Journal articles on the topic 'European Union countries – Emigration and immigration – Economic aspects'

The article explores the essence of multiculturalism and its place in the politics of the European Union. This article looks at aspects of the impact of migration flows on countries of the world and world politics. It reveals the scope and main directions of international labor migration. The purpose of the article is to investigate the economic indicators of the countries most affected by irregular migration flows and to develop practical recommendations for improving the mechanisms of employment in international relations. Analyzing and summarizing the results of scientific works and research of domestic and foreign scholars, the tendency of characteristic changes of multiculturalism as part of cultural relations was considered. Several consequences of international labor migration from different countries are described. The importance of multiculturalism policy for international economic relations has been proved. Particular attention is paid to the problems and prospects of multicultural policy development in EU countries. Keywords: multiculturalism, migration, labor migration, emigration, immigration, economic migrants.

The paper aims to analyse the effects induced by labour mobility within the European Union, focusing both on emigration and immigration effects for major sending and host economies in terms of the overall economic activity, empowering the business enterprise sector and labour market, as well as on economic (labour force) and non-economic (humanitarian, asylum seekers) migration. Labour mobility within the European Union is an important coordinate of the economic integration process and one of the freedoms granted to the member states, with significant consequences upon their economies. Nevertheless, the international labour migration mainly resides from wage differentials, working conditions or opportunities between sending and host economies, thus proving to be an important symbol of global economic inequality. Taking into consideration all these aspects, our analysis is based on developing various double-log fixed (LSDV) and random (ECM) effects models, using a panel structure that covers five main EU destination countries and ten New EU Member States, respectively a complex set of indicators compiled during 2000-2014 and 2006-2015. The models are processed through OLS and GLS methods of estimation, as well as by using the correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSE) method, being completed by in-sample and out-of-sample predictions. The results show that immigration flows have important economic consequences leading to significant changes in labour market performances both for natives and foreign population (decreases in employment rates and lowering wage levels). Still, one of the most important positive effects of immigration reflected by the results obtained is represented by an increase in the number of innovative enterprises in the host country, thus confirming the theories linking migration to innovation. In terms of labour emigration, there is evidence to attest that it generates positive effects on the main sending economies from Central and Eastern Europe on the GDP per capita, earnings and exports, especially through remittances, but the overall negative impact is predominant.

Abstract Subject and purpose of work: The article is devoted to factors influencing the migration decisions of young Poles to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and to showing the differences in their perception of the country of emigration and the country of immigration. The elements of youth policy in Poland and the Netherlands were also presented. The hypothesis adopted in the paper was that the decisions of young people in the labor market are mainly influenced by short-term financial aspects. Materials and methods: The observations and assessments used in the article were formulated based on the research literature on the subject, the statistical data collected by the institutions of Poland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the European Union, a questionnaire survey and own experiences gained from mobility. Results: The article outlines the course of migration trends of Poles and presents the causes of changes in the choice of the destination country for migration. It presents factors encouraging young people to take up employment in the country and those encouraging them to search a job abroad, specifically in the Netherlands. The barriers and facilities that may be encountered by young people seeking employment in the labor market in both countries were indicated. The reasons for the emigration of young people from Poland were discussed based on the results of the current study, that is a 400-person research sample obtained from an online survey. The aim of the study was to identify three important factors influencing the decision to emigrate and to evaluate this decision. Conclusions: The conducted analysis shows the complexity of the problems of migration of young people. Economic, political, social, cultural, and environmental factors have a significant influence on the decisions made. From the point of view of young people, the unattractive domestic labor market in terms of finance and development, and all the resulting consequences are the biggest problems.

The past decade was a period that was characterized by massive migration flows in European Union countries, a situation like none other before. Different migration flows contributed to inflow of working force from conflict areas of the Middle East, countries from the Western Balkans, and also migration within the European Union. While immigration is dominant, emigration also has large impact in the migration flow in the EU. The purpose of this paper is to determine the main factors that contribute to emigration in the 28 EU countries. The panel regression model with random effects is used where seven factors were examined in order to determine their influence on the emigration. Macroeconomic determinants include GDP per capita and unemployment rate, demographic factors include total population, young male population and young female population and other factors include level of corruption and enrollment in tertiary education. Analysis includes 28 EU countries, while the analyzed period is 1999-2017 (19 periods), and the total number is 560 observations. The results confirm that emigration is driven by unemployment rate, total population, young male and young female population. When the unemployment rate increases, the emigration also increases, which is logical. If the national labor market cannot provide vacancies for the increasing supply of work force, the next option would be emigration in another country due to eligible working positions. Population, as demographic factor, also influences emigration. The bigger the population, the larger emigration is expected. Also, young female and male population have statistically significant effect on the emigration, yet the direction of the relationship is different. Increase in young male population can contribute to increase in emigration. On the other side, increase in young female population reduces the number of emigrants. From the results it would seem that demographic factors dominate over macroeconomic and other factors. Policy makers in the countries with accentuated emigration component should be concerned that young male population is leaving, and this labor force is or soon will become deficitary. Also, unemployment is another issue that should be addressed. National governments should create policies that contribute to increased economic growth that produces vacancies. Otherwise, the high unemployment rate would soon drain the country out of its working source. Other factors such as level of corruption, GDP per capita and enrollment in tertiary education seem not to have statistically significant impact on emigration in the countries of the European Union.

The study deals with the analysis of global labor market trends in the European Union countries under the influence of free movement and labor migration within the European Union. Named analyzes include defining trends in the emigration and immigration flows of the workforce among the countries of the European Union that apply the policy of migration and countries that are the source of labor emigration. On this basis, labor migration losses and benefits are assessed and their impact on GDP creation on the labor market, the state budget and other economic and social indicators for countries with a migration policy and for countries with a strong majority of labor migration flows abroad are examined. On this basis, the processes of creating imbalances in the European labor market, which are affected by the absence of balance sheets in the benefits and losses of labor migration for individual countries, are examined. The analyzes and investigations carried out have resulted in the definition and justification of the shift in the balance of losses and benefits of labor migration towards a predominance of benefits for countries with a migration policy and a prevalence of losses for countries with a strong dominance of labor migration flows abroad.

The article deals with challenges and opportunities for international labour migration in Ukraine. It is stressed that the approach to regulation of international labour migration should be comprehensive and should encompass a whole range of factors influencing migration flows, which will ensure making appropriate economic and social changes. The present concept of regulation of international labour migration in Ukraine is analyzed and the need for its improvement is discussed. The priority goals of the Concept of State Migration Policy in Ukraine are highlighted. It is stated that state migration policy is carried out in both emigration and immigration. Some of the key factors of immigration and emigration are identified. It is proved that migration policy in Ukraine is being shaped towards the European Union, which envisages a mutually beneficial redistribution of human resources over the countries. The paper claims, that achieving the quality of life as high as in the EU countries is a key demand for the integration into the European Union. It is emphasized that the existing legislation on migration has some weak points related to developing and fulfilling human potential of migrants. A range of measures to regulate international labour migration is introduced. Based on the research findings, the following actions are proposed to meet the aims of regulation of international labour migration in Ukraine: reduction of emigration from Ukraine by improving its socio-economic status; training and retraining of potential emigrants tailored to the specific characteristics of labor market growth in the country; stimulation of internal mobility aimed at the reduction of emigration; regulation of external employment of Ukrainian citizens; creation of conditions for attracting and efficient using of migrants’ money transfers; using transnational connections of migrants; halting the employment of national human resources; stimulation of immigration attractiveness for certain professional; halting illegal and undesirable migration; regulation of immigrants in Ukraine; legalization of illegal present immigrants; signing bilateral agreements between countries on return migration; stimulating re-emigration; protection of the rights and interests of labour migrants in Ukraine and abroad.

Immigration in Europe has been shaped by: a) its particular development in time; b) the geographical patterns of migration within and towards European countries; and c) the shifting types of migration and characteristics of migrants involved. The first part of this contribution outlines changes in these three basic migration-related factors. Migration outcomes are not haphazard nor are these the result of unhindered economic push and pull factors in a free market. Immigration policies of receiving countries do greatly influence the volume and patterns of migration, the place of settlement and the characteristics of migrants. Regulations on conditions of residence and integration do furthermore influence significantly the position of immigrants in their new destination, among others by setting conditions for their stay (residence rights) and access to the labour market. The second part of this chapter outlines the migration and integration regimes that have been developed by states of different parts of Europe and by the European Union. In conclusion, immigration has become a relevant phenomenon in all EU countries. However, as a consequence of different timing of immigration, different socio-economic contexts and varying governmental migration and integration policies, European countries are confronted with different forms migration (immigration, emigration, transit migration) and with different types of migrants. European states have also developed different governmental policies of migration and integration. Historically, a common denominator in the framing of European policies is that countries do not see themselves as immigration countries; they are immigration countries against their will. In recent times, such framing is reinforced by populist and nationalist movements that see immigrants not only as economic competitors, but also as a threat to the national "culture and world views". The more Europe needs immigrants for economic and demographic reasons, the less they are welcomed for cultural and political reasons.

From the perspective of international migration, Ukraine represents a particularly interesting case because it is a country of emigration, immigration and transit migration; wherefore the movement of people occurs in all directions. Moreover, the country faces serious economic problems that are fuelled by political instability within the country. Nowadays, Ukraine is a country with fifth largest emigration in the world with the largest representation of emigrants in Czechia. This paper examines the remittance behaviour of Ukrainian labour migrants. We attempt to test the theory of dwindling remittances on the data on Ukrainian migration in seven European Union countries and to determine whether the time spent away from home actually has a negative effect of remittances. We use data from a recent project called MIRPAL (Migration and Remittance Peer Assisted Learnings) conducted by Ukrainian researchers in cooperation with the World Bank which maps in detail the economic and social situation of Ukrainian migrants in European Union.

The text focuses on the migration in the European Union and in Poland at the begging of the 21st century. It aims to prove that even if the reasons and consequences of migration are varied, they have significantly shaped the development of human civilization and have been a part of human socialization. Furthermore, this text points out that the phenomena of globalization and democratization have affected the population movement and caused new patterns of contemporary migration. The European Union is a great example of cooperation between different countries in order to realize the principle of free population movement, which was put to the test over past years. Additionally, this article characterizes the Polish migration, especially the inflow of immigrants to Poland. Poland has become an emigration and an attractive immigration country. This text revels also the consequences of migration in modern Europe.

Emigration flows and their relations with economic development can be observed through different aspects, where one of the important questions is the role of the remittances, and transfer of foreign money to home countries. The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of remittances on economic development in Central and Eastern European countries. A review of previous research on the role of emigration and the impact of remittances on economic development is presented in the first part of the paper. This is followed by panel data analysis. The analysis covers the period after the enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004 till the nowadays. The results confirm the positive and statistically significant influence of personal remittances on the economic development of the new EU member states, as well as the positive and statistically significant influence of final consumption, gross fixed capital formation, external trade balance, and foreign direct investments. The positive influence of remittances on economic development should be observed with caution, regarding that remittances are the results of emigration and also are connected with the unfavourable effects of emigration. This study adds to previous research about the significance of remittances in the economies of the new EU member states.

Abstract In the modern world, processes of migration are expected to contribute to economic development, the interchange of progressive technologies and knowledge as well as the blending of cultures. Solving the problems linked to migration processes is an important task to be accomplished by various state policies of European Union member countries. Both internal and external reasons explain why such policies are treated with much consideration nowadays. The present paper describes the development of European Union regulations on immigration and asylum, while tackling certain - primarily legal - aspects of immigration policies, too. Its conclusion based on the discussion of processes and legal provisions relates to the possible future of Europe.

Migration is the most common social phenomenon in the modern world. First of all it helps people to improve their financial situation and living conditions. Besides, the decision on migration can be taken due to the unstable safety in the country. The paper presents the migration process from and to the Middle East, in particularly the process of emigration to Western Europe (mainly illegal emigration of refugees, emigration of elite and religious minorities). Moreover, it shows the migration process to the countries of the Middle East, especially in the context of economic migration in the Persian Gulf, taking into consideration features, forms, sources and consequences of this phenomenon. The main hypothesis of the presented concept is the assumption that migration directly affects international relations and is often associated with risk. The issue of migration in many Western countries has become an important and urgent issue related to security and terrorism. Therefore, the European Union began to perceive the flow of illegal migrants as a source of risk that could be a threat to European safety. One should realize that analyzed phenomenon affects almost all aspects of the functioning of society. Moreover, we should emphasize the inestimable economic potential brought by immigrants, especially because of the society aging in Western Europe. Consequently, it is necessary to establish agreements between EU countries and countries-exporters of immigrants, not only on a bilateral basis, but also at a multilateral level. In the countries of emigrants there is no elaborated migration policy, besides there are no signs of improvement in the political, economic and social situation in the Middle East – on the contrary the situation is worsening, that will certainly contribute to an increase of emigrants who want to leave the region.

Abstract The phenomenon of globalization has greatly influenced migration in recent years in the European Union. In this article we aim to analyze the benefits of migration in the economy by emphasizing the impact of remittances on the economic development of a country. Remittances are considered as an external source of important, stable funds that help the economic development of a country. We identify also the macroeconomic determinants of remittances. For the statistical and econometric analysis of these factors, we have chosen to use the Panel Data Regression for the countries of the European Union. To analyze the benefits of remittances, the most appropriate macroeconomic indicator is GDP. So in the first part of the article we will present the impact of globalization and migration on remittances, and in the second part we will highlight the economic growth through the presence of remittances. This article examines the role of migrants as a particular segment of the market and as a resource for development. All aspects to be analyzed will outline an overview of population emigration and factors that influence the development of the economy at a time when globalization is on the rise.

Turkey’s accession to the European Union has turned out to be a very long saga. One of the concerns in Europe is that Turkey’s membership would open the way for millions of immigrants from Turkey arriving in Western European member states, as was believed to be the case with Eastern European enlargement in the 2000s. This paper focuses on migration flows and causes of human mobility while drawing upon the Gallup World Poll on migration in Europe with particular reference to the data on desire to migrate permanently from Turkey and to Turkey. The Gallup World Poll is an on-going project surveying residents in more than 150 countries on a variety of topics including international mobility. The full data set includes over 400,000 face-to-face interviews conducted in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Despite exceptions with different sample sizes, in each of the 160 countries 3,000 cases were collected as part of a larger survey. Turkish respondents have lower desire to emigrate compared to the rest of the world while Iranians and Germans are top groups who desire to migrate to Turkey. The data shows that Turkey has been a growing economy and attracting immigration while also producing emigration. Turkey’s overall socio-economic and political record suggests that the desire to migrate from Turkey will continue despite recent economic advances. Nevertheless, the Gallup data shows that the level of desire to migrate in Turkey is remarkably lower than many neighbouring countries and Europe.

International migration is an integral part of globalization: the twenty-first century is even called the “age of migration”. Although international migration has existed for a long time before the age of globalization, global migration volume, speed and complexity during this time, has become unprecedented. Lithuania is attributed to countries where migration flows are particularly large currently. The country’s negative international net migration for 1000 persons is one of the largest in the European Union. Assessing the impact of emigration on the country, researchers express ambiguous attitude and identifies both positive and negative aspects of this phenomenon. However, it is emphasized that intensive growing emigration threatens both the social and economic stability of the country. So both scientific and practical aspect is important to investigate the emigration from Lithuania processes and assess determinants of emigration from Lithuania. Using the scientific literature analysis, comparison, systematization, classification, generalization it was found that there are no single definitions of migration and emigration. Concepts of these phenomena vary depending on the context, in which they are interpreted. There is no single universal theory of migration which would fully explain the process of migration and determinants of emigration. Migration theories investigate this process at different levels, certain parts, emphasizing one or another aspect. It should be noted that migration theories should be seen not as alternatives, but as complementary theories. Determinants of emigration are very diverse and can be classified into various groups. Using the analytical method of dynamic lines, it was found that the migration situation in the European Union countries has been quite uneven for the period of 1998–2013. Higher number of emigrants than immigrants in Lithuania was every year of analyzed period. The analysis of emigration dynamics showed that emigration flows from Lithuania were uneven. Tarptautinė migracija – neatskiriama globalizacijos dalis: XXI a. net vadinamas „migracijos amžiumi“. Nors tarptautinė migracija ilgą laiką egzistavo ir prieš globalizacijos amžių, pasaulinės migracijos apimtis, greitis ir kompleksiškumas jo metu tapo beprecedentis. Lietuva priskiriama šalims, kuriose šiuo metu vyrauja itin dideli emigracijos srautai. Šalies neigiamas tarptautinės migracijos saldo, tenkantis 1000-iui gyventojų – vienas didžiausių Europos Sąjungoje. Vertinant emigracijos poveikį šaliai, mokslinėje literatūroje išreiškiamas nevienareikšmiškas požiūris ir nurodomi tiek teigiami, tiek neigiami šio reiškinio aspektai. Vis dėlto pabrėžiama, kad intensyviai augantys emigracijos mastai kelia grėsmę tiek socialiniam, tiek ekonominiam šalies stabilumui. Tiek moksliniu, tiek praktiniu aspektu svarbu tirti emigracijos iš Lietuvos procesus ir įvertinti pagrindinius veiksnius, lemiančius sprendimą emigruoti. Naudojant mokslinės literatūros analizę, lyginimą, sisteminimą, klasifikaciją, apibendrinimą nustatyta, kad nėra vieno sąvokų migracija ir emigracija apibrėžimo, o šių reiškinių sampratos kinta priklausomai nuo konteksto, kuriuose yra aiškinamos. Nėra vienos universalios migracijos teorijos, visapusiškai paaiškinančios migracijos procesą ir migraciją lemiančius veiksnius. Migraciją aiškinančios teorijos šį procesą nagrinėja skirtingais lygmenimis, tam tikromis dalimis, akcentuodamos vieną ar kitą aspektą. Pažymėtina, kad migracijos teorijas reikėtų vertinti ne kaip alternatyvas, o kaip viena kitą papildančias teorijas. Emigraciją lemiantys veiksniai yra labai įvairūs bei gali būti klasifikuojami į įvairias grupes. Nustatyta, kad migracijos situacija Europos Sąjungos šalyse 1998–2013 metų laikotarpiu buvo gana nevienoda. Didesnis emigrantų nei imigrantų skaičius Lietuvai buvo būdingas kiekvienais analizuojamo laikotarpio metais. Emigrantų iš Lietuvos srautai analizuojamu laikotarpiu kito gana netolygiai.

This article analyses language rights in the larger language context between Italy, a country who is well established in language minority rights sphere in European Union and Republic of Macedonia. Language diversity is an on-going process impacted by migration and globalization. In this regard, this paper analyses the language policy development of the same language but in two different context. The first scenario is Arbreshi/Albaninan language spoken in Southern Italy after their immigration from Albania in the 15th century, and the Albanian language spoken in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Although it is the same language, the dynamics of globalization, absence of economic opportunities, local and the international political context and the status of a minority language in both countries have stirred the same language in different directions in Italy and Macedonia. The study investigates the possible scenarios that these languages could be considered endangered as a result of assimilation in Southern Italy or massive emigration which the case in Macedonia is. The biggest challenges seem to be the disability to fight in the aggressive economic race and are lacking vitality and policy mechanisms to survive. The study investigates how languages are overpowered because they do not present an economic factor in their community and as a consequence they first lose their rank in the local community and consequently they lose their chance for revitalization The paper also analyses the current legal status of these languages in both aforementioned countries and possible scenarios of being endangered languages as a result of urbanization and economic competition in this globalized reality.

In this article the author analyses the evolution of complex corpus of legislation concerning the freedom of movement for persons in European Union Law. The article deals with the subject in two aspects: the first part of the analysis considers the conceptual development of free movement of persons by way of deliberation of building-up the authority of Union in that area, and the second part analyses the contents of the right of the Union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member State. The freedom of movement for people includes the right of Union citizens to enter, move and reside in another Member State and, in that context prohibition of any discrimination based on nationality. Conceived originally as primarily an economic phenomenon, the free movement of persons was closely linked to the pursuit of an occupation. It was the mobility of human resources as a factor of production, which inspired the chapters of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957) relating to the free movement of workers, freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. In that sense, freedom of movement is a part of a wider concept, that of the common/internal market. Since then, through the combined effect of secondary legislation and the case law of the Court of Justice, the concept has been broadened and it tends, from the Maastricht Treaty (1992), to form one of the fundamental and individual rights of Union citizens generally. Also, the amendments of EEC Treaty, which were made by the Single European Act (1985) and specially by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001), have formalised the external aspect of freedom of movement. Namely, it was recognised that freedom of movement for persons could not take place at the expense of security, protection against crime and illegal immigration. The abolition of internal controls has generated the need of the transferring checks to the external frontiers of the Union and, in this connection, the gradual establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice. In the first part of the article the author presents and analyses the development of the Union power in the policies of freedom of movement: in facilitating of free movement of people as a principle of the common/internal/single market, in achievement of the right to free movement for Union citizens, and also in the fields related to the external aspect of freedom of movement, or, actually, the issues pertaining to visas, asylum and immigration. The second part presents the specific contents of freedom of movement for persons that consists of the corpus of individual rights enjoyed by Union citizens on the territories of EU Member States that are not countries of their origin. These are the right to entry and residence and the right to engagement in gainful activity as well as the related social rights. This part of the article also explores the freedom of movement restriction regime as well as the corresponding Union legislation in preparation.

Statement of the problem. Employment of the population and reduction of unemployment rate are priority objectives for economic recovery in the country suffering from the hybrid war for many years, affected by the COVID-19 pandemic for two years, and involved into the full-scale war since February 24, 2022 that results in joblessness for thousands of people, destruction of the businesses, equipment and facilities, as well as the natural resources of Ukraine. These and other factors are undermining the normalfunc- tioning of the labor market that currently features high unemployment rate, essential territorial differentiation in the area of employment in connection with the temporary occupation of the territories and warfare, imbalances between the vacancies and the qualifications in demand, negative demographic processes (increase in the rate of mortality, disability, migration within and outside the country). Today, governmental regulation of the labor market is a necessity because coordination between the interests of the workforce and the employers has to be supported and monitored by the government to enable fast recovery from the crisis and integration of Ukraine into the world economic space, increase of the economic competitiveness and acceptance of Ukraine as the member of the European Union. Analysis of the latest researches and publications. The war in Ukraine that has caused social and economic crisis has also adversely affected the national labor market and employment industry. The vacancies have been curtailed as a result of emigration of people and relocation of businesses, employment has become problematic or impossible, accordingly, there is increase in unemployment rate stemming from the pandemic and economic crisis emerging before the war. That is why a lot of scientists have started researching this problem, namely, N. Balashova, O. Bokov, M. Butko, V. Vasylchenko, R. Voitovych [4], S. Honcharova, K. Dubych [4], M. Kravchenko, O. Krainyk, E. Libanova, Y. Marshavin, L. Novak-Kaliaieva, V. Onikienko, N. Savchenko, K. Suprun [5], N. Titchenko. Addressing the previously untouched points of the general problem. The subject of the research constitutes study of the particulars of formation of offer and demand in the labor market of Ukraine amid improvement of its governmental regulation, with due regard to the European Integration ambitions of Ukraine. Presentation of the basic research material. Employment of the population is one of the most important criteria influencing the state of economy and efficiency of public administration in any country. The purpose of the governmental policy in this area is to ensure the fullest involvement of the population in the socioeconomic development processes. Public administration of employment includes ensuring balance between the labor offer and demand for the people with different occupational qualifications, increase of the income and improvement of the quality of life of the people, facilitation of staff support in order to generate and fulfill the creative and business ideas. Public administration of employment plays an important rolein the socioeconomic development policy, offersso- lution to the multidimensional problems, and not only furthers achievement of quantitative target values, but also encourages qualitative economic changes, human capital development, especially in the context of the European integration. Based on the completed analysis, the key measures aimed at improvement of the governmental regulation of the labor market amid the crisis are creation of equal opportunities for the unemployed in the Employment Center of the region, provision of access to the training programs and job offers, introduction of the mechanisms of cooperation and interaction among the State Employment Service and private employment agencies; elimination of imbalance between the workforce offer and demand revealed while analyzing the number of vacancies and unemployed in the labor market of Ukraine, which is especially necessary in times of war, by achieving the balance between the workforce offer and demand in the market through generation of the system of monitoring and forecasting, and estimation of the numbers of the state order in the educational institutions; career guidance organization and promotion, training and re-training of staff; harmonization of the legislative regulation of labor relations of the market participants; in view of the experience gained from the developed countries, prioritization of the social protection of the unemployed population (financial aid, unemployment benefits, unemployment insurance, etc.), which shall definitely decrease emigration of the staff and reduce the criminal rate; generation of the competitive environment, both in the labor market and in the businesses, with due regard to the economic and regional aspects; increase of motivation among the unemployed, etc. Conclusions. The research addresses the evident lack of balance between the offer and demand in the labor market occurring as a result of the pandemic, as well as substantial worsening of this situation since February 24, 2022. In 2018–2019, the difference between the vacancies and the unemployed was not essential, in 2020, the number of unemployed exceeded the number of vacancies 1.5 times, in 2021, 1.7 times, and in 2022, 2.7 times. In addition to the social crisis when the war destroys the life of people and families, ruins or paralyzes the state and private economy sector, the governmental regulation of the labor market is required both at the state and the regional levels. Today, the worst situation is in the occupied territories or the area affected by fighting, and despite partial relocation of businesses, many companies are staying in the danger area any putting the life of their employees at stake every day due to impossibility to move their business to another area, desire to keep the jobs or for other reasons, for stabilization of economic processes and the future without war.

The article considers the formation of the demographic situation in Ukraine during its independence, namely - from 1991 to 2022. The authors analyzed the main demographic indicators - birth rate, mortality rate, natural increase, average life expectancy in the country over the past thirty years. In the first years of our country's acquisition of statehood, in addition to positive natural population growth, the increase in its number was also facilitated by a positive balance of migration due to a significant influx of immigrants. However, the deepening socio-economic crisis in 1992-1995 led to a sharp decline in birth rates, a deepening of natural population decline due to negative natural growth, and mass migration abroad in search of work. For the first time since this period, a negative balance of migration was recorded in Ukraine, and from that time until 2022, the volume of emigration exceeds immigration. Indicators of natural population movement have significant differences in the regions of Ukraine, urban and rural settlements. The highest values ​​are traditionally preserved in Volyn, Rivne and Zakarpattia oblasts, and the lowest ones are in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts. The study allowed us to draw conclusions about the negative demographic phenomena - a rapid decline in population due to a significant decrease in birth rates, high mortality rates, the spread of the phenomenon of "aging" of the population. All this leads to the inevitable depopulation in the country, which confirms the demographic loss of about 10 million people during the study period (due to natural population decline and high migration in the mid-1990s and early XXI century). The demographic situation in rural areas remains particularly catastrophic. Negative demographic trends are exacerbated by the mass exodus of young people to study and work in the cities. Among the main factors that influenced the formation of the current demographic situation in Ukraine are: socio-economic (high unemployment, migration abroad, low level and quality of life compared to other countries in the European region), environmental (high level of industrial pollution) certain regions, uncontrolled application of mineral fertilizers to agricultural land, radiation emissions associated with the Chernobyl disaster), natural (Covid-19 epidemic), military (active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022). The demographic catastrophe in Ukraine, connected with the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, deserves special attention. The huge direct and indirect losses suffered by the country are due to the direct deaths during the hostilities, as well as the mass migration of people abroad since the beginning of the war. The losses will be assessed by demographers and statistical services after the war, but it is already worth considering the directions of a comprehensive demographic policy in Ukraine in the postwar period, which will restore the country's demographic potential. This work requires the coordinated work of demographers, geographers, economists and government and local government representatives. The authors outlined only the most important vectors of the formation of a new demographic policy in postwar Ukraine. They plan to pay more attention to these aspects by continuing further research. Keywords: population reproduction, birth rate, mortality, natural movement, life expectancy

Universities have always had international dimensions in their research, teaching, and service to society, but those dimensions were in general more ad hoc, fragmented, and implicit than explicit and comprehensive. In the last decade of the previous century, the increasing globalization and regionalization of economies and societies, combined with the requirements of the knowledge economy and the end of the Cold War, created a context for a more strategic approach to internationalization in higher education. International organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the World Bank, national governments, the European Union, and higher education organizations such as the International Association of Universities placed internationalization at the top of the reform agenda. Internationalization became a key change agent in higher education, in the developed world but also in emerging and developing societies. Mobility of students, scholars, and programs; reputation and branding (manifested by global and regional rankings); and a shift in paradigm from cooperation to competition (van der Wende, 2001) have been the main manifestations of the agenda of internationalization in higher education over the past 30 years. International education has become an industry, a source of revenue and a means for enhanced reputation. Quantitative data about the number of international degree-seeking students, of international talents and scholars, of students going for credits abroad, of agreements and memoranda of understanding, as well as of co-authored international publications in high impact academic journals, have not only been key manifestations of this perception of internationalization, but also have driven its agenda and actions. This perception has resulted in an increasing dominance of English in research but also teaching, has createdthe emergence of a whole new industry around internationalization, has forced national governments to stimulate institutions of higher education going international, and hasgenerated new buzz words such as “cross-border delivery” and “soft power” in the higher education arena. In the period 2010–2020, we have seen not only the number of international students double to 5 million in the past decade, but also we have noticed an increase in franchise operations, articulation programs, branch campuses, and online delivery of higher education. There is fierce competition for talented international students and scholars, and immigration policies have shifted from low-skill to high-skill immigration. National excellence programs have increased differentiation in higher education with more attention for a small number of international world-class universities and national flagship institutions that compete for these talents, for positions in the global rankings, for access to high impact journals, and for funding, at the cost of other institutions. There is also an increasing concern about the neo-colonial dimension. In the current global-knowledge society, the concept of internationalization of higher education has itself become globalized, demanding further consideration of its impact on policy and practice as more countries and types of institution around the world engage in the process. Internationalization should no longer be considered in terms of a westernized, largely Anglo-Saxon, and predominantly English-speaking paradigm. (Jones & de Wit, 2014, p. 28) Internationalization became defined by the generally accepted definition of Knight (2008): “The process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimension into the purpose, functions and delivery of post-secondary education,” describing clearly the process in a general and value neutral way. Some of the main trends in internationalization in the past 30 years have been: More focused on internationalization abroad than on internationalization at home More ad hoc, fragmented, and marginal than strategic, comprehensive, and central in policies More in the interest of a small, elite subset of students and faculty than focused on global and intercultural outcomes for all Directed by a constantly shifting range of political, economic, social/cultural, and educational rationales, with increasing focus on economic motivations Increasingly driven by national, regional, and global rankings Little alignment between the international dimensions of the three core functions of higher education: education, research, and service to society Primarily a strategic choice and focus of institutions of higher education, and less a priority of national governments Less important in emerging and developing economies, and more of a particular strategic concern among developed economies In the past decade, however, one can observe a reaction to these trends. While mobility is still the most dominant factor in internationalization policies worldwide, there is increasing attention being paid to internationalization of the curriculum at home. There is also a stronger call for comprehensive internationalization, which addresses all aspects of education in an integrated way. Although economic rationales and rankings still drive the agenda of internationalization, there is more emphasis now being placed on other motivations for internationalization. For example, attention is being paid to integrating international dimensions into tertiary education quality assurance mechanisms, institutional policies related to student learning outcomes, and the work of national and discipline-specific accreditation agencies (de Wit, 2019). Traditional values that have driven international activities in higher education in the past, such as exchange and cooperation, peace and mutual understanding, human capital development, and solidarity, although still present in the vocabulary of international education, have moved to the sideline in a push for competition, revenue, and reputation/branding. Around the change of the century, we observed a first response to these developments. The movement for Internationalization at Home within the European Union started in 1999 in Malmö, Sweden, drawing more attention to the 95% of nonmobile students not participating in the successful flagship program of the EU, ERASMUS. In the United Kingdom and Australia, a similar movement asked for attention to internationalization of the curriculum and teaching and learning in response to the increased focus on recruiting income-generating international students. And in the United States, attention emerged around internationalizing campuses and developing more comprehensive approaches to internationalization as an alternative for the marginal and fragmented focus on undergraduate study abroad on the one hand and international student recruitment on the other. These reactions were and are important manifestations of concern about the competitive, elitist, and market direction of internationalization, and are a call for more attention to the qualitative dimensions of internationalization, such as citizenship development, employability, and improvement of the quality of research, education, and service to society. A wide range of academic scholars and international education practitioners have pushed for change with their publications and presentations. A study for the European Parliament on the state of internationalization in higher education gave this push an extra dimension. Not only did the study provide a comprehensive overview of the literature and the practice of internationalization in higher education around the world, but also—based on a global Delphi Exercise—it promoted a new agenda for internationalization for the future, by extending the definition of Knight (2008), defining internationalization as follows: The intentional process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimension into the purpose, functions and delivery of post-secondary education, in order to enhance the quality of education and research for all students and staff and to make a meaningful contribution to society. (de Wit et al., 2015) This definition gave a normative direction to the process by emphasizing that such a process does not proceed by itself but needs clear intentions, that internationalization is not a goal in itself but needs to be directed toward quality improvement, that it should not be of interest to a small elite group of mobile students and scholars but directed to all students and scholars, and that it should make a contribution to society. Over the past 5 years this new approach has received positive attention, and at the start of a new decade it is important to see if this shift back to a more ethical and qualitative approach with respect to internationalization is indeed taking place and what new dimensions one can observe in that shift.

Imigranci po 60. roku życia – przypadek Polski Streszczenie: Niniejszy artykuł, ma na celu przedstawienie skali zjawiska, jakim jest imigracja osób starszych do Polski, struktury demograficznej przyjeżdzających i kierunków imigracji w ostatniej dekadzie. Można przypuszczać, że Polska wzorem krajów, które wstąpiły do Unii Europejskiej kilkanaście lat wcześniej, tj. Irlandia, Grecja czy Hiszpania, po fali emigracji zarobkowej swoich obywateli, stanie się krajem o wzmożonej imigracji. W XXI wieku obserwujemy rosnącą mobilność przestrzenną seniorów, często z Północy Europy na Południe. Część tych przemieszczeń stanowią migracje powrotne. W przypadku Polski, imigranci-seniorzy to najczęściej osoby przed siedemdziesiątym rokiem życia mające polskie obywatelstwo. Świadczy to, iż mamy do czynienia w dużej części przypadków z imigracją powrotną. Rozkład przestrzenny napływu z zagranicy i kraje, z których pochodzą starsi imigranci, sugerują, iż mamy do czynienia z reemigracją Polaków wyjeżdzających jeszcze w XX w. Immigrants over 60 - the case of Poland Abstract: This article aims to present the scale of the phenomenon of immigration of elderly people to Poland, the demographic structure of people arriving and the directions of immigration in the last decade. It can be assumed that Poland, following a wave of economic emigration of its citizens, will become a country with increased immigration, following the example of countries that joined the European Union several years earlier, e.g. Ireland, Greece or Spain. In the 21st century, we observe the growing spatial mobility of seniors, often from the North of Europe to the South. Part of these movements are return migrations. In the case of Poland, senior immigrants are usually people under the age of seventy who have Polish citizenship. This proves that we are dealing, in a large part, with return immigration. The spatial distribution of the inflow from abroad and the countries of origin of older immigrants suggest that we are dealing with the re-emigration of Poles leaving as early as the 20th century.

Migration is one of important aspects of modern global world development, that includes many interrelated factors such as political, economic, social, cultural, etc. With recent trends, international migration is on the rise. Georgia has experienced a significant outflow of population caused by a sharp economic decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union in early 90s of 20th century. Many Georgian citizens migrated to the EU as labour migrants. After gaining the visa-free regime with the EU in 2017, the migration of Georgian citizens to the EU has increased. The reasons for emigration and immigration in Georgia do not differ from the rest of the world and are mainly caused by economic nature. The article presents the analysis and conclusions based on recent data gained by means of the sociological survey, which proves that the attitudes of Georgians towards migration mainly coincide with the approaches of Baltic States’ citizens. The survey results confirm that the experience of the Baltic States is valuable for Georgia. The outcomes demonstrate that it is more productive for Georgia to encourage the circular migration, which means promoting the employment of Georgian workers in the host countries, and later to support and facilitate their subsequent return to Georgia in order to apply the work experience and skills acquired abroad in Georgia.

The article addresses the electoral history of the right-wing populist parties in Austria, France and the Netherlands in the period from the beginning of 1980s till 2017, as well as features inherent in these parties. Similarities and differences between the nationalist, anti-immigrant parties of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, French Republic and Austria have been shown. Analysis of historical underpinnings of the creation of the nationalistically-oriented parties – French Front National (“National Front”, from June 1st 2018 Rassemblement national – “National Rally”), Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (“Freedom Party of Austria”) and Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (“Dutch Party for Freedom”) has been conducted. Influence of various problems present in these countries’ societies on the electoral performance of the mentioned above parties has been analyzed. Research on the electoral trends and main reasons for the surge in popularity of the right-wing populist parties in Austria, France and the Netherlands has been carried out. Direct influence of the issue of illegal immigration (especially so – from the Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East) on electoral preferences of the Austrians, French and Dutch has been demonstrated. History of the creation of the modern-day leading right-wing populist political parties, as well as their ideological evolution has been thoroughly analyzed. The parties’ differences in terms of political, social and economic aspects have been shown. Reasons for the right-wing populist parties’ popularity in Austria, France and the Netherlands have been identified – among them, the most important ones are the increasing immigration of Muslims to these countries, as well as the growing distrust of the citizens of Austria, France and the Netherlands towards the governing bodies and policies of the European Union. It is demonstrated that the causes of such electoral performances are not only the historical underpinnings that have shaped both countries throughout centuries, but also the differences in Scotland’s and Wales’ economic development and the ideological distinctions within the Scottish and Welsh independence movements. Influence of internal rows and ideological divergencies within the National Rally, Freedom Party of Austria and Dutch Party for Freedom on the parties’ performance has been demonstrated.

Abstract Introduction Georgia, like other Eastern European countries, showed a dramatic increase of international labour emigration after becoming independent in 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused economic instability, unemployment and poverty resulting in labour migration. Since then, thousands of children have been left behind in the care of extended family members while their parents work abroad. The aim of this study is to explore schoolteachers’ perceptions on parental migration and left-behind children (LBC) in Georgia as schoolteachers are the main contact persons for LBC and their caregivers. Methods We conducted six focus-group discussions with public school teachers, namely class-tutors and six in-depth interviews with school principals from two migrant sending regions. We applied reflexive thematic analysis to systematically analyse the data and identify main and sub-themes. The contextual model of family stress underpins this study. Results We identified the following themes expressed by both, teachers, and school principals: social and economic impact of migrant labour and relationships between schools and migrant families. School teachers and principals acknowledged some positive aspects of migrant labour, but primarily perceived parental migration as a negative experience for children leading to problems in mental health, well-being, and academic performance. Structural factors, lack of support and lack of community involvement were expressed to further worsen the situation. Teachers saw themselves as one of the main supporters for LBC while they described the role of caregivers ranging from caring to unhelpful or even destructive. School principals stated mitigating the situation by regular meetings with class tutors, extra-tutoring for LBC, psychological counselling, and developing/enacting internal guidelines. Conclusions Our findings suggest that LBCs and transnational families could benefit from the provision of psychological services at schools.

Introduction I am a transmigrant who has moved back and forth between the West and the Rest. I was born and raised in a Muslim family in a predominantly Muslim country, Bangladesh, but I spent several years of my childhood in Pakistan. After my marriage, I lived in the United States for a year and a half, the Middle East for 5 years, Australia for three years, back to the Middle East for another 5 years, then, finally, in Australia for the last 12 years. I speak Bengali (my mother tongue), Urdu (which I learnt in Pakistan), a bit of Arabic (learnt in the Middle East); but English has always been my medium of instruction. So where is home? Is it my place of origin, the Muslim umma, or my land of settlement? Or is it my ‘root’ or my ‘route’ (Blunt and Dowling)? Blunt and Dowling (199) observe that the lives of transmigrants are often interpreted in terms of their ‘roots’ and ‘routes’, which are two frameworks for thinking about home, homeland and diaspora. Whereas ‘roots’ might imply an original homeland from which people have scattered, and to which they might seek to return, ‘routes’ focuses on mobile, multiple and transcultural geographies of home. However, both ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ are attached to emotion and identity, and both invoke a sense of place, belonging or alienation that is intrinsically tied to a sense of self (Blunt and Dowling 196-219). In this paper, I equate home with my root (place of birth) and route (transnational homing) within the context of the ‘diaspora and belonging’. First I define the diaspora and possible criteria of belonging. Next I describe my transnational homing within the framework of diaspora and belonging. Finally, I consider how Australia can be a ‘home’ for me and other Muslim Australians. The Diaspora and Belonging Blunt and Dowling (199) define diaspora as “scattering of people over space and transnational connections between people and the places”. Cohen emphasised the ethno-cultural aspects of the diaspora setting; that is, how migrants identify and position themselves in other nations in terms of their (different) ethnic and cultural orientation. Hall argues that the diasporic subjects form a cultural identity through transformation and difference. Speaking of the Hindu diaspora in the UK and Caribbean, Vertovec (21-23) contends that the migrants’ contact with their original ‘home’ or diaspora depends on four factors: migration processes and factors of settlement, cultural composition, structural and political power, and community development. With regard to the first factor, migration processes and factors of settlement, Vertovec explains that if the migrants are political or economic refugees, or on a temporary visa, they are likely to live in a ‘myth of return’. In the cultural composition context, Vertovec argues that religion, language, region of origin, caste, and degree of cultural homogenisation are factors in which migrants are bound to their homeland. Concerning the social structure and political power issue, Vertovec suggests that the extent and nature of racial and ethnic pluralism or social stigma, class composition, degree of institutionalised racism, involvement in party politics (or active citizenship) determine migrants’ connection to their new or old home. Finally, community development, including membership in organisations (political, union, religious, cultural, leisure), leadership qualities, and ethnic convergence or conflict (trends towards intra-communal or inter-ethnic/inter-religious co-operation) would also affect the migrants’ sense of belonging. Using these scholarly ideas as triggers, I will examine my home and belonging over the last few decades. My Home In an initial stage of my transmigrant history, my home was my root (place of birth, Dhaka, Bangladesh). Subsequently, my routes (settlement in different countries) reshaped my homes. In all respects, the ethno-cultural factors have played a big part in my definition of ‘home’. But on some occasions my ethnic identification has been overridden by my religious identification and vice versa. By ethnic identity, I mean my language (mother tongue) and my connection to my people (Bangladeshi). By my religious identity, I mean my Muslim religion, and my spiritual connection to the umma, a Muslim nation transcending all boundaries. Umma refers to the Muslim identity and unity within a larger Muslim group across national boundaries. The only thing the members of the umma have in common is their Islamic belief (Spencer and Wollman 169-170). In my childhood my father, a banker, was relocated to Karachi, Pakistan (then West Pakistan). Although I lived in Pakistan for much of my childhood, I have never considered it to be my home, even though it is predominantly a Muslim country. In this case, my home was my root (Bangladesh) where my grandparents and extended family lived. Every year I used to visit my grandparents who resided in a small town in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). Thus my connection with my home was sustained through my extended family, ethnic traditions, language (Bengali/Bangla), and the occasional visits to the landscape of Bangladesh. Smith (9-11) notes that people build their connection or identity to their homeland through their historic land, common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions. Though Pakistan and Bangladesh had common histories, their traditions of language, dress and ethnic culture were very different. For example, the celebration of the Bengali New Year (Pohela Baishakh), folk dance, folk music and folk tales, drama, poetry, lyrics of poets Rabindranath Tagore (Rabindra Sangeet) and Nazrul Islam (Nazrul Geeti) are distinct in the cultural heritage of Bangladesh. Special musical instruments such as the banshi (a bamboo flute), dhol (drums), ektara (a single-stringed instrument) and dotara (a four-stringed instrument) are unique to Bangladeshi culture. The Bangladeshi cuisine (rice and freshwater fish) is also different from Pakistan where people mainly eat flat round bread (roti) and meat (gosh). However, my bonding factor to Bangladesh was my relatives, particularly my grandparents as they made me feel one of ‘us’. Their affection for me was irreplaceable. The train journey from Dhaka (capital city) to their town, Noakhali, was captivating. The hustle and bustle at the train station and the lush green paddy fields along the train journey reminded me that this was my ‘home’. Though I spoke the official language (Urdu) in Pakistan and had a few Pakistani friends in Karachi, they could never replace my feelings for my friends, extended relatives and cousins who lived in Bangladesh. I could not relate to the landscape or dry weather of Pakistan. More importantly, some Pakistani women (our neighbours) were critical of my mother’s traditional dress (saree), and described it as revealing because it showed a bit of her back. They took pride in their traditional dress (shalwar, kameez, dopatta), which they considered to be more covered and ‘Islamic’. So, because of our traditional dress (saree) and perhaps other differences, we were regarded as the ‘Other’. In 1970 my father was relocated back to Dhaka, Bangladesh, and I was glad to go home. It should be noted that both Pakistan and Bangladesh were separated from India in 1947 – first as one nation; then, in 1971, Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan. The conflict between Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) and Pakistan (then West Pakistan) originated for economic and political reasons. At this time I was a high school student and witnessed acts of genocide committed by the Pakistani regime against the Bangladeshis (March-December 1971). My memories of these acts are vivid and still very painful. After my marriage, I moved from Bangladesh to the United States. In this instance, my new route (Austin, Texas, USA), as it happened, did not become my home. Here the ethno-cultural and Islamic cultural factors took precedence. I spoke the English language, made some American friends, and studied history at the University of Texas. I appreciated the warm friendship extended to me in the US, but experienced a degree of culture shock. I did not appreciate the pub life, alcohol consumption, and what I perceived to be the lack of family bonds (children moving out at the age of 18, families only meeting occasionally on birthdays and Christmas). Furthermore, I could not relate to de facto relationships and acceptance of sex before marriage. However, to me ‘home’ meant a family orientation and living in close contact with family. Besides the cultural divide, my husband and I were living in the US on student visas and, as Vertovec (21-23) noted, temporary visa status can deter people from their sense of belonging to the host country. In retrospect I can see that we lived in the ‘myth of return’. However, our next move for a better life was not to our root (Bangladesh), but another route to the Muslim world of Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. My husband moved to Dhahran not because it was a Muslim world but because it gave him better economic opportunities. However, I thought this new destination would become my home – the home that was coined by Anderson as the imagined nation, or my Muslim umma. Anderson argues that the imagined communities are “to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (6; Wood 61). Hall (122) asserts: identity is actually formed through unconscious processes over time, rather than being innate in consciousness at birth. There is always something ‘imaginary’ or fantasized about its unity. It always remains incomplete, is always ‘in process’, always ‘being formed’. As discussed above, when I had returned home to Bangladesh from Pakistan – both Muslim countries – my primary connection to my home country was my ethnic identity, language and traditions. My ethnic identity overshadowed the religious identity. But when I moved to Saudi Arabia, where my ethnic identity differed from that of the mainstream Arabs and Bedouin/nomadic Arabs, my connection to this new land was through my Islamic cultural and religious identity. Admittedly, this connection to the umma was more psychological than physical, but I was now in close proximity to Mecca, and to my home of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Mecca is an important city in Saudi Arabia for Muslims because it is the holy city of Islam, the home to the Ka’aba (the religious centre of Islam), and the birthplace of Prophet Muhammad [Peace Be Upon Him]. It is also the destination of the Hajj, one of the five pillars of Islamic faith. Therefore, Mecca is home to significant events in Islamic history, as well as being an important present day centre for the Islamic faith. We lived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia for 5 years. Though it was a 2.5 hours flight away, I treasured Mecca’s proximity and regarded Dhahran as my second and spiritual home. Saudi Arabia had a restricted lifestyle for women, but I liked it because it was a Muslim country that gave me the opportunity to perform umrah Hajj (pilgrimage). However, Saudi Arabia did not allow citizenship to expatriates. Saudi Arabia’s government was keen to protect the status quo and did not want to compromise its cultural values or standard of living by allowing foreigners to become a permanent part of society. In exceptional circumstances only, the King granted citizenship to a foreigner for outstanding service to the state over a number of years. Children of foreigners born in Saudi Arabia did not have rights of local citizenship; they automatically assumed the nationality of their parents. If it was available, Saudi citizenship would assure expatriates a secure and permanent living in Saudi Arabia; as it was, there was a fear among the non-Saudis that they would have to leave the country once their job contract expired. Under the circumstances, though my spiritual connection to Mecca was strong, my husband was convinced that Saudi Arabia did not provide any job security. So, in 1987 when Australia offered migration to highly skilled people, my husband decided to migrate to Australia for a better and more secure economic life. I agreed to his decision, but quite reluctantly because we were again moving to a non-Muslim part of the world, which would be culturally different and far away from my original homeland (Bangladesh). In Australia, we lived first in Brisbane, then Adelaide, and after three years we took our Australian citizenship. At that stage I loved the Barossa Valley and Victor Harbour in South Australia, and the Gold Coast and Sunshine Coast in Queensland, but did not feel at home in Australia. We bought a house in Adelaide and I was a full time home-maker but was always apprehensive that my children (two boys) would lose their culture in this non-Muslim world. In 1990 we once again moved back to the Muslim world, this time to Muscat, Sultanate of Oman. My connection to this route was again spiritual. I valued the fact that we would live in a Muslim country and our children would be brought up in a Muslim environment. But my husband’s move was purely financial as he got a lucrative job offer in Muscat. We had another son in Oman. We enjoyed the luxurious lifestyle provided by my husband’s workplace and the service provided by the housemaid. I loved the beaches and freedom to drive my car, and I appreciated the friendly Omani people. I also enjoyed our frequent trips (4 hours flight) to my root, Dhaka, Bangladesh. So our children were raised within our ethnic and Islamic culture, remained close to my root (family in Dhaka), though they attended a British school in Muscat. But by the time I started considering Oman to be my second home, we had to leave once again for a place that could provide us with a more secure future. Oman was like Saudi Arabia; it employed expatriates only on a contract basis, and did not give them citizenship (not even fellow Muslims). So after 5 years it was time to move back to Australia. It was with great reluctance that I moved with my husband to Brisbane in 1995 because once again we were to face a different cultural context. As mentioned earlier, we lived in Brisbane in the late 1980s; I liked the weather, the landscape, but did not consider it home for cultural reasons. Our boys started attending expensive private schools and we bought a house in a prestigious Western suburb in Brisbane. Soon after arriving I started my tertiary education at the University of Queensland, and finished an MA in Historical Studies in Indian History in 1998. Still Australia was not my home. I kept thinking that we would return to my previous routes or the ‘imagined’ homeland somewhere in the Middle East, in close proximity to my root (Bangladesh), where we could remain economically secure in a Muslim country. But gradually I began to feel that Australia was becoming my ‘home’. I had gradually become involved in professional and community activities (with university colleagues, the Bangladeshi community and Muslim women’s organisations), and in retrospect I could see that this was an early stage of my ‘self-actualisation’ (Maslow). Through my involvement with diverse people, I felt emotionally connected with the concerns, hopes and dreams of my Muslim-Australian friends. Subsequently, I also felt connected with my mainstream Australian friends whose emotions and fears (9/11 incident, Bali bombing and 7/7 tragedy) were similar to mine. In late 1998 I started my PhD studies on the immigration history of Australia, with a particular focus on the historical settlement of Muslims in Australia. This entailed retrieving archival files and interviewing people, mostly Muslims and some mainstream Australians, and enquiring into relevant migration issues. I also became more active in community issues, and was not constrained by my circumstances. By circumstances, I mean that even though I belonged to a patriarchally structured Muslim family, where my husband was the main breadwinner, main decision-maker, my independence and research activities (entailing frequent interstate trips for data collection, and public speaking) were not frowned upon or forbidden (Khan 14-15); fortunately, my husband appreciated my passion for research and gave me his trust and support. This, along with the Muslim community’s support (interviews), and the wider community’s recognition (for example, the publication of my letters in Australian newspapers, interviews on radio and television) enabled me to develop my self-esteem and built up my bicultural identity as a Muslim in a predominantly Christian country and as a Bangladeshi-Australian. In 2005, for the sake of a better job opportunity, my husband moved to the UK, but this time I asserted that I would not move again. I felt that here in Australia (now in Perth) I had a job, an identity and a home. This time my husband was able to secure a good job back in Australia and was only away for a year. I no longer dream of finding a home in the Middle East. Through my bicultural identity here in Australia I feel connected to the wider community and to the Muslim umma. However, my attachment to the umma has become ambivalent. I feel proud of my Australian-Muslim identity but I am concerned about the jihadi ideology of militant Muslims. By jihadi ideology, I mean the extremist ideology of the al-Qaeda terrorist group (Farrar 2007). The Muslim umma now incorporates both moderate and radical Muslims. The radical Muslims (though only a tiny minority of 1.4 billion Muslims worldwide) pose a threat to their moderate counterparts as well as to non-Muslims. In the UK, some second- and third-generation Muslims identify themselves with the umma rather than their parents’ homelands or their country of birth (Husain). It should not be a matter of concern if these young Muslims adopt a ‘pure’ Muslim identity, providing at the same time they are loyal to their country of residence. But when they resort to terrorism with their ‘pure’ Muslim identity (e.g., the 7/7 London bombers) they defame my religion Islam, and undermine my spiritual connection to the umma. As a 1st generation immigrant, the defining criteria of my ‘homeliness’ in Australia are my ethno-cultural and religious identity (which includes my family), my active citizenship, and my community development/contribution through my research work – all of which allow me a sense of efficacy in my life. My ethnic and religious identities generally co-exist equally, but when I see some Muslims kill my fellow Australians (such as the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005) my Australian identity takes precedence. I feel for the victims and condemn the perpetrators. On the other hand, when I see politics play a role over the human rights issues (e.g., the Tampa incident), my religious identity begs me to comment on it (see Kabir, Muslims in Australia 295-305). Problematising ‘Home’ for Muslim Australians In the European context, Grillo (863) and Werbner (904), and in the Australian context, Kabir (Muslims in Australia) and Poynting and Mason, have identified the diversity within Islam (national, ethnic, religious etc). Werbner (904) notes that in spite of the “wishful talk of the emergence of a ‘British Islam’, even today there are Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Arab mosques, as well as Turkish and Shia’a mosques”; thus British Muslims retain their separate identities. Similarly, in Australia, the existence of separate mosques for the Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Arab and Shia’a peoples indicates that Australian Muslims have also kept their ethnic identities discrete (Saeed 64-77). However, in times of crisis, such as the Salman Rushdie affair in 1989, and the 1990-1991 Gulf crises, both British and Australian Muslims were quick to unite and express their Islamic identity by way of resistance (Kabir, Muslims in Australia 160-162; Poynting and Mason 68-70). In both British and Australian contexts, I argue that a peaceful rally or resistance is indicative of active citizenship of Muslims as it reveals their sense of belonging (also Werbner 905). So when a transmigrant Muslim wants to make a peaceful demonstration, the Western world should be encouraged, not threatened – as long as the transmigrant’s allegiances lie also with the host country. In the European context, Grillo (868) writes: when I asked Mehmet if he was planning to stay in Germany he answered without hesitation: ‘Yes, of course’. And then, after a little break, he added ‘as long as we can live here as Muslims’. In this context, I support Mehmet’s desire to live as a Muslim in a non-Muslim world as long as this is peaceful. Paradoxically, living a Muslim life through ijtihad can be either socially progressive or destructive. The Canadian Muslim feminist Irshad Manji relies on ijtihad, but so does Osama bin Laden! Manji emphasises that ijtihad can be, on the one hand, the adaptation of Islam using independent reasoning, hybridity and the contesting of ‘traditional’ family values (c.f. Doogue and Kirkwood 275-276, 314); and, on the other, ijtihad can take the form of conservative, patriarchal and militant Islamic values. The al-Qaeda terrorist Osama bin Laden espouses the jihadi ideology of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian who early in his career might have been described as a Muslim modernist who believed that Islam and Western secular ideals could be reconciled. But he discarded that idea after going to the US in 1948-50; there he was treated as ‘different’ and that treatment turned him against the West. He came back to Egypt and embraced a much more rigid and militaristic form of Islam (Esposito 136). Other scholars, such as Cesari, have identified a third orientation – a ‘secularised Islam’, which stresses general beliefs in the values of Islam and an Islamic identity, without too much concern for practices. Grillo (871) observed Islam in the West emphasised diversity. He stressed that, “some [Muslims were] more quietest, some more secular, some more clamorous, some more negotiatory”, while some were exclusively characterised by Islamic identity, such as wearing the burqa (elaborate veils), hijabs (headscarves), beards by men and total abstinence from drinking alcohol. So Mehmet, cited above, could be living a Muslim life within the spectrum of these possibilities, ranging from an integrating mode to a strict, militant Muslim manner. In the UK context, Zubaida (96) contends that marginalised, culturally-impoverished youth are the people for whom radical, militant Islamism may have an appeal, though it must be noted that the 7/7 bombers belonged to affluent families (O’Sullivan 14; Husain). In Australia, Muslim Australians are facing three challenges. First, the Muslim unemployment rate: it was three times higher than the national total in 1996 and 2001 (Kabir, Muslims in Australia 266-278; Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 63). Second, some spiritual leaders have used extreme rhetoric to appeal to marginalised youth; in January 2007, the Australian-born imam of Lebanese background, Sheikh Feiz Mohammad, was alleged to have employed a DVD format to urge children to kill the enemies of Islam and to have praised martyrs with a violent interpretation of jihad (Chulov 2). Third, the proposed citizenship test has the potential to make new migrants’ – particularly Muslims’ – settlement in Australia stressful (Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 62-79); in May 2007, fuelled by perceptions that some migrants – especially Muslims – were not integrating quickly enough, the Howard government introduced a citizenship test bill that proposes to test applicants on their English language skills and knowledge of Australian history and ‘values’. I contend that being able to demonstrate knowledge of history and having English language skills is no guarantee that a migrant will be a good citizen. Through my transmigrant history, I have learnt that developing a bond with a new place takes time, acceptance and a gradual change of identity, which are less likely to happen when facing assimilationist constraints. I spoke English and studied history in the United States, but I did not consider it my home. I did not speak the Arabic language, and did not study Middle Eastern history while I was in the Middle East, but I felt connected to it for cultural and religious reasons. Through my knowledge of history and English language proficiency I did not make Australia my home when I first migrated to Australia. Australia became my home when I started interacting with other Australians, which was made possible by having the time at my disposal and by fortunate circumstances, which included a fairly high level of efficacy and affluence. If I had been rejected because of my lack of knowledge of ‘Australian values’, or had encountered discrimination in the job market, I would have been much less willing to embrace my host country and call it home. I believe a stringent citizenship test is more likely to alienate would-be citizens than to induce their adoption of values and loyalty to their new home. Conclusion Blunt (5) observes that current studies of home often investigate mobile geographies of dwelling and how it shapes one’s identity and belonging. Such geographies of home negotiate from the domestic to the global context, thus mobilising the home beyond a fixed, bounded and confining location. Similarly, in this paper I have discussed how my mobile geography, from the domestic (root) to global (route), has shaped my identity. Though I received a degree of culture shock in the United States, loved the Middle East, and was at first quite resistant to the idea of making Australia my second home, the confidence I acquired in residing in these ‘several homes’ were cumulative and eventually enabled me to regard Australia as my ‘home’. I loved the Middle East, but I did not pursue an active involvement with the Arab community because I was a busy mother. Also I lacked the communication skill (fluency in Arabic) with the local residents who lived outside the expatriates’ campus. I am no longer a cultural freak. I am no longer the same Bangladeshi woman who saw her ethnic and Islamic culture as superior to all other cultures. I have learnt to appreciate Australian values, such as tolerance, ‘a fair go’ and multiculturalism (see Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 62-79). My bicultural identity is my strength. With my ethnic and religious identity, I can relate to the concerns of the Muslim community and other Australian ethnic and religious minorities. And with my Australian identity I have developed ‘a voice’ to pursue active citizenship. Thus my biculturalism has enabled me to retain and merge my former home with my present and permanent home of Australia. References Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, New York: Verso, 1983. Australian Bureau of Statistics: Census of Housing and Population, 1996 and 2001. Blunt, Alison. Domicile and Diaspora: Anglo-Indian Women and the Spatial Politics of Home. 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Citation reference for this article MLA Style Kabir, Nahid. "Why I Call Australia ‘Home’?: A Transmigrant’s Perspective." M/C Journal 10.4 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/15-kabir.php>. APA Style Kabir, N. (Aug. 2007) "Why I Call Australia ‘Home’?: A Transmigrant’s Perspective," M/C Journal, 10(4). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/15-kabir.php>.