that he adheres to. But even then he cannot solve the initial problem, because this position allows to justify the idea that the infliction of non-moral evils on others is morally wrong only for those agents who do not share rigorism.

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Freeman, Austin. "Flesh, World, Devil: The Nature of Evil in J.R.R. Tolkien." Journal of Inklings Studies 10, no. 2 (October 2020): 139–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/ink.2020.0077.

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This article examines the nature of evil in Tolkien's work in light of Tom Shippey's well-known assertion that Tolkien struggled between two poles: a ‘Manichaean’ or dualist position and the Catholic Augustinian or ‘Boethian’ position which views evil as an absence. After noting that subsequent respondents to Shippey take this distinction for granted and often seem to misread Shippey himself, the author argues that in fact the whole discussion is ill-founded. New frameworks for reading Tolkien's views on evil should be sought. The article then presents a new proposal: dividing Tolkien's evils into the tripartite distinction of flesh, world, and devil long present in theological discussions.

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Chang, Han Jen. "Rape with Murder and Suicide: The Evidential Argument from Evil against Naturalism." Religions 14, no. 6 (May 29, 2023): 715. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14060715.

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The problem of evil seems to have been the patent of theism for a long time. However, some philosophers notice that this is not necessarily the case and raise arguments from evil against atheism. In this paper, I follow this insight and raise the evidential argument from evil against naturalism. I argue that some human behaviors that cause evil and suffering contradict the principles of evolution and should not exist in a naturalistic world. Nevertheless, they do exist, and they accordingly disconfirm naturalism. To attain this conclusion, I first establish that psychological mechanisms as evolutionary causes are the ultimate causes of human behaviors if naturalism is true. Then, I argue that cases of rape with murder and suicide have contravened their relevant psychological mechanisms’ adaptive functions and should not exist. Therefore, cases of these behaviors make it reasonable to believe that naturalism is not true. Both naturalists and theists now have to raise plausible explanations for various evils in the world. It is possible for theism to outcompete naturalism with respect to evil as a result.

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Burns, Elizabeth. "Evil and Divine Power: A Response to James Sterba’s Argument from Evil." Religions 12, no. 6 (June 15, 2021): 442. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12060442.

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In this article, I offer a response to James P. Sterba’s moral argument for the non-existence of God. Sterba applies to God the so-called Pauline Principle that it is not permissible to do evil in order that good may come. He suggests that this is the underlying element in discussions of the Doctrine of Double Effect, a doctrine that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of religion. Although, as hypothetical trolley cases demonstrate, human beings sometimes cannot avoid doing or permitting evil in order to prevent a greater evil, Sterba argues that the same cannot be said of an omnipotent God and that, since our world contains horrendous evils, the existence of a God who is both omnipotent and good is therefore logically impossible. I argue that, if God is thought to be a conscious being with unlimited power to prevent horrendous evils, Sterba’s argument might be valid. I also argue, however, that divine power need not be construed in this way. Drawing on some ideas derived from the work of Charles Hartshorne, I suggest that God is not a kind of divine micromanager and that it is more coherent and, indeed, helpful to think of God as a social influencer whose power is a source of positive energy for the promotion of goodness.

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Skarga, Barbara, and Jacek Dobrowolski. "Evil." Dialogue and Universalism 20, no. 1 (2010): 171–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du2010201/281.

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Corlett, J. A. "Evil." Analysis 64, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 81–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.1.81.

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Perring, Christian. "Evil." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 9 (2000): 30–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm2000991.

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Sullivan, Daniel. "Evil." Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews 43, no. 1 (December 30, 2013): 126–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094306113514539ll.

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35

Anderson, Susan Leigh. "Evil." Journal of Value Inquiry 24, no. 1 (January 1990): 43–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00150573.

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Corballis, Tim. "The Evil of the Lesser Evil." Counterfutures 3 (April 1, 2017): 175. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/cf.v3i0.6425.

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Soni, Devin, and Vivek K. Singh. "See No Evil, Hear No Evil." Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 2, CSCW (November 2018): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3274433.

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38

SALLADAY, SUSAN A. "See no evil, speak no evil." Nursing 32, no. 2 (February 2002): 24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00152193-200202000-00023.

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Driscoll, Sarah, Ann P. Murchison, and Jurij R. Bilyk. "See no evil, hear no evil…" Survey of Ophthalmology 59, no. 2 (March 2014): 251–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.survophthal.2013.03.003.

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Harrison, James. "See no evil, fix no evil." Australian Journal of Public Health 19, no. 5 (February 12, 2010): 440–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1753-6405.1995.tb00406.x.

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Giri, Pradeep Kumar. "William Golding's Lord of the Flies: A Study of Evil in Man." Batuk 5, no. 1 (January 31, 2019): 52–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/batuk.v5i1.27924.

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William Golding's first and the most popular novel Lord of the Flies (1954) presents a depressing truth about man and his nature: here, he portrays inherent evil in man. In this novel there is almost a complete absence of grown-ups, and evil is portrayed through children. It has an instinctual hold upon the human heart. Generally the growth of the inherent evil in human being is kept under control by civilized restraint, but removal of such restriction results in a complete regression into savagery and brutality. This is what happens in the novel too. Therefore, inherent evil in man which brings out the dystopian vision of the post-modern world will be discussed with reference to plot, images, symbols and character in this article. Lust for power and control over other are the evils of society from which even the children are not immune.

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Shelomita Selamat. "ARENDT’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF THE INTELLECT IN THE ACT OF AVOIDING EVIL." Jurnal Filsafat dan Teologi Katolik 1, no. 2 (January 22, 2018): 46–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.58919/juftek.v1i2.3.

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Human being is a rational animal who has the capability to think. The activity of thinking distinguishes man from other animals. Nevertheless, there are some people who do not use their capability to think. Many people just follow what other people said without really considering what they actually do. For Hannah Arendt, this is one of the factors that causes many evils have occurred in our daily life. Moreover, she used the term of the banality of evil to describe the evil that has happened because of the culprit’s inability to think. Therefore, she emphasized the importance of thinking in every human being. For her, thinking makes human to avoid grave evil.

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Reitan, Eric. "Divine Omnipotence, Divine Sovereignty and Moral Constraints on the Prevention of Evil: A Reply to Sterba." Religions 13, no. 9 (August 31, 2022): 813. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13090813.

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In Is a Good God Logically Possible?, James Sterba uses the analogy of a just political state to develop evil-prevention principles he thinks a good God would follow. With the assumption that God is omnipotent, these principles entail that God would never permit free agents to bring about horrendous evil. But free agents routinely succeed in doing so: entailing a logical incompatibility between the world’s evils and the existence of a good, omnipotent God. I challenge this conclusion by sketching two ways divine omnipotence arguably entails that God would face moral constraints on the prevention of moral evil that human agents and political states do not. If my account is sound, God would be morally precluded from functioning as a sovereign governing authority in the manner of just political states. If this is correct, Sterba’s arguments might be taken to show, not that there is a contradiction between the world’s evil and the existence of a good, almighty God, but that there is a contradiction between the world’s evil and the common theistic belief that such a God is the sovereign ruler of the world.

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Hasker, William. "Why is there so much evil?" Review & Expositor 111, no. 3 (August 2014): 238–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0034637314534626.

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The problem of evil is one that perplexes both believers and non-believers. The best approach to the problem is to see evil and suffering as the outcome of general policies God has adopted in creating and governing the world—policies which on the whole are good and beneficial, but which in specific cases lead to suffering for humans and other sentient creatures. Chief among these policies are the policy of allowing human beings to exercise free will in choosing between good and evil, and the policy of creating and sustaining a world of nature that operates according to its inherent laws, with divine interventions into the natural order comparatively infrequent. This approach benefits persons suffering from various evils by releasing them from an often fruitless search for “God’s reasons” for the evil in question, and enabling them to focus on the grace and strength given by Christ to live courageously in spite of their suffering.

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Harrison, Peter. "Theodicy and Animal Pain." Philosophy 64, no. 247 (January 1989): 79–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100044053.

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The existence of evil is compatible with the existence of God, most theists would claim, because evil either results from the activities of free agents, or it contributes in some way toward their moral development. According to the ‘free-will defence’, evil and suffering are necessary consequences of free-will. Proponents of the ‘soul-making argument’—a theodicy with a different emphasis—argue that a universe which is imperfect will nurture a whole range of virtues in a way impossible either in a perfect world, or in a totally evil one. The pain of animals is widely thought to constitute a major difficulty for both of these accounts, for if we ask whether the only evils present in the world result directly from the free actions of created agents, or contribute in some way to ‘soul-making’ of such agents, we are bound to admit that, on the face of it, much animal pain does not.

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Alford, C. Fred. "Reply to Michael Levine's 'See no evil, Hear no evil, Speak no evil: Psychiatry, psychoanalysis and evil'." Psychoanalytic Studies 3, no. 1 (March 2001): 111–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14608950020026881.

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Huffling, J. Brian. "The Problem of Evil and God’s Moral Standing: A Rejoinder to James Sterba." Religions 13, no. 11 (October 28, 2022): 1031. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13111031.

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This article is a rejoinder to James Sterba’s response to my previous article on the topic of his book, Is a Good God Logically Possible? Sterba argues that a good God is not logically possible given the amount of horrendous evil in the world. If God did exist, Sterba asserts, then he would be able to prevent such evils from happening while not losing any goods. My original article was a response to the notion that God is morally obligated to prevent such evil. The main points considered here are whether there really is a logical problem of evil and how God can have moral virtues ascribed to him while not being morally obligated in the sense that Sterba’s position requires.

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TAŞKIN, Ferhat. "The Free Will Defense and the Problem of Heavenly Freedom." Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 64, no. 1 (May 31, 2023): 121–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.33227/auifd.1258091.

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According to the logical problem of evil, the co-existence of evil and the theistic God who is considered to be omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent is impossible. The fact that our world contains evils invalidates the existence of the theistic God. A libertarian theistic response to this problem, the free will defense, holds that if God actually has or could have a sufficient reason to actualize a world containing evils, the problem fails. This good reason, according to the defense, might be significant freedom, the freedom to choose between moral good and evil. Yujin Nagasawa, Graham Oppy, and Nick Trakakis, however, approach this debate from a different angle and argue that the traditional theistic view of heaven is a problem for this theistic response when we ask whether there is freedom in heaven. They contend that if the inhabitants of heaven do not have significant freedom, free will cannot be a great good that gives God a good reason to create a world containing evils. Thus, the free will defense fails. In this paper, I claim that this is mistaken. I argue that even though the inhabitants of heaven are not free in the most robust sense (i.e. they are no longer capable of sinning), this does not show that significant freedom is not a great good that justifies God’s creating a world containing evils.

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Flint, David. "Internet: Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil CDA Revisited." Business Law Review 20, Issue 1 (January 1, 1999): 14–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/bula1999006.

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Kruse, G. "See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil [enterprise resource planning]." Manufacturing Engineer 85, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 40–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/me:20060208.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Evil'

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