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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 20 February 2023

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1

Menary, Richard, ed. Radical Enactivism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ceb.2.

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2

Erik, Myin, ed. Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2013.

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3

The experientiality of narrative: An enactivist approach. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014.

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4

Baerveldt, Cor, and Theo Verheggen. Enactivism. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195396430.013.0009.

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5

Wallis, Charles, and Wayne Wright. Enactivism's Vision: Neurocognitive Basis or Neurocognitively Baseless? Edited by John Bickle. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0012.

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This article aims to clarify the central commitment and the claimed advantages of enactivism, a theoretical approach for understanding the mind. The analysis reveals that there is no compelling reason to embrace either the enactivists' aim of completely revolutionizing vision science or their understanding of the character of that new vision science. There are also numerous serious empirical and conceptual problems for even the more modest enactivism. This article discusses enactivist responses to empirical evidence cited as posing difficulties for enactivism and considers areas of neuroscience deemed highly relevant but that remain unconsidered by enactivism.
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6

Hutto, Daniel D., and Erik Myin. Evolving Enactivism. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10366.001.0001.

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7

Gallagher, Shaun. Making Enactivism Even More Embodied. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794325.003.0008.

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An enactivist approach to understanding the mind, in its fullest sense, is not just a matter of action-oriented processes; enactivism is about more than action and sensory–motor contingencies. To understand cognition as richly embodied this chapter considers factors involving affectivity and intersubjectivity. Empirical studies show that affectivity, in a wide sense that includes hunger, fatigue, pain, respiration, as well as emotion, has an effect on perception, attention, and judgment. Likewise, intersubjective factors, including the role of bodily postures, movements, gestures, gaze and facial expressions, and dynamical aspects of interaction, have similar effects. This richer conception of embodied cognition also holds implications for understanding how the brain works.
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8

Richard, Menary, ed. Radical enactivism: Intentionality, phenomenology, and narrative. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub. Co., 2006.

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9

Hutto, Daniel D., and Erik Myin. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. MIT Press, 2012.

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10

Hutto, Daniel D., and Erik Myin. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. MIT Press, 2012.

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11

Hutto, Daniel D. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. MIT Press, 2017.

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12

Hutto, Daniel D., and Erik Myin. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. MIT Press, 2017.

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13

Hutto, Daniel D., and Erik Myin. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. MIT Press, 2017.

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14

Hutto, Daniel D., and Erik Myin. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. MIT Press, 2017.

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15

Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. The MIT Press, 2017.

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16

Autonomy, Enactivism, and Mental Disorder: A Philosophical Account. Taylor & Francis Group, 2022.

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17

Maiese, Michelle. Autonomy, Enactivism, and Mental Disorder: A Philosophical Account. Taylor & Francis Group, 2022.

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18

Maiese, Michelle. Autonomy, Enactivism, and Mental Disorder: A Philosophical Account. Taylor & Francis Group, 2022.

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19

Maiese, Michelle. Autonomy, Enactivism, and Mental Disorder: A Philosophical Account. Taylor & Francis Group, 2022.

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20

Gallagher, Shaun. Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794325.003.0001.

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This chapter introduces some of the questions and issues that are explored in more depth in later chapters. It starts with a brief review of some internalist conceptions of cognition and then specifies, in contrast, the assumptions that define enactivist approaches to specific issues. The chapter includes a discussion of one of the main objections against enactivist and extended conceptions of cognition, the causal-constitution fallacy, and initiates a discussion of the role of representation and inference, especially in recent predictive coding approaches in neuroscience. It concludes by arguing that enactivism is best conceived as a philosophy of nature rather than a scientific research agenda.
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21

Casper, Mark-Oliver. Social Enactivism: On Situating High-Level Cognitive States and Processes. de Gruyter GmbH, Walter, 2018.

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22

Social Enactivism: On Situating High-Level Cognitive States and Processes. De Gruyter, Inc., 2018.

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23

Casper, Mark-Oliver. Social Enactivism: On Situating High-Level Cognitive States and Processes. de Gruyter GmbH, Walter, 2018.

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24

Gallagher, Shaun. Enactivist Interventions. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794325.001.0001.

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Enactivist Interventions explores central issues in the contemporary debates about embodied cognition, addressing interdisciplinary questions about intentionality, representation, affordances, the role of affect, and the problems of perception and cognitive penetration, action and free will, higher-order cognition, and intersubjectivity. It argues for a rethinking of the concept of mind, drawing on pragmatism, phenomenology, and cognitive science. It interprets enactivism as a philosophy of nature that has significant methodological and theoretical implications for the scientific investigation of the mind. Enactivist Interventions argues that, like the basic phenomena of perception and action, sophisticated cognitive phenomena like reflection, imagining, and mathematical reasoning are best explained in terms of an affordance-based skilled coping. It thus argues for a continuity that runs between basic action, affectivity, and a rationality that in every case remains embodied. It also discusses recent predictive models of brain function and outlines an alternative, enactivist interpretation that emphasizes the close coupling of brain, body, and environment rather than a strong boundary that isolates the brain in its internal processes. The extensive relational dynamics that integrates the brain with the extra-neural body opens into an environment that is physical, social, and cultural and that recycles back into the enactive process. Cognitive processes are in the world, situated in affordance spaces defined across evolutionary, developmental, and individual histories, and are constrained by affective processes and normative dimensions of social and cultural practices.
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25

Di Paolo, Ezequiel A., Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier E. Barandiaran. Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.003.0001.

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For the last two decades, research in cognitive science has increasingly turned toward notions of embodiment and situatedness. Some approaches also foreground the relevance of personal experience and embodied action in forming the basis of sense-making. In particular, “enactivist” perspectives have started to make a profound change in the way we conceive our minds as animate and embodied, as opposed to brain-bound information processing architectures. Braiding phenomenology, cognitive science, and dynamical systems theory, enactivism offers a series of proposals for understanding the sensorimotor basis of cognition, and introduces the concept of sensorimotor life. This chapter presents the broad motivations for these proposals and situates them within their broader scientific and philosophical contexts.
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26

Gallagher, Shaun. The Practice of Thinking. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794325.003.0010.

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This chapter addresses what is sometimes called the ‘scaling-up’ problem. The challenge is to show how enactivism can explain higher-order cognition that may involve memory, imagination, reflection, and abstract thinking. The chapter is framed around three interventions. First, it develops an enactivist account of affordance-based imagining, with reference to concepts of simulation and pretend play. Second, reflective thinking is conceived as a skillful practice, a concept introduced with reference to the recent McDowell–Dreyfus debate. Finally, this enactivist conception of thinking as practice is applied to mathematical reasoning, seemingly the most abstract of cognitive accomplishments. Just as we can understand the movement possibilities of our bodies as tracing out physical affordances to be found in particular environments, the principles and operations of geometry and mathematics trace out cultural affordances that allow us to solve problems, to communicate at abstract levels, to model knowledge, and thereby to transform our environments.
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27

Menary, Richard. Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative. Focus on the philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006.

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28

Gallagher, Shaun. Pragmatic Resources for Enactive and Extended Minds. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794325.003.0003.

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This chapter situates the embodied cognition (EC) approaches of extended mind and enactivism in relation to pragmatism. Despite some disagreements, highlighted in Chapter 2, enactivism and extended mind share some common ground in their pragmatist roots. The argument here is not only that pragmatism (especially as found in the work of John Dewey) offers the possibility of rapprochement between these versions of EC, but also that it offers resources for responding to some of the common objections raised against them, involving concepts of causality, constitution, and the ‘mark of the mental’. Responding to these concerns points in the direction of reconceiving the notion of intentionality.
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29

Di Paolo, Ezequiel A., Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier E. Barandiaran. Virtual actions and abstract attitudes. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.003.0008.

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This chapter discusses the claim that enactivism cannot account for “representation-hungry” cognitive performance. Clusters of sensorimotor schemes suggest a way in which the virtual sensitivities inherent in every act of sense-making can be extended beyond the immediate situation by means of virtual actions. These are regulations performed by the agent that alter the functional relations between potential acts in a given activity. The chapter also reconsiders the question of object perception. Evidence suggests that adopting an abstract perceptual attitude toward an object (seeing it beyond its instrumental use) is a social skill, both in terms of how it develops and in terms of what this attitude entails, particularly as a form of decentering. Both of these analyses sketch viable routes through which enactivism can claim to address complex cognitive phenomena that previously only seemed explainable via the use of internal representations.
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30

Publishing, Sunshine. I Would Rather Suffer with Enactivism Than Be Senseless: Funny Notebook for Enactivism Lovers, Cute Journal for Writing Journaling and Note Taking at Home Office Work School College,appreciation Birthday Christmas Gag Gift for Women Men Teen Friend. Independently Published, 2020.

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31

Menary, Richard. Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative / Focus on the philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto (Consciousness & Emotion Book Series). John Benjamins Publishing Co, 2006.

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32

Konstan, David. Love and Friendship. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190887872.003.0002.

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Aristotle described a friend as “another self” and is quoted as saying that friends are one soul in two bodies. This chapter proposes to take such statements literally rather than merely metaphorically, and suggests that certain modern theories, such as “distributed cognition,” and “enactivism,” help to make sense of these propositions. It also considers friendship as an activity rather than a state: “to be a friend” is not simply equivalent to the English “I am a friend” or “we are friends” but is more like “I am being your friend”: spending time together is thus necessary for the actualization of friendship.
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33

Fulford, K. W. M., Martin Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton. Introduction. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579563.013.0054.

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This section concerns the question of how best to understand the scientific status of mental health care in general and psychiatry in particular. On the assumption that psychiatry is based, in part at least, on natural science, what is the nature or the general shape of that science? Some of the chapters aim at shedding light on component parts of a scientific world view: causation, explanation, natural kinds, models of medicine, etc. Others concern potentially fruitful scientific approaches to mental health care, drawing on brain imaging results, phenomenology, enactivism and what can be learnt from debate of the status of psychoanalysis. One overall lesson is that twenty-first-century psychiatry needs twenty-first-century philosophy of science.
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34

Gallagher, Shaun. Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind. Oxford University Press, 2017.

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35

Gallagher, Shaun. Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind. Oxford University Press, 2019.

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36

Gallagher, Shaun. Action and the Problem of Free Will. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794325.003.0007.

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This chapter examines the concept of free will as it is discussed in philosophy and neuroscience. It reviews reflective and perceptual theories of agency and argues against neuro-centric conclusions about the illusory nature of free will. Experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet suggest that neural activations prior to conscious awareness predict specific actions. This has been taken as evidence that challenges the traditional notion of free will. Libet’s experiments, arguably, are about motor control processes on an elementary timescale and say nothing about freely willed intentional actions embedded in personal and social contexts that involve longer-term, narrative timescales. One implication of this interpretation is that enactivism is not a form of simple behaviorism. Agency is not a thing reducible to elementary neuronal processes; nor is it an idea or a pure consciousness. It rather involves a structure of complex relations.
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37

Carvalho, John M. Thinking with Images: An Enactivist Aesthetics. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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38

Carvalho, John M. Thinking with Images: An Enactivist Aesthetics. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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39

Carvalho, John M. Thinking with Images: An Enactivist Aesthetics. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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40

Caracciolo, Marco. Experientiality of Narrative: An Enactivist Approach. de Gruyter GmbH, Walter, 2014.

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41

Carvalho, John M. Thinking with Images: An Enactivist Aesthetics. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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42

Caracciolo, Marco. Experientiality of Narrative: An Enactivist Approach. de Gruyter GmbH, Walter, 2017.

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43

Di Paolo, Ezequiel A., Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier E. Barandiaran. Representational pull, enactive escape velocity. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.003.0002.

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Two different paths have been taken by researchers who argue that embodiment is crucial for understanding the mind. The first path is embodied functionalism, essentially the claim that traditional cognitivism needs to take into account the lessons of cognitive linguistics, dynamical systems explanations, and autonomous robotics seriously, so as to include bodily structures and processes in accounts of cognition. However, what it means to be a cognitive system remains unchanged and ruled by the computer metaphor. The other path rejects this metaphor and proposes that the self-organizing living body is constitutive of what it is to be a mind. This path, represented by enactivism, is not committed to a representational view of the mind, but rather understands it as an emergent, relational, world-involving phenomenon. The sensorimotor approach to perception may be interpreted in these terms; however, this approach requires a nonrepresentational account of sensorimotor mastery and a theory of agency.
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44

Maitra, Keya, and Jennifer McWeeny, eds. Feminist Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University PressNew York, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190867614.001.0001.

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Abstract This collection is the first book to focus on the emerging field of study called feminist philosophy of mind. Each of the twenty chapters of Feminist Philosophy of Mind employs theories and methodologies from feminist philosophy to offer fresh insights into issues raised in the contemporary literature in philosophy of mind and/or uses those from the philosophy of mind to advance feminist theory. The book delineates the content and aims of the field and demonstrates the fecundity of its approach, which is centered on the collective consideration of three questions: What is the mind? Whose mind is the model for the theory? To whom is mind attributed? Topics considered with this lens include mental content, artificial intelligence, the first-person perspective, personal identity, other minds, mental attribution, mental illness, perception, memory, attention, desire, trauma, agency, empathy, grief, love, gender, race, sexual orientation, materialism, panpsychism, and enactivism. In addition to engaging analytic and feminist philosophical traditions, chapters draw from resources in phenomenology, philosophy of race, decolonial studies, disability studies, embodied cognition theory, comparative philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology.
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45

Kirloskar-Steinbach, Monika, and Bruce B. Janz. African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2022.

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46

Fuchs, Thomas. In Defence of the Human Being. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898197.001.0001.

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With the progress of artificial intelligence, the digitalization of the lifeworld, and the reduction of the mind to neuronal processes, the human being appears more and more as a product of data and algorithms. Thus, we conceive ourselves “in the image of our machines,” and conversely, we elevate our machines and our brains to new subjects. At the same time, demands for an enhancement of human nature culminate in transhumanist visions of taking human evolution to a new stage. Against this self-reification of the human being, the present book defends a humanism of embodiment: our corporeality, vitality, and embodied freedom are the foundations of a self-determined existence, which uses the new technologies only as means instead of submitting to them. The book offers an array of interventions directed against a reductionist naturalism in various areas of science and society. As an alternative, it offers an embodied and enactive account of the human person: we are neither pure minds nor brains, but primarily embodied, living beings in relation with others. This general concept is applied to issues such as artificial intelligence (AI), transhumanism and enhancement, virtual reality, neuroscience, embodied freedom, psychiatry, and finally to the accelerating dynamics of current society which lead to an increasing disembodiment of our everyday life. The book thus applies cutting-edge concepts of embodiment and enactivism to current scientific, technological, and cultural tendencies that will crucially influence our society’s development in the twenty-first century.
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47

Kaup, Monika. New Ecological Realisms. Edinburgh University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474483094.001.0001.

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What is the singular reality of humanistic objects of study? New Ecological Realism argues that our contemporary moment after the exhaustion of postmodernism presents an unprecedented opportunity to pursue this question. It proposes that the answer is found in a new concept of the real that hinges on, instead of denying, context, organization and form. New Ecological Realism showcases a context-based concept of the real, arguing that new realisms of complex and embedded wholes, actor-networks, and ecologies, rather than old realisms of isolated parts and things, represent the most promising escape from the impasses of constructivism and positivism. To achieve this, this study devotes equal attention to literature and theory. By pairing post-apocalyptic novels by Margaret Atwood, José Saramago, Octavia Butler, and Cormac McCarthy with new realist theories, this study shows that, just as new realist theories can illuminate post-apocalyptic fiction, post-apocalyptic fiction also embeds new theories of the real. Reassessing the recent revival of interest in ontology in contemporary theory, this study brings together four contemporary theories that formulate context-based realisms: Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory; Chilean neurophenomenologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s theories of autopoiesis and enactivism; German philosopher Markus Gabriel’s new ontology of fields of sense; French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness and American philosopher Alphonso Lingis’s writings on passionate identification. Their shared emphasis on interconnectedness over individuation has gone unnoticed because these theories have never been considered together before.
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48

Gallagher, Shaun. Perception without Inferences. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794325.003.0006.

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This chapter examines inference models of perception, including predictive coding models, and offers an enactivist alternative. It explores how the enactivist approach can respond to issues related to cognitive penetration and the effects of culture on perception. The enactivist view appeals to an account of the co-variant coupling of brain–body–environment, structured by the physical aspects of neuronal processes, bodily movements, affects, anatomy and function, and environmental regularities. Changes in any of these factors mean that perception changes. Processes involved in neural plasticity (where the brain is ‘set up to be set off’), and metaplasticity, where material and cultural practices define environmental regularities, mitigate the need to think that subpersonal perceptual processes are inferential.
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49

Li, Qing. Learning Through Digital Game Design and Building in a Participatory Culture: An Enactivist Approach. Lang Publishing, Incorporated, Peter, 2014.

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50

Learning Through Digital Game Design and Building in a Participatory Culture: An Enactivist Approach. Lang AG International Academic Publishers, Peter, 2014.

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