Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Enactivism'

Aquesta tesi explora les relacions entre el pensament del filòsof francès Henri Bergson, una de les figures clau del pensament d'inicis del segle XX, i les propostes enactivistes en la filosofia actual de les ciències cognitives. Per tal de fer-ho du a terme, per una banda, una comparació directa entre les tesis principals de la filosofia de la ment bergsoniana i les de l'enactivisme, i per l'altra una anàlisi dels llocs del pensament de Bergson i de l'enactivisme en l'evolució dels paradigmes científics en l'estudi de la ment, així com de les relacions i influències entre ambdós. Aquestes anàlisis es basen en una perspectiva historicista kuhniana sobre el canvi científic (i filosòfic).
Esta tesis explora las relaciones entre el pensamiento del filósofo francés Henri Bergson, una de las figuras clave del pensamiento de inicios del siglo XX, y las propuestas enactivistes en la filosofía actual de las ciencias cognitivas. Para hacerlo lleva a cabo, por una parte, una comparación directa entre las tesis principales de la filosofía de la mente bergsoniana y las del enactivisme, y por la otra un análisis de los lugares del pensamiento de Bergson y de el enactivisme en la evolución de los paradigmas científicos en el estudio de la mente, así como de las relaciones e influencias entre ambos. Estos análisis se basan en una perspectiva historicista kuhniana sobre el cambio científico (y filosófico).
This thesis explores the relationships between the thought of French philosopher Henri Bergson, one of the key figures in early twentieth-century thought, and enactivist proposals in the current philosophy of cognitive science. In order to do so, in the first place a direct comparison between the main theses of Bergson's Philosophy of Mind and those of enactivism is established, followed by an analysis of the places of Bergson's thought and enactivism in the evolution of contemporary scientific paradigms in the study of the mind, as well as the of relationships and influences between the two. These analyses are informed by a historicist account of scientific (and philosophical) change.

In this thesis I develop a novel approach to conscious perception, which I label “radical sensorimotor enactivism” (RSE). In chapter one, I explain how the development of RSE is guided by the tenets of activity and knowledge-how. In chapter two, I outline and explain RSE. Throughout the thesis, I will pit RSE against cognitivist accounts of conscious perception and argue that RSE is to be preferred. In chapters three and four, I highlight two problems facing cognitivist accounts of conscious perception which RSE avoids. I argue that cognitivist accounts of conscious perception face the ‘hard problem of perceptual consciousness', whilst RSE can provide a phenomenologically plausible deflation of this problem. I next explain why cognitivist accounts are incapable of providing a satisfactory explanation of split-brain syndrome. Then, I argue that RSE can provide a parsimonious explanation of this syndrome. Theories predicated on activity and knowledge-how are often rejected for being incapable of accounting for the brain's role in conscious perception. In chapter five, I argue that RSE can account for the brain's role by adopting a non-representational version of predictive processing (PP). Moreover, I argue that the resultant account improves upon cognitivist alternatives. Then, in chapter six, I argue that even representational explanations of PP can be subsumed within RSE by accepting fictionalism about their representational posits. Consequently, I conclude that RSE cannot be objected to for failing to account for the brain's role in conscious perception. Finally, in chapter seven, I discuss ‘non-veridical' experiences. Accounts like RSE are often rejected because it is thought they are incapable of explaining the existence of these phenomena. I explain how the existence of such phenomena is wholly compatible with the truth of RSE. Thus, I conclude that RSE should not be rejected solely on the basis that non-veridical experiences exist.

Panpsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are basic phenomenal subjects, is motivated by a commitment to explaining human subjects of experience, as well as by a rejection of the possibility that phenomenal properties are arbitrarily necessitated – human subjects of experience are thought to only be possible if prefigured by more basic phenomenal subjecthood. In this paper I will consider autopoietic enactivism as an alternative to panpsychism when it comes to explaining human subjects of experience on the basis of subjective precursors. Both of the theories theorise possible subjective precursors but panpsychism (which will be referred to as panphenomenal monism) is mostly based on speculative, unobservable, fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Autopoietic enactivism does not require that there is fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Instead it describes emergent individuals with subjective behaviour at the biological level. This involves a form of bodily subjecthood that may be pre-phenomenal. If autopoietic enactivism involves describing phenomenal subjecthood as possible on the basis of bodily subjecthood, it is not describing an arbitrary but an intelligible necessitation, because phenomenal subjecthood, then, is understandable on the basis of some other subjecthood. However, that other subjecthood is not fundamental. Since autopoietic enactivism does not require fundamental phenomenal subjecthood it is compatible with the NFM (The No Fundamental Mentality Constraint) which means that it is seamlessly compatible with a form of physicalism that panpsychism is not compatible with. The fundamental question that panpsychists start out with is The Hard Problem of Consciousness, a version of the problem of experience that may contain an unnecessarily wide, or even insurmountable, gap between two types of mutually exclusive properties – phenomenal and physical properties. Autopoietic enactivism has a corresponding problem that is tied to a common denominator between phenomenal and physical properties, namely biological life. The enactivist's Body-Body Problem involves an explanatory gap between the living body and the lived body. Since the phenomenal and the physical are united in (at least some) biological life, life is a relevant starting point for investigation regarding the problem of consciousness. I will argue that autopoietic enactivism offers a way of understanding the intelligible necessitation of the known subjects of experience on the basis of emergent, and not necessarily fundamental, subjective precursors. Moreover, I will briefly show how autopoietic enactivism also is compatible with panprotopsychism, a view closely related to panpsychism. My argument in favor of autopoietic enactivism, and against the need for fundamental phenomenal subjecthood, may lead undecided pan(proto)psychists to choose panprotopsychism over panpsychism.

This thesis investigates the role of representations and intersubjectivity in explaining pretend play of young children. Its goal is to show that basic forms of pretending can be explained without recourse to mental representations. The thesis targets two aspects of pretence: imagining (underlying the ability to act as if), and guiding (underlying the ability to play in specific ways). It proposes an alternative account of pretence to cognitivist accounts that dominate in the literature. The alternative account is based on enactivism; it proposes to explain pretending through dynamic interactions of environmental affordances and animal effectivities in context. The thesis emphasises the role of social and environmental factors as well as cultural engagements in shaping the relevant context for pretence to occur. The thesis is an important contribution both to the literature on pretence as well as to philosophy of mind. While the topic of pretence is narrow, considering it through enactive lens involves considering some of the most debated issues, such as the applicability of mechanistic explanations to studying cognition.

Kognitivismen med rötter i analytisk filosofi och logik beskriver tänkande som symbolmanipulation efter logiska regler. Begrepp har sin mening genom att de refererar till objekt och händelser i världen. Embodied cognition (EC) eller kroppsbasserad kognition, med rötter i biologi, fenomenologi och pragmatism ser istället tänkande som ett emergent fenomen som uppstår ur erfarandet av kroppens aktivitet i världen. Begrepps mening har istället sin grund i det sensomotoriska systemet.  Abstrakta begrepp får sin mening via metaforer och metonymer. Likt konstruktivism ser EC lärande som modifiering av tidigare kunskap. Den skiljer sig dock från konstruktivism i avseende på dualism, hur kunskap finns organiserad och var begreppens mening finns. EC:s inflytande på didaktisk forskning inom naturvetenskap och matematik undersöktes genom sökning av artiklar där orden EC eller enactivism finns med. Resultatet visade ett klart större genomslag för EC inom matematikdidaktik med fler artiklar där teorin beskrivs utförligare. Inom naturvetenskapens didaktik har EC uppmärksammats i mycket mindre grad. Orsakerna till detta diskuteras.

The 2007 revised mathematics curriculum in Ghana introduced many changes to the way mathematics should be taught and learned. However, before this research started in 2010, very little was known about how this subject is taught and learned. This study aims to investigate mathematics teachers’ teaching practices and students’ learning experiences in junior high schools (12-14 years) using a mixed methods design. The study’s conceptual framework is informed by two different, but interrelated theories: behaviourism and constructivism. Participants in the study were 24 mathematics teachers and 358 students from 12 schools. Semistructured questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data about participants’ perceptions, and classroom observations and interviews were used to collect qualitative data about actual classroom practices. The quantitative data was analysed using SPSS, STATSDIRECT and ORIGIN software and the qualitative data assessed using a thematic analysis approach. The key findings include: teachers and students espoused the belief that their teaching and learning practices are consistent with the principles and guidelines of the new mathematics curriculum. Teachers perceived teaching practices were complex as they contain both behaviourist and constructivist beliefs; however, their actual teaching practices were didactic. It also emerged that both teachers and students try to avoid making mistakes, despite the importance of correcting students’ misconceptions when promoting effective teaching and learning. The fact that peer influence is a key factor that shapes students’ learning was an important theme that emerged from the interview and the classroom observations. Students were only willing to participate in class discussions if they knew the correct answer, as they would be ridiculed by their peers for giving a wrong answer. The movement towards a more constructivist approach to teaching and learning, which is the prime objective of the new mathematics curriculum, occurred at a slower pace. Thus, a conceptual model for the teaching and learning of mathematics which advocates collaboration and partnership between teachers and students in the classroom is offered.

The 2007 revised mathematics curriculum in Ghana introduced many changes to the way mathematics should be taught and learned. However, before this research started in 2010, very little was known about how this subject is taught and learned. This study aims to investigate mathematics teachers’ teaching practices and students’ learning experiences in junior high schools (12-14 years) using a mixed methods design. The study’s conceptual framework is informed by two different, but interrelated theories: behaviourism and constructivism. Participants in the study were 24 mathematics teachers and 358 students from 12 schools. Semistructured questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data about participants’ perceptions, and classroom observations and interviews were used to collect qualitative data about actual classroom practices. The quantitative data was analysed using SPSS, STATSDIRECT and ORIGIN software and the qualitative data assessed using a thematic analysis approach. The key findings include: teachers and students espoused the belief that their teaching and learning practices are consistent with the principles and guidelines of the new mathematics curriculum. Teachers perceived teaching practices were complex as they contain both behaviourist and constructivist beliefs; however, their actual teaching practices were didactic. It also emerged that both teachers and students try to avoid making mistakes, despite the importance of correcting students’ misconceptions when promoting effective teaching and learning. The fact that peer influence is a key factor that shapes students’ learning was an important theme that emerged from the interview and the classroom observations. Students were only willing to participate in class discussions if they knew the correct answer, as they would be ridiculed by their peers for giving a wrong answer. The movement towards a more constructivist approach to teaching and learning, which is the prime objective of the new mathematics curriculum, occurred at a slower pace. Thus, a conceptual model for the teaching and learning of mathematics which advocates collaboration and partnership between teachers and students in the classroom is offered.

Proponents of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) argue that the mind literally extends into the world because mental states literally extend into the world. But the arguments presented in favour of these claims are compatible with a much weaker conclusion, expressed as the Extended Machinery of Mind Thesis (EMMT) that secures only the extension of the enablers of mental states. What is required is a mark of the mental that can settle the constitutive versus enabling issue. Both sides of the debate accept non-derived content as a necessary condition on a state‘s being mental but this cannot settle the constitution versus enabling issue, meaning the debate has stagnated because there are no decisive moves left to make. Thus, the strongest move for the EM theorist to make is to reject non-derived content as the mark of the mental and seek an alternative. Because enactivism rejects the representational view of mind then if it can be made to work as an account of mentality it offers promise with regard to the formation of a new mark of the mental on which a genuinely interesting EMT can be based.

There have been monumental advances in the study of the social dimensions of knowledge in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. But it has been common within a wide variety of fields--including social philosophy, cognitive science, epistemology, and the philosophy of science--to approach the social dimensions of knowledge as simply another resource to be utilized or controlled. I call this view, in which other people's epistemic significance are only of instrumental value, manipulationism. I identify manipulationism, trace its manifestations in the aforementioned fields, and explain how to move beyond it. The principal strategy that I employ for moving beyond manipulationism consists of synthesizing enactivism and neo-Kuhnian social epistemology. Specifically, I expand the enactivist concept of participatory sense-making by linking it to recent conceptual innovations in social epistemology, such as the concept of immanent cogent argumentation.

Theories of cognition and theories of social practices and institutions have often each separately acknowledged the relevance of the other; but seldom have there been consistent and sustained attempts to synthesize these two areas within one explanatory framework. This is precisely what my dissertation aims to remedy. I propose that certain recent developments and themes in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, when understood in the right way, can explain the emergence and dynamics of social practices and institutions. Likewise, the view I construct explains how social practices and institutions shape the character of cognition of their constituent agents. Moreover, I explain both cognitive and social agency under the single explanatory framework provided by Dynamic Systems Theory. Drawing upon the phenomenological tradition, "embodied, "extended", "embedded", "enactive", and "ecological" approaches to cognition, as well as the conceptual resources of Dynamic Systems Theory, I construct a theory of agency that sees cognitive and social agents as far-from-equilibrium, open, recursively self-maintenant dynamic systems. Depending on the specifics of concrete circumstances, such systems, which I call "Dynamic Embodied Agents" (or DEAs), may develop and possess emergent capacities for error-detection, flexible learning, normative behavior, representation, self-reflection, various modes of pattern-recognition, a temporal sense of self, and even moral responsibility. Some such systems are also sensitive to perceived social influences (practices and institutions); while reciprocally constituting and causally affecting them.

The sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment. In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies perceptual consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to offer a new and improved account the logical and phenomenological character of perceptual experience, and the relation between physical and phenomenal states. Since its inception in a 2001 paper by O'Regan and Noë, the theory has prompted a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical work in cognitive science, as well as a large body of secondary literature in philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of perception. In spite of its influential character, many of the theory's most basic tenets are incompletely or ambiguously defined, and it has attracted a number of prominent objections. This thesis aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of the sensorimotor theory, including the key theoretical concepts of sensorimotor contingency, sensorimotor mastery, and presence-as-access, and defends a particular understanding of the respective theoretical roles of internal representation and behavioural capacities. In so doing, the thesis aims to highlight the sensorimotor theory's virtues and defend it from some leading criticisms, with particular attention to a response by Clark which claims that perception and perceptual experience plausibly depend on the activation of representations which are not intimately involved in bodily engagements between the agent and environment. A final part of the thesis offers a sensorimotor account of the experience of temporally extended events, and shows how with reference to this we can better understand object experience.

Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASCs) are marked by social-communicative difficulties and unusually fixed or repetitive interests, activities, and behaviors (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In this thesis, I review empirically and conceptually based philosophic proposals that maintain the social-communicative difficulties exhibited by persons on the autism spectrum result from a lack of capacity to understand other persons as minded. I will argue that the social-communicative difficulties that characterize ASCs may instead result from a lack of ability to access other minds, and that this lack of ability is due to a contingent lack of external resources.

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy)
This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
The theory-ladenness of perception thesis claims that the perception of different subjects might differ depending on prior knowledge, concepts and theories they hold. Oftentimes this thesis is associated with relativistic views, and therefore rejected. One of the strategies introduced to avoid the theory-ladenness of perception consists in affirming a strong version of the modularity of mind thesis, put forth by Fodor (1983). According to this thesis, some of the processing stages of perception would be performed by informationally encapsuled modules. This dissertation contains two independent papers, the first of which questions the empirical and theoretical plausibility of informational encapsulation of the perceptual modules. The second paper puts forth arguments for an enactivist view of the mind, in which the thesis of the theory-ladenness of perception is not thought to be problematic, but an essential element. This latter paper draws mainly on Noë (2004, 2009, 2012), and defends a version of the thesis of the theory-ladenness of perception grounded in the practice and the abilities of perceiving organisms in the physical environments in which they find themselves and with which they interact.
A tese da impregnação teórica da percepção afirma que a percepção de sujeitos diferentes pode diferir em função dos conhecimentos, conceitos e teorias prévias de que dispõem. Frequentemente, essa tese é associada a posições relativistas e, por isso, rejeitada. Uma das estratégias apresentadas para evitar a impregnação teórica da percepção consiste em afirmar uma versão forte da tese da modularidade da mente, proposta por Fodor (1983). De acordo com essa tese, alguns estágios do processamento perceptual seriam realizados em módulos informacionalmente encapsulados. Esta dissertação compreende dois artigos independentes, o primeiro dos quais questiona a plausibilidade empírica e teórica do encapsulamento informacional dos módulos perceptuais. O segundo artigo apresenta argumentos favoráveis a uma concepção enativista da mente, na qual a tese da impregnação teórica não é tida como problemática, mas como um componente essencial. Esse segundo artigo baseia-se principalmente nos trabalhos de Noë (2004, 2009, 2012), e defendemos uma versão da tese da impregnação teórica da percepção que tem como fundamento a prática e as habilidades dos organismos nos ambientes físicos nos quais se encontram e com os quais interagem.

'Self-study' is a methodological approach that sets out to improve learner and teacher interactions by engaging with problems faced by educators on a daily basis. Through a creative engagement with theory and my on-going experiences as a teacher, employing selfstudy methodology has allowed me to challenge ideas and assumptions that can permeate learning and teaching, including roles, relationships, curricular content and design. This process of unsettling was achieved by drawing attention to the highly contextualised nature of my everyday interactions in relation to my pupils. The notion of context is central to this study and supported me in identifying links between a range of theoretical ideas, including: social constructivism, complexity theory and phenomenology. The connections made at a theoretical level then enabled me to explore my current practice through a period of sustained reflection. As part of this reflective activity, I was motivated to conduct a smallscale intervention in the form of a Participatory Action Research (PAR) project with my class of Primary 1 and 2 children. The rich and meaningful knowledge created through an on-going process of walking and reflection, supported me in bringing participatory and enactivist approaches to teaching and learning to life. Engaging in the self-study has, therefore supported me in contributing possible roles and methodologies that express an interpretation of teaching and learning, which engages with learners' localised and on-going experiences, focussed upon the making of their worlds.

À son niveau le plus général, l’objet de la thèse est de défendre une conception cognitive de l’art visuel qui s’alimente au développement de la philosophie analytique de l’art, plus spécifiquement de la théorie de l’art proposée par Nelson Goodman et Arthur Danto dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, et de l’entreprise des sciences cognitives contemporaines, et plus précisément du courant récent dit de la cognition « 4E ». Le travail s’attache à dégager les principes généraux d’une version spécifique de ce dernier appelée énactivisme de type sense-making. Par là, il cherche notamment à dépasser les insuffisances de la théorie de l’art proposée par le moment danto-goodmanien, qu’il interprète comme une théorie cognitive. À ce titre, cette théorie est considérée comme bien orientée, mais comme péchant par une perspective trop intellectualiste sur la cognition. Enfin, cet effort pour développer une approche cognitive énactive de type sense-making qui rétablisse les pleins droits d’éléments non intellectuels au sein même de la cognition est concentré sur ce moment clef du processus artistique qu’est la réponse artistique ou appréhension de l’œuvre
At its most general level, the goal of the thesis is to defend a cognitive conception of visual art informed by the development of the analytical philosophy of art, specifically by Nelson Godman and Arthur Danto in the second half of the 20th century, and by the contemporary cognitive science enterprise, more precisely by the recent trend known as ‘‘4E’’ cognition. The work advocates a specific version of it labeled sense-making enactivism. By doing so, it seeks in particular to overcome the inadequacies of the conception of art put forward by the Danto-Goodmanian analytical approach, which it interprets as a cognitive theory, and as such as a well oriented one, although suffering from an overly intellectualist perspective on cognition. Finally, this effort to develop an enactivist approach to cognition of a sense-making kind that reinstates the full rights of non-intellectual elements within cognition is focused on the key moment in the art process of the artistic response or apprehension of the work of art

The purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs between us and the environment in a way which modulates the dynamic patterns of our self development; the laying down of these basic patterns helps make us who we are and gives rise to the phenomenological, experiential mineness. Drawing on these two core ideas, I will be arguing for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (abbreviated PEMS). I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the role of affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important components relevant to understanding minimal selfhood. Put more concretely, the set of conditions which constitute the PEMS view are: (i) The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is present whenever there is awareness. It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain. (ii) The phenomenological part of the PEMS view turns on the idea of a bodily and dynamic integration of sensorimotor coupling and affective experience. It is, ontologically speaking, the lived body in enactive engagement with the environment. It is this embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the later ‘narrative' self, which emerges from it and which is continually influenced by it. It is the subject enactively engaged with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects. We have an identity, but it emerges from relational and dynamic processes.

In this dissertation, I address issues in relation to working with teachers on viewing video recordings of their own, or their colleagues' lessons and ask: how can I use video to support teacher learning? what patterns of interaction (in discussion of video clips) support teacher learning? what is the role of the discussion facilitator? I also address similar issues in relation to mathematics classrooms: how can I use video to study classroom discussion? what patterns of interaction get established and alter in a classroom over an academic year? what is the role of the teacher? I look at similarities and differences, across these two contexts. I bring an enactivist epistemological stance to this study, which took place in one secondary school in the UK. I draw out methodological implications from enactivism for the study of discussion and use the tools I develop to analyse data from year 1 of the project. In year 2, I developed alternative techniques to aid my analysis of micro-events in teacher discussions and mathematics classroom, drawing on ideas from linguistic ethnography. My first analysis of the data from teacher discussions of video, threw up five elements of the role of the discussion facilitator: setting up discussion norms; starting with reconstruction and moving to interpretation; re-watching the video; metacommenting; selecting a video clip. Bringing the more micro-techniques of analysis to the same data served to trouble the categorisation above, and I conclude that my description of practice cannot be separated from the particular context in which it took place. My analysis of data from mathematics classrooms suggests the teacher's use of explicit metacommunicative messages (metacomments) was significant in terms of establishing desired patterns of interaction. In one classroom I study, there is evidence of student metacommunication and metacognition in relation to work in mathematics lessons. I argue for a re-framing of metacognition to include the perspective of a process of becoming, as well as the development of skills. Looking across the data of teacher discussions and mathematics classrooms, I introduce the notion of a heightened listening as a description of a similarity in the roles of a discussion facilitator and teacher wanting to develop metacommunicative or metacognitive practices with others.

The guiding question for this essay is: who is the learner? The aim is to examine and criticize one answer to this question, sometimes referred to as the theory of the learning brain, which suggests that the explanation of human learning can be reduced to the transmitting and storing of information in the brain’s formal and representational architecture, i.e., that the brain is the learner. This essay will argue that this answer is misleading, because it cannot account for the way people strive to learn in an attempt to lead a good life as it misrepresents the intentional life of the mind, which results in its counting ourselves out of the picture when it attempts to provide a scientific theory of the learning process. To criticize the theory of the learning brain, this essay will investigate its philosophical foundation, a theory of mind called cognitivism, which is the basis for the cognitive sciences. Cognitivism is itself built on three main tenets: mentalism, the mind-brain identity theory and the computer analogy. Each of these tenets will be criticized in turn, before the essay turns to criticize the theory of the learning brain itself. The focus of this essay is, in other words, mainly negative. The hope is that this criticism will lay the groundwork for an alternative view of mind, one that is better equipped to give meaningful answers to the important questions we have about what it means to learn, i.e., what we learn, how we do it and why. This alternative will emphasize the holistic and intentional character of the human mind, and consider the learning process as an intentional activity performed, not by isolated brains, but by people with minds that are extended, embodied, enacted and embedded in a sociocultural and physical context.

Cette thèse porte sur le rythme musical considéré sous l’angle particulier de son mouvement et entreprend une approche empirique de cette notion abstraite, en l’absence de consensus sur la définition du rythme et d’une théorie scientifique sur le mouvement en musique. Différentes conceptions théoriques du mouvement sont exposées suivant que le rythme musical est considéré comme un objet, un phénomène ou une forme dynamique. Ces points de vue sont enrichis de données empiriques sur la description du rythme par les mouvements de l’auditeur. A l’appui de ce cadre de référence, la forme dynamique est saisie comme outil conceptuel et méthodologique qui permet de cerner les qualités dynamiques du rythme suivant l’évolution temporelle de ses éléments dynamo-agogiques, supposés porteurs d’informations de vitesse du mouvement, et d’analyser cette forme dynamique musicale par les formes dynamiques graphiques tracées par l’auditeur lors de l’écoute du rythme. Cet outil est testé dans une expérience exploratoire durant laquelle on enregistre les traçages effectués avec un stylo numérique par 33 enfants de 5 ans, sujets enactifs, lors de la représentation graphique de 24 brefs patterns percussifs. Les 792 traçages avec l’environnement sonore sont étudiés avec deux méthodes de comparaison de l’évolution temporelle du graphisme et du rythme. L’analyse de l’appariement de ces formes dynamiques rythmiques et graphiques met en évidence des liens solides entre des propriétés d’intensité et de durées des rythmes et des propriétés formelles et dynamiques des graphismes des auditeurs
Given the lack of a consensual definition of rhythm and of a scientific theory of musical motion, this dissertation approaches empirically the abstract notion of the motion conveyed by musical rhythm. We present several theoretical conceptions of motion, musical rhythm being alternatively considered as an object, a phenomenon or a dynamic form. These points of view are completed with empirical data describing rhythms through listener’s movements. Within this framework, we use the dynamic form as a conceptual and methodological tool giving insights into the rhythm dynamics according the way their dynamo-agogic elements, assumed to convey information regarding motions' speed, change over time. It also allows the analysis of this musical dynamic form through the graphical dynamic form drawn by the listeners as they listen to a rhythm. This tool was tested in an exploratory experiment on 33 five-year-old enactive subjects, during which the movements of an electronic pen were recorded as the children were asked to draw an enactive graphical representation of 24 brief percussive patterns. The 792 tracing samples thus generated as rhythms unfold are studied with two methods comparing the respective temporal changes of tracing movements vs rhythms. Pairing these graphical and rhythmic dynamic forms for analysis exhibited strong links between the properties of intensity and duration of rhythms on one hand, and dynamic and formal properties of the graphical patterns generated by the listeners on the other hand

This research into Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) presents the results of 60 first-person psycho-phenomenological interviews with 30 New Zealand women. The participants were recruited from the Canterbury and Wellington regions, 10 had recovered. Taking a non-dual, non-reductive embodied approach, the phenomenological data was analysed semiotically, using a graph-theoretical cluster analysis to elucidate the large number of resulting categories, and interpreted through the enactive approach to cognitive science. The initial result of the analysis is a comprehensive exploration of the experience of CFS which develops subject-specific categories of experience and explores the relation of the illness to universal categories of experience, including self, ‘energy’, action, and being-able-to-do. Transformations of the self surrounding being-able-to-do and not-being-able-to-do were shown to elucidate the illness process. It is proposed that the concept ‘energy’ in the participants’ discourse is equivalent to the Mahayana Buddhist concept of ‘contact’. This characterises CFS as a breakdown of contact. Narrative content from the recovered interviewees reflects a reestablishment of contact. The hypothesis that CFS is a disorder of action is investigated in detail. A general model for the phenomenology and functional architecture of action is proposed. This model is a recursive loop involving felt meaning, contact, action, and perception and appears to be phenomenologically supported. It is proposed that the CFS illness process is a dynamical decompensation of the subject’s action loop caused by a breakdown in the process of contact. On this basis, a new interpretation of neurological findings in relation to CFS becomes possible. A neurological phenomenon that correlates with the illness and involves a brain region that has a similar structure to the action model’s recursive loop is identified in previous research results and compared with the action model and the results of this research. This correspondence may identify the brain regions involved in the illness process, which may provide an objective diagnostic test for the condition and approaches to treatment. The implications of this model for cognitive science and CFS should be investigated through neurophenomenological research since the model stands to shed considerable light on the nature of consciousness, contact and agency. Phenomenologically based treatments are proposed, along with suggestions for future research on CFS. The research may clarify the diagnostic criteria for CFS and guide management and treatment programmes, particularly multidimensional and interdisciplinary approaches. Category theory is proposed as a foundation for a mathematisation of phenomenology.

Recent findings in complexity theory and enactivism have a relevance on how we view and teach children. In this study, 10-yearold children were taught the basics of complexity theory using improvisational writing, theatre sports, and fractal geometry over a 6-month period. The curriculum was framed in an extemporal methodology based in complexity theory (specifically drawing on chaos theory, systems theory, and emergence). An enactivist theory of cognition, whereby knowledge is seen as a complex process involving learners, teacher, and environment—rather than a reductionist project of inputting information into learners—was the basis for final appraisal of student learning. The outcomes of the study suggest that complexity and enactivism might serve to inform both the content and the structure of curriculum—in the process, rendering visible many of the reductionist and untenable assumptions that infuse much of conventional teaching.

This thesis reports on a qualitative study in which three fifth grade children were presented with six nonroutine mathematical problems involving six different 3-D pyramids, constructed out of multi-link cubes1. The children were videotaped while they worked without any adult help as a cooperative group to solve the pyramid problems. During these sessions, the students produced various 3-D cube models, 2-D drawings, and written records of arithmetic calculations as their solutions to the six problems. Through the lens of enactivism, this study describes and interprets the coevolutionary processes of the group's path of mathematical understandings as it unfolded during the six videotaped sessions. The results revealed building, drawing, and numbering as modes of representation of this group's problem solving work. An analysis of these three modes of representation explored the co-emergence of the children's individual and collective understandings, as well as the interrelationships which existed between their spatial structuring and their use of numerical operations in solving the pyramid problems.

The potential of a broad enactive approach in education has yet to be realized. This thesis contributes to the development of a well-rounded enactive educational theory and practice. This thesis argues that a broad enactive perspective has the potential to challenge, reframe and reconfigure problems, issues and practices in education in ways that improve teaching, learning and research communities. It establishes that a broad enactive approach as a theory of embodied mind, a dynamic co-emergence theory, and a method of examining human experience helps to realize the meaning, scope, and potential of enactive education. It takes as its point of departure Dewey’s broad enactive philosophy of mind, cognition, embodiment, experience, and dynamic co-emergence. It shows, through an examination of an actual public classroom encounter, that a broad enactive approach has the potential to reconfigure responsibility, ethics and justice in education. It demonstrates using a case study of the enactment of impostor feelings in higher education how a broad enactive approach to education as the potential to reconfigure teaching, learning and research practices.

In this dissertation, I criticize current approaches to moral cognition research and develop an embodied account of moral cognizing. Contemporary research into moral cognizing is strongly influenced by an orthodox cognitive mindset. Modern approaches to cognitive science, especially situated, i.e., embodied-enacted, approaches emphasize the role of affectivity, emotions, bodily experiences, sociality, culture, interpersonal relationship, and dynamic interactions in human cognizing. However, these non-orthodox approaches have only occasionally been applied to the study of the moral mind. The embodied account defended analyzes moral actions in terms of an agent's engagement with the world. Agents acquire a repertoire of possible interactions with the world rooted in their sensorimotor expertise. This embodied view of moral action focuses on the role culture, sociality, and interpersonal relations play in contextualizing actions and constituting an agent's identity. Enactive theory provides a broader cognitive framework to understand embodied action and moral identity, overcoming the dominant logic of doing and being done to, opening up moral agency to a sphere of joint action.

The goal of the present study is to examine the enactive approaches of Susan Hurley and Alva Noë through the prism of Husserlian temporal constitution. In the first part we offer criticism to Hurley’s notion of ‘non-instrumental interdependence of perception and action’. Her grounding of this interdependence on the subpersonal level constitutional sensory input-motor output interdependence will be viewed as necessary but not sufficient for the first-personal level perception-action interdependence. That sufficiency can only be provided through an exposition of their constitutive interdependence at the first-personal level itself by a phenomenological analysis of perceptual and intentional acts. In the second part we examine Noë’s notion of the ‘virtuality’ of perceptual content. By interpreting his relevant concept of ‘free access’ according to the proposed motif of ‘expectation fulfillment’ we suggest that the problem of the virtuality of content should be interpreted as the problem of the constitution of the temporally enduring perceptual object. We shall work out this issue by appealing to the Husserlian account of perception. By a constructive reading of Husserl’s notions of ‘motivation’ and ‘kinesthesis’ we arrive at the ‘subjective temporal self-relating core’ of perceptual and motor acts. It is this functional temporal self-relatedness, described exclusively on the first-personal descriptive level, that finally offers us the sought after first-personal non-instrumental interdependence of perception and action. We finally suggest that augmented by this notion the sensorimotor approaches can have a better understanding of the neuroscientific explanandum and thus be better informed in their potential epistemological role. Some empirical literature is reviewed at the closure of the study in support of our case.
Στόχος της παρούσας εργασίας είναι η εξέταση των κιναισθητηριακών προσεγγίσεων της Σούζαν Χάρλεϋ και του Άλβα Νόε μέσα από το πρίσμα της χουσερλιανής χρονικής σύνθεσης. Στο πρώτο μέρος ασκούμε κριτική στην έννοια της ‘μη-εργαλειακής αλληλεξάρτησης αντίληψης-πράξης’, της Χάρλεϋ. Η θεμελίωση, εκ μέρους της συγγραφέως, της παραπάνω αλληλεξάρτησης στην συγκροτητική αλληλεξάρτηση αισθητηριακών εισόδων-κινητικών εξόδων του υποπροσωπικού επιπέδου περιγραφής θα χαρακτηριστεί ως αναγκαία αλλά όχι επαρκής για την αλληλεξάρτηση αντίληψης-πράξης στο πρώτο-προσωπικό επίπεδο. Η επάρκεια αυτή μπορεί να χορηγηθεί μόνο μέσα από την έκθεση της συγκροτητικής αλληλεξάρτησης τους στο ίδιο το πρώτο-προσωπικό επίπεδο, δια μίας φαινομενολογικής ανάλυσης των αντιληπτικών και προθεσιακών ενεργημάτων. Στο δεύτερο μέρος εξετάζουμε της έννοια της ‘δυνητικότητας’ του αντιληπτικού περιεχομένου, του Νόε. Ερμηνεύοντας της σχετική έννοια του της ‘ελεύθερης πρόσβασης’ με βάση το μοτίβο της ‘πλήρωσης προσδοκιών’ το οποίο εισάγουμε, προτείνουμε πως το πρόβλημα της δυνητικότητας των αντιληπτικών περιεχομένων θα πρέπει να κατανοηθεί ως πρόβλημα συγκρότησης του χρονικά διαρκούς αντιληπτικού αντικειμένου. Καταπιανόμαστε με αυτό το ζήτημα κάνοντας χρήση της χουσερλιανής άποψης περί αντίληψης. Μέσω μίας εποικοδομητικής ανάγνωσης των εννοιών της ‘κινητοποίησης’ (σχέσης-κινήτρων) και ‘κιναίσθησης’, του Χούσερλ, καταλήγουμε στον ‘υποκειμενικό πυρήνα χρονικού αυτοσχετισμού’ των αντιληπτικών και κινητικών ενεργημάτων. Είναι αυτός ο λειτουργικός χρονικός αυτοσχετισμός, η περιγραφή του οποίου γίνεται κατ’ αποκλειστικότητα στο πρώτο-προσωπικό επίπεδο, ο οποίος μας προσφέρει την ζητούμενη πρώτο-προσωπική μη-εργαλιακή αλληλεξάρτηση αντίληψης-πράξης. Καταλήγουμε προτείνοντας, ότι συνεπικουρούμενες από αυτή την έννοια οι κιναισθητηριακές προσεγγίσεις μπορούν να έχουν μία καλύτερη κατανόηση του νευροφυσιολογικού εξηγητέου και συνεπώς να δύναται να καταστούν πιο ενήμερες όσον αφορά τον πιθανό επιστημολογικό τους ρόλο. Η μελέτη κλείνει με μία ανασκόπηση μέρους της σχετικής εμπειρικής βιβλιογραφίας προς υποστήριξη των θέσεων μας.

Le « problème difficile » de la conscience est un des problèmes centraux de la philosophie de l’esprit. Faisant écho au problème corps-esprit de Descartes, le problème difficile met en évidence les difficultés épistémologiques et ontologiques de la thèse physicaliste qui cherche à réduire l’expérience subjective à un caractère physique et fonctionnel. Ce mémoire propose une réponse potentielle au problème difficile de la conscience selon l’approche énactive, plus précisément selon une variante de l’approche énactive que nous appelons parfois l’énactivisme autopoïétique. L’énactivisme autopoïétique se présente comme une approche alternative aux tendances dominantes en sciences cognitives dites « limitées au cerveau. » Contrairement au courant cognitiviste, l’énactivisme autopoïétique propose une conception de l'esprit centrée sur l'activité incarnée de l'organisme. Au coeur de cette conception de l’esprit incarné se trouve le concept d’autopoïèse, une théorie de la vie organique et de l’autonomie biologique définie selon l'activité de donation de sens des organismes vivants. Ce concept est au centre de la solution au problème difficile de l'énactivisme autopoïétique, car il révèle les profondes similitudes entre la vie et l'esprit.
The “hard problem” of consciousness is one of the central problems of philosophy of the mind. Echoing Descartes’s mind-body problem, the hard problem highlights the epistemological and ontological difficulties of physicalism in its attempt to reduce subjective experience to a physical and functional character. This thesis proposes a potential answer to the hard problem of consciousness by the enactive approach, more specifically a variant of the enactive approach that we sometimes call autopoietic enactivism. Autopoietic enactivism presents itself as an alternative approach to “brain-bound” approaches in cognitive science. In contrast to the cognitivist trend, autopoietic enactivism presents a conception of the mind centred around the embodied activity of an organism. At the heart of this embodied conception of the mind lies the concept of autopoiesis, a theory of organic life and biological autonomy defined by the sense-making activity of living organisms. This concept is central to autopoietic enactivism’s solution to the hard problem, as it reveals the deep similarities between both life and mind.

We live in complex times. To some, this statement might be referring to the modern factors that must be controlled so we can live comfortably. To an enactivist, this statement has a different meaning. Living, as viewed through the lens of this deep ecological philosophy, is a constant bringing forth of a world with our knowing, identity, and actions. Human living occurs in the taken for granted context of other living beings and non-living entities. We exist in the present, shaped by a past that simultaneously determines our future. Places, times, and living are continuously participating in an interdependent, co-evolutionary process. This research study sets out to explore, through the lens of enactivism, how relationships among identity, knowing, and action shape one family's food practices during meals at home. I begin with an account of the context from which this study arose. Included is an overview of the field of nutrition education, a review of my personal history and understandings regarding food and nutrition, and a discussion of how an enactivist perspective is related to education. Then the qualitative case study strategy utilizing snowball sampling and a variety of data collection methods (researcher journal entries, video taped household and extended family meals, individual interviews, and stimulated recall (group) interviews) is described. Information was collected from one Caucasion, middle class extended family of British-German heritage, residing in the lower mainland of BC, Canada. There were eight adults and three children representing four generations living in four separate households. The information gathered from this family was used to create a written description of their everyday familial meals at home. The family's food practices were found to be complexly connected to various physical places (geographical locations and interior spaces) as well as metaphorical places (social roles and places in time) within their context. Examination of these interconnected places presented a view of the family's sensing of places around their dinner table which in turn, revealed facets of their knowing, identity, and actions related to food and eating practices. Finally (but not in conclusion), I discuss how contextualized relationships among places and people could be adopted by future nutrition education research and practice. It is my intention that these new understandings now become the grounds for future enactivist endeavors in the field.

In the dissertation, I analyse anti-Cartesian theories of consciousness, i.e. theories that reject the model of the Cartesian theatre defined by Dennett (1991): Baars's global workspace theory, Dennett's multiple drafts model, O'Regan and Noë's sensorimotor theory and the predictive processing framework. These theories reject the assumption about the existence of some central point in the mind that each piece of information would have to go through in order to become conscious. I compare the global workspace theory, the multiple drafts model, conservative predictive coding, the radical predictive processing and the sensorimotor theory in terms of the ways in which they depart from the model of the Cartesian theatre. I also analyse the explanatory power of the anti-Cartesian theories, focusing on how they solve problems in consciousness studies without retreating to the traditional approach to qualia. The starting point for the dissertation was the article by Degenaar and Keijzer (2009), in which the authors indicate that two theories of consciousness – the global workspace theory and the sensorimotor theory – are compatible with each other and their synthesis can explain more than each theory on its own because these theories focus on the solution of different problems of consciousness. Degenaar and Keijzer briefly outlined three possible ways of combining these two theories: the internal localisation scenario, the external localisation scenario and the no localisation scenario. In the dissertation, I analyse basic assumptions of the anti-Cartesian theories and consider all three ways of combining the global workspace theory with the sensorimotor theory. I show that it is possible to combine the global workspace theory with the sensorimotor theory within the external localisation scenario by means of the radical predictive processing developed by Clark (2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016). I apply the new theory created as a hybrid mental architecture to solve basic problems of consciousness discussed in contemporary literature in philosophy and cognitive science: the concept of consciousness; integration of consciously processed information and its comprehensibility for all unconscious processors; sensations and qualia; the absolute explanatory gap and the comparative explanatory gap; differences between the first-person and third-person perspectives and the personal and subpersonal levels; the binding problem; attention and cognitive penetrability. I also apply the new theory to explain cognitive changes occurring in psychoses and autism, change blindness and inattentional blindness, blindsight and changes in perception caused by image-inverting lenses and two-coloured lenses. In the Introduction, I briefly describe the notion of the model of the Cartesian theatre and the distinction between weak and strong anti-Cartesianism. I discuss traditional arguments that support the existence of qualia and the hard problem of consciousness. I also present counter-arguments that criticise the traditional concept of qualia. I explain the purpose of the dissertation that consists in the analysis of contemporary anti-Cartesian theories of consciousness and presentation of a combination of two of them within one of the three scenarios delineated by Degenaar and Keijzer In chapter 1, I present Baars's theory of the architecture of the mind as the primary example of global workspace theories (Baars 1988; 1997a; 1997b; 2002; 2007, Baars et al. 2013). I show how this theory focuses on functions of consciousness. I present connections between the global workspace theory and contemporary research in neuroscience. I explain how the global workspace theory rejects the model of the Cartesian theatre and introduces a new modified theatre metaphor to analyse interactions between conscious and unconscious processes. I show that the theory can explain some frequently discussed issues related to consciousness studies, e.g. the stream of consciousness, Libet's experiments on free will, blindsight. I outline the limitations of the theory, which consist mainly in focusing on the absolute explanatory gap and neglecting the comparative explanatory gap. In chapter 2, I describe the model of the mind in Dennett's multiple drafts model. I present its relations with empirical evidence concerning the functioning of the mind. I compare the multiple drafts model with Baars's global workspace theory. These two theories are similar in treating consciousness functionally, as arising from the cooperation of distributed processors that work in parallel. The multiple drafts model differs from the global workspace theory in rejecting a clear boundary between conscious and unconscious processes. I indicate that the model is highly influenced by Dennett's philosophical views, in which a significant role is played by the notions of the intentional stance, heterophenomenology and interpretivism. I discuss some limitations of the multiple drafts model, which are related to its failure to explain some crucial functions of consciousness. These issues include: the coordinative and integrative role of consciousness, some important aspects of the self and the impact of embodiment on conscious states. In chapter 3, I present O'Regan and Noë's sensorimotor theory (O'Regan & Noë 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; Noë 2004; O'Regan 2011). I show how it departs from traditional representationalism and physicalism. I illustrate how the theory adopts basic assumptions of enactivism. I describe the strong anti-Cartesian character of the sensorimotor theory that is related with the rejection of both the model of the Cartesian theatre and a definite division between the brain and the rest of the body. I discuss the concept of sensorimotor contingencies and their role in explaining experience on the personal level. I explain how the theory manages to bypass the hard problem of consciousness and to skilfully reformulate some traditional problems like Levine's explanatory gap by redefining qualia. The theory explains differences between various sensory modalities and differences between experiences within the same sensory modality through the notion of sensorimotor contingencies. Since the theory closes the intermodal and intramodal comparative gap but does not deal with the absolute explanatory gap, it is beneficial to combine it with the global workspace theory. In chapter 4, I discuss some of the most important experiments and empirical data relevant for the sensorimotor theory. I indicate that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with the results from experiments on saccades, the blind spot, sensory substitution systems, change blindness and inattentional blindness, image inverting lenses, two-coloured lenses and evolutionary approach. The sensorimotor theory may be described as having a higher explanatory power than alternative theories, e.g. traditional representationalism. In chapter 5, I present predictive processing, paying a special attention to its version developed by Clark (2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016), which I later use to carry out the main task of my dissertation that consists in combining the global workspace theory with the sensorimotor theory. I show how the radical predictive processing explains action and perception – including interoception. This specific version of predictive coding does justice to a close relation between perception and action emphasised by enactivism that inspired the sensorimotor theory. I indicate how the radical predictive processing developed by Clark differs from more conservative versions of predictive coding. Furthermore, I present Hobson and Friston's research on dreams and development of consciousness, which is relevant for the analysis of consciousness through a metaphor of the virtual reality in predictive coding. I indicate that predictive coding can be considered an anti-Cartesian theory since it rejects the model of the Cartesian theatre. The radical predictive processing may also be an antiCartesian theory in a strong sense since it may also reject a clear division between the brain and the rest of the body. I explain how predictive coding can be analysed through a modified metaphor of a theatre, which is related to the model of virtual reality produced out of hypotheses about the world. In chapter 6, I describe three scenarios distinguished by Degenaar and Keijzer (2009) as possible ways of combining the global workspace theory and the sensorimotor theory: the internal localisation scenario, the external localisation scenario and the no localisation scenario. I present the synthesis of the global workspace theory and the sensorimotor theory by means of the radical predictive processing within the second type of synthesis among the three distinguished by Degenaar and Keijzer (2009). The combination within the external localisation scenario has a higher explanatory power than each of the theories on its own. I claim that the two other scenarios are less attractive than the selected scenario of external localisation, but I do not exclude the possibility of combining the theories within the alternative scenarios by other researchers. Moreover, I briefly discuss some methodological issues related to the integration and unification of theories: the integration challenge in the unification of theories described by Bermúdez (2010/2011), older approaches to integration (intertheoretic reduction or analysis in terms of Marr's tri-level approach), the notion of a mental architecture and specifically a hybrid mental architecture (Bermúdez 2010/2011), and interlevel integration (Craver & Darden 2013). I also compare the global workspace theory, the sensorimotor theory and predictive coding in terms of explanatory internalism and externalism. I discuss early attempts at combing the global workspace theory with the embodied mind approach (Shanahan 2005) and conservative predictive coding with the global neuronal workspace theory (Hohwy 2013, 2015). In chapter 7, I compare the global workspace theory, the multiple drafts model, conservative predictive coding, the radical predictive processing and the sensorimotor theory with respect to the way in which they reject the model of the Cartesian theatre. I briefly describe elements from Descartes' philosophy that are relevant for the concept of the model of the Cartesian theatre discussed by Dennett. I enumerate elements characteristic for the Cartesian mode of thinking about consciousness. I demonstrate that the analysed antiCartesian theories differ in their approach to the Cartesian model. I propose to analyse the theories by means of an ordinal scale on which it is possible to assess their different modes of departure from the model of the Cartesian theatre. These theories modify the original Cartesian theatre metaphor and introduce their own modified theatre metaphors. I show how the predictive coding framework can constitute the link between two kinds of models: the conservative model adopted by the global workspace theory and partially by the multiple drafts model and the radical model supported by the sensorimotor theory. In chapter 8, I explain how the unified account can approach problems that were previously discussed from independent perspectives of analysed theories. The complex account of consciousness, which comprises elements of the global workspace theory and the sensorimotor theory unified by the radical predictive processing within the external localisation scenario, is capable of providing a fuller explanation of problems usually posed with reference to consciousness: the concept of consciousness; integration of consciously processed information and its comprehensibility for all unconscious processors; sensations and qualia; the absolute explanatory gap and the comparative explanatory gap; the distinction between the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective; the problem of sensory binding; cognitive penetrability; changes in psychoses and autism; attention; experiments on change blindness and inattentional blindness; blindsight; changes in perception caused by image inverting lenses and two-coloured lenses. The combination of the global workspace theory and the sensorimotor theory by means of the radical predictive processing results in a comprehensive description of these exemplary issues. The presented hybrid mental architecture comprises elements of several contemporary approaches to consciousness. Although each approach has its strengths and can be used independently to focus on particular problems, on a more general conceptual level it may be beneficial to study consciousness in a more comprehensive manner.
W rozprawie doktorskiej analizuję antykartezjańskie teorie świadomości, czyli teorie, które odrzucają model teatru kartezjańskiego opisany przez Dennetta (1991): teorię globalnej przestrzeni roboczej Baarsa, model wielorakich szkiców Dennetta, teorię sensomotoryczną, którą zaproponowali O'Regan i Noë, oraz teorię kodowania predykcyjnego. Teorie te odrzucają założenie o istnieniu punktu centralnego w umyśle, przez który musiałaby przejść każda świadoma informacja. Porównuję teorię globalnej przestrzeni roboczej, model wielorakich szkiców, konserwatywną teorię kodowania predykcyjnego i radykalną teorię kodowania predykcyjnego pod względem tego, w jaki sposób odchodzą od modelu teatru kartezjańskiego. Analizuję także moc eksplanacyjną poszczególnych teorii antykartezjańskich, skupiając się na tym, jak rozwiązują one problemy dotyczące świadomości bez uciekania się do tradycyjnego rozumienia qualiów. Punktem wyjścia rozprawy doktorskiej był artykuł Degenaara i Keijzera (2009), w którym autorzy wskazują, że dwie teorie świadomości – teoria globalnej przestrzeni roboczej i teoria sensomotoryczna – są ze sobą kompatybilne, a ich synteza może wyjaśnić więcej zagadnień niż każda z tych teorii z osobna, ponieważ teorie te skupiają się na rozwiązywaniu innych problemów świadomości. Degenaar i Keijzer krótko zarysowują trzy możliwe sposoby połączenia tych teorii: scenariusz lokalizacji wewnętrznej, scenariusz lokalizacji zewnętrznej i scenariusz braku lokalizacji. W swojej rozprawie analizuję podstawowe założenia teorii antykartezjańskich i rozważam wszystkie trzy sposoby połączenia teorii globalnej przestrzeni roboczej z teorią sensomotoryczną. Ukazuję, że możliwe jest połączenie teorii globalnej przestrzeni roboczej z teorią sensomotoryczną według scenariusza lokalizacji zewnętrznej za pomocą radykalnej teorii kodowania predykcyjnego rozwijanej przez Clarka (2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016). Uzyskaną w ten sposób nową teorię, mającą postać hybrydowej architektury umysłu, wykorzystuję do wyjaśnienia podstawowych problemów związanych ze świadomością omawianych we współczesnej literaturze filozoficznej i kognitywistycznej: pojęcia świadomości; integracji świadomie przetwarzanej informacji i jej zrozumiałości dla wszystkich nieświadomych procesorów; wrażeń i qualiów; absolutnej luki eksplanacyjnej i komparatywnej luki eksplanacyjnej; różnic pomiędzy perspektywą pierwszoosobową i trzecioosobową oraz poziomem osobowym i podosobowym; problemu łączenia (ang. binding problem); uwagi i penetracji poznawczej (ang. cognitive penetrability). Wykorzystuję także nową teorię do wyjaśnienia: zmian w procesach poznawczych występujących w chorobach psychotycznych i urojeniach; ślepoty na zmianę i ślepoty z nieuwagi; ślepowidzenia oraz zmian w percepcji spowodowanych soczewkami odwracającymi obraz i soczewkami dwukolorowymi. We wstępie krótko opisuję model teatru kartezjańskiego oraz podział na słaby i silny antykartezjanizm. Omawiam tradycyjne argumenty, które podtrzymują istnienie qualiów i trudnego problemu świadomości. Prezentuję również kontrargumenty, które krytykują tradycyjne pojęcie qualiów. Wyjaśniam cel rozprawy, którym jest analiza współczesnych antykartezjańskich teorii świadomości i przedstawienie syntezy dwóch z nich w obrębie jednego z trzech scenariuszy nakreślonych przez Degenaara i Keijzera. W rozdziale 1. przedstawiam architekturę umysłu zaproponowaną przez Baarsa jako reprezentatywny przykład dla grupy teorii globalnej przestrzeni roboczej (Baars 1988; 1997a; 1997b; 2002; 2007, Baars et al. 2013). Ukazuję, w jaki sposób teoria ta analizuje funkcje świadomości. Przedstawiam związki między teorią globalnej roboczej i współczesnymi badaniami z zakresu neuronauk. Wyjaśniam, w jaki sposób teoria globalnej przestrzeni roboczej odrzuca model teatru kartezjańskiego i wprowadza nową zmodyfikowaną metaforę teatru, opisującą interakcje między procesami świadomymi i nieświadomymi. Przedstawiam, w jaki sposób teoria ta wyjaśnia często dyskutowane zagadnienia związane z badaniami nad świadomością, np. strumień świadomości, eksperymenty Libeta dotyczące wolnej woli, ślepowidzenie. Zarysowuję ograniczenia tej teorii, które są związane głównie z tym, że teoria ta skupia się na absolutnej luce eksplanacyjnej, a pomija komparatywną lukę eksplanacyjną. W rozdziale 2. opisuję model umysłu ukazany w modelu wielorakich szkiców Dennetta. Przedstawiam jego związki z badaniami empirycznymi dotyczącymi funkcjonowania umysłu. Porównuję model wielorakich szkiców z teorią globalnej przestrzeni roboczej Baarsa. Te dwie teorie są podobne ze względu na opisywanie świadomości w sposób funkcjonalistyczny, jako wynikającej ze współdziałania rozproszonych procesorów pracujących równolegle. Model wielorakich szkiców różni się od teorii globalnej przestrzeni roboczej z powodu odrzucania w nim wyraźnej granicy między procesami świadomymi a nieświadomymi. Wskazuję, jak bardzo na ten model wpłynęły poglądy filozoficzne Dennetta, w których kluczową rolę odgrywają pojęcia nastawienia intencjonalnego, heterofenomenologii i interpretywizmu. Omawiam ograniczenia modelu wielorakich szkiców, które są związane z tym, że nie jest on w stanie wyjaśnić istotnych funkcji świadomości. Do tych problemów należą: koordynująca i integrująca rola świadomości, ważne aspekty jaźni i wpływ ucieleśnienia na stany świadome. W rozdziale 3. przedstawiam teorię sensomotoryczną, którą rozwijali O'Regan i Noë (O'Regan, Noë 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; Noë 2004; O'Regan 2011). Ukazuję, jak odchodzi ona od tradycyjnego reprezentacjonizmu i fizykalizmu. Wyjaśniam, w jaki sposób teoria ta przyjmuje podstawowe założenia enaktywizmu. Opisuję silnie antykartezjański charakter teorii sensomotorycznej, który jest związany z odrzuceniem zarówno modelu teatru kartezjańskiego, jak i wyraźnego podziału na mózgowie i resztę ciała. Omawiam pojęcie reguł sensomotorycznych i ich rolę w wyjaśnianiu doświadczenia na poziomie osobowym. Wyjaśniam, w jaki sposób udaje się tej teorii ominąć trudny problem świadomości i zręcznie przeformułować pewne tradycyjne problemy, takie jak luka eksplanacyjna Levine'a, dzięki przedefiniowaniu qualiów. Teoria ta opisuje różnice między modalnościami sensorycznymi i różnice między doświadczeniami w obrębie tej samej modalności sensorycznej, odwołując się do pojęcia reguł sensomotorycznych. Ponieważ teoria sensomotoryczna zamyka intermodalną i intramodalną komparatywną lukę eksplanacyjną, ale nie zajmuje się absolutną luką eksplanacyjną, korzystne jest połączenie tej teorii z teorią globalnej przestrzeni roboczej. W rozdziale 4. omawiam najistotniejsze doświadczenia i dane empiryczne związane z teorią sensomotoryczną. Wskazuję, że teoria sensomotoryczna jest kompatybilna z wynikami badań dotyczących ruchów sakadowych, plamki ślepej, systemów substytucji sensorycznej, ślepoty na zmianę i ślepoty z nieuwagi, soczewek odwracających obraz, soczewek dwukolorowych i podejścia ewolucyjnego. Teorię sensomotoryczną można określić jako cechującą się wyższą mocą eksplanacyjną niż teorie alternatywne, np. tradycyjny reprezentacjonizm. W rozdziale 5. opisuję teorię kodowania predykcyjnego, zwracając szczególną uwagę na jej wersję rozwijaną przez Clarka (2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016), którą później wykorzystuję do wykonania głównego zadania w rozprawie, polegającego na połączeniu teorii globalnej przestrzeni roboczej z teorią sensomotoryczną. Ukazuję, w jaki sposób radykalna teoria kodowania predykcyjnego wyjaśnia działanie i percepcję – wraz z interocepcją. Ta szczególna wersja teorii kodowania predykcyjnego oddaje sprawiedliwość ścisłym związkom między percepcją a działaniem podkreślanym przez enaktywizm, który stanowi inspirację dla teorii sensomotorycznej. Wskazuję, w jaki sposób radykalna teoria kodowania predykcyjnego rozwijana przez Clarka różni się od bardziej konserwatywnych teorii kodowania predykcyjnego. Ponadto przedstawiam badania Hobsona i Fristona nad snami i rozwojem świadomości, które mają związek z analizą świadomości przez pryzmat metafory rzeczywistości wirtualnej w teorii kodowania predykcyjnego. Ukazuję, że teorię kodowania predykcyjnego można określić jako teorię antykartezjańską, gdyż odrzuca ona model teatru kartezjańskiego. Radykalna teoria kodowania predykcyjnego może być również antykartezjańska w silnym znaczeniu tego słowa, ponieważ może w jej ramach zostać także odrzucony ścisły podział na mózgowie i resztę ciała. Wyjaśniam, w jaki sposób można do analizy teorii kodowania predykcyjnego korzystać ze zmodyfikowanej metafory teatru, która jest związana z modelem rzeczywistości wirtualnej stworzonej na podstawie hipotez na temat świata. W rozdziale 6. opisuję trzy scenariusze wyróżnione przez Degenaara i Keijzera (2009) jako możliwe sposoby połączenia teorii globalnej przestrzeni roboczej z teorią sensomotoryczną: scenariusz lokalizacji wewnętrznej, scenariusz lokalizacji zewnętrznej i scenariusz braku lokalizacji. Przedstawiam syntezę teorii globalnej przestrzeni roboczej z teorią sensomotoryczną za pomocą radykalnej teorii kodowania predykcyjnego w obrębie drugiego typu syntezy spośród trzech wyróżnionych przez Degenaara i Keijzera (2009). Synteza w obrębie scenariusza lokalizacji zewnętrznej ma wyższą moc eksplanacyjną niż każda z tych teorii z osobna. Twierdzę, że pozostałe dwa scenariusze są mniej atrakcyjne niż wybrany scenariusz lokalizacji zewnętrznej, ale nie wykluczam możliwości połączenia tych teorii w obrębie pozostałych scenariuszy przez innych badaczy. Ponadto zwięźle omawiam zagadnienia metodologiczne związane z integracją i unifikacją teorii: problem integracji (ang. integration challenge) w unifikacji teorii opisany przez Bermúdeza (2010/2011), starsze podejścia do integracji (redukcja międzyteoretyczna czy analiza w terminach podejścia trzypoziomowego Marra), pojęcie architektury umysłu, a w szczególności hybrydowej architektury umysłu (Bermúdez 2010/2011) i integrację międzypoziomową (Craver, Darden 2013). Porównuję także teorię globalnej przestrzeni roboczej, teorię sensomotoryczną i teorię kodowania predykcyjnego pod względem internalizmu i eksternalizmu eksplanacyjnego. Omawiam wczesne próby połączenia teorii globalnej przestrzeni roboczej z teoriami umysłu ucieleśnionego (Shanahan 2005) oraz konserwatywnej teorii kodowania predykcyjnego z teorią globalnej neuronalnej przestrzeni roboczej (Hohwy 2013, 2015). W rozdziale 7. porównuję teorię globalnej przestrzeni roboczej, model wielorakich szkiców, konserwatywną teorię kodowania predykcyjnego, radykalną teorię kodowania predykcyjnego i teorię sensomotoryczną pod względem tego, w jaki sposób odrzucają model teatru kartezjańskiego. Zwięźle opisuję elementy filozofii kartezjańskiej mające związek z pojęciem teatru kartezjańskiego omawianym przez Dennetta. Wyliczam cechy charakterystyczne dla kartezjańskiego sposobu myślenia o świadomości. Wskazuję, że analizowane teorie antykartezjańskie różnią się pod względem podejścia do modelu kartezjańskiego. Proponuję analizę tych teorii za pomocą skali porządkowej, na której możliwe jest oszacowanie różnych sposobów odchodzenia przez teorie od modelu teatru kartezjańskiego. Teorie te modyfikują wyjściową metaforę teatru kartezjańskiego i wprowadzają swoje własne zmodyfikowane metafory teatru. Pokazuję, jak teoria kodowania predykcyjnego może stanowić pomost między dwoma rodzajami modeli: modelem konserwatywnym przyjętym przez teorię globalnej przestrzeni roboczej i częściowo przez model wielorakich szkiców a modelem radykalnym wspieranym przez teorię sensomotoryczną. W rozdziale 8. przedstawiam, jak stanowisko powstałe w wyniku unifikacji teorii antykartezjańskich może wyjaśnić problemy, które były wcześniej dyskutowane z niezależnych perspektyw analizowanych teorii. Złożony opis świadomości, zawierający elementy teorii globalnej przestrzeni roboczej i teorii sensomotorycznej połączonych za pomocą radykalnej teorii kodowania predykcyjnego w obrębie scenariusza lokalizacji wewnętrznej, może dostarczyć pełniejszego wyjaśnienia problemów zazwyczaj stawianych w odniesieniu do świadomości: pojęcia świadomości; integracji świadomie przetwarzanych informacji i ich zrozumienia przez wszystkie nieświadome procesory; wrażeń i qualiów; absolutnej luki eksplanacyjnej i komparatywnej luki eksplanacyjnej; podziału na perspektywę pierwszoosobową i trzecioosobową; problemu łączenia (ang. binding problem); penetracji poznawczej (ang. cognitive penetrability); zmian poznawczych w chorobach psychotycznych i autyzmie; uwagi; eksperymentów dotyczących ślepoty na zmianę i ślepoty z nieuwagi; ślepowidzenia; zmian w percepcji spowodowanych soczewkami odwracającymi obraz i soczewkami dwukolorowymi. Połączenie teorii globalnej przestrzeni roboczej i teorii sensomotorycznej za pomocą radykalnej teorii kodowania predykcyjnego skutkuje pełniejszym opisem tych standardowych zagadnień. Przedstawiona hybrydowa architektura umysłu zawiera elementy kilku współczesnych stanowisk na temat świadomości. Chociaż każde z tych stanowisk ma swoje mocne strony i może być wykorzystywane oddzielnie do analizy wybranych problemów, na ogólniejszym poziomie teoretycznym może być korzystne badanie świadomości w bardziej kompleksowy sposób.