Academic literature on the topic 'Epistemic; Judgement evaluation'

Discretionary judgment is a necessary and desirable attribute of child protection practice and decision-making. Increasingly, approaches towards accountability in child protection services act to constrain the use of practitioner discretionary judgement through ever increasing layers of standardisation and technical-rational approaches to practice. This situation is at odds with the need for professionals to adaptively respond to practice environments that are characterised by uncertainty and complexity. At the same time, there are known weakness and problems that are reported in the decision-making literature, begging questions about how to best support and evaluate for effective and accountable discretion and decision-making across a whole system. In this paper discretion is conceptualised as a structural and epistemic phenomena that is constrained and restricted under the weight of standardisation. A five-part conceptual framework for a systems approach to policy evaluation is presented, and it is argued that this framework would support the capacity for effective discretionary judgement and decision-making to emerge as a property of the system overall. This paper is a theoretical and conceptual argument for a systemic policy evaluation framework that is supportive of discretionary judgment and decision-making in child protection systems shifting the emphasis away from technical-rational compliance.

Effective person-centred care requires recognition of the personhood not only of patients but of practitioners. This chapter explores the consequences of this recognition for major debates in medical epistemology, regarding clinical reasoning and the relationship between research and practice. For too long these debates have been dominated by false dichotomies - subjectivity versus objectivity, judgement versus evidence, reason versus emotion. Based on flawed understandings of such core concepts as “objectivity” and “engagement”, this distorted dissection of the subject-object relationship has served to depersonalise practice. The costs of this depersonalisation include over-regulation and micromanagement of healthcare processes by administrators and payers at the same time that information from clinical research remains under-utilized and the personhood of patients’ risks being ignored.Science is a human practice, founded in a broader conception of human reasoning, ontologically dependent on human beings living and engaging with the world in social, emotional and ethical contexts. After looking at different conceptions of epistemic hierarchies and their uses in the analysis and evaluation of reasoning in a range of practice contexts, we propose a “nested hierarchy” that effectively turns upside-down the flawed evidence hierarchies that have helped to depersonalise care. T.S. Eliot’s “wisdom, knowledge, information” scheme (to which we add “data” below “information”) provides a model for a person-centred epistemic hierarchy. This crucial, person-centred inversion represents levels of awareness that characterize more or less developed thinking and judgment on the part of the particular practitioner.

Abstract. Uncertainties in natural hazard risk assessment are generally dominated by the sources arising from lack of knowledge or understanding of the processes involved. There is a lack of knowledge about frequencies, process representations, parameters, present and future boundary conditions, consequences and impacts, and the meaning of observations in evaluating simulation models. These are the epistemic uncertainties that can be difficult to constrain, especially in terms of event or scenario probabilities, even as elicited probabilities rationalized on the basis of expert judgements. This paper reviews the issues raised by trying to quantify the effects of epistemic uncertainties. Such scientific uncertainties might have significant influence on decisions that are made for risk management, so it is important to communicate the meaning of an uncertainty estimate and to provide an audit trail of the assumptions on which it is based. Some suggestions for good practice in doing so are made.

Abstract. Part 1 of this paper has discussed the uncertainties arising from gaps in knowledge or limited understanding of the processes involved in different natural hazard areas. Such deficits may include uncertainties about frequencies, process representations, parameters, present and future boundary conditions, consequences and impacts, and the meaning of observations in evaluating simulation models. These are the epistemic uncertainties that can be difficult to constrain, especially in terms of event or scenario probabilities, even as elicited probabilities rationalized on the basis of expert judgements. This paper reviews the issues raised by trying to quantify the effects of epistemic uncertainties. Such scientific uncertainties might have significant influence on decisions made, say, for risk management, so it is important to examine the sensitivity of such decisions to different feasible sets of assumptions, to communicate the meaning of associated uncertainty estimates, and to provide an audit trail for the analysis. A conceptual framework for good practice in dealing with epistemic uncertainties is outlined and the implications of applying the principles to natural hazard assessments are discussed. Six stages are recognized, with recommendations at each stage as follows: (1) framing the analysis, preferably with input from potential users; (2) evaluating the available data for epistemic uncertainties, especially when they might lead to inconsistencies; (3) eliciting information on sources of uncertainty from experts; (4) defining a workflow that will give reliable and accurate results; (5) assessing robustness to uncertainty, including the impact on any decisions that are dependent on the analysis; and (6) communicating the findings and meaning of the analysis to potential users, stakeholders, and decision makers. Visualizations are helpful in conveying the nature of the uncertainty outputs, while recognizing that the deeper epistemic uncertainties might not be readily amenable to visualizations.

ABSTRACTLesson-drawing addresses the question: Under what circumstances and to what extent can a programme that is effective in one place transfer to another. Searching for fresh knowledge is not normal; the second section describes the stimulus to search as dissatisfaction with the status quo. Lessons can be sought by searching across time and/or across space; the choice depends upon a subjective definition of proximity, epistemic communities linking experts together, functional interdependence between governments, and the authority of intergovernmental institutions. The process of lesson-drawing starts with scanning programmes in effect elsewhere, and ends with the prospective evaluation of what would happen if a programme already in effect elsewhere were transferred here in future. Lesson-drwaing is part of a contested political process; there is no assurance that a lesson drawn will be both desirable and practical. The conclusion considers the uncertainty and instability of judgements about the practicality and desirability of transferring programmes.

In order to achieve the goals of social commentary and moral judgement pursued in her novels, Jane Austen describes and evaluates different aspects of her characters’ personalities: social attitude, intellectual qualities and moral traits (Lodge 1966). Mansfield Park (1814) is one of her novels in which this moral awareness is most acute. In order to construct a community of shared values with her readers, Austen skilfully alternates different points of view as sources of evaluation. We propose an analysis of the first chapter of Mansfield Park that addresses this dialogic dimension by focusing on the resources of engagement, the subsystem of Appraisal Theory with which speakers/writers express their commitment to the truth of a proposition and their willingness to open the negotiation space to other voices (Martin & White 2005: 97).The linguistic subtlety and complexity of Jane Austen’s writing is a challenge to translators, who must try to identify all the concurrent interpretation possibilities and reproduce them in the target language. In this article we compare the English source text with various translations into Spanish, Catalan and German. Our analysis focuses on the lexicogrammatical realisations of engagement such as verba dicendi, epistemic expressions, lexical choices with a distinct attitudinal load, and also on the development of narration – as far as that is possible in a study centering on the first chapter –, since it is often the case that narrator stance is modified as the text unfolds.We discuss fragments of narrator discourse, direct speech and indirect/free indirect speech and consider the advantages of the framework to uncover changes in the evaluative dimension of meaning that affect the readings the translations will afford in their target society, from character building to the articulation of points of view.

In order to achieve the goals of social commentary and moral judgement pursued in her novels, Jane Austen describes and evaluates different aspects of her characters’ personalities: social attitude, intellectual qualities and moral traits (Lodge 1966). Mansfield Park (1814) is one of her novels in which this moral awareness is most acute. In order to construct a community of shared values with her readers, Austen skilfully alternates different points of view as sources of evaluation. We propose an analysis of the first chapter of Mansfield Park that addresses this dialogic dimension by focusing on the resources of engagement, the subsystem of Appraisal Theory with which speakers/writers express their commitment to the truth of a proposition and their willingness to open the negotiation space to other voices (Martin & White 2005: 97).The linguistic subtlety and complexity of Jane Austen’s writing is a challenge to translators, who must try to identify all the concurrent interpretation possibilities and reproduce them in the target language. In this article we compare the English source text with various translations into Spanish, Catalan and German. Our analysis focuses on the lexicogrammatical realisations of engagement such as verba dicendi, epistemic expressions, lexical choices with a distinct attitudinal load, and also on the development of narration – as far as that is possible in a study centering on the first chapter –, since it is often the case that narrator stance is modified as the text unfolds.We discuss fragments of narrator discourse, direct speech and indirect/free indirect speech and consider the advantages of the framework to uncover changes in the evaluative dimension of meaning that affect the readings the translations will afford in their target society, from character building to the articulation of points of view.

The rapid development in healthcare technologies in recent years has resulted in the need for health services, whether publicly funded or insurance based, to identify means to maximise the benefits and provide equitable distribution of limited resources. This has resulted in the need for rationing decisions, and there has been considerable debate regarding the substantive and procedural ethical principles that promote distributive justice when making such decisions. In this paper, I argue that while the scientifically rigorous approaches of evidence-based healthcare are claimed as aspects of procedural justice that legitimise such guidance, there are biases and distortions in all aspects of the process that may lead to epistemic injustices. Regardless of adherence to principles of distributive justice in the decision-making process, evidential failings may undermine the fairness and legitimacy of such decisions. In particular, I identify epistemic exclusion that denies certain patient and professional groups the opportunity to contribute to the epistemic endeavour. This occurs at all stages of the process, from the generation, analysis and reporting of the underlying evidence, through the interpretation of such evidence, to the decision-making that determines access to healthcare resources. I further argue that this is compounded by processes which confer unwarranted epistemic privilege on experts in relation to explicit or implicit value judgements, which are not within their remit. I suggest a number of areas in which changes to the processes for developing, regulating, reporting and evaluating evidence may improve the legitimacy of such processes.

Abstract Multi-state is a typical characteristic of engineered systems. Most existing studies of redundancy allocation problems (RAPs) for multi-state system (MSS) design assume that the state probabilities of redundant components are precisely known. However, due to lack of knowledge and/or ambiguous judgements from engineers/experts, the epistemic uncertainty associated with component states cannot be completely avoided and it is befitting to be represented as belief quantities. In this paper, a multi-objective RAP is developed for MSS design under the belief function theory. To address the epistemic uncertainty propagation from components to system reliability evaluation, an evidential network (EN) model is introduced to evaluate the reliability bounds of an MSS. The resulting multi-objective design optimization problem is resolved via a modified non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm II (NSGA-II), in which a set of new Pareto dominance criteria is put forth to compare any pair of feasible solutions under the belief function theory. A numerical case along with a SCADA system design is exemplified to demonstrate the efficiency of the EN model and the modified NSGA-II. As observed in our study, the EN model can properly handle the uncertainty propagation and achieve narrower reliability bounds than that of the existing methods. More importantly, the original nested design optimization formulation can be simplified into a one-stage optimization model by the proposed method.

Le chiavi di lettura della bioetica della realizzazione e l’utilizzo degli OGM adottate nell’attuale dibattito culturale e filosofico sono: la filosofia del rapporto scienze sperimentali/etica e la filosofia del rapporto uomo/natura/ economia. Il rapporto scienze sperimentali/etica viene letto secondo due prospettive: la prospettiva scientista/progressista e la prospettiva precauzionista. La prospettiva scientista/progressista, cadendo nelle maglie della della fallacia scientifica e della fallacia naturalistica, sostiene che gli OGM sono eticamente da accettare, in quanto non si sono finora dimostrati dannosi. La prospettiva precauzionista, al contrario, supportata da un pregiudizio sostanzialmente antiscientifico, ritiene che la scienza non offra elementi di certezza sull’assenza di danno e che quindi spetti al diritto stabilire i criteri di accettabilità etica delle biotecnologie. L’orientamento personalista prende le distanze da entrambe, esprimendo i seguenti punti di vista: le scienze sperimentali, per il loro statuto epistemico, non possono offrire elementi di certezza assoluta sull’innocuità degli OGM, vanno quindi incrementate la ricerca e la sperimentazione case by case ed il follow-up nei lunghi tempi; i dati sperimentali finora acquisiti offrono elementi che sono probanti per stabilire il loro carattere di non dannosità e sono ritenuti irrinunciabili per un giudizio morale, che deve comunque tenere conto di elementi extrascientifici di valutazione. L’altro cardine filosofico di riferimento, che è i l rapporto uomo/natura/economia, si incentra sulla sostenibilità, concetto di matrice economica. I criteri della sostenibilità debole e della sostenibilità forte vedono rispettivamente la predominanza dello sviluppo economico sulla natura oppure la priorità della preservazione assoluta della natura sullo sviluppo. I diversi significati di sostenibilità sono motivati da concezioni radicalmente diverse di natura: la natura come risorsa, la natura come bene intangibile. L’orientamento personalista permette di superare la dicotomia incremento dello sviluppo/tutela della natura, con un radicale cambiamento di prospettiva, uno sviluppo non più sfrenato ed autonomo, che diventa sapiente amministrazione, ed una natura non più fine a se stessa, che diventa dono. Il concetto di amministrazione del dono affonda le sue radici nel libro della Genesi, laddove è scritto che Dio creò l’uomo e lo pose nel giardino dell’Eden, perché lo coltivasse e lo custodisse. L’imperativo del coltivare sollecita l’uomo ad impegnare la sua intelligenza e la sua libertà per fare fruttificare il giardino, con l’avvertenza però di non dimenticare che esso proviene da una “originaria donazione di Dio”. L’imperativo del custodire chiama in causa la responsabilità dell’uomo nel custodire l’essere, l’essere delle cose e l’essere dell’uomo, che dalla creazione sono inscindibilmente connessi. Ed è proprio la connessione originaria che impone alla bioetica questa come domanda etica di fondo: nel nostro rapporto con la natura, che cosa perdiamo o acquistiamo di noi stessi, che uomini diventiamo? In definitiva il vero sviluppo che siamo chiamati a realizzare non riguarda l’economia e quindi l’avere di più ma la pienezza di un’umanità autentica, e quindi l’essere di più mediante l’agire virtuoso: un agire prudente, temperante e, per ultimo, ma non da ultimo, giusto. ---------- The reading keys of bioethics about the creation and the utilization of GMO that are adopted in contemporary cultural and philosophical debate are: the philosophy of experimental sciences/ethics relationship and the philosophy of man/nature/economy relationship. The experimental sciences/ethics relationship could be read following two perspectives: the scientistic-progressist perspective and the precautionary perspective. The scientistic-progressist perspective, getting involved in the scientific and naturalistic fallacy, sustains that GMO are ethically acceptable because up to now they do not prove to be harmful. On the contrary, the precautionary perspective, supported by a substantially antiscientific prejudice, affirms that science does not offer elements of certainty about the absence of damage and that thus it is up to the right to establish the criteria of ethical acceptability of biotechnologies. The personalist approach dissociates itself from both perspectives, affirming the following points of view: experimental sciences, because of their epistemic statute, can not offer elements of absolute certainty about GMO harmlessness, so it is necessary to increase research, case by case experimentation and long-term follow-up; experimental data acquired up to now offer probative elements for establishing their character of harmlessness and that are considered as irrenounceable for a moral judgement which in any case must take into account extra-scientific elements of evaluation. The other philosophical support of reference, the man/nature/economy relationship, is based on sustainability, a concept having an economical matrix. The criteria of weak and of strong sustainability reflect respectively the prevailing of economic growth over nature or the priority of absolute preservation of nature over development. The different meanings of sustainability derive from radically different ideas of nature: nature as a resource, nature as intangible good. The personalist approach allows to overcome the dichotomy between the increase of development and the protection of nature through a radical change of perspective, a development which is no more unbridled and autonomous, which becomes wise administration and a nature which is no more an end in itself but becomes a gift. The idea of administration of the gift is rooted in the Book of Genesis, where it is written that God created man and put him in the Garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it. The imperative of dressing it urges man to use his intelligence and freedom to make the garden fructify, with the advise of never forgetting that it derives from a “God’s prior and original gift”. The imperative of keeping it involves man’s responsibility in keeping the being, the being of things and the being of man that from creation are inseparably connected. It is precisely this original connection that imposes on bioethics the following question as a basic ethical question: through our relationship with nature, what we lose or acquire of ourselves, what kind of men we become? Finally, the true development we are called to realize does not concern economy and thus having more, but the fullness of an authentic humanity, that is to say being more by acting virtuously: acting prudently, temperately and, last but not least, rightly.

This diploma thesis examines functions of the modal verb should in nominal content clauses introduced by the conjunction that. The Czech counterparts of the English sentences are considered as well. The research focuses on the so-called putative should which occurs after main clauses with directive, epistemic, attitudinal, evaluative and volitional expressions. Should expressing intrinsic (root) modality (expressing permission, obligation or ability) is left out of account. The work pays attention to the basic classification of nominal content clauses deriving from a verbal form alternating with putative should. Two kinds of putative should will be dealt with, namely should after directive and volitional expressions which could have its alternative form in the present subjunctive and should after epistemic, attitudinal and evaluative expressions which could possibly alternate with the indicative. The work examines these verbal forms in relation to the intentional modality of the sentence in an independent form (e.g. declarative, interrogative or imperative sentence). The work is divided into two parts: theoretical and practical. The theoretical part of the work describes the basic classification of all central modal verbs in English and putative should in terms of its relation towards the...

Stereotypes sometimes lead us to make poor judgements of other people, but they also have the potential to facilitate quick, efficient, and accurate judgements. How can we discern whether any individual act of stereotyping will have the positive or negative effect? How Stereotypes Deceive Us addresses this question. It identifies various factors that determine whether or not the application of a stereotype to an individual in a specific context will facilitate or impede correct judgements and perceptions of the individual. It challenges the thought that stereotyping only and always impedes correct judgement when the stereotypes that are applied are inaccurate, failing to reflect social realities. It argues instead that stereotypes that reflect social realities can lead to misperceptions and misjudgements, and that inaccurate but egalitarian social attitudes can facilitate correct judgements and accurate perceptions. The arguments presented in this book have important implications for those who might engage in stereotyping and for those at risk of being stereotyped. They have implications for those who work in healthcare and those who have mental health conditions. How Stereotypes Deceive Us provides a new conceptual framework—evaluative dispositionalism—that captures the epistemic faults of stereotypes and stereotyping, providing conceptual resources that can be used to improve our own thinking by avoiding the pitfalls of stereotyping, and to challenge other people’s stereotyping where it is likely to lead to misperception and misjudgement.

It is argued that the second version of the parity premise—irreducibility-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements, unlike moral judgements, are committed to merely reducibly normative properties. The argument for this is based on the same basic rationale outlined in chapter 3: epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law. A ‘back-up’ view is introduced: even if irreducibility-parity is true, the analogy between epistemic judgements and normative or evaluative judgements within institutions can yet be used to render the epistemic error theory less implausible than it may at first appear.

It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral judgements, by contrast, are committed to the existence of genuinely normative reasons. This claim is defended by appeal to the basic rationale that epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law, but moral judgements are not. It is argued that this does not render epistemic norms merely conventional in an objectionable sense.

In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has been assumed that the final or basic epistemic value is true belief. This chapter considers objections to this from knowledge-first and anti-consequentialist conceptions of epistemic norms. It presents reasons for scepticism about these views and claims that these alternatives are still compatible with the basic view in the book of the contrast between epistemic norms and moral norms and so with its rejection of the parity premise.

It is sometimes claimed that ‘belief aims at truth’ in a sense that explains the existence and nature of epistemic norms. Furthermore it is sometimes claimed that there is no analogous explanation of moral norms. In this chapter it is asked whether these claims represent an alternative means of rejecting the parity premise to the basic rationale—comparing epistemic judgements to normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—offered in chapters 3 and 5. It is argued that they do not. Three different readings of ‘belief aims at truth’ are identified. None are found to be plausible as an alternative route to rejection of the parity premise.