Journal articles on the topic 'European Union countries – Foreign economic relations – ACP-Group countries'

Subject. Foreign economic and trade ties among countries are getting tighter and less predictable in the early 21st century. This directly stems from a growing disparity of partners, especially if it goes about their future cooperation as part of integration groups or international organizations. Communities of experts suggest using various approaches to locally adjusting integration phases, especially implementing the two-speed integration in the European Union. Objectives. The study is an attempt to examine an improvement of foreign economic cooperation and suggest its implementation steps for the European Union. This all is due to considerable inner controversies and problems within the EU, which grow more serious year by year. Methods. The methodological framework comprises the historical logic, dialectical principles, scientific abstraction method. The process and system approach was especially important for justifying the implementation of the above steps. It was used to examine foreign economic relations of partners in the European Union. Results. The article sets forth the theoretical and methodological framework for the geostrategic economic bloc, including a conceptual structure model. I present steps to implement a foreign economic cooperation of partners in the EU in terms of its form. Conclusions and Relevance. Should the form of the foreign economic relations among the EU countries be implemented, counties at the periphery of the EU will be able to become active parties to the integration group.

In modern conditions, the external economic relations between countries of the vanguard and periphery are becoming increasingly controversial and ambiguous. Undoubtedly, the problem of inequality between the mentioned groups of countries has been always acute, and many schools of economics have been working on a solution of this question. This problem has escalated after the first wave of the global economic crisis (2008–2009). Despite everything, countries of the vanguard continue to promote principles of the neoliberal model through international organizations and financial institutions, which turned out to be unviable due to numerous reasons. The article deals with economic and trade relations between countries of the vanguard and periphery within the European Union, problems and controversies of their interaction and provides with a prediction of further development of the integration group. It may definitely be said that the liberalization of the external economic relations between partners has led to the increase of inequality among them, deepening of structural problems in countries of the periphery and to the stifling of their social and economic development. On that basis, the reasons of transformation of the European Union in context of the modern global instability have been outlined, as well as two groups of country outsiders in this association. The article shows that countries of the South and Central and Eastern Europe have found themselves in a financial bondage to the core countries and that their further membership in the EU will lead to even more harmful consequences and to a deep transformation of the whole EU.

The scientific interest of the development of the theory and practice of cooperation of Central European countries of the Visegrád Group in the context of modern European integration processes is important for developing and implementing the strategy of foreign and domestic policy in European countries and Ukraine at the modern stage. At the beginning of the XXI century, under the changes in the geopolitical situation on the European continent, the countries of Central Europe (full members of the European Union) build a new operating system of international relations and accordingly continue to delegate some of their powers to suprastate institutions of the EU. The purpose of this scientific study is to determine paradigmatic aspects of European integration processes, modern threats arising in the EU, prospects for the interaction of EU countries, and to form a new format of cooperation of Ukraine and countries of the Visegrád Group. The aim of the creation of the alliance of the Visegrád Group (1991) was the desire to contribute to the construction of European security architecture and economic cooperation through the effective cooperation within European institutions. The whole activity of the Visegrád Group is aimed at strengthening stability in the Central European region. Risks in the economic sphere and strengthening of Euroscepticism are considered traditional for the EU functioning. In view of signing the Rome Declaration in 2017, the EU threats and challenges for the short-term (2018–2020) include: hybrid consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, European migrant crisis, a series of terrorist acts in European cities, unpredictable policy of the newly elected US president D. Trump in relation to the European security system, strengthening the position of far-left and far-right political forces in European states, Brexit and its consequences, in particular, risk of domino effect in other member countries of the Union. Therefore, we consider it appropriate to carry out system analysis of key relevant challenges and threats to the EU for 2018–2020 and to consider interconditionality and interdependence of problems that may affect the EU future. Given the defined trends, development and economic stability of each state are strategically important, however, special attention in this context should be paid to the analysis of the development of large countries of the European Union, such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. V4 countries are characterized by sustainable economic growth. If to analyse the Visegrád Four as a single national state, then the Visegrád Group is the fifth largest economy in Europe and the 12th in the world. The authors consider it too simplistic to define the essence of the Visegrád alliance only as a consolidation of the efforts of Central European countries for the sake of “returning to Europe” through Euro-Atlantic integration. In the modern dimension of events, the interaction format V4 + Ukraine is much more complex and more promising than it appears. Since joining NATO and the European Union in 1999 and 2004 by the Visegrád Group (i.e. Central European countries) geopolitically changes the status of the Central European Region, transforms bilateral and multilateral relations of Central European countries – full members of the EU with Ukraine. Moreover, this changes the system of relations within the Visegrád Four, as well as with other member states of the European Union.

This aim of this work is to study the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade. FDI is a driving force for economic growth for host countries. The positive effects of FDI are seen in many aspects of the economy. However, the implications of FDI on foreign trade are questionable. Therefore, this study uses a Granger causality technique to test whether the relationship between FDI and foreign trade is complementary or substitutive. The findings of this study indicate that this relationship appears to be complementary, and FDI investment does cause an increase in trade flow in the countries that are taken into consideration. This research aims to make a comparison between the relations of FDI flows of three groups of countries from the European Union (EU)—Romania and Bulgaria, the Visegrád Group and the Euro area—for the period of 2005 to 2019. However, the results indicate that this link between the variables is not yet found for the three group of countries, and further research is required in this aspect. This leads to the conclusion that the FDI impact on foreign trade of the host country depends on the type of investment and absorptive capacity of the receiver, the economic development of host and home countries, and not every type of FDI leads to more trade.

The article examines the degree of independence of the Visegrad Group countries in the European Union in terms of economic prerequisites and actual implementation. It has been suggested that the countries of the Visegrad Group, having reached a certain level of economic prosperity and diversified their foreign economic relations, began to strive to play a more independent role in making integration decisions in the EU, including on issues of basic common European values. This hypothesis is tested on the example of the negotiation process of the EU countries on the adoption of the MultiYear Financial Plan for 2021–2027 and the creation of a Next Generation EU Fund to work together to tackle the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The main directions of the negotiations, the positions of the participants and the general results are analyzed. Particular attention is drawn to the fact that Poland and Hungary have succeeded in achieving ambivalent language on the issues of linking the allocation of funds to member countries with their provision of the rule of law and observance of other democratic principles. It is shown that in practice the European Commission still does not abandon this linkage. It is concluded that during the EU membership, the Visegrad Group countries have succeeded in demonstrating their economic capabilities, and their ability to influence the solution of common European issues has increased, but the real degree of autonomy of the Visegrad countries within the EU has not reached a qualitatively new level, including and due to contradictions in the positions of countries within the bloc itself.

The article analyzes the response of the Visegrad Group countries to the 2020 pandemic. Measures are outlined that were taken by Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to support their economies, including efforts to stabilize labour markets and measures for several most affected sectors. The author assesses the main economic indicators of the Visegrad countries during the first half of 2020 in the light of the consequences of imposed restrictive measures. The reaction of the Visegrad economies to the pandemic correlates with the pan-European reaction. Special attention is paid to the condition of the foreign trade sector of the “four” members, which plays an important role in their economies. The dynamic of foreign trade relations of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic with the European Union and Russia during the pandemic is analyzed. Mutual trade flows within the Visegrad Group are evaluated in the light of opportunities to compensate downturns in other markets. Possible prospects for the development of the Visegrad Group after the pandemic are considered. The existing forecasts of the Group’s countries development are analyzed. The factors influencing the recovery process in the Visegrad countries are given. The consequences of COVID 19 will affect many sectors of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which will not be able to cope with them without the EU support. Realization of opportunities including the emergence of more innovative elements in their economies that meet the challenges of the 21st century, will also depend on the members of the Visegrad Group themselves. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the project “Post-crisis world order: challenges and technologies, competition and cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

International trade is an important component of the national economy of any country in the world, as well as a leading form of international economic relations. Changes in the main indicators of foreign trade, such as exports, imports, trade balance, can cause significant imbalances in the parameters of economic growth of the subjects of such relations.The article proposes an approach to analyzing the intensity of dynamic changes in international trade in goods on the example of EU countries during 2004-2021 with using such methodological approaches as grouping, comparison, calculation and analysis of absolute and relative characteristics of dynamics. For this purpose, two groups of countries where distinguished: countries that were members of the EU before 2004 (Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Germany, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Greece, Portugal, Sweden and Finland) and countries that became members of the EU after 2004 (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Cyprus. Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia). In carrying out the study, the cost indicators of trade transactions of the EU countries were used. With the help of such indicators as specific weight, chain and basic growth rates, coefficients of advance, the intensity of export and import dynamics in terms of selected groups where analyzed. The main trends and determinants of the development of export import activities, under the influence of which there were certain changes in the international trade of the EU countries during the period under study, were identified. These determinants include EU enlargement in 2004, the 2009 financial crisis and the COVID 2019 pandemic. Three periods of development of foreign trade of the member countries of this integration group are distinguished. The 5 largest exporter and importer countries, as well as the largest net exporters and net importers in terms of allocated groups, were identified. The results of the analysis also indicate that the countries that joined the EU after 2004 actively used their membership in the context of the development of foreign economic activity: they rapidly increased the volume of merchandise exports and imports. It has been proved that the proposed approach is effective for analyzing the nature of dynamic changes in international trade of any international organizations, integration associations, etc.

The main objective of this research is to discover the idea of innovation of Indonesia's legislation system on food security/seafood which has been heavily influenced by trade relations between Indonesia and the European Union as a group of major importing countries. This is a case study that largely examines and presents trade disputes between Indonesia and some major importing countries, especially with the EU countries as a major group of country importers of fishery products and seafood from Indonesia. The various disputes and complaints found in this case study demonstrate the fact that the marine fisheries sector as one of Indonesia's mainstay sectors has a very potential economic value for the country's foreign exchange earnings. There is a very close relationship between the fisheries sector with the fulfillment of people's living needs as well as the development of the economic sector in general, including food safety aspects. This should be addressed appropriately and efficiently by the government by adjusting and even updating laws and regulations in this sector by the international food standard/food security; given the numerous demands and rejection of most of Indonesia's trading partner countries in this sector. Keyword: Indonesian Fisheries, Policy Reform, Compliance, Food Safety Requirements, Importing Countries.

Eurasianism, in its various interpretations, from ideology to the implementation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) programs, is regarded as one of the strategies of creating a multipolar world order. This article analyzes the views and assessments of foreign authors regarding the relationship between Eurasianism and the EAEU amid the changing international context. The authors present both critical and positive opinions on Eurasianism, Eurasian integration and its political and economic interlinkages with other countries and associations (China, Vietnam, the European Union (EU), Latin America). Thus, we identify three main lines of assessments on Eurasianism and Eurasian integration. The first includes negative assessments ranging from characterizing Eurasianism and the EAEU as a threat to the EU, the US, and the West in general to deliberate misinformation about the Eurasian ideology, for instance, denoting Eurasianism as parafascism. The second comprises more pragmatic and balanced views, with an emphasis on economic cooperation, which may imply cooperation with the EAEU and acceptance of the Eurasian integration if specific conditions are met, or cessation of such cooperation. The third group includes positive assessments and emphasizes the need for more intensive interaction between the EAEU and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Such views are generally held by Russian and Chinese authors. Non-Russian conceptions of Eurasianism that gained popularity in Turkey or Kazakhstan are ideologically close to the classic Eurasianism and the EAEU, although these conceptions take a distinctive national shape. The article provides some examples of interregional cooperation promoted by the EAEU within the BRICS under the outreach model, i.e., adding new dimensions to existing cooperation formats. The authors arrive at a conclusion that most often the assessments of Eurasian integration and cooperation proposals by foreign experts are tied to Russian foreign policy (or experts opinion of it). They often find interconnections between EAEU, Eurasianism and Russian policy, which emphasize Russian identity as a marker of distinctive civilization. The article also notes comments of Russian authors on the EAEU - EU relations. The research is based on comparative analysis of analytical and research publications on the subject.

Eurasianism, in its various interpretations, from ideology to the implementation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) programs, is regarded as one of the strategies of creating a multipolar world order. This article analyzes the views and assessments of foreign authors regarding the relationship between Eurasianism and the EAEU amid the changing international context. The authors present both critical and positive opinions on Eurasianism, Eurasian integration and its political and economic interlinkages with other countries and associations (China, Vietnam, the European Union (EU), Latin America). Thus, we identify three main lines of assessments on Eurasianism and Eurasian integration. The first includes negative assessments ranging from characterizing Eurasianism and the EAEU as a threat to the EU, the US, and the West in general to deliberate misinformation about the Eurasian ideology, for instance, denoting Eurasianism as parafascism. The second comprises more pragmatic and balanced views, with an emphasis on economic cooperation, which may imply cooperation with the EAEU and acceptance of the Eurasian integration if specific conditions are met, or cessation of such cooperation. The third group includes positive assessments and emphasizes the need for more intensive interaction between the EAEU and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Such views are generally held by Russian and Chinese authors. Non-Russian conceptions of Eurasianism that gained popularity in Turkey or Kazakhstan are ideologically close to the classic Eurasianism and the EAEU, although these conceptions take a distinctive national shape. The article provides some examples of interregional cooperation promoted by the EAEU within the BRICS under the outreach model, i.e., adding new dimensions to existing cooperation formats. The authors arrive at a conclusion that most often the assessments of Eurasian integration and cooperation proposals by foreign experts are tied to Russian foreign policy (or experts opinion of it). They often find interconnections between EAEU, Eurasianism and Russian policy, which emphasize Russian identity as a marker of distinctive civilization. The article also notes comments of Russian authors on the EAEU - EU relations. The research is based on comparative analysis of analytical and research publications on the subject.

AbstractThis article concerns the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) outflow from India to Poland with some insights to other European countries. This topic strongly relates to globalization of foreign trade and especially new economic initiatives between European Union (EU) and India, which was one of the first countries to develop trade relations with EU. According to CEIC data – Financial Data and Economic Indicators, India’s FDI outflow increased slightly to 1.4 billion USD in September 2019 in comparison with 996.5 million USD in September 2018, but it is still below the average of 1.8 billion USD for a period of 2007–2019.Available at: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/india/foreign-direct-investment-outflow/foreign-direct-investment-outflow (accessed October 19, 2019). Very limited number of the scientific research can be found in European literature about India’s FDI outflow to EU countries in period of 2004–2019. Indian economists made some research on that topic. Professor J. Ramachandran (listed among the Best Management Thinkers for the year 2015, the first Bain Fellow in India) from Indian Institute of Management Bangalore in 2004 and Professor Jaya Prakesh Pradhan from Central University of Gujarat in 2008 explored the evolution in Indian outward FDI, referring to a shift in the pattern of overseas expansion and basis of competitiveness of Indian companies. The main goal of this article is to explain what really triggers Indian investors to go to Poland and what kind of businesses they form. Some examples of the Indian-based companies are mentioned to support the analysis. The author of this article also researched on different governmental bilateral trade agreements and initiatives, trying to find any direct impacts of that on the India FDI outflow to Poland and other EU countries. He used empirical method of the analysis based on accessible data for period 2004–2019 and literature in that topic and also direct interviews with private Indian investors who made decision to start and run their business in Poland or other EU countries. The main conclusion is that Poland the leader of Visegrad Group is an interesting investment for India and India can be for Poland a counterpart investment partner to China.

The primary purpose of the article is to present the long term ties between India and Central Europe, and examine the transformation of their relationship after the end of the Cold War. Using J.A. Braveboy-Wagner’s liberal approach to diplomacy and foreign policy-making of developing countries as a tool of analysis, the article shows how the executive preferences of political leaders, historical narratives, and the strength of local values such as soft power, have influenced the political and economic cooperation between India and the Visegrad Group of countries that constitute the core of Central Europe – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. This method helps to show that contrary to the widely held opinion1 that the bonds between the Indian subcontinent and Central Europe were an artificial creation of the Soviet Union, they were instead created much earlier by contacts of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Rabindranath Tagore in the first half of the 20th century. Indeed, a mutual interest and fascination between the two parties, combined with the complementary of needs of both sides after the end of WWII resulted in the development of a promising relationship in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Unfortunately, despite a lot of effort this promising partnership has failed to deliver since the end of the Cold War, and this paper is an attempt to find an explanation for this situation. The European’s focus on integrating with European institutions on one hand, and India’s new foreign policy priorities that were driven by modernization and regional, and then global power aspirations, on the other hand, weakened the intensity of this cooperation for two decades. The completing of the European Union enlargement process in 2004, and the increasing influence of China in Central Europe since 2012, has triggered a reaction by India in the form of the creation of India-Central Europe Business Forum in 2014, which until now has not yet met expectations. The article points to the potential of the Visegrad Group+ (V4+) formula of cooperation, which still possesses many untapped opportunities.

The author investigates the impact of COVID‑19 and macro-policy adjustment on China’s economic development. The aim is to describe the situation and trend of China’s economic development before and after COVID‑19. The research method is the comparative data analysis. The study shows that in response to COVID‑19, the Chinese government, on the one hand, has accelerated its opening-up, taken the opportunity of fighting against the pandemic to provide medical assistance to and cooperate with other countries, and actively promoted the building of a community with a shared future for mankind and the process of globalization. On the basis of the Belt and Road Initiative and multilateral, regional, and subregional cooperation mechanisms such as the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), G20 (Group of 20), and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), China and the Eurasian Economic Union began to cooperate more frequently and the trade relations between Japan, South Korea, and European developed countries became closer. Meanwhile, committed to building a global interconnection partnership, China actively participates in global economic governance and provides various public products. The Chinese government has proposed “Six Guarantees” on the basis of “Six Stability”. In order to achieve the purpose of stabilizing foreign trade and expanding imports, China has imposed various measures to accelerate the liberalization and facilitation of international trade and investment, such as implementing the new version of the “Foreign Investment Law”, establishing free trade zones, and promoting its experience and organizing international import expositions. Additionally, the Chinese government also implemented targeted fiscal and monetary policies, increased support for enterprises, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, and promoted the construction of “new infrastructure” and innovation of business model, which have formed the driving forces for the transformation of the economic development model in China from traditional business to cloud business, from traditional marketing to live streaming marketing, from traditional sales to online sales. The author concluded thatChina’s adjustment of macro policies in response to COVID‑19 was effective and played an important role in the resumption of production and life, stabilizing foreign trade activities, releasing domestic demand and promoting stable and sustained growth of the economy

Belarus – Hungary: pattern of interaction in the conditions of asymmetric associations The article focuses on bilateral relations between the Republic of Belarus and Hungary in the context of their membership in the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union. The author made an attempt to define the model of bilateral cooperation between states limited in their actions by membership in regional associations. The features of the development of political dialogue, which was formed under the influence of the national vision and approaches of the EU as a whole, are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the regional format of relations within the Visegrad Group, CEI and the „Eastern Partnership” initiative. The analysis current state of trade and economic cooperation between Belarus and Hungary is made. The author identifies the strengths and weaknesses of relations, and outlines perspective spheres of cooperation. The active phase of relations between Belarus and Hungary began in the 2000-s, when the parties finally decided on the vectors of their foreign policy. The launch of the „Eastern Partnership” initiative has played a decisive role in the development of political dialogue and economic cooperation on an ongoing basis. Bilateral relations between Belarus and Hungary are an example for building a model of interaction that is not burdened by a common historical past and based on pragmatism. The fairly active political dialogue between the two countries is based on an economic component. In parallel, the parties actively declare the primacy of national interests over collective ones – the EU and the EAEU. At the same time, the analysis indicates, membership in regional associations significantly limits the possibilities of their implementation in practice. This especially affects the trade and economic sphere of interaction. These factors determine the cyclical nature of relations between Belarus and Hungary. Thus, the bilateral format of cooperation within the framework of asymmetric associations is a sufficiently effective mechanism for the development of a full-fledged dialogue. At the same time, it is important to understand that the political component is secondary to the economic one. This approach allows the parties not to overestimate expectations and to develop mutually beneficial, equal relationships based on pragmatism and real opportunities.

In the context of Cotonou and Post Cotonou Partnership Agreements stablished between the European Union and former colonies named by the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP), this paper investigates the possible risks over ACP of one of the Agreement main objectives: the Free Trade Areas or EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements).With this purpose, the paper uses as a case study the analisis of Western African, focusing on the particular context of Senegal. The selected region presents some of the paradox that are communly seen in ACP countries: an outstanding wealth in natural resources, together with some of the lowest indicators of Human Development in the world. Thus, despite the region hosts up to 267 international companies exploiting the mining sector (International Transparency, 2013) and one of the world richest maritime areas, basic needs for its population are still a challenge. To adress such complex matter as an International Trade Agreement launched by the European Union with a wide block of countries of ACPs the paper presents a survey including both primary and secondary data collection in a mixted methodology which combines quantitative and qualitative data. In-depth interviews were carried out at two Directorates of the European Commission to responsibles for external relations with West Africa. In Senegal, officials of public institutions and civil society representatives were consulted. The research concludes that the EU policies promoted with ACP countries in EPAs framework show serious contradictions with the social, environmental and economic priorities of the mostly classified as Least Developed Countries in Western Africa region. Thus, for Senegal case, the policies would increase the risk of increasing dependency on food imports and food insecurity.

The article presents the second Revision of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)-European Union (EU) Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement (CA)) and contains an outlook on the future of the relations between the EU and the ACP Group of States, taking also into account the restructuring of the EU's external relations under the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the new European External Action Service (EEAS). The second Revision of the CA was signed in June 2010.Ten years after the conclusion of the CA, its second revision sought to find a balance between the increasing trend towards differentiation within the ACP Group and the unity of the ACP Group of States. The EU side felt that developments in the regional dimension had to be addressed, such as the relations with the African Union as a key interlocutor for peace and security in the pan-African dimension and the conclusion of (interim) Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Moreover, the 2010 Revision coincided with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. The restructuring of the EU's external relations under the Lisbon Treaty and its impact on the relations between the EU and ACP also influenced the 2010 Revision, as the ACP were concerned about the loss of their special status under the new treaty regime. In addition, at the administrative level, the bilateral relations with the ACP countries will be dealt with by the EEAS and not by the former Commission's Directorate-General for development, which means a potential loss of exclusivity for the ACP Group.

The Carribbean Forum-European Communities (CARIFORUM-EC) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) represents a new era of development cooperation and trade relations between the European Union (EU) on the one hand, and a subgrouping of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of countries on the other hand. The inclusion of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses in the EPA, which require CARIFORUM countries to extend to the EU any more favourable treatment granted to third parties in future Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) has generated some controversy. This note critically examines the arguments that have been levelled against the inclusion of these clauses from legal and policy perspectives. Notwithstanding the often nebulous distinction between law and policy, it will be argued here that questions of policy and issues of law must be bifurcated in order to meaningfully assess the value of MFN clauses in the EPA. A paradigm for assessing such clauses in other so-called North-South FTAs is also suggested.

AbstractFor a long time, the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) was characterized by the focus on trade issues. In recent years however, other policy aspects have emerged, amongst which migration. This evolution results from the gradual recognition of the importance of migration in the Union’s external relations. The mainstreaming of migration in the relations with third countries raised the need for a Global Approach to Migration (2005) connecting illegal and legal migration, as well as introducing a positive migration-development nexus. The acknowledgement of a possible positive contribution of legal migration ‐ if well managed ‐ for developing countries, has resulted into new concrete initiatives such as circular migration, mobility partnerships and the Blue Card Directive. A closer look at the policy frameworks, as well as specific measures demonstrate however, that a true comprehensive approach is a long way from home. It is examined if the specific EU-ACP relationship offers a different point of view and effectively makes migration work for the development of both parties. More specifically, do the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) correspond to the abovementioned goal? A comprehensive and coherent legal framework that unites the interests of the Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and those of the developing countries, on the other hand, seems a distant perspective. It is concluded that ambitious policy objectives have been set and are waiting to be addressed by corresponding policy frameworks and legal commitments.

The article substantiates the necessity to introduce systematic and effective tax eco-reforms in the context of resource-oriented economic development by the European Union countries. The performance and effectiveness of the reforms are estimated in relation to the main four groups of environmental taxes: energy taxes, pollution taxes, resource taxes and transport taxes. The macroecological policy of the European Union countries is the object of the undertaken analysis. The article examines the impact of macroeconomic factors on environmental taxes across the EU, using a correlation analysis toolkit. Four groups of macroeconomic parameters were selected for analysis: internal macroeconomic factors (nominal GDP, real GDP, inflation, business cycle stage, budget deficit, energy consumption level); external macroeconomic factors (government debt, exports, foreign direct investments); institutional macroparameters (environmental culture, shadow economy, trust in government) and fiscal macroparameters (tax culture and fiscal freedom). The economic interpretation of the obtained correlates is given. Based on the correlation analysis, stimulators and de-stimulators of tax environmental reforms across the EU were identified. It is established that the factors that positively influence on the tax environmental reforms are the overwhelming majority of the analyzed factors. The formation of indicators of the effectiveness of tax environmental reforms is undertaken for six countries of the Community. In particular, the analysis covers three economic leaders (Germany, the United Kingdom and France) and three leading EU countries in the field of environmental tax collection (Latvia, Greece and Slovenia). The article presents approaches to improving the assessment of the effectiveness of tax environmental reforms based on the consideration of fiscal (budget-filling) and reproductive (multiplicative) functions of environmental taxes. In this regard, the environmental tax multiplier and accelerator, as well as the GDP elasticity coefficient for environmental taxes, were calculated for the analyzed group of countries. The criteria of economic efficiency of tax eco-reforms are proposed. Keywords: environmental taxes, macroeconomic effect, macro-environmental policy, multiplier, accelerator, elasticity

This article is devoted to the study of the position of the Visegrad countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia) on the further development of European integration. Particular attention is paid to such important EU projects as the Defense Union, the Energy Union and the European Green Deal. The article also analyzes the stand of the Visegrad states on migration issues, institutional problems of European integration, energy security. Prestige and status remain important factors for the foreign and European policy of the Visegrad countries. For this reason, the latter are supporters of an intergovernmental and confederal approach to European integration, preservation of national competencies. In the vision of the further development of European integration, the positions of the mainstream and V4 have come closer. The Visegrad states do not want to leave the EU and are not ready to go to a tough confrontation with Brussels. The V4 countries that are not part of the Eurozone are planning to join it. They also support the main and most ambitious projects of European integration mentioned above, although they have their own special priorities in these projects. Visegrad is a sub-region with its own characteristics in the perception of European integration. These characteristics consist in conservatism, pragmatism, agrarianism, an anti-migrant mood. In this, some neighboring countries are similar to the Visegrad Four – Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia. This circumstance suggests that in the future it will be possible to speak about the informal group “V4+”.

The article analyzes the three stages of the migration of the German ethnic group into the territory of modern Ukraine, different in nature, character and orientation, and their features are clarified. The author reveals the geography of the first migratory flows of the Goths in the second half of the II century, which went from the Wisla delta to Scythia, and were divided into the western (settled on the right bank of the Dnieper) and eastern. The latter, having settled down near the Sea of Azov, founded the state of Germanarich, and in the IV century, under the pressure of the Huns, the center of life of Goths moved to the Kerch Peninsula, the mountainous region of Crimea, where their state association Gothia existed until the XVIII century. It turns out that in the early Middle Ages there was a second wave of German settlements on modern Ukrainian lands from the West European direction. The expansion of the settlements of Germans and immigrants from other European countries on the lands of Kievan Rus was facilitated by political relations, which were also realized with the help of dynastic marriage unions. The princes of Kiev, pursuing a foreign policy worthy of a great power, have equal relations with the main European states of the medieval world - the Holy Roman Empire (Germany) and Byzantium, they invite priests, German craftsmen and merchants. Starting from the XI century, small German trade colonies appeared in Kiev, Vladimir-Volynsky, Lutsk and other cities. During the Lithuanian-Polish period, the influx of German settlers to Ukrainian lands is increasing. This was facilitated by various benefits and provision of points to the German immigrants by Lithuanian princes and Polish kings. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Magdeburg law was acquired by large trading cities. The third period, the most significant resettlement and colonization, that is, large-scale development of the South of Ukraine - the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea region and the lands of Crimea - begins in the second half - the end of the 18th century. The author emphasizes that this most powerful period and the great positive history of the development of our region is largely connected with immigrants of German origin (and representatives of other ethnic groups). This period becomes a powerful colonization and economic development of the entire South of Ukraine, the rich land of the Azov, Black Sea, Crimea. It is noted that then, on the initiative and real support of the government of tsarist Russia, the development of wide steppe spaces took place, which, together with Ukrainian lands, had recently been transferred to the Russian Empire. Since then, the history of immigrants has become part of the history of the Ukrainian people. The dynamics of the development of German colonies in different provinces of the South of Russia is analyzed separately, the social aspects of the life of settlements, the grave consequences for the colonists associated with the First World War, and revolutionary events in the Russian Empire are indicated. The gains and losses in the national development, in the arrangement, in the administrative division of the German and other settlers, which were the consequences of radical fluctuations in the national policy of the Soviet government in the pre-war period, are revealed.

In times of globalization, there is a worldwide trend of creating various regional economic integrations which aim to benefit for their members. Almost all of the countries belong to or aspire to belong to a group. One of them is Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a member of CEFTA since 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina has built its foreign trade position together with other members, with which it has had exceptionally immense level of cooperation. Bosnia and Herzegovina is committed to joining the European Union, but the accession process is facing a lot of difficulties and going slowly, so that the time of receiving full membership is completely uncertain.Croatian withdrawal from the zone of free trade for the sake of joining the European Union has had inevitably serious consequences for the rest of the countries, reflected in decreasing the volume of mutual trade, stricter standards for export and differences in tariff and non-tariff barriers relative to those that existed during the membership in the same integration. At the same time, there is a change for the new member of the European Union, which improves its trade relations with for-eign countries and confirms some theoretical standpoints on the effects of regionalintegration. Although mostly positive, these effects are not equally distributed to allmembers of the European Union.The aim of this study is to investigate the effects of the European Union enlargementon the foreign trade positions of new member states, as well as the countrieswhich are in the accession process and have a significant exchange with the EuropeanUnion. Through the analysis of indicators of the member countries, a possibledirection of foreign trade development of Bosnia and Herzegovina on its path towardsfull membership in the European Union is presented.

The worldwide processes of economic globalization and integration are irreversible. This, on the one hand, provides significant opportunities for small countries and contains some threats on the other hand. There are the following integration groups in Europe: the European Union, European Free Trade Association and CIS (Eurasian Union). Despite the current hard challenges it is facing, the European Union is the most developed integration group, as well as one of the largest markets in the world. It should be noted that in recent years Georgia has achieved significant progress on the path of economic inte-gration with the EU; in particular, we mean the Association Agreement signed between the European Union and Geor-gia, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area is the part of this Agreement. The Association Agreement between EU and Georgia has fully entered into force. The Agreement suggests Georgia to adjust trade-related legislation and regulations to the EU standards. As indicated in the paper, although Georgia is not a member of the CIS, the country has quite close trade relations with the CIS member states, which have been characterized by increasing trend recently. Of course, we are not against trade relations between countries; however, future risks and challenges should be studied and analyzed. CIS member states accounted for almost 35% of Georgia’s export, while the average corresponding indicator for CIS member states was 16-17%. For example, CIS accounts for 23% of Armenia’s export, 7% of Azerbaijan’s export, 21% of Moldova’s export, 17% the Ukraine’s export, etc. The processes globalization and European integration are irreversible and Georgia has to use the current processes for the development of its economy. The country has chosen the appropriate foreign political and economic priorities and therefore it should continue its way towards the EU towards establishing closer ties with the EU. It would be desirable for Georgia to use the experience of leading European countries, as well as new EU member countries while implementing economic reforms.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Turkish foreign policy witnessed an almost fundamental change from what it was in the last century, when new worlds emerged in front of Turkey, from the Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia through the Middle East. New political approaches have also emerged aimed at inspiring the Ottoman multi-ethnic group formula to reconcile with Turkey's Islamic and Ottoman legacy at home as well as abroad, and within the framework of this new political concept that restored balance to Turkey's regional relations, which it did not attach importance to in the past because of its excessive focus on building solid relations with the European Union and the United States of America. After the Justice and Development Party came to power in Turkey in late 2002, Turkey's new leaders worked to activate the Turkish role in the regional environment surrounding Turkey. The beginning was to establish good relations with neighboring countries in the Middle East. In order to be effective and influential, the new Turkish vision in foreign policy focused on the importance of internal transformation, especially the consolidation of political and economic stability in the country, as internal reform in Turkey and its growing economic capabilities allowed it to emerge as a sponsor of peace in the Middle East. On this basis, Turkey's leaders have expressed their willingness to pursue active diplomacy in the Middle East in order to reduce or end problems with neighboring countries through a zero-problem policy.

Problem setting. The issue of Ukrainian relations with the four state members of the Visegrad Group is important from the very beginning of the establishment of the Visegrad Group as Ukraine is interested in raising the question of its support in the integration into the NATO and EU. The Visegrad Group has the experience of supporting its members in such integration. In addition, Ukraine is concerned about the resolution of its defence problems. Takin into consideration the war conflict of Ukraine with the Russian Federation that started in 2014, issues of cooperation in the military field turned out to be of top priority in relations with the state members of the Visegrad Group. Recent research and publications analysis. Issues of cooperation of Ukraine with the four state members of the Visegrad Group, in particular as a means for the European integration, have been studied by O. Andriychuk, Ye. Kish, M. Lendiel, A. Kudriachenko, S. Mitriaeva and H. Perepelytsia. Challenges and opportunities in collaboration of the Visegrad Group countries with Ukraine in the field of defence and security have been analysed in research works of V. Andreiko, H. Mysak and O. Kaplynskyi. Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. In spite of numerous studies of the above-mentioned authors, military cooperation between Ukraine and the state members of the Visegrad Group is understudied. Issues of working together with individual state members of the Visegrad Group in the military field need to be addressed deeper. Especially, it is important to outline military cooperation with the Republic of Poland in light of understanding the threats posed by the Russian Federation to Eastern-European countries. Paper main body. The Visegrad Group (Visegrad Four or V4) is a union of the four countries – Poland, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia, founded 25 years ago on 15 February 1991, composed at that time of the three states: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The union was formed as a result of the reaction of countries of the former Communist Bloc to the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance that created economic and security problems for the states, which they tried to solve partially by the enforcement of regional cooperation. According to the instruments of incorporation, the V4 Group is headed by one of the state members based on annual rotation, with a Summit of Heads of Governments held at the end. The countries head the organization for one year by turn. The main priorities of heading include expansion of the EU to the Western Balkans and eastern policy of the EU, cooperation in the field of defence, etc. Ukraine is one of the key partners of the V4 Group, aiming primarily at establishing a comprehensive dialogue and elaborating a joint position on the whole range of topical issues of international partnership and political situation, including in the region of the East Central Europe. In the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020, the V4 Group was headed by the Czech Republic. Taking into consideration significant changes in the security environment, the program of Czech heading was targeted at the expansion of cooperation in the following areas: – internal unity (joint political approach and solutions: there were more than 10 statements approved by the V4 Group at the level of Heads of Governments and Ministers of Foreign Affairs since the escalation of the situation in Ukraine regarding the support of Ukraine and preservation of its territorial integrity); – defence and security cooperation (implementation of common projects both within the V4 Group and the European Union), and others. Polish heading provided for coordination of the position of the state members of the V4 Group concerning Ukraine and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, and evaluation of the previous activities of the V4 Group towards the support of Ukraine. The Republic of Poland makes every effort to strengthen relations with Ukraine aimed at minimizing political threats and enforcing Polish defence. In the area of military cooperation, Ukraine and the Republic of Poland achieved substantial success in formation of the regulatory and legal framework of cooperation and initiation of primary directions of collaboration – from participation in the Partnership for Peace Program, joint military trainings, sharing experiences, improvement of professional skills of officers, education of mobile and tank forces to formation of a Polish-Ukrainian unit. Support of the idea of creation of a common security (defence) space from the Baltic States to the Back Sea must become a prioritized direction in cooperation between Ukraine and the Visegrad Group. Intensification of mutual efforts in the mentioned area will contribute to restraining the unhidden full-scale military aggression of Russia and serve as a factor of holding the Russian Federation from new re-division of the spheres of influence and territories. Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. Therefore, Ukraine has a great potential for the expansion of cooperation with the countries of the V4 Group in the military field, in particular with Poland and Czech Republic. Planning of and participation in the activities within the regional military collaboration of the Visegrad Group with Ukraine gradually turn into an efficient ground for the achievement of the main strategic objective of our country – full integration into the European Atlantic security space and joining the political and military alliance NATO. Further studies will provide an insight into the possibilities for enhancement of cooperation of Ukraine with the individual state members of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia) in the military field and development of comprehensive measures to mitigate the destructive policy of Hungary towards Ukraine.

The article examines the role of product quality and its impact on exports. It is noted that quality affects the competitiveness of both products and companies. The aim is to study product quality, on the example of pharmaceutical products, as a factor in the dynamism of foreign trade in the current world economy, in particular the study of export-import operations in the pharmaceutical market between Ukraine and the EU. The article analyzes the volume of exports and imports of medical devices between Ukraine and the EU in recent years. Emphasis is placed on this group of products that are aimed at protecting public health. The importance of this sector of the economy is proved. In the article shown the dynamics of its development and dependence on crisis phenomena, pandemics on the example of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and the anti-terrorist operation in Ukraine since 2014. Emphasis is placed on the fact that Ukraine has lost a third of its export potential, which was caused by Russian aggression. There is a positive tendency to increase trade in medical goods between Ukraine and the European Union, due to the current state of close relations between the countries. Based on the analysis of statistics on trade in medical devices, the author calculated the projected volumes of exports of medical devices to the EU for 2021-2023. For the next four years, further slow growth of foreign trade in medical devices between Ukraine and EU countries. Scenarios of development for the future are considered: optimistic, realistic and pessimistic scenarios of growth of domestic exports to the EU. The most probable realistic development scenario, which assumes a slow growth in exports of medical devices to the EU, reflects the trends of the last decade of relations between Ukraine and the EU. A pessimistic scenario will take place in the event of unforeseen events, global crises, and the possible onset of pandemics. In the article states that during the crisis, governments around the world, as a rule, may introduce measures related to trade in medical devices, which will directly affect global supply markets, change their structure. Currently, there is a gradual liberalization of the medical device market. Ukraine can benefit from the vector of European integration, which will promote economic growth.

Women in federal politics are under-represented today and always have been. At no time in the history of the federal parliament have women achieved equal representation with men. There have never been an equal number of women in any federal cabinet. Women have never held an equitable number of executive positions of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) or the Liberal Party. Australia has had only one female Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, and she was the recipient of sexist treatment in the parliament and the media. A 2019 report by Plan International found that girls and women, were “reluctant to pursue a career in politics, saying they worry about being treated unfairly.” The Report author said the results were unsurprisingwhen you consider how female politicians are still treated in Parliament and the media in this country, is it any wonder the next generation has no desire to expose themselves to this world? Unfortunately, in Australia, girls grow up seeing strong, smart, capable female politicians constantly reduced to what they’re wearing, comments about their sexuality and snipes about their gender.What voters may not always see is how women in politics respond to sexist treatment, or to bullying, or having to vote against their principles because of party rules, or to having no support to lead the party. Rather than being political victims and quitting, there is a ground-swell of women who are fighting back. The rage they feel at being excluded, bullied, harassed, name-called, and denied leadership opportunities is being channelled into rage against the structures that deny them equality. The rage they feel is building resilience and it is building networks of women across the political divide. This article highlights some female MPs who are “maintaining the rage”. It suggests that the rage that is evident in their public responses is empowering them to stand strong in the face of adversity, in solidarity with other female MPs, building their resilience, and strengthening calls for social change and political equality.Her-story of Women’s MovementsThroughout the twentieth century, women stood for equal rights and personal empowerment driven by rage against their disenfranchisement. Significant periods include the early 1900s, with suffragettes gaining the vote for women. The interwar period of 1919 to 1938 saw women campaign for financial independence from their husbands (Andrew). Australian women were active citizens in a range of campaigns for improved social, economic and political outcomes for women and their children.Early contributions made by women to Australian society were challenges to the regulations and of female sexuality and reproduction. Early twentieth century feminist organisations such The Women’s Peace Army, United Association of Women, the Australian Federation of Women’s Societies for Equal Citizenship, the Union of Australian Women, the National Council of Women, and the Australian Federation of Women Voters, proved the early forerunners to the 1970s Women’s Liberation Movement (WLM). It was in many of these early campaigns that the rage expressed in the concept of the “personal is political” (Hanisch) became entrenched in Australian feminist approaches to progressive social change. The idea of the “personal is political” encapsulated that it was necessary to challenge and change power relations, achievable when women fully participated in politics (van Acker 25). Attempts by women during the 1970s to voice concerns about issues of inequality, including sexuality, the right to abortion, availability of childcare, and sharing of household duties, were “deemed a personal problem” and not for public discussion (Hanisch). One core function of the WLM was to “advance women’s positions” via government legislation or, as van Acker (120) puts it, the need for “feminist intervention in the state.” However, in advocating for policy reform, the WLM had no coherent or organised strategy to ensure legislative change. The establishment of the Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL), together with the Femocrat strategy, sought to rectify this. Formed in 1972, WEL was tasked with translating WLM concerns into government policy.The initial WEL campaign took issues of concern to WLM to the incoming Whitlam government (1972-1975). Lyndall Ryan (73) notes: women’s liberationists were the “stormtroopers” and WEL the “pragmatic face of feminism.” In 1973 Whitlam appointed Elizabeth Reid, a member of WLM, as Australia’s first Women’s Advisor. Of her appointment, Reid (3) said, “For the first time in our history we were being offered the opportunity to attempt to implement what for years we had been writing, yelling, marching and working towards. Not to respond would have felt as if our bluff had been called.” They had the opportunity in the Whitlam government to legislatively and fiscally address the rage that drove generations of women to yell and march.Following Reid were the appointments of Sara Dowse and Lyndall Ryan, continuing the Femocrat strategy of ensuring women were appointed to executive bureaucratic roles within the Whitlam government. The positions were not well received by the mainly male-dominated press gallery and parliament. As “inside agitators” (Eisenstein) for social change the central aim of Femocrats was social and economic equity for women, reflecting social justice and progressive social and public policy. Femocrats adopted a view about the value of women’s own lived experiences in policy development, application and outcome. The role of Senator Susan Ryan is of note. In 1981, Ryan wrote and introduced the Sex Discrimination Bill, the first piece of federal legislation of its type in Australia. Ryan was a founding member of WEL and was elected to the Senate in 1975 on the slogan “A woman’s place is in the Senate”. As Ryan herself puts it: “I came to believe that not only was a woman’s place in the House and in the Senate, as my first campaign slogan proclaimed, but a feminist’s place was in politics.” Ryan, the first Labor woman to represent the ACT in the Senate, was also the first Labor woman appointed as a federal Minister.With the election of the economic rationalist Hawke and Keating Governments (1983-1996) and the neoliberal Howard Government (1996-2007), what was a “visible, united, highly mobilised and state-focused women’s movement” declined (Lake 260). This is not to say that women today reject the value of women’s voices and experiences, particularly in politics. Many of the issues of the 1970s remain today: domestic violence, unequal pay, sexual harassment, and a lack of gender parity in political representation. Hence, it remains important that women continue to seek election to the national parliament.Gender Gap: Women in Power When examining federal elections held between 1972 and 2016, women have been under-represented in the lower house. In none of these elections have women achieved more than 30 per cent representation. Following the 1974 election less that one per cent of the lower house were women. No women were elected to the lower house at the 1975 or 1977 election. Between 1980 and 1996, female representation was less than 10 per cent. In 1996 this rose to 15 per cent and reached 29 per cent at the 2016 federal election.Following the 2016 federal election, only 32 per cent of both chambers were women. After the July 2016 election, only eight women were appointed to the Turnbull Ministry: six women in Cabinet and two women in the Outer Cabinet (Parliament of Australia). Despite the higher representation of women in the ALP, this is not reflected in the number of women in the Shadow Cabinet. Just as female parliamentarians have never achieved parity, neither have women in the Executive Branch.In 2017, Australia was ranked 50th in the world in terms of gender representation in parliament, between The Philippines and South Sudan. Globally, there are 38 States in which women account for less than 10 per cent of parliamentarians. As at January 2017, the three highest ranking countries in female representation were Rwanda, Bolivia and Cuba. The United Kingdom was ranked 47th, and the United States 104th (IPU and UNW). Globally only 18 per cent of government ministers are women (UNW). Between 1960 and 2013, 52 women became prime ministers worldwide, of those 43 have taken office since 1990 (Curtin 191).The 1995 United Nations (UN) Fourth World Conference on Women set a 30 per cent target for women in decision-making. This reflects the concept of “critical mass”. Critical mass proposes that for there to be a tipping balance where parity is likely to emerge, this requires a cohort of a minimum of 30 per cent of the minority group.Gender scholars use critical mass theory to explain that parity won’t occur while there are only a few token women in politics. Rather, only as numbers increase will women be able to build a strong enough presence to make female representation normative. Once a 30 per cent critical mass is evident, the argument is that this will encourage other women to join the cohort, making parity possible (Childs & Krook 725). This threshold also impacts on legislative outcomes, because the larger cohort of women are able to “influence their male colleagues to accept and approve legislation promoting women’s concerns” (Childs & Krook 725).Quotas: A Response to Gender InequalityWith women representing less than one in five parliamentarians worldwide, gender quotas have been introduced in 90 countries to redress this imbalance (Krook). Quotas are an equal opportunity measure specifically designed to re-dress inequality in political representation by allocating seats to under-represented groups (McCann 4). However, the effectiveness of the quota system is contested, with continued resistance, particularly in conservative parties. Fine (3) argues that one key objection to mandatory quotas is that they “violate the principle of merit”, suggesting insufficient numbers of women capable or qualified to hold parliamentary positions.In contrast, Gauja (2) suggests that “state-mandated electoral quotas work” because in countries with legislated quotas the number of women being nominated is significantly higher. While gender quotas have been brought to bear to address the gender gap, the ability to challenge the majority status of men has been limited (Hughes).In 1994 the ALP introduced rule-based party quotas to achieve equal representation by 2025 and a gender weighting system for female preselection votes. Conversely, the Liberal Party have a voluntary target of reaching 50 per cent female representation by 2025. But what of the treatment of women who do enter politics?Fig. 1: Portrait of Julia Gillard AC, 27th Prime Minister of Australia, at Parliament House, CanberraInside Politics: Misogyny and Mobs in the ALPIn 2010, Julia Gillard was elected as the leader of the governing ALP, making her Australia’s first female Prime Minister. Following the 2010 federal election, called 22 days after becoming Prime Minister, Gillard was faced with the first hung parliament since 1940. She formed a successful minority government before losing the leadership of the ALP in June 2013. Research demonstrates that “being a female prime minister is often fraught because it challenges many of the gender stereotypes associated with political leadership” (Curtin 192). In Curtin’s assessment Gillard was naïve in her view that interest in her as the country’s first female Prime Minister would quickly dissipate.Gillard, argues Curtin (192-193), “believed that her commitment to policy reform and government enterprise, to hard work and maintaining consensus in caucus, would readily outstrip the gender obsession.” As Curtin continues, “this did not happen.” Voters were continually reminded that Gillard “did not conform to the traditional.” And “worse, some high-profile men, from industry, the Liberal Party and the media, indulged in verbal attacks of a sexist nature throughout her term in office (Curtin 192-193).The treatment of Gillard is noted in terms of how misogyny reinforced negative perceptions about the patriarchal nature of parliamentary politics. The rage this created in public and media spheres was double-edged. On the one hand, some were outraged at the sexist treatment of Gillard. On the other hand, those opposing Gillard created a frenzy of personal and sexist attacks on her. Further attacking Gillard, on 25 February 2011, radio broadcaster Alan Jones called Gillard, not only by her first-name, but called her a “liar” (Kwek). These attacks and the informal way the Prime Minister was addressed, was unprecedented and caused outrage.An anti-carbon tax rally held in front of Parliament House in Canberra in March 2011, featured placards with the slogans “Ditch the Witch” and “Bob Brown’s Bitch”, referring to Gillard and her alliance with the Australian Greens, led by Senator Bob Brown. The Opposition Leader Tony Abbott and other members of the Liberal Party were photographed standing in front of the placards (Sydney Morning Herald, Vertigo). Criticism of women in positions of power is not limited to coming from men alone. Women from the Liberal Party were also seen in the photo of derogatory placards decrying Gillard’s alliances with the Greens.Gillard (Sydney Morning Herald, “Gillard”) said she was “offended when the Leader of the Opposition went outside in the front of Parliament and stood next to a sign that said, ‘Ditch the witch’. I was offended when the Leader of the Opposition stood next to a sign that ascribed me as a man’s bitch.”Vilification of Gillard culminated in October 2012, when Abbott moved a no-confidence motion against the Speaker of the House, Peter Slipper. Abbott declared the Gillard government’s support for Slipper was evidence of the government’s acceptance of Slipper’s sexist attitudes (evident in allegations that Slipper sent a text to a political staffer describing female genitals). Gillard responded with what is known as the “Misogyny speech”, pointing at Abbott, shaking with rage, and proclaiming, “I will not be lectured about sexism and misogyny by this man” (ABC). Apart from vilification, how principles can be forsaken for parliamentary, party or electoral needs, may leave some women circumspect about entering parliament. Similar attacks on political women may affirm this view.In 2010, Labor Senator Penny Wong, a gay Member of Parliament and advocate of same-sex marriage, voted against a bill supporting same-sex marriage, because it was not ALP policy (Q and A, “Passion”). Australian Marriage Equality spokesperson, Alex Greenwich, strongly condemned Wong’s vote as “deeply hypocritical” (Akersten). The Sydney Morning Herald (Dick), under the headline “Married to the Mob” asked:a question: what does it now take for a cabinet minister to speak out on a point of principle, to venture even a mild criticism of the party position? ... Would you object if your party, after fixing some areas of discrimination against a minority group of which you are a part, refused to move on the last major reform for that group because of ‘tradition’ without any cogent explanation of why that tradition should remain? Not if you’re Penny Wong.In 2017, during the postal vote campaign for marriage equality, Wong clarified her reasons for her 2010 vote against same-sex marriage saying in an interview: “In 2010 I had to argue a position I didn’t agree with. You get a choice as a party member don’t you? You either resign or do something like that and make a point, or you stay and fight and you change it.” Biding her time, Wong used her rage to change policy within the ALP.In continuing personal attacks on Gillard, on 19 March 2012, Gillard was told by Germaine Greer that she had a “big arse” (Q and A, “Politics”) and on 27 August 2012, Greer said Gillard looked like an “organ grinder’s monkey” (Q and A, “Media”). Such an attack by a prominent feminist from the 1970s, on the personal appearance of the Prime Minister, reinforced the perception that it was acceptable to criticise a woman in this position, in ways men have never been. Inside Politics: Leadership and Bullying inside the Liberal PartyWhile Gillard’s leadership was likely cut short by the ongoing attacks on her character, Liberal Deputy leader Julie Bishop was thwarted from rising to the leadership of the Liberal Party, thus making it unlikely she will become the Liberal Party’s first female Prime Minister. Julie Bishop was Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2013 to 2018 and Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party from 2007 to 2018, having entered politics in 1998.With the impending demise of Prime Minister Turnbull in August 2018, Bishop sought support from within the Liberal Party to run for the leadership. In the second round of leadership votes Bishop stood for the leadership in a three-cornered race, coming last in the vote to Peter Dutton and Scott Morrison. Bishop resigned as the Foreign Affairs Minister and took a seat on the backbench.When asked if the Liberal Party would elect a popular female leader, Bishop replied: “When we find one, I’m sure we will.” Political journalist Annabel Crabb offered further insight into what Bishop meant when she addressed the press in her red Rodo shoes, labelling the statement as “one of Julie Bishop’s chilliest-ever slapdowns.” Crabb, somewhat sardonically, suggested this translated as Bishop listing someone with her qualifications and experience as: “Woman Works Hard, Is Good at Her Job, Doesn't Screw Up, Loses Out Anyway.”For political journalist Tony Wright, Bishop was “clearly furious with those who had let their testosterone get the better of them and their party” and proceeded to “stride out in a pair of heels in the most vivid red to announce that, despite having resigned the deputy position she had occupied for 11 years, she was not about to quit the Parliament.” In response to the lack of support for Bishop in the leadership spill, female members of the federal parliament took to wearing red in the parliamentary chambers signalling that female members were “fed up with the machinations of the male majority” (Wright).Red signifies power, strength and anger. Worn in parliament, it was noticeable and striking, making a powerful statement. The following day, Bishop said: “It is evident … that there is an acceptance of a level of behaviour in Canberra that would not be tolerated in any other workplace across Australia" (Wright).Colour is political. The Suffragettes of the early twentieth century donned the colours of purple and white to create a statement of unity and solidarity. In recent months, Dr Kerryn Phelps used purple in her election campaign to win the vacated seat of Wentworth, following Turnbull’s resignation, perhaps as a nod to the Suffragettes. Public anger in Wentworth saw Phelps elected, despite the electorate having been seen as a safe Liberal seat.On 21 February 2019, the last sitting day of Parliament before the budget and federal election, Julie Bishop stood to announce her intention to leave politics at the next election. To some this was a surprise. To others it was expected. On finishing her speech, Bishop immediately exited the Lower House without acknowledging the Prime Minister. A proverbial full-stop to her outrage. She wore Suffragette white.Victorian Liberal backbencher Julia Banks, having declared herself so repelled by bullying during the Turnbull-Dutton leadership delirium, announced she was quitting the Liberal Party and sitting in the House of Representatives as an Independent. Banks said she could no longer tolerate the bullying, led by members of the reactionary right wing, the coup was aided by many MPs trading their vote for a leadership change in exchange for their individual promotion, preselection endorsements or silence. Their actions were undeniably for themselves, for their position in the party, their power, their personal ambition – not for the Australian people.The images of male Liberal Members of Parliament standing with their backs turned to Banks, as she tended her resignation from the Liberal Party, were powerful, indicating their disrespect and contempt. Yet Banks’s decision to stay in politics, as with Wong and Bishop is admirable. To maintain the rage from within the institutions and structures that act to sustain patriarchy is a brave, but necessary choice.Today, as much as any time in the past, a woman’s place is in politics, however, recent events highlight the ongoing poor treatment of women in Australian politics. Yet, in the face of negative treatment – gendered attacks on their character, dismissive treatment of their leadership abilities, and ongoing bullying and sexism, political women are fighting back. They are once again channelling their rage at the way they are being treated and how their abilities are constantly questioned. They are enraged to the point of standing in the face of adversity to bring about social and political change, just as the suffragettes and the women’s movements of the 1970s did before them. The current trend towards women planning to stand as Independents at the 2019 federal election is one indication of this. Women within the major parties, particularly on the conservative side of politics, have become quiet. Some are withdrawing, but most are likely regrouping, gathering the rage within and ready to make a stand after the dust of the 2019 election has settled.ReferencesAndrew, Merrindahl. Social Movements and the Limits of Strategy: How Australian Feminists Formed Positions on Work and Care. Canberra. 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Women in Politics: 2017. 2017. 29 Jan. 2018 <https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/infographics/2017-03/women-in-politics-2017>.Krook, Mona Lena. “Gender Quotas as a Global Phenomenon: Actors and Strategies in Quota Adoption.” European Political Science 3.3 (2004): 59–65.———. “Candidate Gender Quotas: A Framework for Analysis.” European Journal of Political Research 46 (2007): 367–394.Kwek, Glenda. “Alan Jones Lets Rip at ‘Ju-liar’ Gillard.” Sydney Morning Herald 25 Feb. 2011. 12 Sep. 2016 <http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/tv-and-radio/alan-jones-lets-rip-at-juliar-gillard-20110224-1b7km.html>.Lake, Marilyn. Getting Equal: The History of Australian Feminism. 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Ed. Jocelynne Scutt. Ringwood: Penguin 1987. 107-120.Ryan, L. “Feminism and the Federal Bureaucracy 1972-83.” Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions. Ed. Sophie Watson. Sydney: Allen and Unwin 1990.Ryan, Susan. “Fishes on Bicycles.” Papers on Parliament 17 (Sep. 1992). 1 Mar. 2018 <https://www.aph.gov.au/~/~/link.aspx?_id=981240E4C1394E1CA3D0957C42F99120>.Sydney Morning Herald. “‘Pinocchio Gillard’: Strong Anti-Gillard Emissions at Canberra Carbon Tax Protest.” 23 Mar. 2011. 12 Sep. 2016 <http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/pinocchio-gillard-strong-antigillard-emissions-at-canberra-carbon-tax-protest-20110323-1c5w7.html>.———. “Gillard v Abbott on the Slipper Affair.” 10 Oct. 2012. 12 Sep. 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-09/gillard-vs-abbott-on-the-slipper-affair/4303618>.United Nations Women. Facts and Figures: Leadership and Political Participation. 2017. 1 Mar. 2018 <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures>.Van Acker, Elizabeth. Different Voices: Gender and Politics in Australia. Melbourne: MacMillan Education Australia, 1999.Wright, Tony. “No Handmaids Here! Liberal Women Launch Their Red Resistance.” Sydney Morning Herald 17 Sep. 2018. 20 Jan. 2019 <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/no-handmaids-here-liberal-women-launch-their-red-resistance-20180917-p504bm.html>.Wong, Penny. “Marriage Equality Plebiscite.” Interview Transcript. The Project 1 Aug. 2017. 1 Mar. 2018 <https://www.pennywong.com.au/transcripts/the-project-2/>.

Introduction I am a transmigrant who has moved back and forth between the West and the Rest. I was born and raised in a Muslim family in a predominantly Muslim country, Bangladesh, but I spent several years of my childhood in Pakistan. After my marriage, I lived in the United States for a year and a half, the Middle East for 5 years, Australia for three years, back to the Middle East for another 5 years, then, finally, in Australia for the last 12 years. I speak Bengali (my mother tongue), Urdu (which I learnt in Pakistan), a bit of Arabic (learnt in the Middle East); but English has always been my medium of instruction. So where is home? Is it my place of origin, the Muslim umma, or my land of settlement? Or is it my ‘root’ or my ‘route’ (Blunt and Dowling)? Blunt and Dowling (199) observe that the lives of transmigrants are often interpreted in terms of their ‘roots’ and ‘routes’, which are two frameworks for thinking about home, homeland and diaspora. Whereas ‘roots’ might imply an original homeland from which people have scattered, and to which they might seek to return, ‘routes’ focuses on mobile, multiple and transcultural geographies of home. However, both ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ are attached to emotion and identity, and both invoke a sense of place, belonging or alienation that is intrinsically tied to a sense of self (Blunt and Dowling 196-219). In this paper, I equate home with my root (place of birth) and route (transnational homing) within the context of the ‘diaspora and belonging’. First I define the diaspora and possible criteria of belonging. Next I describe my transnational homing within the framework of diaspora and belonging. Finally, I consider how Australia can be a ‘home’ for me and other Muslim Australians. The Diaspora and Belonging Blunt and Dowling (199) define diaspora as “scattering of people over space and transnational connections between people and the places”. Cohen emphasised the ethno-cultural aspects of the diaspora setting; that is, how migrants identify and position themselves in other nations in terms of their (different) ethnic and cultural orientation. Hall argues that the diasporic subjects form a cultural identity through transformation and difference. Speaking of the Hindu diaspora in the UK and Caribbean, Vertovec (21-23) contends that the migrants’ contact with their original ‘home’ or diaspora depends on four factors: migration processes and factors of settlement, cultural composition, structural and political power, and community development. With regard to the first factor, migration processes and factors of settlement, Vertovec explains that if the migrants are political or economic refugees, or on a temporary visa, they are likely to live in a ‘myth of return’. In the cultural composition context, Vertovec argues that religion, language, region of origin, caste, and degree of cultural homogenisation are factors in which migrants are bound to their homeland. Concerning the social structure and political power issue, Vertovec suggests that the extent and nature of racial and ethnic pluralism or social stigma, class composition, degree of institutionalised racism, involvement in party politics (or active citizenship) determine migrants’ connection to their new or old home. Finally, community development, including membership in organisations (political, union, religious, cultural, leisure), leadership qualities, and ethnic convergence or conflict (trends towards intra-communal or inter-ethnic/inter-religious co-operation) would also affect the migrants’ sense of belonging. Using these scholarly ideas as triggers, I will examine my home and belonging over the last few decades. My Home In an initial stage of my transmigrant history, my home was my root (place of birth, Dhaka, Bangladesh). Subsequently, my routes (settlement in different countries) reshaped my homes. In all respects, the ethno-cultural factors have played a big part in my definition of ‘home’. But on some occasions my ethnic identification has been overridden by my religious identification and vice versa. By ethnic identity, I mean my language (mother tongue) and my connection to my people (Bangladeshi). By my religious identity, I mean my Muslim religion, and my spiritual connection to the umma, a Muslim nation transcending all boundaries. Umma refers to the Muslim identity and unity within a larger Muslim group across national boundaries. The only thing the members of the umma have in common is their Islamic belief (Spencer and Wollman 169-170). In my childhood my father, a banker, was relocated to Karachi, Pakistan (then West Pakistan). Although I lived in Pakistan for much of my childhood, I have never considered it to be my home, even though it is predominantly a Muslim country. In this case, my home was my root (Bangladesh) where my grandparents and extended family lived. Every year I used to visit my grandparents who resided in a small town in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). Thus my connection with my home was sustained through my extended family, ethnic traditions, language (Bengali/Bangla), and the occasional visits to the landscape of Bangladesh. Smith (9-11) notes that people build their connection or identity to their homeland through their historic land, common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions. Though Pakistan and Bangladesh had common histories, their traditions of language, dress and ethnic culture were very different. For example, the celebration of the Bengali New Year (Pohela Baishakh), folk dance, folk music and folk tales, drama, poetry, lyrics of poets Rabindranath Tagore (Rabindra Sangeet) and Nazrul Islam (Nazrul Geeti) are distinct in the cultural heritage of Bangladesh. Special musical instruments such as the banshi (a bamboo flute), dhol (drums), ektara (a single-stringed instrument) and dotara (a four-stringed instrument) are unique to Bangladeshi culture. The Bangladeshi cuisine (rice and freshwater fish) is also different from Pakistan where people mainly eat flat round bread (roti) and meat (gosh). However, my bonding factor to Bangladesh was my relatives, particularly my grandparents as they made me feel one of ‘us’. Their affection for me was irreplaceable. The train journey from Dhaka (capital city) to their town, Noakhali, was captivating. The hustle and bustle at the train station and the lush green paddy fields along the train journey reminded me that this was my ‘home’. Though I spoke the official language (Urdu) in Pakistan and had a few Pakistani friends in Karachi, they could never replace my feelings for my friends, extended relatives and cousins who lived in Bangladesh. I could not relate to the landscape or dry weather of Pakistan. More importantly, some Pakistani women (our neighbours) were critical of my mother’s traditional dress (saree), and described it as revealing because it showed a bit of her back. They took pride in their traditional dress (shalwar, kameez, dopatta), which they considered to be more covered and ‘Islamic’. So, because of our traditional dress (saree) and perhaps other differences, we were regarded as the ‘Other’. In 1970 my father was relocated back to Dhaka, Bangladesh, and I was glad to go home. It should be noted that both Pakistan and Bangladesh were separated from India in 1947 – first as one nation; then, in 1971, Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan. The conflict between Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) and Pakistan (then West Pakistan) originated for economic and political reasons. At this time I was a high school student and witnessed acts of genocide committed by the Pakistani regime against the Bangladeshis (March-December 1971). My memories of these acts are vivid and still very painful. After my marriage, I moved from Bangladesh to the United States. In this instance, my new route (Austin, Texas, USA), as it happened, did not become my home. Here the ethno-cultural and Islamic cultural factors took precedence. I spoke the English language, made some American friends, and studied history at the University of Texas. I appreciated the warm friendship extended to me in the US, but experienced a degree of culture shock. I did not appreciate the pub life, alcohol consumption, and what I perceived to be the lack of family bonds (children moving out at the age of 18, families only meeting occasionally on birthdays and Christmas). Furthermore, I could not relate to de facto relationships and acceptance of sex before marriage. However, to me ‘home’ meant a family orientation and living in close contact with family. Besides the cultural divide, my husband and I were living in the US on student visas and, as Vertovec (21-23) noted, temporary visa status can deter people from their sense of belonging to the host country. In retrospect I can see that we lived in the ‘myth of return’. However, our next move for a better life was not to our root (Bangladesh), but another route to the Muslim world of Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. My husband moved to Dhahran not because it was a Muslim world but because it gave him better economic opportunities. However, I thought this new destination would become my home – the home that was coined by Anderson as the imagined nation, or my Muslim umma. Anderson argues that the imagined communities are “to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (6; Wood 61). Hall (122) asserts: identity is actually formed through unconscious processes over time, rather than being innate in consciousness at birth. There is always something ‘imaginary’ or fantasized about its unity. It always remains incomplete, is always ‘in process’, always ‘being formed’. As discussed above, when I had returned home to Bangladesh from Pakistan – both Muslim countries – my primary connection to my home country was my ethnic identity, language and traditions. My ethnic identity overshadowed the religious identity. But when I moved to Saudi Arabia, where my ethnic identity differed from that of the mainstream Arabs and Bedouin/nomadic Arabs, my connection to this new land was through my Islamic cultural and religious identity. Admittedly, this connection to the umma was more psychological than physical, but I was now in close proximity to Mecca, and to my home of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Mecca is an important city in Saudi Arabia for Muslims because it is the holy city of Islam, the home to the Ka’aba (the religious centre of Islam), and the birthplace of Prophet Muhammad [Peace Be Upon Him]. It is also the destination of the Hajj, one of the five pillars of Islamic faith. Therefore, Mecca is home to significant events in Islamic history, as well as being an important present day centre for the Islamic faith. We lived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia for 5 years. Though it was a 2.5 hours flight away, I treasured Mecca’s proximity and regarded Dhahran as my second and spiritual home. Saudi Arabia had a restricted lifestyle for women, but I liked it because it was a Muslim country that gave me the opportunity to perform umrah Hajj (pilgrimage). However, Saudi Arabia did not allow citizenship to expatriates. Saudi Arabia’s government was keen to protect the status quo and did not want to compromise its cultural values or standard of living by allowing foreigners to become a permanent part of society. In exceptional circumstances only, the King granted citizenship to a foreigner for outstanding service to the state over a number of years. Children of foreigners born in Saudi Arabia did not have rights of local citizenship; they automatically assumed the nationality of their parents. If it was available, Saudi citizenship would assure expatriates a secure and permanent living in Saudi Arabia; as it was, there was a fear among the non-Saudis that they would have to leave the country once their job contract expired. Under the circumstances, though my spiritual connection to Mecca was strong, my husband was convinced that Saudi Arabia did not provide any job security. So, in 1987 when Australia offered migration to highly skilled people, my husband decided to migrate to Australia for a better and more secure economic life. I agreed to his decision, but quite reluctantly because we were again moving to a non-Muslim part of the world, which would be culturally different and far away from my original homeland (Bangladesh). In Australia, we lived first in Brisbane, then Adelaide, and after three years we took our Australian citizenship. At that stage I loved the Barossa Valley and Victor Harbour in South Australia, and the Gold Coast and Sunshine Coast in Queensland, but did not feel at home in Australia. We bought a house in Adelaide and I was a full time home-maker but was always apprehensive that my children (two boys) would lose their culture in this non-Muslim world. In 1990 we once again moved back to the Muslim world, this time to Muscat, Sultanate of Oman. My connection to this route was again spiritual. I valued the fact that we would live in a Muslim country and our children would be brought up in a Muslim environment. But my husband’s move was purely financial as he got a lucrative job offer in Muscat. We had another son in Oman. We enjoyed the luxurious lifestyle provided by my husband’s workplace and the service provided by the housemaid. I loved the beaches and freedom to drive my car, and I appreciated the friendly Omani people. I also enjoyed our frequent trips (4 hours flight) to my root, Dhaka, Bangladesh. So our children were raised within our ethnic and Islamic culture, remained close to my root (family in Dhaka), though they attended a British school in Muscat. But by the time I started considering Oman to be my second home, we had to leave once again for a place that could provide us with a more secure future. Oman was like Saudi Arabia; it employed expatriates only on a contract basis, and did not give them citizenship (not even fellow Muslims). So after 5 years it was time to move back to Australia. It was with great reluctance that I moved with my husband to Brisbane in 1995 because once again we were to face a different cultural context. As mentioned earlier, we lived in Brisbane in the late 1980s; I liked the weather, the landscape, but did not consider it home for cultural reasons. Our boys started attending expensive private schools and we bought a house in a prestigious Western suburb in Brisbane. Soon after arriving I started my tertiary education at the University of Queensland, and finished an MA in Historical Studies in Indian History in 1998. Still Australia was not my home. I kept thinking that we would return to my previous routes or the ‘imagined’ homeland somewhere in the Middle East, in close proximity to my root (Bangladesh), where we could remain economically secure in a Muslim country. But gradually I began to feel that Australia was becoming my ‘home’. I had gradually become involved in professional and community activities (with university colleagues, the Bangladeshi community and Muslim women’s organisations), and in retrospect I could see that this was an early stage of my ‘self-actualisation’ (Maslow). Through my involvement with diverse people, I felt emotionally connected with the concerns, hopes and dreams of my Muslim-Australian friends. Subsequently, I also felt connected with my mainstream Australian friends whose emotions and fears (9/11 incident, Bali bombing and 7/7 tragedy) were similar to mine. In late 1998 I started my PhD studies on the immigration history of Australia, with a particular focus on the historical settlement of Muslims in Australia. This entailed retrieving archival files and interviewing people, mostly Muslims and some mainstream Australians, and enquiring into relevant migration issues. I also became more active in community issues, and was not constrained by my circumstances. By circumstances, I mean that even though I belonged to a patriarchally structured Muslim family, where my husband was the main breadwinner, main decision-maker, my independence and research activities (entailing frequent interstate trips for data collection, and public speaking) were not frowned upon or forbidden (Khan 14-15); fortunately, my husband appreciated my passion for research and gave me his trust and support. This, along with the Muslim community’s support (interviews), and the wider community’s recognition (for example, the publication of my letters in Australian newspapers, interviews on radio and television) enabled me to develop my self-esteem and built up my bicultural identity as a Muslim in a predominantly Christian country and as a Bangladeshi-Australian. In 2005, for the sake of a better job opportunity, my husband moved to the UK, but this time I asserted that I would not move again. I felt that here in Australia (now in Perth) I had a job, an identity and a home. This time my husband was able to secure a good job back in Australia and was only away for a year. I no longer dream of finding a home in the Middle East. Through my bicultural identity here in Australia I feel connected to the wider community and to the Muslim umma. However, my attachment to the umma has become ambivalent. I feel proud of my Australian-Muslim identity but I am concerned about the jihadi ideology of militant Muslims. By jihadi ideology, I mean the extremist ideology of the al-Qaeda terrorist group (Farrar 2007). The Muslim umma now incorporates both moderate and radical Muslims. The radical Muslims (though only a tiny minority of 1.4 billion Muslims worldwide) pose a threat to their moderate counterparts as well as to non-Muslims. In the UK, some second- and third-generation Muslims identify themselves with the umma rather than their parents’ homelands or their country of birth (Husain). It should not be a matter of concern if these young Muslims adopt a ‘pure’ Muslim identity, providing at the same time they are loyal to their country of residence. But when they resort to terrorism with their ‘pure’ Muslim identity (e.g., the 7/7 London bombers) they defame my religion Islam, and undermine my spiritual connection to the umma. As a 1st generation immigrant, the defining criteria of my ‘homeliness’ in Australia are my ethno-cultural and religious identity (which includes my family), my active citizenship, and my community development/contribution through my research work – all of which allow me a sense of efficacy in my life. My ethnic and religious identities generally co-exist equally, but when I see some Muslims kill my fellow Australians (such as the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005) my Australian identity takes precedence. I feel for the victims and condemn the perpetrators. On the other hand, when I see politics play a role over the human rights issues (e.g., the Tampa incident), my religious identity begs me to comment on it (see Kabir, Muslims in Australia 295-305). Problematising ‘Home’ for Muslim Australians In the European context, Grillo (863) and Werbner (904), and in the Australian context, Kabir (Muslims in Australia) and Poynting and Mason, have identified the diversity within Islam (national, ethnic, religious etc). Werbner (904) notes that in spite of the “wishful talk of the emergence of a ‘British Islam’, even today there are Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Arab mosques, as well as Turkish and Shia’a mosques”; thus British Muslims retain their separate identities. Similarly, in Australia, the existence of separate mosques for the Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Arab and Shia’a peoples indicates that Australian Muslims have also kept their ethnic identities discrete (Saeed 64-77). However, in times of crisis, such as the Salman Rushdie affair in 1989, and the 1990-1991 Gulf crises, both British and Australian Muslims were quick to unite and express their Islamic identity by way of resistance (Kabir, Muslims in Australia 160-162; Poynting and Mason 68-70). In both British and Australian contexts, I argue that a peaceful rally or resistance is indicative of active citizenship of Muslims as it reveals their sense of belonging (also Werbner 905). So when a transmigrant Muslim wants to make a peaceful demonstration, the Western world should be encouraged, not threatened – as long as the transmigrant’s allegiances lie also with the host country. In the European context, Grillo (868) writes: when I asked Mehmet if he was planning to stay in Germany he answered without hesitation: ‘Yes, of course’. And then, after a little break, he added ‘as long as we can live here as Muslims’. In this context, I support Mehmet’s desire to live as a Muslim in a non-Muslim world as long as this is peaceful. Paradoxically, living a Muslim life through ijtihad can be either socially progressive or destructive. The Canadian Muslim feminist Irshad Manji relies on ijtihad, but so does Osama bin Laden! Manji emphasises that ijtihad can be, on the one hand, the adaptation of Islam using independent reasoning, hybridity and the contesting of ‘traditional’ family values (c.f. Doogue and Kirkwood 275-276, 314); and, on the other, ijtihad can take the form of conservative, patriarchal and militant Islamic values. The al-Qaeda terrorist Osama bin Laden espouses the jihadi ideology of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian who early in his career might have been described as a Muslim modernist who believed that Islam and Western secular ideals could be reconciled. But he discarded that idea after going to the US in 1948-50; there he was treated as ‘different’ and that treatment turned him against the West. He came back to Egypt and embraced a much more rigid and militaristic form of Islam (Esposito 136). Other scholars, such as Cesari, have identified a third orientation – a ‘secularised Islam’, which stresses general beliefs in the values of Islam and an Islamic identity, without too much concern for practices. Grillo (871) observed Islam in the West emphasised diversity. He stressed that, “some [Muslims were] more quietest, some more secular, some more clamorous, some more negotiatory”, while some were exclusively characterised by Islamic identity, such as wearing the burqa (elaborate veils), hijabs (headscarves), beards by men and total abstinence from drinking alcohol. So Mehmet, cited above, could be living a Muslim life within the spectrum of these possibilities, ranging from an integrating mode to a strict, militant Muslim manner. In the UK context, Zubaida (96) contends that marginalised, culturally-impoverished youth are the people for whom radical, militant Islamism may have an appeal, though it must be noted that the 7/7 bombers belonged to affluent families (O’Sullivan 14; Husain). In Australia, Muslim Australians are facing three challenges. First, the Muslim unemployment rate: it was three times higher than the national total in 1996 and 2001 (Kabir, Muslims in Australia 266-278; Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 63). Second, some spiritual leaders have used extreme rhetoric to appeal to marginalised youth; in January 2007, the Australian-born imam of Lebanese background, Sheikh Feiz Mohammad, was alleged to have employed a DVD format to urge children to kill the enemies of Islam and to have praised martyrs with a violent interpretation of jihad (Chulov 2). Third, the proposed citizenship test has the potential to make new migrants’ – particularly Muslims’ – settlement in Australia stressful (Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 62-79); in May 2007, fuelled by perceptions that some migrants – especially Muslims – were not integrating quickly enough, the Howard government introduced a citizenship test bill that proposes to test applicants on their English language skills and knowledge of Australian history and ‘values’. I contend that being able to demonstrate knowledge of history and having English language skills is no guarantee that a migrant will be a good citizen. Through my transmigrant history, I have learnt that developing a bond with a new place takes time, acceptance and a gradual change of identity, which are less likely to happen when facing assimilationist constraints. I spoke English and studied history in the United States, but I did not consider it my home. I did not speak the Arabic language, and did not study Middle Eastern history while I was in the Middle East, but I felt connected to it for cultural and religious reasons. Through my knowledge of history and English language proficiency I did not make Australia my home when I first migrated to Australia. Australia became my home when I started interacting with other Australians, which was made possible by having the time at my disposal and by fortunate circumstances, which included a fairly high level of efficacy and affluence. If I had been rejected because of my lack of knowledge of ‘Australian values’, or had encountered discrimination in the job market, I would have been much less willing to embrace my host country and call it home. I believe a stringent citizenship test is more likely to alienate would-be citizens than to induce their adoption of values and loyalty to their new home. Conclusion Blunt (5) observes that current studies of home often investigate mobile geographies of dwelling and how it shapes one’s identity and belonging. Such geographies of home negotiate from the domestic to the global context, thus mobilising the home beyond a fixed, bounded and confining location. Similarly, in this paper I have discussed how my mobile geography, from the domestic (root) to global (route), has shaped my identity. Though I received a degree of culture shock in the United States, loved the Middle East, and was at first quite resistant to the idea of making Australia my second home, the confidence I acquired in residing in these ‘several homes’ were cumulative and eventually enabled me to regard Australia as my ‘home’. I loved the Middle East, but I did not pursue an active involvement with the Arab community because I was a busy mother. Also I lacked the communication skill (fluency in Arabic) with the local residents who lived outside the expatriates’ campus. I am no longer a cultural freak. I am no longer the same Bangladeshi woman who saw her ethnic and Islamic culture as superior to all other cultures. I have learnt to appreciate Australian values, such as tolerance, ‘a fair go’ and multiculturalism (see Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 62-79). My bicultural identity is my strength. With my ethnic and religious identity, I can relate to the concerns of the Muslim community and other Australian ethnic and religious minorities. And with my Australian identity I have developed ‘a voice’ to pursue active citizenship. Thus my biculturalism has enabled me to retain and merge my former home with my present and permanent home of Australia. References Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, New York: Verso, 1983. Australian Bureau of Statistics: Census of Housing and Population, 1996 and 2001. Blunt, Alison. Domicile and Diaspora: Anglo-Indian Women and the Spatial Politics of Home. 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Citation reference for this article MLA Style Kabir, Nahid. "Why I Call Australia ‘Home’?: A Transmigrant’s Perspective." M/C Journal 10.4 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/15-kabir.php>. APA Style Kabir, N. (Aug. 2007) "Why I Call Australia ‘Home’?: A Transmigrant’s Perspective," M/C Journal, 10(4). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/15-kabir.php>.