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Published: 9 March 2023

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1

Cerfeda, Walter. "La di-unione europea e il patto euro plus." SOCIOLOGIA DEL DIRITTO, no. 3 (February 2012): 85–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sd2011-003005.

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L'Europa sta attraversando il periodo piů difficile della sua storia e gli sbocchi sono del tutto incerti ed imprevedibili. La combinazione inedita tra stagnazione economica e speculazione finanziaria puň determinare un lungo periodo di recessione economica e la messa in discussione della stessa moneta dell'euro. Per questo vi č una sostanziale moratoria dei diritti sociali. Il modello sociale europeo č stato sempre interconnesso al modello economico e la crisi attuale ingenera quella sociale. Una politica di solo rigore non basta. La crisi non č nell'euro ma dell'euro. Serve un equilibrio urgente tra rigore e crescita. Quindi non un'Europa delle nazioni ma un'accelerazione dell'integrazione economica e un vero ruolo di Banca centrale della BCE. La scorciatoia di rovesciare tutto il deficit di competitivitŕ sul lavoro in realtŕ sta conducendo l'UE in un vicolo cieco.

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2

Gjurchinova, Anastasija, and Lindita Ahmeti. "Номадизам и феминизам. Кон Rosi Braidotti, Soggeto nomade. Femminismo e crisi della modernità." Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture 1, no. 3 (June 1, 2002): 183–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.51151/identities.v1i3.75.

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Author(s): Anastasija Gjurchinova | Анастасија Ѓурчинова Title (Macedonian): Номадизам и феминизам. Кон Rosi Braidotti, Soggeto nomade. Femminismo e crisi della modernità Title (Albanian): Nomadizmi dhe feminizmi. Për Rosi Braidotti, Soggetto nomade. Femminismo e crisi della modernità Translated by (Macedonian to Albanian): Lindita Ahmeti Journal Reference: Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Summer 2002) Publisher: Research Center in Gender Studies - Skopje and Euro-Balkan Institute Page Range: 183-187 Page Count: 5 Citation (Macedonian): Анастасија Ѓурчинова, „Номадизам и феминизам. Кон Rosi Braidotti, Soggeto nomade. Femminismo e crisi della modernità“, Идентитети: списание за политика, род и култура, т. 1, бр. 3 (лето 2002): 183-187. Citation (Albanian): Anastasija Gjurchinova, „Nomadizmi dhe feminizmi. Për Rosi Braidotti, Soggetto nomade. Femminismo e crisi della modernità“, përkthim nga Maqedonishtja Lindita Ahmeti, Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Summer 2002): 183-187.

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3

Guarriello, Fausta. "La concertazione: prospettive euro-unitarie." GIORNALE DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DI RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI, no. 172 (February 2022): 703–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/gdl2021-172013.

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L'introduzione della procedura di dialogo sociale nel Protocollo sulla Politica sociale e nel Trattato dell'Unione europea ha consacrato il ruolo delle parti sociali nella elaborazione e attuazione delle misure normative di politica sociale e del lavoro. Il modello del dialogo sociale eu-ropeo ha costituito fonte di ispirazione per gli ordinamenti nazionali quale riferimento normativo delle pratiche di concertazione sociale. Dopo una prima intensa stagione di accordi-quadro europei cui è stata attribuita efficacia erga omnes tramite atti legislativi, il modello è entrato in crisi a causa della rarefazione della legislazione comunitaria in campo sociale e dell'affermarsi di meccanismi di soft law, come della crescente difficoltà per le parti sociali di stipulare accordi di natura normativa. Di recente la Commissione, dopo aver attivato la fase di consultazione, ha bloccato la richiesta delle parti sociali di presentare una proposta legislativa sulla base dell'accordo da esse sottoscritto, invocando l'esistenza di un potere discrezionale di valutare l'opportunità del recepimento in una misura legislativa. La Corte di giustizia ha confermato tale interpretazione delle disposizioni del Trattato, aprendo una breccia nel modello europeo di concertazione sociale che appare del tutto dissonante rispetto all'attuale fase politica di ricostruzione della dimensione sociale.

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4

Fantini, Giulia. "Effetti sulle banche minori della crisi dei debiti sovrani in area euro." ARGOMENTI, no. 39 (January 2014): 71–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/arg2013-039003.

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5

de Crescenzo, Armando. "Il Meccanismo Europeo di Stabilità ‘alla prova' del futuro dell'Unione europea. Parlamenti (ancora) assenti nelle condizionalità macroeconomiche?" CITTADINANZA EUROPEA (LA), no. 1 (August 2020): 133–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/ceu2020-001005.

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Il lavoro inquadra la genesi e la governance del Meccanismo Europeo di Stabilità (MES), anche in relazione all'ordinamento costituzionale, più di recente oggetto di un acceso dibattito pubblico sia con riguardo alle sue modifiche, quanto al suo impiego per risolvere la crisi sanitaria che ha investito la zona euro a dieci anni di distanza dalla crisi economica iniziata nel 2008. Nell'ambito delle numerose problematiche giuridiche che pone il MES, ci si concentra sul funzionamento delle condizionalità previste dal Trattato, l'impatto sull'indirizzo politico nazionale e il deficit di democraticità che si registra in questi meccanismi intergovernativi. Bisognerebbe chiedersi se sia realmente questa l'idea di Unione Europea auspicata dai padri fondatori e se siano maturi i tempi per operare una vera (e significativa) svolta, indispensabile per la sopravvivenza stessa del progetto europeo.

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6

Guasconi, Maria Eleonora. "Prove tecniche di politica estera: la Comunitŕ economica europea e lo sviluppo del dialogo euro-arabo negli anni Settanta." MONDO CONTEMPORANEO, no. 2 (December 2012): 35–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/mon2012-002002.

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L'articolo ricostruisce i negoziati che, all'indomani dello shock petrolifero del 1973, si svolsero tra i nove membri della Comunitŕ economica europea e i paesi della Lega araba nella cornice della cooperazione politica, mettendo in luce il tentativo europeo di trovare una via d'uscita autonoma alla crisi energetica degli anni Settanta. Grazie a un'ampia documentazione archivistica, l'autrice dimostra che, pur tra numerose difficoltŕ e ostacoli, attraverso il dialogo euro-arabo la Comunitŕ sperimentň per la prima volta, dopo gli accordi di Yaoundé/Lomé, un'esperienza di relazioni collettive con un gruppo di paesi terzi, promuovendo un negoziato che, seppur limitato a questioni economiche che esulavano dal petrolio, portň ad alcuni significativi risultati, come la dichiarazione di Venezia del 1980, considerata una pietra miliare della posizione europea nei confronti del conflitto arabo-israeliano. La ricostruzione dello svolgimento del dialogo euro-arabo rappresenta inoltre un interessante esempio della crescita della dimensione delle relazioni esterne della Cee durante gli anni Settanta.

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7

Jimena Quesada, Luis. "Pace, Lorenzo Federico. Il regime giuridico dell’euro. La nascita dell’Uione economica e monetaria, la sua crisi e la risposta dell’Unione europea, Cacucci Editore, Bari, 2018, 184 pp., ISBN 978-88-6611-695-0." Estudios de Deusto 68, no. 1 (July 3, 2020): 577–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ed-68(1)-2020pp577-583.

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El Doctor Lorenzo Federico Pace, Profesor de Derecho de la Unión Europea (UE) en la Università degli Studi del Molise (Italia), nos ofrece una monografía sólida y de lectura imprescindible para acercarse al régimen jurídico del euro y, como más específicamente reza el subtítulo y sirve de eje a la estructura de la obra en tres grandes capítulos: al nacimiento de la Unión Económica y Monetaria (capítulo primero), a su crisis (capítulo segundo) y a la respuesta dada por la propia UE (capítulo tercero).

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Montoro, Xabier Arrizabalo. "El euro, caballo de Troya del FMI en Europa." Argumentum 5, no. 2 (February 27, 2014): 6–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.18315/argumentum.v5i2.6166.

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Trescientos cuarenta y cuatro euros mensuales, 344. Ésta es la pérdida salarial que, en promedio, sufrió cada trabajador español sólo en 2006. Es el resultado de la caída de participación de los salarios en el PIB, desde el 63,3% de 1993 hasta el 54,9% de 2006; pérdida que totalizó 82.927 millones de euros y, por tanto, 4.130 euros anuales por trabajador o los 344 mensuales mencionados. El período 1993-2006 abarca desde la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Maastricht, que inicia oficialmente el camino hacia el euro, hasta justo antes del estallido de la crisis. Se trata, por consiguiente, del período del euro, en cuyo marco se decía “España va bien” . Y esta pérdida salarial sintetiza con claridad el significado del euro, la intencionalidad con la que fue impuesto. De hecho, supone una caída de participación, en promedio simple anual, del 0,65%, mientras en el período 1978-93 fue del 0,28% y en el período 2006-2013, ya en la crisis actual, del 0,49%.

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9

Datta, Bivek. "Impact of Euro Crisis on the Tourism Industry in Euro Zone." Paripex - Indian Journal Of Research 3, no. 4 (January 15, 2012): 247–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/22501991/apr2014/80.

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10

Dimitrios, Dapontas. "Can Euro Zone Survive and Long Prosper?" Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 4, no. 2 (February 15, 2012): 121–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22610/jebs.v4i2.309.

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The current problems on the aftermath of the global credit crunch left the weakest Euro countries in the turbulence of a debt crisis, which has been spread in five countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain respectively) and raised the question of a Euro zone future survival. The surviving barriers have to do with limitations and restrictions on the single market, the lack of political union and different monetary policy targets. Incentives to secede are also present. However, a possible withdraw of a country would have high cost for all the participants and it could lead to monetary unionâ€™s demolition. The costs related with a possible withdraw are high, thus it is difficult for a country to leave a union. In the recent debt crisis, the countries accepted bailouts from their counterparts and international organizations in order to prevent the Euro zone collapse spreading the crisis further. Three possible Euro zone future scenarios are analyzed. The volunteer or not breakup of the union and reintroducing of national currencies, the breakup of the Euro zone to two currencies consisting Optimal Currency Areas (OCAs)is analyzed by using thirteen equally weighted optimum area criteria and the imposition of an interest equalization tax(IET) in order to make the Euro zone a single OCA. The results show that the asymmetries lead to the crisis persists in a possible two Euros area and this scenario cost is higher than union dissolutionâ€™s. An IET can help Euro zone in the short time to develop sustainable characteristics.

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11

Kraciuk, Jakub. "Financial crisis in euro area." Optimum. Studia Ekonomiczne, no. 4(64) (2013): 125–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.15290/ose.2013.04.64.12.

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12

Prokopijevic, Miroslav. "Euro crisis." Panoeconomicus 57, no. 3 (2010): 369–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/pan1003369p.

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It is argued the current eurozone crisis is neither new nor surprising. Fiscal discipline in the eurozone was weak from its creation in 1999, but ongoing economic prosperity limited the damage. Economic recession deepened the impact of crisis on public finance and pushed some eurozone countries to the edge of bankruptcy. Options available now are costly and painful: foreign bailouts, cuts to expenditures, higher revenues and some combination of the three. They may be conducted both inside and outside the eurozone. If eurozone problems are not solved, financial markets may turn down the euro as a currency, possibly marking the beginning of Euro-disintegration.

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Swamy, Vighneswara. "Euro Crisis." Indian Economic Journal 60, no. 1 (April 2012): 88–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019466220120106.

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14

Botrup, Heinz-J. "Finanzmarktkrise und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des deutschen Bankensektors." Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 87, no. 3 (September 1, 2018): 27–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3790/vjh.87.3.27.

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Zusammenfassung: Der deutsche Bankensektor hat die weltweite Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, sieht man von den hoch spekulativen Großbanken und den geschäftsmodelllosen Landesbanken einmal ab, relativ gut überstanden. Auch das der Krise folgende Niedrigzinsniveau hat zwar im Zinsergebnis negative Spuren hinterlassen, dennoch konnte der gesamte deutsche Bankensektor von 2000 bis 2017 einen Jahresüberschuss vor Ertragsteuern in Höhe von fast 326 Milliarden Euro (jahresdurchschnittlich 18,1 Milliarden Euro) erzielen. Davon haben sich die öffentlichen Sparkassen mit gut 120 Milliarden Euro den größten Teil des Gewinns einverleibt, gefolgt von den Volksbanken mit fast 84 Milliarden Euro. Zusammen kamen Sparkassen und Volksbanken auf einen Gewinnanteil von 62,7 Prozent des gesamten Bankensektors. Die Großbanken realisierten dagegen von 2000 bis 2017 „nur“ fast 31 Milliarden Euro beziehungsweise kamen auf einen Gewinnanteil von 9,5 Prozent. Das mit Abstand größte deutsche Kreditinstitut, die Deutsche Bank, konnte von 2000 bis 2017 insgesamt 56 Milliarden Euro an Gewinn vor Steuern einstreichen, was bedeutet, dass die anderen Großbanken im selben Zeitraum zusammen einen Verlust in Höhe von 25 Milliarden Euro verkraften mussten. Die trotz Wirtschaftskrise hohen Gewinne im Bankensektor haben im Grundsatz mit einer marktwirtschaftlich gewollten Wettbewerbssituation nur wenig zu tun. Allerdings relativieren sich die Gewinne bezogen auf das niedrig eingesetzte Eigenkapital. Die Eigenkapitalrentabilitäten vor Steuern schwanken hier von 2000 bis 2017 im gesamten deutschen Bankensektor zwischen –7,4 Prozent (2008) und 12,9 Prozent (2005). Auffallend hoch sind hier die Profitraten der Sparkassen mit Werten von 27,4 Prozent (2011) und 16,4 Prozent (ebenfalls 2011) bei den Volksbanken. Im Vergleich zur deutschen Wirtschaft fallen die Renditewerte im Bankensektor natürlich weit geringer aus, weil sich die Gewinne der Finanzsphäre nur aus der produzierenden Wirtschaft ergeben können. Nach der Krise ist vor der Krise. Zwar wurde der Bankensektor einer größeren staatlichen Kontrolle unterworfen, die aber nur die Symptome bekämpft und nicht die Krisenursache, die in einer neoliberal gewollten Umverteilung von den Arbeits- zu den Kapitaleinkünften liegt. So konnte auch ein stetig wachsender gefährlicher Schattenbankensektor entstehen, der ohne jegliche staatlichen Kontrollen die nach wie vor sich zu den Kapitaleinkünften umverteilenden Wertschöpfungen in spekulativer Manier aufsaugt. Wird die Umverteilung in der produzierenden Wirtschaft nicht endlich durch einen signifikanten Anstieg der Lohnquote und durch eine entsprechende staatliche Besteuerung des völlig ungleich verteilten Vermögens geändert, also die Krisenursache beseitigt, so ist die nächste schwere Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise nicht mehr weit. Summary: The German banking sector has weathered the global financial and economic crisis relatively well, apart from the highly speculative big banks and the non-banked state banks. Even though the low interest rate following the crisis has had a negative impact on net interest, the entire German banking sector was able to generate net income before taxes of nearly 326 billion euros (annual average 18.1 billion euros) from 2000 to 2017. Of these, the public savings banks have incorporated 120 billion euros, this is most of the profits, followed by the Volksbanks with almost 84 billion euros. Together, savings banks and Volksbanks earned a 62.7 percent share of the total banking sector. By contrast, the big banks are realizing „only“ almost 31 billion euros between 2000 and 2017, or a profit share of 9.5 percent. By far the largest German bank, Deutsche Bank, was able to recoup a total of 56 billion euros in profit before tax from 2000 to 2017, which means that the other major banks together had to cope with a loss of 25 billion euros during the same period. The high profits in the banking sector despite the economic crisis have, in principle, little to do with a market-driven competitive situation. However, the profits are relative to the low capital employed. The pre-tax return on equity between 2000 and 2017 in the German banking sector as a whole fluctuates between –7.4 percent (2008) and 12.9 percent (2005). Noticeably high here are the profit rates of the savings banks with values of 27.4 percent (2011) and 16.4 percent (also 2011) at the Volksbanks. Compared to the German economy as a whole, the return values in the banking sector are, of course, much lower because the profits of the financial sphere are. After the crisis is before the crisis. It is true that the banking sector has been subject to greater state control, which, however, only combats the symptoms of the crisis and not the cause of the crisis, which is a neoliberal change from labor to capital. As a result, a steadily growing dangerous shadow banking sector could emerge which, without any state controls, absorbs in a speculative manner the added value of reallocated capital gains. If the decisive redistribution in the producing economy is not finally reversed in a significant increase in the wage share and by a corresponding state taxation of completely unevenly distributed assets, thus eliminating the cause of the crisis, the next serious financial and economic crisis is not far away.

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Bieniek, Damian. "GERMAN ACTIONS ON GREEK CRISIS." sj-economics scientific journal 9 (December 30, 2011): 101–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.58246/sjeconomics.v9i.466.

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Beginning of Greece problems was related to the accession to the Euro Zone. It occurred despite Greece did not meet the criteria thanks to the support of Germany and the Bundesbank, which assessed the economies of countries aspiring to a common currency. Lack of credibility for one country could burry the entire project. After entering the euro zone, Greece has significantly increased the reliability and successive governments could continue to fund increasing debt by issuance of bonds, bought mostly by French and German banks. Greek debt problem was exposed by the crisis of 2008. After collapse of the Greek finance European Union was forced to create assistance programs for the country, exceeding 100 billion. The largest cost were beard of course, by the economy of Germany. In the possession of European banks are Greek government bonds worth 52,3 billion dollars. With about 43 percent of this amount corresponds to German institutions, and further 27 percent to French lenders. Thus, Greece's problems transforms into problems of the banking sector in Germany and France, and problems across the EU economy Financial institutions and EU member states have imposed draconian Greek rescue package, which is believed to be a rescue package for the EURO. Germany stresses that loans to Greece, should be based on "market price" because otherwise it would be a form of subsidy, which violates the principle of the euro area. Angela Merkel has been pushing up the leading role of the IMF's "rescue" of Greece, which met with numerous objections. Merkel has been opposing by long time the idea of financing the debt of Greece by other countries, particularly by Germany. Merkel behaved so in fear of her party's election results, because the German taxpayers with an increasing reluctance opposed aid for the Greeks. German minister of economy said, however, that the ejection of Greece from the euro zone is impossible. In consideration to many economists Greeks will not be able to repay their obligations, most Greek bonds which were held by German banks should be written off. Germany has adopted a tough stance towards Greece and its problems with a huge budget deficit, impending bankruptcy of the country. Germany was the biggest beneficiary of the unified currency. Now it's bearing the greatest cost of saving a drowning partner. Billions of euros, which are pumped, are not guided by a means of noble conception of European solidarity, but a pragmatic concern about its banking system.

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Barnes, Jonathan. "Euro Crisis Reconsidered." CFA Institute Magazine 22, no. 4 (July 2011): 21–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/cfm.v22.n4.15.

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Jones, Andrew. "The euro crisis." Local Economy: The Journal of the Local Economy Policy Unit 26, no. 6-7 (September 2011): 594–618. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0269094211421748.

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18

Bojovic, Bosko. "Le sud-est européen et l'Europe: Origines et perspectives d'une altérité mal assumée en marge de l'élargissement européen." Balcanica, no. 35 (2004): 239–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc0535239b.

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(francuski) Depuis l'Antiquit? l'histoire de la P?ninsule balkanique est jalonn?e d'alternances entre clivages culturels ou politiques et synth?ses de civilisation: Gr?ce, Rome, Byzance, Empire ottoman. Ce qui a cr?? une superposition de nuances et de diff?renciations ethniques et nationales selon les lignes de partage confessionnelles et culturelles, id?ologiques et politiques. La r?manence de ces lignes de partage, issues en partie du Moyen Age, et qui ne cessent de se d?multiplier depuis le XIXe si?cle, fait que les Balkans oscillent de nos jours entre adh?sion aux processus d'int?gration euro-atlantiques et processus de d?sint?grations successives sur la base des singularisassions communautaires et de pulsions identitaires. Menace majeure de la stabilit? europ?enne au XIXe si?cle connue ? l'?poque sous la d?nomination de "Question d'Orient", la crise balkanique est depuis la fin du XXe si?cle une zone d'ombre sur la toile d'int?gration europ?enne. Les redoutables difficult?s ? g?rer cette crise d?sormais redevenue chronique, font que les Balkans, ind?pendamment ou non de toutes autres contradictions euro-atlantiques, apparaissent comme un espace crucial au sein duquel la future Grande Europe joue tout ou partie de son avenir.

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Ivashina, Victoria, David S. Scharfstein, and Jeremy C. Stein. "Dollar Funding and the Lending Behavior of Global Banks*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 130, no. 3 (April 2, 2015): 1241–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv017.

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Abstract A large share of dollar-denominated lending is done by non-U.S. banks, particularly European banks. We present a model in which such banks cut dollar lending more than euro lending in response to a shock to their credit quality. Because these banks rely on wholesale dollar funding, while raising more of their euro funding through insured retail deposits, the shock leads to a greater withdrawal of dollar funding. Banks can borrow in euros and swap into dollars to make up for the dollar shortfall, but this may lead to violations of covered interest parity when there is limited capital to take the other side of the swap trade. In this case, synthetic dollar borrowing also becomes expensive, which causes cuts in dollar lending. We test the model in the context of the Eurozone sovereign crisis, which escalated in the second half of 2011 and resulted in U.S. money market funds sharply reducing their exposure to European banks in the year that followed. During this period dollar lending by Eurozone banks fell relative to their euro lending, and firms who were more reliant on Eurozone banks before the Eurozone crisis had a more difficult time borrowing.

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Kim, Jongheon, and Hoon Paik. "유로 위기에 있어 Rule Setter로서의독일 질서자유주의." Ordo Economics Journal 20, no. 4 (December 31, 2017): 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.20436/oej.20.4.001.

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S. Weber, Christoph. "The Euro crisis. Causes and Symptoms." Estudios Fronterizos 16, no. 32 (July 1, 2015): 247–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.21670/ref.2015.32.a09.

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The Euro crisis is mainly a consequence of the international financial crisis of 2008. Thereby, the term Euro crisis is misleading as there is no currency crisis. First, the article shows some of the birth defects of the Euro. Second, it shows that the increase in public debt was caused by rescue measures for banks and anti-cyclical fiscal policy. Third, we argue that the Euro crisis is not just one crisis (a sovereign debt crisis) but it is a combination of several macroeconomic crises including a growth crisis, a labour market crisis, a public debt crisis, and a current account crisis.

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Colmenarejo, Juan Pablo, and María del Pilar Martínez Costa. "El poder de la creación de imágenes sonoras: cómo la radio contó la crisis del euro." Ámbitos. Revista Internacional de Comunicación, no. 54 (2021): 71–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.12795/ambitos.2021.i54.04.

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La radio es un medio que dispone exclusivamente del sonido y de la construcción de imágenes sonoras para elaborar sus mensajes. Lo hace desplegando una variedad de recursos lingüísticos, con un alto poder evocador. Mediante la construcción de metáforas conceptuales, que permiten concretar nociones abstractas, la radio consigue explicar y mostrar la realidad, a través de representaciones sonoras de la vida cotidiana de sus oyentes. Cuanto más complejo es el tema de la actualidad, la radio recurre con más frecuencia a las metáforas conceptuales —mediante la acumulación de recursos y la redundancia— para recrear las imágenes que lo expliquen. El objetivo de este trabajo es describir y caracterizar cómo la radio informó de la crisis del euro a través de la creación de imágenes sonoras. Desde una aproximación cuantitativa y cualitativa, se analiza la construcción de la metáfora conceptual ‘La crisis es una guerra’ en la tertulia El equipo económico de La linterna de la Cadena COPE de mayo de 2010 a julio de 2012, período central de la crisis del euro en España. En la construcción de dicha metáfora conceptual y las imágenes sonoras asociadas se estudian los atributos y conceptos adjudicados a la expresión “rescate”, cuya explicación fue importante para mostrar la evolución de la crisis, primero como una “operación de salvamento”, y luego como una “invasión”. El estudio concluye que la forma de contar de la radio, recurriendo a imágenes próximas al oyente, refuerza su poder informativo para explicar una realidad compleja.

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Herzog, Bodo. "Interdisciplinary Analysis of Luhmann’s Sociological Theory on the Euro-Crisis." ECONOMICS & SOCIOLOGY 8, no. 2 (September 5, 2015): 102–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.14254/2071-789x.2015/8-2/8.

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Arestis, Philip, and Malcolm Sawyer. "The Ongoing Euro Crisis." Challenge 54, no. 6 (November 2011): 6–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/0577-5132540601.

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Schwartz, Herman. "Euro-crisis, American lessons?" Review of International Political Economy 19, no. 4 (October 2012): 701–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2012.719534.

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Feldstein, Martin. "Ending the euro crisis." Journal of Policy Modeling 37, no. 3 (May 2015): 423–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2015.03.005.

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Boysen-Hogrefe, Jens. "Die Zinslast des Bundes in der Schuldenkrise: Wie lukrativ ist der „sichere Hafen“?" Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 13, Supplement (May 2012): 81–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2516.2012.00393.x.

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Abstract In the aftermath of the Great Recession and during the debt crisis in the euro area yields on German federal bonds have been exceptionally low. This analysis tries to calculate the profits that the federal government makes due to these low yields. The interest payments that are due to emissions of bonds and bills made between 2009 and 2012 are approximated and compared to several benchmark scenarios. Compared to the mean yields of the years 1999-2008 profits of the federal government are quite high (68 billion euros). Application of yield curve models show that most of these profits are due to the macroeconomic conditions in the euro area and to low central bank rates. To a much smaller extend these profits are due to flight into safety, which, however, has become more relevant recently.

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Schmidt, Ingo. "Unmaking Neoliberal Europe: Capitalist Crisis and the Search for Alternatives." Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 12, no. 1-2 (2013): 41–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341241.

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AbstractThe first part of this article situates the Euro-crisis in the larger context of the world economic crisis 2008/9 and then looks at the imbalances between creditor and debtor countries within the Euro-zone. These imbalances predate the introduction of the Euro, but sharpened massively since the start of European Monetary Union. These imbalances are the economic core of the Euro-crisis. The second part of the article looks at economic policies and argues that the austerity measures prescribed by the EU Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) deepened the economic crisis and led to the outbreak of an already looming crisis of legitimacy in the Euro-zone and the EU at large. This latter crisis fosters economic nationalism and thus impedes any kind of EU-level response to the Euro-crisis.

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Hibou, Béatrice. "les faces cachées du Partenariat euro-méditerranéen." Critique internationale 18, no. 1 (2003): 114. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/crii.018.0114.

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Castleberry, Douglas, Balasundram Maniam, and Geetha Subramaniam. "The Euro And The European Debt Crisis." International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER) 13, no. 1 (December 31, 2013): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/iber.v13i1.8360.

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This paper studies the history of the Euro leading up to its inception, what happened after the Euro was introduced into circulation and implications for its future. The Euro was set up to accommodate a unified currency while preserving sovereignty among nations who, less than a century ago, were mortal enemies. Preserving sovereignty weakened the ability to respond to crisis by design, and it wasnt long before the limits of the European Monetary Union were tested after a series of financial crisis threatened the very existence of the Euro. The Euro held together, yet the inability of the European Central Bank to assist member nations control subsequent debt following the financial crisis may wound the ability of the Euro to replace the dollar as the dominant world currency or even prove fatal. Greece is on the verge of collapse, and is so entangled with other Euro nations; a systemic domino effect will occur should any of the troubled member Eurozone nations collapse uncontrollably. Three options remain for the European Monetary Union, banding together and preserving the currency, grossly indebted countries exiting to preserve the health of countries which are more fiscally responsible, or the Euro may land inconsequentially between success and failure, never challenging the power of the dollar as the dominant world currency.

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Chea, Ashford C. "The Euro Zone Financial Meltdown and Sub-Saharan Africa’s Financial Sector: Analysis and The Way Forward for Financial Development and Economic Growth." International Journal of Regional Development 3, no. 1 (January 23, 2016): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ijrd.v3i1.8925.

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<p>The purpose of the paper was to assess the effects of the euro zone financial crisis on sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) financial sector. The evidence showed that the euro zone crisis had limited negative effects on SSA financial sector as a whole. However, individual countries were impacted negatively based on their relative integration into the global financial system and the idiosyncratic responses by policy makers to the crisis. The article begins with a historical perspective and underpinning of the euro zone financial crisis. Next, it presents a brief overview of the euro zone financial sector. This is followed by an analysis of SSA’s financial sector and its exposure to the euro zone crisis. The paper then continues with a discussion of the transmission mechanisms of the crisis to SSA’s financial sector. The article ends with an outline of policy lessons learned from the euro debt crisis, policy implications for SSA’s financial sector, and recommendations for the way forward for financial development and stability in SSA.</p>

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Koronowski, Adam. "Dual Currency System as a Solution to the Eurozone Crisis." Gospodarka Narodowa 270, no. 2 (April 30, 2014): 5–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/gn/100866.

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Kundera, Jarosław. "Euro Crisis and the EMU Institutional Reforms." Equilibrium 8, no. 1 (March 31, 2013): 7–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/equil.2013.001.

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The main goal of this article is to find the answer for the question about the necessary reform to be undertaken in the EU to save the euro as a common currency. The author envisages three scenarios of the euro area’s future development. In his opinion, the most probable one are the institutional reforms in the euro area. The essential element of the reform is to establish a proper mix between the ECB’ monetary policy and fiscal policies in the member states. All proposed steps against the euro crisis are mutually correlated: monetary integration requires stricter fiscal integration, fiscal integration requires banking union, but banking union is going to require some form of a political union. This way the debt crisis in the euro area may present an opportunity to renew the strength of the European institutions.

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Venizélos, Evángelos, and Isabelle Hausser. "Crise grecque et zone euro." Commentaire Numéro159, no. 3 (2017): 555. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/comm.159.0555.

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De Grauwe, Paul. "Towards a New Euro Crisis?" Intereconomics 57, no. 5 (October 10, 2022): 273–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10272-022-1078-x.

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AbstractThere is thus a fundamental credibility issue about the willingness of the ECB to be a lender of last resort in the government bond markets. This will continue to make the eurozone a fragile construction. As a result, the possibility of a future euro crisis cannot be excluded.

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Betz, Frederick. "Disequilibrium Pricing—Greek Euro Crisis." Theoretical Economics Letters 04, no. 09 (2014): 897–909. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/tel.2014.49113.

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García, Carlos. "La crisis y el euro." Observatorio Económico, no. 58 (November 1, 2011): 4–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.11565/oe.vi58.269.

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El problema con el euro es Europa. Un conjunto de países con diferentes niveles de desarrollo y políticas fiscales está sumergido en una crisis que ha afectado acada uno de sus miembros en forma dispareja. Grecia, España e Italia no son Alemania. Por el contrario, necesitan que el euro se deprecie respecto al dólar, al yen, al yuan y a otros, de manera de estimular su sector exportador y así enfrentar la crisis. Continuar leyendo...

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Meadway, James. "The Euro: Crisis and Collapse?" Competition & Change 16, no. 2 (April 2012): 150–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/1024529412z.0000000007.

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By the end of the last decade, the European project appeared secure. Monetary union had been successfully negotiated and Eurozone members who had previously lagged, like Greece and Ireland, had sustained high rates of growth since their entry to the single currency in 1999. It did not seem ridiculous for a former foreign policy advisor to Tony Blair, Mark Leonard, to tell us in breathless style Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (2005) . Citing Europe's new synthesis of social democracy's concern for welfare with the liberalism's support for freedom, Leonard happily forecast the spread of the European model to the rest of the world. That vision, needless to say, now lies in ruins. Europe, both as a constellation of supranational institutions making up the European Union, and as a collection of different nation states, is in a deep, and deepening, crisis. For the last eighteen months, its political leaders have met with increasing frequency to offer a succession of failed solutions, with the gap between the summit's final statement of intent and its collapse seemingly shrinking on every occasion. The malaise looks incurable.

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Darvas, Zsolt. "The Euro Crisis: Mission Accomplished?" World Policy Journal 30, no. 1 (2013): 87–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0740277513482620.

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Gabor, Daniela, and Jakob Vestergaard. "Chasing unicorns: The European single safe asset project." Competition & Change 22, no. 2 (March 1, 2018): 139–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1024529418759638.

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For the past 20 years, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) institutions have sought to engineer a single safe asset that would provide a credible store of value for capital market participants. Before 2008, the European Central Bank used shadow banking to create a single safe asset that we term shadow money, and in doing so also erased borders between Euro area government bond markets. Lacking appropriate ECB support, shadow euros could not withstand the pressures of the global financial crisis and brought down several periphery euro government bonds with them. Two new plans, the Capital Markets Union and the Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities, again turn to shadow banking, this time by using securitization to generate an entirely private safe asset or a public–private safe asset. Such plans cannot solve the enduring predicament of EMU’s bond markets architecture: that Member States have competed for investors (liquidity) since the introduction of the euro, betraying a deep hostility towards collective political solutions to the single safe asset problem. Technocratic-led, market-based initiatives need to persuade EMU states that there is little threat to their ability to issue debt in liquid markets. Without ECB interventions, market-based engineering of single safe assets runs the danger of repeatedly destabilizing national bond markets.

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Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès. "Recovering from Maastricht." European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention 17, no. 2 (September 18, 2020): 129–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/ejeep.2020.02.03.

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The euro area crisis was less a crisis of the euro than a crisis of the Maastricht doctrine. The latter was based on a triple ban: no monetization of fiscal deficits, no bail-out, no sovereign default. The euro architecture was also based on a strict division of tasks: the European Central Bank would stabilize prices in the euro area as a whole, whereas national governments would stabilize their own economies in case of idiosyncratic shocks. To make things even more dysfunctional, bank supervision remained under the competence of the member states. Although much has been done since the crisis to reform the Maastricht framework, there are still major flaws that weaken the single currency.

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Miklaszewicz, Sławomir. "Sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone countries." Oeconomia Copernicana 7, no. 3 (September 30, 2016): 357. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/oec.2016.021.

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The aim of the publication is to examine the fiscal position of the euro area countries and fiscal policy architecture in Europe after the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis started in 2008. The first part of the publication consists of the analyses of the budgetary situation of euro area countries and complications with the increasing costs of servicing the public debt in the European market affected by the financial liquidity crisis. In the second section the most important changes in the framework of budgetary policies coordination process in the euro zone are presented. The final section describes the role and activities of the European Central Bank in minimising the negative consequences of the debt crisis in the euro zone.

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Kouretas, Georgios, and Prodromos Vlamis. "The Greek crisis: Causes and implications." Panoeconomicus 57, no. 4 (2010): 391–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/pan1004391k.

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This paper presents and critically discusses the origins and causes of the Greek fiscal crisis and its implications for the euro currency as well as the SEE economies. In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis the enormous increase in sovereign debt has emerged as an important negative outcome, since public debt was dramatically increased in an effort by the US and the European governments to reduce the accumulated growth of private debt in the years preceding the recent financial turmoil. Although Greece is the country member of the eurozone that has been in the middle of this ongoing debt crisis, since November 2009 when it was made clear that its budget deficit and mainly its public debt were not sustainable, Greece?s fiscal crisis is not directly linked to the 2007 US subprime mortgage loan market crisis. As a result of this negative downturn the Greek government happily accepted a rescue plan of 110 billion euros designed and financed by the European Union and the IMF. A lengthy austerity programme and a fiscal consolidation plan have been put forward and are to be implemented in the next three years.

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Sapir, J. "Crisis of the euro zone and prospects of the euro." Studies on Russian Economic Development 22, no. 3 (May 2011): 225–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s1075700711030142.

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45

Strange, Gerard. "The euro crisis, euro reform, and the problem of hegemony." Asia Europe Journal 16, no. 2 (March 13, 2018): 125–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-0501-1.

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46

Marcussen, Michala. "Euro Conditionality Hinges on Positive Convergence." Intereconomics 57, no. 5 (October 10, 2022): 288–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10272-022-1081-2.

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AbstractThe present cocktail of a bleak economic outlook combined with high inflation and rising interest rates has raised questions as to whether a new euro debt crisis might emerge. Euro area sovereign spreads have widened, but not to “unwarranted” levels, unlike the situation that prevailed during the European debt crisis. A replay of the funding fears, which drove the euro area debt crisis a decade ago, seems unlikely today with the extensive toolkit now in place.

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Joris, Willem, Liina Puustinen, and Leen d’Haenens. "More news from the Euro front: How the press has been framing the Euro crisis in five EU countries." International Communication Gazette 80, no. 6 (January 24, 2018): 532–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748048518754375.

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This article examines the metaphoric frames in the coverage of the Euro crisis in newspapers across five EU countries. Our quantitative frame analysis identified five dominant frames: war, construction, disease, natural disaster, and game. In all five countries, the Euro crisis as war turned out to be the most prominent news frame. Such framing uses martial, aggressive language to describe the European public sphere. This finding is not without importance, as newspapers play a key role in shaping the general public’s perception of the Euro crisis and by extension the European Union’s institutional elite and its (in)ability to cope with crisis.

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48

Stawasz-Grabowska, Ewa. "Negative Feedback Loop between Banks and Sovereigns in the Euro Area – Experience of the Crisis and Post-Crisis Perspective." Comparative Economic Research. Central and Eastern Europe 23, no. 3 (September 21, 2020): 41–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1508-2008.23.19.

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The euro area crisis was characterised by a negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. The paper aims to indicate the genesis of this phenomenon and to determine the scale of its operation during the crisis and post-crisis conditions, as well as to identify the threats it brings. In addition, the paper discusses the actions that have been taken so far at the euro area level to reduce the feedback loop and the existing challenges in this area. The following hypothesis has been formulated: in the post-crisis conditions the euro area remains vulnerable to the sovereign-bank nexus, which in particular stems from the very legacy of the crisis, bank-based financial system, as well as incomplete reforms of the euro area institutional architecture. The research methods include data selection and evaluation as well as descriptive statistics. The main contribution of the study stems from the adoption of a post-crisis perspective and the assessment of the loop with the use of the most recent data and in relation to the crisis period. The results show that in the post-crisis period, a reduction in interconnectedness has been observed, although it has not been evenly experienced by all euro area countries. At the same time, despite some progress in recent years, institutional reforms aimed at breaking the sovereign-bank nexus are far from complete.

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Winkler, Adalbert. "The joint production of confidence: lessons from nineteenth-century US commercial banks for twenty-first-century Euro area governments." Financial History Review 18, no. 3 (October 11, 2011): 249–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0968565011000205.

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This article argues that the crisis in euro area government bond markets reflects the same kind of stability challenges financial intermediaries face when confronted with a negative macroeconomic shock without having access to a lender of last resort. Nineteenth-century US banks operated under such a framework and used clearing houses in times of crisis as a co-insurance mechanism against contagious runs. Their experience provides valuable lessons for the ongoing reform efforts in the euro area. The analysis reveals that most of the instruments clearing houses used in the joint production of confidence are similar to the ones euro area governments have recently decided upon, such as the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility. This suggests that the euro area crisis response has followed best private-sector practices of crisis management. However, inherent fragilities of co-insurance mechanisms as well as the long maturity and elusive quality of government debt present a challenge in designing a sustainable solution to the crisis without compromising on the original goal of euro area governance: ensuring sound fiscal policies as a prerequisite for maintaining price stability. To meet this challenge a substantially more comprehensive economic and political union might be needed.

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Mooij, Annelieke AM. "The Weiss judgment: The Court’s further clarification of the ECB’s legal framework: Case C-493/17 Weiss and others, EU:C:2018:1000." Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 26, no. 3 (June 2019): 449–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1023263x19837208.

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In December 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the Weiss case. This case is the most recent development in the Euro crisis case law. The financial crisis has shown the difficulty in determining the precise limits to the mandate of the European Central Bank. The Gauweiler case provided a legal framework but also left unanswered questions. This contribution will first provide the background to the Euro crisis and the context of the case then continue by giving a short summary and analyses of the Opinion of the Advocate General and the judgment of the Court. Finally, a reflection will be given on what lessons can be taken from the Weiss case. As the Weiss case appears to be last in Euro crisis case law, this reflection will include an overall analysis of the current interpretation of the mandate of the European Central Bank post-Euro crisis.

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