Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Euro crisi'

The thesis aims at investigating the influence of Ordoliberalism, a German variant of Neoliberalism, in the reforms of the European economic governance undertaken during the crisis. The influence of the ordoliberal ideology has become, in the last years, a contentious topic: part of the literature claims that Ordoliberalism did influence the actions of the German government in the years of the crisis, while another part denies that this ideology played any significant role. This thesis aims to contribute to this debate. The thesis is divided in two parts. The first one is theoretical and reconstructs the ordoliberal ideology relying on Michael Freeden’s morphological approach. The second part is empirical and uses the methodologies of political science to trace the influence of this ideology in the European crisis politics.

This work contributes to the literature about the Euro-area monetary policy analysing the effects of unconventional measures, the conduct of monetary policy by the European central bank and the effects of the crisis on the economic structures of member countries. The first chapter deals with the effects of unconventional monetary policy measures implemented since 2007 to cope with the financial and sovereign debt crisis. The focus is on government bond yields as they as they became the direct expression of the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area, and it deals with two aspects of the transmission mechanism: the first one is the expectational channel and the second one is the effect of liquidity injections. Results show that the effect of unconventional monetary policies are not unique inside the monetary union but vary across countries and over time. In particular, the unfolding of the European sovereign debt crisis completely changed the impact of liquidity injections as they led to a rise in interest rate spreads for highly indebted countries. The second chapter analyzes the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro area over the period 1999-2013 by estimating several monetary policy reaction functions with time-varying coefficients and heteroskedastic error terms. This allows to evaluate whether relevant shifts in the conduct of monetary policy occurred and whether the current financial crisis had an influence on that. Results show that the sensitivity of the ECB towards inflation and output gap changed along the time span and mainly after 2008 as it also started to respond to new variables like bank loans and sovereign bond yield spreads. The third chapter analyzes the effects of the recent economic crisis in the Euro area in light of international structural macroeconomic relationships. This is achieved through a conditional forecast exercise. By comparing the forecast with the actual path of the Euro-area variables it is possible to evaluate whether, given the effects of the crisis in US, pre-crisis structural macroeconomic relationship are able to explain Euro-area economic developments during the crisis. Results show that the effects of the crisis have been much more heterogeneous than what implied by structural relationships and the crisis shock suggesting that either a structural break or a strong idiosyncratic shock affected the Euro area after 2008. Finally, the sovereign debt crisis by itself seems not to be able to explain neither business-cycle and inflation heterogeneity, nor the recent recession and economic slack.

La mia tesi di dottorato consiste di tre articoli empirici sul mercato interbancario europeo non collateralizzato e il suo funzionamento durante la crisi finanziaria del 2007-2008. Il primo articolo, intitolato “Il funzionamento del mercato interbancario europeo durante la crisi finanziaria del 2007-2008”1 fornisce un’analisi dettagliata del funzionamento del mercato interbancario europeo dei prestiti non collateralizzati con scadenza overnight (O/N) durante la crisi finanziaria del 2007-2008, studiando le serie storiche dei tassi di interesse, del turnover del mercato, e dei costi di indebitamento delle banche. Lo scopo è cercare di distinguere l’impatto degli eventi di mercato – sin dall’inizio delle tensioni nell’estate del 2007 fino alla fine di novembre 2008 – da pattern stagionali, dinamiche regolari determinate dalla cornice istituzionale dell’operatività dell’Eurosistema, dall’impatto degli interventi eccezionali intrapresi dalla Banca Centrale Europea (BCE) durante la crisi. I risultati mostrano il ruolo importante, accanto agli eventi di mercato, della liquidità addizionale fornita dalla BCE e dell’accresciuta tendenza delle istituzioni finanziarie a trattenere la liquidità in eccesso piuttosto che scambiarla sul mercato interbancario. L’aumento del rischio di controparte e fattori stagionali sono importanti determinanti dei tassi d’interesse e dei volumi O/N; la fornitura eccezionale di liquidità da parte dell’Eurosistema e i notevoli cambiamenti alla cornice istituzionale di implementazione della politica monetaria hanno influenzato gli incentivi delle banche a scambiare liquidità nel mercato. L’analisi dei tassi di interesse pagati dalle singole banche per i prestiti non collateralizzati documenta il ruolo chiave della reputazione al fine di ottenere migliori condizioni di funding e, durante la crisi, mostra un ripiegamento verso controparti nazionali e la garanzia implicita goduta dalle banche con i maggiori volumi d’affari di essere “too-big-to-fail”. Il secondo articolo, intitolato “La microstruttura del mercato monetario prima e dopo la crisi finanziaria: una prospettiva di rete”2, fornisce una dettagliata analisi sulla microstruttura del mercato monetario europeo secondo l’approccio della teoria delle reti. Le banche sono i nodi delle reti; i prestiti overnight non collateralizzati formano i link che connettono i nodi. L’analisi statica degli indicatori di rete conferma molti fatti stilizzati verificati per altri sistemi complessi: le reti interbancarie sono molto sparse – lungi dall’essere complete – esibiscono la proprietà “small world” e una distribuzione del grado (il numero di controparti con cui ogni banca stabilisce dei link) che segue una legge esponenziale. D’altra parte la tendenza della banche al clustering, cioè a formare gruppi dove i link sono relativamente più densi, è molto più bassa rispetto ad altri sistemi reali. L’analisi della topologia delle reti prima versus dopo l’inizio della crisi fornisce intuizioni interessanti sul potenziale per il contagio finanziario; la partizione delle reti in diverse sotto-reti più piccole e internamente connesse documenta un movimento contro l’integrazione del mercato; pattern eterogenei degli indicatori per banche che hanno dimensioni diverse offrono intuizioni sul loro comportamento. Infine, 1 CEIS Working Paper No. 158 (December 2009). Submitted to the International Journal of Central Banking. 2 CEIS Working Paper No. 181 (January 2011). l’analisi degli indicatori di centralità di rete indica chiaramente che le banche più grandi sono anche le più centrali/influenti nel sistema prima della crisi. Questo cambia dopo Agosto 2007, quando le banche di medie dimensioni e quelle molto piccolo gradualmente aumentano la loro influenza nel mercato come prestatori di liquidità. Il terzo articolo, intitolato “Too-connected versus too-big-to-fail: la centralità di rete delle banche e i tassi di interesse overnight”3 studia cosa determina i costi di indebitamento delle banche nel mercato monetario non collateralizzato. L’obiettivo è testare se misure di centralità, che quantificano gli effetti di rete dovuti alle interazioni tra le banche nel mercato, possono aiutare a spiegare i pattern eterogenei nei tassi di interesse pagati per prendere a prestito fondi non collateralizzati una volta che si controlla per la dimensione della banca e per altri fattori specifici di ogni banca e del mercato. Evidenza preliminare mostra che le banche grandi si indebitano in media a tassi migliori rispetto alle istituzioni più piccole, sia prima che dopo l’inizio della crisi finanziaria. Tuttavia, controllando per la dimensione, le misure di centralità riescono a catturare parte della variazione cross-section nei tassi overnight. Più in particolare: (1) Prima dell’inizio della crisi tutte le banche, indipendentemente dalla loro dimensione, beneficiano di forme diverse di interconnessione, ma l’effetto è piccolo in termini economici. La reputazione della banca e il rischio di controparte sono i fattori più rilevanti per ridurre i tassi d’interesse medi giornalieri. Le banche straniere prendono a prestito a sconto rispetto a quelle italiane. (2) Dopo Agosto 2007 l’impatto della centralità delle banche diventa più forte ma assume segno opposto: la “ricompensa” derivante da una maggiore interconnessione diventa una “punizione”, segnale questo forse di disciplina di mercato. La reputazione della banca diventa ancora più importante. (3) Dopo la bancarotta di Lehman l’effetto della centralità sullo spread mantiene lo stesso segno che aveva dopo Agosto 2007, ma la sua dimensione economica è notevolmente più grande. Le banche straniere pagano un premio significativo rispetto a quelle Italiane; la reputazione diventa estremamente più importante rispetto a prima della crisi.
My doctoral thesis consists of three empirical papers on the unsecured euro money market and its functioning during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The first paper, titled “The functioning of the European interbank market during the 2007-2008 financial crisis”1 provides a detailed analysis of the functioning of the overnight (O/N) unsecured euro money market during the 2007-2008 financial crisis by looking at the time patterns of interest rates, market turnover and banks’ borrowing costs. The aim is to disentangle the impact of market events – since the outbreak of tensions in the summer of 2007 until the end of November 2008 – from seasonal patterns of market activity, movements determined by the Eurosystem’s operational framework, the impact of the ECB’s exceptional crisis-related interventions. The results show the important role, alongside market events, of the additional refinancing provided by the ECB and of credit institutions’ increased tendency to hoard surplus reserves rather than trading them in the secondary market. Higher counterparty credit risk and seasonal factors are important determinants of O/N rates and volumes; the exceptional provision of liquidity by the Eurosystem and the relevant changes to the operational framework have influenced banks’ incentives to trade liquidity in the market. The analysis of banks’ costs for uncollateralised loans provides evidence of the major role of bank reputation to obtain better funding and, during the crisis, of a retreat towards national counterparties and of a too-big-to-fail guarantee implicitly granted to the banks with the highest volumes of business. The second paper, titled “The microstructure of the money market before and after the financial crisis: a network perspective”2, provides a detailed microstructure analysis of the euro money market by taking a network perspective. Banks are the nodes of the networks; overnight unsecured loans form the links connecting the nodes. The static analysis of network indicators confirms a number of stylised facts verified for other real complex systems: interbank networks are highly sparse, far from being complete, exhibit the small world property and a power-law distribution of degree (the number of counterparties each bank establishes links with). On the other hand the tendency of banks to cluster, i.e. to form groups where links are relatively denser, is much lower than in other real systems. The analysis of the topology before versus after the start of the crisis provides interesting insights into the potential for financial contagion; the partition of the network into several smaller sub-networks documents a move against market integration; heterogeneous patterns of indicators across banks of different size offer insights into banks’ behaviour. Finally, the analysis of network centrality indicates unambiguously that the biggest banks are also the most central/influent in the system before the onset of the crisis. Things change after August 2007 since medium-sized and very small banks progressively increase their influence in the market as liquidity providers. 1 CEIS Working Paper No. 158 (December 2009). Submitted to the International Journal of Central Banking. 2 CEIS Working Paper No. 181 (January 2011). The last paper, titled “Too-connected versus too-big-to-fail: banks’ network centrality and overnight interest rates”3 aims at studying what influences banks’ borrowing costs in the unsecured euro money market. The objective is to test whether measures of centrality, quantifying network effects due to interactions among banks in the market, can help explain heterogeneous patterns in the interest rates paid to borrow unsecured funds once bank size and other bank and market factors that affect the overnight segment are controlled for. Preliminary evidence shows that large banks borrow on average at better rates compared to smaller institutions, both before and after the start of the financial crisis. Nonetheless, controlling for size, centrality measures can capture part of the cross-sectional variation in overnight rates. More specifically: (1) Before the start of the crisis all the banks, independently of their size, profit from different forms of interconnectedness, but the economic size of the effect is small. Bank reputation and perceived credit riskiness are the most relevant factors to reduce average daily interest rates. Foreign banks borrow at a discount over Italian ones. (2) After August 2007 the impact of banks’ interconnectedness becomes larger but changes sign: the “reward” stemming from a higher centrality becomes a “punishment”, which possibly reflects market discipline. Bank reputation becomes even more important. (3) After Lehman’s bankruptcy the effect of centrality on the spread maintains the same sign as after August 2007, but the magnitude increases remarkably. Foreign banks borrow at a relevant premium over Italian ones; reputation becomes outstandingly more important than in normal times.

Depuis son éruption en septembre 2009, la crise de la zone euro a été au centre de l'attention des économistes et des décideurs politiques. L'objectif principal de cette thèse est de développer des modèles théoriques pertinents afin d'analyser les facteurs à l'origine de la crise jumelle des banques et de la dette souveraine dans une union monétaire avec une architecture institutionnelle globalement similaire de l'Union économique et monétaire avant 2012. Tout en mettant l'accent sur la vulnérabilité financière, nous explorons la relation entre le secteur bancaire, l'économie réelle et le budget du gouvernement dans le contexte d 'une union monétaire. Cette thèse se compose de quatre modèles théoriques de la crise bancaire, avec le premier illustrant la crise financière qui avait éclaté en 2008 dans les petites économies européennes en dehors de l 'UEM et les trois modèles suivants élucidant la situation de crise dans la zone euro en2009 jusqu'en 2012
In this Ph. D. thesis, we analyze the conditions for the emergence and the aggravation of the recent crisis in Europe from 2008 to 2012. The major objective of this Ph. D. thesis is to develop theoretical models which will be effective in investigating the twin banking and sovereign debt crises in a monetary union with a broadly similar institutional design to the EMU before 2012. Different from 'traditional' financial crisis models that shed light on the role of the central bank in crisis policy response, the models developed in this thesis investigate and underline the importance of fiscal crisis management. White accentuating financial vulnerability, we explore the relationship between the banking sector, the realeconomy and the public budget in the context of a monetary union. This thesis consists of four theoretical models of the banking crisis, with the first framework depicting the financial crisis which burst in 2008 in small European economies outside the EMU and the next three models elucidating the crisis situation in the Eurozone from early 2009 until August 2012

Master of Arts
Department of Economics
Lloyd B. Thomas Jr
The European sovereign debt crisis has had a profound impact on the rest of the world. The “debt crisis” refers to the rapid accumulation of debt within some struggling euro-zone countries. This debt accumulation has resulted in a variety of financial bailouts made to various countries within the European Union and a debt default by the country of Greece. The results of this crisis have changed the way of life for many living within the struggling economies. Division within the euro zone, on both policy and ideology, has begged the question of whether the euro will be able to survive in the long term. The purpose of this report is to investigate the buildup and evolution of this crisis, as well as to highlight various responses and proposed solutions of the future.

Mestrado em Economia Internacional e Estudos Europeus
A moeda única, à semelhança do próprio projeto europeu, nasceu de um impulso político associado à necessidade de enquadrar a Alemanha num espaço de paz e prosperidade. A atual crise do Euro reavivou divisões e temores associados à notória influência germânica. Surgem, assim, crescentes incógnitas sobre o futuro do Euro, debatendo-se cenários que vão desde a sua dissolução até ao reforço da integração política e orçamental. Mas há um ponto pouco contestado: a Alemanha desempenhará um papel decisivo na resolução do presente impasse, quando definir se a sua liderança decorre de uma «Alemanha europeísta» ou visa uma «Europa germânica».
Very much like the European project, the single currency was born from a political impulse related to the need of framing Germany in a region of peace and prosperity. The current Euro crisis aroused scissions and fears as a consequence of the clear Germanic influence. Therefore, increasing uncertainty about the future of the Euro arises, creating scenarios that range from its dissolution to the reinforcement of the political and fiscal integration. However there is a not much disputed matter: Germany will play a decisive role on the resolution of the current deadlock when it decides if its leadership stems from a «European Germany» or a «Germanic Europe».

The current euro crisis is shaped by urgency and actuality. Since it affects a lot of people and different countries, it is also denoted by transboundary effects. Considering these circumstances, the call for quick crisis solution occurs. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the leadership issue during the euro crisis. Based on theoretical principles of crisis leadership, we examine the role and behavior of Germany in the euro crisis. Due to the fact that Germany is currently in a significant position, we narrow down the crisis leadership aspect to this specific view. Providing an overall and thorough picture, we investigate Germany’s leadership in the euro crisis from different perspectives. In order to achieve this purpose, we determine this issue from a political, economical and societal perception, which seem to be the most influencing factors in the case of the euro crisis. By assembling the crucial findings of these separate categories, we gain a broader perspective and hence a generalized evaluation and understanding of the German leadership style.

Mestrado em Finanças
O objetivo desta dissertação é investigar a persistência da PEAD (Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift) durante os anos de crise e pós-crise. Utilizando o período de 2008 a 2017 como amostra, analisarei o impacto produzido no PEAD pela instabilidade financeira decorrente da Crise Financeira e consequente Crise da Dívida na Zona do Euro. Com base nos resultados de regressões estatísticas, concluo que o fenómeno continua a existir. No entanto, existem algumas discrepâncias na variação de magnitude se forem consideradas a Crise Financeira Global (final de 2008) ou a Crise Financeira da Zona do Euro (final de 2009) como datas de início da recessão. Os meus resultados indicam que o período de crise a partir do final de 2009 proporciona retornos muito mais elevados, que são menos explicados por qualquer um dos fatores de risco em comparação com o período de crise iniciado em Outubro de 2008. Adicionalmente, a exclusão do EPS negativo implica uma atenuação do PEAD, independentemente do início da amostra.
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the persistence of the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift (PEAD) over the crisis and post-crisis years. Using the period from 2008 to 2017 as a sample, I will analyze the impact produced on the PEAD by the financial instability due to Financial Crisis and consequential Debt Crisis in the Eurozone. Based on the results of statistical regressions, I conclude that the phenomenon continues to exist. However, there are some discrepancies in magnitude variation whether you consider the Global Financial Crisis (late 2008) or the Eurozone Financial Crisis (late 2009) as the starting date for the recession. My results indicate that the crisis period from late 2009 onwards provides much higher returns which are less explained by any of the risk factors compared to the crisis period starting on October 2008. Additionally, excluding negative EPS implies attenuation of PEAD regardless of the inception of the sample.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The diploma thesis deals with the impact of the Global Financial Crisis to the Czech Economy. The aim of the thesis is to analyze the actual implications of the Global Financial Crisis to the Czech economy. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part describes the causes of crisis and the way how the crisis split from the USA to Europe and other countries. The second part deals with the impact of the financial crisis on the Czech Republic. The impact of the financial crisis to the individual areas of the Czech economy is described as well as the reaction of monetary policy and government including the fiscal impact. The third part deals with the possibility of the Czech Republic's entry to the European Monetary Union in the light of current financial crisis.

As the effects of the crisis became more and more evident, some nations began to show signs of economic decline and some of them started to think about abandoning Euro. Many economists argued that such a proposal was pure mad-ness, stupid and inconvenient if implemented. However, this idea increasingly began to attract attention over time. Numerous hasty and superficial analysis on the use started to flock, stimulating the spread of further opinions and publica-tions. The debate began to deepen and the contrast between the two schools of economic thought (the orthodox and the heterodox neo-classical post-Keynesian) has reinvigorated. The awareness about the seriousness of the matter, though, arose in England in 2011 when a competition with a prize of 250 thousand pounds was organized. The Wolfson prize was awarded to the best piece of aca-demic work which could provide a sensible answer to the question: “If member states leave the Economic and Monetary Union, what is the best way for the eco-nomic process to be managed to provide the soundest foundation for the future growth and prosperity of the current membership?”. The contest was won by Roger Bootle, with his “Leaving the Euro: a practical guide” which will be dis-cussed in the last chapter. This thesis analyses the global financial and economic crisis from its origins en-tailed in the excesses of Wall Street, until the imbalances in Europe, through the opinions and studies of internationally renowned economists belonging to both schools of economic thought. Particular attention has been given to the economic policies of austerity in Europe and the main macroeconomic effects that these re-strictive policies have had on the member states restrictions, especially on pe-ripheral countries. Consequently the focus will shifts to the Modern Monetary Theory as a theoretical alternative to interpret the reasons for the imbalances in the Euro area. The cen-tral aspect of this theory is the different interpretation of the deficit of the govern-ment budget on the basis of sectorial balance sheets and their mechanism of supporting the economy in the downturn. To conclude, referring to the paper that won the Wolfson prize in 2011 a potential exit strategy with a main focus on Italy is described, addressing the more relevant legal and economic issues. As for economic aspects, a comparison is performed to determine which option was the best among the potential solutions to a long period of austerity or the ordered abandonment of the Euro. Finally, several probable drawbacks are listed that should give pause to the countries in question before making such a drastic choice.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
There is a turbulence in the recent history of the common European currency. The public debt crisis in the Eurozone has caused discussions about the monetary integration process. Until then, the Economic and monetary european union served as a reference for agreements such as Mercosur and NAFTA. In recent years, as an effect of the global economic crisis of 2008, a strong deficit increase has occurred in the Eurozone’s countries due to the need to stimulate demand and prevent bankruptcy of large private banks. Consequently, the public debt crisis in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain creates uncertainty about the euro’s future. The public expenditure cuts, freezing of salaries, pensions and tax increment were immediate alternatives to contain deficits. Political and economic differences re-emerged on the continent, undermining the pact resulting from attempts to integrate the continent economically and politically. Thus, the European Union is experiencing the most controversial situation in its history. The main objective of this research is to understand the roots of the European economic crisis and investigate instruments for its containment, permeating the orthodox, keynesian and marxist paradigms
Há uma turbulência na história recente da moeda comum europeia. A crise da dívida pública na zona do euro vem ocasionando debates acerca do processo de integração monetária. Até então, a União econômica e monetária europeia (Ueme) servia como fonte de referência para acordos como o Mercosul e o NAFTA. Nos últimos anos, como efeito da crise econômica mundial de 2008, notou-se grande elevação dos déficits nos países da zona do euro em decorrência da necessidade de estímulo à demanda e de impedir que houvesse falência de grandes bancos privados. Consequentemente, a crise da dívida pública na Grécia, Itália, Irlanda, Portugal e Espanha gera incerteza com relação ao futuro do euro. Os cortes de gastos públicos, o aumento de impostos e congelamento de salários e aposentadorias foram alternativas imediatas para a contenção dos déficits. As divergências políticas e econômicas reemergiram no continente, abalando o pacto resultado de décadas de tentativas para integrar econômica e politicamente a Europa. Dessa forma, a União Europeia atravessa a situação mais controversa de sua história. O objetivo central da pesquisa é entender as raízes da crise econômica europeia e investigar os instrumentos para sua contenção, permeando os paradigmas ortodoxo, keynesiano e marxista

For many the euro crisis has been a complete disaster for the European Union (EU) with a cascade of crisis from one policy area to another with collapse both imminent and inevitable. This conception of crisis relies on a progressive vision. As Angela Merkel epitomised in 2010, "If the euro fails, it's not only the currency that fails ... it's Europe that fails and with it the idea of the European Union”. However, what really constitutes a crisis? Can a crisis act as an ‘engine’ rather than an obstruction for EU policy development? Crises are not uncommon to the EU nor are they necessarily a hindrance. As the history of the EU demonstrates, responding to crisis is normal. A crisis does not present the end of something or a binary option between a negative or positive eventuality. Rather, this thesis purports that a crisis creates a range of possibilities. To demonstrate this, theories of Europeanization are combined with a novel ‘crisis spectrum’ concept comprising of three crisis logics; ‘crisis progression’, ‘crisis diversity’ and ‘crisis stability’ and applied to particular areas of British and Irish social policy. While these crisis logics can be applied to any policy area, this research focuses on the case of social policy. In particular, the British social policy response from welfare policy to the free movement of EU nationals due to the national immigration debate induced by the euro crisis, and the Irish social policy response from activation policy to the unprecedented unemployment crisis due to the euro crisis. Semi-structured interviews combined with an analysis of primary documents reveal which of these crisis logics is occurring, whether independently or simultaneously within the same period. Both the British and Irish case demonstrate how a crisis does not always occur in a progressive, mechanical fashion, uniformly arresting policy development and policy responses, but that it can lead to a range of responses from different policy areas and contexts.

This paper summarizes the main Optimum Currency Area Theories (AMO), in order to use this branch of regional integration, to verify the configuration, in a cluster scenario, the euro area member countries during the period 2002-2013, from the perspective of macroeconomic imbalances factors, evidenced by the euro crisis, recent. Therefore, making use of statistical methods of multivariate analysis, and, factor analysis and cluster analysis were allowed to result in that during the period before the outbreak of the euro crisis had agreater concentration of countries in the first group, composed of countries more mature and more competitive economy. However, during the most turbulent crisis years, there is a greater amount of the groups formed by making the first less concentrated and dispersed in the composition of the other group. Only in the last two years of observation, 2012 and 2013, we find again a concentration of member countries in a group, then it is observed that in the years most critical crisis, show up macroeconomic disparities in the euro zone countries. Thus, the research contributes in order to verify, by means of multivariate analysis every year, over a period of time, and contrast with the reality that reaches the monetary union in Europe, to confirm that the disparities that existed before the outbreak of the crisis, and continue to exist between the members of the currency area. Confirming that the convergence criteria has not stopped economic disparities were reduced.
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
O presente trabalho faz um resumo das principais Teorias de Área Monetária Ótima (AMO), de modo a utilizar este ramo de integração regional, para verificar a configuração, em um panorama de agrupamento, dos países-membros da área do euro, durante o período de 2002 a 2013, pela ótica de fatores de desequilíbrios macroeconômicos, evidenciado pela crise do euro, recente. Logo, fazendo uso de metodologias estatísticas de análise multivariada, mais precisamente, análise fatorial e análise de agrupamento, permitiu-se resultar em que durante o período anterior à eclosão da crise do euro havia uma maior concentração de países no primeiro grupo, composto por países de economia mais madura e mais competitiva. Entretanto, durante os anos mais turbulentos de crise, observa-se uma maior quantidade de grupos formados, tornando o primeiro grupo menos concentrado e disperso na composição dos demais. Apenas nos dois últimos anos observados, 2012 e 2013, verifica-se novamente uma concentração de países-membros em um grupo, logo se observa que nos anos mais críticos de crise, evidenciam-se as disparidades macroeconômicas dos países da zona do euro. Assim, a pesquisa contribui no sentido de verificar, por meio de análise ultivariada ano a ano, ao longo de um período de tempo, e contrastar com a realidade que atinge a união monetária na Europa, ao confirmar que as disparidades, que já existiam antes da eclosão da crise, e continuam a existir entre os integrantes da área monetária. Confirmando que os critérios de convergência não impediu que as disparidades econômicas fossem diminuídas.

Terminada a Segunda Guerra Mundial, o continente europeu encontrava-se devastado pelo conflito que havia mobilizado o maior contingente de países envolvidos numa só guerra até então. Nesse cenário, renasceria a ideia de criação de um bloco econômico alinhado aos EUA, mas, ao mesmo tempo, economicamente autônomo. Este seria construído lentamente, entre 1948 a 1989, e chegaria ao fim da década de 1980 com 12 participantes que, mais uma vez, presenciariam uma mudança continente europeu. O final da Guerra Fria e o desmonte do bloco soviético marcariam os novos rumos da integração europeia, agora livre da divisão Leste-Oeste. Ainda assim, o século XX se encerraria com boas perspectivas para os defensores de união dos países da Europa, e o desejo por numa agenda mais profunda do que a econômica e de defesa voltaria à pauta. Contudo, o início do século XXI assistiria a intervenções militares, massacres, limpezas étnicas, e guerras justificadas pelo discurso da Guerra ao Terror. Além de crises especulativas que levaram a unificação europeia a uma nova fase de busca de identidade e discurso. Adicionalmente, uma crise financeira, com origem na não-realização de investimentos em papeis de origem estadunidense, e garantidos em última instância pelo governo daquele país, alavancaria a crise de dívida pública de alguns países do subconjunto da União Europeia: a Zona do Euro. Sem liberdade para aplicar políticas fiscais, monetárias ou cambiais próprias, tais países se veriam obrigados a arcar com os custos da opção realizada por seus bancos privados, no mercado financeiro internacional. É esse o tema deste trabalho, a formação e expansão do bloco econômico europeu e a crise que atingiu o subconjunto dos países unificados monetariamente, a Zona do Euro.
After the Second World War, the European continent found itself devastated by the conflict that had mobilized the largest number of countries involved in one war so far. Such scenario would inspire and renew the wish to create a group of countries aligned with the USA, but at the same time economically autonomous. This would slowly be built between 1948 and 1989. By the end of the decade of 1980, the economic bloc counted twelve participants and, once again, the old continent would go thru another transformation. The end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet bloc would mark the new direction of European integration, now free of East-West polarities. The twentieth century would end with good prospects for the ones who advocated in favor of a more closely union of the countries of Europe, and the desire for a deeper than economic and defense calendar were put back on the agenda. However, the early twenty-first century would watch military interventions, massacres, \"ethnic cleansing\", all justified by the discourse of the \"War on Terror\". In addition, the European unification reached a new phase marked by the search for identity and discourse better related to the new international scenario. In the first decade of this new century, a financial crisis, originated in a low-performing investments in papers of American origin, and ultimately guaranteed by the government of that country, end up by levering the public debt in some countries of the European Union, more precisely, in the Eurozone. Without freedom to apply their own fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies, such countries would be forced to bear the costs of the options held by its private banks in international financial markets. That\'s the theme of this work, the formation and expansion of European economic bloc and the crisis that hit the Eurozone in the first decade of the 21th Century.

Mestrado em Economia Monetária e Financeira
Através de uma análise às políticas monetárias dos países da União Europeia utilizadas durante a crise actual, verifica-se que durante os anos de 2008 a 2010 houve uma variação negativa do PIB bastante mais acentuada nos países pertencentes à Zona Euro que nos países não pertencentes à moeda única. Neste trabalho mostra-se ainda qual o peso que cada um dos instrumentos de política monetária teve, desde o começo da Zona Euro, na variação do PIB, tendo sido a taxa de câmbio aquele que revelou maior eficácia. Para a obtenção destes resultados foi feita uma estimação em dados de painel recorrendo a dados trimestrais de 1999 Q1 até 2010 Q4 dos 15 países da UE(15).
This paper analyses the monetary policies of the European Union member states emerged during the current crisis. It is confirmed that, between the years 2008 and 2010, there was a negative growth of GDP much stronger in the countries inside than outside the Euro Area. Using pooled panel OLS estimation, with quarterly data from Q1 1999 to Q4 2010 from all EU(15) countries this work also shows the weight that each monetary policy's instrument had on GDP variation, since the start of the Euro Zone, and where the exchange rate proved to be more effective.

Dans cette thèse, nous nous concentrons sur la relation entre l'économie et sa représentation sociale, entre la science et son sens commun. Dans un premier chapitre, théorique, nous démontrons que les représentations sociales des individus profanes jouent un rôle dans la modélisation économique et dans la mise en oeuvre des politiques économiques. Dans un second chapitre, empirique, nous décrivons d'abord la représentation sociale de la crise économique de 2008 en France et montrons que les différences de représentation peuvent être dues à la perception des menaces financières personnelles. Ces dernières conduisent à différents types d'actions pour faire face (ou non) à la crise économique. Dans un troisième chapitre, empirique, nous étudions la possibilité d'un ajustement cognitif entre les représentations profanes des théories économiques qui expliquent les crises économiques et ces théories économiques. Nous étudions également l'influence des différences sociodémographiques et psychologiques (telles que les opinions politiques et la croyance en un monde juste) sur ces théories économiques. Enfin, dans un dernier chapitre empirique, nous examinons les représentations sociales de l'euro et abordons la notion d'illusion monétaire ainsi que la perception des politiques monétaires européennes en France
In this thesis we focus on the relationship between economics and social representations, between science and common sense. First in a theoretical chapter, we discuss how social representations of lay individuals can potentially play a role in economic modeling and in the implementation of economic policies. Secondly, in an empirical chapter, we firstly describe the social representation of the 2008 economic crisis in France and link it to the perception of personal financial threats. We then proceed to demonstrate that this difference can lead to different types of actions in order to cope (or not) with the economic crisis. The third chapter investigates empirically the possibility of a cognitive fit between lay representations of economic theories that explain economic crises and economic theories themselves. The influence of sociodemographic and psychological differences (such as political opinions, and Belief in a Just World) over these economic theories is also studied. The final chapter examines the social representations of the euro and approaches the notion of monetary illusion as well as the perception of European monetary policies among the French population

This thesis examines the effect of the Euro crisis on the construction of European identities in three case study countries- Germany, Ireland and Poland. Combining a social constructivist approach to European identities with the constructivist and discursive institutionalist literature on ideational change and crisis, it investigates the extent to which the crisis constituted a 'critical juncture' for European identity discourses. Through extensive qualitative frame analysis of political and media discourse at key moments of the crisis, it examines how European identities are constructed through the debates about the crisis. The central argument is that the Euro crisis has had little effect on European identities because actors construct the crisis in their respective national contexts. In doing this, they draw on existing identities and ideas which then 'endogenises' the crisis into the existing national discourses. Where identity change is possible, it is subtle rather than a dramatic shift. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the EU has remained completely unified. Because the crisis generally serves to reinforce, rather than challenge, existing identities, attachments to national sovereignty and old national stereotypes have created or reinforced divisions particularly between northern and southern Europe and core and periphery.

This thesis aims to characterise and analyse the political strategies pursued by the EU institutions and the national governments of its member states in order to manage the so-called European sovereign debt crisis (2009-2013). By relying on a discursive perspective on policy analysis, it departs from the basic analytical assumption that the development of the crisis was constructed through meaning-making practices: the nature of a crisis is never simply determined by ‘objective’ dislocations, but rather, amid the radical uncertainty provoked by the economic downturn, some actors imposed onto others their diagnosis of ‘what had gone wrong’ and thus ‘what had to be done’. In the light of this perspective, four research questions guide the thesis: what were the main ideational underpinnings of the discursive construction of the euro crisis? Why did the ordoliberal construal of the crisis, at the centre of these underpinnings, become the dominant one at the EU level? How was the austerity-based management of the euro crisis legitimised despite the regressive, inefficient and unpopular consequences that this policy strategy implied? What have the main consequences been of the institutionalised discursive construction of the euro crisis for the economic governance of the European and Monetary Union? Overall, the research seeks to understand why the scale and depth of the Great Recession in the Eurozone was met with a commensurate revaluation of the pre-crisis modes of European integration. In order to answer these questions, the thesis first describes and problematises the main policies and institutional reforms adopted in the EU in response to the euro crisis. Secondly, it identifies the signifying practices that led to the construction of the European sovereign debt crisis as a problem of ‘wasteful Southern states’ that required the application of austerity and internal devaluation measures. And thirdly, it explores the constitution of competing discursive coalitions on the basis of rival rhetorical strategies and political projects. There are three main discursive strategies identified as key in providing the political conditions for possible austerity in the EU: the depoliticisation of economic – particularly budgetary – policy, the articulation of a discourse on social and economic development focused on the notion of competitiveness, and the deployment of anti-populist discourses in order to marginalise worries about fiscal consolidation programmes. The first three journal articles of the thesis – which is a compilation of articles, not a monograph – study each of these discursive articulations. The fourth departs slightly from the focus of the thesis; by relying on the policy learning approach, it analyses the development of the idea of austerity in the post-crisis context, and therefore studies the aftermath of the management of the euro crisis rather than its management as such.

The crisis that started in Greece culminated into a crisis of the Eurozone as a whole. How did we get into this mess? Generally, there are three types of macroeconomic stabilisation policies facilitating instruments to react against economic crises, which are the fiscal policy exerted by (national) governments, the monetary policy under the responsibility of central banks and the wage policy, normally negotiated between trade unions and employer associations.

The European common currency, the euro, is in crisis. Bad news about indebted governments and economic recession has continuously outperformed itself since 2009/2010 and kept the European Union and its member states in suspense. It is up to them to combat the crisis. This master thesis deals with the European sovereign debt crisis (“euro crisis”) and tries to allow a better understanding of how the crisis has been managed by governments at the European level. A special focus is put on decision-making in the crisis, posing the research question “How can the decision-making of the EU in the euro crisis be understood?”. To solve this research problem, three different approaches are applied: liberal intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalism and cognitive institutionalism. Each of them adds different aspects to the analysis, gives answers from its respective point of view and thereby widens the overall picture that evolves. The design of the thesis is a case study with the euro crisis as a special case of decision-making and crisis management. Official documents and statements, expert interviews, scholastic, expert, and journalistic analyses are employed as basic research material. It has been uncovered that, powerful states, especially Germany and France, have bargaining advantages during crisis decision-making. However, the decision-making is constrained by institutional aspects (rules, norms and values). Stress factors deriving from the crisis situation facilitate group dynamics that appeared at least partially during the ongoing crisis.

For decades, scholars, investors and policymakers treated sovereign default risk as a defining feature of emerging market economies. Recently, sovereign risk has re‐emerged as an empirical issue for advanced economies, raising new questions for academic research. This thesis investigates the link between political economy factors and financial market perceptions of sovereign risk during the Euro area debt crisis, representing one of the timeliest academic analyses of this episode. It combines an innovative international political economy framework applicable to developed democracies with in‐depth analysis of government bond market fluctuations during the Greek and Irish sovereign debt crises. The thesis argues that political factors influence sovereign risk premia in developed democracies, particularly in crisis periods. This is in contrast to the dominant claim that politics has no or little direct impact on government bond yields in advanced economies. Specifically, it highlights the importance of the domestic political system, finding a role for socio‐political contestation and its interaction with institutional checks and balances. Moreover, it expands the analysis to the international sphere, integrating the so far mostly separate analyses of the domestic and international sources of sovereign credibility. Specifically, it argues that external de‐facto veto players and the degree of proximity between sovereign borrower and international creditors are also significant. Finally, it shows that investment analysis evolves over time, so that the categorisation of sovereign borrowers as either developed democracies or emerging markets, found to prevail during a specific historical phase, may not hold in the longer term. Both the Greek and the Irish sovereigns suffered government bond market reversals in 2010, but their overall sovereign debt crisis experiences differed in length and severity. When compared with the Greek experience, Ireland’s lower degree of socio‐political contestation and greater proximity to international creditors contributed to supporting the sovereign’s financial market credibility.

Mestrado em Economia Internacional e Estudos Europeus
Face à crise económico-financeira internacional, eclodida em 2008, que assolou profundamente a Europa, tendo abalado os alicerces desta, o BCE, a atuar no contexto de um «choque assimétrico» (a crise das dívidas soberanas, despontada em 2010, na Zona Euro), teve de reformular as suas funções e tomar medidas de cariz não convencional. Desde a tradicional movimentação das taxas de juro, foi necessário ceder liquidez em quantidades avultadas e, in extremis, intervir no mercado secundário de títulos de dívida. Portugal, enquanto uma das economias mais fragilizadas por este choque, assistiu ao resvalar da sua economia para uma profunda recessão, situação que levou a que o país tivesse de pedir um resgate financeiro. Desta forma, a análise do caso português torna-se pertinente. Averigua-se que a ação do BCE, conjugada com o Programa de Assistência Económica e Financeira, constituiu-se como crucial para impedir o completo desmoronamento da economia portuguesa. A resposta do BCE foi um tanto ou quanto tardia, mas não falhou. Não obstante a incerteza do futuro, almeja-se uma recuperação de Portugal e, em caso de sobrevivência do Euro a esta intempérie, a União Europeia sairá fortalecida em todas as suas vertentes.
Regarding the international economic and financial crisis, that began in 2008, which has deeply strucked Europe, having shaked its foundations, the ECB, acting in a context of an «asymmetric shock» (the sovereign debt crisis emerged in 2010, in the Euro Zone) had to reformulate its functions and to take unconventional measures. Since the traditional movement of the interest rates, it was necessary to provide liquidity in considerable amounts and, in extremis, to intervene in the secondary market of debt securities. Portugal, as one of the economies that had suffered most damage with this shock, has seen its economy plunging into a great recession, a situation which has led the country to ask for a financial bailout. Thus, the analysis of the portuguese case becomes relevant. It can be noticed that the action of the ECB, combined with the Economic and Financial Assistance Programme, was crucial to prevent the complete collapse of the portuguese economy. The response of the ECB was somewhat late, but it hasn?t failed. Despite the uncertainty of the future, it is aimed a full recovery of Portugal and, if the Euro survives this storm, the European Union will be strengthened in all its dimensions.

Mestrado em Economia Internacional e Estudos Europeus
Todas as referências sobre as quais a Zona Euro se ergueu foram postas em causa no dia em que se iniciou a crise. O choque inicial teve início com a chamada crise do suprime nos Estados Unidos tendo-se alastrado globalmente afetando, de forma particular, a União Europeia. Esta ganhou uma dinâmica própria na sequência de problemas estruturais já existentes na União, que vieram ao de cima, impedindo-a de dar uma resposta coerente aos problemas da crise conjuntural. O presente estudo justifica-se pelas mudanças que se fizeram sentir desde então. Pode-se mesmo classificar o período iniciado de transformador, inovador, extravagante ou, simplesmente, incomum, no quadro do que tem sido a evolução da zona euro. Várias ocorrências atípicas se sucederam: estagflação seguida de deflação, taxas de juro nulas e medidas extraordinárias de política monetária. O foco do presente trabalho recai sobre o fenómeno da deflação e das medidas extraordinárias de política monetária, incluindo as taxas de juro nulas e o que daí resulta. Assim, pretende-se dar resposta à questão se as medidas não convencionais do Banco Central Europeu conseguiram dar resposta ao fenómeno da deflação (e taxas de inflação muito reduzidas) recuperando a estabilidade de preços. Para isso, utiliza-se uma abordagem teórico-descritiva, assente numa análise de alguns indicadores, posteriormente analisados de forma qualitativa. Concluiu-se que, apesar das medidas inovativas, a abordagem do BCE não conseguiu até agora dar resposta aos problemas essenciais vividos pelos Estados-Membros da Zona Euro, nomeadamente, o da estabilidade de preços.
All the foundations on which the Euro Zone rose were called into question in the day that the current crisis began. The initial impact began with the so-called subprime crisis in the United States taking up sprawled globally affecting, in a very particular way, the European Union. This gained its own dynamics, worsening the already existing structural problems, and blocking a coherent and united response to the crisis. This study is justified by the dramatic changes felt since then. This period may even be classified as transforming, innovative, extravagant or, at least, unusual in the context of what has been the evolution of the eurozone. Several atypical events have taken place: deflation followed by stagflation, zero interest rates, and extraordinary monetary policy measures. This work focuses on the deflation phenomenon and the extraordinary monetary policy measures, also including the zero interest rates and its related effects. Thus, it is intended to answer the question whether the unconventional measures the European Central Bank failed to respond to the phenomenon of deflation (and very low inflation rates) restoring price stability, or not. For this, a theoretical and descriptive approach was employed, based on the analysis of certain indicators, posteriorly explored in a quantitative way. The key conclusion was that, despite all the innovative measures, the ECB approach did not succeed in solving effectively the critical problems faced by the EU Member-States, in particular, price stability.

Cette thèse relève du commerce international, des politiques monétaires et de macroéconomie internationale. Le premier chapitre étudie les différentes caractéristiques des différents régimes de change fixe et évalue les effets de chacune de ces caractéristiques sur le commerce international. Il apparaît que la transparence des prix et les coûts de transaction liés au changement de monnaie n’ont pas d’effet significatif sur le commerce, seule la crédibilité du régime de change fixe (liée à l’absence de possibilité de dévaluation) augmente significativement le commerce. Cela explique pourquoi seule l’union monétaire augmente le commerce entre ses membres dès les premières années du régime de change. Le second chapitre s’intéresse aux effets de l’euro sur le commerce pendant la crise financière de 2008-2009. Il apparaît que l’euro amortit la chute du commerce observée partout dans le monde, grâce à l’absence de volatilité du taux de change entre ses membres. Le troisième chapitre présente un modèle théorique permettant d’étudier la transmission des chocs dans une économie spécialisée verticalement, et propose une politique monétaire optimale pour stabiliser l’économie. Le modèle promeut des politiques monétaires symétriques entre les deux pays partageant un mode de production basé sur les chaînes globales de valeur
This thesis studies international trade, monetary policy and international macroeconomics. Chapter 1 examines the different characteristics of different fixed exchange rate regimes and assesses the effects of each of these characteristics on international trade. It appears that price transparency and transaction costs linked to the currency changes do not have a significant effect on trade; only the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime (due to the absence of devaluation possibilities) increases trade significantly. This explains why only monetary union increases trade between its members from the first years of the exchange rate regime. Chapter 2 looks at the effects of the euro on trade during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.It seems that the euro amortized the trade drop observed throughout the world, owing to the absence of exchange rate volatility among its members. Chapter 3 presents a theoretical model to study the transmission of shocks in a vertically specialized economy, and proposes an optimal monetary policy to stabilize the economy. The model promotes symmetrical monetary policies between the two countries sharing a production mode based on global value chains

Mestrado em Finanças
O presente trabalho, tem como objetivo principal a análise de performance de 353 bancos, de 17 países da zona euro, para o período de 2005 a 2010. A análise é feita através da aplicação do método do Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) sobre dados financeiros de demonstrações financeiras, e os resultados da mesma sujeitos a uma regressão para determinar possíveis determinantes de performance. Este estudo sugere que a performance foi constante para a amostra selecionada e aponta como principais determinantes da performance o tamanho e a localização dos bancos.
The present work analyses the performance of 353 banks, from 17 countries of the euro zone, for the period of 2005 to 2010. The analysis is made through the application of Data Envelopment Analysis method (DEA) upon financial data from financial reports, and the results are then subject to a regression analysis to determine possible efficiency determinants. The results suggest that performance was somewhat constant across the sample firms and points out the main determinants of efficiency being the bank size and location.

Mestrado em Finanças
A presente dissertação pretende avaliar o nível de eficiência bancária dos países da União Europeia dos 15, com especial atenção para os países da Zona Euro, no período de 2005 a 2011, analisando o impacto da crise financeira internacional e da subsequente crise da dívida soberana do euro nos resultados de eficiência. Para efeitos de análise subdividiu-se o período em estudo em três subperíodos: 2005/2006, 2007/2008 e 2009/2011. No cálculo da eficiência de custos, optou-se pela aplicação do método não paramétrico data envelopment analysis (DEA). Os resultados obtidos apontaram para uma influência da crise da dívida soberana nos níveis de eficiência dos sectores bancários da maioria dos países, consubstanciada numa degradação deste indicador entre os subperíodos 2007/2008 e 2009/2011. Apesar disso, constatou-se uma ligeira melhoria dos níveis de eficiência entre os subperíodos de 2005/2006 e 2009/2011, na maior parte dos casos.
This dissertation aims to assess the level of bank efficiency in the countries of EU-15, with special attention to the Eurozone countries in the period 2005-2011, analyzing the impact of the international financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis of the euro in efficiency results. For analysis purposes, the study period was divided into three sub-periods: 2005/2006, 2007/2008 and 2009/2011. In calculating the cost efficiency, we opted for the nonparametric method data envelopment analysis (DEA). The results showed an influence of the sovereign debt crisis in the levels of efficiency of banking sectors of most countries, reflected in a deterioration of this indicator between the sub-periods 2007/2008 and 2009/2011. Nevertheless, it was found a slight improvement in efficiency levels between the sub-periods 2005/2006 and 2009/2011, in most cases.

This diploma thesis deals with the prospect of introducing the euro in the Czech Republic under the actual circumstances. The process of entering the Economic and Monetary Union is described, as well as the criteria comparison of nominal and real convergence and the hitherto development of fulfilment of conditions for introducing the euro in the Czech Republic. The other part of the diploma work compares, according to some chosen data, the development of Czech and Slovak Economies in 2004-2008, when both countries had their national currencies, and in 2009 when euro was introduced in the Slovak Republic. The aim of the analysis is to show, whether it is more beneficial for the economy to introduce euro in the current economic crisis and the prospects of euro introduction in the Czech Republic.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais, 2013.
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Esta dissertação tem como objetivo analisar a evolução dos indicadores econômicos na zona do euro e seus reflexos na formação da crise econômica e financeira de 2008. A pergunta-problema que a dissertação busca responder é por que a crise econômica e financeira afetou distintamente as economias da zona do euro. Os governos europeus criaram no início da década de 1990 os critérios de Maastricht, que supostamente deveriam promover a convergência dos indicadores econômicos na zona do euro. Entretanto, o aprofundamento da crise nos GIIPS (Grécia, Irlanda, Itália, Portugal e Espanha) demonstrou que os critérios de Maastricht foram insuficientes para promover a homogeneização dos indicadores econômicos na zona do euro. O método utilizado para responder a pergunta-problema da dissertação foi dividir os países da zona do euro em dois grupos. O primeiro grupo é formado pelas economias menos afetadas pela crise e o segundo pelos países que apresentaram um quadro de maior deterioração em seus indicadores econômicos. Os principais resultados alcançados demonstram que o aprofundamento da crise econômica e financeira nos GIIPS decorreu da deterioração dos indicadores de competitividade e externos em detrimento dos critérios de convergência de Maastricht. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze the evolution of the economic indicators in the euro zone and its reflections on the economic and financial crisis of 2008. The question-issue that this dissertation aims to address is to understand why the economic and financial crisis affected the euro zone countries distinctively. The European governments created in the beginning of the 1990s, the Maastricht criteria to promote the convergence of the economic indicators in the euro zone. However, the emerging of the economic and financial crisis in some countries have demonstrated that the Maastricht criteria were insufficient to homogenize the economic indicators in the euro zone. The method used to address the question-issue was to split the countries in two groups. The first group is composed of the countries that have not been strongly hit by the crisis and the second group is composed of the economies that have been strongly hit by the crisis. Results show that the deepening of the crises in GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) happened not because of Maastricht criteria. Instead, the main roots of the crisis are the eterioration of competitiveness and external indicators.

Mestrado em Economia Internacional e Estudos Europeus
A crise da dívida pública europeia, que se seguiu à crise financeira internacional de 2008, ditou o rumo das políticas económicas dos seus países. Através do estudo a dois Estados-membro da União Europeia, Portugal e Polónia, simbolizando respectivamente, a zona euro e os países não pertencentes à UEM, analisam-se, no período entre 2008 e 2013, as respectivas evoluções económicas e as características macroeconómicas prevalecentes. Assim, pretende-se responder aos objectivos propostos, procedendo a: (i) contextualização histórica da crise económica e financeira actual, (ii) revisão da teoria das Zonas Monetárias Óptimas, (iii) análise de indicadores macroeconómicos. As evoluções das economias portuguesa e polaca (2008-2013) demonstram o modo como os dois países, que se encontram em diferentes estágios de maturação económica e de integração europeia, reagiram à crise internacional de 2008. A economia portuguesa, apresentando fortes desequilíbrios macroeconómicos, prosseguiu com um programa de assistência económica e financeira, apresentando a partir de 2013, uma recuperação económica gradual. Por sua vez, a Polónia foi, não só a única grande economia na Europa a evitar uma recessão durante a crise financeira, como apresentou a maior taxa de crescimento dentro da União Europeia - mais de 20%, em termos cumulativos entre 2008 e 2013.
The European sovereign debt crisis, which followed the global financial crisis of 2008, dictated the direction of the economic policies of their countries. Through the analysis of two EU Member States, Portugal and Poland, respectively symbolizing the eurozone countries and non-EMU, are analyzed in the period between 2008 and 2013, their economic developments and the prevailing macroeconomic characteristics of that period. Thus, it is intended to meet the proposed objectives, expressed: (i) historical context of the current economic and financial crisis, (ii) review of the theory of Optimal Monetary zones, (iii) analysis of macroeconomic indicators. The evolutions of the Portuguese and Polish (2008-2013) economies demonstrate how the two countries, which are at different stages of economic maturity and European integration, reacted to the international crisis of 2008. The Portuguese economy with strong macroeconomic imbalances continued with a program of economic and financial assistance, presenting from 2013, a gradual economic recovery. In turn, Poland was not only the only major economy in Europe to avoid a recession during the financial crisis, as had the highest growth rate in the European Union - more than 20% in cumulative terms between 2008 and 2013.

Mestrado em Economia Internacional e Estudos Europeus
O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar as alterações estruturais que se processaram na economia portuguesa após a crise das dívidas soberanas de 2010/2013, tendo por comparação a Alemanha e como pano de fundo a discussão em curso sobre a nova reforma da Zona Euro. Pretende-se, assim, perceber se existiu alguma aproximação entre uma economia periférica (Portugal) e a economia nuclear da Zona Euro (a Alemanha), suscitando reflexões sobre o que essa aproximação significa para a sustentabilidade da União Económica e Monetária, especialmente no que diz respeito ao processo de convergência real. O estudo será enquadrado na teoria das variedades do capitalismo e dos regimes de crescimento, focando-se na análise da evolução de um conjunto de variáveis relevantes no contexto das duas teorias, nos dois países, desde 1995. Será ainda realizada uma análise à especialização produtiva dos dois países com base no Índice de Krugman, sendo também analisada a convergência setorial.
This study aims at analyzing the structural changes that occurred in the Portuguese economy after the 2010/2013 sovereign debt crisis, compared with what occurred in Germany and having the current debate surrounding the new reform of the Eurozone as a backdrop. We thus intend to find out if a peripheric economy like Portugal and the Eurozone's nuclear economy (Germany) have become closer, also looking to understand what that means for the sustainability of the Economic and Monetary Union, especially in what regards the process of real convergence. The study will be framed in the varieties of capitalism theory and in the theory of growth regimes, focusing on the analysis of the evolution of a set of variables relevant to both theories, in both countries, since 1995. We will also perform an analysis on both countries' productive structure based on the Krugman Specialization Index, as well as a sectoral convergence analysis
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Cette thèse réalisée au sein du département finance d’HEC Paris est constituée de trois parties. La première s’intéresse à la résilience des chambres de compensation en temps de crise. C’est un travail réalisé avec François Derrien, Evren Örs et David Thesmar dans lequel nous montrons que le manque de régulation de ces acteurs conduit à une détérioration de la confiance qui leur est accordée quand les conditions macroéconomiques se détériorent. Ceci impacte alors négativement leur capacité à assurer une liquidité suffisante sur le marché interbancaire. Le deuxième chapitre porte sur l’impact de la concentration du secteur bancaire autour de quelques grands groupes sur l’allocation macroéconomique du crédit. J’y développe une approche innovante pour répondre à cette question et montre que cet impact est limité: les chocs idiosyncratiques des "big players" n’ont qu’un rôle limité dans la fluctuation du crédit aggrégé. La dernière partie est un travail réalisé avec Adrien Matray et Thomas Bourveau. Nous nous intéressons à la transmission de la culture du risque au sein du secteur bancaire et montrons que les filiales d’un groupe bancaire tendent à converger quant à leur évaluation du risque futur. En retour, cela peut amener à une sous-évaluation de ce dernier et impacter la stabilité financière
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first one deals with Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs) and their resiliency in crisis times. This is a joint work with François Derrien, Evren Ors and David Thesmar. Focusing on CCPs backed repo trades during the eurozone crisis, we show that the market factored in the default of CCPs. In turn, this affected their capacity to ensure liquidity in the interbank market. Our results have strong consequences for the way CCPs should be regulate. The second chapter aims at quantifying the impact of the rise of the concentration in the banking sector on aggregate credit fluctuations. Building on novel empirical approach, I show that big players’ idiosyncratic shocks have a limited impact on aggregate credit. The explanation lies in the fact that the strength of banking groups idiosyncratic shocks is limited compared to aggregate and subsidiaries level ones. The last chapter, a joint work with Thomas Bourveau and Adrien Matray, focuses on the transmission of corporate risk culture. We show that subsidiaries of the same banking group tend to assess future risks in similar ways. In turn, this gives insights on how banking crisis can spread be fueled by corporate risk culture

Mestrado em Economia Internacional e Estudos Europeus
Este TFM tem como objetivo analisar a versão original do Programa de Ajustamento Económico e Financeiro português e as suas sucessivas revisões ao longo do tempo. O enquadramento teórico pretende assim retomar a literatura relacionada com o multiplicador orçamental de modo a conseguir compreender a parte empírica deste documento, no qual se faz uma análise dos documentos relativos ao processo de consolidação das contas públicas. Inclui-se igualmente uma análise dos desequilíbrios estruturais e conjunturais da economia portuguesa, focalizando no comportamento do produto e do mercado de trabalho.
This document aims to analyse the original version of the Economic Adjustment Programme of Portugal and its subsequent revisions over time. The theoretical framework thus intends to resume the literature related to the fiscal multiplier in order to understand the empirical part of this paper, in which an analysis is made of the documents relating to the consolidation of the public accounts. It also includes an analysis of structural and cyclical economic imbalances of the Portuguese economy, focusing on the product behaviour and labour market.

This thesis analyses determinants for structural reforms in the euro area. First, it is theoretically scrutinized how the common monetary policy of the European Central Bank causes a reform bias between small and large countries. Second, it is examined how private market adjustment, structural reforms and their interaction affect the intra-euro area current account balances of euro area countries. Third, it is analysed how an asymmetric foreign asset and liability distribution across the euro area affects single countries need for structural reforms of labour markets. Fourth, the impact of fiscal stabilization policy on structural reform activity will be examined.

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CAPES
The main goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate how the decision making process of the European Union during the eurozone crisis has deepened its democratic deficit between 2008 and 2014. The historical and institutional evolution of the EU together w ith the gradual transfer of competences from the domestic sphere to the supranacional one have raised academic and popular suspicion (HIX e FØLLESDAL, 2006; AZMAN, 2001; JOLLY, 2013) about how democratic and legitimate were the decisions taken by the EU. In the context of the global financial turmoil initiated in 2008 with the Lehman Brothers ‟ s declaration of bankruptcy , it did not take long until the European Union started to feel the effects of this major financial crisis, which shed light into an even d eeper problem: the crisis of the eurodemocracy. In this sense, this dissertation aims to analyze how the EU‘s decision making to refrain the crisis has deepened its democratic d e ficit between 2008 and 2014. The hypothesis is that the EU, during the eurozon e crisis, concentrated its decision making process in the hands of indirectly elected political actors and of the wealthiest member states. In order confirm that, it will briefly present the institucional setup and the decision ma k ing process of the EU, as well as the academic debate regarding the existence of such demoratic d e ficit. The second section will cover the global financial crisis and how it affected Europe, leading to the emergence of the so called european sovereign debt crisis. The third sectio n will present the new architecture of the EU emerged to contain the crisis, especially the new fiscal transfers mechanisms, the new institutional framework and the European Central Bank‘s new role. The fourth and final section will aggregate the previousl y presented data and analyze them in the light of Føllesdal and Hix‘s (2006) systematization of the democratic deficit. Th is dissertation will delineate the causal pathway that led the EU to use technocratic resources to adopt crisis contention policies an d to concentrate its decision making processes in unelected Executive and suprana tional actors. It will also demonstrate how the EU lost its legitimacy and democratic accountability, both in relation to the (lack of) popular participation, the (poor) polit ical outcomes and also in relation to the very political process who lead to the adoption of all these measures.
O objetivo precípuo dessa dissertação é demonstrar de que forma a tomada de decisão da União E uropeia durante a crise da Zona do Euro aprofundou o seu déficit democrático entre os anos de 2008 e 2014. A evolução histórica e institucional da UE , concomitante à gradual transferência de competências da esfera interna para a supranacional, levantou questionamentos da academia (HIX e FØLLESDAL, 2006; AZMAN, 2001; JOLLY, 2013) e dos cidadãos a respeito do quão democráticas e legítimas seriam a s políticas discutidas e/ou adotadas pela UE. No contexto do revés financeiro mundial iniciado em 2008 com a quebra do Banco Lehman Brothers , nos EUA, a Europa não demorou a sentir os efeitos da crise que, além de afetar as grandes e conomias europeias, evidenciou que a maior crise talvez não fosse a do euro, mas sim a da eurodemocracia . Dessa forma, a presente proposta tem como objetivo analisar de que forma a tomada de decisão para conter a crise aprofundou o défic it democrático da UE entre os anos de 2008 e 2014. A hipótese é a de que, durante a crise, a UE concentrou a tomada de decisão nas mãos de atores políticos indiretamente eleitos e dos Estados membros com maior poderio financeiro. Em um primeiro momento , s e rá apresentada brevemente a estrutura institucional e o processo decisório da UE, bem como o debate acadêmico acerca da existência ou não de déficit democrático. O segundo capítulo versará sobre a crise financeira mundial e como ela verberou na Europa, ger ando a chamada crise do endividamento soberano europeu . O terceiro capítulo abordará a nova arquitetura emergida na UE para conter a crise, em especial os mecanismos para transferências fiscais, a nova arquit etura institucional e o novo papel do Banco Cent ral. Por fim, o quarto capítulo agregará os dados expostos nas seções anteriores e analisará a reação europeia à crise à luz da sistematizaçãoo do déficit democrático feita por Føllesdal e Hix (2006). Ser á demonstrado o caminho causal que levou a UE a usar recursos tecnocráticos para adotar medidas impopulares de contenção à crise e a concentrar sua tomada de decisão em atores Executivos e instituições supranacionais indiretamente eleitas. Em decorrência disso , houve perda de legitimidade e accountability d emocrático da UE, tanto em relação à participação popular, quanto aos resultados políticos e ao processo político que deu origem a essas políticas.

Die sich zunächst um Griechenland rankende Krise wurde zu einer europäischen, die den Euro bedroht. Allenthalben wird die Frage gestellt: Wer ist schuld? In deutschen Groß-Medien wird auf das Zögern der derzeitigen Bundesregierung verwiesen. Der Euro rutschte in die Gefahrenzone. Aber ist der Verweis auf falsche Politik die Antwort auf die Frage nach dem erneuten Aufbrechen der Finanzkrise?

Orientador: Giuliano Contento de Oliveira
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia
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Resumo: Esta dissertação tem o objetivo de analisar a crise da zona do euro (2007-2013) à luz do processo de integração europeu do pós-guerra e da teoria econômica ortodoxa que embasou e legitimou a forma de constituição da zona do euro. Em relação ao processo de integração, o trabalho enfatiza cinco fatores: 1) mudança das motivações; 2) consolidação da liderança alemã; 3) como as diversas etapas de integração impactaram na coordenação de políticas econômicas; 4) inserção do bloco no sistema monetário e financeiro internacional em cada período; e 5) constituição de um bloco com países heterogêneos. Argumenta-se que a evolução do processo de integração, resultando na constituição de uma união monetária, em 1999, ocorreu sob influência da teoria econômica ortodoxa, com o Novo Consenso Macroeconômico e a Hipótese dos Mercados Eficientes, além dos efeitos dessas teorias para as modificações da teoria das Áreas Monetárias Ótimas. Nesse sentido, sustenta-se que a institucionalidade da zona do euro, em um contexto de livre movimentação de capitais, resultou em problemas estruturais que permitiram: 1) a evolução dos desequilíbrios internos ao bloco, no período de expansão econômica (2000-2007), entre centro e periferia (PIIGS); 2) o aprofundamento e transformação da crise, a partir de 2010, com a crise dos títulos soberanos dos PIIGS; e 3) o prolongamento da crise, devido às recomendações realizadas pelas autoridades europeias. Defende-se, assim, que a crise da zona do euro é o resultado dessa dinâmica e que os países centrais possuem um papel essencial para sua determinação. Dessa forma, as causas da crise da zona do euro devem ser buscadas nos problemas estruturais do bloco, com a evolução de suas assimetrias internas e das dificuldades que a institucionalidade do euro impôs para a adoção de políticas econômicas autônomas, especialmente de caráter anticíclico. Para isso, será utilizado o referencial teórico keynesiano e pós-keynesiano, evidenciando a importância da incerteza, das expectativas e do comportamento dos bancos nesse processo
Abstract: This paper seeks to analyze the eurozone crisis (2007-2013) in the light of the European integration process and orthodox economic theory that contributed to legitimate the form of the constitution of the euro area. Regarding the integration process, the paper emphasizes five factors: 1) change in the motivations; 2) consolidation of the German leadership; 3) how the different integration steps impacted in the coordination of the economic policies; 4) insertion of the region in the international monetary and financial system in each period; and 5) establishment of a monetary union with heterogeneous countries. It is argued that the evolution of the integration process, resulting in the formation of a monetary union in 1999, occurred under the influence of orthodox economic theory, with the New Consensus Macroeconomic and the Efficient Market Hypothesis, in addition of the effects of these theories to the modifications of the theory of Optimal Currency Area. In this sense, the overall goal of the dissertation is to show that the institutions of the euro area, in a context of free movement of capital, resulted in structural problems that allowed: 1) development of internal imbalances, between center and periphery (PIIGS), in the economic expansion period (2000-2007); 2) deepening and transformation of the crisis, from 2010, with the crisis of sovereign bonds in the PIIGS; and 3) prolonging the crisis, due to recommendations made by the European authorities. It is argued, therefore, that the eurozone crisis is the result of this dynamic and those central countries has a key role in its determination. In this sense, the causes of the eurozone crisis must be sought in the structural problems of the monetary union, in the performance of its internal imbalances and the difficulties that the institutions of the euro imposed for the adoption of autonomous economic policies, especially countercyclical ones. For this, a theoretical framework of Keynesian and post-Keynesian nature will be used, highlighting the importance of uncertainty and bank behavior
Mestrado
Teoria Economica
Mestre em Ciências Econômicas

In the year of 1999 a new monetary experiment commenced – the birth of the euro. Over the years more countries have joined the new currency and it was expected to be a continuously growing community. The purpose of this paper is to measure the effect of European membership, the currency of euro and the financial crisis on trade between the countries located in Europe. For the task of this paper the gravity model is used to study the bilateral trade flows in the European Union from 1995-2011. It additionally investigates, besides the correlation between GDP and distance, the effect of shared border, shared language and coastal access. The results showed that the euro did indeed have a positive impact on trade in the introduction year to later significantly have a negative impact on trade. Moreover, a membership in the European Union results showed to promote intra-European Union trade at the cost of extra-European Union trade and have its largest impact in the beginning and end of the study years. The conclusion is that other factors than increased trade were the main reasons to join the European Union, such as enhancing the role of Europe in the world market and to turn into a unified market. Finally, the effect of the financial crisis was found to have a negative impact on trade, concluded that it exposed the failures and lack of coordination between and within countries. It was also shown that the physical distance, and not specifically distances in i.e. social culture and languages, boosted the trade between countries.

Mestrado em Economia e Políticas Públicas
Esta dissertação pretende analisar o papel do Banco Central Europeu (BCE) na União Europeia e na crise da zona euro. Especialmente, procura compreender se a arquitetura inicial sobre a qual o BCE foi construído era adequada para responder aos desafios que se vieram colocar durante a crise, procurando analisar as alterações motivadas pelo desenvolvimento da crise. O BCE é uma instituição fundamental para a união monetária. Estando no centro da questão, dadas as características financeira e bancária da crise, o BCE tem vindo a enfrentar muitos desafios. Muitos têm criticado o papel do BCE na crise da zona euro, realçando a sua limitação de poderes pelos Tratados e a sua lentidão na resolução dos problemas de liquidez dos estados membros. Outros consideram que o BCE tem sido a instituição determinante para a resolução da crise. Mas durante o período em que a crise se foi aprofundando, e em que a crise financeira inicial evoluiu para a crise da zona euro, o BCE enfrentou e continua a enfrentar muitos desafios e mudanças, assumindo um papel decisivo na crise. No Sistema Monetário Europeu, o BCE é agora uma instituição mais forte com mais instrumentos e novos poderes. A União Europeia enfrentou o seu maior desafio e conseguiu sobreviver unida pelo euro. Contudo, o BCE, que tinha a estabilidade de preços como o seu principal objetivo, enfrenta agora o perigo de deflação. Manter a estabilidade financeira é agora um objetivo fundamental e a regulação das instituições financeiras é fundamental para a estabilidade da zona euro. Uma união bancária eficaz, capaz de regular a integração financeira e de efetuar uma supervisão bancária centralizada adequada é fundamental para a continuidade da zona euro. Nesta presumível fase final da crise europeia, o BCE tornou-se num banco central muito mais interventivo devido às circunstâncias excepcionais que tem vindo a enfrentar. Esta dissertação começa por caracterizar o papel de um banco central numa união monetária e os seus constrangimentos. Seguidamente, expõe as políticas, os instrumentos e a arquitetura original do BCE. No final, é abordado concretamente o papel do BCE na crise da zona euro com a análise paramétrica dos efeitos das políticas do BCE nas taxas de juro das dívidas soberanas.
This dissertation is an attempt to explain the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the European Union and in the Eurozone crisis. In depth, it attempts to comprehend if the initial framework on which the ECB was built was designed to respond to the problems faced by the Eurozone, and to analyze the changes motivated by the course of the Eurozone crisis. The ECB is a key institution in the monetary union. Being at the heart of the problem, the ECB faces many challenges. Many have criticized the ECB’s role in the current crisis, pointing out its lack of power and slowness in solving the Eurozone’s problems, while others see the ECB as the main contributor to solving the ongoing crisis. But as the crisis deepened, and the initial financial crisis became the Eurozone crisis, the ECB has experienced many challenges and changes, playing a key role in the Eurozone crisis. The ECB is now a stronger European institution with more instruments and power. The European Union has faced its biggest challenge and has, for now, survived united by the euro. However, the ECB that saw price stability as its primary objective now faces the danger of deflation. Financial stability is now of major importance and the regulation of financial and banking institutions must be undertaken by the ECB in order to prevent future crisis. A strong Banking Union, capable to regulate financial integration and to supervise banking institutions is fundamental to the Eurozone. In this presumably final stage of the Eurozone crisis, the ECB has evolved into a much more active central bank, due to the exceptional circumstances. This work characterizes the role of a central bank in a monetary union and its constraints. After, it describes the ECB’s framework, instruments and policies. Lastly, this dissertation addresses the ECB’s role in the Eurozone crisis supported by a parametrical analysis of the effects of the ECB’s measures on sovereign debts.

Mestrado em Economia Internacional e Estudos Europeus
No início dos anos 40, Keynes formulou um esquema para uma união monetária (UM) internacional a adotar no pós-guerra. A prioridade máxima era desenvolver uma construção institucional capaz de ultrapassar aquilo que considerava ser uma incapacidade histórica de alcançar uma situação duradoura de equilíbrio económico mundial. Décadas mais tarde, surgiria outra construção institucional que alguns autores comparam à UM pensada por Keynes: a União Monetária e Económica da União Europeia (UEM). Apesar da sua elaborada arquitetura institucional, esta não conseguiu prevenir a acumulação de desequilíbrios macroeconómicos e a eclosão da chamada ?crise das dívidas soberanas?, cujas repercussões se estendem até aos dias que correm e podem constituir uma ameaça para a viabilidade do euro. Neste trabalho propomos analisar a estrutura da UM pensada por Keynes, bem como a estrutura e os problemas atuais da UEM, de modo a dar resposta às duas questões-chave seguintes: podem as ideias propostas por Keynes em Bretton Woods ajudar a uma redefinição do euro capaz de prevenir o seu colapso? E caso tal redefinição seja impossível, existe alguma alternativa ao projeto de moeda única que se aproxime da UM pensada por Keynes e que possa vir a ser aplicável no plano europeu?
In the early 1940s, Keynes started working on a plan for an international currency union (CU) to be adopted in the post-war world. His major priority was to develop an institutional construction that would allow overcoming what he considered to be a historical inability to achieve a sustainable situation of global economic equilibrium. A few decades later, another institutional construction would emerge: The Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU). Many authors have stressed the similarities between the EMU and Keynes's CU. Despite its complex institutional design, the EMU wasn't able to prevent the accumulation of severe macroeconomic disequilibria and the outbreak of the so called European sovereign debt crisis, whose effects are at present still a cause of concern. In this work, we analyse the structure of Keynes's CU, as well as the structure and current issues of the EMU, in order to provide an answer to the two following key questions: can the ideas underlying Keynes's proposal at the Bretton Woods Conference help redefine the euro in a way that would make it more resilient? If not, is there an alternative to the single currency project that comes into line with Keynes's CU and may be applicable at European level?
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Alors que le début de la crise de l'euro a relancé le débat sur l’interdépendance du risque decrédit et la relation dette bancaire-dette souveraine, l’importance du secteur réel est négligéedans l’élaboration des mesures de relance de la croissance économique dans la zone euro. Cettethèse se concentre sur ces questions au sein de la zone euro. D’abord, nous évaluons les effets«spillover» de la crise souveraine sur le coût de crédit des entreprises non financières enprésence des mesures d’austérité (Chapitre-I). Nos résultats indiquent un effet significatif de ladette publique sur le coût des prêts. En outre, en période de crise, les mesures d’austéritéimpactent significativement le coût de crédit tandis qu’avant la crise, on note une petite illustrationde la demande agrégée de Keynes. Ensuite, nous montrons que les fonctions traditionnelles desbanques, notamment celle de création de liquidité fragilisent le secteur souverain (Chapitre-II). Enparticulier, nous montrons que le risque de liquidité des banques agit comme un canal depropagation de l'incertitude vers les sociétés non financières et inversement. Enfin, nousexaminons la dynamique du risque de crédit sur la dette souveraine, les entreprises et lesbanques (Chapitre-III). Nos résultats montrent qu’il existe un risque de contagion sur les secteurset les marchés financiers de l’union monétaire. Par ailleurs, les résultats des simulations dechocs de primes de risque des pays «noyaux» de la zone euro confirment l’existence d’effetsindirects sur le reste de la zone. De plus, nous constatons un phénomène de fuite desinvestisseurs vers les valeurs refuges
The onset of euro crisis has rekindled the policy debate regarding credit risk interdependenceamong sovereign-bank nexus. In this vein, the importance of real sector is overlooked whileformulating corrective measures for the recovery of economic growth in EMU. This thesispresents a study that examined these issues in euro zone. First, we evaluate spillover effect ofeuro crisis on borrowing cost of non-financial firms in presence of austerity measures (Chapter-I).Our results suggest significant effect especially where creditor rights protection are weak. Inaddition during recent crisis, results indicate presence of credibility channel due to austeritymeasures whereas; there is slight indication of aggregate demand channel before crisis. Second,we find traditional function of bank’s liquidity creation as a significant conduit of sovereign distressto real sector (Chapter-II). Particularly, our main finding shows that bank liquidity risk acts as aconduit which propagates uncertainty towards non-financial firms and re-channels it back torespective government. Finally, we examine cross-market credit risk dynamics among sovereignbank-firm nexus to identify presence of contagion during euro crisis period (Chapter-III). Ourresults report grave evidence of credit risk contagion across sectors and member states incorresponding financial markets in EMU. Moreover like peripheral countries, simulation results toshock in core countries risk premia strongly provide evidence of contagion towards remainingeuro zone

Mestrado em Economia
Após a crise financeira que surgiu em 2007 são inúmeras as intervenções de política monetária, apoiadas por novas técnicas e instrumentos, que têm sido implementadas pelos bancos centrais. Estas intervenções têm surgido com o objetivo de restaurar a estabilidade monetária, nomeadamente a estabilidade dos sistemas financeiros e bancários. A presente dissertação de mestrado surge com o objetivo de contribuir para a compreensão da reação dos mercados financeiros, acionista e obrigacionista da zona euro, aos anúncios de política monetária do BCE. A investigação baseou-se na metodologia do estudo de eventos, tendo por base 91 anúncios relativos à política monetária, emitidos durante o período de 1 de janeiro de 2008 a 31 de dezembro de 2012. Os resultados evidenciam o conteúdo informativo dos anúncios de política monetária, visto que foram encontradas evidências empíricas de rendibilidade anormal em torno do dia dos anúncios. Concluiu-se adicionalmente, que os mercados reagem de forma distinta às boas e às más notícias, encontrando-se evidências de um maior impacto das más notícias sobre o preço das ações e obrigações da zona euro. Resultado este que pode ser explicado pela especificidade do período em análise, um período de recessão económica. Esta conclusão permite-nos afirmar que a análise é sensível à distinção por tipos de notícias, sendo necessária a sua correta classificação. Os resultados indiciam também reações distintas para os diferentes países da zona euro, não existindo uma tendência linear. Importa ainda referir que, regra geral, na zona euro, as notícias de política monetária do BCE, apresentam de acordo com o nosso estudo um maior impacto sobre o mercado obrigacionista do que sobre o mercado acionista
After the financial crisis that erupted in 2007, there are numerous interventions of monetary policy, supported by new techniques and instruments that have been implemented by the central banks. These interventions have emerged in order to restore monetary stability, including stability of financial and banking systems. This master's thesis appears with the aim of contributing to the understanding of the reaction of financial markets, shareholders and bondholders of the euro area, to monetary policy announcements by the ECB. The research was based on the event study methodology, based on 91 notices relating to monetary policy, issued during the period 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2012. The results provide some evidence of the information content of monetary policy announcements, as we found evidence of abnormal returns around the announcement day. It was concluded additionally that markets react differently to good and bad news, finding evidence of a greater impact of bad news on the price of shares and bonds of the euro zone. This result can be explained by the specificity of the period, a period of economic recession. This finding allows us to state that the analysis is sensitive to the distinction by types of news, being necessary to the correct classification. The results also indicate different reactions to the different countries of the euro zone, and there isn't a linear trend. It should also be noted that, generally, in the euro area, the news of ECB monetary policy, have according to our study a greater impact on the bond market than on the equity market.

The master thesis focuses on the European debt crisis. It first studies the development of monetary integration on the continent. It is followed by the detailed analyses of the debt crisis, how it started, what were the triggers, how it unfolded and at what point is it now. It identifies the fundamental issues of the crisis and the reasons of it. Lastly, it analyzes the implications of the crisis in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The master thesis contains 73 pages, 25 figures or tables and 1 annex.

NUNES NETO, Afonso de Deus. A vulnerabilidade das economias europeias ante a crise financeira internacional: um estudo para países selecionados. 2013. 33 f. Dissertação (mestrado profissional) - Programa de Pós Graduação em Economia, CAEN, Universidade Federal do ceará, Fortaleza-CE, 2013.
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Whereas the decisive performance of the public sector in the economies affected by the international financial crisis of 2008, this thesis investigates how the key European economies lead his tax policy to establish a measure of vulnerability of the Euro Area to adverse shocks such as the recent crisis. Investigates further, the functions of reaction estimated tax for eight of the main European economies and for the Euro area as a whole and the negligence of the monetary authorities of these countries in relation to the generation of primary surplus ahead to possible increases in public debt. This situation worsens in times of crisis and exposes the economies on negative impacts due to the limited ability of the public sector to conduct counter-cyclical policies able to reverse the recession, promoting the increase in the number of jobs and stimulating the growth of production.
Considerando a atuação decisiva do setor público nas economias atingidas pela crise financeira internacional de 2008, esta dissertação investiga a forma como as principais economias europeias conduzem sua política fiscal para estabelecer uma medida de vulnerabilidade da Zona do Euro aos choques adversos como o da referida crise recente. Investiga ainda, as funções de reação fiscal estimadas para oito das principais economias europeias e para Zona do Euro como um todo e a negligência das autoridades monetárias desses países em relação à geração de superávit primário frente a eventuais aumentos da dívida pública. Tal situação agrava-se nos períodos de crise e expõe as economias aos impactos negativos em virtude da limitada capacidade do setor público de realizar políticas anticíclicas capazes de reverter à recessão, promovendo o aumento no número de empregos e estimulando o crescimento da produção.

Esta tesis pretende dar respuesta a la crisis del euro y a las contradicciones que genera su gestión, partiendo de la premisa de que para asegurar la sostenibilidad de la moneda única es preciso consolidar la reforma federal que, según concluimos en la investigación, ya se ha emprendido. En esta investigación se valora hasta qué punto la eurocrisis impulsa la reforma política, analizando el contexto en que se ha desarrollado la Unión Económica y Monetaria (UEM). Asimismo, se establece una justificación normativa del federalismo, de forma que éste es un marco teórico sustantivo, que nos permite valorar el funcionamiento de las instituciones y las leyes de la Unión Europea en su conjunto, y de la UEM, en particular. El análisis diacrónico de la integración nos permite establecer que existe ya un proceso de federalización en marcha, aunque con algunas lagunas, que también constituyen el núcleo del análisis. Habiendo establecido un diagnóstico sobre las carencias de la UEM, que, lejos de convertirse en una zona monetaria óptima, incluso ha exacerbado las diferencias entre Estados miembros, el federalismo actúa como marco analítico, estableciendo las directrices a seguir en la gobernanza de la zona euro, y desembocando en conclusiones de carácter prospectivo sobre la reforma institucional y legal, para dotar de eficacia y legitimidad al gobierno de la UEM. De forma paralela, es preciso verificar si esta crisis ha sido interpretada adecuadamente por parte de los actores políticos y económicos, preguntándonos hasta qué punto la rigidez de los criterios de convergencia y la ortodoxia monetaria son la solución, y de qué manera los mercados financieros interpretan la unión (o la desunión) política en la zona euro. Una de las conclusiones relevantes es que los actores económicos demandan una respuesta de carácter supranacional, requiriendo la explicitación de un marco de unión política, que, a nuestro juicio, ha de ser federal, superando el intergubernamentalismo, ya que dicha lógica no ha cumplido sus objetivos. Ello ha llevado a afrontar la crisis a través de la reforma institucional de los últimos años. Dicha reforma ha sido bien recibida en los mercados, generando una tensión hacia la supranacionalidad, que iría en la línea adecuada, y en este sentido, destacamos los instrumentos de rescate, y, particularmente, la Unión Bancaria. Sin embargo, estas decisiones generan tensiones en la ciudadanía, debido a los graves problemas de déficit democrático en el ámbito decisorio de la UEM, altamente cuestionado, llegando incluso a concretarse acciones políticas que van más allá de lo establecido en los tratados. La tesis se refuerza con el análisis de las implicaciones que tiene el desarrollo de la gobernanza económica, con variables como el mercado interior, el desarrollo presupuestario y el federalismo fiscal. Habiendo demostrado la necesidad de la reforma de la gobernanza de la zona euro, se incide en que la incapacidad de articular un sistema dotado de legitimidad llevaría a una crisis política en la UEM, poniendo en riesgo la viabilidad de la moneda única. Una variable explicativa fundamental en la tesis es demostrar la naturaleza política de la crisis del euro.
The aim of the thesis is to put forward a proposal to stabilise the euro area in the context of the euro crisis and its contradictions, given the premise that in order to ensure the sustainability of the single currency, federal achievements so far must be consolidated. In this research it is assessed to what extent the euro crisis fosters political reform. It is also an aim of the research to analyse the context and the development of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), in order to set a normative theory of federalism, so that it becomes a suitable theoretical framework to assess in full the functioning of the EU laws and institutions as a whole, but, particularly in the EMU. The old frames seem to be worn out and too monolithic to allow for a proper interpretation of the euro area reform. The diachronic analysis of the European integration process allows us to conclude that a process of incremental federalism is well on the way, though there are some loopholes to be sorted out, specially the democratic deficit. These gaps, in fact, are one of the key elements to explain the conclusions of this research. Once it has been possible to set an explanatory variable, and having reached a clear conclusion on the failings of the euro area, the thesis demonstrates that rather than becoming an optimal currency area, the EMU may have, in fact, exacerbated the economic asymmetries between Member States. Federalism is a perfect analytical frame, for it sets out the guidelines to be followed in the realm of the European economic governance. We therefore get to prospective conclusions regarding the institutional reform to be addressed in order to achieve the aim of giving efficiency and legitimacy to the governing system in the euro area. At the same time, we conclude that more analytical coherence is needed to construe how the political and economic actors receive and understand the euro crisis. In this context, it is necessary to assess whether the monetary orthodoxy and the budgetary discipline can offer the right solution to the problem. In this sense, the financial markets react to their perception about the political union (or disunity) in the euro area. One of the most relevant conclusions is that the economic and financial actors ask for a political response. A supranationally integrated system is expected. This requires a frame of political union, i.e. an explicit federal frame. The intergovernmentalist logic lacks the capacity to achieve the goal of financial and political sustainability in the euro area, not to mention the dissociation of decision-making and public opinion. As reflected in certain improvements in market, over the last five years significant progress has been made towards stabilising the euro area. The underlying structural reform and the market response generate a pressure towards supranationalism. The foundations of the EMU are being changed, sometimes going beyond the treaties. This trend is validated when we look at the bailout mechanisms, the ECB intervention, and, particularly, the Banking Union. The thesis is enriched by the analysis of the economic governance, and the political relevance of the single market, the budgetary procedure and the fiscal federalism. The capacity to build up a legitimate system would be an essential step to ensure the viability of the euro. Thus, the euro crisis has a political nature, which takes us to conclude that the loopholes in the institutional building put the euro project at stake, in a context in which democratic legitimacy is of utmost relevance.

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This thesis examines Germanys role at the center of the European Monetary Union (EMU). It explores German socio-economic policies and experiences in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of why the EMU operates with German influence as well as in opposition to it. Historically, Germanys economic experience, from the Weimar Republic to 2013, has been uniquely shaped by its population and the embeddedness of its market place. From this experience, Germany has erected certain elements of government protection forged by a century of civil protection. These experiences also shape Germanys place in the Euro area as well as its policies toward the European economic crisis from 2007 through 2013. As of 2013, most Euro area members consider Germany as the economic backbone to the union, but rarely internalize Germanys economic past. Therefore, an application of the development of the German social market bears considerable importance upon the future of the Euro area as well as the policies enacted within the union, which Germany seeks to shape.

The recent financial crisis continues to draw attention in the literature given its deep impact. This dissertation investigates three main areas associated with the crisis. Firstly it focuses on bank default prediction models asking whether structural or accounting models can better predict default. In the second instance we investigate the credit rating agencies culpability in the financial crisis by attempting to trace the transmission from sovereign debt ratings to bank credit ratings, an area that is sparse in the literature. Finally we investigate the classification of bank ratings using four statistical techniques altering the independent variables with financial variables and principal components to assess which statistical method and technique is better able to classify ratings. In the first instance the analysis compares accounting and structural default prediction models using a logit analysis to predict default. The paper uses panel data on US banks from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation database between 1993-2015 and the analysis is developed on 536 defaulted bank years and 25,614 non-defaulted bank years. The dissertation goes on to evaluate the impact of sovereign credit ratings on the ratings assigned to banks. Using data on Euro zone countries by credit rating agencies Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch between 2003-2013, I find that multiple notch sovereign downgrades do influence bank downgrades particularly in the crisis period. The study suggests that while a bank's financial fundamentals do play an important role in rating assignments the rating change of the sovereign provides stimulus for the amount of notches the bank is downgraded by. In the final chapter the empirical results suggest that the multiple discriminant analysis statistical model is the better classifier of bank credit ratings for all three rating agencies.