Journal articles on the topic 'European tax citizenship'

Interrelation between economic and political dimensions of constitutionalism – European market integration and erosion of democratic representation within Member States of the EU – Regulatory externalities between national democracies – European market citizenship and its ramifications for democratically legitimate exercise of the power to tax – Underinclusiveness of domestic democratic process – Political representation beyond the state – European economic constitution as a source of political empowerment and the EU economic freedoms as political rights – The European Court of Justice as a protector of representation – Reinforcing political participation through regulatory competition – European market freedoms enhance representation but at the expense of political equality – Economic freedoms as insufficient means of political empowerment – Improving democratic representation and equality beyond the state requires properly political citizenship instead of mere market rights

This article builds on observations of self-employed Romanian migrants and their encounters with UK fiscal obligations to position tax as a distinct node in the worker-citizen nexus. Speaking to anthropological critiques of neoliberalism, I argue that economic activity is not merely the ethical imperative of a political order premised on self-reliance. It is also a practical test of migrants’ abilities to translate the moral capital of ‘hard work’ into the categories and bureaucracy of fiscal contribution. Analyzing migrants’ compliance with immigration controls and fiscal regimes, seen as a duty to ‘account for oneself’ in moral and financial terms, this article theorizes tax returns as a key junction in the worker-citizen nexus—one that can allow migrants into, but also confine them to the margins of, European citizenship.

The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the status of EU citizenship to the nationals of Member States. Central to that status is the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, in combination with the right to non-discrimination on the ground of nationality. This contribution argues that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is in the process of reconceptualizing the economically based treaty rights on the free movement of persons into a right that is becoming more and more disconnected from the EU's objective of the realization of the internal market. That perspective is also recognized in the ECJ's direct tax case law on the free movement of economically active persons and has caused for expansion of the influence of EU law on the direct tax autonomy of Member States. This contribution argues that EU citizenship can be viewed as the normative treaty justification underlying that new perspective.

The Neumark report draws attention on several occasions to taxes that affect citizens, including income tax, wealth tax, inheritance tax and taxes on motor vehicles, while also making a number of recommendations. However, the subject of citizens and taxation attracted little attention in the first fifty years of the EU, with the primary focus of cooperation being on economic matters. A Savings Tax Directive was adopted, and there has also been quite some ECJ case law on specific national schemes' compliance, or otherwise, with EU law. The Treaty of Maastricht widened European cooperation to include the second and third pillars, and also of course monetary cooperation. Another relevant development was the introduction of Citizenship of the Union. Since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009, Brussels has been devoting increasing attention to the citizens of Europe, including in the field of taxation. Tax obstacles for citizens in cross-border situations now need to be identified and resolved so that European citizens, too, can enjoy the full benefits of the single market.

La constante expansión del mercado interior de la Unión Europea está desbordando las estrictas previsiones que se deducirían para el derecho a la libertad de circulación y residencia regulada en el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea y en el derecho derivado. Así, a la primigenia conexión del derecho a la libertad de circulación y residencia con la eliminación de las fronteras interiores han sucedido en la actualidad las múltiples conexiones de dicho derecho con el derecho fiscal, los derechos de la personalidad, la educación y la sanidad, tal y como acredita la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. Esas son las nuevas fronteras que deberán ser afrontadas por el Derecho de la Unión para lograr una ciudadanía plena.The steady expansion of the internal market of the European Union is overflowing the strict provisions that would be deducted for the right to freedom of movement and residence regulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and legislation. Thus, the primal connection of the right to freedom of movement and residence with the elimination of controls on persons at internal borders have happened today the multiple connections of this right with the tax law, rights of personality, the education and health, as proving the Court of Justice of the European Union. These are the new frontiers that must be addressed by EU law to achieve full citizenship.

The end of globalization, following the Brexit and Trump’s election, is having immediate repercussions also on the approach of States on tax policies. Although the international community is still engaged in various multilateral projects (e.g. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), etc.), in the recent years various States, especially in the European area, have unilaterally introduced optional tax regimes specifically designed to attract foreign individuals, reopening a new phase of (lawful) tax competition. Italy has recently aligned with this trend by introducing significant amendments to its immigration and tax rules aimed at permitting a ‘fast-track’ visa procedure for relevant foreign investors and a fifteen-year long exception to the worldwide income tax principle, which allows for the payment of an annual flat tax of EUR 100,000 (plus EUR 25,000 for each family member transferring to Italy with the main applicant) for foreign-sourced income in lieu of the standard progressive tax rates. This measure, which is very interesting also because it allows ‘new Italian residents’ to start accumulating the years necessary for applying for citizenship, appears compatible both with EU law and Italian constitutional principles, and guarantees a coordination with the double tax treaties in force.

Since its formation in 1950s as the economic community, the EU has created the monetary union and is increasingly evolving also into a political union – part of which is also a union or Europe of citizens. This article explores the development and the existing EU legislation and case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) on Union citizenship. The article emphasises the importance of the case law of the CJEU for the development of this concept, focusing especially on the case law pertaining to access to social security benefits in another Member State, the rights of students, tax relief, and personal rights such as the right to write a name in a certain way and the right to family life. Case law of the CJEU has, inter alia, confirmed that even economically inactive Union citizens lawfully residing in another Member State have a right to access to social benefits under the same conditions as the Member State’s own nationals. The concept of the Union citizenship is of key importance in the development of EU law, as it expands the scope of the applicability of the provisions on free movement of persons and other fundamental freedoms. New challenges and questions linked to Union citizenship are arising over time, which should also be regulated at the EU level in the future. Therefore, further development of this concept can still be expected in the EU.

AbstractPositing a “clash of cultures,” many European politicians oppose Muslim headscarves as well as Islamic instruction in public schools; the real source of “failed integration” lies not with the religiosity of young Muslims but rather with an arcane definition of “state neutrality” that sustains the dominance of some religions at the expense of others. Focusing on Germany, this study reviews educational statistics pertaining to youth of migrant origin, showing that conflicts over Islamic instruction mirror deeper patterns of minority discrimination. It outlines the legal hurdles new faith communities must overcome to secure recognition as “corporate entities under public law” (Körperschaftsstatus), entitling them to accredited teacher training, tax-funded salaries, construction subsidies, and other institutional privileges. It describes divergent curricular models utilized by the Länder, followed by a closer look at Islamic instruction in Berlin, where a court ruling compelled authorities to take a pro-active approach. It concludes with a review of dilemmas inherent in Germany's approach to “value education” against the backdrop of the new European Union anti-discrimination directives. Show me any mischief produced by the madness or wickedness of theologians, and I will show you a hundred resulting from the ambition and villany of conquerors and statesmen. Show me an absurdity in religion, and I will undertake to show you a hundred for one in political laws and institutionsEdmund Burke, 1756

In the context of the reform of the tax system and the accounting and reporting system, as well as the integration of Ukraine with the European Community, the issue of simplifying the conditions for doing business, building an effective and understandable system for administering taxes and other duties acquire special significance. One of the important aspects of reforming the tax system of Ukraine is the introduction of unified reporting on personal income tax and unified social tax. The purpose of the article is to identify the positive and negative aspects of the process of reforming the reporting on personal income tax and unified social tax and scientifically substantiate the structure of such unified reporting. The existing forms of reporting on personal income tax and unified social tax, proposed by government agencies, were analyzed. In addition, the unified reporting models from these taxes proposed by scientists were critically assessed by the author. It was found that such indicators as the presence of Ukrainian citizenship, gender and the sign of a new job, do not participate in the process of monitoring the completeness of tax payments. Therefore, it is impractical to fill in these indicators for each employee, and it is enough to submit the total number and structure of these indicators on the reporting title page. The opposite situation exists with the military tax, which is advisable to display for each employee in the reporting for more effective control over its accrual and payment. The author has improved the structure of unified reporting on personal income tax and unified social tax, which will reduce the time spent on filling out such reports, increase the efficiency of control by the fiscal authorities and simplify the process of processing unified reporting data. The main advantages of the proposed form of unified reporting are: significant reduction in the number of indicators; simplicity and compactness; personalized registration of military tax; ease of filling and processing information.

From the 1860s to 1917, direct taxation provides a window onto the paradoxes of reform in late imperial Russia. The new systems of assessment that culminated in the income tax of 1916 aimed to individualize government in a regime still ordered by legal estate and collective identity; to recognize the autonomy of the individual while disassembling and reintegrating the person by way of comprehensive assessment; and to promote a sense of citizenship, participation, and individual responsibility while still defending autocracy. Yanni Kotsonis suggests that these tensions were borrowed, along with the new techniques of taxation and of government, from European and transatlantic practice, but Kotsonis also locates the distinctiveness of the Russian case in the historical context and the set of ideological premises into which the practices were introduced.

The paper is devoted to a careful and topical topic of studying the administrative responsibility of foreigners and stateless persons in some foreign countries. It is noted that foreigners and stateless persons in Ukraine are subject to the national legal regime, i.e., they are endowed with the same scope of rights and responsibilities as citizens of Ukraine. Except for certain political and labor rights. Thus, foreigners and stateless persons are brought to legal responsibility, including administrative, on a par with the citizens of Ukraine. In the context of improving and optimizing the process of bringing to administrative responsibility foreigners and stateless persons in Ukraine, it is advisable to study the positive foreign experience. Thus, the proposed study is relevant and important. The methodological basis of the study were general scientific and special legal methods of cognition. Among the general scientific methods, we used dialectical, general logical, analysis, generalization, and formalization. Regarding specifically legal methods, we used, among others, formal-legal, systemic, theoretical, and legal. The key place in our study, of course, was occupied by the comparative law method, which allowed to conduct a comparative legal study of the grounds of administrative liability of foreigners and stateless persons in foreign countries, as well as those sanctions and penalties that may apply to some foreign countries. The authors found that the states of the Anglo-American legal system do not recognize separate administrative legislation. Acts that in Ukraine are considered administrative offenses, violations of customs law or tax misdemeanors in the United States belong to the category of crimes or civil misdemeanors. It has been proven that in most European countries belonging to the continental group of legal systems, cases of administrative offenses belong to the field of criminal law, i.e., such offenses are considered a type of crime. It is determined that the peculiarity of the administrative and legal status of foreigners in Japan is the fact that the migration policy of this country is not focused on the integration of foreigners, plus this country does not have adequate social infrastructure for their settlement.

By researching various literature and publications we have managed to summarize a proper structure related to this topic. CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) is a free trade agreement in which eight countries of the Western Balkans region participate. CEFTA was established with the aim of eliminating payments for mutual trade between member states; creating favorable conditions for the development and diversification of trade; promoting trade and economic cooperation; intensification of economic relations for mutual benefit and for the contribution to the EU integration process; contribution to the development of EU trade relations and integration into the multilateral trading system. in the EU. Although not mandatory, CEFTA is the inevitable path for all EU aspiring countries. It is also one of the conditions for Kosovo to integrate into the EU, but from the research we reach a conclusion that the Cefta Agreement was not favorable for Kosovo and the Trade that it conducts with the Balkan countries. Also, the presence of Kosovo in Cefta as a representative of UNMIK and not as an independent state like the Republic of Kosovo provides an overview that Kosovo in Cefta is conditional starting from its absence as a state and then in the space provided in market, states that do not recognize Kosovo's citizenship are a barrier to Kosovo's integration into this agreement. In terms of trade, Kosovo is obliged to start these barriers set by non-recognizing states of its citizenship and to act with the same currency, these states especially Serbia and Bosnia have constantly hindered the development of Kosovo economy which aim only to benefit from Kosovo which trade policies link to the political status that these countries develop towards each other. As Kosovo does not have the expected benefits from this agreement, some advice and recommendations are given to change the situation, but it is not a solution to set obstacles, as the very purpose of integration in this agreement has been the release of barriers and cooperation between member countries. Since the commitment to implement CEFTA is also included in the Stabilization and Association Agreement signed between Kosovo and the European Union, the opportunity for Kosovo is to renegotiate this agreement together with other member states. Keywords: Tax (tarrif), Export, Import, Market, Economic Report, Domestic Products, Competition

Para enmarcar la evolución de los estudios de género en la Universidad de Huelva, querría partir de la creación del “Seminario de Estudios de la Mujer” en Julio de 1996 y del desarrollo que han tenido estos estudios en estos ocho años para presentar una trayectoria que, aunque no excesivamente larga debido a la relativa juventud de nuestra Universidad (el curso pasado celebramos el décimo aniversario de su fundación), sí que podemos calificar de nutrida y especialmente enriquecedora para las personas que como yo nos dedicamos a los estudios de género en nuestra tarea docente e investigadora. Finalizaré realizando algunas observaciones sobre la relevancia de los estudios de género en el proceso de convergencia europea, tan de actualidad en nuestros días.

Desde hace unas décadas, como consecuencia, fundamentalmente,del acusado déficit democrático de la Unión Europea,por las instituciones comunitarias se están adoptando medidas quepretender reducirlo y paliarlo. Entre dichas medidas se encuentranaquellas que pretender convertir a los ciudadanos de la Unión en laverdadera razón de ser de la misma, superando sus iniciales pretensionesexclusivamente económicas, ahondando en aspectos jurídicopolíticos,tales como la ciudadanía y sus derechos. No obstante, elalcance de estas medidas está siendo muy limitado pues tanto la regulaciónefectuada, como la realidad existente, pone de manifiestocomo la ciudadanía de la Unión Europea se sustenta en la nacionalidadde los Estados miembros, es decir, en normas de Derecho interno.Ello, unido a la preponderancia de los intereses económicossobre los aspectos políticos, hace que la construcción de una auténticaciudadanía europea, tal y como la entendemos desde el punto devista del Derecho interno, no se haya alcanzado todavía, aspecto quetiene su reflejo en el escaso alcance de los derechos que rodean a lamisma.For decades now, in consequence, fundamentally, ofthe pronounced democratic deficit of the European Union, measuresare being taken by the Community institutions that seek to reduceand alleviate it. Amongst these measures are those that seek to convertthe citizens of the Union into its real reason d’être, by overcomingthe initial exclusively financial claims, delving into political issues,such as citizenship and their rights. However, the significanceof these measures is being very limited, since both the regulationand the existing reality show how citizenship of the European Unionis based on the nationality of the Member States, that is, on rulesof domestic law. This fact, together with the preponderance of economicinterests over the political aspects, means that the constructionof a genuine European citizenship, as we understand it from thepoint of view of domestic law, has not yet been achieved, aspect thatis reflected in the scanty scope of the rights that surround it.

<p>Como muchos conceptos en las ciencias sociales, la noción de ciudadanía está sujeta a diferentes interpretaciones basadas en los intereses y preferencias particulares de aquellos que participan en discursos públicos sobre su significado. A menudo se descarta la noción de ciudadanía de la Unión Europea como insustancial. Distintos autores constatan que los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea continuan teniendo diferentes leyes sobre la ciudadanía, que la ciudadanía de la Unión se deriva de la ciudadanía de los Estados miembros, y que la ciudadanía de la Unión no ha sido capaz de promover un sentido de identidad europea. La idea de ciudadanía cultural, mientras tanto, ha sido descrita como un oximorón, y muchos autores opinan que si bien se trata de un concepto útil, sigue estando muy poco desarrollado y muy poco utilizado, y que necesita ser articulado en conexión con temas y contextos más específicos. En esta misma línea, partiendo de la teoría hacia la práctica, este artículo pretende explorar cómo ciertas ideas de pertenencia política y cultural se han solapado de tal manera que están dirigiendo a la ciudadanía en Europa desde la asociación con Estados o culturas hacia una asociación con ideas.</p><p><strong>Recibido</strong>: 31.11.2012<br /><strong>Aceptado</strong>: 20.11.2012</p>

The EU, being a complex regional integration body, goes beyond the modern understanding of international organizations. This unique institution has unique criteria and characteristics in the field of human rights and freedoms, as in any other field. The institution of human and civil rights and freedoms in the EU is a key part of the Union's “constitutional law”. In the EU, institutional acts are primarily a source of human and civil rights and freedoms. However, not all rights and freedoms are fully reflected in the institutional acts. These documents mainly refer to “Union citizenship”. Taking all this into account, we can say that the study of the general principles of the European Union is very relevant for our time. Key words: European Union, civil rights, human rights, general principles, integration Roza Sadin Əsgərzadə Avropa Ittifaqında insan və vətəndaş hüquqlarının ümumi prinsipləri Xülasə Aİ mürəkkəb regional inteqrasiya qurumu olmaqla beynəlxalq təşkilatların müasir anlayışından kənara çıxır. Bu unikal qurumun hər bir sahədə olduğu kimi insan hüquq və azadlıqları sahəsində də özünəməxsus meyarları və xüsusiyyətləri vardır. Aİ-də insan və vətəndaş hüquq və azadlıqları institutu İttifaqın “konstitusiya hüququ”nun əsas hissəsidir. Aİ-də institusional aktlar ilk növbədə insan və vətəndaş hüquq və azadlıqlarının mənbəyidir. Lakin institusional aktlarda bütün hüquq və azadlıqlar tam əks olunmur. Bu sənədlər əsasən “İttifaq vətəndaşlığına” aiddir. Bütün bunları nəzərə alaraq deyə bilərik ki, Avropa İttifaqının ümumi prinsiplərinin öyrənilməsi müasir dövrümüz üçün çox aktualdır. Açar sözlər: Avropa İttifaqı, vətəndaş hüquqları, insan hüquqları, ümumi prinsiplər, inteqrasiya

The peninsula of Athos in Chalkidiki became a center of organized monachal life in monasteries in the year 963, when with the initiative of the Byzantine emperor Nichephorus Phocas the Monastery of Great Laura was founded. Since that time Mount Athos (=MA) became the "Holy Mountain" and has attracted the moral and material support of the Byzantine emperors, various Orthodox countries and the flock till today. During this long period of more then one thousand years, MA was armed with a privileged legal status, the existence of which continues till now. The legal status of MA is based on three foundations: I. The law of the Hellenic Republic, II. The Public International Law, and III. The European Law. I. Fundamental significance for the status of MA have the provisions of article 105 of the Greek Constitution. Then is the Charter of MA, which is drawn up and voted by the Athonite monachal authorities and afterwards ratified by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Greek Parliament. The Charter is a law of superior formal force in comparison to the other laws. According to the Constitution and the Charter, MA has an ancient privileged status and is a self-governed part of the Greek State, whose sovereignty remains intact. Spiritually MA is under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, direct in the sense that the Ecumenical Patriarch is also the local bishop of MA The territory of the peninsula is exempt from expropriation and is divided among the twenty Athonite monasteries exclusively. The administrative power lies in self-administration of the first and the second degree. The first is exercised by the ruling twenty monasteries. This number may not be changed, nor may their position in the preeminence, nor towards their dependencies (skates, cells, hermitages). Nowadays all the monasteries are coenobitic, i.e. the monks share a common life and have no private property. The monasteries are administered by the abbot, the Elders' Assembly and the Brotherhood. Second degree administration is operated by: 1. the Holy Community. It is comprised by twenty monks members, each of whom represents one monastery, 2. the Holy Community's executive organ is the Hiera Epistassia, which comprises four monks drawn annually from four monasteries in rotation. The leader of the Hiera Epistassia is called the First (= Protos). The Hiera Epistassis also performs specific duties as police force, police court and municipality of Karyes, the capital town of MA The legislative power is in the hands of: 1. The Holy Community as far as concerns the Charter of MA, 2. the Extraordinary Biannual Twenty-Members Assembly, which draws up the regulative provisions, and 3. the Greek State, as far as concerns: a) the rights and the duties of the (civil) Governor of MA, b) the judicial power of the Athonite authorities, and c) the custom and taxation privileges granted by the State to MA The judicial power belongs to: 1. the monastic courts (the abbot with the Elders' Assembly), 2. the Holy Community, 3. the Hiera Epistassia, and 4. the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The observance of the regimes is in the spiritual field under the supreme supervision of the Patriarchate and in the administrative under the supervision of the State, which is also exclusively responsible for safeguarding public order and security. These responsibilities of the State are exercised through the (civil) Governor of MA, whose rights and duties are determined by common law. All persons leading a monastic life in MA acquire the Greek citizenship without further formalities, upon admission in a monastery as novices or monks. Also persons who are not Orthodox Christians or they are schismatic Orthodox are prohibited from dwelling in MA II. The first international treaty that recognized an international protection of the MA status was that of San Stefano (1878), but only for the Russian monks. The Treaty of Berlin (also 1878) recognized the same protection for all the monks who were not borne in the Ottoman empire. Its article n? 62,8 was as follows: "Les moines du Mont Athos, quel que soit leur pays d'origine, seront maintenus dans leurs possessions et avantages ant?rieurs et jouiront, sans aucune exception, d'une enti?re ?galit? de droits et prerogatives". This provision was repeated in the special treaties of S?vres (1920) and then in the protocol of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). These treaties safeguarded the rights and the liberties of the non-Greek monastic communi ties in MA as follows: "La Gr?ce s'engage ? reconna?tre et maintenir les droits traditionnels et les libert?s, dont jouissent les communaut?s monastiques non grecques du Mont Athos d'apr?s les dispositions de l'article 62 du trait? de Berlin du 13 juillet 1878". The same provision has been repeated in the Legislative Decree of 29.9/30.10.1923 "On the Protection of Minorities in Greece", article 13. III. Because a lot of provisions of the MA law are opposite to the principles of the European Union (for example the clausura to women, the special license in order to visit the peninsula, the taxation and customs privileges etc.), Joint Declaration n? 4 concerns MA was included in the Final Act (1979) of the Agreement concerning the accession of the Hellenic Republic in the European Economic Community, now-a days European Union. According to this Declaration, recognizing that the special status granted to MA, as guaranteed by the Greek Constitution, is justified exclusively on grounds of a spiritual and religious nature, the Community will ensure that this status is taken into account in the application and subsequent preparation of pro visions of Community law, in particular in relation to customs franchise privileges, tax exemptions, and the right of establishment. .

The European Espace of Education for 2025 designed by the European Commission considers education and culture the engines for generating employment and economic growth; The new Space proposes reinforce, at the same time, the identification processes with the European project. This approach has made teachers' mobility and the construction of collaboration and learning networks as essential pillars in the development of this goal. The success of the eTwinning and Erasmus + programs has encouraged them to focus on the confidence of consolidating an active and identity-oriented citizenship. We approach, first, to analyze the educational perspective that seeks to promote European identity, the European Dimension of Education and the promotion of key competencies being two decisive initiatives in the framework of European education policy. The following are some of the exprofeso proposals for the school context, highlighting the variety and breadth of specific possibilities. Finally we focus in the evaluation of the eTwinning and Erasmus + program. The analysis methodology focuses on a descriptive analysis of the budget data and the number of projects, provided by the Annual Reports of the Erasmus + Program and by the Intermediate Evaluation of the Erasmus + Program (2014-2020). As well as the analysis of data referring to the participation of the teaching staff of the schools, both in the mobility projects proposed by the Erasmus + program, and in the uniqueness that defines the eTwinning program. It can be concluded that the large budgetary investment, which emanates from a firm commitment to an identity construction based on education, is endorsed by the positive results; On the one hand, there are more teachers tan ever who participate in the different training proposals; On the other hand, those who participate increase their civic habilities and have a more Europeanist predisposition.

A partir da análise da ordem jurídica da União Europeia, este trabalho busca identificar a representação normativa vigente dos grupos culturais europeus – majoritários e minoritários – e, o projeto político de construção de um espaço público comum. Com a utilização da Teoria da Ação Comunicativa, de Jürgen Habermas, e da Teoria da Luta por Reconhecimento, de Axel Honneth, será possível evidenciar os limites e as possibilidades da afirmação de uma cidadania supranacional — calcada no estabelecimento de uma identidade comum europeia e na ideologia de harmonização social no interior do bloco — bem como, os paradoxos que perpassam o âmbito multicultural da integração. Esta investigação constitui-se como um esforço teórico essencial para a compreensão dos atuais empecilhos sociais europeus causados por medidas político-jurídicas implementadas pelos órgãos coordenadores da integração na sociedade civil. Deste modo, esta pesquisa utiliza-se da corrente crítica do pensamento social fundamentada, basicamente, nos estudos habermasianos e honnethianos. Outros importantes autores contribuirão com o fornecimento de concepções teóricas alternativas, com o objetivo de complementar a análise inicialmente proposta.Ao fim, pretende-se, como resultado esperado, questionar as concepções correntes acerca da possibilidade de criação de uma identidade comum europeia através da efetivação da cidadania supranacional e da manutenção da harmonia social por meios exclusivamente político-jurídicos. Arguir-se-á, desta maneira, os efeitos colaterais de tal implementação normativa nas sociedades europeias contemporâneas e a necessidade iminente de reestruturação político-institucional no atual projeto integracionista. Abstract: From the analysis of the legal system of the European Union, this work aimed at identifying the current normative representation of European cultural groups – majority and minority – and, the political project of building of a common public space. Using the Theory of Communicative Action by Jürgen Habermas and the Theory of the Struggle for Recognition by Axel Honneth, it was possible to evidence the limits of the affirmation of a supranational citizenship, based on the establishment of an European identity and ideology of social harmonization, as well as the popular acceptance of this legislative framework. In addition, to further the paradoxes that pervade the multicultural context of European integration. This research constituted as an essential theoretical effort to understand the possible social obstacles caused by political and legal measures, implemented by bureaucratic agencies of the integration in civil society. Thus, this study used the critical current of social studies based primarily on studies of Habermas and Honneth. Other important authors contributed to the provision of alternative theoretical concepts, in order to complement the analysis initially proposed. At the end, it was intended as expected outcome, questioning current thinking about the possibility of creating a common European identity through effective supranational citizenship and maintaining social harmony by political and legal means. It is argued in this way, the side effects of such implementation rules in contemporary European societies and the imminent need for political and institutional restructuring in the current European integration project.

Tradicionalmente, los estudios centrados en las relaciones entre migración y estratificación han prestado especial atención a la influencia de características tales como el origen, la etnia o el género a la hora de determinar la posición dentro de la estratificación migratoria, interesándose, a su vez, particularmente por los inmigrantes que se encontraban en la base de dicha estratificación. Sin embargo, estudios recientes (Shachar, 2011, 2016; Shachar & Hirschl, 2013) han cambiado esta tendencia virando su interés hacia aquellos migrantes situados en la cúspide de la estratificación, beneficiados por la apertura de una vía exprés para la obtención de la ciudadanía en razón de sus excepcionales talentos en ámbitos tan diversos como el deporte, la academia o la industria. Esta nueva forma de acceso a lo alto de la estratificación migratoria, en expansión, existe en todo el mundo y suele darse normalmente de forma particularizada y discrecional. Menos atención han obtenido otro tipo de programas que igualmente facilitan el acceso a lo más alto de la estratificación migratoria, esta vez basándose en la condición económica del postulante. Me refiero a los citizenship by investment programs (CIPs por sus siglas en inglés), los cuales acortan la ruta a la ciudadanía a cambio de inversiones económicas, que se dan de formas altamente diversas dependiendo del país y del programa a la sazón. A pesar de la citada diversidad, aquello que caracteriza a los CIPs es que para estos la capacidad económica del postulante se convierte en la llave que da acceso a la ciudadanía del país que implanta el programa. Facilitando y acelerando la adquisición de la ciudadanía en razón de la capacidad económica, los CIPs conllevan así una estratificación en el acceso a la ciudadanía que es establecida de jure o por ley. Dicha estratificación en la naturalización requiere de una investigación ulterior y suscita diversas cuestiones de gran importancia: ¿es justo eliminar algunos requisitos, tales como los exámenes cívicos y de idioma, a los ciudadanos de chequera, mientras los mismos se mantienen para otros solicitantes de naturalización? ¿Debería la capacidad económica del postulante ser aceptada como el requisito principal a la hora de garantizar la ciudadanía? ¿Son dichas políticas arbitrarias? Este artículo tiene tres objetivos. En primer lugar, presentar el fenómeno de los CIPs, centrándose especialmente en aquellos programas establecidos entre los miembros de la Unión Europea. El interés principal de centrarse en dichos estados es que en su caso las decisiones unilaterales de otorgar la ciudadanía nacional a cambio de una inversión económica conllevan igualmente el otorgamiento de la ciudadanía europea, la cual garantiza derechos supranacionales e impone obligaciones a otros estados miembros. En segundo lugar, comparar los requisitos solicitados a los postulantes generales de naturalización y a aquellos que siguen la vía exprés abierta por los CIPs. Esto se hará a fin de probar que los CIPs comportan una severa estratificación, establecida y plasmada de jure en el acceso a la ciudadanía en favor de los solicitantes que siguen esta vía. Por último, ofrecer argumentos que despierten la sospecha sobre la posible arbitrariedad de dichas políticas de naturalización, arbitrariedad que no tiene cabida ni respaldo legal en el contexto del constitucionalismo contemporáneo.

Over hele verden fremmes internasjonalisering som en viktig dimensjon for studiekvalitet, og internasjonalisering løftes som en sentral dimensjon i skolelederutdanning. Et viktig mål for Erasmus-programmene er å fremme studentmobilitet. Antallet studenter på slike utvekslingsprogram har økt gradvis gjennom en årrekke, men vi har per i dag lite kunnskap om på hvilken måte slike program bidrar til økt kvalitet, og hvilken betydning deltakelse i slike program har for studenters læring. I denne artikkelen undersøker vi et Erasmus Intensive Programme (EIP), Leadership for Democratic Citizenship in European Schools. Deltakerne var masterstudenter i utdanningsledelse fra Spania, Tyrkia, Polen, Norge, England og Irland. Hensikten med denne artikkelen er å undersøke studentenes muligheter for kunnskapsutvikling. Vi tar utgangspunkt i Wells’ læringssyklus når vi analyserer survey-data, intervjuer og kursmateriell. Tre områder viser seg å være vesentlige for studentenes læring: kommunikasjon, kritisk tenkning og studieinnholdet. I artikkelen diskuterer vi hvordan ulike aspekter ved disse områdene bidro til, og i noen tilfeller begrenset, studentenes muligheter for å utvikle lederkompetanse.Analysen viser at designet av dette EIPet hadde et potensial for å gi gode muligheter for studentenes læring. Men den viser også at i et internasjonalt program er det utfordringer knyttet til kommunikasjon og utvelgelse av innhold. Dessuten tyder resultatene på at for å nå målsettingen om å bidra til at studentene utvikler kritisk tenkning kreves et lengre forløp enn et to-ukers internasjonalt program.Nøkkelord: internasjonalisering, skolelederutdanning, Erasmus Intensive ProgrammeAbstractInternationalisation in higher education is promoted as positive and important in education policies world wide, and an international perspective is regarded as crucial in leadership research and education. A central aim of the Erasmus Programmes is to increase student mobility, and although the number of students in such programmes has increased steadily over the years, we know less about the challenges and benefits for students and staff who participate, and how the experience of studying abroad may contribute to students’ learning. The focus in this paper is on the Erasmus Intensive Programme (EIP) Leadership for Democratic Citizenship in European Schools for master students in educational leadership from Spain, Turkey, Poland, Norway, Ireland, and England. The aim is to explore the students’ opportunities for learning. Wells’ cycle of knowing is used as an analytical approach in an analysis of survey data, interviews and course material. The findings suggest that three key areas were pivotal for the students’ opportunities for knowledge building: communication, critical thinking and the course curriculum. In the paper we discuss how aspects within these three areas enhance, and in some cases hinder, the development of the students as critical change agents able to lead democratic schools and engage in improvement.The analysis indicates that the EIP had a potential to create learning opportunities. However, we point to challenges related to language and communication and choice of curriculum content. Moreover, our study indicates that designing for criticality is problematic in short term international programmes.Keywords: internationalisation, leadership education, Erasmus Intensive Programme

Since the time of the ancient Greeks and Romans, citizenship has defined the membership of an individual to a polity. Despite being a central pillar of national states and a supranational institution like the European Union, the importance of citizenship has progressively declined due to globalization and increased cross-border mobility. Indeed, citizenship has almost been abandoned as a connecting factor for establishing a state’s tax jurisdiction. This article, however, argues that such a perception is partly misplaced. Far from being a relic of the past, citizenship still maintains relevance in today’s international tax arena. Citizenship can serve, at times, either to extend or restrict a state’s taxing rights over an individual’s income. And yet, the use of citizenship for tax purposes is often instrumental and does not reflect the effective participation of an individual in a polity, which might ultimately suggest abandoning citizenship altogether as a relevant connecting factor in jurisdictional tax matters.

PurposeThe authors’ aim is to establish the variance of youth welfare citizenship regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and to revisit the applicability of the regime approach to the emerging welfare regimes (EWRs).Design/methodology/approachThe empirical analysis follows the descriptive case study strategy aiming to discover diversity of youth welfare citizenship patterns. The case selection is made within the CEE country group, which includes countries in Central Europe, the Baltics, Eastern Europe and Southeast Europe, all sharing the communist past. The subdivision of these countries in reference to the welfare states can be made via the European Union (EU) membership based on the assumption that EU social policy frameworks and recommendations have an important effect on domestic policies. We included countries which are in the EU, i.e., with a similar political and economic transition path. There were three waves of accession to the EU in CEE countries. In the first wave (2004), all the Baltic countries, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia joined. In the second wave (2007), Romania and Bulgaria joined. Finally, Croatia joined the EU in 2013. Altogether 11 CEE countries are the EU members today, the remaining CEE countries are non-EU members and thus are excluded from the current research. Those countries which are part of the EU share similarities in social and economic reforms during the pre-accession period and after in order to reach a comparatively similar system with other member states. So, in terms of casing strategy these six countries can be named as emerging welfare regimes (EWRs) evolving transformations across different public policy areas. Handpicking of six countries out of 11 relies on the assumption that the Anglo-Saxon welfare system characteristics are more evident in the Baltic countries (Aidukaite, 2019; Aidukaite et al., 2020; Ainsaar et al., 2020; Rajevska and Rajevska, 2020) and Slovenia, while in Bulgaria and Croatia certain outcomes reflect the Bismarckian principles of social security (Hrast and Rakar, 2020; Stoilova and Krasteva, 2020; Dobrotić, 2020). This brings important variety into our analysis logic. Last but not least, we juxtapose six CEE EWR countries under analysis with six mature welfare regime countries representing different welfare regime types. Those mature welfare regime countries (Finland, Sweden, France, Germany, Italy, UK) are not an explicit object of the study but help to put analysed CEE EWR cases into larger context and thus, reflect upon theoretical claims of the welfare regime literature.FindingsThe authors can confirm that the EWR countries can be rather well explained by the welfare citizenship typology and complement the existing knowledge on youth welfare regime typology clusters in the Western Europe. Estonia is clustered close to the Nordic countries, whereas Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia and Slovenia are close to the Bismarckian welfare model despite rather flexible, non-restricted educational path, universal child and student support. Bulgaria is an outlier; however, it is clustered together with mature Mediterranean welfare regimes. Former intact welfare regime clusters are becoming more diverse. The authors’ findings confirm that there is no any intact cluster of the “post-communist” welfare regime and Eastern European countries are today “on move”.Research limitations/implicationsAltogether 11 CEE countries are the EU members today. The remaining CEE countries are non-EU members and thus are excluded from the current research. Those countries which are part of the EU share similarities in social and economic reforms during the pre-accession period and after in order to reach a comparatively similar system with other member states. At least one CEE country was chosen based on existing theoretical knowledge on the welfare regime typology (Anglo Saxon, Beveridgean, Bismarckian) for the Post-communist country groups.Practical implicationsIn the social citizenship dimension we dropped social assistance schemes and tax-relief indices and included poverty risk and housing measures. Youth poverty together with housing showed rather clear distinction between familialized and individualised countries and thus, made the typology stronger. In the economic dimension the preliminary picture was much fuzzier, mainly due to the comprehensive education in the region and intervention of the EU in domestic ALMPs (and VET) reforms. The authors added a new indicator (pro-youth orientation of ALMP) in order better to capture youth-sensitivity of policy.Social implicationsThe authors included a working poverty measure (in-work poverty rate) in order to reflect labour market insecurity as an increasing concern. Yet, the analysis results were still mixed and new indicators did not help locating the regime types.Originality/valueIn order to improve the validity of the youth welfare citizenship regime economic dimension, Chevalier's (2020) model may also be worth revisiting. The authors argue that this dichotomy is not sufficient, because inclusive type can have orientation towards general skills or occupational skills (i.e. monitored or enabling citizenship clusters), which is currently ignored. Chevalier (2020) furthermore associates inclusive economic citizenship with “coordinated market economies” (referring to Hall and Soskice, 2001), which seems hardly hold validity in the Nordic and at least some CEE countries.

Neste artigo a difusão do lema da responsabilidade social é resgatada pela analise de três percursos internacionais: EUA, Brasil e União Européia. No primeiro caso, a vasta literatura sociológica americana relata as preocupações e as pressões de diferentes atores sociais dirigidas às empresas americanas, ao longo dos anos 1960. No Brasil, as primeiras elaborações provêm de ass ociações empresariais nos meados dos anos 60 e se ampliam justo quando a sociedade, no fim dos anos 1990, demanda prosseguir na direção a integrar o compromisso da aplicação das normas e direitos do trabalho. Na União Européia, o lema da responsabilidade social é introduzido nos finais dos anos 1990 envolvendo o compromisso de fazer retroagir a alta taxa de desemprego estrutural. Na última seção, a análise comparativa internacional sugere recompor o quadro dos diversos conteúdos da responsabilidade social a partir da grande questão que está em debate nas sociedades: recompor o compromisso de fortalecimento do vínculo de emprego como fonte de cidadania social. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: responsabilidade social, empresas, empresas na sociedade, Brasil e empresas, cultura empresarial. BUSINESSES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES. THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY NORTH AND SOUTH Paola Cappellin Raquel Giffoni In this paper the diffusion of the slogan of social responsibility is rescued by the analysis of three international trajectories: USA, Brazil and European Union. In the first case, the vast sociological literature American tells the concerns and the different social actors’ pressures on the American businesses, during the 1960’s. In Brazil, the first elaborations come from business associations in the middle of the sixties and are enlarged exactly when the society, at the end of the 1990’s, demand to continue in a direction to integrate the commitment of the application of labor norms and rights. In the European Union, the slogan of social responsibility is introduced in the end of the 1990’s involving the commitment of turning around the high tax of structural unemployment. In the last section, the international comparative analysis suggests a recomposition of the framework of several contents of social responsibility starting from the great issue that is in debate in the societies: to recompose the commitment of invigoration of the job bond as source of social citizenship. KEYWORDS: social responsibility, businesses, businesses in the society, Brazil and businesses, business culture. LES ENTREPRISES DANS LES SOCIÉTÉS CONTEMPORAINES. LA RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIALE DANS LE NORD ET DANS LE SUD Paola Cappellin Raquel Giffoni On retrouve, dans cet article, la diffusion du thème de la responsabilité sociale grâce à la reprise de l’analyse de trois évolutions internationales: les Etats-Unis, le Brésil et l’Union Européenne. Dans le premier cas, de nombreux écrits sociologiques américains décrivent les préoccupations et les pressions exercées par les différents acteurs sociaux sur les entreprises américaines au cours des années 1960. Au Brésil, les premières mises en oeuvre proviennent d’associa-tions d’entreprises vers le milieu des années 60 et s’amplifient à la fin des années 90, au moment où la société veut continuer dans la ligne de l’intégration pour que les normes et les droits du travail continuent à être appliqués. Au sein de l’Union Européenne, le thème de la responsabilité sociale est introduit à la fin des années 90 avec l’engagement de faire diminuer le taux élevé de chômage structurel. Dans la dernière partie, l’analyse comparative internationale propose une recomposition du cadre des divers contenus de la responsabilité sociale en partant de la grande question en débat dans les sociétés: rétablir l’engagement des entreprises pour une consolidation des contrats de travail en tant qu’élément de la citoyenneté sociale. MOTS-CLÉS: responsabilité sociale, entreprises, entreprises dans la société, Brésil et entreprises, culture des entreprises. Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.br

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To transform an individual pain into a collective feeling of suffering is a capacity of all mass media. However, television has, in this point, a tremendous power. The capacity to join millions of TV viewers in front of itself is its most admirable merit, but it’s also its most dreadful danger. Principally when the point are the human rights, as the right of privacy or the right of not suffer in the public space, the demand of quality appears not only as an obligation of the Government but also as a duty of citizenship of all TV viewers. Although it is not properly a novelty in some European countries, the existence of a TV Ombudsman2 will be a reality in Portugal only this year. The Government has approved a legal diploma to create this figure, which will evaluate the programming and information of the public channel RTP. As the ombudsmen of press that we already know, the TV Ombudsman will be the person who receives the critics and observations of TV viewers, evaluates them and writes about them an impression to the administration of the channel. Being a self-regulatory proceeding, the TV Ombudsman is fundamentally a mechanism that implicates citizens. It is not only an entity of vigilance on ethics of Television. It is essentially a platform of dialogue between journalists, programmers and TV viewers. As in the press, the Ombudsman is a mediator. Although it is probably not an absolute guarantee of quality, TV Ombudsman is surely an argument of citizens against the bad things diffused by the box that we believe is the one by which the most important of our lives goes trough. Transformar uma dor individual num sentimento colectivo de sofrimento é uma capacidade de todos os meios de massa. Todavia, a televisão tem a este título um poder tremendamente grande. A capacidade de reunir milhões de telespectadores à sua frente é o seu mais admirável mérito, mas também o seu mais temível perigo. Sobretudo quando estão em causa direitos humanos, como o direito à privacidade ou a não sofrer no espaço público, a procura de qualidade surge não somente como uma obrigação do governo como também como um dever de cidadania de todos os espectadores. Não sendo propriamente novidade em alguns países europeus, a existência do Provedor do Telespectador1 só será uma realidade em Portugal este ano. O governo aprovou um diploma para a criação desta figura que deverá avaliar a programação e a informação do canal público RTP. Como os provedores dos leitores que conhecemos, também o Provedor do Telespectador será a pessoa que receberá as críticas e as observações dos telespectadores, as avaliará e emitirá sobre elas um parecer para a administração do canal. Sendo um procedimento de auto-regulação, o Provedor do Telespectador é fundamentalmente uma entidade de vigilância da ética da televisão. Essencialmente é uma plataforma de diálogo entre jornalistas, programadores e telespectadores. Tal como na imprensa, o Provedor é um mediador. Ainda que não seja provavelmente uma garantia absoluta de qualidade, o Provedor do Telespectador é seguramente um argumento dos cidadãos contra os males difundidos pela caixa que se crê ser aquela por onde passa o mais importante das nossas vidas.

Women in federal politics are under-represented today and always have been. At no time in the history of the federal parliament have women achieved equal representation with men. There have never been an equal number of women in any federal cabinet. Women have never held an equitable number of executive positions of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) or the Liberal Party. Australia has had only one female Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, and she was the recipient of sexist treatment in the parliament and the media. A 2019 report by Plan International found that girls and women, were “reluctant to pursue a career in politics, saying they worry about being treated unfairly.” The Report author said the results were unsurprisingwhen you consider how female politicians are still treated in Parliament and the media in this country, is it any wonder the next generation has no desire to expose themselves to this world? Unfortunately, in Australia, girls grow up seeing strong, smart, capable female politicians constantly reduced to what they’re wearing, comments about their sexuality and snipes about their gender.What voters may not always see is how women in politics respond to sexist treatment, or to bullying, or having to vote against their principles because of party rules, or to having no support to lead the party. Rather than being political victims and quitting, there is a ground-swell of women who are fighting back. The rage they feel at being excluded, bullied, harassed, name-called, and denied leadership opportunities is being channelled into rage against the structures that deny them equality. The rage they feel is building resilience and it is building networks of women across the political divide. This article highlights some female MPs who are “maintaining the rage”. It suggests that the rage that is evident in their public responses is empowering them to stand strong in the face of adversity, in solidarity with other female MPs, building their resilience, and strengthening calls for social change and political equality.Her-story of Women’s MovementsThroughout the twentieth century, women stood for equal rights and personal empowerment driven by rage against their disenfranchisement. Significant periods include the early 1900s, with suffragettes gaining the vote for women. The interwar period of 1919 to 1938 saw women campaign for financial independence from their husbands (Andrew). Australian women were active citizens in a range of campaigns for improved social, economic and political outcomes for women and their children.Early contributions made by women to Australian society were challenges to the regulations and of female sexuality and reproduction. Early twentieth century feminist organisations such The Women’s Peace Army, United Association of Women, the Australian Federation of Women’s Societies for Equal Citizenship, the Union of Australian Women, the National Council of Women, and the Australian Federation of Women Voters, proved the early forerunners to the 1970s Women’s Liberation Movement (WLM). It was in many of these early campaigns that the rage expressed in the concept of the “personal is political” (Hanisch) became entrenched in Australian feminist approaches to progressive social change. The idea of the “personal is political” encapsulated that it was necessary to challenge and change power relations, achievable when women fully participated in politics (van Acker 25). Attempts by women during the 1970s to voice concerns about issues of inequality, including sexuality, the right to abortion, availability of childcare, and sharing of household duties, were “deemed a personal problem” and not for public discussion (Hanisch). One core function of the WLM was to “advance women’s positions” via government legislation or, as van Acker (120) puts it, the need for “feminist intervention in the state.” However, in advocating for policy reform, the WLM had no coherent or organised strategy to ensure legislative change. The establishment of the Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL), together with the Femocrat strategy, sought to rectify this. Formed in 1972, WEL was tasked with translating WLM concerns into government policy.The initial WEL campaign took issues of concern to WLM to the incoming Whitlam government (1972-1975). Lyndall Ryan (73) notes: women’s liberationists were the “stormtroopers” and WEL the “pragmatic face of feminism.” In 1973 Whitlam appointed Elizabeth Reid, a member of WLM, as Australia’s first Women’s Advisor. Of her appointment, Reid (3) said, “For the first time in our history we were being offered the opportunity to attempt to implement what for years we had been writing, yelling, marching and working towards. Not to respond would have felt as if our bluff had been called.” They had the opportunity in the Whitlam government to legislatively and fiscally address the rage that drove generations of women to yell and march.Following Reid were the appointments of Sara Dowse and Lyndall Ryan, continuing the Femocrat strategy of ensuring women were appointed to executive bureaucratic roles within the Whitlam government. The positions were not well received by the mainly male-dominated press gallery and parliament. As “inside agitators” (Eisenstein) for social change the central aim of Femocrats was social and economic equity for women, reflecting social justice and progressive social and public policy. Femocrats adopted a view about the value of women’s own lived experiences in policy development, application and outcome. The role of Senator Susan Ryan is of note. In 1981, Ryan wrote and introduced the Sex Discrimination Bill, the first piece of federal legislation of its type in Australia. Ryan was a founding member of WEL and was elected to the Senate in 1975 on the slogan “A woman’s place is in the Senate”. As Ryan herself puts it: “I came to believe that not only was a woman’s place in the House and in the Senate, as my first campaign slogan proclaimed, but a feminist’s place was in politics.” Ryan, the first Labor woman to represent the ACT in the Senate, was also the first Labor woman appointed as a federal Minister.With the election of the economic rationalist Hawke and Keating Governments (1983-1996) and the neoliberal Howard Government (1996-2007), what was a “visible, united, highly mobilised and state-focused women’s movement” declined (Lake 260). This is not to say that women today reject the value of women’s voices and experiences, particularly in politics. Many of the issues of the 1970s remain today: domestic violence, unequal pay, sexual harassment, and a lack of gender parity in political representation. Hence, it remains important that women continue to seek election to the national parliament.Gender Gap: Women in Power When examining federal elections held between 1972 and 2016, women have been under-represented in the lower house. In none of these elections have women achieved more than 30 per cent representation. Following the 1974 election less that one per cent of the lower house were women. No women were elected to the lower house at the 1975 or 1977 election. Between 1980 and 1996, female representation was less than 10 per cent. In 1996 this rose to 15 per cent and reached 29 per cent at the 2016 federal election.Following the 2016 federal election, only 32 per cent of both chambers were women. After the July 2016 election, only eight women were appointed to the Turnbull Ministry: six women in Cabinet and two women in the Outer Cabinet (Parliament of Australia). Despite the higher representation of women in the ALP, this is not reflected in the number of women in the Shadow Cabinet. Just as female parliamentarians have never achieved parity, neither have women in the Executive Branch.In 2017, Australia was ranked 50th in the world in terms of gender representation in parliament, between The Philippines and South Sudan. Globally, there are 38 States in which women account for less than 10 per cent of parliamentarians. As at January 2017, the three highest ranking countries in female representation were Rwanda, Bolivia and Cuba. The United Kingdom was ranked 47th, and the United States 104th (IPU and UNW). Globally only 18 per cent of government ministers are women (UNW). Between 1960 and 2013, 52 women became prime ministers worldwide, of those 43 have taken office since 1990 (Curtin 191).The 1995 United Nations (UN) Fourth World Conference on Women set a 30 per cent target for women in decision-making. This reflects the concept of “critical mass”. Critical mass proposes that for there to be a tipping balance where parity is likely to emerge, this requires a cohort of a minimum of 30 per cent of the minority group.Gender scholars use critical mass theory to explain that parity won’t occur while there are only a few token women in politics. Rather, only as numbers increase will women be able to build a strong enough presence to make female representation normative. Once a 30 per cent critical mass is evident, the argument is that this will encourage other women to join the cohort, making parity possible (Childs & Krook 725). This threshold also impacts on legislative outcomes, because the larger cohort of women are able to “influence their male colleagues to accept and approve legislation promoting women’s concerns” (Childs & Krook 725).Quotas: A Response to Gender InequalityWith women representing less than one in five parliamentarians worldwide, gender quotas have been introduced in 90 countries to redress this imbalance (Krook). Quotas are an equal opportunity measure specifically designed to re-dress inequality in political representation by allocating seats to under-represented groups (McCann 4). However, the effectiveness of the quota system is contested, with continued resistance, particularly in conservative parties. Fine (3) argues that one key objection to mandatory quotas is that they “violate the principle of merit”, suggesting insufficient numbers of women capable or qualified to hold parliamentary positions.In contrast, Gauja (2) suggests that “state-mandated electoral quotas work” because in countries with legislated quotas the number of women being nominated is significantly higher. While gender quotas have been brought to bear to address the gender gap, the ability to challenge the majority status of men has been limited (Hughes).In 1994 the ALP introduced rule-based party quotas to achieve equal representation by 2025 and a gender weighting system for female preselection votes. Conversely, the Liberal Party have a voluntary target of reaching 50 per cent female representation by 2025. But what of the treatment of women who do enter politics?Fig. 1: Portrait of Julia Gillard AC, 27th Prime Minister of Australia, at Parliament House, CanberraInside Politics: Misogyny and Mobs in the ALPIn 2010, Julia Gillard was elected as the leader of the governing ALP, making her Australia’s first female Prime Minister. Following the 2010 federal election, called 22 days after becoming Prime Minister, Gillard was faced with the first hung parliament since 1940. She formed a successful minority government before losing the leadership of the ALP in June 2013. Research demonstrates that “being a female prime minister is often fraught because it challenges many of the gender stereotypes associated with political leadership” (Curtin 192). In Curtin’s assessment Gillard was naïve in her view that interest in her as the country’s first female Prime Minister would quickly dissipate.Gillard, argues Curtin (192-193), “believed that her commitment to policy reform and government enterprise, to hard work and maintaining consensus in caucus, would readily outstrip the gender obsession.” As Curtin continues, “this did not happen.” Voters were continually reminded that Gillard “did not conform to the traditional.” And “worse, some high-profile men, from industry, the Liberal Party and the media, indulged in verbal attacks of a sexist nature throughout her term in office (Curtin 192-193).The treatment of Gillard is noted in terms of how misogyny reinforced negative perceptions about the patriarchal nature of parliamentary politics. The rage this created in public and media spheres was double-edged. On the one hand, some were outraged at the sexist treatment of Gillard. On the other hand, those opposing Gillard created a frenzy of personal and sexist attacks on her. Further attacking Gillard, on 25 February 2011, radio broadcaster Alan Jones called Gillard, not only by her first-name, but called her a “liar” (Kwek). These attacks and the informal way the Prime Minister was addressed, was unprecedented and caused outrage.An anti-carbon tax rally held in front of Parliament House in Canberra in March 2011, featured placards with the slogans “Ditch the Witch” and “Bob Brown’s Bitch”, referring to Gillard and her alliance with the Australian Greens, led by Senator Bob Brown. The Opposition Leader Tony Abbott and other members of the Liberal Party were photographed standing in front of the placards (Sydney Morning Herald, Vertigo). Criticism of women in positions of power is not limited to coming from men alone. Women from the Liberal Party were also seen in the photo of derogatory placards decrying Gillard’s alliances with the Greens.Gillard (Sydney Morning Herald, “Gillard”) said she was “offended when the Leader of the Opposition went outside in the front of Parliament and stood next to a sign that said, ‘Ditch the witch’. I was offended when the Leader of the Opposition stood next to a sign that ascribed me as a man’s bitch.”Vilification of Gillard culminated in October 2012, when Abbott moved a no-confidence motion against the Speaker of the House, Peter Slipper. Abbott declared the Gillard government’s support for Slipper was evidence of the government’s acceptance of Slipper’s sexist attitudes (evident in allegations that Slipper sent a text to a political staffer describing female genitals). Gillard responded with what is known as the “Misogyny speech”, pointing at Abbott, shaking with rage, and proclaiming, “I will not be lectured about sexism and misogyny by this man” (ABC). Apart from vilification, how principles can be forsaken for parliamentary, party or electoral needs, may leave some women circumspect about entering parliament. Similar attacks on political women may affirm this view.In 2010, Labor Senator Penny Wong, a gay Member of Parliament and advocate of same-sex marriage, voted against a bill supporting same-sex marriage, because it was not ALP policy (Q and A, “Passion”). Australian Marriage Equality spokesperson, Alex Greenwich, strongly condemned Wong’s vote as “deeply hypocritical” (Akersten). The Sydney Morning Herald (Dick), under the headline “Married to the Mob” asked:a question: what does it now take for a cabinet minister to speak out on a point of principle, to venture even a mild criticism of the party position? ... Would you object if your party, after fixing some areas of discrimination against a minority group of which you are a part, refused to move on the last major reform for that group because of ‘tradition’ without any cogent explanation of why that tradition should remain? Not if you’re Penny Wong.In 2017, during the postal vote campaign for marriage equality, Wong clarified her reasons for her 2010 vote against same-sex marriage saying in an interview: “In 2010 I had to argue a position I didn’t agree with. You get a choice as a party member don’t you? You either resign or do something like that and make a point, or you stay and fight and you change it.” Biding her time, Wong used her rage to change policy within the ALP.In continuing personal attacks on Gillard, on 19 March 2012, Gillard was told by Germaine Greer that she had a “big arse” (Q and A, “Politics”) and on 27 August 2012, Greer said Gillard looked like an “organ grinder’s monkey” (Q and A, “Media”). Such an attack by a prominent feminist from the 1970s, on the personal appearance of the Prime Minister, reinforced the perception that it was acceptable to criticise a woman in this position, in ways men have never been. Inside Politics: Leadership and Bullying inside the Liberal PartyWhile Gillard’s leadership was likely cut short by the ongoing attacks on her character, Liberal Deputy leader Julie Bishop was thwarted from rising to the leadership of the Liberal Party, thus making it unlikely she will become the Liberal Party’s first female Prime Minister. Julie Bishop was Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2013 to 2018 and Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party from 2007 to 2018, having entered politics in 1998.With the impending demise of Prime Minister Turnbull in August 2018, Bishop sought support from within the Liberal Party to run for the leadership. In the second round of leadership votes Bishop stood for the leadership in a three-cornered race, coming last in the vote to Peter Dutton and Scott Morrison. Bishop resigned as the Foreign Affairs Minister and took a seat on the backbench.When asked if the Liberal Party would elect a popular female leader, Bishop replied: “When we find one, I’m sure we will.” Political journalist Annabel Crabb offered further insight into what Bishop meant when she addressed the press in her red Rodo shoes, labelling the statement as “one of Julie Bishop’s chilliest-ever slapdowns.” Crabb, somewhat sardonically, suggested this translated as Bishop listing someone with her qualifications and experience as: “Woman Works Hard, Is Good at Her Job, Doesn't Screw Up, Loses Out Anyway.”For political journalist Tony Wright, Bishop was “clearly furious with those who had let their testosterone get the better of them and their party” and proceeded to “stride out in a pair of heels in the most vivid red to announce that, despite having resigned the deputy position she had occupied for 11 years, she was not about to quit the Parliament.” In response to the lack of support for Bishop in the leadership spill, female members of the federal parliament took to wearing red in the parliamentary chambers signalling that female members were “fed up with the machinations of the male majority” (Wright).Red signifies power, strength and anger. Worn in parliament, it was noticeable and striking, making a powerful statement. The following day, Bishop said: “It is evident … that there is an acceptance of a level of behaviour in Canberra that would not be tolerated in any other workplace across Australia" (Wright).Colour is political. The Suffragettes of the early twentieth century donned the colours of purple and white to create a statement of unity and solidarity. In recent months, Dr Kerryn Phelps used purple in her election campaign to win the vacated seat of Wentworth, following Turnbull’s resignation, perhaps as a nod to the Suffragettes. Public anger in Wentworth saw Phelps elected, despite the electorate having been seen as a safe Liberal seat.On 21 February 2019, the last sitting day of Parliament before the budget and federal election, Julie Bishop stood to announce her intention to leave politics at the next election. To some this was a surprise. To others it was expected. On finishing her speech, Bishop immediately exited the Lower House without acknowledging the Prime Minister. A proverbial full-stop to her outrage. She wore Suffragette white.Victorian Liberal backbencher Julia Banks, having declared herself so repelled by bullying during the Turnbull-Dutton leadership delirium, announced she was quitting the Liberal Party and sitting in the House of Representatives as an Independent. Banks said she could no longer tolerate the bullying, led by members of the reactionary right wing, the coup was aided by many MPs trading their vote for a leadership change in exchange for their individual promotion, preselection endorsements or silence. Their actions were undeniably for themselves, for their position in the party, their power, their personal ambition – not for the Australian people.The images of male Liberal Members of Parliament standing with their backs turned to Banks, as she tended her resignation from the Liberal Party, were powerful, indicating their disrespect and contempt. Yet Banks’s decision to stay in politics, as with Wong and Bishop is admirable. To maintain the rage from within the institutions and structures that act to sustain patriarchy is a brave, but necessary choice.Today, as much as any time in the past, a woman’s place is in politics, however, recent events highlight the ongoing poor treatment of women in Australian politics. Yet, in the face of negative treatment – gendered attacks on their character, dismissive treatment of their leadership abilities, and ongoing bullying and sexism, political women are fighting back. They are once again channelling their rage at the way they are being treated and how their abilities are constantly questioned. They are enraged to the point of standing in the face of adversity to bring about social and political change, just as the suffragettes and the women’s movements of the 1970s did before them. The current trend towards women planning to stand as Independents at the 2019 federal election is one indication of this. Women within the major parties, particularly on the conservative side of politics, have become quiet. Some are withdrawing, but most are likely regrouping, gathering the rage within and ready to make a stand after the dust of the 2019 election has settled.ReferencesAndrew, Merrindahl. Social Movements and the Limits of Strategy: How Australian Feminists Formed Positions on Work and Care. Canberra. 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Women in Politics: 2017. 2017. 29 Jan. 2018 <https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/infographics/2017-03/women-in-politics-2017>.Krook, Mona Lena. “Gender Quotas as a Global Phenomenon: Actors and Strategies in Quota Adoption.” European Political Science 3.3 (2004): 59–65.———. “Candidate Gender Quotas: A Framework for Analysis.” European Journal of Political Research 46 (2007): 367–394.Kwek, Glenda. “Alan Jones Lets Rip at ‘Ju-liar’ Gillard.” Sydney Morning Herald 25 Feb. 2011. 12 Sep. 2016 <http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/tv-and-radio/alan-jones-lets-rip-at-juliar-gillard-20110224-1b7km.html>.Lake, Marilyn. Getting Equal: The History of Australian Feminism. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1999.McCann, Joy. “Electoral Quotas for Women: An International Overview.” Parliament of Australia Library 14 Nov. 2013. 1 Feb. 2018 <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/ElectoralQuotas>.Parliament of Australia. “Current Ministry List: The 45th Parliament.” 2016. 11 Sep. 2016 <http://www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parliamentary_library/parliamentary_handbook/current_ministry_list>.Plan International. “Girls Reluctant to Pursue a Life of Politics Cite Sexism as Key Reason.” 2018. 20 Jan. 2019 <https://www.plan.org.au/media/media-releases/girls-have-little-to-no-desire-to-pursue-a-career-in-politics>.Q and A. “Mutilation and the Media Generation.” ABC Television 27 Aug. 2012. 28 Sep. 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s3570412.htm>.———. “Politics and Porn in a Post-Feminist World.” ABC Television 19 Mar. 2012. 12 Sep. 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s3451584.htm>.———. “Where Is the Passion?” ABC Television 26 Jul. 2010. 23 Mar. 2018 <http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s2958214.htm?show=transcript>.Reid, Elizabeth. “The Child of Our Movement: A Movement of Women.” Different Lives: Reflections on the Women’s Movement and Visions of Its Future. Ed. Jocelynne Scutt. Ringwood: Penguin 1987. 107-120.Ryan, L. “Feminism and the Federal Bureaucracy 1972-83.” Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions. Ed. Sophie Watson. Sydney: Allen and Unwin 1990.Ryan, Susan. “Fishes on Bicycles.” Papers on Parliament 17 (Sep. 1992). 1 Mar. 2018 <https://www.aph.gov.au/~/~/link.aspx?_id=981240E4C1394E1CA3D0957C42F99120>.Sydney Morning Herald. “‘Pinocchio Gillard’: Strong Anti-Gillard Emissions at Canberra Carbon Tax Protest.” 23 Mar. 2011. 12 Sep. 2016 <http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/pinocchio-gillard-strong-antigillard-emissions-at-canberra-carbon-tax-protest-20110323-1c5w7.html>.———. “Gillard v Abbott on the Slipper Affair.” 10 Oct. 2012. 12 Sep. 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-09/gillard-vs-abbott-on-the-slipper-affair/4303618>.United Nations Women. Facts and Figures: Leadership and Political Participation. 2017. 1 Mar. 2018 <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures>.Van Acker, Elizabeth. Different Voices: Gender and Politics in Australia. Melbourne: MacMillan Education Australia, 1999.Wright, Tony. “No Handmaids Here! Liberal Women Launch Their Red Resistance.” Sydney Morning Herald 17 Sep. 2018. 20 Jan. 2019 <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/no-handmaids-here-liberal-women-launch-their-red-resistance-20180917-p504bm.html>.Wong, Penny. “Marriage Equality Plebiscite.” Interview Transcript. The Project 1 Aug. 2017. 1 Mar. 2018 <https://www.pennywong.com.au/transcripts/the-project-2/>.

Introduction This article aims to explore some of the ideological discourses that reinforce marriage as a central social and cultural institution in US-American society. Andrew Cherlin argues that despite social secularisation, rising divorce rates and the emergence of other, alternative forms of love and living, marriage “remains the most highly valued form of family life in American culture, the most prestigious way to live your life” (9). Indeed, marriage in the US has become an ideological and political battlefield, with charged debates about who is entitled to this form of state-sanctioned relationship, with the government spending large sums of money to promote the value of marriage and the highest number of people projected to get married (nearly 90 per cent of all people) compared to other Western nations (Cherlin 4). I argue here that the idea of marriage as the ideal form for an intimate relationship permeates US-American culture to an extent that we can speak of a marital hegemony. This hegemony is fuelled by and reflected in the saturation of American popular culture with celebratory depictions of the white wedding as public performance and symbolic manifestation of the values associated with marriage. These depictions contribute to the discursive production of weddings as “one of the major events that signal readiness and prepare heterosexuals for membership in marriage as an organizing practice for the institution of marriage” (Ingraham 4). From the representation of weddings as cinematic climax in a huge number of films, to TV shows such as The Bachelor, Bridezillas and Race to the Altar, to the advertisement industry and the bridal magazines that construct the figure of the bride as an ideal that every girl and woman should aspire to, popular discourses promote the desirability of marriage in a wide range of media spheres. These representations, which I call bridal fictions, do not only shape and regulate the production of gendered, raced, classed and sexual identities in the media in fundamental ways. They also promote the idea that marriage is the only adequate framework for an intimate relationship and for the constitution of an acceptable gendered identity, meanwhile reproducing heterosexuality as norm and monogamy as societal duty. Thus I argue that we can understand contemporary bridal fictions as a symbolic legitimation of marital hegemony that perpetuates the idea that “lifelong marriage is a moral imperative” (Coontz 292). Marital Hegemony By drawing on Gramsci’s term and argument of cultural hegemony, I propose that public, political, religious and popular discourses work together in intersecting, overlapping, ideologically motivated and often even contradictory ways to produce what can be conceptualised as marital hegemony. Gramsci understands the relationship between state coercion and legitimation as crucial to an understanding of constituted consensus and co-operation. By legitimation Gramsci refers to processes through which social elites constitute their leadership through the universalizing of their own class-based self-interests. These self-interests are adopted by the greater majority of people, who apprehend them as natural or universal standards of value (common sense). This ‘hegemony’ neutralizes dissent, instilling the values, beliefs and cultural meanings into the generalized social structures. (Lewis 76-77)Marital hegemony also consists of those two mechanisms, coercion and legitimation. Coercion by the social elites, in this case by the state, is conducted through intervening in the private life of citizens in order to regulate and control their intimate relationships. Through the offering of financial benefits, medical insurance, tax cuts and various other privileges to married partners only (see Ingraham 175-76), the state withholds these benefits from all those that do not conform to this kind of state-sanctioned relationship. However, this must serve as the topic of another discussion, as this paper is more interested in the second aspect of hegemony, the symbolic legitimation. Symbolic legitimation works through the depiction of the white wedding as the occasion on which entering the institution of marriage is publicly celebrated and marital identity is socially validated. Bridal fictions work on a semiotic and symbolic level to display and perpetuate the idea of marriage as the most desirable and ultimately only legitimate form of intimate, heterosexual relationships. This is not to say that there is no resistance to this form of hegemony, as Foucault argues, eventually there is no “power without resistances” (142). However, as Engstrom contends, contemporary bridal fictions “reinforce and endorse the idea that romantic relationships should and must lead to marriage, which requires public display—the wedding” (3). Thus I argue that we can understand contemporary bridal fictions as one key symbolic factor in the production of marital hegemony. The ongoing centrality of marriage as an institution finds its reflection, as Otnes and Pleck argue, in the fact that the white wedding, in spite of all changes and processes of liberalisation in regard to gender, family and sexuality, “remains the most significant ritual in contemporary culture” (5). Accordingly, popular culture, reflective as well as constitutive of existing cultural paradigms, is saturated with what I have termed here bridal fictions. Bridal representations have been subject to rigorous academic investigation (c.f. Currie, Geller, Bambacas, Boden, Otnes and Pleck, Wallace and Howard). But, by using the term “bridal fictions”, I seek to underscore the fictional nature of these apparent “representations”, emphasising their role in producing pervasive utopias, rather than representing reality. This is not to say that bridal fictions are solely fictive. In fact, my argument here is that these bridal fictions do have discursive influence on contemporary wedding culture and practices. With my analysis of a bridal advertisement campaign later on in this paper, I aim to show exemplarily how bridal fictions work not only in perpetuating marriage, monogamy and heteronormativity as central organizing principles of intimate life. But moreover, how bridal fictions use this framework to promote certain kinds of white, heterosexual, upper-class identities that normatively inform our understanding of who is seen as entitled to this form of state-sanctioned relationship. Furthermore my aim is to highlight the role of postfeminist frames in sustaining marital hegemony. Second Wave feminism, seeing marriage as a form of “intimate colonization” (in Finlay and Clarke 416), has always been one of the few sources of critique in regard to this institution. In contrast, postfeminist accounts, now informing a significant amount of contemporary bridal fictions, evoke marriage as actively chosen, unproblematic and innately desired state of being for women. By constructing the liberated, self-determined figure of the postfeminist bride, contemporary bridal fictions naturalise and re-modernise marriage as framework for the constitution of modern feminine identity. An analysis of postfeminist bridal identities, as done in the following, is thus vital to my argument, because it highlights how postfeminist accounts deflect feminism’s critique of marriage as patriarchal, political and hegemonic institution and hence contribute to the perpetuation and production of marital hegemony. The Postfeminist Bride Postfeminism has emerged since the early 1990s as the dominant mode of constructing femininities in the media. Angela McRobbie understands postfeminism as “to refer to an active process by which feminist gains of the 1970s and 80s come to be undermined”, while simultaneously appearing to be “a well-informed and even well-intended response to feminism” (“Postfeminism” 255). Based on the assumption that women nowadays are no longer subjected to patriarchal power structures anymore, postfeminism actively takes feminism into account while, at the same time, “undoing” it (McRobbie “Postfeminism” 255). In contemporary postfeminist culture, feminism is “decisively aged and made to seem redundant”, which allows a conscious “dis-identification” and/or “forceful non-identity” with accounts of Second Wave feminism (McRobbie Aftermath 15). This demarcation from earlier forms of feminism is particularly evident with regard to marriage and wedding discourses. Second wave feminist critics such as Betty Friedan (1973) and Carole Pateman were critical of the influence of marriage on women’s psychological, financial and sexual freedom. This generation of feminists saw marriage as a manifestation of patriarchal power, which is based on women’s total emotional and erotic loyalty and subservience (Rich 1980), as well as on “men’s domination over women, and the right of men to enjoy equal sexual access to women” (Pateman 1988 2). In contrast, contemporary postfeminism enunciates now that “equality is achieved, in order to install a whole repertoire of new meanings which emphasise that it [feminism] is no longer needed, it is a spent force” (McRobbie “Postfeminism” 255). Instead of seeing marriage as institutionlised subjugation of women, the postfeminist generation of “educated women who have come of age in the 1990s feel that the women’s liberation movement has achieved its goals and that marriage is now an even playing field in which the two sexes operate as equal partners” (Geller 110). As McRobbie argues “feminism was anti-marriage and this can now to be shown to be great mistake” (Aftermath 20). Accordingly, postfeminist bridal fictions do not depict the bride as passive and waiting to be married, relying on conservative and patriarchal notions of hegemonic femininity, but as an active agent using the white wedding as occasion to act out choice, autonomy and power. Genz argues that a characteristic of postfemininities is that they re-negotiate femininity and feminism no longer as mutually exclusive and irreconcilable categories, but as constitutive of each other (Genz; Genz and Brabon). What I term the postfeminist bride embodies this shifted understanding of feminism and femininity. The postfeminist bride is a figure that is often celebrated in terms of individual freedom, professional success and self-determination, instead of resting on traditional notions of female domesticity and passivity. Rather than fulfilling clichés of the homemaker and traditional wife, the postfeminist bride is characterised by an emphasis on power, agency and pleasure. Characteristic of this figure, as with other postfemininities in popular culture, is a simultaneous appropriation and repudiation of feminist critique. Within postfeminist bridal culture, the performance of traditional femininity through the figure of the bride, or by identification with it, is framed in terms of individual choice, depicted as standing outside of the political and ideological struggles surrounding gender, equality, class, sexuality and race. In this way, as Engstrom argues, “bridal media’s popularity in the late 20th and early 21st centuries in the United States as indicative of a postfeminist cultural environment” (18). And although the contemporary white wedding still rests on patriarchal traditions that symbolise what the Second Wave called an “intimate colonization” (such as the bride’s vow of obedience; the giving away of the bride by one male chaperone, her father, to the next, the husband; her loss of name in marriage etc.), feminist awareness of the patriarchal dimensions of marriage and the ritual of the wedding is virtually absent from contemporary bridal culture. Instead, the patriarchal customs of the white wedding are now actively embraced by the women themselves in the name of tradition and choice. This reflects a prevailing characteristic of postfeminism, which is a trend towards the reclamation of conservative ideals of femininity, following the assumption that the goals of traditional feminist politics have been attained. This recuperation of traditional forms of femininity is one key characteristic of postfeminist bridal culture, as Engstrom argues: “bridal media collectively have become the epitomic example of women’s culture, a genre of popular culture that promotes, defends, and celebrates femininity” (21). Bridal fictions indeed produce traditional femininity by positioning the cultural, social and historical significance of the wedding as a necessary rite of passage for women and as the most important framework for the constitution of their (hetero)sexual, classed and gendered identities. Embodied in its ritual qualities, the white wedding symbolises the transition of women from single to belonging, from girlhood to womanhood and implicitly from childlessness to motherhood. However, instead of seeing this form of hegemonic femininity as a product of unequal, patriarchal power relations as Second Wave did, postfeminism celebrates traditional femininity in modernised versions. Embracing conservative feminine roles (e.g. that of the bride/wife) is now a matter of personal choice, individuality and freedom, characterised by awareness, knowingness and sometimes even irony (McRobbie “Postfeminism”). Nevertheless, the wedding is not only positioned as the pinnacle of a monogamous, heterosexual relationship, but also as the climax of a (female) life-story (“the happiest day of the life”). Combining feminist informed notions of power and choice, the postfeminist wedding is constructed as an event which supposedly enables women to act out those notions, while serving as a framework for gendered identity formation and self-realisation within the boundaries of an officialised and institutionalised relationship. “Modern” Brides I would like to exemplarily illustrate how postfeminism informs contemporary bridal fictions by analysing an advertising campaign of the US bridal magazine Modern Bride that paradigmatically and emblematically shows how postfeminist frames are used to construct the ‘modern’ bride. These advertisements feature American celebrities Guiliana Rancic (“host of E! News”), Daisy Fuentes (“host of Ultimate Style”) and Layla Ali, (“TV host and world champion”) stating why they qualify as a “modern bride”. Instead of drawing on notions of passive femininity, these advertisements have a distinct emphasis on power and agency. All advertisements include the women’s profession and other accomplishments. Rancic claims that she is a modern bride because: “I chased my career instead of guys.” These advertisements emphasise choice and empowerment, the key features of postfeminism, as Angela McRobbie (“Postfeminism”) and Rosalind Gill argue. Femininity, feminism and professionalism here are not framed as mutually exclusive, but are reconciled in the identity of the “modern” bride. Marriage and the white wedding are clearly bracketed in a liberal framework of individual choice, underpinned by a grammar of self-determination and individualism. Layla Ali states that she is a modern bride: “Because I refuse to let anything stand in the way of my happiness.” This not only communicates the message that happiness is intrinsically linked to marriage, but clearly resembles the figure that Sharon Boden terms the “super bride”, a role which allows women to be in control of every aspect of their wedding and “the heroic creator of her big day” while being part of a fairy-tale narrative in which they are the centre of attention (74). Agency and power are clearly visible in all of these ads. These brides are not passive victims of the male gaze, instead they are themselves gazing. In Rancic’s advertisement this is particularly evident, as she is looking directly at the viewer, where her husband, looking into another direction, remains rather face- and gazeless. This is in accord with bridal fictions in general, where husbands are often invisible, serving as bystanders or absent others, reinforcing the ideal that this is the special day of the bride and no one else. Furthermore, all of these advertisements remain within the limited visual repertoire that is common within bridal culture: young to middle-aged, heterosexual, able-bodied, conventionally attractive women. The featuring of the non-white bride Layla Ali is a rare occasion in contemporary bridal fictions. And although this can be seen as a welcomed exception, this advertisement remains eventually within the hegemonic and racial boundaries of contemporary bridal fictions. As Ingraham argues, ultimately “the white wedding in American culture is primarily a ritual by, for, and about the white middle to upper classes. Truly, the white wedding” (33). Furthermore, these advertisements illustrate another key feature of bridal culture, the “privileging of white middle- to upper-class heterosexual marriage over all other forms” (Ingraham 164). Semiotically, the discussed advertisements reflect the understanding of the white wedding as occasion to perform a certain classed identity: the luscious white dresses, the tuxedos, the jewellery and make up, etc. are all signifiers for a particular social standing. This is also emphasised by the mentioning of the prestigious jobs these brides hold, which presents a postfeminist twist on the otherwise common depictions of brides as practising hypergamy, meaning the marrying of a spouse of higher socio-economic status. But significantly, upward social mobility is usually presented as only acceptable for women, reinforcing the image of the husband as the provider. Another key feature of postfeminism, the centrality of heterosexual romance, becomes evident through Daisy Fuentes’ statement: “I’m a modern bride, because I believe that old-school values enhance a modern romance.” Having been liberated from the shackles of second wave feminism, which dismissed romance as “dope for dupes” (Greer in Pearce and Stacey 50), the postfeminist bride unapologetically embraces romance as central part of her life and relationship. Romance is here equated with traditionalism and “old school” values, thus reinforcing sexual exclusiveness, traditional gender roles and marriage as re-modernised, romantic norms. Angela McRobbie describes this “double entanglement” as a key feature of postfeminism that is comprised of “the co-existence of neo-conservative values in relation to gender, sexuality and family life […] with processes of liberalisation in regard to choice and diversity in domestic, sexual and kinship relations” (“Postfeminism” 255–56). These advertisements illustrate quite palpably that the postfeminist bride is a complex figure. It is simultaneously progressive and conservative, fulfilling ideals of conservative femininity while actively negotiating in the complex field of personal choice, individualism and social conventions; it oscillates between power and passivity, tradition and modern womanhood, between feminism and femininity. It is precisely this contradictory nature of the postfeminist bride that makes the figure so appealing, as it allows women to participate in the fantasy world of bridal utopias while still providing possibilities to construct themselves as active and powerful agents. Conclusion While we can generally welcome the reconfiguration of brides as powerful and self-determined, we have to remain critical of the postfeminist assumption of women as “autonomous agents no longer constrained by any inequalities or power imbalances whatsoever” (Gill 153). Where marriage is assumed to be an “even playing field” as Geller argues (110), feminism is no longer needed and traditional marital femininity can be, once again, performed without guilt. In these ways postfeminism deflects feminist criticism with regard to the political dimensions of marital femininity and thus contributes to the production of marital hegemony. But why is marital hegemony per se problematic? Firstly, by presenting marital identity as essential for the construction of gendered identity, bridal fictions leave little room for (female) self-definition outside of the single/married binary. As Ingraham argues, not only “are these categories presented as significant indices of social identity, they are offered as the only options, implying that the organization of identity in relation to marriage is universal and in no need of explanation” (17). Hence, by positioning marriage and singledom as opposite poles on the axis of proper femininity, bridal fictions stigmatise single women as selfish, narcissistic, hedonistic, immature and unable to attract a suitable husband (Taylor 20, 40). Secondly, within bridal fictions “weddings, marriage, romance, and heterosexuality become naturalized to the point where we consent to the belief that marriage is necessary to achieve a sense of well-being, belonging, passion, morality and love” (Ingraham 120). By presenting the white wedding as a publicly endorsed and visible entry to marriage, bridal fictions produce in fundamental ways normative notions about who is ‘fit’ for marriage and therefore capable of the associated cultural and social values of maturity, responsibility, ‘family values’ and so on. This is particularly critical, as postfeminist identities “are structured by, stark and continuing inequalities and exclusions that relate to ‘race’ and ethnicity, class, age, sexuality and disability as well as gender” (Gill 149). These postfeminist exclusions are very evident in contemporary bridal fictions that feature almost exclusively young to middle-aged, white, able-bodied couples with upper to middle class identities that conform to the heteronormative matrix, both physically and socially. By depicting weddings almost exclusively in this kind of raced, classed and gendered framework, bridal fictions associate the above mentioned values, that are seen as markers for responsible adulthood and citizenship, with those who comply with these norms. In these ways bridal fictions stigmatise those who are not able or do not want to get married, and, moreover, produce a visual regime that determines who is seen as entitled to this kind of socially validated identity. The fact that bridal fictions indeed play a major role in producing marital hegemony is further reflected in the increasing presence of same-sex white weddings in popular culture. These representations, despite their message of equality for everyone, usually replicate rather than re-negotiate the heteronormative terms of bridal culture. This can be regarded as evidence of bridal fiction’s scope and reach in naturalising marriage not only as the most ideal form of a heterosexual relationship, but increasingly as the ideal for any kind of intimate relationship. References Bambacas, Christyana. “Thinking about White Weddings.” Journal of Australian Studies 26.72 (2002): 191–200.The Bachelor, ABC, 2002–present. Boden, Sharon. Consumerism, Romance and the Wedding Experience. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Bridezillas, We TV, 2004–present. Cherlin, Andrew. The-Marriage-Go-Round. The State of Marriage and the Family in America Today. New York: Vintage, 2010. Coontz, Stephanie. Marriage. A History. New York: Penguin, 2005. Currie, Dawn. “‘Here Comes the Bride’: The Making of a ‘Modern Traditional’ Wedding in Western Culture.” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 24.3 (1993): 403–21. Engstrom, Erika. The Bride Factory. Mass Portrayals of Women and Weddings. New York: Peter Lang, 2012. Fairchild Bridal Study (2005) 27 May 2012. ‹http://www.sellthebride.com/documents/americanweddingsurvey.pdf›. Finlay, Sara-Jane, and Victoria Clarke. “‘A Marriage of Inconvenience?’ Feminist Perspectives on Marriage.” Feminism & Psychology 13.4 (2003): 415–20. Foucault, M. (1980) “Body/Power and Truth/Power” in Gordon, C. (ed.) Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge, Harvester, U.K. Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1973. Geller, Jaqlyn. Here Comes the Bride. Women, Weddings, and the Marriage Mystique. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2001. Genz, Stéphanie. Postfemininities in Popular Culture. New York: Palgrave, 2009. 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The use of the family home as a setting for television sitcoms (situation comedies) has long been recognised for its ability to provide audiences with an identifiable site of ontological security (much discussed by Giddens, Scannell, Saunders and others). From the beginnings of American sitcoms with such programs as Leave it to Beaver, and through the trail of The Brady Bunch, The Cosby Show, Roseanne, The Fresh Prince of Bel Air, and on to Home Improvement, That 70s Show and How I Met Your Mother, the US has led the way with screenwriters and producers capitalising on the value of using the suburban family dwelling as a fixed setting. The most obvious advantage is the use of an easily constructed and inexpensive set, most often on a TV studio soundstage requiring only a few rooms (living room, kitchen and bedroom are usually enough to set the scene), and a studio audience. In Singapore, sitcoms have had similar successes; portraying the lives of ‘ordinary people’ in their home settings. Some programs have achieved phenomenal success, including an unprecedented ten year run for Phua Chu Kang Pte Ltd from 1996-2007, closely followed by Under One Roof (1994-2000 and an encore season in 2002), and Living with Lydia (2001-2005). This article furthers Blunt and Dowling’s exploration of the “critical geography” of home, by providing a focused analysis of home-based sitcoms in the nation-state of Singapore. The use of the home tells us a lot. Roseanne’s cluttered family home represents a lived reality for working-class families throughout the Western world. In Friends, the seemingly wealthy ‘young’ people live in a fashionable apartment building, while Seinfeld’s apartment block is much less salubrious, indicating (in line with the character) the struggle of the humble comedian. Each of these examples tells us something about not just the characters, but quite often about class, race, and contemporary societies. In the Singaporean programs, the home in Under One Roof (hereafter UOR) represents the major form of housing in Singapore, and the program as a whole demonstrates the workability of Singaporean multiculturalism in a large apartment block. Phua Chu Kang Pte Ltd (PCK) demonstrates the entrepreneurial abilities of even under-educated Singaporeans, with its lead character, a building contractor, living in a large freestanding dwelling – generally reserved for the well-heeled of Singaporean society. And in Living with Lydia (LWL) (a program which demonstrates Singapore’s capacity for global integration), Hong Kong émigré Lydia is forced to share a house (less ostentatious than PCK’s) with the family of the hapless Billy B. Ong. There is perhaps no more telling cultural event than the sitcom. In the 1970s, The Brady Bunch told us more about American values and habits than any number of news reports or cop shows. A nation’s identity is uncovered; it bares its soul to us through the daily tribulations of its TV households. In Singapore, home-based sitcoms have been one of the major success stories in local television production with each of these three programs collecting multiple prizes at the region-wide Asian Television Awards. These sitcoms have been able to reflect the ideals and values of the Singaporean nation to audiences both at ‘home’ and abroad. This article explores the worlds of UOR, PCK, and LWL, and the ways in which each of the fictional homes represents key features of the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural Singapore. Through ownership and regulation, Singaporean TV programs operate as a firm link between the state and its citizens. These sitcoms follow regular patterns where the ‘man of the house’ is more buffoon than breadwinner – in a country defined by its neo-Confucian morality, sitcoms allow a temporary subversion of patriarchal structures. In this article I argue that the central theme in Singaporean sitcoms is that while home is a personal space, it is also a valuable site for national identities to be played out. These identities are visible in the physical indicators of the exterior and interior living spaces, and the social indicators representing a benign patriarchy and a dominant English language. Structure One of the key features of sitcoms is the structure: cold open – titles – establishing shot – opening scene. Generally the cold opening (aka “the teaser”) takes place inside the home to quickly (re)establish audience familiarity with the location and the characters. The title sequence then features, in the case of LWL and PCK, the characters outside the house (in LWL this is in cartoon format), and in UOR (see Figure 1) it is the communal space of the barbeque area fronting the multi-story HDB (Housing Development Board) apartment blocks. Figure 1: Under One Roof The establishing shot at the end of each title sequence, and when returning from ad breaks, is an external view of the characters’ respective dwellings. In Seinfeld this establishing shot is the New York apartment block, in Roseanne it is the suburban house, and the Singaporean sitcoms follow the same format (see Figure 2). Figure 2: Phua Chu Kang External Visions of the Home This emphasis on exterior buildings reminds the viewer that Singaporean housing is, in many ways, unique. As a city-state (and a young one at that) its spatial constraints are particularly limiting: there simply isn’t room for suburban housing on quarter acre blocks. It rapidly transformed from an “empty rock” to a scattered Malay settlement of bay and riverside kampongs (villages) recognisable by its stilt houses. Then in the shadow of colonialism and the rise of modernity, the kampongs were replaced in many cases by European-inspired terrace houses. Finally, in the post-colonial era high-rise housing began to swell through the territory, creating what came to be known as the “HDB new town”, with some 90% of the population now said to reside in HDB units, and many others living in private high-rises (Chang 102, 104). Exterior shots used in UOR (see Figure 3) consistently emphasise the distinctive HDB blocks. As with the kampong housing, high-rise apartments continue notions of communal living in that “Living below, above and side by side other people requires tolerance of neighbours and a respect towards the environment of the housing estate for the good of all” (104). The provision of readily accessible public housing was part of the “covenant between the newly enfranchised electorate and the elected government” (Chua 47). Figure 3: Establishing shot from UOR In UOR, we see the constant interruption of the lives of the Tan family by their multi-ethnic neighbours. This occurs to such an extent as to be a part of the normal daily flow of life in Singaporean society. Chang argues that despite the normally interventionist activities of the state, it is the “self-enforcing norms” of behaviour that have worked in maintaining a “peaceable society in high-rise housing” (104). This communitarian attitude even extends to the large gated residence of PCK, home to an almost endless stream of relatives and friends. The gate itself seems to perform no restrictive function. But such a “peaceable society” can also be said to be a result of state planning which extends to the “racial majoritarianism” imposed on HDB units in the form of quotas determining “the actual number of households of each of the three major races [Chinese, Malay and Indian] … to be accommodated in a block of flats” (Chua 55). Issues of race are important in Singapore where “the inscription of media imagery bears the cultural discourse and materiality of the social milieu” (Wong 120) perhaps nowhere more graphically illustrated than in the segregation of TV channels along linguistic / cultural lines. These 3 programs all featured on MediaCorp TV’s predominantly English-language Channel 5 and are, in the words of Roland Barthes, “anchored” by dint of their use of English. Home Will Eat Itself The consumption of home-based sitcoms by audiences in their own living-rooms creates a somewhat self-parodying environment. As John Ellis once noted, it is difficult to escape from the notion that “TV is a profoundly domestic phenomenon” (113) in that it constantly attempts to “include the audiences own conception of themselves into the texture of its programmes” (115). In each of the three Singaporean programs living-rooms are designed to seat characters in front of a centrally located TV set – at most all the audience sees is the back of the TV, and generally only when the TV is incorporated into a storyline, as in the case of PCK in Figure 4 (note the TV set in the foreground). Figure 4: PCK Even in this episode of PCK when the lead characters stumble across a pornographic video starring one of the other lead characters, the viewer only hears the program. Perhaps the most realistic (and acerbic) view of how TV reorganises our lives – both spatially in the physical layout of our homes, and temporally in the way we construct our viewing habits (eating dinner or doing the housework while watching the screen) – is the British “black comedy”, The Royle Family. David Morley (443) notes that “TV and other media have adapted themselves to the circumstances of domestic consumption while the domestic arena itself has been simultaneously redefined to accommodate their requirements”. Morley refers to The Royle Family’s narrative that rests on the idea that “for many people, family life and watching TV have become indistinguishable to the extent that, in this fictional household, it is almost entirely conducted from the sitting positions of the viewers clustered around the set” (436). While TV is a central fixture in most sitcoms, its use is mostly as a peripheral thematic device with characters having their viewing interrupted by the arrival of another character, or by a major (within the realms of the plot) event. There is little to suggest that “television schedules have instigated a significant restructuring of family routines” as shown in Livingstone’s audience-based study of UK viewers (104). In the world of the sitcom, the temporalities of characters’ lives do not need to accurately reflect that of “real life” – or if they do, things quickly descend to the bleakness exemplified by the sedentary Royles. As Scannell notes, “broadcast output, like daily life, is largely uneventful, and both are punctuated (predictably and unpredictably) by eventful occasions” (4). To show sitcom characters in this static, passive environment would be anathema to the “real” viewer, who would quickly lose interest. This is not to suggest that sitcoms are totally benign though as with all genres they are “the outcome of social practices, received procedures that become objectified in the narratives of television, then modified in the interpretive act of viewing” (Taylor 14). In other words, they feature a contextualisation that is readily identifiable to members of an established society. However, within episodes themselves, it as though time stands still – character development is almost non-existent, or extremely slow at best and we see each episode has “flattened past and future into an eternal present in which parents love and respect one another, and their children forever” (Taylor 16). It takes some six seasons before the character of PCK becomes a father, although in previous seasons he acts as a mentor to his nephew, Aloysius. Contained in each episode, in true sitcom style, are particular “narrative lines” in which “one-liners and little comic situations [are] strung on a minimal plot line” containing a minor problem “the solution to which will take 22 minutes and pull us gently through the sequence of events toward a conclusion” (Budd et al. 111). It is important to note that the sitcom genre does not work in every culture, as each locale renders the sitcom with “different cultural meanings” (Nielsen 95). Writing of the failure of the Danish series Three Whores and a Pickpocket (with a premise like that, how could it fail?), Nielsen (112) attributes its failure to the mixing of “kitchen sink realism” with “moments of absurdity” and “psychological drama with expressionistic camera work”, moving it well beyond the strict mode of address required by the genre. In Australia, soap operas Home and Away and Neighbours have been infinitely more popular than our attempts at sitcoms – which had a brief heyday in the 1980s with Hey Dad..!, Kingswood Country and Mother and Son – although Kath and Kim (not studio-based) could almost be counted. Lichter et al. (11) state that “television entertainment can be ‘political’ even when it does not deal with the stuff of daily headlines or partisan controversy. Its latent politics lie in the unavoidable portrayal of individuals, groups, and institutions as a backdrop to any story that occupies the foreground”. They state that US television of the 1960s was dominated by the “idiot sitcom” and that “To appreciate these comedies you had to believe that social conventions were so ironclad they could not tolerate variations. The scripts assumed that any minute violation of social conventions would lead to a crisis that could be played for comic results” (15). Series like Happy Days “harked back to earlier days when problems were trivial and personal, isolated from the concerns of a larger world” (17). By the late 1980s, Roseanne and Married…With Children had “spawned an antifamily-sitcom format that used sarcasm, cynicism, and real life problems to create a type of in-your-face comedy heretofore unseen on prime time” (20). This is markedly different from the type of values presented in Singaporean sitcoms – where filial piety and an unrelenting faith in the family unit is sacrosanct. In this way, Singaporean sitcoms mirror the ideals of earlier US sitcoms which idealise the “egalitarian family in which parental wisdom lies in appeals to reason and fairness rather than demands for obedience” (Lichter et al. 406). Dahlgren notes that we are the products of “an ongoing process of the shaping and reshaping of identity, in response to the pluralised sets of social forces, cultural currents and personal contexts encountered by individuals” where we end up with “composite identities” (318). Such composite identities make the presentation (or re-presentation) of race problematic for producers of mainstream television. Wong argues that “Within the context of PAP hegemony, media presentation of racial differences are manufactured by invoking and resorting to traditional values, customs and practices serving as symbols and content” (118). All of this is bound within a classificatory system in which each citizen’s identity card is inscribed as Chinese, Malay, Indian or Other (often referred to as CMIO), and a broader social discourse in which “the Chinese are linked to familial values of filial piety and the practice of extended family, the Malays to Islam and rural agricultural activities, and the Indians to the caste system” (Wong 118). However, these sitcoms avoid directly addressing the issue of race, preferring to accentuate cultural differences instead. In UOR the tables are turned when a none-too-subtle dig at the crude nature of mainland Chinese (with gags about the state of public toilets), is soon turned into a more reverential view of Chinese culture and business acumen. Internal Visions of the Home This reverence for Chinese culture is also enacted visually. The loungeroom settings of these three sitcoms all provide examples of the fashioning of the nation through a “ubiquitous semi-visibility” (Noble 59). Not only are the central characters in each of these sitcoms constructed as ethnically Chinese, but the furnishings provide a visible nod to Chinese design in the lacquered screens, chairs and settees of LWL (see Figure 5.1), in the highly visible pair of black inlaid mother-of-pearl wall hangings of UOR (see Figure 5.2) and in the Chinese statuettes and wall-hangings found in the PCK home. Each of these items appears in the central view of the shows most used setting, the lounge/family room. There is often symmetry involved as well; the balanced pearl hangings of UOR are mirrored in a set of silk prints in LWL and the pair of ceramic Chinese lions in PCK. Figure 5.1: LWL Figure 5.2: UOR Thus, all three sitcoms feature design elements that reflect visible links to Chinese culture and sentiments, firmly locating the sitcoms “in Asia”, and providing a sense of the nation. The sets form an important role in constructing a realist environment, one in which “identification with realist narration involves a temporary merger of at least some of the viewer’s identity with the position offered by the text” (Budd et al. 110). These constant silent reminders of the Chinese-based hegemon – the cultural “majoritarianism” – anchors the sitcoms to a determined concept of the nation-state, and reinforces the “imaginative geographies of home” (Blunt and Dowling 247). The Foolish “Father” Figure in a Patriarchal Society But notions of a dominant Chinese culture are dealt with in a variety of ways in these sitcoms – not the least in a playful attitude toward patriarchal figures. In UOR, the Tan family “patriarch” is played by Moses Lim, in PCK, Gurmit Singh plays Phua and in LWL Samuel Chong plays Billy B. Ong (or, as Lydia mistakenly refers to him Billy Bong). Erica Sharrer makes the claim that class is a factor in presenting the father figure as buffoon, and that US sitcoms feature working class families in which “the father is made to look inept, silly, or incompetent have become more frequent” partly in response to changing societal structures where “women are shouldering increasing amounts of financial responsibility in the home” (27). Certainly in the three series looked at here, PCK (the tradesman) is presented as the most derided character in his role as head of the household. Moses Lim’s avuncular Tan Ah Teck is presented mostly as lovably foolish, even when reciting his long-winded moral tales at the conclusion of each episode, and Billy B. Ong, as a middle-class businessman, is presented more as a victim of circumstance than as a fool. Sharrer ponders whether “sharing the burden of bread-winning may be associated with fathers perceiving they are losing advantages to which they were traditionally entitled” (35). But is this really a case of males losing the upper hand? Hanke argues that men are commonly portrayed as the target of humour in sitcoms, but only when they “are represented as absurdly incongruous” to the point that “this discursive strategy recuperates patriarchal notions” (90). The other side of the coin is that while the “dominant discursive code of patriarchy might be undone” (but isn’t), “the sitcom’s strategy for containing women as ‘wives’ and ‘mothers’ is always contradictory and open to alternative readings” (Hanke 77). In Singapore’s case though, we often return to images of the women in the kitchen, folding the washing or agonising over the work/family dilemma, part of what Blunt and Dowling refer to as the “reproduction of patriarchal and heterosexist relations” often found in representations of “the ideal’ suburban home” (29). Eradicating Singlish One final aspect of these sitcoms is the use of language. PM Lee Hsien Loong once said that he had no interest in “micromanaging” the lives of Singaporeans (2004). Yet his two predecessors (PM Goh and PM Lee Senior) both reflected desires to do so by openly criticising the influence of Phua Chu Kang’s liberal use of colloquial phrases and phrasing. While the use of Singlish (or Singapore Colloquial English / SCE) in these sitcoms is partly a reflection of everyday life in Singapore, by taking steps to eradicate it through the Speak Good English movement, the government offers an intrusion into the private home-space of Singaporeans (Ho 17). Authorities fear that increased use of Singlish will damage the nation’s ability to communicate on a global basis, withdrawing to a locally circumscribed “pidgin English” (Rubdy 345). Indeed, the use of Singlish in UOR is deliberately underplayed in order to capitalise on overseas sales of the show (which aired, for example, on Australia’s SBS television) (Srilal). While many others have debated the Singlish issue, my concern is with its use in the home environment as representative of Singaporean lifestyles. As novelist Hwee Hwee Tan (2000) notes: Singlish is crude precisely because it’s rooted in Singapore’s unglamorous past. This is a nation built from the sweat of uncultured immigrants who arrived 100 years ago to bust their asses in the boisterous port. Our language grew out of the hardships of these ancestors. Singlish thus offers users the opportunity to “show solidarity, comradeship and intimacy (despite differences in background)” and against the state’s determined efforts to adopt the language of its colonizer (Ho 19-20). For this reason, PCK’s use of Singlish iterates a “common man” theme in much the same way as Paul Hogan’s “Ocker” image of previous decades was seen as a unifying feature of mainstream Australian values. That the fictional PCK character was eventually “forced” to take “English” lessons (a storyline rapidly written into the program after the direct criticisms from the various Prime Ministers), is a sign that the state has other ideas about the development of Singaporean society, and what is broadcast en masse into Singaporean homes. Conclusion So what do these home-based sitcoms tell us about Singaporean nationalism? Firstly, within the realms of a multiethnic society, mainstream representations reflect the hegemony present in the social and economic structures of Singapore. Chinese culture is dominant (albeit in an English-speaking environment) and Indian, Malay and Other cultures are secondary. Secondly, the home is a place of ontological security, and partial adornment with cultural ornaments signifying Chinese culture are ever-present as a reminder of the Asianness of the sitcom home, ostensibly reflecting the everyday home of the audience. The concept of home extends beyond the plywood-prop walls of the soundstage though. As Noble points out, “homes articulate domestic spaces to national experience” (54) through the banal nationalism exhibited in “the furniture of everyday life” (55). In a Singaporean context, Velayutham (extending the work of Morley) explores the comforting notion of Singapore as “home” to its citizens and concludes that the “experience of home and belonging amongst Singaporeans is largely framed in the materiality and social modernity of everyday life” (4). Through the use of sitcoms, the state is complicit in creating and recreating the family home as a site for national identities, adhering to dominant modes of culture and language. References Blunt, Alison, and Robyn Dowling. Home. London: Routledge, 2006. Budd, Mike, Steve Craig, and Clay Steinman. Consuming Environments: Television and Commercial Culture. New Jersey: Rutgers UP, 1999. 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"At Home in Singaporean Sitcoms: Under One Roof, Living with Lydia and Phua Chu Kang." M/C Journal 10.4 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/09-pugsley.php>. APA Style Pugsley, P. (Aug. 2007) "At Home in Singaporean Sitcoms: Under One Roof, Living with Lydia and Phua Chu Kang," M/C Journal, 10(4). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/09-pugsley.php>.