Journal articles on the topic 'Environmental Ombudsman'

Problems of enforcing EU environmental law by means of Article 169 procedure, adopting the "Newbury Bypass" case as an example; the background to the case - the Environmental Impact Directive and the "pipe-line" point; referral of the Commission's withdrawal from the case to the EU Ombudsman; the office and powers of the Ombudsman; the four main points of complaint; the Commission's arguments to the Ombudsman; the Ombudsman's conclusions, including the "rather surprising" possibility that "a bona fide but wrong interpretation of the law could amount to maladministration"; and his decision to conduct an "own initiative" inquiry into the workings of Article 169 generally; simultaneous consideration of petitions in respect of the same matter by the Petitions Committee of the European Parliament; the Committee's view that the Commission's decision had been made at a political level and its instigation of further investigations; conclusion as to the importance of these references to the Ombudsman and the Parliament.

Customer satisfaction is an integral element in inculcating trust among the common people in the banking sector, which may also boost financial inclusion. Customer satisfaction can be measured in terms of complaints received about the bank services. The Banking Ombudsman Scheme was introduced in India in 1995 and revised in 2002 to enable the resolution of complaints of customers of banks relating to certain services rendered by the banks. To analyse the performance of the Banking Ombudsman Scheme in India based on selected parameters, a descriptive research design has been used. The present study is based on secondary data compiled mainly from “The Banking Ombudsman Scheme-Annual report” which is published by RBI every year from 2015-16 to 2019-20. For analysis purposes, descriptive statistics tools such as percentages have been used.The Ombudsman scheme is a blessing and a very prominent medium for redressal of grievances by the general public against banks and banking services. The resolution and the pace of resolution of the complaints is an essential aspect of consumer satisfaction. Also, the total number of banking transactions is growing because of inclusion, new modes of payments & settlements coming, and newer products, offerings & services. considering this, RBI should increase the number of Ombudsmen proportionately. BO‟s offices have started outreach activities for creating awareness among customers But still, it needs to be more rigorous, especially in rural areas.

In this article, the author examines the organization of the activities of the national ombudsman (Human Rights Commissioner in the Russian Federation) to ensure human rights in the field of ecology, conducts a structural analysis of the received applications from citizens on environmental issues, and also makes a number of proposals to improve the activities of the ombudsman. Based on the results of the study, the main topics of citizens’ appeals regarding violations of the rules for the environment use and abuse of environmental human rights submitted to the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation were identified. The identification of borderline points by the national ombudsman requires attention in the field of environmental protection of citizens and giving them a public discussion, allows to focus the attention of society and the state on the most problematic aspects of ensuring human rights in the field of ecology, which helps the responsible state authorities to build their work more effectively in this direction, since the state of nature, environment and the ecological situation ultimately affect the development of both individual citizens and society and the state as a whole.

This research discusses the Effectiveness of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia Representatives of the Province of Lampung in Completing Reports Regarding the Distribution of Social Assistance for Communities Affected by the Covid-19 National Disaster in Lampung Province. With the formulation of the problem 1) How is the Effectiveness of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia Representatives of the Province of Lampung in Completing Reports Regarding the Distribution of Social Assistance for Communities Affected by the Covid-19 National Disaster in Lampung Province? 2) What were the inhibiting factors experienced and the efforts made by the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia representatives of the province of Lampung in completing the report? The conclusions of this study are 1) Completion of reports related to the distribution of social assistance to communities affected by the Covid-19 national disaster in Lampung Province carried out by the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia Representatives of the Province of Lampung is quite effective but not maximized, this is because the settlement regulatory mechanism is only based on in the Circular that has differences with the Ombudsman Regulations of the Republic of Indonesia 2) The main obstacle to the completion of public reports experienced by the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia Representatives of the Province of Lampung is the issuance of the Circular of the Chairman of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia which overrides higher Regulations, and efforts made to overcome obstacles The Head of the Ombudsman Representative of the Republic of Indonesia, Lampung Province, took another policy in the form of continuing to use several requirements stipulated in the Ombudsman Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the active health Ombudsman service as an instrument to evaluate the quality of delivery and birth care in the Cegonha Network of the Federal District of Brazil. METHODS: This is a cross-sectional study of the telephone survey type carried out with 1,007 mothers with deliveries between October 15, 2013 and November 19, 2013 in the twelve public maternity hospitals that make up the Cegonha Network of the Federal District of Brazil. The instrument has 25 multiple choice or Likert scale questions, including sociodemographic data and acceptability evaluation in five domains: accessibility, relationship between the patient and health professionals, conditions of the structure of the service, information to the patient, and equity and opinion of the patient. We have studied qualitative or categorical variables according to the frequency and distribution of proportions. We have used the score transformed into a scale from zero to 100 for the analysis of the Likert-type scale questions. Results have been expressed as mean and standard deviation. RESULTS: Access to prenatal appointments was evaluated as good or excellent by 86.1% of the participants and laboratory tests was evaluated as good or excellent by 85.2% of them. The access to imaging tests was evaluations as good or excellent by 45.7% of the women; 79.5% of the interviewees had their delivery in the maternity hospital where they sought initial care and 18.3% received a home visit by a community health agent after discharge. Most women reported that newborns were placed skin-to-skin immediately after birth, 48.9% had a companion at the time of the delivery, 76.3% were advised about the first appointment of the newborn, and 94.8% were advised on breastfeeding in the maternity hospital. Regarding the evaluation of health professionals, 85.9% of the women considered reception and cordiality as good or excellent at the prenatal care and 94.8% considered it as good or excellent at the maternity hospital. CONCLUSIONS: The active health Ombudsman service has contributed to evaluate the quality of public management by allowing the incorporation of the perspective of users of the health service in the evaluation of the acceptability of the Cegonha Network in the Federal District of Brazil.

On 18 February 2016, the European Ombudsman delivered a decision (case 12/2013/MDC) that has the potential to thoroughly shake up the manner in which the European Commission authorises plant protection products (PPPs).Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN-Europe) brought the case before the Ombudsman. It alleged that the Commission approves potentially unsafe PPPs and disregards data gaps in the risk assessment, thereby ignoring concerns raised by the European Food and Safety Authority. PAN-Europe also argued that the Commission fails to set appropriate risk mitigation measures and to check Member States’ compliance with those measures. The Ombudsman largely agreed with PAN-Europe. She found that the Commission indeed authorised substances, even when it was unclear whether a substance met the legal health and environmental safety requirements. The Ombudsman made several recommendations to the Commission for bringing its approval practice, which constitutes maladministration, in conformity with EU pesticide law.

The Fundamental Law of Hungary has a special focus on sustainable development, the protection of the interests of future generations and the common heritage of the nation. The ombudsman for future generation is a special and unique institution, responsible for the safeguard of these issues. The primary mission of the ombudsman is to remind the state, including all the state organs and levels, of this task and responsibility, also to propose legislation and to examine individual complaints. In this article we provide a breif overview of those part of the Fundamental Law, which are well-equipped by the decisions of the Constitutional Court. Among others is is clear from the above cases, that everyone has a three-fold obligation towards the interest of the future generation: conservation of options, conservation of quality, and conservation of access. These are supported by the principle of non-derogation and also by the wide interpretation of precautionary principle, in connection with the fundamental right to the environment.

In this paper, the authors discuss the decision-making method of the UK Financial Services Ombudsman enabling more favourable outcomes for an insured person in relation to the strict application of law. The authors delineate the manner in which the Ombudsman and the courts act and present specific examples in which the Ombudsman has recognized some rights to the insured whose exercising they themselves did not demand from the insurer. In the practice of the Ombudsman, there are numerous examples in which disputes arose due to a poor understanding of the breadth of the insurance coverage by the insured, the quality and scope of the damage repair service, a restrictive interpretation of the subject of insurance by the insurer. The circumstances on which the Ombudsman made decisions in disputes were based on the standard of a "vulnerable insured person" and a free belief of this body regarding the existence of unfulfilled expectations, which could contribute to the further improvement of the legal framework for the protection of the insured persons.

Dwelling time impor peti kemas di empat pelabuhan besar Indonesia, hasil penyelidikan Ombudsman Republik Indonesia mendapatkan beberapa temuan yang ditujukan pada Kementerian terkait dan PT. Pelindo (Pelabuhan Indonesia). Hasil temuan tersebut merupakan rapor buruk tentang pelayanan publik di Tanjung Priok Port, Tanjung Perak Port, Belawan Port dan Soekarno Hatta Port. Sebuah studi yang dilakukan oleh Ombudsman Indonesia menemukan sejumlah penemuan yang merugikan dan menghambat perekonomian Indonesia. Selain penyalahgunaan dwelling time keberangkatan oleh pemangku kepentingan di empat pelabuhan, terdapat kendala infrastruktur, staf, serta regulasi dan manajemen. Ombudsman akan mengawal temuan yang didapat hingga ke Presiden untuk ditindaklanjuti ke arah perbaikan layanan masyarakat (publik), dalam kaitannya kasus percepatan dwelling time ini, serta menjadi mediator antara aspirasi masyarakat dan pejabat instansi publik terkait. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dalam pelayanan publik kepelabuhanan, standar operasional harus lebih transparan dan sistematis, yang menjadi standar operasional bagi pemerintah, dan perkembangan kegiatan kepelabuhanan yang sangat pesat. Ombudsman RI perlu memantau dan mengawal kasus dwelling time ini hingga diperbaiki oleh pemerintah dan tersedia untuk pelayanan publik.

Directive 90/313 on access to information relating to the environment and The Code of Conduct on Public Access to Council and Commission documents - aims and structure; scope; procedures; exceptions; administrative and judicial review; comparison between the Directive and the Code of Conduct; interpretation by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice; the adoption of similar rules by other institutions following an owninitiative inquiry by the European Ombudsman.

In Greece, the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) provisions have not yet received special elaboration because of how misunderstood its operation within the modern administrative mechanism is, and the fact that many stakeholders may even be unaware of its existence. However, Presidential Decree (PD) 148/2009 transposing the directive into the Greek legislation remains the main legislative instrument, which establishes an environmental liability regime based on the polluter pays principle, focused on the prevention and remediation of environmental damage. Active citizens can play a very important role in the successful implementation of the ELD directive. But, as immediate public participation and informed decision-making is not always possible at an individual level, environmental organizations contribute to raising awareness, informing, and activating society to onset of the ELD procedure. The Greek Ombudsman can also make a unique and crucial contribution in ensuring the implementation of the environmental liability legislation. The power of environmental transparency and the implementation of the Aarhus Convention principles will help implement the ELD regime. Up-to-date, accurate and easyto- find environmental information empowers public and key stakeholders to make informed decisions that impact the environment. The aim of this article is to share the experience gained in the application of ELD and to contribute to a better understanding of the ELD key terms, and to improving the effectiveness of its implementation. Environment, liability, Ombudsman, operator, environmental damage, remediation, compliance, authorities, transparency, prevention

The fundamental aim of a country like Bangladeshis to realise through the democratic process a socialist society, free from exploitation- society in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice, political, economic and social will be secured for all citizens. The Office of an Ombudsman is not a basic institution of a democratic government; but it is very important to keep democracy intact and effective. Article 77 of the Constitution of Bangladesh is inserted therein in conformity with this statement of the Preamble to attain the same purpose. Keywords: Reality; Ombudsman; Constitutional Institution; Unwillingness of Bureaucrats

The article discusses legal basis for organizing the activities of the Ombudsman (Commissioner for Human Rights in Russian Federation) with the penitentiary system in the field of ensuring human rights, makes a structural analysis of the subject of incoming appeals to the Commissioner for Human Rights in Russian Federation, and also highlights the main areas of interaction in the field of ensuring human rights. In connection with the humanization of criminal and criminal-executive policy of Russia, the number of convicts has significantly decreased, material and household and medical support has improved, etc. As of August 1, 2020, 496 791 people were kept in the institutions of penitentiary system. (minus 27,137 people compared to 01.01.2020). At the same time, some problems regarding the protection of rights of suspects, accused, and convicted persons in the penal system continue to exist. The search for ways to improve penal system, its social reorientation and humanization determine the appeal to a new type of control over the observance of rights and legitimate interests of both convicts and employees of Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia - the institution of Ombudsman in Russian Federation, since problems related to observance of human rights in this area can accumulate for a long time, however, negative consequences of their non-resolution will further affect society and the state as a whole. The interaction of the Commissioner for Human Rights in Russian Federation and the penal system is manifested primarily in the field of ensuring human rights.

In addition to interpreting the precautionary principle, the present article shows that this principle of environmental law applies to agricultural practice as well. In a separate chapter, we analyze the relationship between the non-refoulement (also known as non-derogation) principle and the precautionary principle in connection with the latest cases of the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s practice. This article summarizes the counter-arguments of the constitutional judges against a strong interpretation of the precautionary principle and analyzes whether a strong interpretation of said principle prevails in the practice of the Deputy Ombudsman for Future Generations.

This article presents data from two sources. The first set of data comes from complaints received by the Health Services Commissioner (Health Ombudsman) in Victoria from Consumers of Health Services about health service providers. The second set of data has been provided by 92 public hospitals using the health complaints information program. The Health Complaints Resolution Process is described and the data are presented in the hope that they may assist in formulating policies for women's health.

The subject of the discussion is the legal nature of restrictions on the use of real estate in relation to the protection of environmental resources. Art. 129 of Environmental Law can have the effect that the use of a property or its part is impossible or substantially reduced. In doctrine, the dominant view is that such public-law interference in the right of property assumes the form of restriction referred to in Art. 64, par. 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Another interpretation is also possible. Since the depth of the interference with property rights can lead to the effect that this property will become, as the Ombudsman has pointed out recently, “useless” to the owner, it would be reasonable to consider whether or not such property is de facto being expropriated. In such a case, the standard of constitutional control would be Art. 21, sec. 2.

Since the early 1990s Peru has experienced an expansion in mining activities and an expansion in what the Peruvian ombudsman defines as socioenvironmental conflicts. This article examines the dynamics through which an environmental issue is transformed into a matter of citizenship and social belonging during a weeklong uprising in defense of Lake Conococha. Highlighting the collective actions and personal narratives from participants in the region-wide blockade, the article therefore seeks to understand how dispossessions of environmental resources perceived as common property are cast in terms of individual rights that move well beyond the site of conflict. It is therefore argued that the actions to reclaim Lake Conococha were not only a battle for natural resources and clean water, but more fundamentally an attempt to repossess a citizenship that may be constitutionally secured but all too often fails to be a lived reality in the high Andes of Peru.

This article examines the principles of accountability applied by the European Investment Bank in comparison with the practices of other Multilateral Lending Institutions. After a brief description of the EIB and its activities, the substantive and procedural principles governing the EIB's external accountability are reviewed. The substantive accountability principles considered are the applicable rules of the EU legal order and the voluntary human rights, social and environmental principles and standards which the EIB has identified for itself and committed to follow throughout its operations. The article evaluates the extent to which these norms form a credible normative framework against which the EIB's lending practices can be appraised. From a procedural accountability point of view, the article assesses the transparency and participation policies of the EIB, as well as the mechanisms offered to external stakeholders to seek redress from the EIB in case they are wronged by one of its decisions. The redress mechanisms analysed are the recent EIB's Complaints Office, the European Ombudsman and the Court of Justice. We conclude that the EIB should take more advantage of its being subjected to the EU human rights, social and environmental rules and of the EU judicial apparatus in order to upgrade its substantive and procedural accountability towards external stakeholders.

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan: (1) deskripsi representasi media tempo terhadap kasus TWK melalui deksripsi teks dalam tataran linguistik (2) deskripsi peran pihak-pihak yang terlibat dalam penyelesaian kasus TWK bagi pegawai KPK melalui interpretasi tema dan judul wacana berita TWK dan (3) deskripsi representasi keberpihakan media tempo dalam wacana berita TWK melalui interpretasi dan eksplanasi makna wacana berdasarkan unsur modalitas, metafora, dan keterlibatan actor dalam wacana berita TWK. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian deskriptif kualitatif dengan pendekatan Analisis Wacana Kritis (AWK). Objek penelitian ini adalah wacana berita dengan topik TWK di media Tempo. Data dikumpulkan dengan teknik simak dan cacat. Data dianalisis sesuai rumusan permasalahan. Teknik analisis data dilakukan secara kualitatif, menggunakan validitas semantis, serta reliabilitas interrater dan intrarater. Hasil penelitian ini adalah sebagai berikut. (1) Struktur dalam teks berita ini terdiri dari empat elemen yaitu judul berita, orientasi, untaian peristiwa dan penutup. (2) penyusunan tema dan informasi dalam judul berita utama didominasi 57 anggota KPK yang tidak lolos TWK, LSM, Pakar Hukum tata negara, Komnas HAM, dan Ombudsman yang melihat TWK tidak tepat. Penggunaan modalitas dalam teks berita ini didominasi modalitas intensional sebanyak 69 tuturan (61 %). Dalam tataran diksi, penggunaan metafora juga cukup dominan, khususnya dalam diksi kalimat judul (3) Berdasarkan hasil interpretasi dan eksplanasi, Tempo menyuguhkan beberapa argumen dengan kutipan langsung dari pihak-pihak yang tidak mendukung langkah ketua KPK untuk segera memberhentikan pegawai KPK yang tidak lolos asesmen TWK. Kata kunci: Representasi media Tempo, wacana Bberita, Tes Wawasan Kebangsaan, Analisis Wacana KritisRepresentation of Tempo's taking sides on the oppressed: A critical discourse analysisAbstractThis research presents a critical discourse analysis on how twelve Tempo headlines represent their taking sides with the 57 KPK employees who failed the civics test. Using the qualitative method, this study aims: 1) to describe the textual evidence of how Tempo framed the KPK civics test through its twelve headlines, 2) to describe how Tempo employs the theme structure of its twelve headlines titles that invokingly indicate its position concerning the KPK civic test, and 3) to describe how Tempo takes sides with the 57 KPK employees through modalities, metaphors, and direct quoted utterances in the news discourses. This study finds firstly that the twelve Tempo headlines were instantiated with the schematic structure of orientation, events sequence, and closing. Secondly, the theme-rheme analysis on the twelve headlines titles show that the 57 KPK employees, Indonesian Human Rights Commission, Ombudsman, Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), and Constitutional Law experts are foregrounded as the topical unmarked themes. Thirdly, the use of intentional modalities and metaphors and the direct quoting of arguments against the dismissal of the 57 employees voiced by Indonesian Human Rights Commission, Ombudsman, Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), and Constitutional Law experts show how Tempo headlines framed the KPK civic test.Keywords: Civics Tests, critical discourse analysis, media representation

This article’s overall goal is to examine the development of constitutional rights and their mechanisms for protection and promotion in Viet Nam through the case of the right to environment. Utilising legal methods, as well as qualitative and quantitative methods, the research investigates the ways in which the right to environment has been protected in Viet Nam through examining the case of the Thi Vai River. Given the strengths and weaknesses of Viet Nam’s existing legal system and its mechanisms for human rights protection through accessing the case of the citizen’s right to environment, the article proposes several recommendations for better protecting and promoting constitutional rights. These include further improving its legal system, establishing independent institutions and effective mechanisms (such as the Constitutional Council, Ombudsman, a National Human Rights Body, and an Environmental Court), and enhancing education, training and dissemination of international human rights law and constitutional rights for all.

This article studies how disabilities are conceptualized and used by citizens when they report perceived discrimination associated with disability in Sweden. A review of all 485 disability-related complaints filed with the Equality Ombudsman in 2012 shows how disabilities are conceptualized on three different themes. The first involves environmental obstacles that include references to deficiencies regarding human rights as well as material deficiencies. The second involves diagnoses and incapacity by using medical language citing medical certificates. The third involves those complaints that cite multiple discriminatory grounds, of which disability is one. These individual interpretations of disability show how citizens justify their belonging to the category of disabled people. The variations of the concept of disability can be viewed as a pragmatic way of relating to disability, suggesting the possibility of assuming different positions in different situations, where the context determines what is most suitable.

The paper analyses the status of international agreements in the field of air protection, aiming to interpret the discord between the adopted legal standards and their application. Having in mind the harmonisation process of Serbian law with the EU law, the author further analyzes the obligations of Member States arising from Directive 2008/50/EC on Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe, the developed practice of the CJEU which embodies elements determining the rights of individuals to initiate a procedure for protecting the right to a healthy environment if states do not adopt an air quality action plan, as well as the measures that domestic courts may prescribe to ensure the implementation of decisions establishing the obligation to implement measures for reduction of emissions above the limit values. The concluding sections analyse the degree of harmonisation of our positive law with the adopted standards and the environmental acquis. Having in mind a substantial number of cases related to air protection in the practice of the Serbian Protector of Citizens (Ombudsman), the analysis of the application of recommendations arising from these cases may suggest the degree of harmonisation of commitments and their application, and serve as an instrument for amending positive law.

The Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (known as DMA – “Digital Market Act”) sets clear rules for large online platforms. It aims to ensure that no large online platform that is in a “gatekeeper” position - to many users - abuses that position to the detriment of businesses wishing to access those users. The most innovative elements are the introduction of the legal figure of the “gatekeeper” and the provision of specific duties imposed on the same. The Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (known as DSA “Digital Services Act”) introduces a common set of rules on intermediaries’ obligations and accountability across the single market, aiming to ensure a high level of protection to all users. This paper aims to analyse the new provisions introduced by the Digital Service Package in the framework of market regulation policies. Keywords: Digital markets; Intermediary service; Online platforms; Online search engines; Market regulation; EU policies Ombudsman; Constitutional Institution; Unwillingness of Bureaucrats

The objective of this study was to adapt and make available a valid instrument based on a joint questionnaire (self-report type) to detect the risk of bullying and emotional problems in pupils aged from 11 to 13 years. The questionnaires used were that of Spain’s Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) to detect the risk of becoming a victim of bullying and an adaptation of Spain’s CECAD to assess the risk of emotional problems. The participants were 1077 gender-matched subjects enrolled in the 6th year of Primary Education (n = 467) and the 1st year of Lower Secondary Education (n = 610) from 19 schools in the Region of Extremadura. High reliability was obtained in both questionnaires, as well as a significant relationship between bullying and emotional problems (0.36). The scales place the pupils at either a certain risk level (mild, moderate, or severe) or no risk. The study concludes with the description of four situations deriving from the cross relationship between victimization and the pupil’s emotional problems: (1) no risk of bullying and no risk of emotional problems (73.2%), (2) risk of bullying but no risk of emotional problems (11.1%), (3) no risk of bullying but risk of emotional problems (9.4%), and (4) risk of bullying and risk of emotional problems (6.3%).

The institution of the Ombudsman in national human rights protection systems plays a significant role in the implementation of the rule of law. The rule of law is a fundamental legal principle of sustainable development. All citizens have equal rights that guarantee the well-being of society. Disclosure of the essence of the in-stitution of the Ombudsman, determination of its legal nature is impossible without its functional characteristics, which is also important for the practice of state and legal development, increasing the efficiency of the implementation of state func-tions. The purpose of this study is to analyse the experience of foreign countries regarding the organisation of the Ombudsman's control and oversight function and formulate proposals aimed at improving the institution of the Ombudsman in Kazakhstan on this basis. The study uses theoretical, general scientific, and special research methods. First of all, the composition of law enforcement agencies was determined, including its structural features in Kazakhstan, and their functional purpose. The regulated control and supervisory powers are outlined to suppress il-legal actions of law enforcement agencies. The typologisation of the system for the implementation of the control and supervisory function in the activities of law enforcement agencies was carried out according to its subject composition. The structural and functional features of all the noted forms and levels of implementa-tion of the control and oversight function are considered, with the allocation of the Commissioner for Human Rights in Kazakhstan as the leading subject. The analy-sis of the dynamics of quantitative and qualitative indicators of the activities of the Ombudsman of Kazakhstan in the process of implementing the control and supervisory function in the activities of law enforcement agencies. The national preventive mechanism as one of the forms of public control of the institutions of the law enforcement system of Kazakhstan is investigated, the effectiveness of its implementation is assessed.

ABSTRAKAplikasi Apekesah merupakan sebuah aplikasi pengaduan online masyarakat yang digagas olehPemerintah Kota Batam melalui Dinas Komunikasi dan Informatika Kota Batam pada tahun 2017.Berdasarkan data dari Ombudsman RI, instansi yang paling banyak mendapatkan laporan terkait masalahpelayanan publik di Indonesia adalah pemerintah daerah yakni sebesar 681 laporan. Oleh karena itu,pemerintah daerah harus melakukan pembenahan terutama dalam hal bidang pelayanan publik. Salahsatu, pemerintah daerah yang melakukan perbaikan kualitas pelayanan publik adalah Kota Batam.Pemerintah Kota Batam melalui Dinas Komunikasi dan Informatika membuat gagasan berupa inovasipengaduan online yang diberi nama Apekesah. Inovasi tersebut menjadi salah satu cara yang ingindilakukan pemerintah agar dapat menampung aduan dan keluhan masyarakat Kota Batam. Berdasarkandata yang diperoleh dari Obudsman Perwakilan Kepulauan Riau, dari 6 kabupaten/kota yang ada diKepulauan Riau, pada tahun 2017 Kota Batam menempati urutan pertama sebagai Kota yang palingbanyak mendapatkan aduan dari masyarakat yaitu sebesar 129 laporan. Tujuan dari penelitian ini untukmelihat bagaimana difusi inovasi aplikasi apekesah pada masyarakat Kota Batam. Metode Penelitianyang digunakan adalah kualitatif deskriptif dengan metode pengumpulan data primer dan sekundermelalui wawancara dan dokumentasi. Dalam penelitian ini peneliti menggunakan Teori Difusi Inovasimilik Everett M. Rogers dan Floyd Shoemaker dengan menganalisis 4 indikator utama yaitu inovasi;jangka waktu; anggota sistem sosial dan saluran komunikasi. Hasil dari penelitian ini, aplikasi apekesahbelum secara keseluruhan telah memenuhi indikator dari difusi inovasi khususnya indikator inovasi yaitukerumitan. Serta dalam penelitian ini, diperoleh hasil perbedaan jangka waktu masyarakat Kota Batamdalam mengadopsi aplikasi apekesah yang dapat dilihat perbedaannya bedasarkan tipe anggota sosial dansaluran komunikasi yang digunakan Dinas Komunikasi Kota Batam dengan media massa maupuninterpersonal. Kata kunci: Aplikasi Pengaduan Online Apekesah, Penyebaran/difusi, Kota Batam

Introduction. Reducing the transmission of infectious diseases both among vaccinated individuals and the general population is only possible with the introduction of mandatory vaccination. The purpose of this article is to analyze the normative acts in force in the territory of the Republic of Poland, regulating mandatory and recommended immunizations. State of the art description. In Poland, immunization is mandatory and carried out in accordance with the Immunization Program for children and adolescents up to the age of 19, and persons particularly vulnerable to disease are published annually as a communiqué of the Chief Sanitary Inspector in the Official Journal of the Minister of Health. The issue of recommended immunizations is clarified by the Regulation of the Minister of Health of September 16, 2010, on the list of recommended immunizations and how to finance and document recommended immunizations required by international health regulations. According to Article 17(6) of the Law, vaccination may be performed by a doctor, feldsher, nurse, midwife, and school hygienist, as long as they have the appropriate qualifications. These qualifications are described in detail in the Ordinance of the Minister of Health of August 18, 2011, on mandatory immunization. According to Article 16 of the Law on Patient Rights and Patient Ombudsman, every patient has the right both to consent and to refuse certain health services. Conclusion. Immunization on the territory of the Republic of Poland is mandatory and is subject to legal regulation in the form of laws, regulations, and announcements, cited above. The exceptions are recommended vaccinations and COVID-19 vaccination, which are voluntary but are also legally normalized.

Abstract: User satisfaction is known to be related to quality of healthcare. The aim of this study was to evaluate the influence of contextual and individual factors associated with user dissatisfaction with the Brazilian Unified National Health System (SUS). This was a cross-sectional multilevel study. Data were collected via telephone by the ombudsman's office of the SUS. Telephone numbers were randomly selected from a telephone company database. Health services, socioeconomic, and individual demographic variables were evaluated, in addition to information on the municipalities. The outcome variable was dissatisfaction with the SUS. Hierarchical multilevel logistic regression was used, and 18,673 individuals were contacted. Prevalence of dissatisfaction was 63.4% (95%CI: 62.7-64.1). Unmet demand (OR = 3.66), waiting time > 4 hours (OR = 2.82), and number of Primary Healthcare Units (OR = 0.89) were associated statistically with dissatisfaction. Characteristics of the health teams' work process showed a strong association with dissatisfaction.

AbstractIn Sweden, electrohypersensitivity is recognized as a functional impairment which implies only the environment as the culprit. The Swedish view provides persons with this impairment a maximal legal protection, it gives them the right to get accessibility measures for free, as well as governmental subsidies and municipality economic support, and to provide them with special Ombudsmen (at the municipality, the EU, and the UN level, respectively), the right and economic means to form disability organizations and allow these to be part of national and international counterparts, all with the simple and single aim to allow persons with the functional impairment electrohypersensitivity to live an equal life in a society based on equality. They are not seen as patients, the do not have an overriding medical diagnosis, but the ‘patient’ is only the inferior and potentially toxic environment. This does not mean that a subjective symptom of a functionally impaired can not be treated by a physician, as well as get sick-leave from their workplace as well as economic compensation, and already in the year 2000 such symptoms were identified in the Internal Code of Diagnoses, version 10 (ICD-10; R68.8/now W90), and have been since. But the underlying cause still remains only the environment.

Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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