Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Equity Agency Costs'
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Junker, Lukas. "Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value /." Wiesbaden : Dt. Univ.-Verl, 2005. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/497325225.pdf.
Full textTruong, Thanh, and thanh truong@rmit edu au. "Corporate Ownership, Equity Agency Costs and Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis." RMIT University. Economics, Finance and Marketing, 2008. http://adt.lib.rmit.edu.au/adt/public/adt-VIT20080528.094747.
Full textHijazi, Bassem. "Bank Loans as a Financial Discipline: A Direct Agency Cost of Equity Perspective." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2006. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc5411/.
Full textPark, Jung Chul. "Two essays on market efficiency : tests of idiosyncratic risk: informed trading versus noise and arbitrage risk, and agency costs and the underlying causes of mispricing: information asymmetry versus conflict of interests." [Tampa, Fla.] : University of South Florida, 2007. http://purl.fcla.edu/usf/dc/et/SFE0001944.
Full textDocument formatted into pages; contains 100 pages. Title from PDF of title page. Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Amini, Moghadam Shahram. "Two Essays on Competition, Corporate Investments, and Corporate Earnings." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/82851.
Full textPh. D.
Nilsson, Mattias. "Essays in empirical corporate finance and governance." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2002. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-587.
Full textDiss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002
Zhu, Yin. "Essays on accounting and incentives in Chinese equity markets." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/essays-on-accounting-and-incentives-in-chinese-equity-markets(74adb2ee-0cfc-40f6-8d62-392ab7bbdc1b).html.
Full textPuleo, Michael. "Insider Share-Pledging and Firm Investors." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/386109.
Full textPh.D.
Corporate insiders frequently borrow from lending institutions and pledge personal equity shares as collateral for the loan. Using manually collected pledge data for January 2007-December 2011, I examine how this phenomena affects firm investors and analyze agency conflicts between pledging managers and (a) outside shareholders, and (b) bondholders. Pledging potentially influences investor risk through changing managerial incentives and/or contingency risk from ill-timed margin calls. Findings suggest influential insiders extract private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders through pledging. Difference-in-differences regressions utilizing an exogenous shock to lending supply indicate pledging corresponds with a 9.9% relative increase in stock volatility – controlling for changes in fundamentals – and support a causal interpretation of the relation between pledging and equity risk. Despite apparently harming equity investors however, further analysis suggests pledging benefits bondholders, and corresponds with an economically and statistically significant reduction in yield spreads on corporate bonds. Robustness tests evidence reductions in risky financing when insiders pledge, corroborating the negative relation between pledging and cost of debt and consistent with mitigated agency conflicts between managers and bondholders.
Temple University--Theses
Burkhardt, Kirsten. "Le rôle des sociétés de capital-investissement dans la formation d'alliances stratégiques." Thesis, Dijon, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014DIJOE009/document.
Full textThis research analyses the role of Private Equity firms in the formation of strategic alliances within the field of the French Private Equity market. We start to provide evidence of its importance from new survey information, before offering an explanation of the organizational phenomenon. The study addresses the questions of how and why Private Equity firms act as relational intermediaries to help their portfolio companies form alliances. Both questions are investigated in the light of the Private Equity firms’ contribution to the value creation process that comes with alliance formation. Answers are provided by means of three jointly used theoretical frameworks: (1) mainstream theories (transaction cost theory and the positive theory of agency); (2) the knowledge based view; and 3) social network theories to complement the resulting from jointly use of the previous two theories. The theoretical construct is then tested empirically by means of a multi-method study with explanatory design, based on the pattern of joint evidence from both statistical tests and a multiple case study. Results show that French Private Equity firms do play a role in alliance formation. This role can be intentional as well as non-intentional. Furthermore, although arguments from the knowledge-based perspective finds more support in explaining this behavior than from the mainstream theories, our study highlights the benefits of the joint use of these theories and the complementary nature of them to better explaining the phenomenon as a whole
HUANG, YU-CHEN, and 黃昱甄. "Overvalued Equity and Agency Costs." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/01100880424095238787.
Full text國立臺北大學
會計學系
94
The main purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between overvalued equity and agency costs. A series of papers by Jensen (2002; 2005) demonstrate that, when a firm’s equity is overvalued that it will not, except by pure luck, be able to deliver the financial performance the market requires justifying that valuation, managers are likely to take actions designed to meet the market’s optimistic expectations and sustain the overvaluation, instead of disseminating information disappoint capital markets. They are more likely to generate the appearance of improved performance in the short run. Such actions, however, may sacrifice equity value of the firms in the long run. Kothari, Loutskina, Nikolaev (2005) find that, there is a positive relation between leading period returns and year zero accruals for high accrual-decile firms, however the price reverses in subsequent year. In addition, investment-financing decisions and insider trading activity also correspond with the agency theory of overvalued equity. This study uses Earnings-Based Valuation Model to estimate the theoretical value of a firm’s equity with public available information and management foresight information. The difference between actual and theoretical value is misvaluation. By comparing with the misvaluations which happen in different situations, we test whether asymmetric information exists or not. Moreover, taking assets utilization rate, discretional expense rate and firm size as the proxies of agency costs to examine the connection between agency costs and misvaluation. Research data were collected from TSEC listed companies issued seasoned equity from 1994 to 2002, and the major findings are summarized as follows: 1.SEO companies are more likely to issue equity when stock price are overestimated. 2.Misevaluation based on management foresight information is more than misvaluation based on public available information, and the result shows that when the equity is overvalued, information asymmetries is more serious. 3.There is a significantly negative relation between assets utilization rate and misvaluation, as well as firm size and misevaluation. However, as we separate samples into over-group and under-group by positive or negative value of misevaluation, such significant relation only exists in over-group. This finding implied that the relation between agency costs and misvaluation may not be linear.
Huang, Shin-Chiou, and 黃馨萩. "The Effect of Revision on the SFAS No.7: Evidence from Equity Agency Costs of Taiwanese MNCs." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29350361145199996387.
Full text逢甲大學
國際貿易所
97
Before 2005, firms only need to prepare annual consolidated financial statement, and the criteria of involving subsidiary into consolidated financial statement are extremely strictless. Even though some firms are willing to prepare semi-annual consolidated financial statement, the approving by board of director and accountant is still unnecessary. Stockholder supposed could monitor manager through consolidated financial statement, however, lag information and lack of information authentic and transparency difficult the monitoring behavior, which lead to serious equity agency problem. After implementing revisional SFAS No.7, the problem of lag information and lack of information authentic and transparency phenomenon shall be improved, and expected to diminish agency problem between manager and stockholders. Using data from Taiwanese listing firms issuing bonds and equity from 2000 to 2007 to study that is shareholder wealth effects changed after implementing revisional SFAS No.7. The empirical result shows that revisionary SFAS No.7 reduced the difference of shareholder wealth effects of security offering announcement between MNCs and DCs (and between high and low involved MNCs); and reduced the difference of shareholder wealth effects of security offering announcements associated to equity agency costs between MNCs and DCs. However, the empirical result doesn’t support the hypothesis:New SFAS No.7 reduces the difference of shareholder wealth effects of security offering announcements associated to equity agency costs between high and low involved MNCs. We also find that compare to the shareholders’ wealth effect, the effect of new SFAS No.7 on firm performance are more positive for MNCs than DCs.
孫惠莉. "Threshold Effect in the Relationship between Overvalued Equity and Agency Costs-Evidence from TSE-listing Hi-tech Companies." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08202896953135855304.
Full text逢甲大學
會計學系
101
The study is based on TSE-listing high-tech companies from 1997 to 2005 to probe into the relationship between overvalued equity and agency costs. The present study adopts panel smooth transition regression model (PSTR) to examine the effect of overvalued/undervalued equity (PF) on agency costs. The empirical evidence confirms the non-linear relationship between the market value of equity and agency costs. When the PF ranges from 0.4631 to 1.3351, the PF is negative relevant to the free cash flow. However, when the PF is above 1.3351 or below 0.4631, it is positive relevant to the free cash flow. Meanwhile, when the PF is below 1.569, the PF is positive relevant to the management’s share; however, when it is above 1.569, the PF is negative relevant to the management’s share. The former literature mostly went to extremes, roughly categorizing the market value of equity into the overvalued and the undervalued groups. The present study confirms the non-linear relationship between the PF and the agency costs to improve the former literature.
Liu, J., Saeed Akbar, S. Z. A. Shah, D. Zhang, and D. Pang. "Market reaction to seasoned offerings in China." 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/17130.
Full textThis study examines stock market reaction to the announcement of various forms of seasoned issues in China. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that market reactions differ in ways that suggest a difference between management's internal assessment and the market's assessment of the stock price. The market responds unfavourably to the announcement, notably in the case of rights issues and also with regard to open offers. Private placements experience an unfavourable pre‐announcement reaction, which contrasts with the favourable reaction after the event. Convertible bond issues generate positive excess returns consistent with the market's confidence that they can help to align management and shareholders’ interests. Further investigation shows that market reaction is related to factors specific to the issuer and issue by reference to the period immediately surrounding the issue. Specifically, ownership concentration, agency matters connected with equity offerings, investor protection connected with fund allocation and security pricing, and the influence of powerful moneyed interests together provide an instructive insight into market reaction. Institutional inefficiency pertaining to underwriting, auditing, analysts’ forecasts and credit ratings are found to have a weak association with market price, consistent with due public scepticism concerning management and their gatekeepers.
Huang, Hong-Fei, and 黃鴻飛. "Does Managerial Ability Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders?" Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/mh65jd.
Full text國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
102
This study explores the relation between the managerial ability and the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) by employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years. We employ Demerjian (2012) to estimate CEO ability and Chen, Liao, Chen (2012) to estimate the cost of B-E agency problem.The empirical results of this study show that, CEO’s ability significantly affects the firm’s B-E agency problem. The higher a firm''s CEO''s ability, the more serious the firm''s B-E agency problem. Furthermore, we find that the instability in a firm''s CEOs’ ability also significantly affect the firm''s B-E agency problem.
Chang, Yi-Huan, and 張翊桓. "Does Firm Location Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders?" Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54125249309753847366.
Full text國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
101
This study explores the relation between the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) and firm location by using the B-E agency proxy developed by Taylor (2010). By employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years, we hypothesize that remotely located firms are more likely to suffer higher B-E agency problem because geographic location limits the ability of minority equity investors to monitor the boards of remotely located firms. We use five different variables to represent location and remoteness of the firm’s headquarters. The empirical results of this study show that a firm’s location significantly affects its B-E agency problem. Higher distance to major city worsens the B-E agency problem.
Chen, Guo-Chang, and 陳國彰. "A Study of the Relationships Between Corporate Governance and the Equity Capital Cost for Taiwan Listing Electronic Companies by Central Agency Problems." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57135979041366215808.
Full text國立交通大學
經營管理研究所
94
Based on the central agency problem between controlling shareholder and minor shareholders, this research uses the five dimensions, which namely ownership structure, board composition, manage pattern, abnormal relatet party transaction, and stock overinvestment of controlling shareholder amounting to fourteen variables, to investage the relationships between central agency problem and the equity capital cost for Taiwain listing electronic companies. Empirical results are summarized below:1.In terms of ownership structure, the larger the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder is, the larger the positive incentive effect is, and leads to higher equity capital cost.2.When the deviation between the voting rights and the cash flow rights is larger, it implys larger negative invasion effect and results in higher equity capital cost.3.In terms of the board composition, when controlling shareholder members occupy fewer directors or supervisor sits and the company has more independent directors or supervisors, the board is less dominated by controlling shareholder and leads to the lower equity capital cost. 4.In terms of management pattern, when the shares held by institutional investors are higher, the external monitors are better for the companies and lead to lower equity capital cost.5.In terms of abnormal related party transaction, there is no obvious relationships between the variable and the equity capital cost.6.In terms of stock overinvestment of the controlling shareholder, when the pledged share ratio and the overinvestiment ratio is higher, stock overinvestment behavior of the controlling shareholder is more apparent and results in higher equity cpital cost. We combine the fourteen variables into one Corporate Governance Index (CGI) and have shown that index is negatively related to equity capital cost. Higer CGI leads to lower equity cost because the central agency problem is slight and the interests of the minor shareholder could be less deprived by the controlling shareholder.