Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Enactivism / Journal articles

Journal articles on the topic 'Enactivism'

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Enactivism.

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 20 February 2023

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Enactivism.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Zilio, Federico. "The Body Surpassed Towards the World and Perception Surpassed Towards Action: A Comparison between Enactivism and Sartre’s Phenomenology." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28, no. 1 (June 15, 2020): 73–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.927.

Full text

Abstract:

Enactivism maintains that the mind is not produced and localized inside the head but is distributed along and through brain-body-environment interactions. This idea of an intrinsic relationship between the agent and the world derives from the classical phenomenological investigations of the body (Merleau-Ponty in particular). This paper discusses similarities and differences between enactivism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology, which is not usually considered as a paradigmatic example of the relationship between phenomenological investigations and enactivism (or 4E theories in general). After a preliminary analysis of the three principal varieties of enactivism (sensorimotor, autopoietic and radical), I will present Sartre’s account of the body, addressing some key points that can be related to the current enactivist positions: perception-action unity, anti-representationalism, anti-internalism, organism-environment interaction, and sense-making cognition. Despite some basic similarities, enactivism and Sartre’s phenomenology move in different directions as to how these concepts are developed. Nevertheless, I will suggest that Sartre’s phenomenology is useful to the enactivist approaches to provide a broader and more complete analysis of consciousness and cognition, by developing a pluralist account of corporeality, enriching the investigation of the organism-environment coupling through an existentialist perspective, and reincluding the concept of subjectivity without the hypostatisation of an I-subject detached from body and world.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Förster, Frank. "Enactivism and Robotic Language Acquisition: A Report from the Frontier." Philosophies 4, no. 1 (March 7, 2019): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4010011.

Full text

Abstract:

In this article, I assess an existing language acquisition architecture, which was deployed in linguistically unconstrained human–robot interaction, together with experimental design decisions with regard to their enactivist credentials. Despite initial scepticism with respect to enactivism’s applicability to the social domain, the introduction of the notion of participatory sense-making in the more recent enactive literature extends the framework’s reach to encompass this domain. With some exceptions, both our architecture and form of experimentation appear to be largely compatible with enactivist tenets. I analyse the architecture and design decisions along the five enactivist core themes of autonomy, embodiment, emergence, sense-making, and experience, and discuss the role of affect due to its central role within our acquisition experiments. In conclusion, I join some enactivists in demanding that interaction is taken seriously as an irreducible and independent subject of scientific investigation, and go further by hypothesising its potential value to machine learning.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Dierckxsens, Geoffrey. "Enactive Cognition and the Other: Enactivism and Levinas Meet Halfway." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28, no. 1 (June 15, 2020): 100–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.930.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper makes a comparison between enactivism and Levinas’ philosophy. Enactivism is a recent development in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that generally defines cognition in terms of a subject’s natural interactions with the physical environment. In recent years, enactivists have been focusing on social and ethical relations by introducing the concept of participatory sensemaking, according to which ethical know-how spontaneously emerges out of natural relations of participation and communication, that is, through the exchange of knowledge. This paper will argue first that, although participatory sensemaking is a valuable concept in that it offers a practical and realistic way of understanding ethics, it nevertheless downplays the significance of otherness for understanding ethics. I will argue that Levinas’ work demonstrates in turn that otherness is significant for ethics in that we cannot completely anticipate others through participation or know-how. We cannot live the other’s experiences or suffering, which makes ethical relation so difficult and serious (e.g. care for a terminally ill person always falls short to a certain extent). I will argue next that enactivism and Levinas’ philosophy nevertheless do not exclude each other insofar they share a similar concept of subjectivity as a quality of naturally interacting with the external world to gain knowledge (Levinas speaks of dwelling). Finally, I will argue that enactivism’s notion of participatory sensemaking also offers something which Levinas’ insufficiently defines, namely a concept of social justice, based on equality and participation, that emerges out of natural relations.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Sridharan, Vishnu. "Beyond consensual domains: Enactivism, social representations and third-order unities." Culture & Psychology 21, no. 2 (June 2015): 259–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354067x15570489.

Full text

Abstract:

Although Enactivism and cultural anthropology share many core principles, a satisfactory Enactivist approach to culture has not yet been articulated. While the Enactivist embraces the cultural anthropologist’s skepticism with respect to a pregiven world described through objective truths, one of its stumbling blocks has been its difficulty in accounting for the normative background of interpersonal interaction, or what Wolfgang Wagner has referred to as “Social Representations.” This article argues that in order for the Enactivist to provide the conceptual tools necessary for this analysis, she must make use of what Varela and others refer to as “third-order unities.” The same principles that the Enactivist uses to explain the emergent properties of cells and organisms—autopiesis and identity-production—must be applied at the level of a society in order to understand how cultural meanings emerge and how they influence individual behavior. By applying these concepts at the supra-individual level, we get a more lucid picture of the fundamental features of an Enactivist account of culture, and can better understand the fundamental principles that Enactivism claims underlie all living systems both simple and complex.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Kee, Hayden. "The Surplus of Signification: Merleau-Ponty and Enactivism on the Continuity of Life, Mind, and Culture." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28, no. 1 (June 15, 2020): 27–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.919.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper provides a critical discussion of the views of Merleau-Ponty and contemporary enactivism concerning the phenomenological dimension of the continuity between life and mind. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s views are at odds with those of enactivists. Merleau-Ponty only applied phenomenological descriptions to the life-worlds of sentient animals with sensorimotor systems, contrary to those enactivists who apply them to all organisms. I argue that we should follow Merleau-Ponty on this point, as the use of phenomenological concepts to describe the “experience” of creatures with no phenomenal consciousness has generated confusion about the role of phenomenology in enactivism and prompted some enactivists to ignore or turn away from phenomenology. Further, Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes the stark distinction between the vital order of animals and the human order to a greater degree than many phenomenologically inspired enactivists. I discuss his view in connection with recent research in developmental and comparative psychology. Despite the striking convergence of Merleau-Ponty’s visionary thought with the most recent findings, I argue that he somewhat overstates the difference between human experience and cognition, and that of our closest animal kin. I outline a developmental-phenomenological account of how the child enters the human order in the first years of life, thereby further mitigating the stark difference between orders. This results in a modified Merleau-Pontian version of the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity which I recommend to enactivism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Gärtner, Klaus, and Robert W. Clowes. "Enactivism, Radical Enactivism and Predictive Processing: What is Radical in Cognitive Science?" Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 18, no. 1 (April 1, 2017): 54–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2017-0003.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractAccording to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem (section 2), we will argue (section 3) that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this (section 4), we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Arango, Alejandro. "Social enactivism about perception—reply to McGann." Adaptive Behavior 27, no. 2 (March 7, 2019): 161–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712319835162.

Full text

Abstract:

In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Figueiredo, Nara M. "On the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 108–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.13.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialectical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemological. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three ontological enactivist claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.Keywords: Dialectics, Enactivism, Language, Epistemology, Ontology.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Silva, Marcos, Carlos Brito, and Francicleber Ferreira. "Review to Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin’s Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. MIT Press, 2017." Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) 26, no. 51 (September 30, 2019): 385–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2019v26n51id16474.

Full text

Abstract:

In this review, Hutto and Myin’s new book “Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content” (2017) is critically presented. Although they do not provide a detailed cognitive science theory based on their Radical Enactive approach, one may say that Hutto and Myin originally address the perennial philosophical issue about our nature as human beings giving an impossible-to-neglect enactivist contribution to the current state-of-art in the discussion concerning embodied cognition.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Simionescu-Panait, Andrei. "Are Constructivism and Enactivism two opposite philosophies on learning mathematics?" Revista Pesquisa Qualitativa 8, no. 18 (October 7, 2020): 419–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.33361/rpq.2020.v.8.n.18.338.

Full text

Abstract:

Constructivism and enactivism are proposing opposite philosophies regarding the teaching of mathematics. The article explores the roots of kinaesthetic constructivism in Husserl’s phenomenology of the lived body. Then, the article describes the main points on which enactivism explicitly differs from constructivism. Finally, the article lists the criteria for opposing or bringing together constructivism and enactivism and argues that constructivism and enactivism aim for different pedagogical results and have different teaching functions. Keywords: Kinaesthetic constructivism; Enactivism; Husserl; I can; Learning.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Clavel Vázquez, María Jimena. "A match made in heaven: predictive approaches to (an unorthodox) sensorimotor enactivism." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19, no. 4 (December 20, 2019): 653–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09647-0.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractIt has been pointed out that Sensorimotor Enactivism, a theory that claims that perception is enacted and brought about by movement, says very little about the neural mechanisms that enable perception. For the proponents of the predictive approach to Sensorimotor Enactivism, this is a challenge that can be met by introducing predictive processing into the picture. However, the compatibility between these theories is not straightforward. Firstly, because they seem to differ in their stand towards representations: while Sensorimotor Enactivism is said to belong to the non-representational wing of cognitive science, predictive processing has a representational profile. And secondly, because they exhibit different explanatory strategies: while Sensorimotor Enactivism prioritizes the interactions of the embodied agent, predictive processing has internalist commitments. The aim of this paper is to address these concerns and show that a predictive approach to Sensorimotor Enactivism is viable. More specifically, I focus on the Free-Energy approach, a theory that falls within the ballpark of predictive processing. In this paper I argue for the following claims. I argue that (a) both Sensorimotor Enactivism and the Free-Energy approach may be understood for some systems in representational terms. The non-representational reading of Sensorimotor Enactivism is not mandatory and neither is the representational reading of the Free-Energy approach. (b) Sensorimotor Enactivism is, in this respect, compatible with both representational and non-representational interpretations of the FEA. So, the position towards representations of these frameworks should not stand in the way of a predictive approach to Sensorimotor Enactivism. I also show that (c) the Free-Energy approach allows for an account that prioritizes the interaction of the embodied agent with the environment. This is the explanatory strategy followed by Sensorimotor Enactivism. To justify this strategy and following other proponents of Sensorimotor Enactivism, I argue that by referring to the interactions of the embodied agent a better account of the phenomena in question is provided. On this basis, I claim that (d) Sensorimotor Enactivism and the Free-Energy approach are compatible in what concerns their explanatory strategy as well. Thus, making the case for the viability of the predictive approach to Sensorimotor Enactivism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Segovia-Cuéllar, Andrés. "Revisiting the Social Origins of Human Morality: A Constructivist Perspective on the Nature of Moral Sense-Making." Topoi 41, no. 2 (October 11, 2021): 313–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09765-y.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractA recent turn in the cognitive sciences has deepened the attention on embodied and situated dynamics for explaining different cognitive processes such as perception, emotion, and social cognition. This has fostered an extensive interest in the social and ‘intersubjective’ nature of moral behavior, especially from the perspective of enactivism. In this paper, I argue that embodied and situated perspectives, enactivism in particular, nonetheless require further improvements with regards to their analysis of the social nature of human morality. In brief, enactivist proposals still do not define what features of the social-relational context, or which kind of processes within social interactions, make an evaluation or action morally relevant or distinctive from other types of social normativity. As an alternative to this proclivity, and seeking to complement the enactive perspective, I present a definition of the process of moral sense-making and offer an empirically-based ethical distinction between different domains of social knowledge in moral development. For doing so, I take insights from the constructivist tradition in moral psychology. My objective is not to radically oppose embodied and enactive alternatives but to expand the horizon of their conceptual and empirical contributions to morality research.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Loader, Paul. "Marx and Enactivism." Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive 63, no. 1 (2015): 65–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/intel.2015.1024.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Barrett, Louise. "Enactivism, pragmatism…behaviorism?" Philosophical Studies 176, no. 3 (January 1, 2019): 807–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-01231-7.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Dung, Leonard. "Against the Explanatory Argument for Enactivism." Journal of Consciousness Studies 29, no. 7 (July 14, 2022): 57–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.057.

Full text

Abstract:

Sensorimotor enactivism is the view that the content and the sensory modality of perceptual experience are determined by implicit knowledge of lawful regularities between bodily movements and patterns of sensory stimulation. A proponent of the explanatory argument for sensorimotor enactivism holds that this view is able to provide an intelligible explanation for why certain material realizers give rise to certain perceptual experiences, while rival accounts cannot close this 'explanatory gap'. However, I argue that the notion of the 'material realizer' of perceptual experience is ambiguous. On a narrow construal, the explanatory gap cannot be bridged, not even by enactivism. On a wide construal, enactivism gets a grip on the explanatory gap, but only to the same extent as established theories of consciousness. Thus, on both horns of the dilemma, the explanatory power of enactivism is not superior to more traditional theories of conscious experience.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Monterroza-Rios, Alvaro David, and Carlos Mario Gutiérrez-Aguilar. "Enactivism and Material Culture: How Enactivism Could Redefine Enculturation Processes." Philosophies 7, no. 4 (July 4, 2022): 75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040075.

Full text

Abstract:

Culture has traditionally been considered as a set of knowledge, beliefs, arts, laws, norms, and morals, acquired by a human being as a member of a group. Some anthropologists interpret this as a set of abstract representations, such as information or knowledge, while others interpret it as behavioral control mechanisms. These views assume that the contents of a particular culture must be processed by the minds of individuals, either in a direct way or by resorting to learned mental structures in processes of symbolic socialization. Some critics suggest a problem with these perspectives since they do not provide a convincing explanation of the enculturation process beyond metaphorical images of transfer or internalization of symbolic cultural contents through linguistic transmission. The new embodied theories of cognition, especially enactivism, could give new ideas about what enculturation processes are like, through the concept of participatory sense-making in material culture environments. In this essay, we discuss how an enactive vision of culture could be, and what advantages it would have, as well as the challenges and weaknesses in explaining the culture and its learning processes.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Matthen, Mohan. "Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 1 (February 2014): 118–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.905251.

Full text

Abstract:

In this review of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Rolla, Giovanni. "Enativismo radical: exposição, desafios e perspectivas [Radical enactivism: exposition, challenges and prospects]." Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) 25, no. 46 (January 29, 2018): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2018v25n46id12129.

Full text

Abstract:

Primeiro, o enativismo é apresentado como a ideia de que a ação é constitutiva da cognição e é situado historicamente a partir da psicologia ecológica de Gibson. O enativismo radical (segundo o qual nem toda cognição é representacional) é então diferenciado de enativismo moderado (segundo o qual a cognição envolve representações orientadas-pela-ação). É feita uma defesa do enativismo radical diante da objeção de que o papel da ação na cognição é meramente causal. São avançados dois desafios para o futuro do enativismo radical: como podem emergir estados representacionais e qual é a concepção de racionalidade apropriada para este quadro teórico. [Enactivism is first presented as the view that action is constitutive of cognition and it is historically situated as arising from Gibson’s ecological psychology. Radical enactivism (according to which not all cognition is representational) is then differentiated from moderate enactivism (according to which cognition involves action-oriented representations). An argument for choosing the former is then presented. Radical enactivism is defended from the objection that the role played by action in cognition is merely causal. Two challenges for the future of radical enactivism are advanced: how can representational states emerge and which conception of rationality fits this theoretical framework.]

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Simionescu-Panait, Andrei. "Teaching Philosophy and Enactivism." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia 66, no. 2 supplement (October 30, 2021): 191–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2021.2s.14.

Full text

Abstract:

"The paper presents a concise history of enactivism in education, especially in mathematics education. Cases described by Davis’s, Proulx and Simmt’s work showcase the idea that enactivism is a viable alternative to constructivism or to classical views both in terms of practical teaching and theoretical models related to the process of learning. The idea that the student should solve a fixed problem, discover the universally correct solution, and eventually store that correct solution to find many other universally correct solutions to other fixed problems reduces the student to a very simple mechanism aimed at informational efficiency. This problem is met by the enactivistic tradition that began with Varela and Maturana’s work, now updated to the aforementioned researchers. Contra the classical perspective, enactivism proposes the idea that the student collaboratively produces the problem, being able to see multiple solutions, and eventually becoming a performer of knowledge. The article takes these ideas developed in mathematics education and finds their use in philosophical education. The article especially focuses on the student’s problem of being unable to link a new philosophical text discussed in class with their intuition. The last part of the article offers a lesson design example. The philosophical design focuses on making the students explore their own thinking regarding the topic about to be discussed by using a philosophy text before introducing the text. Keywords: enactivism, phenomenology, philosophy of education, classroom design "

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Li, Qing, and Ian Winchester. "Enactivism and Freedom Education." AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard V, no. 2 (2014): 113–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.26913/50202014.0109.0006.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Degenaar, Jan, and J. Kevin O’Regan. "Sensorimotor Theory and Enactivism." Topoi 36, no. 3 (August 15, 2015): 393–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9338-z.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Gallagher, Shaun. "Enactivism, Causality, and Therapy." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 27, no. 1 (2020): 27–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2020.0002.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Villalobos, Mario, and Pablo Razeto-Barry. "Are living beings extended autopoietic systems? An embodied reply." Adaptive Behavior 28, no. 1 (January 22, 2019): 3–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712318823723.

Full text

Abstract:

Building on the original formulation of the autopoietic theory (AT), extended enactivism argues that living beings are autopoietic systems that extend beyond the spatial boundaries of the organism. In this article, we argue that extended enactivism, despite having some basis in AT’s original formulation, mistakes AT’s definition of living beings as autopoietic entities. We offer, as a reply to this interpretation, a more embodied reformulation of autopoiesis, which we think is necessary to counterbalance the (excessively) disembodied spirit of AT’s original formulation. The article aims to clarify and correct what we take to be a misinterpretation of AT as a research program. AT, contrary to what some enactivists seem to believe, did not (and does not) intend to motivate an extended conception of living beings. AT’s primary purpose, we argue, was (and is) to provide a universal individuation criterion for living beings, these understood as discrete bodies that are embedded in, but not constituted by, the environment that surrounds them. However, by giving a more explicitly embodied definition of living beings, AT can rectify and accommodate, so we argue, the enactive extended interpretation of autopoiesis, showing that although living beings do not extend beyond their boundaries as autopoietic unities, they do form part, in normal conditions, of broader autopoietic systems that include the environment.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Agmon, Eran, Matthew Egbert, and Nathaniel Virgo. "The Biological Foundations of Enactivism: A Report on a Workshop Held at Artificial Life XV." Artificial Life 24, no. 1 (February 2018): 49–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/artl_a_00253.

Full text

Abstract:

This is a report on the Biological Foundations of Enactivism Workshop, which was held as part of Artificial Life XV. The workshop aimed to revisit enactivism's contributions to biology and to revitalize the discussion of autonomy with the goal of grounding it in quantitative definitions based in observable phenomena. This report summarizes some of the important issues addressed in the workshop's talks and discussions, which include how to identify emergent individuals out of an environmental background, what the roles of autonomy and normativity are in biological theory, how new autonomous agents can spontaneously emerge at the origins of life, and what science can say about subjective experience.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Butsykin, Yehor. "Ecological, phenomenological and embodied approach in psychotherapy and its significance for the education of psychotherapists." Filosofiya osvity. Philosophy of Education 27, no. 2 (March 2, 2022): 228–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.31874/2309-1606-2021-27-2-13.

Full text

Abstract:

The article is devoted to the basic elements of ecological and phenomenological approach in psychology, psychiatry and psychotherapy, as they are present in the philosophy of the famous German psychiatrist-philosopher Thomas Fuchs, as well as to justificate the translation strategy of Fuchs' philosophy and description of the most difficult terms. The originality of Fuchs' attitude is shown, which is a combination of different modern research approaches: phenomenology, enactivism, ecological psychology, ecological psychotherapy, topological, vector psychology and field psychology, as well as existential psychiatry and psychotherapy. It is proposed to interpret the theoretical and methodological attitude of Thomas Fuchs as based in part on the enactivist guidelines of two-dimensional consideration of the embodied subject, in part on the rehabilitation of philosophical anthropology and Naturphilosophie of Helmut and the natural philosophy of Helmut Plessner and his version of the idea of two-dimensional embodied subject in the methodology of humanities and natural sciences. In particular, the possibility of interpreting Professor Fuchs' approach as a modern Naturphilosophie within the general project of naturalization of phenomenology is shown. In addition, the article shows the difference between the ecological approach and ecological methodology. The emphasis on the fact that Fuchs uses an ecological approach in his philosophy justifies the use, at first glance, of such contradictory methodologies as phenomenology, ecological and topological psychology, enactivism, and so on. Along with this, the ecological approach is considered as a project of radicalization of the phenomenological attitude or as a radical phenomenological stance.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Maiese, Michelle. "Mindshaping, Enactivism, and Ideological Oppression." Topoi 41, no. 2 (October 11, 2021): 341–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09770-1.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Gallagher, Shaun, and Matthew Bower. "Making enactivism even more embodied." AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard V, no. 2 (2014): 232–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.26913/50202014.0109.0011.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Silverman, David. "Sensorimotor enactivism and temporal experience." Adaptive Behavior 21, no. 3 (May 2013): 151–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712313482802.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Corris, Amanda, and Anthony Chemero. "The broad scope of enactivism." Adaptive Behavior 28, no. 1 (April 22, 2019): 27–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712319843268.

Full text

Abstract:

Villalobos and Razeto-Barry suggest that extended enactivist interpretations of the autopoietic theory do not adequately address the bodily dimensions of living beings. In reply, we suggest that the extended enactivist view provides a richer account of living beings than a theory confined to autopoiesis, and therefore should not be supplanted by a modified autopoietic theory.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Maiese, Michelle. "Transformative Learning, Enactivism, and Affectivity." Studies in Philosophy and Education 36, no. 2 (December 21, 2015): 197–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11217-015-9506-z.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Rowlands, Mark. "Enactivism and the Extended Mind." Topoi 28, no. 1 (January 8, 2009): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9046-z.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Ward, Dave, David Silverman, and Mario Villalobos. "Introduction: The Varieties of Enactivism." Topoi 36, no. 3 (April 18, 2017): 365–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9484-6.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

이영의. "Enactivism, Emergence, and Downward Causation." PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE ll, no. 28 (November 2018): 118–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.33639/ptc.2018..28.006.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Rolla, Giovanni. "RADICAL ENACTIVISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE." Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 59, no. 141 (September 2018): 723–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-512x2018n14105gr.

Full text

Abstract:

ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness (one's beliefs, desires, intentions and so on) are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Francis, Krista, Steven Khan, and Brent Davis. "Enactivism, Spatial Reasoning and Coding." Digital Experiences in Mathematics Education 2, no. 1 (December 2, 2015): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40751-015-0010-4.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Stilwell, Peter, and Katherine Harman. "Phenomenological Research Needs to be Renewed: Time to Integrate Enactivism as a Flexible Resource." International Journal of Qualitative Methods 20 (January 1, 2021): 160940692199529. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1609406921995299.

Full text

Abstract:

Qualitative research approaches under the umbrella of phenomenology are becoming overly prescriptive and dogmatic (e.g., excessive and unnecessary focus on the epoché and reduction). There is a need for phenomenology (as a qualitative research approach) to be renewed and refreshed with opportunities for methodological flexibility. In this process paper, we offer one way this could be achieved. We provide an overview of the emerging paradigm of post-cognitivism and the aligned movement of enactivism which has roots in phenomenology and embodied cognition. We argue that enactivism can be used as a flexible resource by qualitative researchers exploring the unfolding of first-person (subjective) experience and its meanings (i.e., the enactive concept of sense-making). Enactive approaches are commonly tethered to “E-based” theory, such as the idea that sense-making is a 5E process (Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Emotive, and Extended). We suggest that enactivism and E-based theory can inform phenomenological research in eclectic and non-prescriptive ways, including integration with existing methods such as observation/interviews and thematic analysis with hybrid deductive-inductive coding. Enactivism-informed phenomenological research moves beyond methodological individualism and can inform novel qualitative research exploring the complex, dynamic, and context-sensitive nature of sense-making. We draw from our enactive study that explored the co-construction of pain-related meanings between clinicians and patients, while also offering other ways that enactive theory could be applied. We provide a sample interview guide and codebook, as well as key components of rigor to consider when designing, conducting, and reporting a trustworthy phenomenological study using enactive theory.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Van Grunsven, Janna. "Enactivism and the Paradox of Moral Perception." Topoi 41, no. 2 (October 11, 2021): 287–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09767-w.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractIn this paper I home in on an ethical phenomenon that is powerfully elucidated by means of enactive resources but that has, to my knowledge, not yet been explicitly addressed in the literature. The phenomenon in question concerns what I will term the paradox of moral perception, which, to be clear, does not refer to a logical but to a phenomenological-practical paradoxicality. Specifically, I have in mind the seemingly contradictory phenomenon that perceiving persons as moral subjects is at once incredibly easy and incredibly difficult; it is something we do nearly effortlessly and successfully all the time without giving it much thought and it is something that often requires effort and that we fail at all the time (also often without giving it much thought). As I will argue, enactivism offers distinctive resources for explaining the paradoxical nature of moral perception. These resources, moreover, bring out two important dimensions of ethical life that are frequently overlooked in contemporary ethical theory: namely the embodied and socio-technical environment-embedded dimensions of moral perception and moral visibility. As I make my argument, I will be connecting enactivism with insights from David Hume’s and Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy as well as insights from the field of Epistemic Injustice. As such, I aim to situate enactivism within the larger theoretical ethical landscape; showing connections with existing ethical theories and identifying some of the ways in which enactivism offers unique contributions to our understanding of ethical life. While doing so, I will furthermore introduce two forms of moral misperception: particular moral misperception and categorial moral misperception.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Borodii, Alina. "THE EMBODIMENT AND PROPRIOCEPTION IN ENACTIVISM." European philosophical and historical discourse 7, no. 1 (2021): 113–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.46340/ephd.2021.7.1.16.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Hutto, Daniel D. "From Radical Enactivism to Folk Philosophy." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 88 (2020): 75–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20208815.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Moon-Jung Bae. "Enacting enactivism: Concerning the translation problem." Korean Journal of Cognitive Science 25, no. 4 (December 2014): 303–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.19066/cogsci.2014.25.4.002.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Ivanov, Dmitry. "Enactivism and the Problem of Consciousness." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 49, no. 3 (2016): 88–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201649353.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Borodii, Alina. "THE CONCEPT OF AUTOPOIESIS IN ENACTIVISM." European philosophical and historical discourse 7, no. 4 (2021): 61–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.46340/ephd.2021.7.4.8.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Satne, Glenda. "Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic Minds without Content." Philosophical Quarterly 64, no. 254 (November 1, 2013): 202–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqt032.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

De Jesus, Paulo. "From enactive phenomenology to biosemiotic enactivism." Adaptive Behavior 24, no. 2 (March 8, 2016): 130–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712316636437.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Ward, Dave. "Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93, no. 3 (May 8, 2015): 650–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12188.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Kinnear, Paul R. "Color enactivism: A return to Kant?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15, no. 1 (March 1992): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00067418.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Towers, Jo, and Lyndon C. Martin. "Enactivism and the study of collectivity." ZDM 47, no. 2 (November 11, 2014): 247–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11858-014-0643-6.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Fenici, Marco. "Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content." Philosophical Psychology 28, no. 2 (May 28, 2013): 298–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.804645.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Weichold, Martin. "Evolving enactivism: basic minds meet content." Philosophical Psychology 31, no. 8 (July 9, 2018): 1265–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1492104.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Hutto, Daniel D. "Knowing What? Radical Versus Conservative Enactivism." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4, no. 4 (December 2005): 389–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9001-z.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!