Academic literature on the topic 'Epistocracy'
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Journal articles on the topic "Epistocracy"
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Min, John B. "Epistocracy and democratic epistemology." Politics in Central Europe 11, no. 1 (April 1, 2015): 91–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pce-2015-0005.
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Abstract Epistocracy, the rule by the experts or educated, poses a significant challenge to authentic democratic rule. Epistocrats typically reason from the premise, “experts have knowledge of political truths” to the conclusion, “experts should have the authority to rule.” There may be powerful moral reasons for thinking that the inference is fallacious. Invoking a public reason standard of acceptability, David Estlund makes a powerful argument of this sort. I argue that Estlund’s argument against epistocracy overlooks democratic epistemology, which can and should be utilized to strengthen the epistemic merits of a democratic rule. I therefore examine whether democratic democracy’s epistemic value can rest on a formal epistemic model. The inadequacy of the formal epistemic model leads us to defend democratic epistemology differently. This will be defended in two ways. The first step will be to cast doubt into the epistemic merits of expert rule in two ways. First, experts sometimes do not have access to privileged information of citizens who bear the consequences of expert decisions. Second, experts themselves can be biased. I argue that democratic deliberation can offset those two disadvantages of expert rule. The second step will be to examine the epistemic values of inclusive democratic rule.
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Gibbons, Adam F. "Epistocracy and the Problem of Political Capture." Public Affairs Quarterly 39, no. 1 (January 1, 2025): 19–42. https://doi.org/10.5406/21520542.39.1.02.
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Abstract Concerned about the harmful effects of pervasive political ignorance, epistocrats argue that we should amplify the political power of politically knowledgeable citizens. But their proposals have been widely criticized on the grounds that they are susceptible to manipulation and abuse. Instead of empowering the knowledgeable, incumbents who control epistocratic institutions are likely to selectively empower their supporters, thereby increasing their share of power. Call this the problem of political capture. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, I claim that the problem of political capture for epistocracy has been overstated. Incumbents who want to increase their share of power will encounter certain obstacles that complicate the task of capturing the system. Second, however, I claim that if the problem is nevertheless sufficiently serious, it militates against not just epistocracy, but also many other institutions. The problem of political capture is thus far wider than typically recognized.
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Gunn, Paul. "Against Epistocracy." Critical Review 31, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 26–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1609842.
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Moraro, Piero. "Against Epistocracy." Social Theory and Practice 44, no. 2 (2018): 199–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract20185835.
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Jason Brennan has argued that democracy is intrinsically unjust, for it grants voting power to politically incompetent individuals, thus exposing people to an undue risk of harm. He claims democracy should be replaced by epistocracy, i.e., the rule of the knowers. In this paper, I show that his argument fails. First, Brennan mistakes voters’ competence for voters’ trustworthiness. Second, despite Brennan's claim to the contrary, an epistocracy may not reduce people’s exposure to an undue risk of harm. Third, Brennan overlooks the fact that citizens are not equally affected by ‘bad voting.’ Fourth, far from being a defence of libertarian ideals, Brennan's argument supports paternalism.
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Blunt, Gwilym David. "The case for epistocratic republicanism." Politics 40, no. 3 (November 22, 2019): 363–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263395719889563.
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In recent years, the fortunes of democracy have waned both in theory and practice. This has added impetus not only to the republican case for strengthening democratic institutions but also to new anti-democratic thought. This article examines the claim made by Jason Brennan that epistocracy, rule by the ‘knowledgeable’, is compatible with freedom from domination. It begins by briefly explaining epistocracy and republicanism. It then presents the argument for epistocratic republicanism: that democracy can be a source of domination and that freedom from domination can be secured through non-democratic political institutions. The case against epistocratic republicanism is grounded in concerns about systemic domination and the ability of epistocrats to arbitrarily set the terms of social cooperation. These two arguments are judged on the basis of which better minimises domination while respecting its value to all people. Epistocratic republicanism is found to be less reliable because of the risks of epistemic injustice that accompanies systemic domination; democracy, accompanied by other republican institutions, is better at minimising domination and respecting persons. It concludes that republicans ought to be democrats.
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Van der Haak, Donovan. "The Incompatibility of Moral Relativism and Brennan’s Argument for Epistocracy." Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science 54 (September 30, 2022): 22–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.22151/politikon.54.2.
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In Against Democracy, Brennan argues in favor of restricting suffrage, proposing epistocracy. He argues political power should not be held by incompetent and morally unreasonable people (i.e., the competence principle) and that epistocracy would create more just outcomes than democracy. However, Brennan assumes his argument is compatible with different meta-ethical frameworks. In this article, I examine the extent to which his argument is challenged by meta-ethical moral relativism, aiming to answer the following central research question: what are the repercussions of meta-ethical moral relativism for Brennan’s use of the competence principle and the creation of just outcomes as an argument in favor of epistocracy over democracy? I argue that democracy better satisfies Brennan’s own principles compared to epistocracy, for the epistocratic reliance on experts renders epistocracy inherently incapable of collecting sufficient information about moral facts from the right voting population.
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Marrone, Pierpaolo. "Epistemic Democracy and Technopolitics." International Journal of Technoethics 13, no. 1 (January 2022): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijt.291551.
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In this article I examine the structure of four deliberative models: epistemic democracy, epistocracy, dystopic algocracy, and utopian algocracy. Epistocracy and algocracy (which in its two versions is an extremization of epistocracy) represent a challenge to the alleged epistemic superiority of democracy: epistocracy for its emphasis on the role of experts; algocracy for its emphasis on technique as a cognitively and ethically superior tool. In the concluding remarks I will advance the thesis that these challenges can only be answered by emphasizing the value of citizens’ political participation, which can also represent both an increase in their cognitive abilities and a value for public ethics.
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Hannon, Michael. "Are knowledgeable voters better voters?" Politics, Philosophy & Economics 21, no. 1 (January 10, 2022): 29–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594x211065080.
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It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals tend to be the most partisan and the strength of partisan identity tends to corrupt political thinking. This creates a conundrum. On the one hand, an informed citizenry is allegedly necessary for a democracy to flourish. On the other hand, the most knowledgeable and passionate voters are also the most likely to think in corrupted, biased ways. What to do? This paper examines this tension and draws out several lessons. First, it is not obvious that more knowledgeable voters will make better political decisions. Second, attempts to remedy voter ignorance are problematic because partisans tend to become more polarized when they acquire more information. Third, solutions to citizen incompetence must focus on the intellectual virtue of objectivity. Fourth, some forms of epistocracy are troubling, in part, because they would increase the political power of the most dogmatic and biased individuals. Fifth, a highly restrictive form of epistocracy may escape the problem of political dogmatism, but epistocrats may face a steeper tradeoff between inclusivity and epistemic virtue than they would like.
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Hédoin, Cyril. "Liberal Perfectionism and Epistocracy." Public Affairs Quarterly 37, no. 4 (October 1, 2023): 307–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21520542.37.4.01.
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Abstract This essay explores the possible justification that liberal perfectionism may provide to an epistocratic regime. I suggest that epistocratic mechanisms and rules can maintain and improve epistemic autonomy, which itself contributes to the form of personal autonomy to which perfectionists grant a moral priority. Though not decisive, I claim that the Perfectionist Argument for Epistocracy partially justifies epistocracy. Because this argument is developed in the context of liberal social forms, this indicates the conceptual possibility of liberal epistocracy.
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Jeffrey, Anne. "LIMITED EPISTOCRACY AND POLITICAL INCLUSION." Episteme 15, no. 4 (April 20, 2017): 412–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.8.
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ABSTRACTIn this paper I defend a form of epistocracy I call limited epistocracy – rule by institutions housing expertise in non-political areas that become politically relevant. This kind of limited epistocracy, I argue, isn't a far-off fiction. With increasing frequency, governments are outsourcing political power to expert institutions to solve urgent, multidimensional problems because they outperform ordinary democratic decision-making. I consider the objection that limited epistocracy, while more effective than its competitors, lacks a fundamental intrinsic value that its competitors have; namely, political inclusion. After explaining this challenge, I suggest that limited epistocracies can be made compatible with robust political inclusion if specialized institutions are confined to issuing directives that give citizens multiple actionable options. I explain how this safeguards citizens’ inclusion through rational deliberation, choice, and contestation.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Epistocracy"
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Malm, Samuel. "Does climate change justify a global epistocracy?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-414812.
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In this paper, I will argue that given a choice between a global epistocracy and a global democracy, we ought to choose epistocracy. The reason for this is the need for stopping the ongoing climatic change that will cause a massive amount of suffering and death. Accordingly, I will demonstrate why the democratic process is inadequate in preventing the future climate disaster, and why an epistocracy have a better chance to succeed in this endeavour. My argumentation relies on four steps. First, I shall start with some initial housekeeping that explains why the outcome of continuing climate change is so repugnant. Secondly, I will demonstrate why implementing policies that halt climate change is something we ought to do and why it takes priority over other political concerns. Thirdly, I will argue that given psychological barriers coupled with the Condorcet Jury Theorem we have reason to believe a global democracy will fail to implement these necessary policies. Finally, I shall defend some fundamental claims that the epistocratic method relies on. This I do for two reasons: first, to give some moral credence to the epistocratic method and as a consequent close the door to radical authoritarianism. I do this because even if our priority is to prevent the impending climate disaster, we need to safeguard against a decision-making process that possibly could enact morally repugnant policies (perhaps in other political areas), e.g., bestow only one person with all political power. Secondly, the defence of epistocracy will demonstrate why a proceduralist argumentation for democracy does not yield a great moral advantage vis-à-vis the epistocratic method.
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Malik, Ali. "Democracy and epistocracy reconciled? : the Scottish Police Authority and police governance in Scotland after 2012." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/25843.
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This thesis examines the emergent role of the Scottish Police Authority (SPA) in delivering organisational accountability of the Police Service of Scotland, following reform in 2012. The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 amalgamated the eight local police forces into a single force, ‘Police Scotland’, and replaced the concomitant local police authorities, responsible for maintaining and governing those forces, into a national governing body: the SPA. The study draws on a broad range of qualitative data that includes official policy documents, selected minutes of public meetings held by the Justice Committee, and the SPA, inspection reports by HMICS and Audit Scotland, and interviews with a cross-section of stakeholders including a former Minister, senior police officers, members of the SPA, and MSPs. This study chronicles the inception and early development of the SPA, and critically assesses the SPA’s emergent accountability processes in relation to the perennial problems of police governance. Firstly, the doctrine of operational independence of chief constables, rooted in the traditional, and to-date “sacrosanct”, notion of constabulary independence (Reiner, 2013: 169), makes organisational accountability of the police a complicated and contested matter (Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Jones, 2008; Reiner, 2010). Secondly, there is a perpetual debate about whether the governance of police should be situated within local government structures, or delivered through central government. There is consensus among policing scholars that the persistent trend towards greater centralisation, coupled with the operational independence doctrine, curtailed the performance of the local police boards and their ability to hold chief constables to account (Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Scott, 2011; Reiner, 2013). Amidst the tussle between central and local political actors for democratic control of the police, the recent policy discourse in Scotland, that led to the reforms and the creation of the SPA, has highlighted that the governance of the police requires expertise, skills and capacities, which the previous local police authorities lacked (Tomkins, 2009; Laing and Fossey, 2011). In light of the persistent difficulties of democratic governance, and the creation of the SPA as an expert body, the study presents an original conceptual framework outlining an ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police governance. The framework seeks to reconcile democracy and expertise and offers a prescriptive solution to resolve the underlying problems of police governance. The study applies the notion of epistocracy or knowledge-based rule (Estlund, 2003, 2008) to the role of experts in institutional settings (Holst, 2012; Holst and Mollander, 2014). Conceiving the SPA as an institutional epistocracy, it is argued that such an arrangement needs to be underpinned by the right Composition, and that it needs Power, and Autonomy in order to function effectively and independently. It is further argued that principles of Deliberation, including reasoning and justification, can further strengthen epistocratic governance arrangements, as well as providing a crucial democratic dimension. The analysis of the SPA provides a strong empirical basis for the framework. The study shows that while the SPA was created as a professional body of experts, it was unable to resolve the underlying problems of police governance in its first three years. This was due to inadequacies in its composition resulting from insufficient expertise and a lack of training for new board members, differing interpretations of its role and statutory powers, and external pressures and impositions resulting in a lack of autonomy. Looking to recent developments, the study suggests that deliberative principles are now implicit in the SPA’s approach to more proactive scrutiny, which has started to serve to alleviate some shortcomings and problems it encountered in its formative years. However, the study concludes that further strengthening of the SPA’s composition, clarity around its role and powers, greater autonomy, and explicit focus on deliberative principles is needed.
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Ween, David Anders. "Epistocracy’s Competence Problem: An Instrumentalist Defense of Democracy." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1627993424084938.
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Lindström, Anton. "Den absoluta sanningens konsekvenser för demokratin." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-148995.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the adherence to absolute truth and moraluniversalism is compatible with democracy. The starting point is that there is absolute truthand absolute values.My thesis is that democracy in the form of universal suffrage is not necessarily in the wayof truth, but rather party politics and representative democracy. Abolishing the parties may besufficient to overcome both truth relativism and moral relativism, and thus provide analternative to abolishing universal suffrage. I suggest the problem lies in party politics, andthe way in which political talks are conducted, rather than in the right to vote.The investigation shows that democracy only have instrumental value. It shall be judgedbased on how well it promotes absolute truth and absolute values. Furthermore, representativedemocracy does not promote absolute truth and absolute values. One alternative isepistocracy. Another option is to abolish the parties, preserve universal suffrage, and createconditions for a new form of political dialogue. The conclusion is that the latter option is bestfor promoting the absolute truth.
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BODINI, PAOLO. "DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF KNOWLEDGE." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/920424.
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Democracy and the Rule of Knowledge
The work starts from the analyses of epistocratic theorists, reconstructing their criticism to democracy in order to develop a broader reflection on the role of political knowledge (episteme) within democratic paradigm. The thesis aims to present knowledge as vital component of political agency that democracy assumes and institutionalizes. Nonetheless, epistocrats’ epistemic reductionism represents a misinterpretation of such an agency and, accordingly, the remedies they support are presented as a misunderstanding of episteme’s reach and function in political process.
Chapter 1 focuses on epistocrats’ account of citizens’ epistemic littleness, emphasizing how ignorance and irrationality characterize their participation to political decision-making. Chapter 2 deals with the notion of political knowledge assumed by epistocracy: episteme is understood as a body of factual information, which constitutes the cognitive background of political decision-making. Chapter 3 argues that epistocratic interpretation of democracy recalls instrumentalism and, with it, the questionable assumption of politics as a mere epistemic practice. On the contrary, the thesis collocates the role of episteme in a procedural understanding of democracy, asserting that democracy embodies an “enlightened procedure”. In this view, democracy institutionalizes people’s capacity to formulate and consider factual truths (“serviceable truths”) concerning the context in which they operate as decision-makers. Chapter 4 challenges epistocracy by proposing an alternative institutional approach to deal with political ignorance. Democratic institutions have the duty to empower citizens’ epistemic agency, transforming the assumption of that agency into the commitment to spread political knowledge in society.
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Ferey, Camille. "Une justification épistémique pragmatiste de la démocratie : connaissance et participation politique en contexte inégalitaire : de John Dewey à la philosophie féministe contemporaine." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 10, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024PA100101.
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Au sein des justifications philosophiques de la démocratie, certains arguments sont qualifiés d’épistémiques parce qu’ils mettent l’accent sur la capacité des pratiques démocratiques à identifier, définir et résoudre les problèmes sociaux. Une telle justification épistémique présente néanmoins le risque de poser la qualité des décisions comme première par rapport aux valeurs démocratiques et donc de subordonner les institutions politiques à un impératif d’efficacité. Ma thèse analyse la capacité du cadre épistémologique pragmatiste à éviter cet écueil épistocratique tout en maintenant un ensemble d’arguments épistémiques en faveur de la démocratie. Pour ce faire, je m’appuie sur l’épistémologie de John Dewey et sur son articulation avec l’épistémologie critique contemporaine, en particulier l’épistémologie féministe du positionnement et la théorie des injustices épistémiques. Ce cadre théorique sert, d’une part, à mettre en lumière le potentiel démocratique de l’enquête sur les problèmes sociaux et, d’autre part, à défendre un approfondissement de la participation démocratique pour des raisons épistémiques.À partir de l’épistémologie pragmatiste critique, je développe une critique épistémique de l’épistocratie. Je défends la capacité de pratiques épistémiques participatives à produire une meilleure connaissance des problèmes sociaux, notamment à partir de l’exemple du « recensement populaire » des personnes sans domicile en Argentine. Ces pratiques sont ainsi évaluées à l’aune des critères pragmatistes de la méthode et de la validité de la connaissance ; et elles permettent en retour de préciser ces derniers.J’analyse ensuite la manière dont cette critique épistémique de l’épistocratie conduit à repenser les institutions politiques démocratiques. Je m’intéresse tout d’abord à la théorie de la délibération, en montrant que le cadre pragmatiste conduit à défendre une approche critique interne du modèle délibératif, telle qu’on la trouve notamment chez les philosophes féministes critiques de Habermas (Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser et Jane Mansbridge). Puis je propose une conception pragmatiste féministe de la représentation politique. J’analyse en particulier les vertus et lacunes épistémiques des différents modes de sélection des représentants (élection, tirage au sort et pratiques de représentation sélective) et je défends, à partir du cadre pragmatiste, une certaine conception de la représentation descriptive, revendiquée notamment par les féministes chiliennes actrices et observatrices du processus constituant de 2020.Ce travail a donc pour ambition d’actualiser le pragmatisme deweyen, en le mobilisant dans un ensemble de débats philosophiques et politiques contemporains. Cette actualisation entend contribuer au renouveau de l’exégèse deweyenne en en proposant une lecture féministe qui ouvre de nouveaux champs d’usage du pragmatisme. Enfin, cet usage du pragmatisme permet d’approfondir l’apport de l’épistémologie critique à la théorie empirique et normative des institutions démocratiquesPhilosophical justifications of democracy are defined as “epistemic” when they claim democracy’s capacity to develop social knowledge and problem-solving. However, such an epistemic justification puts political institutions at risk of defining efficiency as opposed to democratic participation. Do social knowledge and problem-solving involve reducing the scope of political participation? Relying on John Dewey’s philosophy, I argue that such an opposition can be overcome. In order to do so, I provide a new reading of his pragmatist epistemology, through contemporary critical epistemology’s main insights, especially standpoint theories and the theory of epistemic injustice. Drawing on this epistemological framework as well as on several case studies (the French Climate Convention, the Argentinian popular census of homeless people and the Chilean constitutional process) I claim that efficiency and participation are co-dependent. I provide an analysis of the pragmatist concept of inquiry that sheds light on its democratic components. Firstly, I highlight how pragmatist inquiry on social problems requires deepening democratic practices. Secondly, I focus on the democratic outputs of such an account of knowledge, examining how it can contribute to a better understanding of the experiences of oppressed groups.Relying on this epistemological stance, I develop a pragmatist-feminist approach to political institutions. Firstly, I discuss and argue against epistocratic practices and theories, defended by both Walter Lippmann and Jason Brennan. Secondly, I sketch an account of democratic deliberation. I argue that pragmatist epistemic standards relevantly contribute to feminist critiques of Habermas’ account. I especially examine and defend the consistency of Iris Marion Young’s model of communicative democracy in the light of such standards. Thirdly, I focus on political representation, providing a pragmatist-feminist account of its democratic deepening based on John Dewey, Nancy Fraser, Iris Marion Young and Jane Mansbridge. I examine the three main models of representatives’ selection: election, sortition and descriptive selection. I argue that the pragmatist frame provides a distinctive argument in favor of descriptive selection, while avoiding this model’s main shortcomings.My epistemic approach to democracy aims at providing tools to improve democratic institutions on both political and epistemic levels. Moreover, it also contributes to update Dewey’s philosophy by confronting it to current philosophical and political issues. Finally, it promotes a stronger integration of critical epistemology into the normative political philosophy of democracy
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"Everybody Wants to Rule the World: Comparing Democracy and Epistocracy on the Problem of Incompetence." Master's thesis, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.49298.
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abstract: This paper examines the strength of a recent argument made against democracy. The notion of epistocracy, a system of government where the wise or the knowers rule, has garnered some attention of late. These theories of epistocracy have traditionally struggled with questions of political legitimacy and authority. In Against Democracy, Jason Brennan articulates an alternative theory for epistocracy which may prove more promising. Brennan argues instead that democracy faces objections of political legitimacy which epistocracy avoids because democracy either harms or violates rights as a result of granting political power to the incompetent. This negative argument against democracy hopes to make epistocracy the preferable option in comparison. I will argue, however, that if we take this comparative approach then we ought to prefer democracy---or, rather, democratic reform---over epistocracy as the best solution in addressing the concerns which Brennan raises. It is not enough to merely point to flaws in democracy. For this argument to be successful, it must also be shown that epistocracy avoids those flaws at an acceptable cost. I claim that, upon examination, epistocratic theories fail to make this case. Rather, it is evident from this examination that there are various institutional mechanisms available with which democracy may manage the risks and harms which might arise from imbuing the incompetent with political power. This in turn suggests ways by which we might reform democracy to achieve similar results hoped for by epistocrats without the effort, risk, and cost of tearing down and rebuilding our fundamental political institutions.Dissertation/Thesis
Masters Thesis Philosophy 2018
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N`duk, Quintino Na. "A defesa do governo de quem mais sabe. Uma alternativa para melhorar a democracia." Master's thesis, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/50259.
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Com esta tese, pretende-se analisar a democracia representativa com sufrágio universal, desde o seu aparecimento no século XIX. O objetivo principal do trabalho consiste em analisar o princípio do sufrágio universal de uma forma realista à luz dos «três modelos sucessivos de democracia liberal, dos quais se pode dizer tenham prevalecido alternamente desde inícios do século XIX até o presente»1. Consequentemente, pretende-se explorar a função que estes modelos atribuem à participação política dos cidadãos na democracia liberal, bem como algumas das críticas ao princípio do sufrágio universal que foram apresentadas por vários teóricos liberais. Face às razões contraditórias que foram apresentadas por eles para justificar a limitação do sufrágio universal, tornou-se imperioso dizer que, no contexto atual da democracia representativa é possível defender sufrágio limitado recorrendo aos estudos empíricos sobre o comportamento dos votantes. Neste sentido, esta tese tem como fim a defesa do sistema epistocrático no qual o governo é eleito pelos eleitores mais informados sobre os fatos políticos à luz do princípio da competência política individual.This thesis aims to analyze representative democracy with universal suffrage, since it’s emergence in the 19th Century. The prime objective of the work is to realistically analyze the principal of universal suffrage in light of the “three successive models of liberal democracy, which have prevailed alternately since the beginning of the 19th century until present day” 1. Consequently, the thesis seeks to explore the functionalities that these models attribute to political participation by citizens in liberal democracy, as well as some critiques on the principals of universal suffrage that have been presented by various liberal academics. Due to the contradictions they present to justify the limitation of universal suffrage, it becomes imperative to defend in the context of representative democracy resorting to the empirical studies on voter behavior. With that in mind, the ultimate end of this thesis is the defense of the epistocratical system in which the government is elected by the most informed voters regarding political affairs, considering individual political competence.
Books on the topic "Epistocracy"
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Goodin, Robert E., and Kai Spiekermann. Epistocracy or Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823452.003.0015.
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The case for epistocracy rests on the assumption that identifiable experts tend to be better truth trackers than the electorate. The case is typically weak because large numbers of only minimally competent voters are difficult to beat and unbiased experts are hard to identify in advance. Sample calculations demonstrate that enfranchising more voters is often epistemically advantageous, even if additional voters are less competent. To deal with less-competent voters, it has been suggested that votes be weighted by competence. This strategy works, but the effects tend to be limited. Looking from the perspective of the Best Responder Corollary (Chapter 5), there are reasons why smaller groups can beat larger groups and vice versa, depending on which group faces a more truth-conducive decision problem. A final argument in favour of universal franchise is that voters learn from experience and thereby improve their competence.
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Malik, Ali. Politics of Police Governance: Scottish Police Reform, Localism, and Epistocracy. Policy Press, 2024.
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Malik, Ali. Politics of Police Governance: Scottish Police Reform, Localism, and Epistocracy. Policy Press, 2024.
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Malik, Ali. Politics of Police Governance: Scottish Police Reform, Localism, and Epistocracy. Bristol University Press, 2024.
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Farrelly, Colin. Virtue Epistemology and the Democratic Life. Edited by Nancy E. Snow. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199385195.013.17.
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Integrating insights from the Ancient Greeks (e.g. concerning virtue, eudaimonia, and the original meaning of “democracy”), John Dewey, and recent work in virtue epistemology, this chapter develops a virtue-based defense of democracy, one that conceives of democracy as an inquiry-based mode of social existence. This account of democracy is developed by responding to three common concerns raised against democracy, which the author calls the Irrationality Problem, the Problem of Autonomy, and the Epistocracy Objection. Virtue epistemology can help elucidate the link between democracy and human flourishing by drawing attention to democracy’s potential for cultivating and refining the “intellectual virtues” (e.g. intellectual humility, fairness in evaluating the arguments of others, the social virtue of being communicative, etc.) constitutive of the good life.
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Dalton, Russell J. Democracy in Unequal Terms. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198733607.003.0011.
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This chapter summarizes the results of this study: changes in social structure and participation patterns are increasing social-status-based inequality in political participation. Those with higher educational levels, incomes, or occupation have greater political voice, while lower-status individuals are less politically involved. Moreover, the politically rich are getting richer, and the politically poor are getting poorer. The chapter then discusses the implications of these results. The chapter considers claims that participation erodes governance and some form of epistocracy (rule by the knowledgeable) is preferable. Cross-national analysis shows that well-governed democracies have high levels of citizen participation, including both conventional and contentious forms of action. In addition, the size of the SES participation gap is negatively related to good governance. The conclusion discusses ways that democracies might narrow the participation gap and give voice to those citizens who need government support.
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Goodin, Robert E., and Kai Spiekermann. An Epistemic Theory of Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823452.001.0001.
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One attractive feature of democracy is its ability to track the truth by information aggregation. The formal support for this claim goes back to Condorcet’s famous jury theorem. However, the theorem has often been dismissed as a mathematical curiosity because the assumptions on which the theorem is based are demanding. Such quick dismissals tend to misunderstand the original theorem. They also fail to appreciate how Condorcet’s assumptions can be weakened to obtain jury theorems that are readily applicable in the real world. The first part of the book explains the original theorem and its various extensions and introduces results to deal with the challenge of voter dependence. Part II considers opportunities to make democracies perform better in epistemic terms by improving voter competence and diversity, by dividing epistemic labour, and by preceding voting with deliberation. In the third part, political practices are looked at through an epistemic lens, focusing on the influence of tradition, following opinion leaders or cues, and on settings in which the electorate falls into diverging factions. Part IV analyses the implications for the structures of government. While arguing against the case for epistocracy, the use of deliberation and expert advice in representative democracy can lead to improved truth-tracking, provided epistemic bottlenecks are avoided. The final part summarizes the results and explores how epistemic democracy might be undermined, using as case studies the Trump and Brexit campaigns.
Book chapters on the topic "Epistocracy"
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Williston, Byron. "Plato: Epistocracy." In Philosophy and the Climate Crisis, 73–91. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge environmental ethics: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003050766-7.
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Paudyn, Bartholomew. "Epistocracy versus Democracy." In Credit Ratings and Sovereign Debt, 183–202. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137302779_5.
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Brennan, Jason. "Epistocracy Within Public Reason." In AMINTAPHIL: The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice, 191–204. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02312-0_14.
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Brennan, Jason. "In defense of epistocracy." In The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology, 374–83. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-45.
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Brennan, Jason. "In Defense of Epistocracy: Enlightened Preference Voting." In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, 391–400. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780367808983-38.
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Tremmel, Jörg, and James Wilhelm. "Democracy or Epistocracy? Age as a Criterion of Voter Eligibility." In Youth Quotas and other Efficient Forms of Youth Participation in Ageing Societies, 125–47. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13431-4_9.
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Lenczewska, Olga. "Electoral Competence, Epistocracy, and Standpoint Epistemologies. A Reply to Brennan." In Testimonial Injustice and Trust, 246–70. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003396789-18.
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Palumbo, Antonino. "Guardian Models of DD: Knowledge, Expertise and the Revival of Epistocracy." In The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, 41–79. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-56513-7_2.
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Reiss, Julian. "Expertise, Agreement, and the Nature of Social Scientific Facts or: Against Epistocracy." In Questioning Experts and Expertise, 33–42. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003161851-4.
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Mousavi Mojab, Seyed Ziae, Seyedmohammad Shams, Hamid Soltanian-Zadeh, and Farshad Fotouhi. "Epistocracy Algorithm: A Novel Hyper-heuristic Optimization Strategy for Solving Complex Optimization Problems." In Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, 408–26. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80126-7_31.
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