Academic literature on the topic 'Evidential burden'
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Journal articles on the topic "Evidential burden"
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Glover, Richard. "Codifying the Law on Evidential Burdens." Journal of Criminal Law 72, no. 4 (August 2008): 305–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1350/jcla.2008.72.4.305.
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This article examines the concept of the evidential burden and argues that the decision in R v Malinina illustrates that the concept of the evidential burden is in desperate need of clarification. It will be contended that, ultimately, codification would be the best means of achieving that end.
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Rajah, Meera. "Rationalising the burden of establishing defences at criminal law in Singapore: Reconsidering Jayasena, in the wake of Eu Lim Hoklai." International Journal of Evidence & Proof 21, no. 4 (May 1, 2017): 299–329. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1365712717701144.
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The reversal of the burden of proof and the imposition of a mandatory death penalty for certain offences have left the Singapore criminal justice system the subject of much rights-based criticism. Case law hints that there exists a very real possibility of wrongful conviction, should the courts apply s. 107 of the Evidence Act (‘EA’) in its literal sense and shift the legal burden to the accused, irrespective of the defence he seeks to invoke. The Singapore courts have acknowledged that the ‘evidential burden’ of proof as a distinct legal concept on numerous occasions but have not reconciled it with Lord Devlin’s interpretation of s. 3(3) EA in Jayasena, which limits proof to the ‘legal burden’. This article argues that the time has come for the Singapore courts to expressly banish the Jayasena ghost. The fairer approach would be to examine whether the defence falls within the categories of (a) mental condition defences, namely insanity, insane automatism, diminished responsibility and intoxication causing abnormality of mind, and (b) other general defences. Reliance on a defence within the former category will cause the accused to bear the legal burden of proof; he should only bear the evidential burden for the latter.
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Nance, Dale A. "The Weights of Evidence." Episteme 5, no. 3 (October 2008): 267–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360008000385.
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ABSTRACTInterest in the Keynesian concept of evidential weight has led to divergent views concerning the burden of proof in adjudication. It is argued that Keynes's concept is properly engaged only in the context of one special kind of decision, the decision whether or not the evidence is ripe for a decision on the underlying merits, whether the latter decision is based on probability, relative plausibility, coherence or otherwise. As a general matter, this question of ripeness is appropriately assigned to the judiciary for resolution as part of the burden of production, rather than to the jury or other factfinder as part of the burden of persuasion.
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Volpin, Cristina. "The ball is in your court: Evidential burden of proof and the proof-proximity principle in EU competition law." Common Market Law Review 51, Issue 4 (August 1, 2014): 1159–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/cola2014089.
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This article addresses the limits of the application of presumptions of fact in EU competition law. It describes the most common presumptions of fact in competition law and their implications for evidential responsibilities. It illustrates the emergence of the proof-proximity principle, which allocates the evidential burden of proof on the party to whom the evidence is available or who is better situated to furnish it easily and promptly. This principle ensures the effectiveness of the fact-finding process in public and the private enforcement, while at the same time guaranteeing that Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 is not violated. The article mentions other areas of law where the proof-proximity principle is applied, and analyses the principle's compatibility with fundamental rights of the defence. It is contended that the proof-proximity principle plays a major role in rendering presumptions of fact compliant with the presumption of innocence enshrined in Articles 6(2) ECHR and 48(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
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Hopkins, Tamar. "Litigating Racial Profiling: The Use of Statistical Data." Law in Context. A Socio-legal Journal 37, no. 2 (September 3, 2021): 37–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.26826/law-in-context.v37i2.155.
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The use of statistical data to prove racial discrimination by police in individual cases is relatively novel in Australia. Based on a survey of international strategies, this article argues that statistical and social science data can play three critical evidential roles in litigation. Firstly, it can form part of the social context evidence used to influence the inferences that can be drawn from other evidence led in a case. Secondly it can influence the cogency of the evidence required for claimants to meet the standard of proof, and thirdly, it can be used to shift the burden of proof. Using these evidential methods, evidence of institutional racism can be used to assist in making findings of discrimination in individual cases. This article speculates on the role that statistics could have played in the Haile-Michael race discrimination claim that settled in 2013, and in the 2019 inquest into the death of Tanya Day.
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Rix, Keith J. B. "The common law defence of automatism: a quagmire for the psychiatrist." BJPsych Advances 21, no. 4 (July 2015): 242–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/apt.bp.113.012146.
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SummaryThis article sets out the complicated and confused law on automatism and identifies the role of the psychiatrist, including paradoxically a role in cases of non-psychiatric disorder where the law requires evidence from a doctor approved under section 12 of the Mental Health Act. Legal definitions of automatism are introduced. The internal/external distinction, evidential burden, burden of proof, standard of proof, prior fault, intoxication and the degree of impairment illustrate how the courts limit the defence. Detailed accounts are given of cases in which the defence of automatism has been based on psychiatric disorder and on the effects of psychotropic drugs. Suggestions are made for approaches to assessment and medicolegal reporting.
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Olmedo-Peralta, Eugenio. "The Evidential Effect Of Commitment Decisions In Damage Claims.What Is Theassumptivevalue Ofa Pledge?" Common Market Law Review 56, Issue 4 (August 1, 2019): 979–1004. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/cola2019078.
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Despite the extensive use of commitment decisions by the European Commission and national competent authorities (NCAs), the effects of such decisions are far from being completely clear. This paper deals with the problems to claim for damages after a commitment decision has been reached. As these decisions do not state the existence or continuation of the infringement, claimants will bear the burden of proof in stand-alone damages actions. However, some evidential effects must be recognized to commitment decisions and to certain statements made throughout the public enforcement proceedings.We conclude that some measures should be introduced in this regard to ensure the victims’right to a compensation in these cases
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Tang, Hesheng, Dawei Li, Lixin Deng, and Songtao Xue. "Evidential uncertainty quantification of the Park–Ang damage model in performance based design." Engineering Computations 35, no. 7 (October 1, 2018): 2480–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ec-11-2017-0466.
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Purpose This paper aims to develop a comprehensive uncertainty quantification method using evidence theory for Park–Ang damage index-based performance design in which epistemic uncertainties are considered. Various sources of uncertainty emanating from the database of the cyclic test results of RC members provided by the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center are taken into account. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, an uncertainty quantification methodology based on evidence theory is presented for the whole process of performance-based seismic design (PBSD), while considering uncertainty in the Park–Ang damage model. To alleviate the burden of high computational cost in propagating uncertainty, the differential evolution interval optimization strategy is used for efficiently finding the propagated belief structure throughout the whole design process. Findings The investigation results of this paper demonstrate that the uncertainty rooted in Park–Ang damage model have a significant influence on PBSD design and evaluation. It might be worth noting that the epistemic uncertainty present in the Park–Ang damage model needs to be considered to avoid underestimating the true uncertainty. Originality/value This paper presents an evidence theory-based uncertainty quantification framework for the whole process of PBSD.
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D'yakonova, Mariya. "Harmonization of the Rules on the Distribution of the Evidential Burden on the Example of the Model European Rules of Civil Procedure." Journal of Russian Law 25, no. 7 (July 6, 2022): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/jrl.2021.091.
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Sidoli del Ceno, Julian, Hannah George, and Michel Vols. "Adjudication in tenancy deposit scheme disputes: agents’ perspectives." International Journal of Law in the Built Environment 7, no. 2 (July 13, 2015): 162–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlbe-09-2014-0026.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the operation of tenancy deposit protection within England and Wales. The paper consciously focuses solely on the views and perspectives of letting agents operating in the various schemes. Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on a series of semi-structured qualitative interviews with lettings agents in two distinct geographical urban areas, Birmingham and South Wales. Participants were selected for their market presence within a given area and the fact that they were all members of approved regulatory schemes. Findings – Overall, most agents were broadly happy with the process and considered adjudication to be an appropriate form of resolution for tenancy deposit disputes given the often small monetary value of the disputes and the large volume of cases. Concerns were raised, however, regarding the heavy bureaucratic burden placed on agents and on the perceived evidential burden on the landlord. There being a widely held view that a landlord could rarely “win” outright. Research limitations/implications – The qualitative data are based on a relatively small although representative sample of lettings agents’ active within the UK residential property sector. Originality/value – The paper provides original data on the attitudes and perspectives of agents who manage deposit disputes. This is an area of current interest that has yet to receive sustained attention. Although concerned with legislation in England and Wales, its findings and discussion are relevant in other jurisdictions facing similar issues.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Evidential burden"
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Aguiló, Regla Josep. "Hominis Presumptions and Evidential Inferences." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116725.
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The author challenges the terminology «legal presumptions» and «judicial presumptions», and rather refers to presumptions established by rules of presumption and to hominis presumptions. He argues that the best way to differentiate between them is by showing the contrast between «it shall be presumed» (syntagm proper to practical reasoning) and «it is presumable» (syntagm proper to theoretical reasoning). The text clarifies the relationship between the so-called hominis presumptions and the factual inferences or evidential inferences, in general. He answers the question of what the «it is presumed» syntagm (proper to the hominis presumptions) brings with respect to the «it is probable» syntagm (proper of all evidentiary inferences).El autor cuestiona la terminología «presunciones legales» y «presunciones judiciales» y, más bien, se refiere a las presunciones establecidas por normas de presunción y a las presunciones hominis. Defiende que la mejor manera de diferenciar unas de otras es mostrando la distancia que media entre «debe presumirse» (sintagma propio del razonamiento práctico) y «es presumible» (sintagma propio del razonamiento teórico). El texto aclara las relaciones entre las llamadas presunciones hominis y las inferencias fácticas o inferencias probatorias, en general, respondiendo a la pregunta sobre qué aporta el sintagma «es presumible» (propio de las presunciones hominis) frente al sintagma «es probable» (propio de todas las inferencias probatorias).
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TAVASSI, LUDOVICA. "L'onere della prova nel processo penale." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10281/241129.
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La tesi si è occupata dell’analisi dei risvolti processuali dell’onere della prova all’interno degli accertamenti giurisdizionali di parte.
Per analizzare compiutamente il tema, l’impianto dell’elaborato è stato articolato in tre capitoli.
Nel primo, partendo dalla considerazione delle teorie generali in ordine alle situazioni giuridiche soggettive e alle modalità deontiche, si è proteso per quelle posizioni dottrinali che, negando un’autonoma identità giuridica alla figura di onere, hanno ritenuto opportuno configurarlo come un elemento di struttura delle fattispecie complesse di potere.
Nel secondo capitolo, lungo un’osservazione più specificamente calata nelle dinamiche processuali, si è proceduto ad osservare come l’onere della prova acquisti un ruolo centrale nelle verifiche cognitive laddove, per un verso, esso descrive la situazione soggettiva di potere esercitata dall’attore che rivendica nel giudizio un proprio diritto, e, per l’altro, implica la regola di giudizio che orienta la decisione nel caso in cui, terminato l’accertamento, permanga l’incertezza sullo stato delle situazioni materiali da verificare.
Il luogo di elezione in cui il principio dell’onere della prova ha trovato la sua collocazione naturale è il processo civile. Qui, vigendo il principio dispositivo, in virtù del diverso standard decisorio della probabilità prevalente, l’opportunità di introdurre o meno i mezzi di prova a sostegno della pretesa attorea resta una libera scelta della parte che, per ottenere una pronuncia in proprio favore, deve, appunto, onerarsi di allegare la prova.
Nel corso del terzo capitolo, si è proceduto ad analizzare come nel processo penale, invece, considerata l’indisponibilità della materia, non si possa parlare di un onere per l’accusa, ma di un dovere di prova in virtù del portato normativo dell’art. 112 Cost. In base ad esso, quindi, il pubblico ministero non è libero di presentare la domanda, ma ha l’obbligo di farlo quando ne ricorrono i presupposti. Al contempo, egli ha dunque un corrispettivo dovere di prova in sostegno dell’imputazione per la verifica dibattimentale (prosecuzione dell’azione). Dunque, una volta superata l’udienza preliminare, il pubblico ministero non è titolare, rispetto all’adduzione dei mezzi di prova, di una posizione di potere; piuttosto egli ha un dovere di prova che in caso di mancato assolvimento dovrà essere giuridicamente sanzionato e non potrà semplicemente essere supplito da quello che, in questo caso, si rivelerebbe come un abusivo esercizio da parte del giudice del potere di acquisire la prova d’ufficio.
Quest’ultimo aspetto, infine, ha offerto lo spunto per osservare in che modo possa definirsi la portata dell’art. 507 c.p.p. senza intaccare l’imparzialità del giudizio. Il dubbio ragionevole, nell’area dell’accertamento definita dalla presunzione di innocenza, non può attagliarsi su un quadro probatorio rimasto, per negligenza o per imperizia dell’accusatore pubblico, incompleto rispetto agli esperimenti di prova disponibili e dunque adducibili al processo.The thesis dealt with the analysis of the trial implications of the burden of evidence within the jurisdictional verification of the party. To fully analyze the theme, the layout’s project has been divided into three chapters. In the first, starting from the consideration of general theories in relation to subjective juridical situations and deontic modalities, the paper leaned over those doctrinal positions which, by denying an autonomous juridical identity to the burden figure, considered it appropriate to configure it as a structural element of the complex cases of power. In the second chapter, along an observation more specifically related to the trial’s dynamics, we proceeded to observe how the burden of evidence acquires a central role in cognitive verifications where, on the one hand, it describes the subjective situation of power exercised by the actor claiming a right in the judgment, and, for the other, implies the rule of judgment that directs the decision in the case in which, once the proof assessment has been completed, remains the uncertainty about the state of the material situations to be verified. The election place which the principle of the burden of evidence finds its natural place is the civil process. Here, in keeping with the device principle, by virtue of the different decision-making standard of the prevailing probability, the opportunity to introduce or not the evidence supporting the alleged claim remains a free choice of the party who, to obtain a sentence in his favor, have to attach the proof. During the third chapter, we proceeded to analyze how, in the criminal trial, however, considering the unavailability of the matter, we can not speak of a evidential burden for the accusation, but a duty of evidence by virtue of the legislative art. 112 of the Constitution. Accordingly, therefore, the public prosecutor is not free to present the request, but he has the obligation to do this when the conditions are met. At the same time, he therefore has a corresponding duty of evidence in support of the indictment for the verification of the proceedings (continuation of the prosecution). Therefore, once the preliminary hearing is over, the public prosecutor does not hold a position of power in relation to the evidence; rather, he has a duty to prove that in the event of failure to comply he must be legally sanctioned and can not simply be compensated by the judge. In this case, his intervention would be an abusive exercise by the judge of power to acquire evidence by himself. Lastly, this last aspect offered the opportunity to observe how the the art. 507 c.p.p. can work without affecting the impartiality of the judgment. Reasonable doubt, in the assessment area defined by the presumption of innocence, can not be based on a probative framework left not complete for a negligent or inexperienced behavior of the public prosecutor, incomplete compared to the available trial experiments and therefore adductible to the trial.
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Rossouw, Tersia. "Vermoedens, die bewyslas en die effek van die grondwet." Diss., 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/17640.
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Text in AfrikaansDie sogenaamde vermoede van onskuld is via die Engelse Reg in ons reg oorgeneem en tot konstitusionele status verhoog met die daarstelling van artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet, No. 200 van 1993. Hierdie reg om onskuldig geag te word en die gepaardgaande swygreg, wat hier kortliks aangeraak word, kan egter aan beperking onderhewig wees soos bepaal deur artikel 33 van die Grondwet. Die beginsels soos ontwikkel in Kanada en Amerika word ondersoek. Die slotsom waartoe geraak word is dat, alhoewel historiese en ander verskille deurgaans voor oe gehou sal moet word, die regspraak in genoemde jurisdiksies, en meer spesifiek Kanada, 'n groat rol sal speel by die inhoud wat die SuidA: frik:aanse howe, in die konteks van statutere vermoedens, aan die konstitusionele reg om onskuldig geag te word, sal gee.
The so-called presumption of innocence has been inherited from the English common law and awarded constitutional status by the introduction of section 25(3)(c) ofthe Constitution, Act 200 ofl993. This right to be presumed innocent and the accompanying right to remain silent, which is briefly touched upon, are however not absolute and can be subject to limitation as provided for by section 33 ofthe Constitution. The principles, as they have been developed in Canada and America, are investigated. The conclusion which is drawn is that, despite historical and other differences, it can be expected that foreign jurisprudence, particularly that of Canada, will play a major role in the content that will be given by the South African courts to the right to be presumed innocent in the context of statutory presumptions.
Criminal & Procedural Law
LL. M.
Books on the topic "Evidential burden"
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Keane, Adrian, and Paul McKeown. 4. The burden and standard of proof. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198811855.003.0004.
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This chapter discusses the rules governing which party bears the legal and evidential burdens on which facts in issue. These rules can determine the eventual outcome of proceedings; determine which party has the right to begin adducing evidence in court; in what circumstances a defendant, at the end of the case for the prosecution, or claimant, may make a successful submission of no case to answer; and how the trial judge should direct the jury. The chapter begins by defining and distinguishing the legal, evidential, and other burdens, and then considers in detail which burden is borne by each of the parties on the various facts in issue in any given case.
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Presumption Of Innocence Evidential And Human Rights Perspectives. Hart Publishing (UK), 2010.
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Brown, Jessica. The Evidential Commitments of Infallibilism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801771.003.0002.
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This chapter examines what commitments concerning evidence and evidential support a non-shifty infallibilist needs to take on in order to avoid scepticism. In particular, it argues that the infallibilist needs to endorse Factivity (p is evidence only if true); the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Evidence (if one knows that p, then p is part of one’s evidence); and the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Self-Support (if one knows that p, then p is part of one’s evidence for p). Certain infallibilists have endorsed some or all of these claims. However, given that chapters 3 and 4 will argue that these claims are problematic, it’s important to show that infallibilists are committed to these claims. This is the burden of the second chapter.
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Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. 2. Burden and standard of proof: presumptions. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198715795.003.0002.
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The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, bullet-pointed answer plans and suggested answers, author commentary and illustrative diagrams and flow charts. This chapter discusses the allocation of the burden of proof in civil and criminal trials, depending on who should bear the risk. In criminal trials the ‘presumption of innocence’ means that the burden is on the prosecution, unless reversed by express or implied statutory provision. The law of evidence safeguards what in some jurisdictions is a civil right backed by the constitution. It is important to understand the difference between the legal and evidential burden and the occasions where they are separately allocated. Tricky areas are where there is a divorce of the legal and evidential burden, primarily in situations where the prosecution cannot expect to put up evidence to anticipate every specific defence the accused may present.
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Hannibal, Martin, and Lisa Mountford. 15. The Burden of Proof. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198765905.003.0015.
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This chapter explains the rules governing the legal and evidential burdens of proof that decide which party has the responsibility of proving a fact in issue to the court. It then discusses the degree of persuasiveness the evidence must attain to satisfy the appropriate standard of proof and considers the human rights issues in those exceptional situations where the accused has the legal burden of proof. For both the prosecution and the defence, the rules that allocate the burden of proof and the degree of proof are fundamental to the outcome of a case at trial.
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Hannibal, Martin, and Lisa Mountford. 15. The Burden of Proof. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198787679.003.0015.
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This chapter explains the rules governing the legal and evidential burdens of proof that decide which party has the responsibility of proving a fact in issue to the court. It then discusses the degree of persuasiveness the evidence must attain to satisfy the appropriate standard of proof and considers the human rights issues in those exceptional situations where the accused has the legal burden of proof. For both the prosecution and the defence, the rules that allocate the burden of proof and the degree of proof are fundamental to the outcome of a case at trial.
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Hannibal, Martin, and Lisa Mountford. 15. The Burden of Proof. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198823216.003.0015.
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This chapter explains the rules governing the legal and evidential burdens of proof that decide which party has the responsibility of proving a fact in issue to the court. It then discusses the degree of persuasiveness the evidence must attain to satisfy the appropriate standard of proof including the test for a successful submission of no case to answer and considers the human rights issues in those exceptional situations where the accused has the legal burden of proof. For both the prosecution and the defence, the rules that allocate the burden of proof and the degree of proof are fundamental to the outcome of a case at trial.
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Graham, Peter J., and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, eds. Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198713524.001.0001.
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This volume collects new work on epistemic entitlement partly motivated by Tyler Burge’s and Crispin Wright’s seemingly identical distinctions between two forms of warrant: entitlement and justification. But despite nomenclature, Burge and Wright are engaged in different projects. Recognizing that we cannot provide a non-question begging evidential reply to the sceptic, Wright seeks an a priori, non-evidential, rational right to accept and claim to know cornerstone propositions. He calls these rights epistemic entitlements. Epistemic justifications are evidential warrants, contributors to knowledge. Tyler Burge does not engage the sceptic. Instead, he assumes knowledge and investigates its structure. Burge’s two core notions are warrant and reasons. Warrants are exercises of belief-forming competences that are good routes to truth and knowledge. A reason is a proposition with a mode that contributes to an explanation of the belief-worthiness of a belief for the individual. A justification is a warrant with reasons. An entitlement is a warrant without reasons. The volume begins with a substantial chapter by Burge. Burge discusses the functional structure of epistemic norms, the case against internalism, clairvoyance and demon world cases, Moore’s anti-sceptical argument, so-called “easy-knowledge”, and Bayesianism in perceptual psychology and objections from Bayesianism to moderate foundationalism. The other chapters by leading figures in epistemology further advance our understanding and possibility of both forms of epistemic entitlement and related topics central to ongoing research in epistemology.
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Sanchirico, Chris William. Law and Economics of Evidence. Edited by Francesco Parisi. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684250.013.004.
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The legal field of evidence concerns how deductions regarding acts and circumstances are or should be made from testimony, documents, and other presentations, whether proffered by interested parties or uncovered by the factfinder’s own investigation. This chapter describes the portion of the academic literature on legal evidence that employs mathematical/economic modeling. It begins by reviewing the four main mathematical/economic approaches: pure probabilistic deduction, omission models, endogenous cost signaling, and correlated private information. Then it discusses the application of mathematical/economic analysis to several specific evidentiary rules, including character evidence, hearsay, privileges, proof burdens, and penalties for evidentiary misconduct.
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Carroll, Noël. Oedipus Tyrannus and the Cognitive Value of Literature. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190669447.003.0002.
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There is a long-standing skeptical position among philosophers regarding the cognitive value of literature. In this essay, using Sophocles’s Oedipus Tyrannus as viewed through Aristotle’s Poetics, I will attempt to undermine the skeptical case against the cognitive value of literature as advanced in terms of the no-evidence argument, the evidentially tainted argument, the no-argument argument, and the banality argument. By defeating these arguments, with reference to Oedipus Tyrannus, I hope to establish the possibility that literature can serve as a vehicle for the communication of general empirical knowledge and philosophical knowledge or, at least, to shift the burden of proof in this debate back to the skeptic.
Book chapters on the topic "Evidential burden"
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Nguyen, Binh, Greg J. Fox, Paul H. Mason, and Justin T. Denholm. "Preventive Therapy for Multidrug Resistant Latent Tuberculosis Infection: An Ethical Imperative with Ethical Barriers to Implementation?" In Ethics and Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health, 19–35. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27874-8_2.
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Abstract Multidrug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) has a substantial impact on individuals and communities globally, including lengthy, expensive and burdensome therapy with high rates of treatment failure and death. Strategies to prevent disease are well established for those who acquire latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) after exposure to drug susceptible TB (DS-TB). However, there has been limited research or programmatic experience regarding the prevention of MDR-TB. Accordingly, while global recommendations strongly emphasize the need to deliver LTBI therapy after TB exposure, most programs do not do so where MDR LTBI is identified. The paucity of prospective randomized trial evidence for the effectiveness of MDR LTBI therapy, and concerns regarding its adverse effects, have been used to justify a reluctance to scale up programmatic interventions to prevent MDR-TB, or to participate in research evaluating such strategies. However, such a response fails to adequately balance potential risks of therapy with the substantial harms associated with inaction. Furthermore, the cost of inaction falls disproportionately on the most vulnerable members of society, including children. Delays in implementing proven preventive strategies may also mask hidden programmatic concerns, particularly regarding the financial cost and other burdens of treating drug resistant infection. Reticence to engage with preventative therapy for MDR-TB, even in the absence of high-level evidence, may run counter to the best interests of individuals who have been exposed to MDR-TB. This chapter will explore ethical tensions raised by expanding access to preventative therapies for MDR-TB, and consider how ethically optimal responses to this adverse condition may be evaluated. An ethical perspective on evidentiary burden will be addressed, emphasizing how MDR LTBI research may both offer, and be shaped by, paradigmatic insights into human research ethics more generally. Emerging research and illustrations from the authors programmatic engagement in Vietnam are offered as case examples, because social and community expectations and norms may challenge, or support, implementation of therapy for drug-resistant infection. Such circumstances prompt consideration of the broader questions of social impact, such as the potential for widespread preventive therapy to accelerate the development of antimicrobial resistance.
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Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. "2. Burden of proof." In Evidence Concentrate, 10–36. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198840633.003.0002.
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This chapter focuses on the burden of proof and presumption of innocence in criminal and civil cases under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It considers the influence of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 on the allocation of the burden of proof and compares legal/persuasive burden of proof with the evidential burden. It contains a detailed examination of the case law under this Act and the criteria developed to assess where reverse burdens should apply. It draws on academic commentary in making this analysis. It also looks at situations where the legal and the evidential burden may be split. It concludes with an overview of the law on presumptions.
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Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. "2. Burden of proof." In Evidence Concentrate, 10–34. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780192865670.003.0002.
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This chapter focuses on the burden of proof and presumption of innocence in criminal and civil cases under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It considers the influence of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) on the allocation of the burden of proof and compares legal/persuasive burden of proof with the evidential burden. It contains a detailed examSination of the case law under this Act and the criteria developed to assess where reverse burdens should apply. It draws on academic commentary in making this analysis. It also looks at situations where the legal and the evidential burden may be split. The leading cases on the standard of proof in civil cases are reviewed.
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Glover, Richard. "4. The burden and standard of proof." In Murphy on Evidence. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198788737.003.0004.
Full textAbstract:
This first part of the chapter discusses the concept of burden of proof, covering the legal or persuasive burden of proof; the evidential burden; the effect of presumptions on the burden of proof; the legal burden of proof in civil cases; the evidential burden in civil cases; the burden of proof in criminal cases; defence burdens of proof before Lambert; defence burdens of proof after Lambert; and the burden of proof of secondary facts. The second part of the chapter discusses the standard of proof, covering standard of proof required of prosecution in criminal cases; standard of proof required of defence; standard of proof of secondary facts; the standard of proof in civil cases; and the standard of proof in matrimonial and family cases.
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Munday, Roderick. "2. Presumptions and the burden of proof." In Evidence, 62–105. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198832461.003.0002.
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Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter discusses the following: criminal and civil burdens of proof; the ‘legal burden of proof’ and the ‘evidential burden’; the ‘tactical burden’; the prosecution’s legal burden of proof in criminal cases; when the defendant in a criminal case bears the legal burden of proof; the standard of proof; the evidential burden; the judge’s ‘invisible burden’; the burden of proof when establishing the admissibility of evidence; presumptions and the incidence of the burden of proof; and reversal of the burden of proof and the European Convention on Human Rights.
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Munday, Roderick. "2. Presumptions and the burden of proof." In Evidence. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198788720.003.0003.
Full textAbstract:
Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter discusses the following: criminal and civil burdens of proof; the ‘legal burden of proof’ and the ‘evidential burden’; the ‘tactical burden’; the prosecution’s legal burden of proof in criminal cases; when the defendant in a criminal case bears the legal burden of proof; the standard of proof; the evidential burden; the judge’s ‘invisible burden’; the burden of proof when establishing the admissibility of evidence; presumptions and the incidence of the burden of proof; and reversal of the burden of proof and the European Convention on Human Rights.
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Munday, Roderick. "2. Presumptions and the burden of proof." In Evidence, 64–107. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780192895660.003.0002.
Full textAbstract:
Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter discusses the following: criminal and civil burdens of proof; the ‘legal burden of proof’ and the ‘evidential burden’; the ‘tactical burden’; the prosecution’s legal burden of proof in criminal cases; when the defendant in a criminal case bears the legal burden of proof; the standard of proof; the evidential burden; the judge’s ‘invisible burden’; the burden of proof when establishing the admissibility of evidence; presumptions and the incidence of the burden of proof; and reversal of the burden of proof and the European Convention on Human Rights.
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Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. "2. Burden of proof and presumptions." In Evidence Concentrate. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198803867.003.0002.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter focuses on the burden of proof and presumption of innocence in criminal and civil cases under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It considers the influence of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 on the allocation of the burden of proof and compares legal/persuasive burden of proof with the evidential burden. It contains a detailed examination of the case law under this Act and the criteria developed to assess where reverse burdens should apply. It draws on academic commentary in making this analysis. It also looks at situations where the legal and the evidential burden may be split. It concludes with an overview of the law on presumptions.
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Keane, Adrian, and Paul McKeown. "3. The burden and standard of proof." In The Modern Law of Evidence, 57–97. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198848486.003.0003.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter discusses the rules governing which party bears the legal and evidential burdens on which facts in issue. These rules can determine the eventual outcome of proceedings; determine which party has the right to begin adducing evidence in court; in what circumstances a defendant, at the end of the case for the prosecution, or claimant, may make a successful submission of no case to answer; and how the trial judge should direct the jury. The chapter begins by defining and distinguishing the legal, evidential, and other burdens, and then considers in detail which burden is borne by each of the parties on the various facts in issue in any given case. The chapter also considers the standard of proof in criminal proceedings where the burden is on the prosecution and on the accused. The standard of proof in civil proceedings is also considered.
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Keane, Adrian, and Paul McKeown. "3. The burden and standard of proof." In The Modern Law of Evidence, 57–95. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780192855930.003.0003.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter discusses the rules governing which party bears the legal and evidential burdens on which facts in issue. These rules can determine the eventual outcome of proceedings; determine which party has the right to begin adducing evidence in court; in what circumstances a defendant, at the end of the case for the prosecution, or claimant, may make a successful submission of no case to answer; and how the trial judge should direct the jury. The chapter begins by defining and distinguishing the legal, evidential, and other burdens, and then considers in detail which burden is borne by each of the parties on the various facts in issue in any given case. The chapter also considers the standard of proof in criminal proceedings where the burden is on the prosecution and on the accused. The standard of proof in civil proceedings is also considered.
Conference papers on the topic "Evidential burden"
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Abdul Nasir, Mohd Aizuddin, Siti Haslina Ramli, Mohd Hasbi Razak, Hambali Chik, Khairol Hazman Karim, M. Afiq M. Suhot, and Rahman Ahiruddin Abdul. "Risk-Based Approach in Composite Repair Integrity Assessment." In SPE Asia Pacific Oil & Gas Conference and Exhibition. SPE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/210679-ms.
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Abstract This paper presents the methodology in addressing composite repair integrity management through a qualitative risk-based approach based on Petronas Technical Guidelines, best practices, lessons learned, manufacturing data, design, application, and presence of defects. Recommendations for monitoring intervals and techniques are generated as the outcome of the assessment. The overall approach of this assessment consists of 5 major steps which include post-application inspection of composite repair, inspection report analysis and evaluation, the risk-based assessment, determination of risk profile, and the development of an Integrity Management Plan. Risk is typically defined as a factor of the probability of failure and the consequence of failure. In this risk-based approach, the probability of failure takes into consideration four hazard categories which are, Manufacturing, Design & Engineering, Application, and In-Service Factor. The consequence of failure on the other hand takes into consideration the effect on four categories namely people, environment, assets, and reputation. The final risk is represented in a 5x5 risk matrix whereby risk can be categorized into four major groups which are LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, and VERY HIGH. As an outcome of the RBI analysis, Integrity Management Plan (IMP) prescribes an inspection method for a composite repair at a specific interval based on its risk profile. Distinctions are made between application locations to promote optimization and comprehensiveness of the integrity management plan deployed. For the above-ground piping section and vessel, for LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, and VERY-HIGH risk categories, inspection intervals of 2 years, 1 year, 6 months, and 3 months are recommended respectively. It involves inspection methods like visual inspection, coin tap test, hardness test and NDT with prescription depending on risk profile. For buried external corrosion with Low and medium risk, pipe to soil potential measures are recommended at an aligned interval with OPU IMP or 2 years whichever comes first. Meanwhile, for High and very high, CIPS, DCVG, and defect verification are advised depending on the risk level. In offshore topsides and risers applications, is also recommended to conduct a visual inspection, coin tap test, hardness test, and NDT, with prescription based on respective risk profiles. Through this approach, a comprehensive integrity management plan can be established to monitor the performance of the composite repair while providing an evidential and qualifiable basis for composite repair design life extension. This will be a platform for the digitalization of composite repair databases which can be an accelerator towards automation in integrity management, especially in composite repair applications.
Reports on the topic "Evidential burden"
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Saville, Alan, and Caroline Wickham-Jones, eds. Palaeolithic and Mesolithic Scotland : Scottish Archaeological Research Framework Panel Report. Society for Antiquaries of Scotland, June 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.9750/scarf.06.2012.163.
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Why research Palaeolithic and Mesolithic Scotland? Palaeolithic and Mesolithic archaeology sheds light on the first colonisation and subsequent early inhabitation of Scotland. It is a growing and exciting field where increasing Scottish evidence has been given wider significance in the context of European prehistory. It extends over a long period, which saw great changes, including substantial environmental transformations, and the impact of, and societal response to, climate change. The period as a whole provides the foundation for the human occupation of Scotland and is crucial for understanding prehistoric society, both for Scotland and across North-West Europe. Within the Palaeolithic and Mesolithic periods there are considerable opportunities for pioneering research. Individual projects can still have a substantial impact and there remain opportunities for pioneering discoveries including cemeteries, domestic and other structures, stratified sites, and for exploring the huge evidential potential of water-logged and underwater sites. Palaeolithic and Mesolithic archaeology also stimulates and draws upon exciting multi-disciplinary collaborations. Panel Task and Remit The panel remit was to review critically the current state of knowledge and consider promising areas of future research into the earliest prehistory of Scotland. This was undertaken with a view to improved understanding of all aspects of the colonization and inhabitation of the country by peoples practising a wholly hunter-fisher-gatherer way of life prior to the advent of farming. In so doing, it was recognised as particularly important that both environmental data (including vegetation, fauna, sea level, and landscape work) and cultural change during this period be evaluated. The resultant report, outlines the different areas of research in which archaeologists interested in early prehistory work, and highlights the research topics to which they aspire. The report is structured by theme: history of investigation; reconstruction of the environment; the nature of the archaeological record; methodologies for recreating the past; and finally, the lifestyles of past people – the latter representing both a statement of current knowledge and the ultimate aim for archaeologists; the goal of all the former sections. The document is reinforced by material on-line which provides further detail and resources. The Palaeolithic and Mesolithic panel report of ScARF is intended as a resource to be utilised, built upon, and kept updated, hopefully by those it has helped inspire and inform as well as those who follow in their footsteps. Future Research The main recommendations of the panel report can be summarized under four key headings: Visibility: Due to the considerable length of time over which sites were formed, and the predominant mobility of the population, early prehistoric remains are to be found right across the landscape, although they often survive as ephemeral traces and in low densities. Therefore, all archaeological work should take into account the expectation of Palaeolithic and Mesolithic ScARF Panel Report iv encountering early prehistoric remains. This applies equally to both commercial and research archaeology, and to amateur activity which often makes the initial discovery. This should not be seen as an obstacle, but as a benefit, and not finding such remains should be cause for question. There is no doubt that important evidence of these periods remains unrecognised in private, public, and commercial collections and there is a strong need for backlog evaluation, proper curation and analysis. The inadequate representation of Palaeolithic and Mesolithic information in existing national and local databases must be addressed. Collaboration: Multi-disciplinary, collaborative, and cross- sector approaches must be encouraged – site prospection, prediction, recognition, and contextualisation are key areas to this end. Reconstructing past environments and their chronological frameworks, and exploring submerged and buried landscapes offer existing examples of fruitful, cross-disciplinary work. Palaeolithic and Mesolithic archaeology has an important place within Quaternary science and the potential for deeply buried remains means that geoarchaeology should have a prominent role. Innovation: Research-led projects are currently making a substantial impact across all aspects of Palaeolithic and Mesolithic archaeology; a funding policy that acknowledges risk and promotes the innovation that these periods demand should be encouraged. The exploration of lesser known areas, work on different types of site, new approaches to artefacts, and the application of novel methodologies should all be promoted when engaging with the challenges of early prehistory. Tackling the ‘big questions’: Archaeologists should engage with the big questions of earliest prehistory in Scotland, including the colonisation of new land, how lifestyles in past societies were organized, the effects of and the responses to environmental change, and the transitions to new modes of life. This should be done through a holistic view of the available data, encompassing all the complexities of interpretation and developing competing and testable models. Scottish data can be used to address many of the currently topical research topics in archaeology, and will provide a springboard to a better understanding of early prehistoric life in Scotland and beyond.