Academic literature on the topic 'Ethnicity – Government policy – China'

What areas of the country does the Chinese government prioritize for drinking water provision infrastructure? Chinese policy prioritizes ethnic minorities and minority autonomous areas due to concerns about inequality and interethnic harmony. However, the implementation is not always equitable or favorable for ethnic minorities. Drawing on a new data set of more than 10,000 drinking water projects, I explore how ethnicity and autonomy influence public goods provision in rural Guizhou Province. I find implementation concerns trump official policy priorities when it comes to drinking water infrastructure. Such facilities are more likely to be built in Han-majority areas, because implementation and project completion are easier for officials. The findings have implications for ethnic politics and public goods provision in nondemocratic contexts. They also demonstrate why regions with larger minority populations are often slower to develop and slower to receive better access to basic public services.

This article discusses the dynamic changes in ethnic relations that have taken place in the Joseonjok (Chaoxianju) community comprising minority Koreans residing in and around Yanbian, an autonomous prefecture in northeastern China, and discusses the implications of those changes for the region. The main focus is on how the tension between China’s fluctuating ethnicity-related politics and this diaspora group’s continual struggle for a collective identity has been managed and internalised. Contrary to existing studies on the Joseonjok, the paper argues that the group has experienced de-ethnicisation, both as a top-down (government policy) and bottom-up (diaspora’s reaction) process, rather than ethnic revival. The puzzling question is how and why de-ethnicisation occurs despite the commonly accepted conditions of ethnonationalism and, more recently, with trans-nationalism, heavily influenced by their Korean motherlands. Based primarily on ethnographical research and using a multiculturalism approach, this paper argues that the recent policy failure in dealing with multiculturality in China, together with the changing geopolitics of the region, has accelerated the process of de-ethnicisation. Joseonjok society’s particular way of resisting political pressures and coping with ethnic tension in fact reflects a diaspora’s common struggle to achieve integration with mainstream society while ensuring recognition of its own distinctive characteristics.

This paper attempts to investigate the reasons behind the negative sentiments directed towards Chinese Indonesians from an International Relations (IR) perspective. By tracing back the treatment of the New Order government towards ethnic Chinese, it was found that such demonization initially happened due to two politically motivated reasons. Firstly, as part of de-Soekarnoization done by the New Order, the Chinese were outcast because Chinese identity does not conform to the “Indonesian identity”, which was in essence, the Javanese identity. Secondly, the condition reflected the change in Indonesian foreign policy which drifted apart from People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the latter was suspected to be involved in September 30 Movement. Then, I argue that due to those reasons, coupled by systematic maltreatment from the New Order Government, Chinese Indonesians were constructed as the “others”, that is, as non-Indonesians. Such construct has been deeply embedded such that reconciliation attempts done by the Reformation Era government were not sufficient enough to stop ethnic discrimination towards Chinese Indonesians from happening even until the present.

Nepal has been a home to diversified settlement in terms of ethnicity, religion, dialect and culture since its outset in civilization. It also lies between two great military and economic giants of Asia – India and China – that are hostile to each other. While these bring abundant opportunities for Nepal, it possesses several internal and external security threats. Nepal suffers from cyber-attack, environmental degradation, pandemic, ethnic, racial or religious conflicts, inequality and poverty, extremism, human trafficking, corruption, migration and trans-boundary crime. In addition, Nepal also faces several security threats, traditional and non–traditional, including terrorism and insurgency. These threats possess serious implications on peace and security of Nepal and the South Asian region. There is a need of serious study about the major internal and external security challenges that Nepal faces in recent decades. This study aims at examining some of the major security challenges, explore the factors behind it, and attempt to suggest few policy recommendations to the government of Nepal to deal with them. The study is conducted by reviewing the primary and secondary sources of data. The primary data includes documents of the government agencies, press release, joint statement and organizational reports. It also includes the interviews with security experts, bureaucrats, policy makers and academicians. Similarly, secondary data includes books, news reports, academic journals, seminars report and reports of research institutes and think tanks. The study highlights that Nepal should prepare itself to meet with the emerging internal and external security challenges what have emerged in recent times. With the rise of India and China, two adversarial powers in the region, Nepal possess extreme challenges in days to come. Similarly, hardly any countries of the world had prepared itself to deal with recent pandemic like COVID-19 that has shattered even the most powerful countries of the world. Taking lessons from these, it is time for Nepal to learn and prepare to mitigate the challenges.

This research aims to analyze how the impact of government policy on formal education of traditional fishermen children. In this research, the author took a study of two ethnicity groups namely Minangkabau and Nias ethnicity in Padang City. The research uses quantitative methods with a survey approach. The research data was taken through a questionnaire to the families of traditional Minangkabau and Nias ethnicity fishermen who were selected based on a Simple Random Sampling technique. All data were analyzed by descriptive analysis using SPSS 18.00 software. The results of the study found that the impact of government policy had affected the formal education of Minangkabau ethnicity fishermen children, even the children's education reached the level of college. But for Nias ethnicity, it does not affect their child's formal education. The difference between the results of government policies on these two ethnicity groups is actually motivated by the cultural factors of both ethnicities. For Minangkabau parents and children, education is something that is so important for the future, on the contrary for parents and children of Nias ethnicity, education is considered less important.

Due to the important strategic political and military standing, during the First Republic Government and the Second Republic Government of Vietnam, the ethnicity policy on Highland minority ethnic groups was promulgated by the republic government of Vietnam. In general, the two Republic Governments of Vietnam paid attention to cultural policy, but the First Republic Government’s ethnicity policy was different from the Second Republic Government’s one. The First Republic Government executed policy of assimilation whereas the Second Republic Government carried out policy respecting minority ethnics’ culture with the perspective “homogeneousness and particularity”. This policy exerted remarkable influences on the minority ethnic groups’ cultural life that left a lot of experiences in developing minority ethnic groups’ culture nowadays.

Although the Chinese corporate sector is deeply involved in the political process, there has been very little research on the topic so far. This article tries to identify the approaches by which Chinese firms influence government policy decision-making, in order to maintain a favorable business environment. Our analysis indicates that, due to the differences in culture and political and economic systems, there are correspondingly great differences in approaches to political participation in China and the west. For China, the participation of business in the policy process has led to corruption and other serious problems.

Although the Chinese corporate sector is deeply involved in the political process, there has been very little research on the topic so far. This article tries to identify the approaches by which Chinese firms influence government policy decision-making, in order to maintain a favorable business environment. Our analysis indicates that, due to the differences in culture and political and economic systems, there are correspondingly great differences in approaches to political participation in Chian and the west. For China, the participation of business in the policy process has led to corruption and other serious problems.

Chinese-sponsored Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones offer African countries opportunities for new sources of investment, employment, skills transfer and technology transfer that promote industrialisation. For more than 15 years, these economic zones have provided a window into the complexities of transforming African aspirations for industrialisation into realities. Through policy frameworks and incentives, Chinese firms have been encouraged to link with local economies. Despite varied outcomes, African support for industrial parks remains strong. To be sustainable, African Special Economic Zones need constructive partnerships and strong African governance, backed by high-quality data to inform both Chinese and African government decisions.

This paper attempts to understand and provide policy recommendations on the development and performance of the emerging elderly care system in the People’s Republic of China. The three-tiered elderly system in the country consists of home-based care as the core support, community-based care as necessary support, and residential care as supplementary support. The main policies and progress of the system are explained, including insights on how the government encourages private sector involvement. A key recommendation of this paper is the need for better integration of residential and home- and community-based care as part of the elderly care system.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

This SIPRI Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of China’s attitudes to and policies on Afghanistan since the August 2021 Taliban takeover. It examines the scope of China’s security, economic and humanitarian interests, and the depth of its engagement so far. It finds that China’s footprint has been minimal not only due to China’s non-interference policy but also to a range of broader challenges: the militant extremist groups that continue to operate on Afghan soil, the risks of investing in a country where the government remains unrecognized by any member of the international community and a fragile stability that is far from conducive to long-term planning. While there may be prospects and opportunities for China to contribute to Afghan stability and development, particularly from a broader regional perspective, current realities mean that China’s overall approach to Afghanistan will remain cautious, pragmatic and limited.

The internet and digital technologies are upending global trade. Industries and supply chains are being transformed, and the movement of data across borders is now central to the operation of the global economy. Provisions in trade agreements address many aspects of the digital economy – from cross-border data flows, to the protection of citizens’ personal data, and the regulation of the internet and new technologies like artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-making. The UK government has identified digital trade as a priority in its Global Britain strategy and one of the main sources of economic growth to recover from the pandemic. It wants the UK to play a leading role in setting the international standards and regulations that govern the global digital economy. The regulation of digital trade is a fast-evolving and contentious issue, and the US, European Union (EU), and China have adopted different approaches. Now that the UK has left the EU, it will need to navigate across multiple and often conflicting digital realms. The UK needs to decide which policy objectives it will prioritise, how to regulate the digital economy domestically, and how best to achieve its priorities when negotiating international trade agreements. There is an urgent need to develop a robust, evidence-based approach to the UK’s digital trade strategy that takes into account the perspectives of businesses, workers, and citizens, as well as the approaches of other countries in the global economy. This working paper aims to inform UK policy debates by assessing the state of play in digital trade globally. The authors present a detailed analysis of five policy areas that are central to discussions on digital trade for the UK: cross-border data flows and privacy; internet access and content regulation; intellectual property and innovation; e-commerce (including trade facilitation and consumer protection); and taxation (customs duties on e-commerce and digital services taxes). In each of these areas the authors compare and contrast the approaches taken by the US, EU and China, discuss the public policy implications, and examine the choices facing the UK.

In recent years, mission-oriented approaches have received growing interest in science, technology and innovation (STI) policies against the background of two developments. First, while so-called “horizontal” or “generic” approaches to research, technology and innovation policies have largely been successful in improving the general innovation performance or the rate of innovation, there are perceived limitations in terms of insufficiently addressing the direction of technological change and innovation. Second, “grand societal challenges” emerged on policy agendas, such as climate change, security, food and energy supply or ageing populations, which call for thematic orientation and the targeting of research and innovation efforts. In addition, the apparent success of some mission-oriented initiatives in countries like China, South Korea, and the United States in boosting technological development for purposes of strengthening competitiveness contributed to boosting the interest in targeted and directional government interventions in STI. Against the backdrop of this renewed interest in mission-oriented STI policy, the OECD has addressed the growing importance of this topic and launched a project looking into current experiences with Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy (MOIP). The present study on MOIP in Austria was commissioned by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Climate Action, Energy, Mobility, Environment, Innovation and Technologiy (BMK) and comprises the Austrian contributions to this OECD project. The study aims at contributing Austrian experiences to the international debate and to stimulate a national debate on MOIP.

We believe the climate crisis will be resolved in cities. Today, while cities occupy only 2% of the Earth's surface, 57% of the world's population lives in cities, and by 2050, it will jump to 68% (UN, 2018). Currently, cities consume over 75% of natural resources, accumulate 50% of the global waste and emit up to 80% of greenhouse gases (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2017). Cities generate 70% of the global gross domestic product and are significant drivers of economic growth (UN-Habitat III, 2016). At the same time, cities sit on the frontline of natural disasters such as floods, storms and droughts (De Sherbinin et al., 2007; Major et al., 2011; Rockström et al., 2021). One of the sustainability pathways to reduce the environmental consequences of the current extract-make-dispose model (or the "linear economy") is a circular economy (CE) model. A CE is defined as "an economic system that is based on business models which replace the 'end-of-life' concept with reducing, alternatively reusing, recycling and recovering materials in production/distribution and consumption processes" (Kirchherr et al., 2017, p. 224). By redesigning production processes and thereby extending the lifespan of goods and materials, researchers suggest that CE approaches reduce waste and increase employment and resource security while sustaining business competitiveness (Korhonen et al., 2018; Niskanen et al., 2020; Stahel, 2012; Winans et al., 2017). Organizations such as the Ellen MacArthur Foundation and Circle Economy help steer businesses toward CE strategies. The CE is also a political priority in countries and municipalities globally. For instance, the CE Action Plan, launched by the European Commission in 2015 and reconfirmed in 2020, is a central pillar of the European Green Deal (European Commission, 2015, 2020). Additionally, more governments are implementing national CE strategies in China (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2018), Colombia (Government of the Republic of Colombia, 2019), Finland (Sitra, 2016), Sweden (Government Offices of Sweden, 2020) and the US (Metabolic, 2018, 2019), to name a few. Meanwhile, more cities worldwide are adopting CE models to achieve more resource-efficient urban management systems, thereby advancing their environmental ambitions (Petit-Boix & Leipold, 2018; Turcu & Gillie, 2020; Vanhuyse, Haddaway, et al., 2021). Cities with CE ambitions include, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Paris, Toronto, Peterborough (England) and Umeå (Sweden) (OECD, 2020a). In Europe, over 60 cities signed the European Circular Cities Declaration (2020) to harmonize the transition towards a CE in the region. In this policy brief, we provide insights into common challenges local governments face in implementing their CE plans and suggest recommendations for overcoming these. It aims to answer the question: How can the CE agenda be governed in cities? It is based on the results of the Urban Circularity Assessment Framework (UCAF) project, building on findings from 25 interviews, focus group discussions and workshops held with different stakeholder groups in Umeå, as well as research on Stockholm's urban circularity potential, including findings from 11 expert interviews (Rezaie, 2021). Our findings were complemented by the Circular Economy Lab project (Rezaie et al., 2022) and experiences from working with municipal governments in Sweden, Belgium, France and the UK, on CE and environmental and social sustainability.