Academic literature on the topic 'Europe – Foreign relations – 1945-'
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Journal articles on the topic "Europe – Foreign relations – 1945-"
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Papenko, Natalia, and Yevgen Papenko. "The policy of the Austrian Republic concerning the constant neutrality (1945-1955)." European Historical Studies, no. 4 (2016): 192–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2016.04.192-208.
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The article is devoted to the exploration of the constant neutrality status of the Second Austrian republic, to its political and legal research, its effectiveness as an instrument of the foreign policy of the state. The problem of the Austrian constant neutrality status is the post-war system of international relations was and is one of the main issues of Austrian internal and foreign policy, as long as it was directly connected with the discontinuance of occupation by the states of anti-Hitler coalition. Status of constant neutrality had to become a pledge of the existence of Austria as an independent and flourishing state, one of the elements of the peace, security and stability in Europe.
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Alstein, Maarten Van. "From Enigma to Enemy: Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Diplomatic Elite, and the Soviet Union, 1944–1945." Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 3 (July 2011): 126–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00144.
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This article draws on recently declassified documents from the Belgian archives to assess the division within the Belgian diplomatic service about Soviet intentions at the start of the Cold War. The diplomatic corps was divided between those who viewed the Soviet Union favorably and believed that continued close cooperation after the war was both feasible and essential, and those who were wary of Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe and believed that Western democracies would have to be united in opposing Soviet encroachments. Paul-Henri Spaak, the long-time Belgian foreign minister, was initially in the former camp, but events at the close of the war and soon thereafter brought him and Belgian foreign policy much closer to the latter's position.
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Behar, Joseph. "Diplomacy and Essential Workers: Official British Recruitment of Foreign Labor in Italy, 1945–1951." Journal of Policy History 15, no. 3 (July 2003): 324–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jph.2003.0015.
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The recruitment of about seven thousand Italian migrant workers by the postwar British Labour government is an interesting study in the use of foreign labor recruitment as a diplomatic policy. Foreign labor recruitment has generally been regarded as primarily an economic policy, with political ramifications entering into the picture in the form of domestic issues around integration, racism, labor relations and so on. However, the various British schemes to recruit Italian migrant workers from 1945 to 1951, and the discussion around the movement of migrant workers in postwar Europe carried on in various inter-European bodies, illustrate that foreign labor recruitment can be a much more complex phenomenon.
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Young, John W. "The Foreign Office, the French and the post-war division of Germany 1945–46." Review of International Studies 12, no. 3 (July 1986): 223–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500113944.
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When, in May 1945, the Allies finally defeated Nazi Germany and began their military occupation, no-one expected that within five years the country would be divided into two political halves, one tied to the West and the other to the Soviet Union. Germany, despite its defeat in 1918, had remained the most powerful state in central Europe and had been an undoubted great power since 1870. If anything, the fear was that Germany would revive quickly and become a menace to the peace again. That it did become divided between East and West was of course due to the start of the ‘Cold War’ after 1945, with the Americans and British on the one side and the Russians on the other seeing, not Germany, but each other as the post-war ‘enemy’. In 1946 Winston Churchill was already able to speak of an ‘iron curtain’ stretching from Trieste, on the Adriatic, to Stettin, on the Baltic. By 1949 each side had established control of its own bloc—the Russians predominating in the Eastern European ‘People's Republics’, the Americans drawing the West Europeans together with the Marshall Aid Programme and the North Atlantic Treaty.
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Jakubec, Pavol. "London 1940-1945, A Europe in Miniature? The Case of Norwegian, Polish and Czechoslovak Exiles." Debater a Europa, no. 13 (July 1, 2015): 91–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/1647-6336_13_6.
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This paper discusses experience of representatives of three European small powers assembled in the London during WWII - Norway, Czechoslovakia and Poland. A common cause, comparable setting and frequent contacts created a promising framework for a new quality of their mutual relations that could, eventually, endorse the European idea. This proved to be at best a partial success: The exiles acted by-and-large as guardians of national interests and identities. As such, and owing to their strained position, they paid considerable attention to status as a principal asset. They subscribed of internalization of their foreign policies and learned or refined their experience with its practices. Yet their visions remained rather regional, with only occasional reference to the idea of European Integration. Albeit the exiles failed to integrate the nations they spoke for, they established closer and better informed transnational ties bound to affect European politics in the years to come. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/1647-6336_13_6
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Rymar, Ihor. "The british-american direction in the strategy of the Third International in 1941-1943 (on the materials of the «diary» of Georgi Dimitrov)." American History & Politics Scientific edition, no. 7 (2019): 92–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2019.07.92-102.
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On the basis of diary entries of the Secretary General of the Third International G. Dimitrov, documents of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, and documents of Soviet foreign policy, the author analyzes the characteristic features of the discursive model of the strategy and tactics of the Third International in 1941-1943, especially its activities in the field of propaganda regarding the Communist Party of the USA and the Communist Party of Great Britain during the first period of the German-Soviet war of 1941-1945 and in the process of the formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition. The role of the CPUSA and CPGB in the process of consolidating democratic forces in the struggle against Germany and its allies, the features of their activities in the framework of the discursive model of the Third International of 1941-1943, are characterized. The place and significance of the CPUSA and CPGB in the context of the Comintern’s strategy of providing comprehensive assistance to the USSR in the war with Germany, the deployment of the partisan movement and the Resistance movement in occupied countries, and the establishment of relations with the governments of F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill for a quick end to the war. In the course of the study, the main areas of activity of the American and British Communist Parties, the preservation of distance in cooperation with national governments and especially the intelligence and counterintelligence bodies of the Allies during 1941-1943, were established. A separate place in G. Dimitrov’s recordings is occupied by the problem of opening a second front in Europe in 1942 and propaganda issues related, first of all, to the signing of the British-Soviet and American-Soviet agreements, the problems of their coverage in newspapers and on the radio.
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Micko, P. "Foreign Trade Relations of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945) with the Counttries of South-Eastern Europe." Codrul Cosminului. New series 22, no. 1 (2016): 93–110.
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Pachocka, Marta. "Zagadnienie mocarstwowości Francji w dobie V Republiki (do 2007 roku)." Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego. Studia i Prace, no. 1 (December 5, 2012): 233–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/kkessip.2012.1.9.
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During World War II and the postwar years, France’s international position has been weakened. The seizure of power by Charles de Gaulle in 1958 contributed to a stabilization of the political situation in the country and to a redefinition of French foreign policy. The article analyzes the international position of France from the end of World War II until 2007, when Nicolas Sarkozy won the presidential election. Thus, the article covers the period of the existence of two French republics: the Fourth Republic in the years 1946–1958 and the Fifth Republic, which remains Hexagone’s contemporary political system since 1958. The article consists of three parts. In the first part the external and internal conditions of the birth of the Fifth Republic are presented, with particular emphasis on the role of its creator – Ch. de Gaulle. The second part discusses the importance of France in Europe aft er 1945, emphasizing its contribution to the process of European integration and to the development of relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the USSR/Russian Federation and the Mediterranean countries. Then, the third part of my article stresses the position of France in the system of international relations after World War II, analyzing it on the example of Franco-American and Franco-NATO relations, the French policy towards the Arab and African countries, and finally, on the example of the Republic’s multilateral diplomacy. I conclude that in the examined period 1945–2007 France is an example of the former global superpower, which builds and strengthens its international position as a regional power with global interests.
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Kakovkina, Olga. "Foreign Delegations in Dnipropetrovsk City and Dnipropetrovska Oblast in 1945–1959." Roxolania Historĭca = Historical Roxolania 2 (December 28, 2019): 199. http://dx.doi.org/10.15421/30190213.
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The purpose of the article is to figure out the features of a foreign presence in the city and the region during 1945–1959, its intensity and content on the example of the visit of foreign delegations – from the end of the World War II, as a result of which the political map of Europe and the world, the content of international relations have changed, to the assignment to Dnipropetrovsk the status of a conditionally closed city in August 1959, which led to the prohibition of its visit by foreigners until 1987.Research methods: historical-chronological, comparative.Main results: One of the aspects of foreign presence in the region is revealed on the example of target groups, which, as a rule, came at the invitation of public organizations, as well as certain departments. Some features of visiting the region by foreign delegations, quantitative indicators, the composition of individual groups, residence programs, service problems were identified. It was found that a certain limit in visiting foreigners to the region, as well as in the whole USSR, was 1953, when, as a result of the liberalization of the foreign policy of the Soviet leadership, the foreign presence in the region became more massive and public. Dnipropetrovsk and the surrounding areas, along with Kyiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhya, were one of the visiting points. The purpose of its visits was to familiarize with the Soviet reality for the formation of a certain image of the USSR, to demonstrate the "advantages" of the Soviet model, and, therefore caused a significant ideological load of programs and strict control by the party bodies. Since the mid-1950s, with the intensive development of international economic relations in the region, primarily in heavy industry, the number of delegations with production targets had been growing. The economic component of relations dominated the tourism sector, which almost did not cover the Dnipropetrovsk region, given the formation of closed industries. In conclusion, it was noted that already at the stage of late Stalinism, the city and region were a significant part of the international presentation of the USSR and Ukraine. However, the stay of foreign groups revealed significant problems in their service due to material difficulties, lack of experience and personnel, and the specifics of organizing admissions under conditions of totalitarian state.Practical significance: the article recommended for the practice of teaching and research regional and urban history.Originality: sources that were first introduced to scientific circulation were used – the Central State Archive of the Public Organizations of Ukraine, the State Archive of the Dnipropetrovsk Region (oblastʼ) and regional periodicals of the period.Scientific novelty: the issue of the presence of foreign delegations in the Dnipropetrovsk region during 1945–1959 was considered, the problem of the place of Dnipropetrovsk region, Dnipropetrovsk in the system of international relations of Ukraine of the totalitarian period was determined.Article type: explanation.
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Demberel, K. "Manifestation of the Internal Systemic Conflict in Mongolia." Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Political Science and Religion Studies 36 (2021): 17–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.26516/2073-3380.2021.36.17.
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The article deals with the issue of Mongolia's foreign policy during the Cold War. This period is divided into two parts. The first period, 1945-1960s, is a period of conflict between two systems: socialism and capitalism. In this first period of the Cold War Mongolia managed to establish diplomatic relations with socialist countries of Eastern Europe, as the “system allowed”. The second period, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, is the period of the conflict of the socialist system, the period of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation. During this period Mongolia's foreign policy changed dramatically and focused on the Soviet Union. This was due to the Soviet investment «boom» that began in 1960s and the entry of Soviet troops on the territory of Mongolia in 1967. The Soviet military intervention into Mongolia was one of the main reasons for cooling the Soviet-Chinese relations. And military withdrawal contributed to the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations until the mid-1980s and one of the conditions for improving relations with their neighbors. The internal systemic conflict had a serious impact on Mongolia's foreign policy over those years.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Europe – Foreign relations – 1945-"
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Lojko, Miklos. "Britain and central Europe, 1919-1925." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.248846.
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Packard, Jerrold Michael. "The European neutrals in World War II." PDXScholar, 1989. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/3984.
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The thesis begins with a short section on the nature of neutrality in Europe in the 1930s, and briefly introduces the political circumstances of the six nations that remained neutral throughout the war. The primary subject of the paper deals with the relationship between the belligerents and the neutral states, especially the extent to which military strength and preparedness was responsible for the latter maintaining their neutrality.
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Cheek, Marc Randall. "At the Core of the Cold War: Soviet Foreign Policy and the German Question 1945-1990." W&M ScholarWorks, 1991. https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd/1539625680.
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Martill, Benjamin. "Cold War at the centre : liberalism and the politics of Euratlantic strategy, 1945-1990." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:59dc5f4a-5a58-4b0e-8690-9f99595e5200.
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Patterns of domestic political contestation in international affairs often see the centre aligned against both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. This is observable in a range of issues, from democracy promotion, intervention, international law, European integration, free trade, globalization and the creation of international regimes. Why centre-periphery ideological competition occurs is an interesting puzzle, given the challenge it offers to the idea that partisanship is an inherently left-right phenomenon. Yet the role of the political centre in foreign policy has not been subjected to systematic analysis. This thesis studies the nature and effects of the foreign policy position of the political centre. It argues that the centre is distinguished from left and right by its embrace of distinct elements of liberal ideology. The liberal view of international politics differs in thee important respects from its socialist and conservative competitors: It is particular, rather than pluralist, when it comes to questions of sovereignty and international legitimacy; it views interdependence, rather than independence, as a natural and desirable condition of the international; and it views deterrence, rather than diplomacy, as the best means of achieving security. To test the validity of this thesis I discuss the role of ideology in explaining variation in relations between four Euratlantic states (Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) and the United States during the Cold War. This is a hard case given the intensity of global threat at the time. The thesis tests the claim that the strength of Euratlantic-American relations is a function of the relative influence of the political centre at the time. To do this it outlines a mixed-methods research design that combines in-depth case studies with a quantitative analysis of Euratlantic-US relations. The results from both elements confirm the validity of the theoretical proposition.
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Christie, Ross. "'Britain's crisis of confidence' : how Whitehall planned Britain's retreat from the extra-European world, 1959-1968." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/2018.
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This thesis attempts to give an account of how Whitehall planned Britain's withdrawal from extra-European commitments in the years 1959-1968, demonstrating that foreign policy development was essentially a cross-departmental process, involving a synthesis of views articulated by the Treasury, Board of Trade, Ministry of Defence, Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, as well as the Foreign Office. More specifically, the thesis is concerned with the direct effects of the interplay of different departmental policies on British retrenchment from Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East. Most accounts of how ministers and officials approached the subject of withdrawal from international commitments lack any substantive analysis of documentary evidence, a fact attributable to the 'thirty-year rule'. Many academic works also contain a reference to 'delusions of grandeur' as the main explanation as to why Whitehall guided a tentative course in extracting Britain from its remaining overseas obligations. By examining Whitehall's attempts to review future policy, usually on an inter-departmental basis, this thesis questions the commonly held assumption that an outdated imperial sentiment permeated the political establishment until economic reality, namely the devaluation of sterling in November 1967, forced Britain to confront the fragility of its position. Developing and expanding upon previous scholarship, this thesis makes a contribution to historical knowledge by providing the first sustained and unified study of how the highest echelons of Whitehall framed Britain's long-term strategic aims in the late 1950s and 1960s. This thesis is a contribution to administrative, diplomatic and military history, and provokes a number of questions. To what extent, for example, did economic considerations inform the decisions of leading policy-makers? Did a misjudgment over the strength of British 'power' lead to the pursuit of inappropriate foreign policy objectives? How was foreign policy affected by defence policy? What influence did the Treasury exert over high foreign policy? Did the influence of civil servants vary according to policy issues and the personalities involved? In what ways did the views of the departments responsible for economic matters differ from those in charge of defence policy on the priority attached to military expenditure? To what extent did the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence disagree on matters regarding Britain's overseas commitments and possessions? In answering such questions, this thesis casts new light on how Whitehall, between 1959 and 1968, reduced the scope of Britain's international commitments, redirecting the central thrust of British foreign policy away from extra-European commitments towards Europe.
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Khabbaz-Hamoui, Fayçal. "Le dialogue euro-arabe: un échec inéluctable?" Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/211211.
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Lazar, Peter. "The Mansfield Amendments and the U.S. commitment in Europe, 1966-1975." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/961.
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Approved for public release, distribution is unlimitedThis thesis explores international and domestic factors that constitute continuities in U.S. foreign and security policy regarding trans-Atlantic relations. Since the founding of the Atlantic Alliance burden sharing has been one of the major sources of conflict between the United States and its European NATO allies. Despite the reluctance to spend more than minimal amounts on military capabilities in most European NATO countries the issue did not become a major concern in the U.S. Congress between 1951 and 1966. It was only in the late 1960s and early 1970s that proposals - including the Mansfield Resolutions and Amendments - were introduced in the Senate calling for a substantial reduction in the number of U.S. troops in Europe. The debates provoked by these proposals threw light on the various determinants of U.S. policy towards Europe. The contemporary relevance of the issue resides in the fact that most of the elements responsible for the emergence of the Mansfield Amendments are still influential in U.S. foreign and security policy. This circumstance might lead to comparable proposals and debates in the near future.
Civilian, Hungarian Ministry of Defense
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Quessard-Salvaing, Maud. "Propagande, information et diplomatie publique pendant la guerre froide : les stratégies de l'USIA en Europe d'Eisenhower à Reagan." Thesis, Paris 3, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA030124.
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Pendant plus de quarante cinq ans l’atout maître de la diplomatie publique américaine a été l’Agence d’information des Etats-Unis (l’USIA, United States Information Agency), établie en 1953 à l’apogée de la guerre froide pour répondre à la propagande soviétique anti-américaine et coordonner les programmes culturels et d’information à l’étranger. En privilégiant une approche comparative, notre thèse se propose d’apporter un éclairage sur le rôle longtemps ignoré de la diplomatie publique au sein de la machine de la politique étrangère américaine en se concentrant sur trois Administrations présidentielles, Eisenhower, Kennedy et Reagan qui se distinguent comme des périodes charnières. Dans ce cadre, notre étude tente de déterminer le rôle qu’ont pu jouer les stratégies de la diplomatie publique américaine élaborées depuis Washington telles qu’elles furent pratiquées par les agents des services d’information (USIS) dans les pays de « la zone cruciale » (France, Italie et Allemagne) en Europe de l’Ouest, ou dans les nations captives. Notre thèse démontre que des premières campagnes de propagande des combattants de la guerre psychologique, dans les années 1950, aux émissions high-tech des champions de l’information et de la désinformation des années 1980, l’USIA fut au cœur des stratégies de persuasion de la puissance américaine en Europe. Au regard des succès et des échecs des activités officielles et officieuses pour lesquelles l’USIA a œuvré, nous abordons la délicate question de la réception des programmes d’information officiels et de l’efficacité des stratégies d’influence américaines dans les batailles européennes pour la libertéFor 46 years, the centrepiece of U.S. public diplomacy was the United States Information Agency (USIA) established in 1953 at the height of the Cold War to counter anti-American propaganda from the Soviet Union and coordinate foreign information dissemination programs. The purpose of my dissertation - a comparative study - is to try to shed a new light on the too long neglected role of public diplomacy in the American foreign policy process over the course of three key presidential Administrations- Eisenhower, Kennedy and Reagan. Therefore in the course of my dissertation, through field centered case studies, I investigate the strategies set up by the USIA in Washington and by the USIS [United States Information Services] in the field for “the crucial zone” (defined as France, Italy and Germany), and for key “captive nations” (such as Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary). In my dissertation I argue that since the first propag! anda campaigns of the cold warriors to the high-tech broadcastings of the champions of information and disinformation, USIA was at the core of the American strategies of persuasion and power in Europe. Indeed, in the field, between 1953 and 1991 the psychological warfare between the US and the USSR turned into a cultural Cold War and a war of information in which both public and private networks were involved. Considering the success and failures of the covert and overt activities of the USIA I may tackle the tricky issue of the effectiveness of American strategies of influence in the European battle for freedom
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Rofe, J. Simon. "'One chance in a thousand' : the mission of Sumner Welles to Europe (Feb-Mar 1940), Rooseveltian foreign policy and Anglo-American relations, Nov 1937-May 1940." Thesis, Swansea University, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.638704.
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This work presents a new analysis of the mission undertaken by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Europe on behalf of President Roosevelt in February-March 1940. The thesis asks what Roosevelt’s motivations were for undertaking the mission, and what he sought to achieve from it. It considers that the Welles mission was an expression of a number of influences upon Roosevelt that date back to late 1937. These influences, or themes, which provide the broader context and run throughout the period up to the beginning of 1940, are as follows: firstly the integral role in Rooseveltian foreign policy played by Sumner Welles is considered. The second theme concerns the position of his superior, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who was to counsel caution in the face of an increasingly serious world situation, whilst a third influence was the limits upon American foreign policymaking itself, especially from American opinion. The last element to be considered throughout this study is the influence of Anglo-American relations upon the Welles mission. Further these themes are not distinct and are interrelated. And all were subject to the influence of an American public who were deeply interested in, but firmly against intervention in, European affairs. This work concludes that the mission that resulted developed multiple objectives after being born out of a discussion between Roosevelt and Welles on the role the United States could play in achieving a sound and lasting peace in Europe. Such a hope, reckoned by Roosevelt to be ‘one chance in a thousand’, was at the outset incongruous with the situation in Europe. Roosevelt and Welles knew this to be the case, and pressed ahead because of the existence of other objectives that such a mission could achieve. These were the gathering of first-hand information by Welles from the four capitals Europe, the perpetuation of Italian neutrality and the prolonging of the ‘phony war’. These objectives were never clarified by the protagonists and evolved in themselves through the deployment of the mission, thus requiring the analysis provided here.
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Clark, John Denis Havey. "British, French, and American attitudes and policies towards the rebirth of Poland, 1914-1921." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:21becc10-e2b5-49cc-ad6e-f568157992f4.
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This thesis considers how attitudes shaped British, French, and American policy regarding the rebirth of Poland. From the outbreak of war in 1914 to the plebiscite in Upper Silesia in 1921, Allied and American policy-makers first considered whether Poland should be an independent state and then where its borders should be. As they did this, they developed attitudes about these questions, for instance about Poles and the right or ability of the Polish nation to administer a modern state. Such considerations assumed that national character exists and is important in the success or failure of a country. My research draws on literature from social psychology in defining the development of such understandings as consistent with stereotyping, in other words using generalisations about social groups to understand those groups or individuals. Allied and American policy-makers considered Poles to be, for instance, quarrelsome, aggressive, anti-Semitic, pitiable, passionate, or loyal. The thesis begins by examining pre-war attitudes to Poland and the impact of the war on these and on the diplomacy of the Polish question. It then discusses the re-emergence of an independent Poland in 1918 and the impact on policies and attitudes of the Polish delegation’s claims at the Paris Peace Conference, of events on the ground, and of the Russo-Polish War. Allied and American decision-making on the rebirth of Poland was central for European diplomacy not only because the attitudes they expressed left lingering grudges on both sides, but also because Poland’s frontiers were an irritant throughout the interwar period until Germany and Russia invaded Poland in September 1939. Moreover, the conclusion that attitudes were a factor in decision-making contributes to a growing recognition among international historians and international relations theorists that it is necessary to look beyond individuals' 'rational' motivations.
Books on the topic "Europe – Foreign relations – 1945-"
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1951-, Fulbrook Mary, ed. Europe since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
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Gordon, Daniels, and Drifte Reinhard, eds. Europe and Japan: Changing relationships since 1945. Woodchurch, Ashford, Kent: P. Norbury Publications, 1986.
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Britain and Europe since 1945. London: Longman, 1999.
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Eric, Remacle, and Winand Pascaline, eds. America, Europe, Africa (1945-1973) =: L'Amérique, l'Europe, l'Afrique (1945-1973). Bruxelles: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009.
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1954-, Jackson Julian, ed. Europe, 1900-1945. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press, 2002.
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May, Alex. Britain and Europe since 1945. New York: Longman, 1998.
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Young, John W. Britain and European unity, 1945-1992. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
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1940-, Gabriel Jürg Martin, and Fischer Thomas 1971-, eds. Swiss foreign policy, 1945-2002. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
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Hans, Branner, and Kelstrup Morten, eds. Denmark's policy towards Europe after 1945: History, theory and options. Odense: Odense University Press, 2000.
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Kathleen, Burk, and Stokes Melvyn, eds. The United States and the European alliance since 1945. Oxford: Berg, 1999.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Europe – Foreign relations – 1945-"
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Rofe, J. Simon. "Introduction: The Mission of Sumner Welles to Europe (February–March 1940), Rooseveltian Foreign Policy, and Anglo-American Relations, November 1937–May 1940." In Franklin Roosevelt’s Foreign Policy and the Welles Mission, 1–12. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230604896_1.
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Smith, Karen E. "EU Foreign Policy and Asia." In Europe—Asia Relations, 47–65. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230583467_3.
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Garnett, Mark, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith. "Foreign policy and International-Relations theory." In British Foreign Policy since 1945, 7–27. New York: Routledge, 2018.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315743394-1.
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Pereira, Juan Carlos. "Spain’s Changing Role in International Relations in the 1950s." In Europe 1945–1990s, 265–74. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23689-3_20.
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Hussini, Mohrez Mahmoud El. "The Foundations of US Foreign Policy and Strategy." In Soviet-Egyptian Relations, 1945–85, 12–24. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07661-1_2.
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Shifrinson, Joshua. "Europe and Asia (and China) in US grand strategy." In US–China Foreign Relations, 99–114. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2021. |: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003056683-12.
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van de Wetering, Carina. "Developing US Relations with India: 1945–1993." In Changing US Foreign Policy toward India, 29–82. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54862-7_3.
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Self, Robert. "Britain and Europe." In British Foreign and Defence Policy since 1945, 112–51. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-31353-8_5.
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Balme, Richard. "A European Strategy Towards China? The Limits of Integration in Foreign Policy Making." In Europe—Asia Relations, 125–44. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230583467_7.
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Lowe, Peter. "The Significance of the Korean War in Anglo-American Relations, 1950–53." In British Foreign Policy, 1945–56, 126–48. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10078-1_7.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Europe – Foreign relations – 1945-"
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Luptáková, Anabela, and Elena Kašťáková. "The Position of the Eurasian Economic Union in the EU’s Foreign Trade Relations." In The 20th International Joint Conference: Central and Eastern Europe in the Changing Business Environment. Prague University of Economics and Business, Oeconomica Publishing House, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/pr.2020.cer.2395.13.
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Liu, Siyang. "China-Czech Relations from the Perspective of Chinese Foreign Policy in Central and Eastern Europe Under Xi Jinping." In 2021 International Conference on Social Science:Public Administration, Law and International Relations (SSPALIR 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210916.033.
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Nagy, Péter Artúr. "Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on the V4." In The European Union’s Contention in the Reshaping Global Economy. Szeged: Szegedi Tudományegyetem Gazdaságtudományi Kar, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/eucrge.2020.proc.7.
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The aim of the research is to explore the development of trade relations between the Visegrád countries and their major Western European partners since accession to the European Union. The topic is currently an important one, as the Visegrád region is highly dependent on Western European countries, especially in the area of foreign trade. The research analyzed how the 2008-2009 global economic crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in Europe affected these trade relationships, i.e. did it cause significant changes in levels of relationship and/or trends. To answer this question, this paper used a time-series analysis method called Interrupted Time Series Analysis. As a result, statistically significant changes in the level and trend of foreign trade relations between the Visegrád countries and their Western European partners were detected. Finally, a more detailed breakdown of product groups also revealed which product groups are most responsible for slowing down the growth of trade relations.
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Gromyko, Alexey Anatolievich. "Cooperation between Russia and Belarus: The time of strategic decisions." In 5th International Conference “Futurity designing. Digital reality problems”. Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.20948/future-2022-6.
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In 2021-2022 a team of well-known Russian and Belorussian specialists conducted a major work on assessment of the current conditions and prospects of relations between Russia and Belorussia and the Union State. The project was organized by the Institute of Europe (RAS) and Andrei Gromyko Association of Foreign Policy Studies with the support of Belorussian State University’s Faculty of International Relations and other partners. The present material highlights key results of the research, which have been reflected in several recent publications. Conceptually members of the project share the view that Russia and Belorussia belong to a common civilization with a joint history, culture, the Russian language, economy and geopolitics.
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Karluk, S. Rıdvan. "EU Enlargement to the Balkans: Membership Perspective to the Balkan Countries." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c05.01163.
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After the dispersion of the Soviet Union, the European Union embarked upon an intense relationship with the Central and Eastern European Countries. The transition into capital market and democratization of these countries had been supported by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 1989 before the collapse of the Soviet Union System. The European Agreements were signed between the EU and Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on December 16th, 1991. 10 Central and Eastern Europe Countries became the members of the EU on May 1st, 2004. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU on January 1st, 2007, the number of the EU member countries reached up to 27, and finally extending to 28 with the membership of Croatia to the EU on July 1st, 2013. Removing the Western Balkan States, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina from the scope of external relations, the EU included these countries in the enlargement process in 2005.The European Commission has determined 2014 enlargement policy priorities as dealing with the fundamentals on preferential basis. In this context, the developments in the Balkans will be closely monitored within the scope of a new approach giving priority to the superiority of law. The enlargement process of the EU towards the Balkans and whether or not the Western Balkan States will join the Union will be analyzed.
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Akbulut, Gizem. "The Role of Extensive and Intensive Margins in Export Growth of Turkey to Central and Eastern European Countries." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c07.01643.
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In the recent years, Central and Eastern Europe Countries-10 (CEEC-10) countries are implementing policies for developing in international trade relations and these countries are relatively small and open economies. On the other hand, they increase both provide a dynamic increase in exports and export market share, to facilitate the European Union (EU) and their activities to integrate into world trade.
The purpose of this study, with CEEC-10 of Turkey’s sectoral export growth rates decomposes into extensive and intensive margins. Also intensive margin decomposes into price and quantity components. By building on the methodology pioneered by Feenstra (1994) and Hummels and Klenow (2005) and then “the decomposition of export growth rates” method developed by Bingzhan (2011). Intensive margin is the growth in products that were exported in both periods. Extensive margin is the growth in product variety or new trade partners. In the empirical part of the study were used the BACI international trade database from CEPII. The database provides the export values and quantities for Turkey to CEEC-10 at the Harmonized System’s (HS96) six-digit level over period 2006 to 2013.
Foreign trade activities of countries is an important channel both to gain of international qualification and to the realization of economic growths and/ or in terms of sustainability of the current growth rates. According to results of a study, with CEEC-10 Turkey’s export is mainly explained generally by the quantity growth rather than price growth. In other words, export growth carries with the low added value product.
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Cieślik, Ewa. "THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN THE ERA OF INDUSTRY 4.0 AND CHINESE DIGITAL SILK ROAD." In Economic and Business Trends Shaping the Future. Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Economics-Skopje, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.47063/ebtsf.2022.0018.
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Over the recent decades, the changes in the paradigm of international trade have been observed. As the result of decreasing of trade barriers as well as the reduction in trade costs allowed companies to divide their production into stages and to locate it in different countries according to their competitive advantage. Eventually, the production process has become more fragmented, both geographically and vertically. It means that intermediate products are shipped across boarders many times and every exporting economy provides some value added according to its competitive advantage. As a result, global value chains have become one of the most important feature of international trade. Following (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011), in this study global value chains are defined as “the full range of activities that firms and workers do to bring a product from its conception to its end use”. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) pointed out four types of upgrading in global value chains: product, process, functional and chain. Product and process upgrading involve companies retaining their positions in global value chains by enhancing productivity gains through adopting new product processes or “new configurations of product mix”. Thus, functional upgrading involves a slicing up the global value chains into new activity which generates higher value added, e.g. own brand manufacturing. In turn, chain upgrading involves a going up to new activity, which needs higher skills and capital and value added. Milberg and Winkler (2013) offered similar classifications of upgrading. Production fragmentation has caused a rapid increase in trade in intermediate goods as often companies offshore an intermediate stage of production process. Offshoring production has been typical to manufacturing (Timmer, et al., 2012), however, services have been often overlooked, but play a major role, especially in supporting global value chains (Kommerskollegium 2013). In turn, Digital Silk Road, announced in 2015, has become a significant part of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative strategy. China has implemented this strategy as a part of its long-term technological plan, under which China provides support to its exporters, including many well-known technology companies and builds a network of cooperation with selected countries in the field of technology, including ICT infrastructure, services, 5G networks, e-commerce, etc. China's rapid technological changes must not go unnoticed by trading partners, including analysed European countries, which, to maintain international competitiveness, are increasing the technological advancement and enhancing market protection against Chinese technology. Until recently, the value added from China to European countries was concentrated mainly on medium technology industries and value added from Europe to China focused more on advanced goods and services. Nowadays, there is a redirection of Chinese value added to high-tech activities (including service activities), which reflects China's ambition to build an economy that leads to innovation and industry 4.0. The transition of the CEE states’ economic and political systems initiated in the early 1990s, earned them the EU membership in 2004. The accession to the EU’s structures meant that these countries achieved the free-market economy status and they should be treated as the full member of the global business networks. Moreover, the decline in trade costs (transport and transaction), greater openness of their market and the removal of trade barriers have all helped the CEE states to join global value chains. Hence, the CEE economies are going to be more heavily involved in global production linkages. Many empirical studies have presented the close and dynamic integration of these countries with the EU market (especially the EU-15) and in a more limited scope with the whole global economy as well (Behar and Freund 2011). Generally, democratisation, the strengthening of political and economic relations (particularly with the EU), and the modernisation of many sectors (including financial sector, more advanced industries), were common elements of the CEE countries long-term development policies. One of their priorities was the redirection of foreign trade towards the EU and joining the global production linkages where China has become the core producer. Recently, the role of the economy in global value chains is more determined by the advancement of value added that it offers. Companies move toward services and innovations in the business model (Nenenen & Storbacka, 2010) and introduce industry 4.0 (Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, 2016). A symptom of these novelty is a concept of servicification of manufacturing (Neely et al. 2011) and cross-sectoral connections, which have reconstructed traditional global value chains (Naude et al. 2019) and, together with Industry 4.0, is expected to change the landscape of global manufacturing. As a result of facilitation of manufacturing, economies placed in the downstream market can improve their role in global value chains. In Europe, this can be an opportunity for most Central and Eastern European countries. Analyzing changes in CEE’s role in technological global value chains, we should take into account its two most important value-added suppliers: China and Germany, as well as their most important value-added buyer - Germany. These three economies established a sort of value added flows triangle. The regional supply chains built by Germany in the CEE allowed it to maintain a comparative advantage in sectors important for the economy, while helping the CEE countries join global value chains, positively influencing economic growth, but also reducing them to entities operating in less advanced stages of production (Jacoby, 2010; Fortwengel, 2011). Today, Germany also cooperates strongly with China (as a result of Digital Silk Road), and the CEE economies (especially the Visegrad Group) are increasingly dependent on Chinese value added, still linked to German value added. The most visible connections can be found in automotive and electronics. Hence, the question is: how strong are these links in servicification of manufacturing and whether there are visible trends in value-added flows in between this triangle in the era of industry 4.0 and Chinese Digital Silk Road. The research question seems to be relevant, thus in the subject literature, little is known about the mentioned relations (Roland Berger, 2021). The research method based on the analysis of data from the OECD Trade in Value Added databases, containing the world input-output tables for the period 2005–2018. The system of balance equations in the input-output model for one economy has been adopted to a multi-economy model. The model is described in more detail in (Koopman et al. 2013 or Hummels et al, 2001) and is based on the decomposition of gross exports. The method includes not only estimates of total value added in global value chains, but also calculations at both the mezoeconomic level and cross-sectoral flows of value added (including servicification of manufacturing). The results of analysis showed that most relations between economies continued to deepen the imbalance in flows of value added. The CEE economies are making their manufacturing increasingly dependent on advanced services (both from Germany and China). On the other hand, the share of CEE services to Chinese and German manufacturing is decreasing or remains steady. However, some trends could be observed in the last years, especially between Germany and China. German manufacturing is starting to rely more on Chinese value added (information and communication technologies services and the subgroup computer programming, consultancy and information services activities in manufacturing, information and communication technologies services' value added in transport equipment), although previously Germany provided more of these services to China. In telecommunications in manufacturing between CEE and Germany, the trend has turned against CEE. However, there was no direct compensation between pairs of economies, but the decrease in German value-added flows to China resulted in a much larger increase in value-added from China in German manufacturing. If the presented changes in flows were to reflect the effectiveness of Chinese industry 4.0 and Digital Silk Road. These strategies serve their purposes and increases not only the advancement of Chinese value-added exports, but also makes important economies dependent on this added value. On the contrary, the industry 4.0 strategy in CEE has not improved its position in the triad. Germany has still a strong position as a provider of value added, but its dependence on foreign value added is high, which derives from the links with CEE.
Reports on the topic "Europe – Foreign relations – 1945-"
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Romero, Antonio. The Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement and relations between European Union and Cuba. Fundación Carolina, February 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.33960/issn-e.1885-9119.dtff01en.
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This document makes an assessment of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between Cuba and the European Union (EU) in its four years of validity, and of the evolution of political and economic relations between both parties. The analysis is structured in five headings that address the background, determinants and significance of the PDCA between Cuba and the EU; the main elements discussed in the political dialogue —and in thematic dialogue— between the two parties since 2018, and the central aspects of trade, investment and cooperation relations between Cuba and the EU. The report concludes that, unlike the United States, the EU is able to support the complex process of economic and institutional transformations underway in Cuba, in four fundamental areas: i) technical assistance and advice for the design and implementation of public policies, macroeconomic management, decentralisation and local development; ii) cooperation to fight climate change and transform Cuba’s productive and technological structure; iii) the promotion and encouragement of foreign investment flows from Europe, targeting key productive sectors; and iv) the exploration of financial opportunities for Cuba through the European Investment Bank (EIB) under the current PDCA.
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Allan, Duncan, and Ian Bond. A new Russia policy for post-Brexit Britain. Royal Institute of International Affairs, January 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55317/9781784132842.
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The UK’s 2021 Integrated Review of security, defence, development and foreign policy describes Russia as ‘the most acute direct threat to [the UK’s] security’ in the 2020s. Relations did not get this bad overnight: the trend has been negative for nearly two decades. The bilateral political relationship is now broken. Russian policymakers regard the UK as hostile, but also as weaker than Russia: a junior partner of the US and less important than Germany within Europe. The consensus among Russian observers is that Brexit has reduced the UK’s international influence, to Russia’s benefit. The history of UK–Russia relations offers four lessons. First, because the two lack shared values and interests, their relationship is fragile and volatile. Second, adversarial relations are the historical norm. Third, each party exaggerates its importance on the world stage. Fourth, external trends beyond the UK’s control regularly buffet the relationship. These wider trends include the weakening of the Western-centric international order; the rise of populism and opposition to economic globalization; and the global spread of authoritarian forms of governance. A coherent Russia strategy should focus on the protection of UK territory, citizens and institutions; security in the Euro-Atlantic space; international issues such as non-proliferation; economic relations; and people-to-people contacts. The UK should pursue its objectives with the tools of state power, through soft power instruments and through its international partnerships. Despite Brexit, the EU remains an essential security partner for the UK. In advancing its Russia-related interests, the UK should have four operational priorities: rebuilding domestic resilience; concentrating resources on the Euro-Atlantic space; being a trusted ally and partner; and augmenting its soft power. UK decision-makers should be guided by four propositions. In the first place, policy must be based on clear, hard-headed thinking about Russia. Secondly, an adversarial relationship is not in itself contrary to UK interests. Next, Brexit makes it harder for the UK and the EU to deal with Russia. And finally, an effective Russia policy demands a realistic assessment of UK power and influence. The UK is not a ‘pocket superpower’. It is an important but middling power in relative decline. After Brexit, it needs to repair its external reputation and maximize its utility to allies and partners, starting with its European neighbours.