Journal articles on the topic 'Ethnic conflict – Kosovo (Serbia)'

AbstractThe paper aims to analyse the state of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs, with special focus on the period after unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008. Inter-ethnic conflict in Kosovo has exclusively been over its territory since both Serbs and Albanians have made claims about history and ethno-demography to justify their alleged exclusive right to this ethnically mixed region. Consequently, inter-ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have been rather problematic throughout the most of the 20thcentury. During this period Albanians in Kosovo have been subjected to discrimination, intimidation and even mass expulsion by Yugoslav/Serb authorities. In late 1990s, these relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have progressively worsened and finally escalated in an armed warfare in 1999.Immediately after the war, Serbs in Kosovo were occasionally exposed to acts of inter-ethnic and retaliatory violence. Inter-ethnic relations between the two major ethnicities continued to be tense and fragile after independence of Kosovo in 2008. Dramatic changes of ethnic composition structure, atrocities and huge number of refugees due to the war, have left a legacy of deep mistrust and animosities between Albanians and Serbs in the newly created state. Consequently, Serbs in Kosovo have from the beginning refused to recognize Kosovo’s independence and have rigorously refused any governance by Kosovo authorities. Serbian community, especially in the North, claims stronger territorial autonomy, even separatism and unification with Serbia. The paper claims that in Kosovo inter-ethnic and interstate relations are basically the components of the same equation. Therefore, paper concludes that only overall improvement of relations between Kosovo and Serbia could contribute to overall relaxation of inter-ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Unfortunately, the latest incidents between Kosovo and Serbia have increased the tensions between the two sides to alarming levels.

This paper argues that current Western-backed approaches to conflict resolution in Kosovo have failed to alter Serbia's policy toward the region and have contributed to the exacerbation of political tensions between Belgrade and Brussels, while deepening ethnic cleavages between Serb and Albanian communities. While there is no possibility of Kosovo returning to Serbia's control, there is an equal unlikelihood that Serbian-populated regions of Kosovo, especially the north, will submit to Pristina's authority. Most importantly, there is little hope that Kosovo can gain full international recognition and membership in international organizations without a compromise settlement with Serbia. While territorial partition has long been a suggested option, I conclude that the best possible solution for Kosovo, given the positions of all parties involved, is a process of significant decentralization beyond the internationally supported measures in the Ahtisaari Plan. A model of consociational power sharing is one in which Serbian and Albanian municipalities are granted high levels of autonomy similar to arrangements made for Bosnia. While this solution may not be ideal and further weakens central authority, I argue that consociationalism reduces the problems of ethnic conflict, encourages local self-government, and preserves the overall territorial integrity of Kosovo.

After almost 20 years since the end of the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia, we are witnesses to the fact that the main causes of the conflicts have not been overcome. Reconciliation between ethnic groups that had been in conflict by means of economic and political cooperation, must have a psychological foundation. This study investigates the relations between Conspiracy Mentality, basic lexical social attitudes, and the factors important for Croatian-Serbian and Kosovo Albanian-Serbian reconciliation, i.e., the Ethos of Conflict and the Readiness for Reconciliation. We hypothesize that Conspiracy Mentality will predict the propensity for reconciliation over and above basic social attitudes, and that will mediate the relations between basic social attitudes and factors contributing (or preventing) reconciliation. With the samples of Serbs from Central Serbia (n = 307) and Northern Kosovo (n = 271), Conspiracy Mentality, Ethos of Conflict, Readiness for Reconciliation and five basic lexical social attitudes (Traditional Religiosity, Unmitigated Self-Interest, Communal Rationalism, Subjective Spirituality, and Inequality-Aversion) were measured. Results showed that Conspiracy Mentality is negatively related to the Readiness for Reconciliation and positively to the Ethos of Conflict. Additionally, Conspiracy Mentality predicts Ethos of Conflict over and above the basic social attitudes. Finally, Conspiracy Mentality mediates the relationships between Traditional Religiosity, Inequality-Aversion and Subjective Spirituality on the one hand, and Ethos of Conflict on the other. The results suggest that Conspiracy Mentality should be taken into consideration when creating policies and programmes focused on reconciliation.

Аbstract. The paper presents the results of the research aimed at identifying changes in ethnic distance among the students of Serbia. The starting point of the study was the author’s belief that ethnic distance is a good indicator of inter-ethnic relations in multi-nation society and an indicator of conflict potential, and that ethnic distance is more stable provided social stability and open society. Ethnic distance was studied in the longitude project among Serbian students at the University in Kosovska Mitrovica five times in 2009-2016, twice - among the students in Belgrade (2010, 2014), and once among the Albanian students in Priština (December 2016 - January 2017) based on the modified Bogardus scale, a part of the questionnaire in the students’ native language and a number of surveys. The paper presents the results of the measurements of values constituting ethnic distance. The data reveal that the largest ethnic distance among Serbian students in Belgrade and in Kosovska Mitrovica was with the Albanians, while the smallest ethnic distance - with the Russians and Greeks. Among the Albanian students, the largest ethnic distance was with the Serbs, Romani and Russians, while the smallest -with the Americans and English. Certainly, the explanation should take into account the relations of these nations and official policies of their states including the self-proclamation of “Kosovo independence”, and also the positions of these nations in the period of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, wars in the former Yugoslav states and the NATO aggression on Serbia. At the same time, the ethnic distances are extremely large in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, however, with a tendency of decline among the Serbs. During the research in 2016 - the beginning of 2017, the values of ethnic distance of the Serbian students from Kosovska Mitrovica to the Albanians and of the Albanian students from Priština to the Serbs were practically the same, especially the leading values of ethnic distance. When explaining the large ethnic distance with the Romani, it is necessary to remember about their social marginalization.

The paper presents a short chronology of the political conflict in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, until the constitutional changes of 1989), which in the 1990s turned into an armed conflict in which the security forces of the Republic of Serbia from October 1998 to June 1999, carried out a planned action of ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians. In the action, several thousand Albanian civilians were executed extrajudicially and between 800,000 and 850,000 Albanians were forcefully expelled to Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This paper is based on the final judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by which the highest state officials and military and police generals in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia were convicted of joint criminal enterprise aimed at altering the ethnic structure in at least 13 Kosovo municipalities, especially in the period of the NATO alliance campaign from March 24 to June 12, 1999. The role of the Ministry of Interior in the joint criminal enterprise (JCE), as established by the ICTY judgments to the then Ministry of Interior leaders: Vlastimir Đordđević, head of the Public Security Department, Sreten Lukić, head of the Ministry of Interior Staff for Kosovo, (Vlajko Stojiljković, the Minister of Interior, was also accused, but he committed suicide in 2002) - is undoubted. Therefore, it calls for a public analysis and presentation of the role of this part of the repressive apparatus of the state of Serbia in the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians, as well as its role in the planned and systematic concealment of crimes. The concealment of the crime was conducted from March to June 1999 by the Ministry of Interior forces through secret operations of transfer of bodies of Kosovo Albanians from primary graves in Kosovo and their burial in mass graves at secret locations in Serbia. Three graves were discovered in 2001 and one in 2013, with the assumption that there are more because they are looking for another 1,086 Albanian victims and 562 victims of Serbs, Roma, Bosniaks, Egyptians, Ashkali and others.

This study analyzes how processes of contesting ethnically-distinct locales after conflict affects stability and violence after institutional settlements. Local institutions that develop during conflict present an obstacle to states reestablishing a monopoly on force and these locales become sites of continued contestation. Where states attempt to crowd local institutions and elites out of post-conflict policing, they have incentives to use violence against the state and police to upset the status quo. Where local institutions are integrated into state institutions, local elites have the incentive to maintain order and prevent violence to avoid crowding out or inviting police operations by interveners. In this study, I combine rationalist modeling to generate expectations for local elites' behavior with three illustrative case studies from the Western Balkans: Kosovo, Macedonia, and southern Serbia.

In this paper we look at the background of the Kosovo problem, its intensification since the 1980s in particular, the response of the international community leading finally to bombing. We also look at whether the international community was able to achieve its objective of preventing ethnic violence and cleansing. Yugoslavia had been a mosaic of ethnic groups with long histories of conflict but without segregated housing patterns. While the other ethnic groups feared Serbian domination in Yugoslavia where the Serbs were the largest ethnic group, the Serbs feared domination in the regions where they were in a minority. Ethnic conflict was aggravated by the economic crisis in the 80s which widened economic disparities, and also because of differences about the relative importance of the state and the market in economic management. The Serbs favoured a more controlled economy and the others a more liberal economy. The conflict in Kosovo flared up with the Serbs trying to limit Kosovar autonomy; the Kosovars retaliated by demanding greater autonomy initially and independence later. The resulting armed conflict led to considerable killing. The international community leaned heavily on the Serbs and their leader Milosevic to stop the repression, but failed. Ultimately the western countries had to resort to bombing. While this resulted in the capitulation by the Serbs, the problem was not solved as now the Kosovars started purging the Serbs. If the objective was to preserve a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, the Western powers seemed to have failed.

As a result of striving accession to the EU, all states in southeast Europe have as precondition to solve inter ethnic conflicts and to balance the system in a way that makes the relations between dominant group and minorities one of the mutual respect, based upon the principle of non discrimination. In Western Balkans some of the most controversial issues in the past decade have revolved around the educational rights. The fragile society of Kosovo faces many challenges, and the system of education is just one of them. The ongoing dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo and painful process of state building often overshadows important educational issues. The educational system of Kosovo is segregated, extremely divisive and highly politicized. It is widely accepted that education has strong impact on individual’s identity formation. In this context ethnicity, nationality and citizenship constitute just a few of the possible identities within the individual’s self-conception being the most relevant to the relationship between citizen and the state. In the analyses of the theoretical foundations of multiculturalism the role of education in a culturally diverse society is very important for identity formation based on the concept of the citizenship as identity. By constitution Kosovo is a multicultural society but the meanings and expressions of this are contested both within the dominant Albanian majority and Serbian minority. Conceiving comprehensive discussions if Albanians and Serbs of Kosovo in the future could potentially accept to identify themselves through the citizenship of the new state before their ethnic and national based identities (cross linked with Albania respectively Serbia), it is a broad topic and beyond the scope of this paper, but for the purpose of this study the concept of the citizenship as identity is considered only in a narrower context - that of the role of education in identity formation

Twenty years (1999 - 2019) after the end of the conflict in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, it can be stated that nowhere in Europe is there such ethnic segregation of the population as is the case with the AP of Kosovo and Metohija. Following the withdrawal of pumped security forces from the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohija and the entry of the United Nations peacekeeping force into the Serbian Autonomous Province, Kosovo Albanians carried out their persecution from Kosovo through terrorist attacks on Serbs and other non-Albanian populations (Montenegrins, Gorans, Roma, Ashkali) carried out their persecution from Kosovo and Metohija and fundamentally changed the ethnic structure of the Province. An insight into the majority of 223.081 exiles and displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija indicates an exodus against the Serbs. The number of displaced Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians is estimated at about 100.000. The mass persecution of the Serb and other non-Albanian populations has resulted in tremendous changes in the ethnic structure of the Province, which today, with 93% of the total population, is dominated by Albanians, while other ethnic communities have a participation of 7%.

Ethnic distance has a great importance for social dynamics, as the source of possible social conflicts, but also the potential source of social cohesion. Therefore, there is a need for constant research. Results of the research carried out among the students of the University in Pristine with temporary head office at Kosovska Mitrovica (May 2009) and the University in Belgrade (May 2010), with implementation of representative quota sample and questionnaire technique, with using Bogardus scale as the instrument modified for the needs of researching student population, have shown that the ethnic distance in average is considerably bigger among the questioned students in Kosovska Mitrovica, comparing to the students questioned in Belgrade. Considering the fact that Kosovska Mitrovica is a city divided on ethnic principle, at the edge of ethnic contact every day, this bigger ethnic distance in average is understandable then, the same that is understandable the smaller ethnic distance among the students in Belgrade, who have more cosmopolitan attitude regarding the case of nation, which can be explained by the size and the spirit of the city, but also with the fact that ethnic conflict is not taking place here - just in front their eyes. Regardless the difference in the result of ethnic distance, they both have the greatest distance towards Albanians, which can be explained by the fact that members of this nation are those who disintegrate the present state of Serbia, creating on its territory so called "independent Kosovo". Considering ethnic distance of students in Kosovska Mitrovica regarding those nations that live in the area of Autonomous Province Kosovo and Metohija, conclusion is imposed that Serbs and Montenegrins there are sufficient for themselves! This fact actually illustrates how much the society of Kosovo and Metohija is actually divided society, while the religion has an important influence in those divisions. Actually, it may be said that obtained results regarding the scale of ethnic distance indicate the results of confessional distance. In case of students from both Universities, it is evident that significantly bigger ethnic distance is to those ex-Yugoslav nations with which wars were waged (except Albanians, these are also Croatians, Muslims/Bosnians and little less Slovenians) and to those non-Yugoslav nations which had an unfriendly relationship with our country during the whole Yugoslav crisis, including the contemporary phase regarding Kosovo and Metohija (Americans, Germans, Englishmen, Dutchmen), while ethnic distance is considerably lower to those non-Yugoslav nations with friendly relationship, with which there is a high level of identification (Russians, Greeks). It is interesting that regardless not so friendly attitude of France to our country recently, ethnic distance to Frenchmen is lower than to the other mentioned western nations, which is probably the relict of the "traditional friendship". It is interesting to observe that in general the ethnic distance of students from both Universities is lower to those nations that have never lived in Yugoslavia, regarding those former Yugoslav nations, from which one may conclude that the joint living actually has deepened the ethnic distance. Great ethnic distance has been recorded with students of both Universities to Gypsies and Chinese. Regarding Gypsies, it can be explained by many negative stereotypes that exist regarding this nation, and it is really the time that Serbs part with them finally, since during the history they have mostly share the faith of Serbian nation, including the ethnic cleansing of Serbs and Gypsies from Kosovo and Metohija in 1999. Regarding the ethnic distance to Chinese, the nation that has friendly and protective relationship with Serbia, it is probably insufficient knowledge on cultures, manner of life, habits and similar that contributed to such a great ethnic distance, which surely should be the subject of further researches.

Ethnic issues have a paramount impact on the security of Southeastern Europe. The most recent proof of that has been NATO's involvement in the conflict between the Serbian government and the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Only NATO's involvement could reverse the highly destabilizing effect of the expulsion of over a million of the Kosovar Albanians by the Serb army and paramilitary forces beyond Kosovo's borders.

In this article, I make a case for a dispersed state control model as an alternative to the territorial and hierarchical principles of the Weberian state. Rather than allocating governance powers in terms of territory, dispersed state controls are based on a functional principle, in which governance is allocated to various subunits by issue area or function. This examination is informed by recent debates in international relations theory on contractual and imperial network models of control, as well as work on non-territorial autonomy in the fields of nationalism and ethnic conflict. I examine the practical application of a dispersed control model in the context of the governance structure proposed for Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. I conclude with an overview of the advantages of creative designs for states that move beyond territory and hierarchy, to deal with complex demographic and governing realities in regions such as the Balkans.

While traditional ethnic/religious rivals had been incorporated to form the modern multiethnic communist nation-state of Yugoslavia under the forceful presence of Marshall Broz Tito, the collapse of the communist bloc and ensuing revolutionary/democratization wave engulfing East-Central Europe created tremendous uncertainty and the perception of a power vacuum throughout the former communist bloc. Conflicts would erupt based on distinctions along traditional cultural/ethnic lines. The struggle for control and territory among Yugoslavia's political elite ultimately resulted in a series of secessionist conflicts in Croatia (1991–1992), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995) and most recently Kosovo (1999).

A lot of arguments support the view that the so-called Republic of Kosovo represents a model of a state that is based on violence, injustice, imposition and the absence of any idea of compromise. The national arrogance and aggressive ideas of Greater Albania, as well as the megalomaniac, violent and undemocratic character of the actions of the interim authorities in Prishtina, represent a real danger for further dissolution of the Balkans, which is why this area is perceived as an area of unfinished conflicts. From the point of view of accomplishing national interests, Kosovo and Metohija represents the greatest security challenge for the Republic of Serbia. The danger of further collapsing and diminishing the Serbian ethnic space, especially of changing the original Serbian character of the southern Serbian province and threatening the identity heritage of the Serbian nation represent particularly dangerous trends in the conflictual character of relations between Serbs and Albanians. The importance of Kosovo and Metohija and the severity and complexity of the problem that the southern Serbian province faces emphasize the necessity of defining a long-term strategy for its solution. With its content, it has to be a clear expression of conceptual readiness for solving the complex Kosovo-Metohija problem. At the basis of such a strategy, which is the starting hypothesis of this paper, is the necessity of redefining the relationship between the Serbian and Albanian nation and stopping the inertia of centuries-old mistrust and animosity between them. The stated position, which has a strategic character, is the cornerstone of the security stabilization and reintegration of Kosovo and Metohija. The main methodological procedures of the research process in this paper are comparative historical method and the method of document content analysisthe case study method, comparative analysis method and historical method.

In 2006, the UNESCO World Cultural and Natural Heritage Committee inscribed four Serbian medieval shrines from Kosovo and Metohija on the World Heritage List, in danger due to difficulties in their preservation and management, as well as the damage they suffered during ethnic conflicts, namely: the Church of Bogorodica Ljeviška in Prizren and the Peć Patriarchate, Dečani and Gračanica monasteries. In accordance with United Nations Resolution 1244, they are currently under the control of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and Metohija. However, in addition to these monuments, the cultural and demographic identity of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija is illustrated by over 1,500 established cultural assets (monasteries, churches, cemeteries, etc.) that testify to the centuries-old presence of the Serbian people and Orthodox faith in this area and their material and spiritual culture, as works of the overall European cultural heritage created in the intertwining of the influences of Eastern and Western Christianity and culture. The inclusion of these four cultural assets of great importance for Serbia in the international system of protection and monitoring has led to initiating the consideration of a comprehensive and long-term view of cultural heritage in Kosovo and Metohija at the international level as a key element in establishing better cultural and overall relations between Serbs and the Albanian population. The paper discusses the problems and possibilities of improving the protection and presentation of World Cultural and Natural Heritage in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the expansion of the list, through the integration of international, national and local protection, and understanding of this area as a specific cultural landscape. Presenting the value of the heritage as a comprehensive cultural landscape which combines natural tangible and intangible aspects, as well as the organization of cultural, educational and other activities, would encourage respect for the diversity, integrity and identity of others, which is an unavoidable condition in the process of European integration currently opposed by ethnic groups.

The situation of Albanians in Serbia, especially in three municipalities bordering with Kosovo-Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvegja, which are known as the Presevo Valley region remains the same even after the Kosovo war and after the war that took place in this region between Serbian government forces and ethnic Albanian fighters LAPMB. Since in this region the majority of the population is Albanian, then the object of study will be focused in the situation of the population there and the challenges facing it in everyday life and problems they encounter, starting from the most basic ones like: education, information, health, use of language, use of national symbols and many other problems. Presevo Valley throughout the stages of its history has always been marked with the various tensions depending on the circumstances, which have escalated to armed conflicts as happened during World War II when fighters of this area contributed greatly to the fight against fascism and Nazis, but even in the latter case when the war took place between government forces and ethnic Albanian Serbian organized around LAPMB. We will also see that the Albanian population in this region is indigenous to the early centuries of history being part of the Ancient Dardania and despite many invaders, Albanian population managed to preserve its national identity. Therefore the aim of this paper is to show the state of Albanians in the Presevo Valley focusing on historical, political, economic, demographic, cultural, educational, health, national rights - the symbols and language, information, migration and many problems other faced by the people of this region.

AbstractThe author claims that strategies of ethnic mobilization have deep roots in the politics of ex-Yugoslav nations, and that these roots are closely related to the response of the Western Balkans, especially Serbian political elites, to the challenges of democratization and modernization. The author develops this notion in two basic sections, outlining the ontology and history, and psychological background of the ethnic mobilization. Beyond the larger historical perspective, which will be reviewed, the very source of current ethno-mobilization processes lies in the deep opposition of Serbian political elites to the loose federal Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 that initiated various political strategies of ethno-mobilization's undermining and neglect. The author understands the term 'ethnic mobilization' to have three layers of meaning, the first being most rudimentary: an orderly and phased procedure aimed at ethnic crystallization or homogenization of Serb people. The second layer encompasses the underlying framing narrative of the reinterpretation of certain social events or conflicts within a particular interpretative frame or 'code.' The third meaning is, in a very important sense, demobilization, namely, the competing elites had to be demobilized, neutralized, or marginalized, and were usually described as ethnic 'traitors,' or 'those who sold to the interests of the enemy, or of the West.' Based on ideas of Latinka Perović and Dubravka Stojanović, the author traces the roots of the ethnopolitics back to the Russian anti-modernist movement of 'narodnichestvo.' This anti-Western and deeply anti-democratic strategy of political power lies at the heart of violent conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia/Kosovo, and even Macedonia. And, in the author's view, it remains the key obstacle to a post-war democratic transition for these countries. Strategies of ethnic mobilization remain, up to the present day, the driving force of power structures in these countries.

In two post-conflict societies (Serbia and Cyprus), the authors investigated how people cope with in-group historical transgression when heroes and villains relevant for their collective identity are made salient in it. The authors set the events in foundational periods for Serbian (Experiment 1) and Greek Cypriot (Experiment 2) ethnic identity—that is, historical representations of the Battle of Kosovo (1389) and the Liberation Struggle (1955–1959), respectively. In both experiments, a between-subjects design was used to manipulate group membership (in-group or out-group) and representation of the salient character (hero, villain, or neutral) in fictitious but historically plausible accounts of transgressions. In Experiment 1 ( N = 225), the participants showed more moral disengagement in the case of in-group historical transgressions than in the case of identical transgressions by an out-group, while the in-group hero was rejected less than all the other historical characters. Social identification based on in-group superiority moderated both observed effects in such a manner that they were more pronounced for participants perceiving their ethnic group as superior. In Experiment 2 ( N = 136), historical transgression involving the in-group hero provoked the most moral disengagement and the least rejection of the group deviant. In-group superiority and in-group importance as distinct modes of social identification moderated these effects in such a way that they were more pronounced for high-identifying individuals. Taken together, the experiments show that the in-group hero, as a highly valued ethnic symbol, is exempt from the black sheep effect and the sanctions of critically attached group members. The authors discuss the implications of in-group heroes for political and educational communication.

Research on intergroup relations in the Balkans typically reveals low trust and high prejudice, even in the young generation born after the conflicts in the 1990s. The intergroup contact is documented to be an efficient means for prejudice reduction, and it is expected to work through enhancing perceived out-group heterogeneity. A total of 1046 young people aged 13 to 18 from five Balkan countries (Serbia, Montenegro, FYRoM, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo) were interviewed for the research. We registered their attitudes towards five minority groups: a dominant ethnic minority in the country, Roma population, gays/lesbians, and very poor and physically disabled people. We also registered their contacts with the out-group members and perceived heterogeneity of all five groups.Data showed the similar pattern of social distance in all five Balkan countries: it was the highest towards gays and lesbians, followed by ethnic minorities and Roma population, whilst it was the lowest towards physically disabled and very poor people. However, the young people from Kosovo consistently reported somewhat higher distance towards all five groups. As expected, a path analysis revealed that more contacts with the out-groups led to a lower social distance both directly and indirectly, mediated by perceived out-group heterogeneity. We also registered a positive relation between ethnic identification and distance towards minority out-groups.This research highlights the importance of fostering different types of intergroup contacts. It also suggests that it would be more informative if we broadened its scope, and investigate both ethnic, and other social groups, especially different types of stigmatized minorities.

The article explores the social and spatial phenomena in the development of three cities on the territory of Kosovo (and Metohija) — Pristina, Prizren and (Kosovska) Mitrovica in the history of the region in the 20th and 21st centuries. All these cities used to contain Turkish, Albanian, Serbian (and more broadly Slavic-speaking), Jewish and Gypsy quarters with shared urban (as opposed to rural) identities. The paper argues is that the interweaving (sometimes even conflicting) of two vectors — “inner logic” and “the logic of the victor” — forms the image of the city, thereby largely determining the everyday life and behavioral models of its inhabitants. Moreover, the evolving urban space itself can be viewed as an actor segmenting various social, ethnic and confessional communities. Thus, the author poses the following questions: What are the historical prerequisites for the transformations of the sociocultural landscape of the cities of Kosovo at the turn of the XX–XXI centuries? What spatial changes in urban space have followed the new social realities and the armed conflict in Kosovo? How can urban space be used to form and broadcast ideological attitudes by political elites?

Serbia's ethnic Hungarian minority, concentrated in the northern province of Vojvodina, is little known compared to other ethnic minorities in the Balkans. Unlike Kosovo Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Croatian Serbs, the Vojvodina Hungarians were not involved in violent conflict during Yugoslavia's disintegration of the 1990s. The Hungarian minority is not without its grievances or its political demands, however. Over the past two decades, Vojvodina Hungarians have organized a campaign for greater cultural accommodation and political autonomy for their community. They argue that the province as a whole has lost most of its meaningful autonomous powers, that the Hungarian minority does not have adequate political representation and cultural institutions, and that the state does not fully protect the minority from growing threats of ethnic violence and discrimination. The minority's campaign directs most of its appeals to the Belgrade authorities, but increasingly it looks beyond Serbia's borders for support as well. Especially when the Serbian government appears hostile or indifferent to their appeals, the Vojvodina Hungarians look to make alliances with foreign actors, including the Hungarian government, the US government, EU institutions, and assorted other media outlets and NGOs. The minority leaders expect that by sending these foreign actors accounts of the human rights abuses that Vojvodina Hungarians suffer, they will ally themselves with the campaign and pressure the Serbian authorities to compromise with its demands.

Recognition of regional features, outlining of the contours of regions, tendency to regionalize ethnic, economic, cultural and state-administrative space, and strengthening the ideology of regionalism in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is Serbia and Montenegro, appear as a practical and political but also as a theoretical problem which includes and combines several scientific disciplines. The phenomenon of regionalism is not contradictory although it is primarily expressed through the numerous conflicts of interests rivalry and antagonisms of political subjects. The problematic side of the phenomenon of regionalism includes the result of an extremely negative and existentially tragic experience of the several years-long disintegration of the complex Yugoslav state. During the partition and disintegration of the second Yugoslavia, there also happened the disintegration of the Serbian ethnic area Growth, support and instigation of regional tendencies occurred in the historical circumstances of secession and did not stop in the post-secession period. Particularization and segmentation of political area, as well as the disintegration of the former state, did not occur in accordance with the norms of internal and international law. Legality was late and was achieved within the transformation of power reflected in the changed territorial policy of the dominant alliance of great powers. The entire past decade was characterized by an extraordinary metamorphosis of political space. Secession trend had the territorial features which included the change of borders and had been long in the focus of the global geopolitical attention. Territories were divided and made smaller. Intensive territorial dynamics within the external silhouette of the de-stated SFR of Yugoslavia resulted in the creation of several state and quasi-state political formations. Former republics became semi-sovereign states. Dispersed and displaced Serbian ethnos was configured in the three territories: in the Republic of Serbia - from which Kosovo and Metohia were amputated and placed under the UN protectorate - in the entire Republic of Montenegro and in the Republic Srpska, located in one part of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demopolitical result of the geopolitical destruction of the Serbian ethnos was a great movement of the Serbian population from the west to the east, and its concentration in the territory of the Republic of Serbia this implied that the Serbs were expelled from their millennia-long abodes in Croatia, parts of Bosnia and from Kosmet. The geo-economic result of the same process was the devastation of the national economic strength west of the Drina and in the southern province. Economic regression occurred also in the national parent-land state. Balkan re-arrangement of the spheres of interest in the post-bipolar period was in 1995. fixed by the interest arrangement of the great powers known under the name Dayton Peace Agreement. Redistribution of the territories from the destroyed state occurred in the post-communist period with the expansion of west-civilization structures to the European east Westernization of the eastern part of Europe, or entire Europe as the other pole of the global West, could be characterized as a dual mega-regionality. Namely, the west is composed of Europe and America; on the other side, there is the global East or its hybrid variation Eurasia. With the disappearance of their common state and its framework, south Slavs found themselves in the seemingly independent, and actually client states. Western delimitation of the south Slavic area moved from the Yugoslav borders towards a wider Balkan demarcation. One could say that the revitalized notion of the Balkans became a new, in many aspects obligatory framework for regional thinking. The Balkan macroregion is further determined by the intentions to expand the European Union. One of the Euro-centric concepts, which is being experimentally employed precisely in the Balkans, is the establishment of the so-called Europe of regions in the peripheral areas. On the other hand, even though the process of the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation appears to be irreversible, the superordinate Euro-American factor does not give up the possibility of the mezzo-regional initiatives, cooperations, associations and integrations. This "middle" level of dealing with the specificities of the Yugoslav region is related to the states and nations from the former Yugoslavia, or the so-called West Balkans. Naturally, it is not the tendency to revive the silhouette of the previous state, but certainly there is a noticeable intention to achieve a regional linking of the related, now semi-sovereign territories which sometimes belonged to the same state framework. The fourth level deals with microregionalism, that is the relation between the different areas in the newly-created states. It is interesting that the regionalist discourse is mostly cherished exactly in the ethno-heterogeneous Serbian area, although other Yugoslav states also have or had regional tradition and mixed population, like, for example, Slovenia and Croatia Nevertheless, these former Yugo-republics are structured as mono-national states, so the regional policy and ideology of regionalism are still not in the first plane. Regionalism within the newly-formed states could be supplemented with the micron level implying specific sub-regionalism of the highest degree, within the larger regions in the same state. This could be illustrated with Backa, Banat and Srem inside Vojvodina, understood as the northern Serbian region, or Kosovo and Metohia in the south of Serbia, in the province with the same name. In the part of Serbia outside the provinces, similar things could be said for Belgrade with its surroundings, Macva, Podrinje, Sumadija, Raska District etc. Thus, when it comes to the present FR of Yugoslavia, all five levels of regional dynamics have a principled, but insufficiently studied significance. Mega-regional level is related to the mark denoting the global belonging to the West. Macroregional level deals with the European loyalty, that is inclusion of the FR of Yugoslavia into the continental European trends. This trans-continental and continental direction of inclusion implies a historical teleology of the relative eastern belonging to the absolute West, that is Euro-America, and the entrance into the full structure of the European Union. All the mentioned problems of recognition and characterization of the regional phenomenology in the political topography of the world are motivated by the tendency to achieve as clear as possible spatial-temporal national and state orientation The direction is related to the so-called safety dilemma of the nation and the country faced with the change of size and essence of one's own state, with the different geopolitical position and redefined foreign-policy priorities. It is also the case of the changed alliance policy, and the innovated strategy of integration into the old and new global and regional political structures. On the basis of the indicated components of geopolitical context, one could say that the phenomenon of regions and their cognate correlates {regionally regionalization and regionalism) should not be understood exclusively through the legal categories of international law and the so-called constitutional solutions, that is administrative division of the state territory. Actually in the analysis of regions and regionalism in Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia it is necessary first to discuss the pre-normative or meta-le-gal factors in the creation of the regional issue within the national and state issue, which have the form of the unsolved political problem. Meta-legality is located within the domain of the international relations and geopolitic. Meta-legal or pre-normative factors of the formation or recognition of regions and regionalisms deal with the possibility of the political constitution of the Serbian, that is Serbian / Montenegrin (still Yugoslav) society. Since the unique state area was destroyed in the four-year secession wars and there occurred significant demopolitical changes, war migrations, forceful displacements and expulsion of the population - the ethnic character of many areas was also drastically changed. At the same time, the post-secession existence of the FR of Yugoslavia could be also viewed through the optics of the state residuum. The remaining Serbia or Serbia (temporarily) without Kosovo is certainly not an equivalent for the Serbian ethnic space, nor for the entire Serbian lands. It is not even the FR of Yugoslavia, as a dual con federation of the Serbian / Montenegrin nation. Geopolitical reduction of the SFR of Yugoslavia to a residual creation of the FR of Yugoslavia was not deduced from the legality sui generis, but resulted from a conflict, the defeat of integralism and the victory of separatism, as well as from a new triumphal configuration of power. The impulse implying the statism of the collective rights from the former complex federal necessarily-multinational level was transferred to a lower mononational level. Therefore, the regionalist ideology in the post-secession reality of the residual state almost inevitably, as a tendency, nears the separatory particularism. Even the lost national state and the state entirety are openly denied within the requests for the territorization of the collective rights of various minorities. Naturally these requests do not carry the primary features of the development of democracy. On the contrary, in the majority of cases this implies the rise of parish and tribal consciousness prone to narrow-minded separation. Thus the post-secession requests for the regionalization are often just a slight rhetorical mask for real separatism. For example, they are expressed through the pseudo-national separation of Vojvodina from Serbia, as well as Montenegro from Serbia, or through the establishment of state-like entities in the territorial tissue of Serbia Alleged arguments are found in the unfinished disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia on the one hand, and in the prevention of the creation of the so-called Greater Serbia, even within the diminished Serbia That way, even in the post-secession, reduced Serbia one could easily recognize the tendencies of federalization and confederalization, even the amputation of its remaining state space. Additional arguments for the crawling secession and prolonged territorial destruction are found in the ideology of globalization and world trends of relativizing territorial integrity and state sovereignty. On the other hand, the idea about the principled insignificance of borders in Europe without borders, as well as Europe of regions, is emphasized. Thus, it is obvious that the new state and regional delimitations and demarcations are in contradiction with the vision of the trans-statal and trans-national integrity of the European continent. In Serbia itself, me problem of the restructuring of regions is determined by the inherited and unchanged triple division of its territory into the central part and two autonomous provinces in the north and south. Thus every idea for regionalization (expert, party, leader's, NGO and the like) faces the inherited, too narrow constitutional framework and easily slides to the federalization or confederalization of the Republic, and in extreme cases to the independence and sovereignty of ethnic, religious, linguistic and other minorities. Roughly put, the tendencies for territorial separation from the Republic of Serbia still exist in several neuralgic and unstable areas or regions. In Vojvodina, the presented tendencies have the character of a meaningless internal - Serbian autonomy, autonomism, latent separatism. Authentic Serbian autonomy lost its original character long ago and deteriorated into an internal national re-statism. On the other hand, in the furthest south of Serbia, in Kosmet, the UN protectorate is established, but the region is actually occupied and thus the status of the Province is "frozen". In the three municipalities in the south of Serbia, with the relative Albanian majority, Albanian separatism smolders within the platform of the so-called east Kosovo. In the Raska region (Sandzak) there are also strong tendencies for separateness on the religious-ecclesiastical, so-called Bosniac platform, with religious solidarity, and ethnic and territorial unity of all Bosniacs. In the meta-legal or pre-normative situation - which most often denotes political and geopolitical context implying interests, power and force - the inclinations for territorial design are faced with the conflicting ideology of regionalism. Therefore, the constitutional-legal solutions of the former, present and future regions, generated within the self-created legality which does not respect meta-legal, political and geopolitical impulses regardless of how aestheticized and "humanized" they may be - at the end face the practical impossibility of realization.

Starting from the indisputable fact that security is the primary interest and a key prerequisite for the development of contemporary societies, understanding and assessing current and future trends in the near and distant environment and their impacts on the security of the Republic of Serbia are particularly important in defining a framework of its conceptual and strategic preparedness to protect vital national interests. There are many factors that are influencing and will continue to influence in a long-term the security of the Republic of Serbia and its environment. The stronger contours of multipolar international order and the emergence of new global participants in world politics, the crisis of the idea of global society and return of realpolitik patterns in international politics, proximity of energy - rich but unstable Arab - Persian and the Caspian basin, conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, serious identity crisis and threat to internal cohesion of the European Union, as well as the migrant crisis, certainly represent major factors that will affect the political and security processes in the near and distant environment of the Republic of Serbia. Projection of security trends and challenges that accompany the process of socialization of the Balkans, as an area which is still, in terms of security, the most sensitive part of the European continent, will have a strong reflection on the definition of long - term commitments of the Republic of Serbia. Problems in Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as potentially the most explosive issues of the Balkan security, as well as the complexity of socio?economic and political context of the societies in the Balkans, especially their unabated ethnic and religious standoff, complicate the process of converting the Balkans from the conflicting area to the area of lasting peace. Also, monitoring of trends in perception and practice of security, especially regarding the waging of contemporary armed conflicts and the revolution in military affairs, as well as their long?term projection are of great importance in defining the strategic framework of security of the Republic of Serbia, primarily the instruments to protect its security.

Throughout the 550 year Ottoman rule over the Balkan lands, where even today internal dynamics threaten peace and justice, how and through what means the Ottoman Empire achieved consistency, security and peace is a question to which a number of political scientists, sociologists, communication scientists and history researchers have sought an answer. The most interesting point of the question is that the peoples of the Balkans, a living museum comprising a number of different ethnic groups and religious beliefs, have reached the point where the culture of coexistence has been internalised and dynamics have moved from the conflict of identities to cultural integration. The Balkans are a bridge to the East from Europe and indeed to the West from Turkey, incorporating a patchwork political and cultural geography, the geopolitical location and a richness of culture and civilization, being one of the areas attracting the attention of researchers from different disciplines and capturing the imagination of the peoples of the world throughout history. Balkan studies are almost as difficult as climbing the peaks in the areas and meaningful answers cannot be reached by defining the area on a single parameter such as language, culture or traditions, while the phenomenon of the other can also be observed within the culture of coexistence in this intricate and significant location. Different ethnic groups with different cultures, such as the Southern Slavs (Bosniaks, Montenegrans, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) as well as Turks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Balkan Jews, Balkan Romany and Wallachians (Romanians and Greeks). Although these peoples may have different religious beliefs, in the ethnically rich Balkan region, religion, language, political and cultural differences are vital in the formation of a mosaic, making the discourse of coexistence possible and creating common values and loyalties, breaking down differences. The Serbian and Montenegrin peoples, belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church, the Croat and Slovene peoples belonging to the Catholic Church and the Muslin Bosniaks have shared the same lands and livee in coexistence throughout the historical process, despite having different beliefs. However, in some periods the other and the perception of the other have replaced common values, leading to conflicts of interest, unrest and religion based wars. After the breakup of the Yugoslavian Federal Socialist Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, defined by the European Union as the Western Balkans, have established themselves as nation states of the stage of history. The scope of our study is these Western Balkan Countries, and we will use the terminology Western Balkans throughout.

In this paper the author presents a part of the results of field research conducted among Serbs in Northern Kosovska Mitrovica between 2011 and 2014. The motive of the research was to offer a contribution to the understanding of the position of the Serbs in this city in the conditions of the altered socio-political context after the war on Kosovo and Metohija in 1999. A part of the research was paid to the problem of the image of Albanians in the perception of Serbs in the context of mutual conflict and the division of Kosovska Mitrovica into two parts - northern, majorly Serbian, and southern - majorly Albanian. This topic has imposed itself practically from the very beginning of the research, due to the fact that the Serbs in Kosovska Mitrovica generally defined their everyday life after the war in 1999 through the picture of division towards Albanians. Theoretically, the research was relied on the concept of ethnic identity, or ethnicity. Starting from Roland Barthes' interpretation of this phenomenon, according to which it is reflective, what means defined by boundaries as a social product arising from the need of groups to differentiate between each other, the aim of the research was to provide ethnographic material useful for understanding the identity position of Serbs in Northern Kosovska Mitrovica in the conditions of conflict with Albanian ethnic group. Methodologically viewed, the research was conducted by using an anthropological approach, which meant that the studied problem was analyzed at the interpersonal level and through the experiences of individuals. Attention was focused on the discourse, which means that the research topic was observed from the point of view of the testimonies of the respondents included in the research. The testimonies of the respondents were obtained by using in-depth, ie qualitative research methods, in the first place formal and informal interviews. The research showed that the identity discourse of the Serbs in Northern Kosovska Mitrovica towards Albanians was marked by distance, imbued with feelings of threat and distrust. Members of the Albanian ethnic group were observed through the generalizing prism of opposing others, so that they were attributed characteristics with most often diametrically different sign compared to the characteristics that the respondents attributed to themselves, to their own, Serbian ethnic group. On the one hand, the respondents attributed negative characteristics to Albanians, which they considered as not appropriate for Serbs. These characteristics were observed at a double level: 1) regardless of contacts with Serbs ("uncultured", "primitive", "uncivilized"); and 2) in the context of mutual contacts (hypocritical, pretentious, cunning, calculated, etc), ie from the aspect of the attitude towards Serbs which was generally described as hostile. Negative characteristics attributed to Albanians respondents perceived as features opposite to the characteristics of Serbs, which means that by emphasizing them, according to the principal of mutual contrast, they implicitly pointed to the positive values of their own, Serbian identity. On the other hand, the respondents attributed certain positive characteristics to Albanians, namely those that they considered to be in favor of members of Albanian ethnic group in relation to Serbs, which the Serbs lacked. These characteristics were also treated in contrast to Serbian characteristics, and they meant patience, tact, wisdom, diligence, meekness, keeping a given word. The results presented in the paper upgrades the results of previous research that included the analyses of the image of Albanians in the perceptions of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija in the conditions of the altered socio-political context in this area after the war in 1999. Presented ethnographic material, obtained in period between 2011 and 2014, showed that Serbs in Northern Kosovska Mitrovica perceived Albanians primarily through the prism of simplified ideas, which viewed from identity aspect implied the perception of members of the Albanian ethnic group as violent, and members of their own, Serbian ethnic group as victims. Generalization as a form of opinion about Albanians in the statements of respondents was colored with the intertwining of negative and positive attitudes about the characteristics of members of the Albanian ethnic group, with the fact that these attitudes were expressed in such a way as to compare the characteristics of their own group. Yet, the research obtained several views which softened the contrast between Serbs and Albanians, by pointing out the elements of a social character common to each other. The image of Albanians, in the end, gained some complexity thanks to the attitudes of those respondents who spoke about members of this ethnic group through the perception of direct connections and personal experiences. This brought to light the attitude towards Albanian that in some measure deviated from the prevailing generalizations, which, from an analytical point of view, suggested that the image of members of this ethnic group in the perception of Serbs in Northern Kosovska Mitrovica was not as simplified as in the context of mutual conflict it might seem so at first glance.

Since it declared its independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia has faced several problems of key importance. Apart from the economic underdevelopment, this country has been characterised by bad ethnic relations between the two most numerous communities in the country - the Macedonian and Albanian ones. The Albanian community, which makes approximately one fourth of the total population in Macedonia, has tended to define itself as a "constitutive nation" within the newly formed and independent Macedonia. The outstanding ethnic tensions present in 1990s turned into open armed conflicts in the February-August 2001 period. More than 200 people were killed, while 100,000 people were displaced from their homes in the conflicts between the Albanian militia and regular Macedonian police and armed forces. After the USA and EU had made pressures on the conflicting parties, they adopted the Framework Agreement on 13 August 2001 in Ohrid. It proposed the amendments to the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. The amendments have brought out changes in the constitutional and political system of Macedonia - "double majority" in the Parliament, increased number of members of ethnic communities in the police and administration, Albanian language as an official, strengthening of the local self-rule, etc. Apart from the Macedonian people as a holder of sovereignty, the preamble of the Constitution of Macedonia includes the Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Serbs, Romans and members of other peoples who live in Macedonia. In September 2002, parliamentary elections took place in Macedonia. The coalition For Macedonia Together headed by the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia won half of the seats in the Macedonian parliament. Then were defeated the nationalistic parties VMRO-DPMNE and Democratic Party of Albanians that had been in power during the ethnic conflicts. The Democratic Union for Integration (established in 2002) won almost 70 per cent of the Albanian votes while the Party for Democratic Prosperity and People's Democratic Party were defeated at the elections. After the September elections, the new government was forded and it embraced the members of the coalition For Macedonia Together and Democratic Union for Integration - with five Albanian ministers. The Ohrid Agreement is a step forward in settling the ethnic relations in Macedonia. Apart from the fact that it was adopted under the pressure of the international community, it is a basis for constitutional and political reforms, improving the position of the Albanians as the most numerous non-Macedonian community. However, it should be said that even today there are two parallel "societies" - Macedonian and Albanian ones, with no common touch between them, living separately from each other. In spite of all obstacles, it is necessary to insist on building of confidence and reconciliation between the Albanians and Macedonians. This can be achieved by repatriation of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, by implementation of the law that includes the provisions on the positive discrimination of the Albanian community and by strengthening of security and stability in the region. As the author assesses, the bad economic situation in Macedonia could set new priorities to the government and it would include improvement of living conditions for its citizens. On the other hand, the greatest danger to the peaceful development of Macedonia is the Albanian National Army (ANA) whose substantial aim is to achieve unification of the "Albanian" territories in Western Macedonia with Kosovo and "Albanian parts" of Montenegro and southern Serbia.

After the restoration of Serbia in 1830, the areas of medieval Serbia left out of her borders were dubbed Old Serbia - Kosovo, Metohija, Rascia (the former sanjak of Novi Pazar and the neighbouring areas). Old Serbia (from 1877 onwards the vilayet of Kosovo) was dominated by local Albanian pashas, whereas the Christian Orthodox Serbs and their villages were attacked and pillaged by Muslim Albanian brigands. The religious antagonism between Muslims and Christians expanded into national conflict after the 1878 Albanian League had claimed the entire ?Old Serbia for Greater Albania?. The position of Christian Orthodox Serbs, who accounted for a half of the population at the end of the nineteenth century, was dramatically aggravated due to Muslim Albanians' tribal anarchy, Austria-Hungary's pro-Albanian agitation and, after 1908, frequent Albanian rebellions. All efforts of Serbia to reach a peaceful agreement with Muslim Albanian leaders in Old Serbia before the First Balkan War had ended in failure. The First Balkan War was the most popular war in Serbia?s history as it was seen as avenging the 1389 Battle of Kosovo which had sealed the Ottoman penetration into the Serbian lands. In October 1912, Serbia liberated most of Old Serbia, while Montenegro took possesion of half of the Rascia area and the whole of Metohija. While the decimated and discriminated Serb population greeted the Serbian and Montenegrin troops as liberators, most Albanians, who had sided with the Ottomans, saw the establishment of Serbian rule as occupation.

Following the spectacular disintegration of the Soviet Union, popularand academic interest in nationalism and religion gathered momentum. Inaddition to recent ethnic clashes and religious conflicts in many parts of theworld, particularly the Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East, and manyAfrican states, questions have been raised about the relation betweennationalism and religion. What, if any, is the relationship between nationalismand religion? To what extent can religion influence the emergenceand maintenance of nationalism? Can religious beliefs and sentiments legitimizea nationalist ideology? What is meant by “religious nationalism,” andhow is it related to nation-states, resistance, and violence? These questionswere addressed during a one-day conference held at the London School ofEconomics, University of London on 22 March 1996. The well-attendedconference was organized by the Association for the Study of Ethnicity andNationalism, which was established in 1990 and has published the journalNations and Nationalism since March 1995.The first paper at the Nationalism and Religion conference was presentedby Bruce Kapferer (University College of London, London, UK).In his paper “Religious and Historical Metaphors in the Context ofNationalist Violence,” he addressed political action, the force of ideologies,and the relevance of mythological schemes to religious and ritual practiceby means of a case study of Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka and theevents of 1989-90. In his own words, his focus was “the dynamics ofremythologization, or the process . . . whereby current political and economicforces are totalized within mythological schemes constructed in historicalperiods relatively independent of the circumstances of contemporarynationalism” and “the force of such ideological remythologizations, that is,how such remythologizations can became a passionate dimension of politicalactivity and give it direction.”According to Kapferer, the relation of mythologization to routine religiousbeliefs and ritual practice is significant. In his paper, he argued that“nationalism is the creation of modernism and it is of a continuous dynamicnature whose power is embedded in and sanctified by the culture that hasoriginated in the rituals of religion which provide a cosmology for nationalism.Cosmology of religion as diverse as nationalism itself that is far fromuniversal claims but exists in diversity.” Kapferer’s theorization is based onhis research in Sri Lanka where, he thinks, continuing conflict is related tonationalism based on cosmologies. The case of Sri Lanka provides anSeminars, Conferences, Addresses 425excellent example of how the construction of state ideology is influencedby religious forces, in this case Buddhism. Kapferer asserted that religionhad a deep territorialization aspect and that nationalism, in this sense, mighthave functioned as reterritorialization of a particular land and postcolonialstate. One can discern from his statements that, in the construction of stateideology in Sri Lanka, myths written by monks and religious rituals wereused to create a nationalist movement that eventually developed into a violentand destructive force in the context of Sri Lanka. Kapferer believes thatthe hierarchical order of the Sri Lankan state is embedded in the cosmologyof ancient religious chronicles.Christopher Cviic (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,UK) analyzed another phenomenon taking place in WesternEurope. His paper, “Chosen Peoples and Sacred Territories: TheBalkans,” discussed the relationship between religion, nation, and statein the Balkans throughout history and analyzed how these forces haveplayed themselves out in current events. According to Cviic, historicaldevelopments in the Balkans can provide important clues to understandingthe ongoing Balkan crisis, in which the Orthodox Church hasassumed the status of a nationalist institution representing the Serbiannation. The roots of these developments and the creation of a mythical“chosen” Serbian nation legitimized by religion can be traced to thedefeat and fall of medieval Serbia at Kosova by the Ottomans. Thisdefeat meant that they lost the land.However, under the Ottoman millet system, non-Muslim communitieswere allowed to organize their religious life and legal and educationalinstitutions. This allowed the Serbs to preserve and develop their ethnicand religious identities under the leadership of the Orthodox Church.Thus, religion and identity became inextricably linked, and the OrthodoxChurch assumed an extremely important role in the public life of individualBalkan nations. Cviic pointed out that “in the case of the Serbs, theirOrthodox Church played an important role in the formation of the modemSerbian nation-state by nurturing the myth of Kosova, named after theKosova Polje defeat by the Turks. Essential to that myth was the view thatby choosing to fight at Kosova Polje, the Serbs had opted for the Kingdomof Heaven. Later on the myth grew into a broader one, representing theSerbs as the martyr/victim people with a sacred mission of wresting theirHoly Territory of Kosova from the infidel Muslims to whom it had fallen.A later variant of that myth defined Serbia in terms of wherever Serbiangraves were to be found.” ...

“We Serbs must militarily defeat our enemies and conquer the territories we need.”Vojislav Maksimovic, MemberBosnian Serb Parliament“I don't see what's wrong with Greater Serbia. There's nothing wrong with a greater Germany, or with Great Britain.”Bosnian Serb LeaderRadovan KaradžićThe break-up of Yugoslavia has come about as a result of national, economic and political conflicts which by the end of 1987 had taken on unprecedented dimensions. At that point, latent political conflicts between various republics came into the open. More specifically, the conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo had turned into a low-intensity war. Under Slobodan Miloševićs leadership in Serbia, the Serbo-Slovenian conflict over Kosovo deepened, forcing other republics and provinces to take sides. The Slovenian leadership opposed a military solution to the Serbo-Albanian conflict in Kosovo. By 1990 the Serbo-Slovenian conflict had spilled over into Croatia, completely polarizing the Yugoslav political elite into two distinct camps; one encompassed Slovenia and Croatia, the other Serbia and Montenegro, with Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina playing the role of unsuccessful mediators.

This article examines the causes and consequences of the limited progress achieved to overcome the lasting conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. This dispute shows that international and local politics in the Western Balkans are characterized by myopia-like symptoms. Whereas the USA remains focused on other areas of the globe, the EU continues to be divided over the issue of Kosovo statehood, while also exhibiting, for years now, a de facto enlargement fatigue. Fundamental differences among the two parties to the conflict and their diametrically opposed positions undermine the real perspective for lasting peace and EU integration, despite the fact that Serbia and Kosovo prepare to engage in new phases of dialogue. The article concludes that the vision of Europeanization and the EU membership for Serbia and Kosovo, as equal partners in a wider community of states, continues to remain the desire and aim of those whom exclude violence and fighting among neighbours.

The paper analyzes modern rural household in Yugoslavia, both by region and at the level of the country as a whole. The author begins by providing a statistical and sociological definition of basic terms, and proceeds with a combination of social and demographic analysis. The basic criterion used is the residential status of the population (permanent residence) based on the administrative distribution of settlements with the non-city ("other") population treated as part of rural population. The descriptive basis was formed on the basis of two types of sources: population census data and relevant studies, on the one hand, and comprehensive researches of rural family in the 1990s, on the other. The modernization theory has provided the basic framework for the analysis of the state and movement in rural households in Yugoslavia since the beginning of the 20th century, but the paper deals mainly with social and economic developments following the Second World War. The following components of the rural households are analyzed: dynamics and average size, as well as composition of households. With reference to the level of the social change they had undergone and some demographic special features, rural households are classified into four main types: 1) purely agricultural; 2) mixed (with income earned from agricultural and non-agricultural activities); 3) non-agricultural; and 4) households of elderly people. The appearance and growth of mixed households during the pest-war period, following adoption of the socialistic command economy, came as a result of objective contradictions in transformation of an individual agricultural household into a modern market-oriented holding, and its cooperation with the state-owned cooperative sector. Since early 1980s, however, with deterioration in its position, agricultural production is gradually given up or maintained at the subsistence level, while most family members earn their living from the non-agricultural sector. These tendencies were most rapidly observed in Vojvodina, which is the most fertile region of the country, and most slowly in central Serbia. As a result of the above social and economic transformation the village was also exposed to a strong demographic transformation, which was most readily observed in ageing and feminization of population and its labor force and narrowing down of family structure to conjugal family united through marriage, which is made up of aged parents without an heir. The rural household and/or family have undergone crucial changes in respect of three main segments: 1) size; 2) structure; and 3) position and role of family members. This last aspect has been the subject of numerous comprehensive studies into the way of life in villages. The analysis of family relations in a village was conducted in two segments: intra-generation (between spouses and between children, especially of different gender) and inter-generation (parent - children relations). Segregation of roles by gender is still characterized by male domination, husband - head of the family, and son - the heir. Housework, parenthood, and the homestead itself (due to the increased engagement of the husband in non-agricultural activities) are the main sources of self-realization of women. Marriage and bearing children (especially male children) represent the main social promotion channel for young girls in a village environment, while education and earning income from work outside the village do not ensure a significant role in making decisions on family life in general, children's future or even personal destiny. Incidence of conflict in marriage is rare. Satisfaction with a twofold role of the mother and housekeeper is very high as well as understanding for tl1e difficulties of the social position of a man - the "bread winner" in the current social crisis and disintegration. The author points to the lack of data on rural households in Kosovo and Metohia caused by the boycott of the latest census by the majority, ethnic Albanian population. An attempt was hence made to compensate for the lack of quantitative information by presenting results of representative investigation of Albanian zadrugas in Kosovo and Metohia.

This paper aims to study the importance of a good management of the Gazivoda reservoir. In the instable region of Balkans, water is considered a strategic resource. Crossing the disputed border between Kosovo and Serbia, Gazivoda’s water plays an important role for economies and water supply in both countries. The desire of controlling Gazivoda may disrupt the relationship that Kosovo and Serbia report. Claims from ethnic minorities of Serbs in Kosovo, and Albanians in Serbia might pose risks to current frontiers. Borders need to be respected to achieve stability. Foreign models of cooperation can be followed in order to achieve a good management successful for society on both sides of the border.

The Technical Agreement between Prishtina and Belgrade, brokered by European Union in April 2013, was hailed as a milestone in the process of normalization of relations between the two countries as well as unblocking the path of both Kosovo and Serbia towards European Union. The dialogue held a promise as a vehicle which, in conjunction with bilateral pressure on both sides by EU and a tailored enlargement process, could finally lead to normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. However, most of the deadlines set up in the implementation plan of the Agreement have been stepped over. This delay in implementation combined with the victory of “Serbian List”, Kosovo Serb political party backed heavily by Belgrade Government, in the last general elections in Kosovo, have brought into jeopardy two of the main targets of the Technical agreement as a vehicle to a broader and more important political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia as well as integration of local Kosovo Serbs into institutions of the state of Kosovo. This paper argues that Germany, United Kingdom and USA need to be more directly engaged in the process to pressure both sides to fulfill what was agreed in April 2013. It is a prevailing belief among many analysts that the only peaceful acceptable outcome depends on full integration of Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo’s state institutions, full normalization of relations between Prishtina and Belgrade, mutual recognition, and rewarding Kosovo by suspending the visa regime for EU countries for citizens of Kosovo. Delay in implementation, loss of pace and interest of EU in this process, is leading to sharpening of ethnic divisions in Kosovo and increasing the numbers of those who oppose dialogue on both sides.

The Technical Agreement between Prishtina and Belgrade, brokered by European Union in April 2013, was hailed as a milestone in the process of normalization of relations between the two countries as well as unblocking the path of both Kosovo and Serbia towards European Union. The dialogue held a promise as a vehicle which, in conjunction with bilateral pressure on both sides by EU and a tailored enlargement process, could finally lead to normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. However, most of the deadlines set up in the implementation plan of the Agreement have been stepped over. This delay in implementation combined with the victory of “Serbian List”, Kosovo Serb political party backed heavily by Belgrade Government, in the last general elections in Kosovo, have brought into jeopardy two of the main targets of the Technical agreement as a vehicle to a broader and more important political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia as well as integration of local Kosovo Serbs into institutions of the state of Kosovo. This paper argues that Germany, United Kingdom and USA need to be more directly engaged in the process to pressure both sides to fulfill what was agreed in April 2013. It is a prevailing belief among many analysts that the only peaceful acceptable outcome depends on full integration of Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo’s state institutions, full normalization of relations between Prishtina and Belgrade, mutual recognition, and rewarding Kosovo by suspending the visa regime for EU countries for citizens of Kosovo. Delay in implementation, loss of pace and interest of EU in this process, is leading to sharpening of ethnic divisions in Kosovo and increasing the numbers of those who oppose dialogue on both sides.

The goal of present study is to increase understanding of evaluation of political parties by exploring their relations with dispositional constructs conceptually related to political behavior. These are: personality traits, social attitudes and the Ethos of conflict, which emerges from protracted violent conflict between societies. The conflict examined in this study involves Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Principal components analysis conducted on parties? preferences isolated two dimensions which can be broadly interpreted as Socio-liberal and National-conservative orientation. Regression analyses have shown that these two dimensions are explained mostly by the Ethos of conflict, followed by social attitudes and personality traits. Personality traits of Honesty and Originality predict evaluation towards Socio-liberal parties. High patriotism and a positive evaluation of one?s own nation characterize supporters of National-conservative parties, while Socio-liberal participants have low patriotic attitudes and do not consider that the aims of Serbian politics in Kosovo automatically exclude the Kosovo Albanian aims.

This study considers the spatial and temporal dimensions of demographic trends in Serbia between 1961 and 2010. Using appropriate spatial autocorrelation statistics, spatial patterns of common demographic indicators including changes in population size, the rate of natural increase and infant mortality rate are investigated across municipalities of Serbia. Also, the impact of differential demographic rates according to ethnic origin on forming spatial clusters is implicitly considered. Different stages of demographic transition across municipalities at the start of the analyzed period determined the spatial pattern of clustered subregions; ethnic origin appeared to be a strong factor of differentiation regarding population dynamics. The two opposed areas regarding the transition of rates of natural increase and infant mortality were clustered; the southern included Kosovo and the least developed subregions of Central Serbia. The City of Belgrade and Kosovo have been the two hubs of population growth in Serbia over the past 50 years, while the strongest depopulation refers to the north and east border regions.

The purpose of the paper is to study the institutional approach of the Serbian state toward ethnic minorities, specifically towards the Albanian ethnic minority in Serbia. The research focuses on the Serbian state governance forms and how these forms reflect on local governance policies by the Albanian majority. The deprivation of many individual and national rights has influenced the strengthening of the national identity (Searle-White, 2001). The paper is a theoretical study that is based on the qualitative research method and includes the discourse analysis of programs, events, writings, and statements of intellectual and political figures of the relevant times. The paper finds out that the violation of freedom and national rights toward the Albanian minority in Serbia has reflected strong forms of political behavior. In conclusion, it turns out that the Albanian political class in Serbia, disappointed by the state institutions, seeks the help of the mother state of Kosovo so that the status of the Albanians in Serbia is resolved the same as the status of the Serbs of Kosovo. This paper seeks to contribute to central government relations with ethnic minorities as well as making a non-prejudiced approach to the freedoms and rights of ethnic minorities in general

Pcinja county is an administrative region bordering Bulgaria, Macedonia and Kosovo, and is featured by a number of demographic peculiarities and extremes. In Central Serbia, this county is certainly the region with the most heterogeneous ethnic distribution; this fact determines differences in fertility transition and the speed of demographic ageing. Almost 90% ethnic Albanians from Serbia inhabit the Pcinja county, and so do 40% of ethnic Bulgarians. In addition, this county is featured by strong intra- and inter-regional demographic differentiations, both spatial and structural. Reduction of polarization of demographic development in Serbia at macro and intermediate levels (excluding the Kosovo territory), as well as minor differences between urban and rural environments, have made the county rather specific. Thus this relatively small province includes the one with the highest fertility rate and with the youngest population in the entire Republic of Serbia, five levels of demographic age in only seven administrative entities, the municipalities with the highest and the lowest international migration, a concentration of municipalities with the highest masculinity, municipalities with extremely high illiteracy rates, municipalities without atheists, and so on. Common features of this demographically heterogeneous province are underdevelopment and poverty. They do not manifest in the same way all over the territory; they are rather modified by various cultural factors. .

Этно-исторические мифы признаны одним из важнейших факторов формирования национальной памяти, конструирования идентичности и разжигания межэтнических конфликтов. При этом исследователи часто сосредотачиваются на межгрупповом противостоянии мифотворцев-интеллектуалов и войнах памяти. Такой подход нивелирует внутриэтническое многоголосие и создает представление о национальной памяти как едином целом. Развитие косовского мифа в среде сербских историков партийно-югославистского, национально-патриотического и скептического течений 1980–1990-х гг. иллюстрирует процессы формирования внутрицехового разноречия. Оно также помогает понять, как внутриэтническое разноголосие эволюционирует в этнонациональное единогласие при встрече с Другим. The scholars of nationalism and memory see ethno-historical myths as important factors in forging national memory, constructing cultural identity, and fueling ethnic conflicts. However, the literature tends to focus on the inter-communal competition between intellectuals, memory wars, and the incompatibility of ethnic claims. This approach neglects intra-ethnic polyphony, thus, contributing to the tendency of seeing “national memory” as a single whole. The case of the famous Kosovo myth in the ranks of Serbian intellectuals of the 1980s–1990s, who belonged to the party-Yugoslavist, Serbian ethno-nationalist and skeptical currents of historical thought, illustrates how intra-ethnic mythopoeic polyphony develops. It also helps to understand how the intra-ethnic polyphony evolves into an ethno-national “symphony” in face of the Other.

Based on previously poorly studied empirical material, the article examines the process of forming the national media system of Kosovo and Metohija as an example of the functioning of the media in the zone of religious-ethnic conflict under the influence of political and economic factors.

This article examines the consociational democracy installed in Kosovo after the war. Starting from the premise that the electoral system is considered one of the key instruments for the engineering of post-conflict societies with deep ethnic divisions, the article analyzes the preferences of local and international actors for the type of electoral system. In particular, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission’s reluctance to organize elections without a prior creation of an institutional base, as well as grand governing coalitions. The mechanisms of consociational democracy aim at addressing elite cooperation between different ethnic communities for building peace and stability in post-conflict societies. But focusing on the intra- and inter-community dynamics of cooperation and confrontation between elites, I conclude that the main obstacle to building a democratic multi-ethnic society in Kosovo and implementing the power-sharing arrangements was the uncertainty over the status of Kosovo.

Far-reaching consequences that linguistic policy may leave in the future decades are denoted in the paper, especially in regions where two nations with their differences interlace. After the World War II, it was enabled for the Albanians in the region of Kosovo and Metohija to get education entirely in their mother tongue, Albanian language, which simultaneously reduced the range of interactions with fellow citizens of Serbian nationality, the ability to understand each other, reducing also their professional possibilities. The years that followed only deepened the linguistic barrier between the two nations living in the same region, which inevitably led to constantly growing ethnic distance and escalation of conflicts. Empirical researches regarding the linguistic and ethnic distance between the Serbs and Albanians were conducted among Serbian students in Kosovska Mitrovica and Albanian students in Pristina after a long time, in December 2016 and January 2017. An opinion poll in the field was implemented along with the representative sample, while Likert scale and modified Bogardus scale were used as instruments. The obtained results showed both the ignorance of the language of the other ethnic group and unwillingness to master that language, as an obstacle for communication. The results could be the guidelines for future state linguistic and educational policy in this region. Ethnic minorities have an indisputable right to foster their mother tongue and culture but necessarily must also master the language of the state whose territory they live on. On the other hand, the Serbian population also should get to know the language of fellow citizens - Albanians, primarily for establishing communication and better understanding, but also for improving the quality of life. Establishing such a linguistic policy would gradually remove linguistic barriers, leading to the reduction of ethnic distance. It would create also the presumptions for overcoming the ?ethnic cultural memory? that deepens differences by its unilaterality, i.e. it would create conditions for the transmission of over-ethnic memory to a common life in the region where such life existed. It would represent the first condition for establishing a common ?cultural memory?.

Collective psychological ownership refers to people’s perception that an object, place, or idea belongs to their own group. We considered this concept in the context of territorial conflicts and proposed that (1) collective psychological ownership is distinct from place attachment, (2) higher ingroup identifiers are more likely to claim collective ownership and feel attached to the territory, yet (3) only ownership claims are related to lower support for reconciliation. These hypotheses were tested in two studies using structural equation modelling. Study 1 addressed the Kosovo conflict, based on Serbian participants living in Serbia (N = 264). We found that collective psychological ownership and place attachment were distinct. Moreover, higher Serbian identifiers had a stronger sense of collective ownership of Kosovo and were more attached to it. Those with stronger feelings of collective ownership supported reconciliation with Albanians less, while place attachment did not hinder reconciliation. Study 2 replicated these findings among a new sample of Serbs in Serbia (N = 173), among Serbs in Kosovo (N = 129), and in two other conflict settings: among Greek Cypriots in Cyprus (N = 135) and Jews in Israel (N = 109). Altogether, we provide evidence that collective psychological ownership can represent an obstacle to reconciliation in conflict regions.

Few countries in Europe have witnessed as much turbulence during the past quarter century as the seven states which emerged from socialist Yugoslavia after it dissolved amidst a catastrophic series of wars of succession. Although actual armed conflict only took place in Serbia (then still including Kosovo in the rump state Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) in 1998 and 1999, Serbia directly participated in the wars of Yugoslav succession beginning in 1991 in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then finally in Kosovo. For nearly a decade from 1992 until 2001 Serbia's economy languished under the combination of a kleptocratic regime, expensive and protracted military engagements and international sanctions. The long Serbian transition entered a new phase in October 2000, when Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević was ousted by a very heterogeneous political coalition whose leaders shared only an intense antipathy for Milošević. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was transformed into the short-lived state union of Serbia and Montenegro, which disappeared when Montenegro declared its independence in 2006, followed by Kosovo in 2008.

Abstract. This article challenges the dominant view that the European Union (EU) acted as a neutral broker in the negotiations over the Kosovo status issue. It also questions some of the critical arguments that the EU behaved as a neo-colonial power. The article suggests that EU policy towards Kosovo was shaped by a ‘victors peace’ approach but it was non-strategic, that is, it was not based on a long-term assessment of how best to foster reconciliation in the region while at the same time safeguarding the EU’s economic, political and security interests. In fact, although a consensus had emerged in 2004–2005 that appeared to favour an imposed solution around the concept of ‘supervised independence’, this was rivalled by tensions cutting across the traditional ‘Europeanists’ and ‘transatlanticists’ divide. The latter got the upper hand as the Kosovo status issue soon became caught up in the ‘second Cold War’, which is the controversy between the United States and Russia over North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement and the deployment of the anti-missile defence shield in Eastern Europe. In the short-to-medium term, the EU has, unintentionally, entrenched divisions among local actors, contributed to the proliferation of external security missions with competing objectives and most EU Member States have undermined international law by recognizing Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence.

Within a decade, Kosovo has compromised twice: accepting the process of decentralization in order to achieve independence and international recognition, through the President Martti Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (2 February 2007), and finally, by approving to offer autonomy for Kosovo Serbs for the sovereignty, but still within the limits of the Ahtisaari Plan.Coincidentally, the same Serbian political parties which had fought three wars, resulting in dissolution of the state (Former Yugoslavia) at that time (the Socialist Party and the Serbian Radical Party), now are in power in the Republic of Serbia, and have the possibility to finally solve the Kosovo case, and to open the perspective for this part, Europe’s black hole, to be engaged in global integration. Statements by senior Serbian politicians are positively shifting, compared to the radicalization of the relations between Albanians and Serbs three decades ago and it is believed that the developments will evolve towards rational choice and acceptance by the parties. Being under pressure by difficult socio-economic situation and need for integration processes, both sides undertake risky and unpopular steps by signing unclear political and verbal agreements on normalization of relations, which may produce difficult solving externalities in the future. The risk lies in the possibility of further damaging the Kosovo’s “piece of the cake”, after every refusal step by the Serbian side, which will damage the interest of Kosovo side according to the “zero sum” game. Analyses of the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia reflect the mixed benefits to the parties, resulting in not very soon European integration, and with hope on difficult but necessary reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs in the region. The broken, after the war established, status quo is better than entering into a protracted conflict in the middle of Europe.

AbstractAs a political scientist with expertise in human rights and the Balkans, I was invited to provide critical commentary and analysis of Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008 for CNN International. I offered an analysis rooted in the understanding and interpretation of international law, foreign policy, and domestic politics of Serbia and Kosovo. While I was not surprised that my analysis was not popular in Serbia—after all, I did argue that the independence of Kosovo was legitimate—I was surprised at the level of ethnic intensity and the broad-based hostile reaction to my CNN appearance in Serbia. This article first documents the harassment campaign I experienced. I then conduct textual analysis of the hate mail and online postings to offer insights about ethnicity's relation to identity, gender, and political analysis in the public sphere. I conclude by discussing how identities of researchers—as crafted by themselves and others—help define analytical tools we use in scholarly inquiry.

AbstractThis article comparesUNandEUmediation practice in the Kosovo-Serbia conflict. It proposes a conceptual framework to analyze mediation effectiveness and its conditions and applies it to theUN-led Kosovo Status Talks in Vienna (2006–2007) and the ongoingEU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina (since 2011). TheEU’s relatively high degree of effectiveness compared to theUNeffort can be partly explained by the application of a strategy of manipulation, drawing on theEU’s strong leverage vis-à-vis both sides; partly by pointing to the conflict context which has been more favorable to mediation since 2011. At the same time, the analysis reveals thatEUmediation has not led to any changes concerning Serbia’s stance toward the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The continuing non-resolution of the conflict demonstrates the limits of theEU’s manipulative mediation approach and points to a substantial dilemma ofEUmediation.