Journal articles on the topic 'European Union countries – Foreign economic relations – Africa, North'

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1

Elbashir, Rania. "LIBYA'S FOREIGN TRADE WITH EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES." MEST Journal 10, no. 2 (July 15, 2022): 64–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.12709/mest.10.10.02.07.

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The subject of this empirical and theoretical work is the exchange of foreign trade in Libya with the countries of the European Union. The scientific objective of the research is to make a scientific classification of the volume of foreign trade between Libya and the European Union countries and to discover the factors that hinder foreign trade and explain them scientifically. European countries also support this cooperation and contribute significantly to the formulation of future cooperation policies with Libya in various social, political, and economic fields. However, this cooperation takes place in light of objective difficulties arising from the conflicting interests of Western countries in North Africa and Libya. Since these relations are burdened with many problems of different nature, we started this paper from two assumptions: The first premise is that in the trade relations between Libya and the European Union, there are common interests for foreign trade that are more feasible. The second premise is that more encouragement and protection for investments by the countries of the European Union helps in new qualitative development and economic growth in Libya, which will significantly improve trade relations between Libya and the countries of the European Union.
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2

Tursunov, Sergey. "Modernization of Maghreb countries in the context of external economic relations." Asia and Africa Today, no. 7 (2022): 64. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s032150750017882-2.

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The article analyses how Maghreb countries’ involvement into the global economy, international trade and investment activity, particularly with France and European Union in general, affects their attempts to modernize their economy and to what extent they are efficient. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have made many steps towards closer integration with Europe, along with certain measures aimed at loosing the barriers for trade with the African continent, including trade relations inside Maghreb itself. However, their economies still hugely rely on the demand of the European market and foreign direct investments coming from the North of the Mediterranean Sea. Another point of great importance is the migration from these countries to EU, which also has a serious impact on their economic development. While liberation of trade and strengthening ties with the developed countries were expected to boost the local economies, improve their technological level through fostering production activity, and induce knowledge spill from multinational corporations to North African companies, the actual result yet does not seem so bright. Currently, Maghreb countries are stuck at their role of either exporters of crude materials like Algeria, or outsource producers of spare parts for particular European high-tech manufacturers who seek here cutting production costs by using the opportunity of paying lower salaries than in developed countries. The role of three Maghreb countries in international economy is, however, significantly different, although they are all dependent on their ties with their former common colonial metropole, France. Investigation of the factors that curb getting benefits from the involvement in global economic activity, as well as nuances of economic development in each of the three countries inside the international context, is the focus of the article.
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Petriaiev, O. S. "STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA." National Technical University of Ukraine Journal. Political science. Sociology. Law, no. 3(55) (December 21, 2022): 77–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.20535/2308-5053.2022.3(55).269555.

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The coming to power in the Republic of Turkey of Prime Minister and later President Recep Tayyip Erdogan led to a change in the ideological foundation of the state, the rejection of the ideology of Kemalism and the transition to the ideology of neo-Ottomanism with an active foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa. The strengthening of Erdogan's power contributed to a change in Turkey's foreign policy and the development of external relations with the Islamic worlds and, first of all, with the Arab countries. The neo-Ottoman ideology has become a key element in Turkey's foreign policy strategy in the Arab region. Prerequisites for changing the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa are complex. After the political party Justice and Development came to power, it led to the desire for neo- Ottoman revanchism and the rejection of the "zero problems with neighbors" political vector. Also, through various reforms, the leader of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, managed to neutralize the political opposition and the Turkish military, who historically were the external arbiters of Turkish political life. The strengthening of Erdogan's political position inside Turkey allowed him to change the external political course of his country. After the start of a series of revolutions in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey felt that it could regain in this region the lost political and economic positions that it had lost after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. After that, Turkey began to position itself as an important military, political and economic player in the region, competing with such countries as Israel, Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This vector of development of Turkey's foreign policy showed that the country no longer seeks to pursue a policy close to the interests of the United States and the European Union, and began to distance itself from the Western world, becoming the dominant political and military player in the Middle East, North Africa and other regions. This trend showed that the Republic of Turkey has already declared itself as a regional power that other political players need to reckon with.
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Babic, Blagoje. "China-European union relations: A developing geoeconomic axis." Medjunarodni problemi 62, no. 3 (2010): 418–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp1003418b.

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China and the European Union are very interested in developing their mutual relations. They strengthen their positions in the world business by their co-ordinated acting. In their mutual relations, they apply Geoeconomics? methods. They do not regard each other as a military threat but as one of the main economic partners. Their economies are highly complementary. ?The common economic interests? have a decisive role in China EU policy and EU China policy, respectively. EU is China?s largest economic partner. It is its largest export market, the largest source of new technologies and equipment and one of the largest sources for foreign investments. China is the second important source of industrial products import to EU and the fastest growing export market for EU. The EU enlargement to the East both favourably and unfavourably affects China?s interests. The main cause of friction in China-EU relations is a high Chinese surplus in their mutual trade, high competitiveness of Chinese products on the EU market and China?s pursuit of energy sources in the parts of the world that Western countries, including the leading EU member states, regard as traditionally ?forbidden? such as the Middle East and Africa. China and EU have created mechanisms to settle conflicts of interest in their mutual trade through dialogue.
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5

Sekongo, N. B. "PROBLEMS OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, PROSPECTS FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT." Vestnik Universiteta, no. 3 (May 29, 2020): 102–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.26425/1816-4277-2020-3-102-110.

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The problems of trade and economic relations between West African countries and the European Union have been considered in the article in detail, a brief description of the Economic Community of West African States has been given. The essence of relationships between West Africa and the European Union based on the papers, both foreign and domestic researchers in the field of security, regional economic development and integration etc. has been disclosed. The historical path within the framework of international legal documentation that preceded the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement has been described. The conducted study was based on the analysis of the cost dynamics of exports, imports and trade balance, their structure has been briefly adduced. The main negative aspects faced by West African countries in connection with the implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement, in particular tariff restrictions, the ban on the use of export taxes, which undermines the national sovereignty of the Economic Community of West African States, have been revealed. Nevertheless, the signed Agreement will allow West Africa to actively integrate into world trade, improve the economic and demographic situation, while the overall trade tariff will remain at the same level.
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6

Bjelic, Predrag. "Model spoljnotrgovinske politike Evropske unije." Ekonomski anali 44, no. 156 (2003): 131–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka0356131b.

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When the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the European Union was formed in 1958, it was agreed that the new integration would be a tariff union with common tariffs toward third countries, but also that it would have a common foreign trade policy. As the Union's executive body, the European Commission is responsible for proposing and implementing foreign trade policies. However, the main subject in creating foreign trade policies still remains the Council of Ministers as the EU's main decision-making and legislative body. The Commission negotiates trade agreements with outside countries on behalf of the Union. However, on foreign trade issues the Commission must report to a committee (the "133 Committee"), which assists the Commission in the course of the negotiations and before becoming valid all agreements must be ratified by the Council of Ministers. The Commission ensures that the European Parliament is kept quickly and fully informed at all stages of the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, in such a way as to enable the Commission to take account of the European Parliament's view, but its role is purely consultative. The EU is trying to establish closer partnership relations with the USA through establishing transatlantic marketplace. However, as the EU is becoming a respectable economic power, an increasing number of trade disputes arise between the EU and the USA. The EU is trying to establish a closer relationship with the European countries since they are candidate countries for EU membership. However, some of them are closer to the membership than others. Therefore the agreements that the EU conclude with certain groups of countries differ among themselves. The EU has special relations with the countries in Africa the Caribbean and the Pacific, former European colonies, that have been granted a preferential treatment allowing preferential trade with the EU. Close relations have been established with countries and regional groups in Latin America as well. The EU has become a significant factor in international economic organizations. However, in order to become an economic power as respectable as the USA and Japan and to give strategic support to its companies in global competition, the EU must integrate politically as well.
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7

Boldyreva, Elena. "Finland’s Africa Strategy." Scientific and Analytical Herald of IE RAS, no. 1 (February 28, 2021): 32–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran120213237.

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The article analyzes Finland’s strategy towards Africa. The relevance of this topic does not raise doubts in the light of the growing interest not only of Finland, but also of the European Union as a whole in Africa, especially the countries of the Sahel. Finland’s strategy was adopted almost simultaneously with the EU’s strategy and can be considered as an integral part of it. The article analyzes the publicly available documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, which are relevant both to the policy of this northern country in relation to the continent as a whole and to individual African countries. The aim of the strategy is to set realistic but ambitious goals for Finland’s policy towards Africa, based on the common interests of Finland and African countries, to define the main directions of Finland’s policy towards Africa and to define concrete actions to achieve them. In addition, it is necessary to pay special attention to strengthening political and economic relations and expand cooperation in various forms. Thus, the research carried out can be useful for a better understanding of one of the most important directions of Finnish foreign policy today.
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8

Armel, Kaze. "Trilateral Cooperation." China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 06, no. 03 (January 2020): 311–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2377740020500189.

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Over the years, China has forged and mastered its own distinctive foreign aid practices as an emerging aid donor. China’s approach to foreign assistance has become highly appreciated as the country’s stature as a provider of economic assistance has matured. In 2013, under President Xi Jinping, Beijing introduced the Belt and Road Initiative, which has become a leading component of China’s foreign policy and triggered a new round of policy reform in its foreign aid agenda. In Africa, China’s foreign assistance has kept in line with the policy of equal treatment. It has shared its development experience, helped many African countries to transition from “poor” to “developing”, from “aid recipients” to “wealth creators,” and many African countries are thus turning their interests from the West to the East. Certainly, the European Union as a traditional aid donor, remains the largest aid distributor in the world, especially in Africa. In other words, the EU’s foreign assistance has become an indispensable source of funding for many African countries. However, foreign aid effectiveness remains low on the African continent because of the absence of native African policymakers in aid programs designed and implemented by Beijing and Brussels. Some critics argue that Chinese and European assistance to Africa is not bringing about the best results as expected. This article argues that a new international architecture of foreign assistance through trilateral cooperation is needed to increase Chinese and European aid effectiveness in Africa. Trilateral cooperation will not only increase foreign assistance efficiency in Africa, but also give a chance to African countries to strengthen their own development capacity through assistance and guidance, reduce Africa’s aid dependence, and hopefully guarantee a smooth “graduation” of African countries from official development assistance.
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9

Hurt, Stephen R., Donna Lee, and Ulrike Lorenz-Carl. "The Argumentative Dimension to the EU-Africa EPAs." International Negotiation 18, no. 1 (2013): 67–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341250.

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Abstract Not only is the participation of developing countries in international trade negotiations growing, so is their influence over the global trade agenda. This article highlights the increasing activism and impact of African states through a detailed study of the current Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs) negotiations with the European Union (EU). In examining African resistance to EPAs, the article develops a constructivist approach to North-South trade negotiations that pays close attention to the role of development discourses. We argue that the growing willingness of African states to challenge the EU to deliver on its development promises during the decade-long EPA process was crucial to informing their sustained opposition to the EU’s goal of completing a comprehensive set of sub-regional economic agreements. We document African resistance to EU trade diplomacy in the EPAs, exploring how these otherwise weak countries were able to pursue normative-based negotiation strategies by recourse to the EU’s promise of a ‘development partnership.’
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10

Choi, Chong-Ki. "The Northern Policy of the Republic of Korea -how to Approach the Soviet Union and East European Countries-." Korean Journal of Policy Studies 5 (December 31, 1990): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.52372/kjps01005.

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Of the Sixth Republic's many policies, the northern policy is most successful. The term, "northern policy" includes all the diplomatic activities and policies to improve relations with the communist countries-the Soviet Union, China, and other East European countries. There are some backgrounds in implementing this policy. In domestic dimension, weak legitimacy of the Sixth Republic and nationalistic desire for reunification of divided nation became a significant background. Economic difficulty-especially the stagnation of exports can not be overlooked as well. From international perspective, Gorbachev's new thinking and change of American Foreign policies are a significant background. As everyone knows, northern policy gives rise to noteworthy achievement in many fields. But there are also various obstacles to implementation of northern policy. South Korea has legal obstacles, such as a security law and various political obstacles. Political and economic situation in socialist countries raises serious problems. International political situation is more or less helpful to implementing northern policy. Drawing upon the above-mentioned obstacles, I would like to suggest how South Korea should approach socialist countries. First, the existing alliance system in Northeast Asia should be taken into account. Second, due attention should be paid to the national interest of all countries concerned. Third, South Korea should not seek isolation of North Korea by pushing nothern policy. There are other ways to approach socialist countries, but I emphasize non-governmental contacts.
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11

Cavatorta, Francesco. "The European Union’s Critical Engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic." European Foreign Affairs Review 15, Issue 5 (December 1, 2010): 629–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eerr2010045.

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This article examines the way in which the Syrian search for a renewed partnership with Europe has met with the corresponding European Union (EU) foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In particular, the impact on the EU of dealing with Syria has not been analysed. This article contributes to fill this gap and examines the founding principles and policy mechanisms of EU engagement with Syria and what they tell us about the priorities, interests, and beliefs of the EU. This is important because the nature of the Syrian regime provides us with the possibility to explore how the EU engages with countries that have a very problematic relationship with the West. What emerges is that EU policy-making is not only highly complex but is greatly influenced by the regime with which it works and therefore, contrary to what many argue, is a pragmatic actor in international relations.
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12

Chuprii, Leonid. "China's Geopolitical Role in the Modern Globalized World." Ukrainian Studies, no. 2(83) (July 24, 2022): 235–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.30840/2413-7065.2(83).2022.261062.

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The article examines the strengthening of China’s foreign policy activity in the conditions of the activation of modern challenges. It is pointed out that today China is increasing its political, economic, and cultural influence in the world. It is noted that China is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, it has become the largest exporter in the world, while also increasing imports. Thus, the average growth of Chinese exports in recent decades has increased by 5 times, and the growth of imports - by 4.7 times. It is emphasized that in response to China's economic growth in the West and some Asian countries, including Japan, the concept of the "Chinese threat" has emerged, the founders of which, believe that China has a negative impact on the Asian security system because of its increased economic growth and its desire to play a dominant role in the region, while not always taking into account the interests of other Asian countries. The peculiarities of the current foreign policy course of China are determined, in particular, it is noted that, as before, serious attention is paid to relations with the great states. Thus, Xi Jin Ping is in active contact with the United States, the European Union, and India. Significant emphasis is placed on a balanced foreign policy course. Much attention is paid to the BRICS countries, including Russia, India, and South Africa. China is also strengthening relations with developing countries. This is evidenced by Xi Jinping's visit to South Africa and the Countries of the Caribbean. Particular attention is paid to the Russian vector, which is aimed at jointly confronting the United States and NATO. It is emphasized that China's economic and geopolitical growth is also holding back several issues that need to be addressed. These are, first of all: incomplete transition to a market economy, excessive state intervention in the economy, in the banking sector, lack of rule of law, violation of human rights and freedoms, high dependence on exports, strong excess credit and growing debt, environmental problems.
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Ustinovich, Elena Stepanovna. "Us sanctional economic policy as a geopolitical reality." Mezhdunarodnaja jekonomika (The World Economics), no. 4 (April 1, 2021): 245–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.33920/vne-04-2104-01.

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This article analyzes the policy of economic sanctions against the Russian Federation since 2008. It’s shown that the sanctions anti-Russian economic policy is the direction of the US foreign policy of the last decade. For many decades, the state of trade and economic relations between the Russian Federation and the United States left much to be desired and did not develop in a normalized format. The volume of trade turnover practically did not manifest itself in the growth dynamics. And both countries were faced with the task of solving this problem. However, the last decade, and especially the events of 2014 and subsequent economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, have shown the role and impact of the political factor in the state of economic relations between the two countries. In this regard, the period of development of trade and economic relations of the last five years is exclusively in the political plane and it can be designated as the period of the US sanctions economic policy towards Russia. They are implementing this policy jointly with a number of North American countries and European Union member states, as a result of which it becomes a geopolitical reality in the modern period of international economic relations and, unfortunately, does not contribute to their normalization. The research methodology includes an interdisciplinary political and economic research method. A primary analysis of sources, as well as policy documents of the leaders of two countries — the United States and the Russian Federation at the end of 2014 and 2015 was carried out. As a scientific and practical result, a recommendation for the Russian Federation was proposed based on the results of the incessant sanctions pressure — not to remain in isolation, to establish contacts with countries in a new format.
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Chupriy, Leonid. "STRENGTHENING CHINA'S GEOPOLITICAL POTENTIAL IN THE CONDITIONS OF CURRENT CHALLENGES." Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Philosophy, no. 6 (2022): 51–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2523-4064.2022/6-10/13.

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The article highlights the peculiarities of the development of China's geopolitical potential in the face of modern challenges. It is pointed out that today China is increasing its political, economic and cultural influence in the world. It is noted that China is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, it has become the largest exporter in the world, while also increasing imports. Thus, the average growth of Chinese exports in recent decades has increased 5 times, and the growth of imports – 4.7 times. It is emphasized that in response to China's economic growth in the West and in some Asian countries, including Japan, the concept of the "Chinese threat" has emerged, not always taking into account the interests of other Asian countries. The peculiarities of the current foreign policy course of China are determined, in particular, it is noted that serious attention is still paid to relations with the great powers. Yes, Xi Jin Ping is in active contact with the United States, the European Union and India. Significant emphasis is placed on a balanced foreign policy course. Much attention is paid to the BRICS countries, including Russia, India and South Africa. China is also strengthening relations with developing countries. This is evidenced by Xi Jinping's visit to South Africa and the Caribbean. Much attention is paid to the Russian vector, which is aimed at jointly confronting the United States and NATO. It is emphasized that China's economic and geopolitical growth is also holding back a number of issues that need to be addressed. These are, first of all: incomplete transition to a market economy, excessive state intervention in the economy, in the banking sector, lack of rule of law, violation of human rights and freedoms, high dependence on exports, strong excess credit and growing debt, environmental problems.
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15

Habro, Iryna. "ASIAN AND AFRICAN DIRECTIONS OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY." European Historical Studies, no. 21 (2022): 6–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2022.21.1.

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The article is devoted to the analysis of environmental diplomacy of the European Union in Asia and Africa. The EU is the leader in the development of international environmental activities. The uniqueness of the EU, compared to other countries in the world, is that its environmental diplomacy is implemented in most regions of the world, including Asia and Africa. All this determines the relevance of the study of Asian and African areas of EU environmental diplomacy. The Asian vector of EU environmental diplomacy is implemented through various programs, projects, through the Asia-Europe Meeting platform (informal process of dialogue and cooperation between Asia and Europe, launched in 1996) and the EU-CA platform on environment and water cooperation (High-level conferences in Rome in 2009 as a basis for EU-CA cooperation in the field of water and environment based on the EU Strategy for Central Asia agreed with the CA countries). The African continent is particularly vulnerable to climate change and environmental degradation. Food security, sustainable water supply and extreme weather events (floods, arid deserts) are key issues that require joint efforts by Africa and the EU. The article reveals the EU-funded Regeneration of Africa program, which began in 2017. The program aims to improve livelihoods, strengthen food security and strengthen resilience to climate change, while restoring degraded ecosystem services in eight countries. The EU pursues its external environmental goals in Africa, namely, high-level political dialogue in the form of a Joint Africa-EU Strategy, capacity building through development projects and programs, and manipulating utility calculations in the Economic Partnership Agreement. The environment and climate change have become more important in EU-Africa relations over the last decade. However, the EU’s attempts to pursue its foreign policy through high-level political dialogue are hampered by many of the same weaknesses that undermine its broader relations with Africa.
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Zubov, V. V. "The Interaction of the European Union and Turkey on the Problem of the Migration Crisis: Deep Contradictions as a Result of Changes in the Geopolitical Realities." Humanities and Social Sciences. Bulletin of the Financial University 9, no. 4 (December 4, 2019): 78–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.26794/2226-7867-2019-9-4-78-82.

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The growing number of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe, which occurred after the onset of the Arab spring and the military strengthening of the Taliban in Afghanistan, has become a severe challenge for the European Union. The migration crisis has forced the EU to step up negotiations with Turkey, a country that has become a transit point for migrants on their way to Europe. It seems evident both parties are not interested in the increase in the number of terrorist acts, the increase in the level of street crime and the appearance of separate enclaves in the territory of the countries participating in the negotiations. However, Turkey and the EU could not reach a final agreement that could completely secure the “European” border from the uncontrolled flow of refugees. Despite the decrease in the number of refugees in 2018, the danger for the European Union remains: the desire of the Kurds to create an independent state can be stopped by military force, and the re-entry of the Taliban to power is quite real. A legitimate question arises: why has Turkey, which has been a member of NATO since 1952, actively pursued the westernisation of its society since Mustafa Kemal and signed the association agreement in 1963, which is unfriendly towards the EU? The article discusses the history of relations between Turkey and the European Union, analyses the role of the EU member states in forming a common position about Turkey’s potential membership in the organisation. The author paid particular attention to changing the foreign policy situation as a factor that influenced the priorities of the parties.
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Juss, Satvinder S. "The Post-Colonial Refugee, Dublin II, and the End of Non-Refoulement." International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20, no. 2 (2013): 307–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718115-02002010.

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Refugee law has been variously conceptualised. Sometimes, as a humanitarian enterprise. Sometimes, as an extension of foreign policy relations based on national self-interests. But can it be better rationalised as a post-colonial enterprise? Does its treatment of Arabs, Afghans and others from the Middle East and North Africa – who are the major consumers of modern refugee law today – tell us something about refugee law? Does it serve to essentialise refugees as the ‘Others’ of the West? If so, can we conceive of a post-colonial refugee? Is modern refugee law an exercise in ‘post-colonialism’, which can be defined as a cultural critique that is opposed to imperialism and Eurocentrism? This essay explores this question through an analysis of the Dublin II Regulation system. This system limits the number of asylum-seekers entering the countries of the European Union. Recent cases confirm that even powerful evidence of individual risk is of no avail and serves as no bar to an asylum-seeker being removed from one European country to another, from where he or she risks being refouled to his/her own country, where he/she may be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. This essay tells that story.
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Zhang, X. "The Coronavirus Will Not Change the long-Term Upward Trend of China’s Economic Development." Finance: Theory and Practice 24, no. 5 (October 24, 2020): 15–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.26794/2587-5671-2020-24-5-15-23.

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The author investigates the impact of COVID‑19 and macro-policy adjustment on China’s economic development. The aim is to describe the situation and trend of China’s economic development before and after COVID‑19. The research method is the comparative data analysis. The study shows that in response to COVID‑19, the Chinese government, on the one hand, has accelerated its opening-up, taken the opportunity of fighting against the pandemic to provide medical assistance to and cooperate with other countries, and actively promoted the building of a community with a shared future for mankind and the process of globalization. On the basis of the Belt and Road Initiative and multilateral, regional, and subregional cooperation mechanisms such as the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), G20 (Group of 20), and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), China and the Eurasian Economic Union began to cooperate more frequently and the trade relations between Japan, South Korea, and European developed countries became closer. Meanwhile, committed to building a global interconnection partnership, China actively participates in global economic governance and provides various public products. The Chinese government has proposed “Six Guarantees” on the basis of “Six Stability”. In order to achieve the purpose of stabilizing foreign trade and expanding imports, China has imposed various measures to accelerate the liberalization and facilitation of international trade and investment, such as implementing the new version of the “Foreign Investment Law”, establishing free trade zones, and promoting its experience and organizing international import expositions. Additionally, the Chinese government also implemented targeted fiscal and monetary policies, increased support for enterprises, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, and promoted the construction of “new infrastructure” and innovation of business model, which have formed the driving forces for the transformation of the economic development model in China from traditional business to cloud business, from traditional marketing to live streaming marketing, from traditional sales to online sales. The author concluded thatChina’s adjustment of macro policies in response to COVID‑19 was effective and played an important role in the resumption of production and life, stabilizing foreign trade activities, releasing domestic demand and promoting stable and sustained growth of the economy
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Konstantynov, Viktor. "Eastern Europe in the Policy of ‘Belt And Road’: Is There a Place for Ukraine?" Diplomatic Ukraine, no. XX (2019): 647–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2019-41.

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The article examines China’s policy in Eastern Europe within the framework of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)’. The level of Ukraine’s involvement in the cooperation within the framework of this initiative and China’s policy in general is analyzed. It is stressed that in recent years, the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative is not only economic but also political and security project of China. The main purpose of the initiative is to consolidate the role of Beijing as one of the leaders in the modern world. It is noted that Europe is becoming increasingly important in China’s foreign policy. How-ever, in this region, it cannot use the usual strategy of wielding its influence, worked out in Asia and Africa. Therefore, Central and Eastern Europe, new EU members and candidate countries are considered as objects for spreading Chinese influence in the Old World. The article identifies the principal reasons for Beijing’s particular attention to Central and Eastern Europe. The main one is the relative weakness of state and political institutions and their vulnerability to financial and political instruments of the spread of Chinese influence. Also, the importance of the European Union as a market for Chinese goods continues to grow, therefore making the transit through the territory of the Eastern European countries increasingly important for Beijing. The significance of the ‘16+1’ format on the formation of a specific role of China in the region is considered. It is argued that the formal ground of the absence of Ukraine in the Chinese strategy in Central and Eastern Europe is that our state is not involved in the ‘16+1’ format. However, bilateral relations with Ukraine do not differ from those with Central and Eastern European countries. An important factor is the lack of Ukraine’s influence on political decisions of the EU, which is the main criterion for China. This accounts for the insufficient level of Ukraine’s involvement in the cooperation within the framework of the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative. Keywords: ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative, the People’s Republic of China, Eastern Europe, European Union, Ukraine, politics.
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Turan, Şuayip. "The role of global actors on the failed transition to democracy in Egypt." Journal of Human Sciences 15, no. 4 (December 21, 2018): 2357. http://dx.doi.org/10.14687/jhs.v15i4.5598.

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The paper aims to roles of the global actors on the failed transition to democracy in Egypt. In this study, the negative political influence of powerful states on Egypt evaluated in terms of democracy. The current social inequality in the region continued to increase in the 2000s. Egypt's authoritarian leader were not able to establish the relations between state structures and citizens in the last decade. The global actors had crucial roles on the continuation the authoritarian regime in Egypt. They were easily able to get their demands from Hosni Mubarak. When the time was at the end of 2010, the popular uprising movements affected the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region deeply. Egypt was one of the most remarkable countries in the region where Hosni Mubarak ousted. The people in Egypt wanted to have a democratic rule in order to have solutions to the social inequality, favoritism, and corruption. Normally, the powerful global actors should have played positive role so as to enable democratic transition. The United States of America and the European Union needed a more proactive policy along with the acceptability of a democratic criteria. Unfortunately, external actors were silent in the following the process in the first place because they were caught unprepared for the Arab Spring and did not expect such a result. Later on, foreign powers supported the counter-revolution in Egypt when they saw that the things did not go as they would have liked. They expressed their support most clearly in the post-coup statements discussing military and financial issues.
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Amineh, Mehdi P., and Wina H. J. Crijns-Graus. "Rethinking eu Energy Security Considering Past Trends and Future Prospects." Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 13, no. 5-6 (October 8, 2014): 757–825. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341326.

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euenergy policy objectives are directed at three highly interdependent areas: energy supply security, competitiveness and decarbonization to prevent climate change. In this paper, we focus on the issue of energy supply security. Security of energy supply for the immediate and medium-term future is a necessary condition in the current context of the global political economy for the survival of the Union and its component member states. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, energy policy no longer comes onto the agenda of the European Commission through the backdoor of the common market, environment and competitiveness. The Treaty created a new legal basis for the internal energy market. However, securing external supplies as well as deciding the energy mix, remain matters of national prerogative, though within the constraints of other parts of eu’s legislation in force. Without a common defense policy, the highly import dependent Union and its members face external instability in the energy rich Arab Middle East and North Africa.Concern about energy security has been triggered by declining European energy production as well as the strain on global demand exerted by newly industrializing economies such as China and India and the Middle East, as well as the political instability in this reserve-rich part of the world. This paper explores the following two topics [1] the current situation and past trends in production, supply, demand and trade in energy in the eu, against the background of major changes in the last half decade and [2] threats to the security of the supply of oil and natural gas from import regions.Fossil fuel import dependence in the eu is expected to continue to increase in the coming two decades. As global trends show, and despite new fields in the Caspian region and the Eastern Mediterranean, conventional fossil oil and gas resources remain concentrated in fewer geopolitically unstable regions and countries (i.e. the Middle East and North Africa (mena) and the Caspian Region (cr) including Russia), while global demand for fossil energy is expected to substantially increase also within the energy rich Gulf countries. This combination directly impacts eu energy supply security. It should be noted that the trend towards higher levels of import dependence was not interrupted when the era of low energy prices, between 1980 and 2003, came to an end.Within the eu itself, domestic resistance to the development of unconventional resources is an obstacle to investment in unconventional sources in this part of the high-income world. This should therefore not put at risk investments in either renewables or alternative sources at home or conventional resources mainly in the Arab-Middle East.The situation is exacerbated by the spread of instability in the Arab-Middle Eastern countries. There are three domestic and geopolitical concerns to be taken into consideration:(1) In the Arab-Middle East, threats to eu energy supply security originate in the domestic regime of these countries. Almost all Arab resource-rich countries belong to a type ofpatrimonial, rentier-type of state-society relation. These regimes rely on rents from the exploitation of energy resources and the way in which rents are distributed.Regimes of this type are being challenged. Their economies show uneven economic development, centralized power structures, corruption and poverty at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The discrimination of females is a major obstacle to the development of the service sector. At present, even the monarchies fear the spread of violent conflict.Offshoots of these consequences have proven to cause civil unrest, exemplified by what optimists have called the ‘Arab Spring.’(2) The second concern is the domestic and global impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds (swfs) managed by Arab patrimonial rentier states. swfs have proven to be an asset in both developing and developed economies due to their ability to buffer the ‘Dutch Disease,’ and to encourage industrialization, economic diversification and eventually the development of civil society. In patrimonial states, however, swfs are affected by corruption and the diversion of funds away from long-term socioeconomic development to luxury consumption by political elites. In fact, Arab swfs underpin the persistence of the Arab patrimonial rentier state system.(3) Finally, the post-Cold War, me and cea geopolitical landscape is shifting. The emergence of China and other Asian economies has increased their presence in the Middle East due to a growing need for energy and the expansion of Asian markets. The recent discovery of energy resources in the us has led to speculation that there will be less us presence in the region. There would be a serious risk to eu energy security if emerging Asian economies were to increase their presence in the Middle East as us interests recede.
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Sobiecki, Roman. "Why does the progress of civilisation require social innovations?" Kwartalnik Nauk o Przedsiębiorstwie 44, no. 3 (September 20, 2017): 4–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0010.4686.

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Social innovations are activities aiming at implementation of social objectives, including mainly the improvement of life of individuals and social groups, together with public policy and management objectives. The essay indicates and discusses the most important contemporary problems, solving of which requires social innovations. Social innovations precondition the progress of civilisation. The world needs not only new technologies, but also new solutions of social and institutional nature that would be conducive to achieving social goals. Social innovations are experimental social actions of organisational and institutional nature that aim at improving the quality of life of individuals, communities, nations, companies, circles, or social groups. Their experimental nature stems from the fact of introducing unique and one-time solutions on a large scale, the end results of which are often difficult to be fully predicted. For example, it was difficult to believe that opening new labour markets for foreigners in the countries of the European Union, which can be treated as a social innovation aiming at development of the international labour market, will result in the rapid development of the low-cost airlines, the offer of which will be available to a larger group of recipients. In other words, social innovations differ from economic innovations, as they are not about implementation of new types of production or gaining new markets, but about satisfying new needs, which are not provided by the market. Therefore, the most important distinction consists in that social innovations are concerned with improving the well-being of individuals and communities by additional employment, or increased consumption, as well as participation in solving the problems of individuals and social groups [CSTP, 2011]. In general, social innovations are activities aiming at implementation of social objectives, including mainly the improvement of life of individuals and social groups together with the objectives of public policy and management [Kowalczyk, Sobiecki, 2017]. Their implementation requires global, national, and individual actions. This requires joint operations, both at the scale of the entire globe, as well as in particular interest groups. Why are social innovations a key point for the progress of civilisation? This is the effect of the clear domination of economic aspects and discrimination of social aspects of this progress. Until the 19th century, the economy was a part of a social structure. As described by K. Polanyi, it was submerged in social relations [Polanyi, 2010, p. 56]. In traditional societies, the economic system was in fact derived from the organisation of the society itself. The economy, consisting of small and dispersed craft businesses, was a part of the social, family, and neighbourhood structure. In the 20th century the situation reversed – the economy started to be the force shaping social structures, positions of individual groups, areas of wealth and poverty. The economy and the market mechanism have become independent from the world of politics and society. Today, the corporations control our lives. They decide what we eat, what we watch, what we wear, where we work and what we do [Bakan, 2006, p. 13]. The corporations started this spectacular “march to rule the world” in the late 19th century. After about a hundred years, at the end of the 20th century, the state under the pressure of corporations and globalisation, started a gradual, but systematic withdrawal from the economy, market and many other functions traditionally belonging to it. As a result, at the end of the last century, a corporation has become a dominant institution in the world. A characteristic feature of this condition is that it gives a complete priority to the interests of corporations. They make decisions of often adverse consequences for the entire social groups, regions, or local communities. They lead to social tensions, political breakdowns, and most often to repeated market turbulences. Thus, a substantial minority (corporations) obtain inconceivable benefits at the expense of the vast majority, that is broad professional and social groups. The lack of relative balance between the economy and society is a barrier to the progress of civilisation. A growing global concern is the problem of migration. The present crisis, left unresolved, in the long term will return multiplied. Today, there are about 500 million people living in Europe, 1.5 billion in Africa and the Middle East, but in 2100, the population of Europe will be about 400 million and of the Middle East and Africa approximately 4.5 billion. Solving this problem, mainly through social and political innovations, can take place only by a joint operation of highly developed and developing countries. Is it an easy task? It’s very difficult. Unfortunately, today, the world is going in the opposite direction. Instead of pursuing the community, empathic thinking, it aims towards nationalism and chauvinism. An example might be a part of the inaugural address of President Donald Trump, who said that the right of all nations is to put their own interests first. Of course, the United States of America will think about their own interests. As we go in the opposite direction, those who deal with global issues say – nothing will change, unless there is some great crisis, a major disaster that would cause that the great of this world will come to senses. J.E. Stiglitz [2004], contrary to the current thinking and practice, believes that a different and better world is possible. Globalisation contains the potential of countless benefits from which people both in developing and highly developed countries can benefit. But the practice so far proves that still it is not grown up enough to use its potential in a fair manner. What is needed are new solutions, most of all social and political innovations (political, because they involve a violation of the previous arrangement of interests). Failure to search for breakthrough innovations of social and political nature that would meet the modern challenges, can lead the world to a disaster. Social innovation, and not economic, because the contemporary civilisation problems have their roots in this dimension. A global problem, solution of which requires innovations of social and political nature, is the disruption of the balance between work and capital. In 2010, 400 richest people had assets such as the half of the poorer population of the world. In 2016, such part was in the possession of only 8 people. This shows the dramatic collapse of the balance between work and capital. The world cannot develop creating the technological progress while increasing unjustified inequalities, which inevitably lead to an outbreak of civil disturbances. This outbreak can have various organisation forms. In the days of the Internet and social media, it is easier to communicate with people. Therefore, paradoxically, some modern technologies create the conditions facilitating social protests. There is one more important and dangerous effect of implementing technological innovations without simultaneous creation and implementation of social innovations limiting the sky-rocketing increase of economic (followed by social) diversification. Sooner or later, technological progress will become so widespread that, due to the relatively low prices, it will make it possible for the weapons of mass destruction, especially biological and chemical weapons, to reach small terrorist groups. Then, a total, individualized war of global reach can develop. The individualisation of war will follow, as described by the famous German sociologist Ulrich Beck. To avoid this, it is worth looking at the achievements of the Polish scientist Michał Kalecki, who 75 years ago argued that capitalism alone is not able to develop. It is because it aggressively seeks profit growth, but cannot turn profit into some profitable investments. Therefore, when uncertainty grows, capitalism cannot develop itself, and it must be accompanied by external factors, named by Kalecki – external development factors. These factors include state expenses, finances and, in accordance with the nomenclature of Kalecki – epochal innovations. And what are the current possibilities of activation of the external factors? In short – modest. The countries are indebted, and the basis for the development in the last 20 years were loans, which contributed to the growth of debt of economic entities. What, then, should we do? It is necessary to look for cheaper solutions, but such that are effective, that is breakthrough innovations. These undoubtedly include social and political innovations. Contemporary social innovation is not about investing big money and expensive resources in production, e.g. of a very expensive vaccine, which would be available for a small group of recipients. Today’s social innovation should stimulate the use of lower amounts of resources to produce more products available to larger groups of recipients. The progress of civilisation happens only as a result of a sustainable development in economic, social, and now also ecological terms. Economic (business) innovations, which help accelerate the growth rate of production and services, contribute to economic development. Profits of corporations increase and, at the same time, the economic objectives of the corporations are realised. But are the objectives of the society as a whole and its members individually realised equally, in parallel? In the chain of social reproduction there are four repeated phases: production – distribution – exchange – consumption. The key point from the social point of view is the phase of distribution. But what are the rules of distribution, how much and who gets from this “cake” produced in the social process of production? In the today’s increasingly global economy, the most important mechanism of distribution is the market mechanism. However, in the long run, this mechanism leads to growing income and welfare disparities of various social groups. Although, the income and welfare diversity in itself is nothing wrong, as it is the result of the diversification of effectiveness of factors of production, including work, the growing disparities to a large extent cannot be justified. Economic situation of the society members increasingly depends not on the contribution of work, but on the size of the capital invested, and the market position of the economic entity, and on the “governing power of capital” on the market. It should also be noted that this diversification is also related to speculative activities. Disparities between the implemented economic and social innovations can lead to the collapse of the progress of civilisation. Nowadays, economic crises are often justified by, indeed, social and political considerations, such as marginalisation of nation states, imbalance of power (or imbalance of fear), religious conflicts, nationalism, chauvinism, etc. It is also considered that the first global financial crisis of the 21st century originated from the wrong social policy pursued by the US Government, which led to the creation of a gigantic public debt, which consequently led to an economic breakdown. This resulted in the financial crisis, but also in deepening of the social imbalances and widening of the circles of poverty and social exclusion. It can even be stated that it was a crisis in public confidence. Therefore, the causes of crises are the conflicts between the economic dimension of the development and its social dimension. Contemporary world is filled with various innovations of economic or business nature (including technological, product, marketing, and in part – organisational). The existing solutions can be a source of economic progress, which is a component of the progress of civilisation. However, economic innovations do not complete the entire progress of civilisation moreover, the saturation, and often supersaturation with implementations and economic innovations leads to an excessive use of material factors of production. As a consequence, it results in lowering of the efficiency of their use, unnecessary extra burden to the planet, and passing of the negative effects on the society and future generations (of consumers). On the other hand, it leads to forcing the consumption of durable consumer goods, and gathering them “just in case”, and also to the low degree of their use (e.g. more cars in a household than its members results in the additional load on traffic routes, which results in an increase in the inconvenience of movement of people, thus to the reduction of the quality of life). Introduction of yet another economic innovation will not solve this problem. It can be solved only by social innovations that are in a permanent shortage. A social innovation which fosters solving the issue of excessive accumulation of tangible production goods is a developing phenomenon called sharing economy. It is based on the principle: “the use of a service provided by some welfare does not require being its owner”. This principle allows for an economic use of resources located in households, but which have been “latent” so far. In this way, increasing of the scope of services provided (transport, residential and tourist accommodation) does not require any growth of additional tangible resources of factors of production. So, it contributes to the growth of household incomes, and inhibition of loading the planet with material goods processed by man [see Poniatowska-Jaksch, Sobiecki, 2016]. Another example: we live in times, in which, contrary to the law of T. Malthus, the planet is able to feed all people, that is to guarantee their minimum required nutrients. But still, millions of people die of starvation and malnutrition, but also due to obesity. Can this problem be solved with another economic innovation? Certainly not! Economic innovations will certainly help to partially solve the problem of nutrition, at least by the new methods of storing and preservation of foods, to reduce its waste in the phase of storage and transport. However, a key condition to solve this problem is to create and implement an innovation of a social nature (in many cases also political). We will not be able to speak about the progress of civilisation in a situation, where there are people dying of starvation and malnutrition. A growing global social concern, resulting from implementation of an economic (technological) innovation will be robotisation, and more specifically – the effects arising from its dissemination on a large scale. So far, the issue has been postponed due to globalisation of the labour market, which led to cheapening of the work factor by more than ten times in the countries of Asia or South America. But it ends slowly. Labour becomes more and more expensive, which means that the robots become relatively cheap. The mechanism leading to low prices of the labour factor expires. Wages increase, and this changes the relationship of the prices of capital and labour. Capital becomes relatively cheaper and cheaper, and this leads to reducing of the demand for work, at the same time increasing the demand for capital (in the form of robots). The introduction of robots will be an effect of the phenomenon of substitution of the factors of production. A cheaper factor (in this case capital in the form of robots) will be cheaper than the same activities performed by man. According to W. Szymański [2017], such change is a dysfunction of capitalism. A great challenge, because capitalism is based on the market-driven shaping of income. The market-driven shaping of income means that the income is derived from the sale of the factors of production. Most people have income from employment. Robots change this mechanism. It is estimated that scientific progress allows to create such number of robots that will replace billion people in the world. What will happen to those “superseded”, what will replace the income from human labour? Capitalism will face an institutional challenge, and must replace the market-driven shaping of income with another, new one. The introduction of robots means microeconomic battle with the barrier of demand. To sell more, one needs to cut costs. The costs are lowered by the introduction of robots, but the use of robots reduces the demand for human labour. Lowering the demand for human labour results in the reduction of employment, and lower wages. Lower wages result in the reduction of the demand for goods and services. To increase the demand for goods and services, the companies must lower their costs, so they increase the involvement of robots, etc. A mechanism of the vicious circle appears If such a mass substitution of the factors of production is unfavourable from the point of view of stimulating the development of the economy, then something must be done to improve the adverse price relations for labour. How can the conditions of competition between a robot and a man be made equal, at least partially? Robots should be taxed. Bill Gates, among others, is a supporter of such a solution. However, this is only one of the tools that can be used. The solution of the problem requires a change in the mechanism, so a breakthrough innovation of a social and political nature. We can say that technological and product innovations force the creation of social and political innovations (maybe institutional changes). Product innovations solve some problems (e.g. they contribute to the reduction of production costs), but at the same time, give rise to others. Progress of civilisation for centuries and even millennia was primarily an intellectual progress. It was difficult to discuss economic progress at that time. Then we had to deal with the imbalance between the economic and the social element. The insufficiency of the economic factor (otherwise than it is today) was the reason for the tensions and crises. Estimates of growth indicate that the increase in industrial production from ancient times to the first industrial revolution, that is until about 1700, was 0.1-0.2 per year on average. Only the next centuries brought about systematically increasing pace of economic growth. During 1700- 1820, it was 0.5% on an annual average, and between 1820-1913 – 1.5%, and between 1913-2012 – 3.0% [Piketty, 2015, p. 97]. So, the significant pace of the economic growth is found only at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. Additionally, the growth in this period refers predominantly to Europe and North America. The countries on other continents were either stuck in colonialism, structurally similar to the medieval period, or “lived” on the history of their former glory, as, for example, China and Japan, or to a lesser extent some countries of the Middle East and South America. The growth, having then the signs of the modern growth, that is the growth based on technological progress, was attributed mainly to Europe and the United States. The progress of civilisation requires the creation of new social initiatives. Social innovations are indeed an additional capital to keep the social structure in balance. The social capital is seen as a means and purpose and as a primary source of new values for the members of the society. Social innovations also motivate every citizen to actively participate in this process. It is necessary, because traditional ways of solving social problems, even those known for a long time as unemployment, ageing of the society, or exclusion of considerable social and professional groups from the social and economic development, simply fail. “Old” problems are joined by new ones, such as the increase of social inequalities, climate change, or rapidly growing environmental pollution. New phenomena and problems require new solutions, changes to existing procedures, programmes, and often a completely different approach and instruments [Kowalczyk, Sobiecki, 2017].
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23

Alcocer, Giovanni. "Climatic Change and Population Control." Mediterranean Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences 06, no. 04 (2022): 42–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.46382/mjbas.2022.6406.

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The main reasons for climate change which are explained in this article are as follows: -Climate pollution by gases with CO2 emission and Greenhouse Effect; Climate contamination of viruses with viruses from nature by animals or glaciers when thawing or produced in Laboratories; Induced Climate Change due to meteorological weapons with high intensity radio waves to produce rains, hurricanes and possible induction of earthquakes; Climate pollution by radiation due wars with irreversible consequences in the climate and Nuclear Winter; Climate Change due the explosion of missiles and atomic weapons in the oceans; Climate Change due the natural cyclical phases of the Earth affected by the cyclical variations of the Earth's magnetic field lines which can be affected by the severe cyclical activity of the sun due storms and sunspot because of the combustion that occurs inside the Sun which is due to the gravitational instabilities produced by the planets of the solar system, asteroids or the Comet Planet; Climate Change due to the invading Comet Planet into the solar system that affects with its gravitational field to the sun with solar storms and the planets with variation of the magnetic field lines affecting the climate, earthquakes and activation of volcanoes and indeed with the entry of many meteors and asteroids to the Earth; Climate change due to the Arm of God Allah explaining all the above reasons being more evident in times of Tribulation. The specific methods and devices of the control and manipulation of the population (inclusive to induce to the concupiscence) in times of new world order (Universal Big Brother Program for the control of human in the Earth) and possible Tribulation are explained in this article: Surveillance programs with all technological devices and networks used by humans systematic methods of persuasive manipulation and indoctrination used by some zombie humans and dark; Through the subjugation of employees and humans (inclusive children teaching them how to manipulate in the same style of the zombies); By enterprises or dark groups so that employees make manipulation games with details (investing work time to play like children) receiving bribes, money or labor benefits or with possible retaliation if they do not obey; Surveillance programs in living and working places with covert technological cameras, coincidence games, activities, plans and events programmed in sequence (inclusive pyrotechnic sounds in sequence); Covert numbers and words (in identification documents, cards, car plates, devices used by humans); Encrypted, hidden codes or small phrases and numbers not visible to the naked eye concealed in objects; Covert words in the speech of zombie humans and from multimedia and channels of traditional technological devices through movies, programs and even newscasts and inclusive to speak in code with the humans who know the surveillance programs and worst using in those channels and programs derogatory words against the Nazarenes (in the style of Nazism with the Jews) in complicity of close acquaintances, zombies and dark who participate profiting from the system for the vile metal; By means of an epidemic and viruses produced in laboratories creating epidemics and chaos in the Earth for the reduction and control of the population; Through strict restrictions and reduction of freedoms; Confinement with subsequent compulsory vaccination to be able to access human rights such as the right to work and the right to travel (with the cover-up of the respective organizations responsibles for it: OIT OMT), without responsibility of the authorities in charge of vaccination worldwide (OMS) for the short or long term counterproductive effects of the vaccinated population due to the risk with the liquid of the vaccines by interfering with the DNA and RNA of the population; Possible marking and elimination of many humans (possibility of control of the pulmonary alveoly or induction controlled of diseases or pain due a virus by means of chips introduced in humans); Control of humans by the introduction of liquid and solid chips in humans (liquid crystals that crystallize in the organism and settle in neurons and receive ultrasonic waves of very low frequency) (possibly inserted from vaccines in global epidemiological programs for population control or invasive medical examination when this is not necessary as a figurative example of review of a patient with a sore in the mouth and introduction of the whole hand in the throat or prostate examination or specific injections to certain objective humans or Nazarenes who have opened the matrix of the darks and the elite that controls the humans in the Earth) in times of epidemic in medical examinations and treatments in hospitals (false medical negligence with breach of the medical oath of the use of Medicine for human good). The possible liquid and solid chips introduced into the human being can be used for mind reading (telepath) and thought induction (double direction: sending and receiving messages in the style of Stephen Hawking and the style of the technology already used in sending probes into space and to the moon) and possible human marking with surveillance program and the possible creation of zombie humans. Humans who have the mind reader chip installed can speak without speaking (the dumb speak playing like the miracles of Jesus Christ). It is possible to detect if the humans who have the mental reading chip installed have psychological alterations without going to a doctor. It is possible to know if humans are good or bad without seeing their actions and without going to a priest. In this way, human beings with the chip installed can be sanctioned before they do somewhat wrong (simply because it is known to be thinking). This can be used to know the fidelity to a political guideline or direction (this is known by the strong rumor in communist countries that already have the technology to detect the fidelity to the political party and possibly this is through this chip installed in the human being and mind reading). The inserted chip can also perform thought induction: this is possibly the apocalyptic mark mentioned in the apocalypse because many humans will perform sins or concupiscence induced and not naturally. Then, this will most probably activate the Wrath of God, the seals, and the trumpets of the apocalypse. It surprises me that actually the OMS wants to bring the vaccination program to Africa when in Africa there are not many dead by the epidemy (possibly for the control and reduction of the population will be in all the Earth). Afterward, the OMS mentioned that wants to insert a manufacturing center of vaccines in many countries and inclusive vigilance programs (possibly for the control and reduction of the population will be effective at the local level). But, what the OMS needs to mention is that it is necessary to eliminate the laboratories of virus creation and not create more vaccine laboratories. Humans do not want more vaccine and injections and laboratories for the creation of vaccines but the elimination of virus laboratories which are most probably used for for the control and reduction of the population: thus, the reason for spreading a virus created in a laboratoy across the Earth is evident: population reduction and control of humanity in preparation for a global elite program (new world order or program 2030 for the control of the dark and of the elite; Connection of covert surveillance cameras (in living and working places) with channels of traditional technological devices through movies, programs and even newscasts (including newscasts that usually make signs of dumb and deaf to those who have already discovered them) used by the dark with the respective programs and in addition, to monitor and tracing to verify the induction to concupiscence through mental reading (chips in humans) and surveillance cameras on line in the best style of James Bond espionage movies (including control of faces, pupils, irises, reflections, details and diseases); Games of judgments of sin against humans and Nazarenes (playing at being gods) and also profiting from the vile metal through the system and contributing to the persecution of the Nazarenes; Fake judgments of sin against humans and Nazarenes because many of these sins have been induced with technology due the possible induction of thoughts by the liquid cristal settle in neurons and have not been natural (dark inducing sin through technology and playing gods to induce evil and destruction of intimacy and privacy even in the mind of the human being); Retaliation to those who report the surveillance and manipulation programs and marking of humans for mind reading (telepathy) and thought induction (making them sick sending to the hospitals or removing them); Digital identification plan and digital money to do digital control and avoid conflict and protests of marked and Nazarenes in surveillance programs who discover that there is no privacy in their documents and inclusive in theirs mind (telepathy: mind reading and thought induction: artificial intelligence): it surprises that EU mention that has a digital plan for europeans for digital control on line. But, before the epidemy, Europe and the world advanced a lot in technology and the data of humans are digitally in hospitals and institutes that humans need. After, the EU mentions artificial intelligence for human beings. Then and in vaccination and epidemy time, it is possible that the digital control is a new digital control with artifitial intelligence and with possible chips installed in the human being (possibly already installed in many human beings); Games of events and coincidences to cause accidents or conflicts in the life of marked, target or Nazarenes (change games of victim to accused by companies that regulate the order with subsequent rectification of the game made by the same companies when the Nazarenes claim); Games of recognition of the identity of human beings (in the style of the movie Unknown) by enterprises and service stations which are necessary for the daily movement of human beings creating conflicts of manipulation and stress in the marked or Nazarenes Salary payment games (payment of wages with dinners and game of check payment) creating manipulation conflicts and stress in the life of marked, target or Nazarenes Programmed plans of theft and scams of enterprises and humans even knowing of the surveillance cameras for the control of the marked, target or Nazarenes. Then, there is severe control of human beings in their daily activities to verify the follow-up of the matrix and darks that plan situations of concupiscence in the human being. Besides, this is occurring in coincidence with an accelerated new world order program and possible tribulation times and possibly already with the installation of the apocalyptic mark (possible chips introduced in the human being for mind reading and thought induction to induce concupiscence) in humans mentioned in the apocalypse for dark control of humans. The global forms of the severe manipulation and population control in times of new world order and Tribulation are explained in this article are as follows: By increasing taxes; Through armed conflicts and wars create discord, wars and chaos between countries (often bordering countries with the same origins and with the same culture: Russia and Ukraine: war motivated by US OTAN EU): To later usurp its resources (oil energy resource: US Iraq Kuwait); To later control them politically and economically (US Iraq Kuwait) and when these power or developed countries cannot control or usurp their resources, they begin to block them economically (Russia in the war between Russia and Ukraine where besides developed countries influence in the war by printing additional money to use for the war causing imbalance and global economic crisis instead of looking for ways to avoid it) in order to cause chaos and economic crisis with the knowledge and complicity of the world organizations responsible (OEA ONU) and make the population believe that the cause of the economic crisis is the government in power. However, some countries have resisted these blockades (Cuba Venezuela Nicaragua Russia China) and managed to show that it is possible to have governments independent of the control of these powers or countries that believe they own the Earth; To put rulers (governing) of interest in the same countries in conflict; To control them using the pretext of placing military bases in the countries in conflict (NATO OTAN: military bases in some European countries, US military bases: in some South American countries and some countries of Europe). In addition, this is preferable to reduce military bases in other countries and reduction of nuclear weapons, and use the financial resources for the reduction of inequity and poverty on the Earth. Thus, the organizations responsible for the proliferation of nuclear weapons (OIEA) have played an ineffective and passive (cover-up) role, which has caused the risk of a third nuclear world war to be imminent); Through the war against terror: however and actually, this is a false speech used to point to countries that oppose the control or directive of the powers and that have a culture or political structure different from that of the powers and later make conflict and war to later control them or usurp their resources (some Arab and Muslim countries, for example, US, Irak, Lybia and blaming an entire country for terrorism and occupying for years (Afganistán)). In this way and actually, some countries have developed nuclear weapons (North Korea, Iran) to protect themselves in some way and thus, the same thing does not happen to them as to the countries mentioned above (Irak, Lybia) and that have been destroyed with the false discourse of the war against terror. In this way, the best thing is to have good relations with all the countries of the Earth which are again summed in the Bible [1] in a message: Love your brother (all human beings) as yourself! (Mt.22-39) (and not to go around the Earth pointing out terrorists to any country that opposes its guidelines). Therefore, it is possible to reduce the economic resources for the war against terror which can be used to reduce poverty and inequity in human beings; Through the war against drugs: there are many other substances and products consumed by humans that can be harmful to health and that are allowed and have not become a vice (when something is forbidden: this increases the interest in obtaining it explained from the beginning of creation in Genesis [1]: an apple from the tree of good and evil in the garden of Eden: Adam and Eve). In addition, many countries have allowed the use of certain types of drugs for medical purposes (Uruguay, Bolivia) where drug use has gone unnoticed in these countries; Through religión: with a structure of religion that tries to control the population through a guideline and speeches that obey the Vatican and the actual governments of each country (which is evident when there are countries such as Nicaragua that do not follow a guideline of the church and the elite and then, the religion surprisingly actively intervenes in politics): the conclusion is reached and to which many humans have reached, that religion is a power most actually used (along with political and economic power); Through political power by means of the false argument used by politicians to reduce inequity and poverty: where a large amount of resources and money have been allocated to the political powers and rulers of many countries for centuries by the respective organizations responsable (FMI BM) without any results and in many countries poverty and inequity have increased. Besides, the bureaucracy is a structure of order and rules of management and administration used within the governments of each country that contribute to the inefficiency and manipulation of the required procedures in human life that ultimately affect the life of each human being when they require formalities that end up being complicated and time-consuming. Then, this power structure in politics, economics, and religion for the control of the population is ineffective and obeys the interests of the dark who control humans on the Earth, and is used ineffectively by the rulers (governing) of the countries who come to power precisely with the false discourse of reducing poverty and inequity; Through the pretext of climate change: severe climate change due to the emission of CO2 and the greenhouse effect is a complete fallacy. The world organizations involved with the climate (ONU) try to make humanity believe that this is the reason for the severe climatic changes that the human being has experienced on the Earth to obtain economic resources and avoid mentioning God in control of the Earth and course the climate and to avoid mentioning the Omnipotence of God [1] in the control of the Earth and the climate: the severe climate change is frequently due to solar storms and variations in the magnetic field lines of the Earth because of gravitational variations in the solar system or due to the entry of an asteroid or Comet Planet what is controlled and all the Universe by God. Therefore, the climate change is controlled by the Eternal God (wich is explained in the Bibles with a lot of examples with Moses, Josue, Hezekiah) and thus, this is better to use the resources and money for so-called climate change to reduce poverty and inequity in the Earth and increase equity in humans: Human Beings must not believe everything said by the organizations and individuals that control the humans in the Earth and that obey the directions imposed within the matrix triangle of control of the Earth; Through the sport by means of the persuasive manipulation of observers or attendees at sporting events through commercials programs, commentators (hidden words and numbers in speech), players participating in the match: with gestures or sequence of plays, numbers, words or details in the players uniform, referees (make decisión of plays in favor of a team purposely: false bad arbitration) or leading organizers committing sports corruption not applying the rules or discriminating players (Serbian, Russian and Belarusian tennis players at tennis competitions due to some tennis organizations) or teams (Russian sports clubs and inclusive the Russian national team due FIFA decision) at convenience. Besides, when there are countries in conflict or war: instead of uniting the countries in conflict by means of the sport, the respective organizations (FIFA UEFA) discriminate and increase the conflict: discriminating and not allowing the participation of tennis players (including top tennis players), Football Countries and Sport Clubs in international competitions for reasons of restrictions due to the epidemic, conflict or war (including countries that organized previous World Cups: Russia) where the interest, quality and love for this sport has increased and that must be used to unite human beings and countries and not to not allow them to participate: which increases the division and conflict between countries or humans: This is important to highlight and value the position of the ATP for deciding that the ATP does not agree that athletes from certain countries (Russia and Belarus) cannot participate in international tournaments stating that this is against the principles of merit and non-discrimination: then, this is tremendously criticizable that the organization responsible of Football (FIFA UEFA) participates in armed conflicts or war with discriminatory decisions in Football, increasing the war by not allowing countries in conflict to participate in World Cup of Football: FIFA slogan of no to racism and some form of discrimination is a complete farce and used for convenience and interest (in the same style of all the other organizations (mainly ONU, OEA, FMI, BM, VATICAN) that control humans and that in 2000 years of the coming of the Envoy of God have not been able to solve iniquity and poverty), discrimination that has been evident in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine: Football is the main sport in the Earth and it is the one that can unite human beings the most and should be used as a source of union and not división; Through education: where this is used by many countries to induce and manipulate their inhabitants in a certain political direction through the dissemination of knowledge and even the textbooks of the students: many underdeveloped countries have increased illiteracy and degradation in education because this favors the politicians of the country's government: having an ignorant people who do not see what they do with the country's money and who cannot criticize them: the greatness of peoples depends on the education that gives the independence of individuals who are the ones that make the country advance; Through world organizations to control countries: ONU, OEA, Vatican, OTAN, UE: many countries have to obey the guidelines of these organizations, which often do not respond to the needs of the citizens of each country: many institutions in the countries must obey the organizations (the Vatican for the religion) in a rigid way, which is often not in accordance with the situation of the country's citizens, who often need new variants or guidelines (some organizations can cause chaos, conflict or war as for example the war of Russia with Ucrania where the possible annexation of Ucrania to the OTAN and UE is one of the reasons for the war between these two countries. Therefore, there would be no war between these two countries where without those organizations); Through world organizations of espionage (CIA, FBI, KGB, Gestapo, SS): employing persuasive interference in the countries and rulers of some undeveloped countries (some South America and Center America countries and some European, Asia and Africa countries) with the objective of the power countries of control, manipulate or destabilize countries and inclusive simple humans (using the personal data of thousands of people around the world). Through the control and intervention of the Creator God Allah which is necessary and essential in times of Tribulation at the time timely (Holy Bible: Apoc. 6 Apoc. 8:6 Apoc. 5 Apoc. 7 Apoc. 21) due to everything mentioned in this scientific research respect to the control and manipulation of the population (regarding the increase of inequity, discord, and evil among humans) which is not following the guideline given by the envoy of God 2000 years ago: Jesus Christ. Keywords: God, Allah, Jesuchrist, Bible, Creator, Education, Climate change, Population Control, Climate Pollution, Gases CO2, Greenhouse Effect, Epidemic, Viruses, Laboratory, Zombies, Dark, Elite, new world order, OMS, ONU, OEA, Vatican, OTAN, UE, FMI, BM, OIT, OMT, Meteorological weapons, Haarp, Sura, Wars, Sport, Religion, Radiation, Nuclear Winter, Sun, Magnetic field lines, Storms, Asteroids, Comet Planet, Volcanoes, Climate Catastrophies, Tribulation, Taxes, Terror, Drugs, Organizations, Inequity, Poverty, Manipulation, Indoctrination, Technological Devices, Covert technological devices, networks, Newscasts, Surveillance programs, Big Brother Program, Digital Identification Plan, Digital Money, Covert numbers and covert words, Encrypted, Hidden codes or small phrases not visible to the naked eye, Covert words in the speech of zombie humans in multimedia and traditional technological devices, Nazism, Jews, Coincidence games, Activities, Plans, Events Programmed in sequence, Pyrotechnic sounds in sequence, Games of events and coincidences to cause accidents or conflicts, Games of judgments of sin against humans and Nazarenes, Games of recognition of the identity of human beings, Unknown, Companies, Service stations, Salary payment games, Programmed plans of theft and scams of companies and enterprises, Retaliation, Marking, Reduction, False medical negligence, Medical oath, Medicine, Liquid and solid chips in humans, Liquid crystals, Neurons, Ultrasonic waves, Vaccines, Global epidemiological programs, Matrix, Dark, Elite, Mind Reading, Telepath, Thought induction, Apocalipse, Wrath of God.
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24

Özkan, Mehmet, and Serhat Orakçı. "Deciphering Turkey—Africa Summits." Africa Review, February 9, 2022, 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/09744061-20220126.

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Abstract Over the last two decades, international summits have gained great importance for regional and global actors in terms of developing relations with African countries. China, India, Japan, the Unites States, European countries and Russia have conducted various summits and business forums to develop political, economic and military relations with Africa. In 2005, Turkey emerged as a new actor when its foreign policy opened up to Africa. It was a strategic partner to the African Union in 2008, has conducted two Turkey–Africa summits—in 2008 in Istanbul, and in 2014 in Malabo—and the third summit was held again in Istanbul in December 2021. This article analyses the Istanbul and Malabo declarations comprehensively to evaluate Turkey’s foreign policy discourse on Africa. Moreover, it examines Turkey’s Africa policy implementations and achievements in the continent through the lens of summits.
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25

"INTRODUCTION EU AND NATO: SECURITY RELATIONS." EU IN NATO: VARNOSTNA RAZMERJA/EU AND NATO: SECURITY RELATIONS, VOLUME 2021/ISSUE 23/2 (June 15, 2021): 11–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.33179/bsv.99.svi.11.cmc.23.2.00.

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In this issue of the Contemporary Military Challenges, we focus on the relations between the European Union and NATO in the field of security. On 1 June 2021, NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels to discuss the details of the NATO Summit to be held on 14 June 2021 in Brussels, Belgium; the period, which coincides with the publication of this thematic issue. Twenty foreign ministers represented NATO member states, which are also EU members, making an event such as the NATO summit all the more important for the future of European security. Many topics were mentioned at the ministerial, such as Afghanistan, Belarus, Russia and China. In general, however, the emphasis was put on the fact that NATO should adapt to new challenges, security settings in a highly competitive environment. As mentioned by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, we are presented with a number of challenges to our security that we need to tackle together, because no country and no continent can deal with them alone. This includes strengthening the existing partnerships and building new ones, including in the Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. The participants also discussed the stepping up of training and capability building for partners, as well as work to address the security impact of climate change. In the conclusion, the ministers broadly agreed that it was important to start work on NATO's next Strategic Concept, because our strategic environment has significantly changed since 2010. Secretary General underlined that NATO’s future adaptation would require Allies to continue investing in defence, and to invest more together, as a force multiplier and a strong message of unity and resolve. During Donald Trump’s mandate as President of the United States, the fact that the European Union or its Member States pay too little attention and thus resources for their own defence has often been a hot topic of political debate. In 2016, a year before the US President Trump took office, the European Union adopted a Global Strategy which envisaged several options to strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy, which we will discuss in further detail in the next issue of the Contemporary Security Challenges. The Global Strategy provided that the European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, and other existing and new mechanisms would operate in such a way that activities, resources and capabilities would not duplicate with NATO’s, but would complement each other. True enough that, within the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Union has already foreseen many activities at its meetings and in the adopted documents in terms of strengthening this policy, but later implemented little. Has anything changed in this area in the past four years, or will perhaps something change at the time of the conference on the European future? Just as the Alliance is planning a new strategic concept, the European Union is announcing a Strategic Compass, which will set new directions for future cooperation, also in the field of security. In this issue, the authors present how the cooperation between the European Union and NATO is taking place in 2021 in some areas of security. The article titled EU-NATO cooperation and the Slovenian presidency of the Council of the European Union by Marko Mahnič presents an interesting thesis on whether obstacles to the coherent functioning of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the field of common security and defence are of a purely technical nature, or are there maybe differences in the policies, bilateral relations and national ambitions of certain countries. Damjan Štrucl writes about the EU-NATO partnership and ensuring information security and cybersecurity: theory and practice. According to him, the development of information and communication technology and new challenges of the modern security environment have led to the signing of the Joint Declaration on deepening the strategic partnership between both organizations in 2016. The author provides an analysis of the EU-NATO strategic partnership in ensuring security and defence in the modern security environment. Defence initiatives to strengthen the security of the European Union motivated Gregor Garb to write an article presenting what the 2016 European Union Global Strategy contributed to the EU’s strategic defence autonomy. Initially, in a theoretical sense, and after five years in a practical sense. All of course, given the fact that the European Union will continue to maintain strong relations and cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance. David Humar and Nina Raduha present the process of creating the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia in the Slovenian Armed Forces. Changes in the international environment have initiated security-related strategic considerations of NATO and the European Union. Slovenia as a member of both organizations also needs a strategic consideration in both military and security fields. Their article provides more details about the The process of devising the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia. Tackling irregular migration in Europe is a topic addressed by Miklós Böröcz. Ever since 2015, the then mass illegal migration has posed a major problem for Europe and the European Union. The mass refugee crisis has gradually transformed into illegal migrations of individuals and small groups, who have maintained and strengthened contact with everybody along the way, who take part in this and ensure that the migration flow with of illegal character does not subside. The author provides some solutions to this problem.
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26

Kumar, Suneel. "Regional Organizations and States in International Relations: A Study of India’s Approach Towards Regional Organizations." Millennial Asia, July 28, 2022, 097639962211051. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09763996221105148.

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Regional organizations (ROs), a key component of the global order, have become a significant tool for achieving foreign policy objectives of the member countries. Amidst the prevailing politico-strategic environment, a speckled range of national interests of the regional states and non-regional states has motivated or compelled the states to create, collaborate and participate in the functioning of ROs. India is associated with those ROs that possess objectives convenient in pursuit of its national interests and also identical to its foreign policy targets. In this context, this article argues that India’s policy towards ROs is shaped by the Cold War and post-Cold War developments along with the emerging strategic and security environment in the twenty-first century. These developments have created a divergence or convergence of India’s preferences and beliefs with other countries and have determined its participation in the ROs. It is participating actively in the functioning of ROs in pursuit of its national interests in diverse arenas. The ROs, especially South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and even European Union (EU) and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) are the key instruments for India to achieve the objectives of respective Neighbourhood First Policy (NFP), Look East Policy (LEP), Act East Policy (AEP), Look North Policy (LNP), Connect Central Asia Policy (CCAP) and Indo-Pacific Vision (IPV) frameworks of its foreign policy towards South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Indo-Pacific and the globe. Apart from economic, strategic and security cooperation in the regional context, the ROs can help India in bolstering its image and status as a key power in global affairs.
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27

Sarkisian, Larysa, and P. V. Onishchuk. "PROSPECTS OF UKRAINE IN THE MARKETS OF TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA." Odessa National University Herald. Economy 27, no. 3(93) (2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.32782/2304-0920/3-93-3.

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Theoretical and practical issues of identifying Ukrainian prospects in the Middle East and Africa telecommunication services market were studied in the article. Theoretical foundations and methodological approaches were based on the research of Ukrainian and international scientists in the chosen scientific field. It has been determined that the post-war renewal process will open more cooperation opportunities for the Ukrainian business with foreign companies. Further liberalization of trade and economic relations, as well as the recovery programs, supported by the international partners will be the drivers of it. The Middle East and North Africa region is one of the most attractive ones for Ukrainian raw materials and high-technological goods and services exports and, as a result, a promising area for R&D cooperation, taking into account Ukrainian scientific base, technologies and qualified scientists. The article analyses foreign trade flows and identifies that the main importers of Ukrainian services in the sphere of telecommunications, computer and information services for the last 5 years were the United States, European Union member-states, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. According data, the share of telecommunications, computer and information services in Ukrainian exports were almost 30 % in 2021. It has been identified that the IT-sphere functions as one of the main engines of the Ukrainian economic system development since the beginning of the Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, as it has advantages over other sectors which generates public revenue (metallurgy and agriculture) – the possibility to continue business operations regardless of location. It was concluded that Ukrainian IT sector is competitive at the foreign markets and is intensively exporting including telecommunications, computer and information services. But given the urgent need to find new sources for the national economy post-war recovery, it is important to strengthen the presence in the African market, which has the capacity potential for Ukrainian IT companies.
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28

"Conference “Africa in the Context of the Formation of a Polycentric World”." Journal of the Institute for African Studies, June 30, 2020, 66–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2020-51-2-66-98.

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The COVID-19 pandemic that spread to Russia as well as to other states of the world caused additional problems for our scientific life, making it impossible to hold the preplanned scientific events in usual format. The Centre for the Study of the Russian-African Relations and African States’ Foreign Policy of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences had scheduled on March 31, 2020 an international scientific conference “Africa in the context of the formation of a polycentric world”. The significance of this problem seems considerable enough, since its discussion raises a number of important issues, including the growing role of African countries in the process of creating a polycentric world and the desire of the African countries for greater subjectivity. At the same time, the fact that the modern global processes are taking place in the context of the growing competition among international actors for influence in the world, including Africa, becomes particularly important for Russia. Given the importance and relevance of the raised issues and the interest shown by potential participants (more than 40 applications were submitted), it was decided to hold the conference on March 31, 2020 by correspondence. The scholars, postgraduates and students, representatives of research institutes of Russian Academy of Sciences (Institute for African Studies RAS, Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, IMEMO RAS, Institute for the US and Canada Studies RAS, Institute of Far Eastern Studies RAS, Institute of Control Sciences RAS), as well as higher educational institutions (RUDN, MGIMO, etc.) took part in this conference. A wide range of issues was discussed, including various aspects of the African countries’ foreign policy, issues of African integration, Africa’s role and place in new geopolitical conditions, the policy of the leading economically developed and developing countries and Russia’s current policy on the African continent. The discussion on the first block of themes “Africa: global problems and current trends in the world economy” was opened with RUDN Prof. V. I. Yurtaev’s paper “Afro-Eurasia: challenges of participation in the formation of a polycentric world”. Не raised the following questions: will the rise of the Afro-Asian world as a new alternative to the existing world order occur in the 21st century, and how necessary are the European and/or Eurasian components in this process? A.I. Neklessa made a contribution on the rather controversial topic of “Postcolonialism in the context of civilizational and regional development”. In addition, there were papers on economic trends in North Africa (A.A. Tkachenko), digitalization in Tropical Africa (N. N. Tsvetkova), challenges that Africa faces today in the fight against drug trafficking (N. N. Grishina), money laundering and the financing of terrorism (Ntegge Edward). The second block of issues “Russia and Africa” was opened with E.N. Korendyasov’s substantive research paper dedicated to the new stage in the development of Russian-African relations, the milestone of which was the Russian-African Summit and Economic Forum in Sochi in October 2019. This topic was also discussed by G. M. Sidorova and E.V. Kharitonova. The economic aspect of Russian-African relations was reflected in the reports of E.V. Morozenskaya and S.N. Volkov, and the presentations of Z.S. Novikova and L.N. Kalinichenko contained an analysis of Russia’s cooperation with African countries in the fields of new technologies and energy sector. The increase in the scientific interest for African policy of the leading Western powers was shown by the reports of the third block “Western countries and Africa”. Five presentations (A.Yu. Urnov, V.K. Parkhomenko, G.R. Grigoryan, A.A. Stepanov, A.Ya.Matkovskaya) were devoted to US policy in Africa; the topic of three other reports (O. S. Kulkova, N.V. Ivkina, N. G. Gavrilova) were the relations of African countries with the EU. Two speakers (A. M. Khalitova and M. R. Toure) focused on the problem of French policies in Africa. Finally, this section concluded with the report on Japanese-African relations (A.A. Zabella). In contrast to the above papers, concerning the policies of separate developed countries or their groups in Africa, the report of corresponding member of RAS, doctor of Economics, Professor Leonid L. Fituni focused on the role of the concept of a politically exposed persons in the structure of mechanisms of the West’s sanctions pressure on African elites. The participants in the discussion showed the expected interest in the problem of the “new players” in Africa. This interest was particularly manifest during the discussion on the topics of the fourth block of problems “Emerging and developing countries and Africa”. The BRICS countries policy in Africa was in the focus of attention. Three reports were devoted to China’ s African policy (T.L. Deych, E.M. Serbina and O.L. Fituni), while two other (A.Yu. Borzova and A.L. Sapuntsov) – to Brazil-Africa relations. Such active new players on the continent as Turkey (Mirmehti Agazade) and the United Arab Emirates (S. V. Kostelyanets) were not left without attention, as well. The fifth block contains papers on a fairly broad topic “Foreign policy of African countries and inter-African relations”. Two participants (O. V. Konstantinova and A.Yu. Sharova) addressed the issue of African integration that has become particularly relevant in recent years, while the others devoted their reports to the problems of foreign policy of individual African countries: S.V. Nenashev – Angola, T.S. Denisova and E.N. Zanoskina – Nigeria, N.A.Panin and Yu.D. Vertashov – South Africa, S.M. Shlenskaya – Madagascar. The conference demonstrated a great interest of the scholars, postgraduates and students in the discussed problems and contributed to further researches within these main trends.
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29

Eckardt, Michael. "Manganyi, Calvin/Liebenberg, Ian/Potgieter, Thean (eds), South Africa and Romania: transition to democracy and changing security paradigms. Durban: Just Done Productions 2013, 376 pp." Strategic Review for Southern Africa 38, no. 2 (December 22, 2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v38i2.261.

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This volume is based on NRF-funded research cooperation between the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History in Bucharest and the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University, dealing with the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. It discusses the transition to multi-party democracy, the consequent changes in the security environment and the current role and defensive posture of these countries in their respective regions. All contributions are abstracted separately in the introductory chapter (pp 1-11). The specific chapters discuss the joint experiences and challenges in facing the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy (1. Liebenberg, I: "Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Democracy": 13-36; 2. Sasz, P V: "Transition to Democracy in Romania": 37-57; 4. Mangayani, C: "The Role of Youth in South Africa's Transition": 87-121), the reform of the armies (3. Ionesco, M: "Transition, Alliances and Military Reform in Romania in the post-Cold War Period": 59-86; 5. Ferreira, R: "South Africa: From Apartheid Army to a Post-Apartheid Defence Force": 123-135; 7. Mangayani, C: "Structures for Political Oversight of the Military": 171-204; 8. Otu, P: "Military Reform in Romania": 205-231) as well as the repositioning of Romania's security strategy (6. Cioculescu, S: "Romania's National Security Strategy in the Post-Cold War Period": 137-170). South Africa's change in strategy concerning its interests in the Indian Ocean is the main focus of T Potgieter in chapter 10 (pp 267-305)and Romania's status within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture after the end of the Cold War and its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) has been dealt with by Carmen Rijnoveanu in chapter 11 (pp307-340). Worthy of special attention is chapter 9 (Liebenberg, I: "The Arms Industry, Reform and Civil-Military Relations in South Africa": 233-266), bridging the purchase of arms and ammunition during the inter-war years (1919-1939) to the period of World War II (1939-1945) and even further to the establishment of South Africa's own defence industry under apartheid rule (1948-1989), emphasising the enormous cost of maintaining a military superiority in southern Africa paving the way for South Africa's economic decline by the end of the 1980s and leading to the political demise of apartheid in the 1994 elections. In chapter 12 ("Waves of Change, Military-Political Reorientation, Economic Alliances and Uncertain Futures": 341-357), the editors make a comparison Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 38, No 2 Book Reviews 181 of the different starting positions of both countries and the national security strategies that emerged from it.
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30

Samoilenko, Alla, and Sergii Sardak. "MILITARY POTENTIAL OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS." Economic scope, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.32782/2224-6282/165-5.

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At the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century, large-scale interna-tional conflicts and wars between groups of individuals, unrecognized international actors and countries continue to unfold. In the context of globalization, the issue of forming and strengthening the military potential of the country largely depends on its international integration policy and participation in regional alliances. Relations between the members of regional organizations are formed in the spheres of trade, finance, technical and political cooperation, among which the most important issue is military cooperation, which strengthens their military potential on the world stage. The study found that in existing regional organizations, the degree of military interaction between countries differs significantly. The authors grouped regional organizations according to the power of military cooperation into three groups. The first group is regional integration organizations that do not have joint military forces, military programs and coordination structures. This group includes the vast majority of regional organizations. The second group is regional integration organizations, which have a small amount of military cooperation, conduct joint military exercises, carry out force programs and are able to solve problems with a consolidated military force. This group includes and studied: Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), African Union (AU). The third group is regional alliances, which have a strong military potential. These integration organizations have: an extensive system of international agreements; unified standards; joint military units; joint development programs; coordinating structures; carry out joint exercises and military operations. This group includes: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), European Union (EU). Based on the author's analysis of the military potential of regional organizations, recommendations for countries have been developed. For the countries of the first group it is necessary to determine the expediency of strengthening the military potential of the country by strengthening the integration process: within the membership of existing integration organizations; joining other integration organizations; creation of new integration organizations. For the countries of the second group, it is advisable to continue to support military formations, increase spending on the protection and defense of life and health of their citizens from terrorist groups and other illegal actions that may endanger the government and civilians. For the countries of the third group it is recommended to maintain cooperation in the military sphere, to increase the costs of improving military equipment and weapons. Conduct more joint exercises to gain new experience and skills in different conditions of use of military resources in civilian and military spheres. These most powerful regional alliances have an advantage in the military field precisely because of the number of troops, the number of weapons, military equipment, and joint military bases. And the main goal of these regional organizations is to create security for their citizens and the world as a whole, through the development of new effective mechanisms for global interaction.
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31

Naheem, Mohammed Ahmad. "Morocco’s market economy expansion and its successful strategy in combatting money laundering and terrorist financing." Journal of Money Laundering Control ahead-of-print, ahead-of-print (August 12, 2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jmlc-06-2020-0068.

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Purpose Morocco is an expanding developing economy in North Africa with increasing bilateral trade relations with larger economies. This paper aims to examine the features of the expanding market economy and the preceding structural reforms initiated by King Mohammed VI. The paper’s primary focus is to study the systematic feature of anti-money laundering and combatting of terrorist financing (AML/CTF). Morocco has emerged as a staunch opponent of terrorism and terrorist financing while garnering joint-investigative operations with European countries against transnational organised crime and money laundering. Design/methodology/approach The paper is divided into two primary series. The first is a view of Morocco’s economy, with a qualitative analysis of significant economic, political and social structural reforms. Second, a qualitative and quantitative analysis of Morocco’s AML and combating of terrorist financing infrastructure is assessed. The qualitative analysis is conducted in two parts; first, by studying the country’s AML/CTF legislation and regulation, and second, by examining the independent international evaluation of the legal structure and its implementation by authorities. The quantitative analysis is conducted by investigating the available statistics relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. Findings The paper finds Morocco to have accomplished essential economic reforms, especially considering greater institutional management and autonomy. Other structural reforms include the reformation of the constitution, a more comfortable business climate, social development projects focusing on enhancing skill labour and connectivity and the development of strong trade capacity. The primary objective discovery concerns the country’s AML/CTF structure, which is found to comply with international standards. Also, efforts enhancing the country’s regulatory environment with low corruption, low risk of money laundering and low risk of terrorist financing have been taken in a series of legislative amendments and programs. The banking sector and Morocco’s Customs agency have reflected the best improvement as per the study in this paper. Practical implications Morocco is witnessing high levels of investment, with year-on-year growth in most existing industrial sectors. The market is also providing for new skilled labour and better trade incentives with the European Union. It is essential for investors, observers and policymakers to understand the market economy reforms and systematic deficiencies in a developing economy. Morocco presents observers with information about policies pre-reform, providing a guide for economic and AML/CTF policy implementation elsewhere. Originality/value The paper concerns itself with two levels of analysis concerning Morocco. The first, broad study, is a review of market economy reforms, which are mostly structural and have assisted in the expansion of the economy greatly. The second objective is specific to examining the country’s AML/CTF structure, which has undergone significant development in legislation, regulation and implementation in the past decade. The paper makes a specific attempt to discuss associate indicators to the AML/CTF network as a part of this study.
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32

"MIGRATIONS AND SECURITY ON THE OLD CONTINENT." CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES, VOLUME 2017 ISSUE 19/3 (September 15, 2017): 11–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.33179/bsv.99.svi.11.cmc.19.3.00.

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It has been two years since the European migrant crisis. In autumn 2015, Europe was flooded by a refugee wave that people neither expected nor imagined. It was a surprise in every way. Modern technology, reputable institutions, and leading global experts from different fields did not anticipate what happened. The European legal order, human rights, the Schengen regime, and the ideas of the West dissolved quickly and left people faced with a naked reality. Where are the refugees now, how many are there, and how do they feel? How did the refugee crisis affect the national security system and the common European defence and security policy? The media rarely reports on this now, two years later. Instead, there is much talk of terrorist attacks in European cities, the UK’s exit from the European Union, the US President, Donald Trump, and the Korean rockets that ruffle the Japanese sea. Years ago, Samuel P. Huntington wrote a book The Clash of Civilizations. It was published in Slovenia in 2005. His assumption was that the main reason for the clash of nations in the future would be their cultural and religious identity. He predicted that the greatest threat would be extreme terrorism. Different ideologies would be replaced by self-oriented individuals, who would no longer be concerned about the common good, but focused on themselves and their benefits. The absence of ideologies would be replaced by a return to ancient traditions. Responses to Huntington's work were very different; some were enthusiastic, others sceptical. We can, however, conclude that his theory, first presented in 1992, was confirmed in the case of the war in the Western Balkans. When the ideology of former Yugoslavia died, the nations and nationalities returned to their roots, which resulted in a war that claimed the lives of many people. Robert D. Kaplan also wrote about the fact that the Western Balkans is a crossroads of different cultures. The most famous of his works is Balkan Ghosts, in which Kaplan examines in detail the historical and cultural turbulence in the immediate neighbourhood of the cradle of Western civilization, which has been the driving force behind the development of the West for the past two thousand years. This issue of Contemporary Military Challenges is therefore interested in what is new on the Old Continent, emphasizing security, defence and the military. In his article Geostrategic Shifts in Contemporary Europe, Uroš Tovornik examines the geostrategic significance of the relationships between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the countries that shaped the fate of Europe in the past. With the UK's decision to leave the European Union, the former classic geostrategic triangle can now turn into other decisive geostrategic links which could greatly change the Old Continent. József Kis Benedek writes about the consequences of events in North Africa and the Middle East. In the recent past, some authors have wondered whether the Arab Spring would be followed by Arab Winter; however, what followed was the European migrant crisis and the escalation of terrorist attacks in Europe. In his article Challenges Posed to the European Union by the Iraqi, Syrian and Libyan Crises, the author focuses on the participation of foreign fighters in crisis areas, coming from Europe to aid. Economic Intelligence: an Inevitable Choice is the title of an article written by Laris Gaiser. It stresses the urgent need for Slovenia to devote greater attention to this area in order to ensure greater benefits for its citizens. Slovenia has come a long way since 1991, but modern security guidelines stipulate that, besides classic tasks in the intelligence and security field, economic intelligence is also important. What is the situation in Slovenia and what else should we do? For several years, the Slovenian Armed Forces have been involved in the international operation and mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slovenia is accompanied by many other European Union member states, ensuring peace and order in the country. How long will this go on, and how successful are the international security forces in the area? It is this and some other questions that the authors Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, Johanna Suhonen and Kari Sainio try to answer in the article Assessing the Planning and Implementation of the EU Missions and Operations: Case Study of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cybernetics, cyberspace and cyber attacks are commonly known terms of which much has been heard and read about recently. How well do we really know these terms? Is there a legal basis at the national level and how is this field regulated in the international environment? This is a challenge requiring strategic and concrete answers. One of the possible answers can be found in the article Legality of Low-Intensity Cyber Operations under International Law by Pika Šarf. Military aviation is an integral part of the modern armed forces. Slovenian military aviation is relatively young and has, in its short history, experienced several development phases, both in the field of aeronautics and in the organizational military sense. The quality of cooperation of Slovenian military pilots in international operations, missions, and international military exercises testifies that we are on the right track. But how to proceed? In his article, Characteristics of the Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force: Now and 20 Years in the future, the author Mitja Lipovšek refers to the idea that history is a debate of the past with the present for the future. We wish you an interesting read, and invite you to also participate as authors of articles.
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33

McNair, Brian. "Vote!" M/C Journal 10, no. 6 (April 1, 2008). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2714.

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Abstract:
The twentieth was, from one perspective, the democratic century — a span of one hundred years which began with no fully functioning democracies in existence anywhere on the planet (if one defines democracy as a political system in which there is both universal suffrage and competitive elections), and ended with 120 countries out of 192 classified by the Freedom House think tank as ‘democratic’. There are of course still many societies where democracy is denied or effectively neutered — the remaining outposts of state socialism, such as China, Cuba, and North Korea; most if not all of the Islamic countries; exceptional states such as Singapore, unapologetically capitalist in its economic system but resolutely authoritarian in its political culture. Many self-proclaimed democracies, including those of the UK, Australia and the US, are procedurally or conceptually flawed. Countries emerging out of authoritarian systems and now in a state of democratic transition, such as Russia and the former Soviet republics, are immersed in constant, sometimes violent struggle between reformers and reactionaries. Russia’s recent parliamentary elections were accompanied by the intimidation of parties and politicians who opposed Vladimir Putin’s increasingly populist and authoritarian approach to leadership. The same Freedom House report which describes the rise of democracy in the twentieth century acknowledges that many self-styled democracies are, at best, only ‘partly free’ in their political cultures (for detailed figures on the rise of global democracy, see the Freedom House website Democracy’s Century). Let’s not for a moment downplay these important qualifications to what can nonetheless be fairly characterised as a century-long expansion and globalisation of democracy, and the acceptance of popular sovereignty, expressed through voting for the party or candidate of one’s choice, as a universally recognised human right. That such a process has occurred, and continues in these early years of the twenty-first century, is irrefutable. In the Gaza strip, Hamas appeals to the legitimacy of a democratic election victory in its campaign to be recognised as the voice of the Palestinian people. However one judges the messianic tendencies and Islamist ideology of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it must be acknowledged that the Iranian people elected him, and that they have the power to throw him out of government next time they vote. That was never true of the Shah. The democratic resurgence in Latin America, taking in Venezuela, Peru and Bolivia among others has been a much-noted feature of international politics in recent times (Alves), presenting a welcome contrast to the dictatorships and death squads of the 1980s, even as it creates some uncomfortable dilemmas for the Bush administration (which must champion democratic government at the same time as it resents some of the choices people may make when they have the opportunity to vote). Since 9/11 a kind of democracy has expanded even to Afghanistan and Iraq, albeit at the point of a gun, and with no guarantees of survival beyond the end of military occupation by the US and its coalition allies. As this essay was being written, Pakistan’s state of emergency was ending and democratic elections scheduled, albeit in the shadow cast by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. Democracy, then — imperfect and limited as it can be; grudgingly delivered though it is by political elites in many countries, and subject to attack and roll back at any time — has become a global universal to which all claim allegiance, or at least pay lip service. The scale of this transformation, which has occurred in little more than one quarter of the time elapsed since the Putney debates of 1647 and the English revolution first established the principle of the sovereignty of parliament, is truly remarkable. (Tristram Hunt quotes lawyer Geoffrey Robertson in the Guardian to the effect that the Putney debates, staged in St Mary’s church in south-west London towards the end of the English civil war, launched “the idea that government requires the consent of freely and fairly elected representatives of all adult citizens irrespective of class or caste or status or wealth” – “A Jewel of Democracy”, Guardian, 26 Oct. 2007) Can it be true that less than one hundred years ago, in even the most advanced capitalist societies, 50 per cent of the people — women — did not have the right to vote? Or that black populations, indigenous or migrant, in countries such as the United States and Australia were deprived of basic citizenship rights until the 1960s and even later? Will future generations wonder how on earth it could have been that the vast majority of the people of South Africa were unable to vote until 1994, and that they were routinely imprisoned, tortured and killed when they demanded basic democratic rights? Or will they shrug and take it for granted, as so many of us who live in settled democracies already do? (In so far as ‘we’ includes the community of media and cultural studies scholars, I would argue that where there is reluctance to concede the scale and significance of democratic change, this arises out of continuing ambivalence about what ‘democracy’ means, a continuing suspicion of globalisation (in particular the globalisation of democratic political culture, still associated in some quarters with ‘the west’), and of the notion of ‘progress’ with which democracy is routinely associated. The intellectual roots of that ambivalence were various. Marxist-leninist inspired authoritarianism gripped much of the world until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war. Until that moment, it was still possible for many marxians in the scholarly community to view the idea of democracy with disdain — if not quite a dirty word, then a deeply flawed, highly loaded concept which masked and preserved underlying social inequalities more than it helped resolve them. Until 1989 or thereabouts, it was possible for ‘bourgeois democracy’ to be regarded as just one kind of democratic polity by the liberal and anti-capitalist left, which often regarded the ‘proletarian’ or ‘people’s’ democracy prevailing in the Soviet Union, China, Cuba or Vietnam as legitimate alternatives to the emerging capitalist norm of one person, one vote, for constituent assemblies which had real power and accountability. In terms not very different from those used by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, belief in the value of democracy was conceived by this materialist school as a kind of false consciousness. It still is, by Noam Chomsky and others who continue to view democracy as a ‘necessary illusion’ (1989) without which capitalism could not be reproduced. From these perspectives voting gave, and gives us merely the illusion of agency and power in societies where capital rules as it always did. For democracy read ‘the manufacture of consent’; its expansion read not as progressive social evolution, but the universalisation of the myth of popular sovereignty, mobilised and utilised by the media-industrial-military complex to maintain its grip.) There are those who dispute this reading of events. In the 1960s, Habermas’s hugely influential Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere critiqued the manner in which democracy, and the public sphere underpinning it, had been degraded by public relations, advertising, and the power of private interests. In the period since, critical scholarly research and writing on political culture has been dominated by the Habermasian discourse of democratic decline, and the pervasive pessimism of those who see democracy, and the media culture which supports it, as fatally flawed, corrupted by commercialisation and under constant threat. Those, myself included, who challenged that view with a more positive reading of the trends (McNair, Journalism and Democracy; Cultural Chaos) have been denounced as naïve optimists, panglossian, utopian and even, in my own case, a ‘neo-liberal apologist’. (See an unpublished paper by David Miller, “System Failure: It’s Not Just the Media, It’s the Whole Bloody System”, delivered at Goldsmith’s College in 2003.) Engaging as they have been, I venture to suggest that these are the discourses and debates of an era now passing into history. Not only is it increasingly obvious that democracy is expanding globally into places where it never previously reached; it is also extending inwards, within nation states, driven by demands for greater local autonomy. In the United Kingdom, for example, the citizen is now able to vote not just in Westminster parliamentary elections (which determine the political direction of the UK government), but for European elections, local elections, and elections for devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The people of London can vote for their mayor. There would by now have been devolved assemblies in the regions of England, too, had the people of the North East not voted against it in a November 2004 referendum. Notwithstanding that result, which surprised many in the New Labour government who held it as axiomatic that the more democracy there was, the better for all of us, the importance of enhancing and expanding democratic institutions, of allowing people to vote more often (and also in more efficient ways — many of these expansions of democracy have been tied to the introduction of systems of proportional representation) has become consensual, from the Mid West of America to the Middle East. The Democratic Paradox And yet, as the wave of democratic transformation has rolled on through the late twentieth and into the early twenty first century it is notable that, in many of the oldest liberal democracies at least, fewer people have been voting. In the UK, for example, in the period between 1945 and 2001, turnout at general elections never fell below 70 per cent. In 1992, the last general election won by the Conservatives before the rise of Tony Blair and New Labour, turnout was 78 per cent, roughly where it had been in the 1950s. In 2001, however, as Blair’s government sought re-election, turnout fell to an historic low for the UK of 59.4 per cent, and rose only marginally to 61.4 per cent in the most recent general election of 2005. In the US presidential elections of 1996 and 2000 turnouts were at historic lows of 47.2 and 49.3 per cent respectively, rising just above 50 per cent again in 2004 (figures by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). At local level things are even worse. In only the second election for a devolved parliament in Scotland (2003) turnout was a mere 48.5 per cent, rising to 50.5 in 2007. These trends are not universal. In countries with compulsory voting, they mean very little — in Australia, where voting in parliamentary elections is compulsory, turnout averages in the 90s per cent. In France, while turnouts for parliamentary elections show a similar downward trend to the UK and the UK, presidential contests achieve turnouts of 80-plus per cent. In the UK and US, as noted, the most recent elections show modest growth in turnout from those historic lows of the late 1990s and early Noughties. There has grown, nonetheless, the perception, commonplace amongst academic commentators as well as journalists and politicians themselves, that we are living through a ‘crisis’ of democratic participation, a dangerous decline in the tendency to vote in elections which undermines the legitimacy of democracy itself. In communication scholarship a significant body of research and publication has developed around this theme, from Blumler and Gurevitch’s Crisis of Public Communication (1996), through Barnett and Gaber’s Westminster Tales (2000), to more recent studies such as Lewis et al.’s Citizens or Consumers (2005). All presume a problem of some kind with the practice of democracy and the “old fashioned ritual” of voting, as Lewis et al. describe it (2). Most link alleged inadequacies in the performance of the political media to what is interpreted as popular apathy (or antipathy) towards democracy. The media are blamed for the lack of public engagement with democratic politics which declining turnouts are argued to signal. Political journalists are said to be too aggressive and hyper-adversarial (Lloyd), behaving like the “feral beast” spoken of by Tony Blair in his 2007 farewell speech to the British people as prime minister. They are corrosively cynical and a “disaster for democracy”, as Steven Barnett and others argued in the first years of the twenty first century. They are not aggressive or adversarial enough, as the propaganda modellists allege, citing what they interpret as supine media coverage of Coalition policy in Iraq. The media put people off, rather than turn them on to democracy by being, variously, too nice or too nasty to politicians. What then, is the solution to the apparent paradox represented by the fact that there is more democracy, but less voting in elections than ever before; and that after centuries of popular struggle democratic assemblies proliferate, but in some countries barely half of the eligible voters can be bothered to participate? And what role have the media played in this unexpected phenomenon? If the scholarly community has been largely critical on this question, and pessimistic in its analyses of the role of the media, it has become increasingly clear that the one arena where people do vote more than ever before is that presented by the media, and entertainment media in particular. There has been, since the appearance of Big Brother and the subsequent explosion of competitive reality TV formats across the world, evidence of a huge popular appetite for voting on such matters as which amateur contestant on Pop Idol, or X Factor, or Fame Academy, or Operatunity goes on to have a chance of a professional career, a shot at the big time. Millions of viewers of the most popular reality TV strands queue up to register their votes on premium phone lines, the revenue from which makes up a substantial and growing proportion of the income of commercial TV companies. This explosion of voting behaviour has been made possible by the technology-driven emergence of new forms of participatory, interactive, digitised media channels which allow millions to believe that they can have an impact on the outcome of what are, at essence, game and talent shows. At the height of anxiety around the ‘crisis of democratic participation’ in the UK, observers noted that nearly 6.5 million people had voted in the Big Brother UK final in 2004. More than eight million voted during the 2004 run of the BBC’s Fame Academy series. While these numbers do not, contrary to popular belief, exceed the numbers of British citizens who vote in a general election (27.2 million in 2005), they do indicate an enthusiasm for voting which seems to contradict declining rates of democratic participation. People who will never get out and vote for their local councillor often appear more than willing to pick up the telephone or the laptop and cast a vote for their favoured reality TV contestant, even if it costs them money. It would be absurd to suggest that voting for a contestant on Big Brother is directly comparable to the act of choosing a government or a president. The latter is recognised as an expression of citizenship, with potentially significant consequences for the lives of individuals within their society. Voting on Big Brother, on the other hand, is unmistakeably entertainment, game-playing, a relatively risk-free exercise of choice — a bit of harmless fun, fuelled by office chat and relentless tabloid coverage of the contestants’ strengths and weaknesses. There is no evidence that readiness to participate in a telephone or online vote for entertainment TV translates into active citizenship, where ‘active’ means casting a vote in an election. The lesson delivered by the success of participatory media in recent years, however — first reality TV, and latterly a proliferation of online formats which encourage user participation and voting for one thing or another — is that people will vote, when they are able and motivated to do so. Voting is popular, in short, and never more so, irrespective of the level of popular participation recorded in recent elections. And if they will vote in their millions for a contestant on X Factor, or participate in competitions to determine the best movies or books on Facebook, they can presumably be persuaded to do so when an election for parliament comes around. This fact has been recognised by both media producers and politicians, and reflected in attempts to adapt the evermore sophisticated and efficient tools of participatory media to the democratic process, to engage media audiences as citizens by offering the kinds of voting opportunities in political debates, including election processes, which entertainment media have now made routinely available. ITV’s Vote for Me strand, broadcast in the run-up to the UK general election of 2005, used reality TV techniques to select a candidate who would actually take part in the forthcoming poll. The programme was broadcast in a late night, low audience slot, and failed to generate much interest, but it signalled a desire by media producers to harness the appeal of participatory media in a way which could directly impact on levels of democratic engagement. The honourable failure of Vote for Me (produced by the same team which made the much more successful live debate shows featuring prime minister Tony Blair — Ask Tony Blair, Ask the Prime Minister) might be viewed as evidence that readiness to vote in the context of a TV game show does not translate directly into voting for parties and politicians, and that the problem in this respect — the crisis of democratic participation, such that it exists — is located elsewhere. People can vote in democratic elections, but choose not to, perhaps because they feel that the act is meaningless (because parties are ideologically too similar), or ineffectual (because they see no impact of voting in their daily lives or in the state of the country), or irrelevant to their personal priorities and life styles. Voting rates have increased in the US and the UK since September 11 2001, suggesting perhaps that when the political stakes are raised, and the question of who is in government seems to matter more than it did, people act accordingly. Meantime, media producers continue to make money by developing formats and channels on the assumption that audiences wish to participate, to interact, and to vote. Whether this form of participatory media consumption for the purposes of play can be translated into enhanced levels of active citizenship, and whether the media can play a significant contributory role in that process, remains to be seen. References Alves, R.C. “From Lapdog to Watchdog: The Role of the Press in Latin America’s Democratisation.” In H. de Burgh, ed., Making Journalists. London: Routledge, 2005. 181-202. Anderson, P.J., and G. Ward (eds.). The Future of Journalism in the Advanced Democracies. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007. Barnett, S. “The Age of Contempt.” Guardian 28 October 2002. http://politics.guardian.co.uk/media/comment/0,12123,820577,00.html>. Barnett, S., and I. Gaber. Westminster Tales. London: Continuum, 2001. Blumler, J., and M. Gurevitch. The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge, 1996. Habermas, J. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989. Lewis, J., S. Inthorn, and K. Wahl-Jorgensen. Citizens or Consumers? What the Media Tell Us about Political Participation. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 2005. Lloyd, John. What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics. London: Constable, 2004. McNair, B. Journalism and Democracy: A Qualitative Evaluation of the Political Public Sphere. London: Routledge, 2000. ———. Cultural Chaos: News, Journalism and Power in a Globalised World. London: Routledge, 2006. Citation reference for this article MLA Style McNair, Brian. "Vote!." M/C Journal 10.6/11.1 (2008). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/01-mcnair.php>. APA Style McNair, B. (Apr. 2008) "Vote!," M/C Journal, 10(6)/11(1). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/01-mcnair.php>.
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34

McNair, Brian. "Vote!" M/C Journal 11, no. 1 (April 1, 2008). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.21.

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Abstract:
The twentieth was, from one perspective, the democratic century — a span of one hundred years which began with no fully functioning democracies in existence anywhere on the planet (if one defines democracy as a political system in which there is both universal suffrage and competitive elections), and ended with 120 countries out of 192 classified by the Freedom House think tank as ‘democratic’. There are of course still many societies where democracy is denied or effectively neutered — the remaining outposts of state socialism, such as China, Cuba, and North Korea; most if not all of the Islamic countries; exceptional states such as Singapore, unapologetically capitalist in its economic system but resolutely authoritarian in its political culture. Many self-proclaimed democracies, including those of the UK, Australia and the US, are procedurally or conceptually flawed. Countries emerging out of authoritarian systems and now in a state of democratic transition, such as Russia and the former Soviet republics, are immersed in constant, sometimes violent struggle between reformers and reactionaries. Russia’s recent parliamentary elections were accompanied by the intimidation of parties and politicians who opposed Vladimir Putin’s increasingly populist and authoritarian approach to leadership. The same Freedom House report which describes the rise of democracy in the twentieth century acknowledges that many self-styled democracies are, at best, only ‘partly free’ in their political cultures (for detailed figures on the rise of global democracy, see the Freedom House website Democracy’s Century). Let’s not for a moment downplay these important qualifications to what can nonetheless be fairly characterised as a century-long expansion and globalisation of democracy, and the acceptance of popular sovereignty, expressed through voting for the party or candidate of one’s choice, as a universally recognised human right. That such a process has occurred, and continues in these early years of the twenty-first century, is irrefutable. In the Gaza strip, Hamas appeals to the legitimacy of a democratic election victory in its campaign to be recognised as the voice of the Palestinian people. However one judges the messianic tendencies and Islamist ideology of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it must be acknowledged that the Iranian people elected him, and that they have the power to throw him out of government next time they vote. That was never true of the Shah. The democratic resurgence in Latin America, taking in Venezuela, Peru and Bolivia among others has been a much-noted feature of international politics in recent times (Alves), presenting a welcome contrast to the dictatorships and death squads of the 1980s, even as it creates some uncomfortable dilemmas for the Bush administration (which must champion democratic government at the same time as it resents some of the choices people may make when they have the opportunity to vote). Since 9/11 a kind of democracy has expanded even to Afghanistan and Iraq, albeit at the point of a gun, and with no guarantees of survival beyond the end of military occupation by the US and its coalition allies. As this essay was being written, Pakistan’s state of emergency was ending and democratic elections scheduled, albeit in the shadow cast by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. Democracy, then — imperfect and limited as it can be; grudgingly delivered though it is by political elites in many countries, and subject to attack and roll back at any time — has become a global universal to which all claim allegiance, or at least pay lip service. The scale of this transformation, which has occurred in little more than one quarter of the time elapsed since the Putney debates of 1647 and the English revolution first established the principle of the sovereignty of parliament, is truly remarkable. (Tristram Hunt quotes lawyer Geoffrey Robertson in the Guardian to the effect that the Putney debates, staged in St Mary’s church in south-west London towards the end of the English civil war, launched “the idea that government requires the consent of freely and fairly elected representatives of all adult citizens irrespective of class or caste or status or wealth” – “A Jewel of Democracy”, Guardian, 26 Oct. 2007) Can it be true that less than one hundred years ago, in even the most advanced capitalist societies, 50 per cent of the people — women — did not have the right to vote? Or that black populations, indigenous or migrant, in countries such as the United States and Australia were deprived of basic citizenship rights until the 1960s and even later? Will future generations wonder how on earth it could have been that the vast majority of the people of South Africa were unable to vote until 1994, and that they were routinely imprisoned, tortured and killed when they demanded basic democratic rights? Or will they shrug and take it for granted, as so many of us who live in settled democracies already do? (In so far as ‘we’ includes the community of media and cultural studies scholars, I would argue that where there is reluctance to concede the scale and significance of democratic change, this arises out of continuing ambivalence about what ‘democracy’ means, a continuing suspicion of globalisation (in particular the globalisation of democratic political culture, still associated in some quarters with ‘the west’), and of the notion of ‘progress’ with which democracy is routinely associated. The intellectual roots of that ambivalence were various. Marxist-leninist inspired authoritarianism gripped much of the world until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war. Until that moment, it was still possible for many marxians in the scholarly community to view the idea of democracy with disdain — if not quite a dirty word, then a deeply flawed, highly loaded concept which masked and preserved underlying social inequalities more than it helped resolve them. Until 1989 or thereabouts, it was possible for ‘bourgeois democracy’ to be regarded as just one kind of democratic polity by the liberal and anti-capitalist left, which often regarded the ‘proletarian’ or ‘people’s’ democracy prevailing in the Soviet Union, China, Cuba or Vietnam as legitimate alternatives to the emerging capitalist norm of one person, one vote, for constituent assemblies which had real power and accountability. In terms not very different from those used by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, belief in the value of democracy was conceived by this materialist school as a kind of false consciousness. It still is, by Noam Chomsky and others who continue to view democracy as a ‘necessary illusion’ (1989) without which capitalism could not be reproduced. From these perspectives voting gave, and gives us merely the illusion of agency and power in societies where capital rules as it always did. For democracy read ‘the manufacture of consent’; its expansion read not as progressive social evolution, but the universalisation of the myth of popular sovereignty, mobilised and utilised by the media-industrial-military complex to maintain its grip.) There are those who dispute this reading of events. In the 1960s, Habermas’s hugely influential Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere critiqued the manner in which democracy, and the public sphere underpinning it, had been degraded by public relations, advertising, and the power of private interests. In the period since, critical scholarly research and writing on political culture has been dominated by the Habermasian discourse of democratic decline, and the pervasive pessimism of those who see democracy, and the media culture which supports it, as fatally flawed, corrupted by commercialisation and under constant threat. Those, myself included, who challenged that view with a more positive reading of the trends (McNair, Journalism and Democracy; Cultural Chaos) have been denounced as naïve optimists, panglossian, utopian and even, in my own case, a ‘neo-liberal apologist’. (See an unpublished paper by David Miller, “System Failure: It’s Not Just the Media, It’s the Whole Bloody System”, delivered at Goldsmith’s College in 2003.) Engaging as they have been, I venture to suggest that these are the discourses and debates of an era now passing into history. Not only is it increasingly obvious that democracy is expanding globally into places where it never previously reached; it is also extending inwards, within nation states, driven by demands for greater local autonomy. In the United Kingdom, for example, the citizen is now able to vote not just in Westminster parliamentary elections (which determine the political direction of the UK government), but for European elections, local elections, and elections for devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The people of London can vote for their mayor. There would by now have been devolved assemblies in the regions of England, too, had the people of the North East not voted against it in a November 2004 referendum. Notwithstanding that result, which surprised many in the New Labour government who held it as axiomatic that the more democracy there was, the better for all of us, the importance of enhancing and expanding democratic institutions, of allowing people to vote more often (and also in more efficient ways — many of these expansions of democracy have been tied to the introduction of systems of proportional representation) has become consensual, from the Mid West of America to the Middle East. The Democratic Paradox And yet, as the wave of democratic transformation has rolled on through the late twentieth and into the early twenty first century it is notable that, in many of the oldest liberal democracies at least, fewer people have been voting. In the UK, for example, in the period between 1945 and 2001, turnout at general elections never fell below 70 per cent. In 1992, the last general election won by the Conservatives before the rise of Tony Blair and New Labour, turnout was 78 per cent, roughly where it had been in the 1950s. In 2001, however, as Blair’s government sought re-election, turnout fell to an historic low for the UK of 59.4 per cent, and rose only marginally to 61.4 per cent in the most recent general election of 2005. In the US presidential elections of 1996 and 2000 turnouts were at historic lows of 47.2 and 49.3 per cent respectively, rising just above 50 per cent again in 2004 (figures by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). At local level things are even worse. In only the second election for a devolved parliament in Scotland (2003) turnout was a mere 48.5 per cent, rising to 50.5 in 2007. These trends are not universal. In countries with compulsory voting, they mean very little — in Australia, where voting in parliamentary elections is compulsory, turnout averages in the 90s per cent. In France, while turnouts for parliamentary elections show a similar downward trend to the UK and the UK, presidential contests achieve turnouts of 80-plus per cent. In the UK and US, as noted, the most recent elections show modest growth in turnout from those historic lows of the late 1990s and early Noughties. There has grown, nonetheless, the perception, commonplace amongst academic commentators as well as journalists and politicians themselves, that we are living through a ‘crisis’ of democratic participation, a dangerous decline in the tendency to vote in elections which undermines the legitimacy of democracy itself. In communication scholarship a significant body of research and publication has developed around this theme, from Blumler and Gurevitch’s Crisis of Public Communication (1996), through Barnett and Gaber’s Westminster Tales (2000), to more recent studies such as Lewis et al.’s Citizens or Consumers (2005). All presume a problem of some kind with the practice of democracy and the “old fashioned ritual” of voting, as Lewis et al. describe it (2). Most link alleged inadequacies in the performance of the political media to what is interpreted as popular apathy (or antipathy) towards democracy. The media are blamed for the lack of public engagement with democratic politics which declining turnouts are argued to signal. Political journalists are said to be too aggressive and hyper-adversarial (Lloyd), behaving like the “feral beast” spoken of by Tony Blair in his 2007 farewell speech to the British people as prime minister. They are corrosively cynical and a “disaster for democracy”, as Steven Barnett and others argued in the first years of the twenty first century. They are not aggressive or adversarial enough, as the propaganda modellists allege, citing what they interpret as supine media coverage of Coalition policy in Iraq. The media put people off, rather than turn them on to democracy by being, variously, too nice or too nasty to politicians. What then, is the solution to the apparent paradox represented by the fact that there is more democracy, but less voting in elections than ever before; and that after centuries of popular struggle democratic assemblies proliferate, but in some countries barely half of the eligible voters can be bothered to participate? And what role have the media played in this unexpected phenomenon? If the scholarly community has been largely critical on this question, and pessimistic in its analyses of the role of the media, it has become increasingly clear that the one arena where people do vote more than ever before is that presented by the media, and entertainment media in particular. There has been, since the appearance of Big Brother and the subsequent explosion of competitive reality TV formats across the world, evidence of a huge popular appetite for voting on such matters as which amateur contestant on Pop Idol, or X Factor, or Fame Academy, or Operatunity goes on to have a chance of a professional career, a shot at the big time. Millions of viewers of the most popular reality TV strands queue up to register their votes on premium phone lines, the revenue from which makes up a substantial and growing proportion of the income of commercial TV companies. This explosion of voting behaviour has been made possible by the technology-driven emergence of new forms of participatory, interactive, digitised media channels which allow millions to believe that they can have an impact on the outcome of what are, at essence, game and talent shows. At the height of anxiety around the ‘crisis of democratic participation’ in the UK, observers noted that nearly 6.5 million people had voted in the Big Brother UK final in 2004. More than eight million voted during the 2004 run of the BBC’s Fame Academy series. While these numbers do not, contrary to popular belief, exceed the numbers of British citizens who vote in a general election (27.2 million in 2005), they do indicate an enthusiasm for voting which seems to contradict declining rates of democratic participation. People who will never get out and vote for their local councillor often appear more than willing to pick up the telephone or the laptop and cast a vote for their favoured reality TV contestant, even if it costs them money. It would be absurd to suggest that voting for a contestant on Big Brother is directly comparable to the act of choosing a government or a president. The latter is recognised as an expression of citizenship, with potentially significant consequences for the lives of individuals within their society. Voting on Big Brother, on the other hand, is unmistakeably entertainment, game-playing, a relatively risk-free exercise of choice — a bit of harmless fun, fuelled by office chat and relentless tabloid coverage of the contestants’ strengths and weaknesses. There is no evidence that readiness to participate in a telephone or online vote for entertainment TV translates into active citizenship, where ‘active’ means casting a vote in an election. The lesson delivered by the success of participatory media in recent years, however — first reality TV, and latterly a proliferation of online formats which encourage user participation and voting for one thing or another — is that people will vote, when they are able and motivated to do so. Voting is popular, in short, and never more so, irrespective of the level of popular participation recorded in recent elections. And if they will vote in their millions for a contestant on X Factor, or participate in competitions to determine the best movies or books on Facebook, they can presumably be persuaded to do so when an election for parliament comes around. This fact has been recognised by both media producers and politicians, and reflected in attempts to adapt the evermore sophisticated and efficient tools of participatory media to the democratic process, to engage media audiences as citizens by offering the kinds of voting opportunities in political debates, including election processes, which entertainment media have now made routinely available. ITV’s Vote for Me strand, broadcast in the run-up to the UK general election of 2005, used reality TV techniques to select a candidate who would actually take part in the forthcoming poll. The programme was broadcast in a late night, low audience slot, and failed to generate much interest, but it signalled a desire by media producers to harness the appeal of participatory media in a way which could directly impact on levels of democratic engagement. The honourable failure of Vote for Me (produced by the same team which made the much more successful live debate shows featuring prime minister Tony Blair — Ask Tony Blair, Ask the Prime Minister) might be viewed as evidence that readiness to vote in the context of a TV game show does not translate directly into voting for parties and politicians, and that the problem in this respect — the crisis of democratic participation, such that it exists — is located elsewhere. People can vote in democratic elections, but choose not to, perhaps because they feel that the act is meaningless (because parties are ideologically too similar), or ineffectual (because they see no impact of voting in their daily lives or in the state of the country), or irrelevant to their personal priorities and life styles. Voting rates have increased in the US and the UK since September 11 2001, suggesting perhaps that when the political stakes are raised, and the question of who is in government seems to matter more than it did, people act accordingly. Meantime, media producers continue to make money by developing formats and channels on the assumption that audiences wish to participate, to interact, and to vote. Whether this form of participatory media consumption for the purposes of play can be translated into enhanced levels of active citizenship, and whether the media can play a significant contributory role in that process, remains to be seen. References Alves, R.C. “From Lapdog to Watchdog: The Role of the Press in Latin America’s Democratisation.” In H. de Burgh, ed., Making Journalists. London: Routledge, 2005. 181-202. Anderson, P.J., and G. Ward (eds.). The Future of Journalism in the Advanced Democracies. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007. Barnett, S. “The Age of Contempt.” Guardian 28 October 2002. < http://politics.guardian.co.uk/media/comment/0,12123,820577,00.html >. Barnett, S., and I. Gaber. Westminster Tales. London: Continuum, 2001. Blumler, J., and M. Gurevitch. The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge, 1996. Habermas, J. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989. Lewis, J., S. Inthorn, and K. Wahl-Jorgensen. Citizens or Consumers? What the Media Tell Us about Political Participation. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 2005. Lloyd, John. What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics. London: Constable, 2004. McNair, B. Journalism and Democracy: A Qualitative Evaluation of the Political Public Sphere. London: Routledge, 2000. ———. Cultural Chaos: News, Journalism and Power in a Globalised World. London: Routledge, 2006.
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Woodward, Kath. "Tuning In: Diasporas at the BBC World Service." M/C Journal 14, no. 2 (November 17, 2010). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.320.

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Abstract:
Diaspora This article looks at diaspora through the transformations of an established public service broadcaster, the BBC World Service, by considering some of the findings of the AHRC-funded Tuning In: Contact Zones at the BBC World Service, which is part of the Diasporas, Migration and Identities program. Tuning In has six themes, each of which focuses upon the role of the BBC WS: The Politics of Translation, Diasporic Nationhood, Religious Transnationalism, Sport across Diasporas, Migrating Music and Drama for Development. The World Service, which was until 2011 funded by the Foreign Office, was set up to cater for the British diaspora and had the specific remit of transmitting ideas about Britishness to its audiences overseas. Tuning In demonstrates interrelationships between the global and the local in the diasporic contact zone of the BBC World Service, which has provided a mediated home for the worldwide British diaspora since its inception in 1932. The local and the global have merged, elided, and separated at different times and in different spaces in the changing story of the BBC (Briggs). The BBC WS is both local and global with activities that present Britishness both at home and abroad. The service has, however, come a long way since its early days as the Empire Service. Audiences for the World Service’s 31 foreign language services, radio, television, and Internet facilities include substantive non-British/English-speaking constituencies, rendering it a contact zone for the exploration of ideas and political opportunities on a truly transnational scale. This heterogeneous body of exilic, refugee intellectuals, writers, and artists now operates alongside an ongoing expression of Britishness in all its diverse reconfiguration. This includes the residual voice of empire and its patriarchal paternalism, the embrace of more recent expressions of neoliberalism as well as traditional values of impartiality and objectivism and, in the case of the arts, elements of bohemianism and creative innovation. The World Service might have begun as a communication system for the British ex-pat diaspora, but its role has changed along with the changing relationship between Britain and its colonial past. In the terrain of sport, for example, cricket, the “game of empire,” has shifted from Britain to the Indian subcontinent (Guha) with the rise of “Twenty 20” and the Indian Premier League (IPL); summed up in Ashis Nandy’s claim that “cricket is an Indian game accidentally discovered by the English” (Nandy viii). English county cricket dominated the airways of the World Service well into the latter half of the twentieth century, but the audiences of the service have demanded a response to social and cultural change and the service has responded. Sport can thus be seen to have offered a democratic space in which new diasporic relations can be forged as well as one in which colonial and patriarchal values are maintained. The BBC WS today is part of a network through which non-British diasporic peoples can reconnect with their home countries via the service, as well as an online forum for debate across the globe. In many regions of the world, it continues to be the single most trusted source of information at times of crisis and disaster because of its traditions of impartiality and objectivity, even though (as noted in the article on Al-Jazeera in this special issue) this view is hotly contested. The principles of objectivity and impartiality are central to the BBC WS, which may seem paradoxical since it is funded by the Commonwealth and Foreign office, and its origins lie in empire and colonial discourse. Archive material researched by our project demonstrates the specifically ideological role of what was first called the Empire Service. The language of empire was deployed in this early programming, and there is an explicit expression of an ideological purpose (Hill). For example, at the Imperial Conference in 1930, the service was supported in terms of its political powers of “strengthening ties” between parts of the empire. This view comes from a speech by John Reith, the BBC’s first Director General, which was broadcast when the service opened. In this speech, broadcasting is identified as having come to involve a “connecting and co-ordinating link between the scattered parts of the British Empire” (Reith). Local British values are transmitted across the globe. Through the service, empire and nation are reinstated through the routine broadcasting of cyclical events, the importance of which Scannell and Cardiff describe as follows: Nothing so well illustrates the noiseless manner in which the BBC became perhaps the central agent of national culture as its cyclical role; the cyclical production year in year out, of an orderly, regular progression of festivities, rituals and celebrations—major and minor, civic and sacred—that mark the unfolding of the broadcast year. (278; italics in the original) State occasions and big moments, including those directly concerned with governance and affairs of state, and those which focused upon sport and religion, were a big part in these “noiseless” cycles, and became key elements in the making of Britishness across the globe. The BBC is “noiseless” because the timetable is assumed and taken for granted as not only what is but what should be. However, the BBC WS has been and has had to be responsive to major shifts in global and local—and, indeed, glocal—power geometries that have led to spatial transformations, notably in the reconfiguration of the service in the era of postcolonialism. Some of these massive changes have involved the large-scale movement of people and a concomitant rethinking of diaspora as a concept. Empire, like nation, operates as an “imagined community,” too big to be grasped by individuals (Anderson), as well as a material actuality. The dynamics of identification are rarely linear and there are inconsistencies and disruptions: even when the voice is officially that of empire, the practice of the World Service is much more diverse, nuanced, and dialogical. The BBC WS challenges boundaries through the connectivities of communication and through different ways of belonging and, similarly, through a problematisation of concepts like attachment and detachment; this is most notable in the way in which programming has adapted to new diasporic audiences and in the reworkings of spatiality in the shift from empire to diversity via multiculturalism. There are tensions between diaspora and multiculturalism that are apparent in a discussion of broadcasting and communication networks. Diaspora has been distinguished by mobility and hybridity (Clifford, Hall, Bhaba, Gilroy) and it has been argued that the adjectival use of diasporic offers more opportunity for fluidity and transformation (Clifford). The concept of diaspora, as it has been used to explain the fluidity and mobility of diasporic identifications, can challenge more stabilised, “classic” understandings of diaspora (Chivallon). A hybrid version of diaspora might sit uneasily with a strong sense of belonging and with the idea that the broadcast media offer a multicultural space in which each voice can be heard and a wide range of cultures are present. Tuning In engaged with ways of rethinking the BBC’s relationship to diaspora in the twenty-first century in a number of ways: for example, in the intersection of discursive regimes of representation; in the status of public service broadcasting; vis-à-vis the consequences of diverse diasporic audiences; through the role of cultural intermediaries such as journalists and writers; and via global economic and political materialities (Gillespie, Webb and Baumann). Tuning In thus provided a multi-themed and methodologically diverse exploration of how the BBC WS is itself a series of spaces which are constitutive of the transformation of diasporic identifications. Exploring the part played by the BBC WS in changing and continuing social flows and networks involves, first, reconfiguring what is understood by transnationalism, diaspora, and postcolonial relationalities: in particular, attending to how these transform as well as sometimes reinstate colonial and patriarchal discourses and practices, thus bringing together different dimensions of the local and the global. Tuning In ranges across different fields, embracing cultural, social, and political areas of experience as represented in broadcasting coverage. These fields illustrate the educative role of the BBC and the World Service that is also linked to its particular version of impartiality; just as The Archers was set up to provide information and guidance through a narrative of everyday life to rural communities and farmers after the Second World War, so the Afghan version plays an “edutainment” role (Skuse) where entertainment also serves an educational, public service information role. Indeed, the use of soap opera genre such as The Archers as a vehicle for humanitarian and health information has been very successful over the past decade, with the “edutainment” genre becoming a feature of the World Service’s broadcasting in places such as Rwanda, Somalia, Nigeria, India, Nepal, Burma, Afghanistan, and Cambodia. In a genre that has been promoted by the World Service Trust, the charitable arm of the BBC WS uses drama formats to build transnational production relationships with media professionals and to strengthen creative capacities to undertake behaviour change through communication work. Such programming, which is in the tradition of the BBC WS, draws upon the service’s expertise and exhibits both an ideological commitment to progressive social intervention and a paternalist approach drawing upon colonialist legacies. Nowadays, however, the BBC WS can be considered a diasporic contact zone, providing sites of transnational intra-diasporic contact as well as cross-cultural encounters, spaces for cross-diasporic creativity and representation, and a forum for cross-cultural dialogue and potentially cosmopolitan translations (Pratt, Clifford). These activities are, however, still marked by historically forged asymmetric power relations, notably of colonialism, imperialism, and globalisation, as well as still being dominated by hegemonic masculinity in many parts of the service, which thus represent sites of contestation, conflict, and transgression. Conversely, diasporic identities are themselves co-shaped by media representations (Sreberny). The diasporic contact zone is a relational space in which diasporic identities are made and remade and contested. Tuning In employed a diverse range of methods to analyse the part played by the BBC WS in changing and continuing social and cultural flows, networks, and reconfigurations of transnationalisms and diaspora, as well as reinstating colonial, patriarchal practices. The research deconstructed some assumptions and conditions of class-based elitism, colonialism, and patriarchy through a range of strategies. Texts are, of course, central to this work, with the BBC Archives at Caversham (near Reading) representing the starting point for many researchers. The archive is a rich source of material for researchers which carries a vast range of data including fragile memos written on scraps of paper: a very local source of global communications. Other textual material occupies the less locatable cyberspace, for example in the case of Have Your Say exchanges on the Web. People also featured in the project, through the media, in cyberspace, and physical encounters, all of which demonstrate the diverse modes of connection that have been established. Researchers worked with the BBC WS in a variety of ways, not only through interviews and ethnographic approaches, such as participant observation and witness seminars, but also through exchanges between the service, its practitioners, and the researchers (for example, through broadcasts where the project provided the content and the ideas and researchers have been part of programs that have gone out on the BBC WS (Goldblatt, Webb), bringing together people who work for the BBC and Tuning In researchers). On this point, it should be remembered that Bush House is, itself, a diasporic space which, from its geographical location in the Strand in London, has brought together diasporic people from around the globe to establish international communication networks, and has thus become the focus and locus of some of our research. What we have understood by the term “diasporic space” in this context includes both the materialities of architecture and cyberspace which is the site of digital diasporas (Anderssen) and, indeed, the virtual exchanges featured on “Have Your Say,” the online feedback site (Tuning In). Living the Glocal The BBC WS offers a mode of communication and a series of networks that are spatially located both in the UK, through the material presence of Bush House, and abroad, through the diasporic communities constituting contemporary audiences. The service may have been set up to provide news and entertainment for the British diaspora abroad, but the transformation of the UK into a multi-ethnic society “at home,” alongside its commitment to, and the servicing of, no less than 32 countries abroad, demonstrates a new mission and a new balance of power. Different diasporic communities, such as multi-ethnic Londoners, and local and British Muslims in the north of England, demonstrate the dynamics and ambivalences of what is meant by “diaspora” today. For example, the BBC and the WS play an ambiguous role in the lives of UK Muslim communities with Pakistani connections, where consumers of the international news can feel that the BBC is complicit in the conflation of Muslims with terrorists. Engaging Diaspora Audiences demonstrated the diversity of audience reception in a climate of marginalisation, often bordering on moral panic, and showed how diasporic audiences often use Al-Jazeera or Pakistani and Urdu channels, which are seen to take up more sympathetic political positions. It seems, however, that more egalitarian conversations are becoming possible through the channels of the WS. The participation of local people in the BBC WS global project is seen, for example, as in the popular “Witness Seminars” that have both a current focus and one that is projected into the future, as in the case of the “2012 Generation” (that is, the young people who come of age in 2012, the year of the London Olympics). The Witness Seminars demonstrate the recuperation of past political and social events such as “Bangladesh in 1971” (Tuning In), “The Cold War seminar” (Tuning In) and “Diasporic Nationhood” (the cultural movements reiterated and recovered in the “Literary Lives” project (Gillespie, Baumann and Zinik). Indeed, the WS’s current focus on the “2012 Generation,” including an event in which 27 young people (each of whom speaks one of the WS languages) were invited to an open day at Bush House in 2009, vividly illustrates how things have changed. Whereas in 1948 (the last occasion when the Olympic Games were held in London), the world came to London, it is arguable that, in 2012, in contemporary multi-ethnic Britain, the world is already here (Webb). This enterprise has the advantage of giving voice to the present rather than filtering the present through the legacies of colonialism that remain a problem for the Witness Seminars more generally. The democratising possibilities of sport, as well as the restrictions of its globalising elements, are well represented by Tuning In (Woodward). Sport has, of course become more globalised, especially through the development of Internet and satellite technologies (Giulianotti) but it retains powerful local affiliations and identifications. At all levels and in diverse places, there are strong attachments to local and national teams that are constitutive of communities, including diasporic and multi-ethnic communities. Sport is both typical and distinctive of the BBC World Service; something that is part of a wider picture but also an area of experience with a life of its own. Our “Sport across Diasporas” project has thus explored some of the routes the World Service has travelled in its engagement with sport in order to provide some understanding of the legacy of empire and patriarchy, as well as engaging with the multiplicities of change in the reconstruction of Britishness. Here, it is important to recognise that what began as “BBC Sport” evolved into “World Service Sport.” Coverage of the world’s biggest sporting events was established through the 1930s to the 1960s in the development of the BBC WS. However, it is not only the global dimensions of sporting events that have been assumed; so too are national identifications. There is no question that the superiority of British/English sport is naturalised through its dominance of the BBC WS airways, but the possibilities of reinterpretation and re-accommodation have also been made possible. There has, indeed, been a changing place of sport in the BBC WS, which can only be understood with reference to wider changes in the relationship between broadcasting and sport, and demonstrates the powerful synchronies between social, political, technological, economic, and cultural factors, notably those that make up the media–sport–commerce nexus that drives so much of the trajectory of contemporary sport. Diasporic audiences shape the schedule as much as what is broadcast. There is no single voice of the BBC in sport. The BBC archive demonstrates a variety of narratives through the development and transformation of the World Service’s sports broadcasting. There are, however, silences: notably those involving women. Sport is still a patriarchal field. However, the imperial genealogies of sport are inextricably entwined with the social, political, and cultural changes taking place in the wider world. There is no detectable linear narrative but rather a series of tensions and contradictions that are reflected and reconfigured in the texts in which deliberations are made. In sport broadcasting, the relationship of the BBC WS with its listeners is, in many instances, genuinely dialogic: for example, through “Have Your Say” websites and internet forums, and some of the actors in these dialogic exchanges are the broadcasters themselves. The history of the BBC and the World Service is one which manifests a degree of autonomy and some spontaneity on the part of journalists and broadcasters. For example, in the case of the BBC WS African sports program, Fast Track (2009), many of the broadcasters interviewed report being able to cover material not technically within their brief; news journalists are able to engage with sporting events and sports journalists have covered social and political news (Woodward). Sometimes this is a matter of taking the initiative or simply of being in the right place at the right time, although this affords an agency to journalists which is increasingly unlikely in the twenty-first century. The Politics of Translation: Words and Music The World Service has played a key role as a cultural broker in the political arena through what could be construed as “educational broadcasting” via the wider terrain of the arts: for example, literature, drama, poetry, and music. Over the years, Bush House has been a home-from-home for poets: internationalists, translators from classical and modern languages, and bohemians; a constituency that, for all its cosmopolitanism, was predominantly white and male in the early days. For example, in the 1930s and 1940s, Louis MacNeice was commissioning editor and surrounded by a friendship network of salaried poets, such as W. H. Auden, Dylan Thomas, C. Day Lewis, and Stephen Spender, who wrote and performed their work for the WS. The foreign language departments of the BBC WS, meanwhile, hired émigrés and exiles from their countries’ educated elites to do similar work. The biannual, book-format journal Modern Poetry in Translation (MPT), which was founded in 1965 by Daniel Weissbort and Ted Hughes, included a dedication in Weissbort’s final issue (MPT 22, 2003) to “Poets at Bush House.” This volume amounts to a celebration of the BBC WS and its creative culture, which extended beyond the confines of broadcasting spaces. The reminiscences in “Poets at Bush House” suggest an institutional culture of informal connections and a fluidity of local exchanges that is resonant of the fluidity of the flows and networks of diaspora (Cheesman). Music, too, has distinctive characteristics that mark out this terrain on the broadcast schedule and in the culture of the BBC WS. Music is differentiated from language-centred genres, making it a particularly powerful medium of cross-cultural exchange. Music is portable and yet is marked by a cultural rootedness that may impede translation and interpretation. Music also carries ambiguities as a marker of status across borders, and it combines aesthetic intensity and diffuseness. The Migrating Music project demonstrated BBC WS mediation of music and identity flows (Toynbee). In the production and scheduling notes, issues of migration and diaspora are often addressed directly in the programming of music, while the movement of peoples is a leitmotif in all programs in which music is played and discussed. Music genres are mobile, diasporic, and can be constitutive of Paul Gilroy’s “Black Atlantic” (Gilroy), which foregrounds the itinerary of West African music to the Caribbean via the Middle Passage, cross-fertilising with European traditions in the Americas to produce blues and other hybrid forms, and the journey of these forms to Europe. The Migrating Music project focused upon the role of the BBC WS as narrator of the Black Atlantic story and of South Asian cross-over music, from bhangra to filmi, which can be situated among the South Asian diaspora in east and south Africa as well as the Caribbean where they now interact with reggae, calypso, Rapso, and Popso. The transversal flows of music and lyrics encompasses the lived experience of the different diasporas that are accommodated in the BBC WS schedules: for example, they keep alive the connection between the Irish “at home” and in the diaspora through programs featuring traditional music, further demonstrating the interconnections between local and global attachments as well as points of disconnection and contradiction. Textual analysis—including discourse analysis of presenters’ speech, program trailers and dialogue and the BBC’s own construction of “world music”—has revealed that the BBC WS itself performs a constitutive role in keeping alive these traditions. Music, too, has a range of emotional affects which are manifest in the semiotic analyses that have been conducted of recordings and performances. Further, the creative personnel who are involved in music programming, including musicians, play their own role in this ongoing process of musical migration. Once again, the networks of people involved as practitioners become central to the processes and systems through which diasporic audiences are re-produced and engaged. Conclusion The BBC WS can claim to be a global and local cultural intermediary not only because the service was set up to engage with the British diaspora in an international context but because the service, today, is demonstrably a voice that is continually negotiating multi-ethnic audiences both in the UK and across the world. At best, the World Service is a dynamic facilitator of conversations within and across diasporas: ideas are relocated, translated, and travel in different directions. The “local” of a British broadcasting service, established to promote British values across the globe, has been transformed, both through its engagements with an increasingly diverse set of diasporic audiences and through the transformations in how diasporas themselves self-define and operate. On the BBC WS, demographic, social, and cultural changes mean that the global is now to be found in the local of the UK and any simplistic separation of local and global is no longer tenable. The educative role once adopted by the BBC, and then the World Service, nevertheless still persists in other contexts (“from Ambridge to Afghanistan”), and clearly the WS still treads a dangerous path between the paternalism and patriarchy of its colonial past and its responsiveness to change. In spite of competition from television, satellite, and Internet technologies which challenge the BBC’s former hegemony, the BBC World Service continues to be a dynamic space for (re)creating and (re)instating diasporic audiences: audiences, texts, and broadcasters intersect with social, economic, political, and cultural forces. The monologic “voice of empire” has been countered and translated into the language of diversity and while, at times, the relationship between continuity and change may be seen to exist in awkward tension, it is clear that the Corporation is adapting to the needs of its twenty-first century audience. ReferencesAnderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities, Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. Anderssen, Matilda. “Digital Diasporas.” 2010. 30 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www8.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/cross-research/digital-diasporas›. Bhabha, Homi. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 1994. Briggs, Asa. A History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume II: The Golden Age of Wireless. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995. Cheesman, Tom. “Poetries On and Off Air.” 2010. 30 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www8.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/cross-research/bush-house-cultures›. Chivallon, Christine. “Beyond Gilroy’s Black Atlantic: The Experience of the African Diaspora.” Diaspora 11.3 (2002): 359–82. Clifford, James. Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. Fast Track. BBC, 2009. 30 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/sport/2009/03/000000_fast_track.shtml›. Gillespie, Marie, Alban Webb, and Gerd Baumann (eds.). “The BBC World Service 1932–2007: Broadcasting Britishness Abroad.” Special Issue. The Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 28.4 (Oct. 2008). Gillespie, Marie, Gerd Baumann, and Zinovy Zinik. “Poets at Bush House.” 2010. 30 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www8.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/about›. Gilroy, Paul. Black Atlantic. MA: Harvard UP, 1993. Giulianotti, Richard. Sport: A Critical Sociology. Cambridge: Polity, 2005. Goldblatt, David. “The Cricket Revolution.” 2009. 30 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0036ww9›. Guha, Ramachandra. A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of an English Game. London: Picador, 2002. Hall, Stuart. “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.” Identity: Community, Culture, Difference. Ed. Jonathan Rutherford. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990, 223–37. Hill, Andrew. “The BBC Empire Service: The Voice, the Discourse of the Master and Ventriloquism.” South Asian Diaspora 2.1 (2010): 25–38. Hollis, Robert, Norma Rinsler, and Daniel Weissbort. “Poets at Bush House: The BBC World Service.” Modern Poetry in Translation 22 (2003). Nandy, Ashis. The Tao of Cricket: On Games of Destiny and the Destiny of Games. New Delhi: Oxford UP, 1989. Pratt, Mary Louise. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. London: Routledge, 1992. Reith, John. “Opening of the Empire Service.” In “Empire Service Policy 1932-1933”, E4/6: 19 Dec. 1932. 30 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/diasporas/research.htm›. Scannell, Paddy, and David Cardiff. A Social History of British Broadcasting, 1922-1938. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991. Skuse, Andrew. “Drama for Development.” 2010. 30 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www8.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/core-research/drama-for-development›. Sreberny, Annabelle. “The BBC World Service and the Greater Middle East: Comparisons, Contrasts, Conflicts.” Guest ed. Annabelle Sreberny, Marie Gillespie, Gerd Baumann. Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 3.2 (2010). Toynbee, Jason. “Migrating Music.” 2010. 30 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www8.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/core-research/migrating-music›. Tuning In. 30 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/diasporas/index.htm›. Webb, Alban. “Cold War Diplomacy.” 2010. 30 Nov. 2010 ‹http://www8.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/projects/cold-war-politics-and-bbc-world-service›. Woodward, Kath. Embodied Sporting Practices. Regulating and Regulatory Bodies. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
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36

Arvanitakis, James. "The Heterogenous Citizen: How Many of Us Care about Don Bradman’s Average?" M/C Journal 11, no. 1 (June 1, 2008). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.27.

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One of the first challenges faced by new Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, was what to do with the former government’s controversial citizenship test. While a quick evaluation of the test shows that 93 percent of those who have sat it ‘passed’ (Hoare), most media controversy has focussed less on the validity of such a test than whether questions relating to Australian cricketing legend, Don Bradman, are appropriate (Hawley). While the citizenship test seems nothing more that a crude and populist measure imposed by the former Howard government in its ongoing nationalistic agenda, which included paying schools to raise the Australian flag (“PM Unfurls Flag”), its imposition seems a timely reminder of the challenge of understanding citizenship today. For as the demographic structures around us continue to change, so must our understandings of ‘citizenship’. More importantly, this fluid understanding of citizenship is not limited to academics, and policy-makers, but new technologies, the processes of globalisation including a globalised media, changing demographic patterns including migration, as well as environmental challenges that place pressure on limited resources is altering the citizens understanding of their own role as well as those around them. This paper aims to sketch out a proposed new research agenda that seeks to investigate this fluid and heterogenous nature of citizenship. The focus of the research has so far been Sydney and is enveloped by a broader aim of promoting an increased level of citizen engagement both within formal and informal political structures. I begin by sketching the complex nature of Sydney before presenting some initial research findings. Sydney – A Complex City The so-called ‘emerald city’ of Sydney has been described in many ways: from a ‘global’ city (Fagan, Dowling and Longdale 1) to an ‘angry’ city (Price 16). Sarah Price’s investigative article included research from the University of Western Sydney’s Centre of Culture Research, the Bureau of Crime Statistics and interviews with Tony Grabs, the director of trauma at St Vincent’s Hospital in inner city Darlinghurst. Price found that both injuries from alcohol and drug-related violence had risen dramatically over the last few years and seemed to be driven by increasing frustrations of a city that is perceived to be lacking appropriate infrastructure and rising levels of personal and household debt. Sydney’s famous harbour and postcard landmarks are surrounded by places of controversy and poverty, with residents of very backgrounds living in close proximity: often harmoniously and sometimes less so. According to recent research by Griffith University’s Urban Research Program, the city is becoming increasingly polarised, with the wealthiest enjoying high levels of access to amenities while other sections of the population experiencing increasing deprivation (Frew 7). Sydney is often segmented into different regions: the growth corridors of the western suburbs which include the ‘Aspirational class’; the affluent eastern suburb; the southern beachside suburbs surrounding Cronulla affectionately known by local residents as ‘the Shire’, and so on. This, however, hides that fact that these areas are themselves complex and heterogenous in character (Frew 7). As a result, the many clichés associated with such segments lead to an over simplification of regional characteristics. The ‘growth corridors’ of Western Sydney, for example, have, in recent times, become a focal point of political and social commentary. From the rise of the ‘Aspirational’ voter (Anderson), seen to be a key ‘powerbroker’ in federal and state politics, to growing levels of disenfranchised young people, this region is multifaceted and should not be simplified. These areas often see large-scale, private housing estates; what Brendan Gleeson describes as ‘privatopias’, situated next to rising levels of homelessness (“What’s Driving”): a powerful and concerning image that should not escape our attention. (Chamberlain and Mackenzie pay due attention to the issue in Homeless Careers.) It is also home to a growing immigrant population who often arrive as business migrants and as well as a rising refugee population traumatised by war and displacement (Collins 1). These growth corridors then, seem to simultaneously capture both the ambitions and the fears of Sydney. That is, they are seen as both areas of potential economic boom as well as social stress and potential conflict (Gleeson 89). One way to comprehend the complexity associated with such diversity and change is to reflect on the proximity of the twin suburbs of Macquarie Links and Macquarie Fields situated in Sydney’s south-western suburbs. Separated by the clichéd ‘railway tracks’, one is home to the growing Aspirational class while the other continues to be plagued by the stigma of being, what David Burchell describes as, a ‘dysfunctional dumping ground’ whose plight became national headlines during the riots in 2005. The riots were sparked after a police chase involving a stolen car led to a crash and the death of a 17 year-old and 19 year-old passengers. Residents blamed police for the deaths and the subsequent riots lasted for four nights – involving 150 teenagers clashing with New South Wales Police. The dysfunction, Burchell notes is seen in crime statistics that include 114 stolen cars, 227 burglaries, 457 cases of property damage and 279 assaults – all in 2005 alone. Interestingly, both these populations are surrounded by exclusionary boundaries: one because of the financial demands to enter the ‘Links’ estate, and the other because of the self-imposed exclusion. Such disparities not only provide challenges for policy makers generally, but also have important implications on the attitudes that citizens’ experience towards their relationship with each other as well as the civic institutions that are meant to represent them. This is particular the case if civic institutions are seen to either neglect or favour certain groups. This, in part, has given rise to what I describe here as a ‘citizenship surplus’ as well as a ‘citizenship deficit’. Research Agenda: Investigating Citizenship Surpluses and Deficits This changing city has meant that there has also been a change in the way that different groups interact with, and perceive, civic bodies. As noted, my initial research shows that this has led to the emergence of both citizenship surpluses and deficits. Though the concept of a ‘citizen deficits and surpluses’ have not emerged within the broader literature, there is a wide range of literature that discusses how some sections of the population lack of access to democratic processes. There are three broad areas of research that have emerged relevant here: citizenship and young people (see Arvanitakis; Dee); citizenship and globalisation (see Della Porta; Pusey); and citizenship and immigration (see Baldassar et al.; Gow). While a discussion of each of these research areas is beyond the scope of this paper, a regular theme is the emergence of a ‘democratic deficit’ (Chari et al. 422). Dee, for example, looks at how there exist unequal relationships between local and central governments, young people, communities and property developers in relation to space. Dee argues that this shapes social policy in a range of settings and contexts including their relationship with broader civic institutions and understandings of citizenship. Dee finds that claims for land use that involve young people rarely succeed and there is limited, if any, recourse to civic institutions. As such, we see a democratic deficit emerge because the various civic institutions involved fail in meeting their obligations to citizens. In addition, a great deal of work has emerged that investigates attempts to re-engage citizens through mechanisms to promote citizenship education and a more active citizenship which has also been accompanied by government programs with the same goals (See for example the Western Australian government’s ‘Citizenscape’ program ). For example Hahn (231) undertakes a comparative study of civic education in six countries (including Australia) and the policies and practices with respect to citizenship education and how to promote citizen activism. The results are positive, though the research was undertaken before the tumultuous events of the terrorist attacks in New York, the emergence of the ‘war on terror’ and the rise of ‘Muslim-phobia’. A gap rises, however, within the Australian literature when we consider both the fluid and heterogenous nature of citizenship. That is, how do we understand the relationship between these diverse groups living within such proximity to each other overlayed by changing migration patterns, ongoing globalised processes and changing political environments as well as their relations to civic institutions? Further, how does this influence the way individuals perceive their rights, expectations and responsibilities to the state? Given this, I believe that there is a need to understand citizenship as a fluid and heterogenous phenomenon that can be in surplus, deficit, progressive and reactionary. When discussing citizenship I am interested in how people perceive both their rights and responsibilities to civic institutions as well as to the residents around them. A second, obviously related, area of interest is ‘civic engagement’: that is, “the activities of people in the various organisations and associations that make up what scholars call ‘civil society’” (Portney and Leary 4). Before describing these categories in more detail, I would like to briefly outline the methodological processes employed thus far. Much of the research to this point is based on a combination of established literature, my informal discussions with citizen groups and my observations as ‘an activist.’ That is, over the last few years I have worked with a broad cross section of community-based organisations as well as specific individuals that have attempted to confront perceived injustices. I have undertaken this work as both an activist – with organisations such as Aid/Watch and Oxfam Australia – as well as an academic invited to share my research. This work has involved designing and implementing policy and advocacy strategies including media and public education programs. All interactions begin with a detailed discussion of the aims, resources, abilities and knowledge of the groups involved, followed by workshopping campaigning strategies. This has led to the publication of an ‘activist handbook’ titled ‘From Sitting on the Couch to Changing the World’, which is used to both draft the campaign aims as well as design a systematic strategy. (The booklet, which is currently being re-drafted, is published by Oxfam Australia and registered under a creative commons licence. For those interested, copies are available by emailing j.arvanitakis (at) uws.edu.au.) Much research is also sourced from direct feedback given by participants in reviewing the workshops and strategies The aim of tis paper then, is to sketch out the initial findings as well as an agenda for more formalised research. The initial findings have identified the heterogenous nature of citizenship that I have separated into four ‘citizenship spaces.’ The term space is used because these are not stable groupings as many quickly move between the areas identified as both the structures and personal situations change. 1. Marginalisation and Citizenship Deficit The first category is a citizenship deficit brought on by a sense of marginalisation. This is determined by a belief that it is pointless to interact with civic institutions, as the result is always the same: people’s opinions and needs will be ignored. Or in the case of residents from areas such as Macquarie Fields, the relationship with civic institutions, including police, is antagonistic and best avoided (White par. 21). This means that there is no connection between the population and the civic institutions around them – there is no loyalty or belief that efforts to be involved in political and civic processes will be rewarded. Here groups sense that they do not have access to political avenues to be heard, represented or demand change. This is leading to an experience of disconnection from political processes. The result is both a sense of disengagement and disempowerment. One example here emerged in discussions with protesters around the proposed development of the former Australian Defence Industry (ADI) site in St Marys, an outer-western suburb of Sydney. The development, which was largely approved, was for a large-scale housing estate proposed on sensitive bushlands in a locality that resident’s note is under-serviced in terms of public space. (For details of these discussions, see http://www.adisite.org/.) Residents often took the attitude that whatever the desire of the local community, the development would go ahead regardless. Those who worked at information booths during the resident protests informed me that the attitude was one best summarised by: “Why bother, we always get stuffed around any way.” This was confirmed by my own discussions with local residents – even those who joined the resident action group. 2. Privatisation and Citizenship Deficit This citizenship deficit not only applies to the marginalised, however, for there are also much wealthier populations who also appear to experience a deficit that results from a lack of access to civic institutions. This tends to leads to a privatisation of decision-making and withdrawal from the public arena as well as democratic processes. Consequently, the residents in the pockets of wealth may not be acting as citizens but more like consumers – asserting themselves in terms of Castells’s ‘collective consumption’ (par. 25). This citizenship deficit is brought on by ongoing privatisation. That is, there is a belief that civic institutions (including government bodies) are unable or at least unwilling to service the local community. As a result there is a tendency to turn to private suppliers and believe that individualisation is the best way to manage the community. The result is that citizens feel no connection to the civic institutions around them, not because there is no desire, but there are no services. This group of citizens has often been described as the ‘Aspirationals’ and are most often found in the growth corridors of Sydney. There is no reason to believe that this group is this way because of choice – but rather a failure by government authorities to service their needs. This is confirmed by research undertaken as early as 1990 which found that the residents now labelled Aspirational, were demanding access to public infrastructure services including public schools, but have been neglected by different levels of government. (This was clearly stated by NSW Labor MP for Liverpool, Paul Lynch, who argued for such services as a way to ensure a functioning community particularly for Western Sydney; NSWPD 2001.) As a result there is a reliance on private schools, neighbourhoods, transport and so on. Any ‘why bother’ attitude is thus driven by a lack of evidence that civic institutions can or are not willing to meet their needs. There is a strong sense of local community – but this localisation limited to others in the same geographical location and similar lifestyle. 3. Citizenship Surplus – Empowered Not Engaged The third space of citizenship is based on a ‘surplus’ even if there is limited or no political engagement. This group has quite a lot in common with the ‘Aspirationals’ but may come from areas that are higher serviced by civic institutions: the choice not to engage is therefore voluntary. There is a strong push for self-sufficiency – believing that their social capital, wealth and status mean that they do not require the services of civic institutions. While not antagonistic towards such institutions, there is often a belief is that the services provided by the private sector are ultimately superior to public ones. Consequently, they feel empowered through their social background but are not engaged with civic institutions or the political process. Despite this, my initial research findings show that this group has a strong connection to decision-makers – both politicians and bureaucrats. This lack of engagement changes if there is a perceived injustice to their quality of life or their values system – and hence should not be dismissed as NIMBYs (not in my backyard). They believe they have the resources to mobilise and demand change. I believe that we see this group materialise in mobilisations around proposed developments that threaten the perceived quality of life of the local environment. One example brought to my attention was the rapid response of local residents to the proposed White City development near Sydney’s eastern suburbs that was to see tennis courts and public space replaced by residential and commercial buildings (Nicholls). As one resident informed me, she had never seen any political engagement by local residents previously – an engagement that was accompanied by a belief that the development would be stopped as well as a mobilisation of some impressive resources. Such mobilisations also occur when there is a perceived injustice. Examples of this group can be found in what Hugh Mackay (13) describes as ‘doctor’s wives’ (a term that I am not wholly comfortable with). Here we see the emergence of ‘Chilout’: Children out of Detention. This was an organisation whose membership was described to me as ‘north shore professionals’, drew heavily on those who believed the forced incarceration of young refugee children was an affront to their values system. 4. Insurgent Citizenship – Empowered and Engaged The final space is the insurgent citizen: that is, the citizen who is both engaged and empowered. This is a term borrowed from South Africa and the USA (Holston 1) – and it should be seen as having two, almost diametrically opposed, sides: progressive and reactionary. This group may not have access to a great deal of financial resources, but has high social capital and both a willingness and ability to engage in political processes. Consequently, there is a sense of empowerment and engagement with civic institutions. There is also a strong push for self-sufficiency – but this is encased in a belief that civic institutions have a responsibility to provide services to the public, and that some services are naturally better provided by the public sector. Despite this, there is often an antagonistic relationship with such institutions. From the progressive perspective, we see ‘activists’ promoting social justice issues (including students, academics, unionists and so on). Organisations such as A Just Australia are strongly supported by various student organisations, unions and other social justice and activist groups. From a reactionary perspective, we see the emergence of groups that take an anti-immigration stance (such as ‘anti-immigration’ groups including Australia First that draw both activists and have an established political party). (Information regarding ‘anti-refugee activists’ can be found at http://ausfirst.alphalink.com.au/ while the official website for the Australia First political part is at http://www.australiafirstparty.com.au/cms/.) One way to understand the relationship between these groups is through the engagement/empowered typology below. While a detailed discussion of the limitations of typologies is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to acknowledge that any typology is a simplification and generalisation of the arguments presented. Likewise, it is unlikely that any typology has the ability to cover all cases and situations. This typology can, however, be used to underscore the relational nature of citizenship. The purpose here is to highlight that there are relationships between the different citizenship spaces and individuals can move between groups and each cluster has significant internal variation. Key here is that this can frame future studies. Conclusion and Next Steps There is little doubt there is a relationship between attitudes to citizenship and the health of a democracy. In Australia, democracy is robust in some ways, but many feel disempowered, disengaged and some feel both – often believing they are remote from the workings of civic institutions. It would appear that for many, interest in the process of (formal) government is at an all-time low as reflected in declining membership of political parties (Jaensch et al. 58). Democracy is not a ‘once for ever’ achievement – it needs to be protected and promoted. To do this, we must ensure that there are avenues for representation for all. This point also highlights one of the fundamental flaws of the aforementioned citizenship test. According to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, the test is designed to: help migrants integrate and maximise the opportunities available to them in Australia, and enable their full participation in the Australian community as citizens. (par. 4) Those designing the test have assumed that citizenship is both stable and, once achieved, automatically ensures representation. This paper directly challenges these assumptions and offers an alternative research agenda with the ultimate aim of promoting high levels of engagement and empowerment. References Anderson, A. “The Liberals Have Not Betrayed the Menzies Legacy.” Online Opinion 25 Oct. 2004. < http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2679 >. Arvanitakis, J. “Highly Affected, Rarely Considered: The International Youth Parliament Commission’s Report on the Impacts of Globalisation on Young People.” Sydney: Oxfam Australia, 2003. Baldassar, L., Z. Kamalkhani, and C. Lange. “Afghan Hazara Refugees in Australia: Constructing Australian Citizens.” Social Identities 13.1 (2007): 31-50. Burchell, D. “Dysfunctional Dumping Grounds.” The Australian 10 Feb. 2007. < http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21199266-28737,00.html >. Burnley, I.H. The Impact of Immigration in Australia: A Demographic Approach. Melbourne: Oxford UP, 2001. Castells, M. “European Cities, the Informational Society, and the Global Economy.” New Left Review I/204 (March-April 1994): 46-57. Chamberlain, C., and D. Mackenzie. Homeless Careers: Pathways in and out of Homelessness. Melbourne: RMIT University, 2002. Chari, R., J. Hogan, and G. Murphy. “Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union.” The Political Quarterly 78.3 (2007): 423-438. Collins, J. “Chinese Entrepreneurs: The Chinese Diaspora in Australia.” International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research 8.1/2 (2002): 113-133. Dee, M. “Young People, Citizenship and Public Space.” International Sociological Association Conference Paper, Brisbane, 2002. Della Porta, D. “Globalisations and Democracy.” Democratizations 12.5 (2005): 668-685. Fagan, B., R. Dowling, and J. Longdale. “Suburbs in the ‘Global City’: Sydney since the Mid 1990s.” State of Australian cities conference. Parramatta, 2003. Frew, W. “And the Most Polarised City Is…” Sydney Morning Herald 16-17 Feb. 2008: 7. Gleeson, B. Australian Heartlands: Making Space for Hope in the Suburbs. Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2006. Gleeson, B. “What’s Driving Suburban Australia?” Australian Policy Online 15 Jan. 2004. < http://www.apo.org.au/webboard/results.chtml?filename_num=00558 >. Gow, G. “Rubbing Shoulders in the Global City: Refugees, Citizenship and Multicultural Alliances in Fairfield, Sydney.” Ethnicities 5.3 (2005): 386-405. Hahn, C. L. “Citizenship Education: An Empirical Study of Policy, Practices and Outcomes.” Oxford Review of Education 25.1/2 (1999): 231-250. Hawley, S. “Sir Donald Bradman Likely to Be Dumped from Citizenship Test.” ABC Local Radio Online. 29 Jan. 2008. < http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2007/s2148383.htm >. Hoare, D. “Bradman’s Spot in Citizenship Test under Scrutiny.” ABC Local Radio online. 29 Jan. 2008. < http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2008/s2149325.htm >. Holston, J. Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil. California: Cloth, 2007. Jaensch, D., P. Brent, and B. Bowden. “Australian Political Parties in the Spotlight.” Democratic Audit of Australia Report 4. Australian National University, 2004. Mackay, H. “Sleepers Awoke from Slumber of Indifference.” Sydney Morning Herald 27 Nov. 2007: 13. NSWPD – New South Wales Parliamentary Debates. “South Western Sydney Banking Services.” Legislative Assembly Hansard, 52nd NSW Parliament, 19 Sep. 2001. Portney, K.E., and L. O’Leary. Civic and Political Engagement of America’s Youth: National Survey of Civic and Political Engagement of Young People. Medford, MA: Tisch College, Tufts University, 2007. Price, S. “Stress and Debt Make Sydney a Violent City.” Sydney Morning Herald 13 Jan. 2008: 16. Pusey, M. The Experience of Middle Australia: The Dark Side of Economic Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. White, R. “Swarming and the Social Dynamics of Group Violence.” Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 326 (Oct. 2006). < http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi2/tandi326t.html >. Wolfe, P. “Race and Citizenship.” Magazine of History 18.5 (2004): 66-72.
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37

Arvanitakis, James. "The Heterogenous Citizen." M/C Journal 10, no. 6 (April 1, 2008). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2720.

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Abstract:
Introduction One of the first challenges faced by new Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, was what to do with the former government’s controversial citizenship test. While a quick evaluation of the test shows that 93 percent of those who have sat it ‘passed’ (Hoare), most media controversy has focussed less on the validity of such a test than whether questions relating to Australian cricketing legend, Don Bradman, are appropriate (Hawley). While the citizenship test seems nothing more that a crude and populist measure imposed by the former Howard government in its ongoing nationalistic agenda, which included paying schools to raise the Australian flag (“PM Unfurls Flag”), its imposition seems a timely reminder of the challenge of understanding citizenship today. For as the demographic structures around us continue to change, so must our understandings of ‘citizenship’. More importantly, this fluid understanding of citizenship is not limited to academics, and policy-makers, but new technologies, the processes of globalisation including a globalised media, changing demographic patterns including migration, as well as environmental challenges that place pressure on limited resources is altering the citizens understanding of their own role as well as those around them. This paper aims to sketch out a proposed new research agenda that seeks to investigate this fluid and heterogenous nature of citizenship. The focus of the research has so far been Sydney and is enveloped by a broader aim of promoting an increased level of citizen engagement both within formal and informal political structures. I begin by sketching the complex nature of Sydney before presenting some initial research findings. Sydney – A Complex City The so-called ‘emerald city’ of Sydney has been described in many ways: from a ‘global’ city (Fagan, Dowling and Longdale 1) to an ‘angry’ city (Price 16). Sarah Price’s investigative article included research from the University of Western Sydney’s Centre of Culture Research, the Bureau of Crime Statistics and interviews with Tony Grabs, the director of trauma at St Vincent’s Hospital in inner city Darlinghurst. Price found that both injuries from alcohol and drug-related violence had risen dramatically over the last few years and seemed to be driven by increasing frustrations of a city that is perceived to be lacking appropriate infrastructure and rising levels of personal and household debt. Sydney’s famous harbour and postcard landmarks are surrounded by places of controversy and poverty, with residents of very backgrounds living in close proximity: often harmoniously and sometimes less so. According to recent research by Griffith University’s Urban Research Program, the city is becoming increasingly polarised, with the wealthiest enjoying high levels of access to amenities while other sections of the population experiencing increasing deprivation (Frew 7). Sydney, is often segmented into different regions: the growth corridors of the western suburbs which include the ‘Aspirational class’; the affluent eastern suburb; the southern beachside suburbs surrounding Cronulla affectionately known by local residents as ‘the Shire’, and so on. This, however, hides that fact that these areas are themselves complex and heterogenous in character (Frew 7). As a result, the many clichés associated with such segments lead to an over simplification of regional characteristics. The ‘growth corridors’ of Western Sydney, for example, have, in recent times, become a focal point of political and social commentary. From the rise of the ‘Aspirational’ voter (Anderson), seen to be a key ‘powerbroker’ in federal and state politics, to growing levels of disenfranchised young people, this region is multifaceted and should not be simplified. These areas often see large-scale, private housing estates; what Brendan Gleeson describes as ‘privatopias’, situated next to rising levels of homelessness (“What’s Driving”): a powerful and concerning image that should not escape our attention. (Chamberlain and Mackenzie pay due attention to the issue in Homeless Careers.) It is also home to a growing immigrant population who often arrive as business migrants and as well as a rising refugee population traumatised by war and displacement (Collins 1). These growth corridors then, seem to simultaneously capture both the ambitions and the fears of Sydney. That is, they are seen as both areas of potential economic boom as well as social stress and potential conflict (Gleeson 89). One way to comprehend the complexity associated with such diversity and change is to reflect on the proximity of the twin suburbs of Macquarie Links and Macquarie Fields situated in Sydney’s south-western suburbs. Separated by the clichéd ‘railway tracks’, one is home to the growing Aspirational class while the other continues to be plagued by the stigma of being, what David Burchell describes as, a ‘dysfunctional dumping ground’ whose plight became national headlines during the riots in 2005. The riots were sparked after a police chase involving a stolen car led to a crash and the death of a 17 year-old and 19 year-old passengers. Residents blamed police for the deaths and the subsequent riots lasted for four nights – involving 150 teenagers clashing with New South Wales Police. The dysfunction, Burchell notes is seen in crime statistics that include 114 stolen cars, 227 burglaries, 457 cases of property damage and 279 assaults – all in 2005 alone. Interestingly, both these populations are surrounded by exclusionary boundaries: one because of the financial demands to enter the ‘Links’ estate, and the other because of the self-imposed exclusion. Such disparities not only provide challenges for policy makers generally, but also have important implications on the attitudes that citizens’ experience towards their relationship with each other as well as the civic institutions that are meant to represent them. This is particular the case if civic institutions are seen to either neglect or favour certain groups. This, in part, has given rise to what I describe here as a ‘citizenship surplus’ as well as a ‘citizenship deficit’. Research Agenda: Investigating Citizenship Surpluses and Deficits This changing city has meant that there has also been a change in the way that different groups interact with, and perceive, civic bodies. As noted, my initial research shows that this has led to the emergence of both citizenship surpluses and deficits. Though the concept of a ‘citizen deficits and surpluses’ have not emerged within the broader literature, there is a wide range of literature that discusses how some sections of the population lack of access to democratic processes. There are three broad areas of research that have emerged relevant here: citizenship and young people (see Arvanitakis; Dee); citizenship and globalisation (see Della Porta; Pusey); and citizenship and immigration (see Baldassar et al.; Gow). While a discussion of each of these research areas is beyond the scope of this paper, a regular theme is the emergence of a ‘democratic deficit’ (Chari et al. 422). Dee, for example, looks at how there exist unequal relationships between local and central governments, young people, communities and property developers in relation to space. Dee argues that this shapes social policy in a range of settings and contexts including their relationship with broader civic institutions and understandings of citizenship. Dee finds that claims for land use that involve young people rarely succeed and there is limited, if any, recourse to civic institutions. As such, we see a democratic deficit emerge because the various civic institutions involved fail in meeting their obligations to citizens. In addition, a great deal of work has emerged that investigates attempts to re-engage citizens through mechanisms to promote citizenship education and a more active citizenship which has also been accompanied by government programs with the same goals (See for example the Western Australian government’s ‘Citizenscape’ program ). For example Hahn (231) undertakes a comparative study of civic education in six countries (including Australia) and the policies and practices with respect to citizenship education and how to promote citizen activism. The results are positive, though the research was undertaken before the tumultuous events of the terrorist attacks in New York, the emergence of the ‘war on terror’ and the rise of ‘Muslim-phobia’. A gap rises, however, within the Australian literature when we consider both the fluid and heterogenous nature of citizenship. That is, how do we understand the relationship between these diverse groups living within such proximity to each other overlayed by changing migration patterns, ongoing globalised processes and changing political environments as well as their relations to civic institutions? Further, how does this influence the way individuals perceive their rights, expectations and responsibilities to the state? Given this, I believe that there is a need to understand citizenship as a fluid and heterogenous phenomenon that can be in surplus, deficit, progressive and reactionary. When discussing citizenship I am interested in how people perceive both their rights and responsibilities to civic institutions as well as to the residents around them. A second, obviously related, area of interest is ‘civic engagement’: that is, “the activities of people in the various organisations and associations that make up what scholars call ‘civil society’” (Portney and Leary 4). Before describing these categories in more detail, I would like to briefly outline the methodological processes employed thus far. Much of the research to this point is based on a combination of established literature, my informal discussions with citizen groups and my observations as ‘an activist.’ That is, over the last few years I have worked with a broad cross section of community-based organisations as well as specific individuals that have attempted to confront perceived injustices. I have undertaken this work as both an activist – with organisations such as Aid/Watch and Oxfam Australia – as well as an academic invited to share my research. This work has involved designing and implementing policy and advocacy strategies including media and public education programs. All interactions begin with a detailed discussion of the aims, resources, abilities and knowledge of the groups involved, followed by workshopping campaigning strategies. This has led to the publication of an ‘activist handbook’ titled ‘From Sitting on the Couch to Changing the World’, which is used to both draft the campaign aims as well as design a systematic strategy. (The booklet, which is currently being re-drafted, is published by Oxfam Australia and registered under a creative commons licence. For those interested, copies are available by emailing j.arvanitakis (at) uws.edu.au.) Much research is also sourced from direct feedback given by participants in reviewing the workshops and strategies The aim of tis paper then, is to sketch out the initial findings as well as an agenda for more formalised research. The initial findings have identified the heterogenous nature of citizenship that I have separated into four ‘citizenship spaces.’ The term space is used because these are not stable groupings as many quickly move between the areas identified as both the structures and personal situations change. 1. Marginalisation and Citizenship Deficit The first category is a citizenship deficit brought on by a sense of marginalisation. This is determined by a belief that it is pointless to interact with civic institutions, as the result is always the same: people’s opinions and needs will be ignored. Or in the case of residents from areas such as Macquarie Fields, the relationship with civic institutions, including police, is antagonistic and best avoided (White par. 21). This means that there is no connection between the population and the civic institutions around them – there is no loyalty or belief that efforts to be involved in political and civic processes will be rewarded. Here groups sense that they do not have access to political avenues to be heard, represented or demand change. This is leading to an experience of disconnection from political processes. The result is both a sense of disengagement and disempowerment. One example here emerged in discussions with protesters around the proposed development of the former Australian Defence Industry (ADI) site in St Marys, an outer-western suburb of Sydney. The development, which was largely approved, was for a large-scale housing estate proposed on sensitive bushlands in a locality that resident’s note is under-serviced in terms of public space. (For details of these discussions, see http://www.adisite.org/.) Residents often took the attitude that whatever the desire of the local community, the development would go ahead regardless. Those who worked at information booths during the resident protests informed me that the attitude was one best summarised by: “Why bother, we always get stuffed around any way.” This was confirmed by my own discussions with local residents – even those who joined the resident action group. 2. Privatisation and Citizenship Deficit This citizenship deficit not only applies to the marginalised, however, for there are also much wealthier populations who also appear to experience a deficit that results from a lack of access to civic institutions. This tends to leads to a privatisation of decision-making and withdrawal from the public arena as well as democratic processes. Consequently, the residents in the pockets of wealth may not be acting as citizens but more like consumers – asserting themselves in terms of Castells’s ‘collective consumption’ (par. 25). This citizenship deficit is brought on by ongoing privatisation. That is, there is a belief that civic institutions (including government bodies) are unable or at least unwilling to service the local community. As a result there is a tendency to turn to private suppliers and believe that individualisation is the best way to manage the community. The result is that citizens feel no connection to the civic institutions around them, not because there is no desire, but there are no services. This group of citizens has often been described as the ‘Aspirationals’ and are most often found in the growth corridors of Sydney. There is no reason to believe that this group is this way because of choice – but rather a failure by government authorities to service their needs. This is confirmed by research undertaken as early as 1990 which found that the residents now labelled Aspirational, were demanding access to public infrastructure services including public schools, but have been neglected by different levels of government. (This was clearly stated by NSW Labor MP for Liverpool, Paul Lynch, who argued for such services as a way to ensure a functioning community particularly for Western Sydney; NSWPD 2001.) As a result there is a reliance on private schools, neighbourhoods, transport and so on. Any ‘why bother’ attitude is thus driven by a lack of evidence that civic institutions can or are not willing to meet their needs. There is a strong sense of local community – but this localisation limited to others in the same geographical location and similar lifestyle. 3. Citizenship Surplus – Empowered Not Engaged The third space of citizenship is based on a ‘surplus’ even if there is limited or no political engagement. This group has quite a lot in common with the ‘Aspirationals’ but may come from areas that are higher serviced by civic institutions: the choice not to engage is therefore voluntary. There is a strong push for self-sufficiency – believing that their social capital, wealth and status mean that they do not require the services of civic institutions. While not antagonistic towards such institutions, there is often a belief is that the services provided by the private sector are ultimately superior to public ones. Consequently, they feel empowered through their social background but are not engaged with civic institutions or the political process. Despite this, my initial research findings show that this group has a strong connection to decision-makers – both politicians and bureaucrats. This lack of engagement changes if there is a perceived injustice to their quality of life or their values system – and hence should not be dismissed as NIMBYs (not in my backyard). They believe they have the resources to mobilise and demand change. I believe that we see this group materialise in mobilisations around proposed developments that threaten the perceived quality of life of the local environment. One example brought to my attention was the rapid response of local residents to the proposed White City development near Sydney’s eastern suburbs that was to see tennis courts and public space replaced by residential and commercial buildings (Nicholls). As one resident informed me, she had never seen any political engagement by local residents previously – an engagement that was accompanied by a belief that the development would be stopped as well as a mobilisation of some impressive resources. Such mobilisations also occur when there is a perceived injustice. Examples of this group can be found in what Hugh Mackay (13) describes as ‘doctor’s wives’ (a term that I am not wholly comfortable with). Here we see the emergence of ‘Chilout’: Children out of Detention. This was an organisation whose membership was described to me as ‘north shore professionals’, drew heavily on those who believed the forced incarceration of young refugee children was an affront to their values system. 4. Insurgent Citizenship – Empowered and Engaged The final space is the insurgent citizen: that is, the citizen who is both engaged and empowered. This is a term borrowed from South Africa and the USA (Holston 1) – and it should be seen as having two, almost diametrically opposed, sides: progressive and reactionary. This group may not have access to a great deal of financial resources, but has high social capital and both a willingness and ability to engage in political processes. Consequently, there is a sense of empowerment and engagement with civic institutions. There is also a strong push for self-sufficiency – but this is encased in a belief that civic institutions have a responsibility to provide services to the public, and that some services are naturally better provided by the public sector. Despite this, there is often an antagonistic relationship with such institutions. From the progressive perspective, we see ‘activists’ promoting social justice issues (including students, academics, unionists and so on). Organisations such as A Just Australia are strongly supported by various student organisations, unions and other social justice and activist groups. From a reactionary perspective, we see the emergence of groups that take an anti-immigration stance (such as ‘anti-immigration’ groups including Australia First that draw both activists and have an established political party). (Information regarding ‘anti-refugee activists’ can be found at http://ausfirst.alphalink.com.au/ while the official website for the Australia First political part is at http://www.australiafirstparty.com.au/cms/.) One way to understand the relationship between these groups is through the engagement/empowered typology below. While a detailed discussion of the limitations of typologies is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to acknowledge that any typology is a simplification and generalisation of the arguments presented. Likewise, it is unlikely that any typology has the ability to cover all cases and situations. This typology can, however, be used to underscore the relational nature of citizenship. The purpose here is to highlight that there are relationships between the different citizenship spaces and individuals can move between groups and each cluster has significant internal variation. Key here is that this can frame future studies. Conclusion and Next Steps There is little doubt there is a relationship between attitudes to citizenship and the health of a democracy. In Australia, democracy is robust in some ways, but many feel disempowered, disengaged and some feel both – often believing they are remote from the workings of civic institutions. It would appear that for many, interest in the process of (formal) government is at an all-time low as reflected in declining membership of political parties (Jaensch et al. 58). Democracy is not a ‘once for ever’ achievement – it needs to be protected and promoted. To do this, we must ensure that there are avenues for representation for all. This point also highlights one of the fundamental flaws of the aforementioned citizenship test. According to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, the test is designed to: help migrants integrate and maximise the opportunities available to them in Australia, and enable their full participation in the Australian community as citizens. (par. 4) Those designing the test have assumed that citizenship is both stable and, once achieved, automatically ensures representation. This paper directly challenges these assumptions and offers an alternative research agenda with the ultimate aim of promoting high levels of engagement and empowerment. References Anderson, A. “The Liberals Have Not Betrayed the Menzies Legacy.” Online Opinion 25 Oct. 2004. http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2679>. Arvanitakis, J. “Highly Affected, Rarely Considered: The International Youth Parliament Commission’s Report on the Impacts of Globalisation on Young People.” Sydney: Oxfam Australia, 2003. Baldassar, L., Z. Kamalkhani, and C. Lange. “Afghan Hazara Refugees in Australia: Constructing Australian Citizens.” Social Identities 13.1 (2007): 31-50. Burchell, D. “Dysfunctional Dumping Grounds.” The Australian 10 Feb. 2007. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21199266-28737,00.html>. Burnley, I.H. The Impact of Immigration in Australia: A Demographic Approach. Melbourne: Oxford UP, 2001. Castells, M. “European Cities, the Informational Society, and the Global Economy.” New Left Review I/204 (March-April 1994): 46-57. Chamberlain, C., and D. Mackenzie. Homeless Careers: Pathways in and out of Homelessness. Melbourne: RMIT University, 2002. Chari, R., J. Hogan, and G. Murphy. “Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union.” The Political Quarterly 78.3 (2007): 423-438. Collins, J. “Chinese Entrepreneurs: The Chinese Diaspora in Australia.” International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research 8.1/2 (2002): 113-133. Dee, M. “Young People, Citizenship and Public Space.” International Sociological Association Conference Paper, Brisbane, 2002. Della Porta, D. “Globalisations and Democracy.” Democratizations 12.5 (2005): 668-685. Fagan, B., R. Dowling, and J. Longdale. “Suburbs in the ‘Global City’: Sydney since the Mid 1990s.” State of Australian cities conference. Parramatta, 2003. Frew, W. “And the Most Polarised City Is…” Sydney Morning Herald 16-17 Feb. 2008: 7. Gleeson, B. Australian Heartlands: Making Space for Hope in the Suburbs. Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2006. Gleeson, B. “What’s Driving Suburban Australia?” Australian Policy Online 15 Jan. 2004. http://www.apo.org.au/webboard/results.chtml?filename_num=00558>. Gow, G. “Rubbing Shoulders in the Global City: Refugees, Citizenship and Multicultural Alliances in Fairfield, Sydney.” Ethnicities 5.3 (2005): 386-405. Hahn, C. L. “Citizenship Education: An Empirical Study of Policy, Practices and Outcomes.” Oxford Review of Education 25.1/2 (1999): 231-250. Hawley, S. “Sir Donald Bradman Likely to Be Dumped from Citizenship Test.” ABC Local Radio Online. 29 Jan. 2008. http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2007/s2148383.htm>. Hoare, D. “Bradman’s Spot in Citizenship Test under Scrutiny.” ABC Local Radio online. 29 Jan. 2008. http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2008/s2149325.htm>. Holston, J. Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil. California: Cloth, 2007. Jaensch, D., P. Brent, and B. Bowden. “Australian Political Parties in the Spotlight.” Democratic Audit of Australia Report 4. Australian National University, 2004. Mackay, H. “Sleepers Awoke from Slumber of Indifference.” Sydney Morning Herald 27 Nov. 2007: 13. NSWPD – New South Wales Parliamentary Debates. “South Western Sydney Banking Services.” Legislative Assembly Hansard, 52nd NSW Parliament, 19 Sep. 2001. Portney, K.E., and L. O’Leary. Civic and Political Engagement of America’s Youth: National Survey of Civic and Political Engagement of Young People. Medford, MA: Tisch College, Tufts University, 2007. Price, S. “Stress and Debt Make Sydney a Violent City.” Sydney Morning Herald 13 Jan. 2008: 16. Pusey, M. The Experience of Middle Australia: The Dark Side of Economic Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. White, R. “Swarming and the Social Dynamics of Group Violence.” Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 326 (Oct. 2006). http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi2/tandi326t.html>. Wolfe, P. “Race and Citizenship.” Magazine of History 18.5 (2004): 66-72. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Arvanitakis, James. "The Heterogenous Citizen: How Many of Us Care about Don Bradman’s Average?." M/C Journal 10.6/11.1 (2008). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/07-arvanitakis.php>. APA Style Arvanitakis, J. (Apr. 2008) "The Heterogenous Citizen: How Many of Us Care about Don Bradman’s Average?," M/C Journal, 10(6)/11(1). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/07-arvanitakis.php>.
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