Academic literature on the topic 'Enactivism'
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Journal articles on the topic "Enactivism"
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Zilio, Federico. "The Body Surpassed Towards the World and Perception Surpassed Towards Action: A Comparison between Enactivism and Sartre’s Phenomenology." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28, no. 1 (June 15, 2020): 73–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.927.
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Enactivism maintains that the mind is not produced and localized inside the head but is distributed along and through brain-body-environment interactions. This idea of an intrinsic relationship between the agent and the world derives from the classical phenomenological investigations of the body (Merleau-Ponty in particular). This paper discusses similarities and differences between enactivism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology, which is not usually considered as a paradigmatic example of the relationship between phenomenological investigations and enactivism (or 4E theories in general). After a preliminary analysis of the three principal varieties of enactivism (sensorimotor, autopoietic and radical), I will present Sartre’s account of the body, addressing some key points that can be related to the current enactivist positions: perception-action unity, anti-representationalism, anti-internalism, organism-environment interaction, and sense-making cognition. Despite some basic similarities, enactivism and Sartre’s phenomenology move in different directions as to how these concepts are developed. Nevertheless, I will suggest that Sartre’s phenomenology is useful to the enactivist approaches to provide a broader and more complete analysis of consciousness and cognition, by developing a pluralist account of corporeality, enriching the investigation of the organism-environment coupling through an existentialist perspective, and reincluding the concept of subjectivity without the hypostatisation of an I-subject detached from body and world.
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Förster, Frank. "Enactivism and Robotic Language Acquisition: A Report from the Frontier." Philosophies 4, no. 1 (March 7, 2019): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4010011.
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In this article, I assess an existing language acquisition architecture, which was deployed in linguistically unconstrained human–robot interaction, together with experimental design decisions with regard to their enactivist credentials. Despite initial scepticism with respect to enactivism’s applicability to the social domain, the introduction of the notion of participatory sense-making in the more recent enactive literature extends the framework’s reach to encompass this domain. With some exceptions, both our architecture and form of experimentation appear to be largely compatible with enactivist tenets. I analyse the architecture and design decisions along the five enactivist core themes of autonomy, embodiment, emergence, sense-making, and experience, and discuss the role of affect due to its central role within our acquisition experiments. In conclusion, I join some enactivists in demanding that interaction is taken seriously as an irreducible and independent subject of scientific investigation, and go further by hypothesising its potential value to machine learning.
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Dierckxsens, Geoffrey. "Enactive Cognition and the Other: Enactivism and Levinas Meet Halfway." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28, no. 1 (June 15, 2020): 100–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.930.
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This paper makes a comparison between enactivism and Levinas’ philosophy. Enactivism is a recent development in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that generally defines cognition in terms of a subject’s natural interactions with the physical environment. In recent years, enactivists have been focusing on social and ethical relations by introducing the concept of participatory sensemaking, according to which ethical know-how spontaneously emerges out of natural relations of participation and communication, that is, through the exchange of knowledge. This paper will argue first that, although participatory sensemaking is a valuable concept in that it offers a practical and realistic way of understanding ethics, it nevertheless downplays the significance of otherness for understanding ethics. I will argue that Levinas’ work demonstrates in turn that otherness is significant for ethics in that we cannot completely anticipate others through participation or know-how. We cannot live the other’s experiences or suffering, which makes ethical relation so difficult and serious (e.g. care for a terminally ill person always falls short to a certain extent). I will argue next that enactivism and Levinas’ philosophy nevertheless do not exclude each other insofar they share a similar concept of subjectivity as a quality of naturally interacting with the external world to gain knowledge (Levinas speaks of dwelling). Finally, I will argue that enactivism’s notion of participatory sensemaking also offers something which Levinas’ insufficiently defines, namely a concept of social justice, based on equality and participation, that emerges out of natural relations.
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Sridharan, Vishnu. "Beyond consensual domains: Enactivism, social representations and third-order unities." Culture & Psychology 21, no. 2 (June 2015): 259–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354067x15570489.
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Although Enactivism and cultural anthropology share many core principles, a satisfactory Enactivist approach to culture has not yet been articulated. While the Enactivist embraces the cultural anthropologist’s skepticism with respect to a pregiven world described through objective truths, one of its stumbling blocks has been its difficulty in accounting for the normative background of interpersonal interaction, or what Wolfgang Wagner has referred to as “Social Representations.” This article argues that in order for the Enactivist to provide the conceptual tools necessary for this analysis, she must make use of what Varela and others refer to as “third-order unities.” The same principles that the Enactivist uses to explain the emergent properties of cells and organisms—autopiesis and identity-production—must be applied at the level of a society in order to understand how cultural meanings emerge and how they influence individual behavior. By applying these concepts at the supra-individual level, we get a more lucid picture of the fundamental features of an Enactivist account of culture, and can better understand the fundamental principles that Enactivism claims underlie all living systems both simple and complex.
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Kee, Hayden. "The Surplus of Signification: Merleau-Ponty and Enactivism on the Continuity of Life, Mind, and Culture." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28, no. 1 (June 15, 2020): 27–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.919.
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This paper provides a critical discussion of the views of Merleau-Ponty and contemporary enactivism concerning the phenomenological dimension of the continuity between life and mind. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s views are at odds with those of enactivists. Merleau-Ponty only applied phenomenological descriptions to the life-worlds of sentient animals with sensorimotor systems, contrary to those enactivists who apply them to all organisms. I argue that we should follow Merleau-Ponty on this point, as the use of phenomenological concepts to describe the “experience” of creatures with no phenomenal consciousness has generated confusion about the role of phenomenology in enactivism and prompted some enactivists to ignore or turn away from phenomenology. Further, Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes the stark distinction between the vital order of animals and the human order to a greater degree than many phenomenologically inspired enactivists. I discuss his view in connection with recent research in developmental and comparative psychology. Despite the striking convergence of Merleau-Ponty’s visionary thought with the most recent findings, I argue that he somewhat overstates the difference between human experience and cognition, and that of our closest animal kin. I outline a developmental-phenomenological account of how the child enters the human order in the first years of life, thereby further mitigating the stark difference between orders. This results in a modified Merleau-Pontian version of the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity which I recommend to enactivism.
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Gärtner, Klaus, and Robert W. Clowes. "Enactivism, Radical Enactivism and Predictive Processing: What is Radical in Cognitive Science?" Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 18, no. 1 (April 1, 2017): 54–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2017-0003.
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AbstractAccording to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem (section 2), we will argue (section 3) that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this (section 4), we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity.
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Arango, Alejandro. "Social enactivism about perception—reply to McGann." Adaptive Behavior 27, no. 2 (March 7, 2019): 161–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712319835162.
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In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception.
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Figueiredo, Nara M. "On the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 108–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.13.
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This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialectical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemological. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three ontological enactivist claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.Keywords: Dialectics, Enactivism, Language, Epistemology, Ontology.
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Silva, Marcos, Carlos Brito, and Francicleber Ferreira. "Review to Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin’s Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. MIT Press, 2017." Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) 26, no. 51 (September 30, 2019): 385–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2019v26n51id16474.
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In this review, Hutto and Myin’s new book “Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content” (2017) is critically presented. Although they do not provide a detailed cognitive science theory based on their Radical Enactive approach, one may say that Hutto and Myin originally address the perennial philosophical issue about our nature as human beings giving an impossible-to-neglect enactivist contribution to the current state-of-art in the discussion concerning embodied cognition.
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Simionescu-Panait, Andrei. "Are Constructivism and Enactivism two opposite philosophies on learning mathematics?" Revista Pesquisa Qualitativa 8, no. 18 (October 7, 2020): 419–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.33361/rpq.2020.v.8.n.18.338.
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Constructivism and enactivism are proposing opposite philosophies regarding the teaching of mathematics. The article explores the roots of kinaesthetic constructivism in Husserl’s phenomenology of the lived body. Then, the article describes the main points on which enactivism explicitly differs from constructivism. Finally, the article lists the criteria for opposing or bringing together constructivism and enactivism and argues that constructivism and enactivism aim for different pedagogical results and have different teaching functions. Keywords: Kinaesthetic constructivism; Enactivism; Husserl; I can; Learning.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Enactivism"
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Ballús, Santacana Andreu. "La recuperación de elementos del pensamiento de Henri Bergson en el paradigma enactivista de la filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas." Doctoral thesis, TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa), 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/670386.
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Aquesta tesi explora les relacions entre el pensament del filòsof francès Henri Bergson, una de les figures clau del pensament d'inicis del segle XX, i les propostes enactivistes en la filosofia actual de les ciències cognitives. Per tal de fer-ho du a terme, per una banda, una comparació directa entre les tesis principals de la filosofia de la ment bergsoniana i les de l'enactivisme, i per l'altra una anàlisi dels llocs del pensament de Bergson i de l'enactivisme en l'evolució dels paradigmes científics en l'estudi de la ment, així com de les relacions i influències entre ambdós. Aquestes anàlisis es basen en una perspectiva historicista kuhniana sobre el canvi científic (i filosòfic).Esta tesis explora las relaciones entre el pensamiento del filósofo francés Henri Bergson, una de las figuras clave del pensamiento de inicios del siglo XX, y las propuestas enactivistes en la filosofía actual de las ciencias cognitivas. Para hacerlo lleva a cabo, por una parte, una comparación directa entre las tesis principales de la filosofía de la mente bergsoniana y las del enactivisme, y por la otra un análisis de los lugares del pensamiento de Bergson y de el enactivisme en la evolución de los paradigmas científicos en el estudio de la mente, así como de las relaciones e influencias entre ambos. Estos análisis se basan en una perspectiva historicista kuhniana sobre el cambio científico (y filosófico).
This thesis explores the relationships between the thought of French philosopher Henri Bergson, one of the key figures in early twentieth-century thought, and enactivist proposals in the current philosophy of cognitive science. In order to do so, in the first place a direct comparison between the main theses of Bergson's Philosophy of Mind and those of enactivism is established, followed by an analysis of the places of Bergson's thought and enactivism in the evolution of contemporary scientific paradigms in the study of the mind, as well as the of relationships and influences between the two. These analyses are informed by a historicist account of scientific (and philosophical) change.
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Downey, Adrian. "Radical sensorimotor enactivism." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2017. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/67116/.
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In this thesis I develop a novel approach to conscious perception, which I label “radical sensorimotor enactivism” (RSE). In chapter one, I explain how the development of RSE is guided by the tenets of activity and knowledge-how. In chapter two, I outline and explain RSE. Throughout the thesis, I will pit RSE against cognitivist accounts of conscious perception and argue that RSE is to be preferred. In chapters three and four, I highlight two problems facing cognitivist accounts of conscious perception which RSE avoids. I argue that cognitivist accounts of conscious perception face the ‘hard problem of perceptual consciousness', whilst RSE can provide a phenomenologically plausible deflation of this problem. I next explain why cognitivist accounts are incapable of providing a satisfactory explanation of split-brain syndrome. Then, I argue that RSE can provide a parsimonious explanation of this syndrome. Theories predicated on activity and knowledge-how are often rejected for being incapable of accounting for the brain's role in conscious perception. In chapter five, I argue that RSE can account for the brain's role by adopting a non-representational version of predictive processing (PP). Moreover, I argue that the resultant account improves upon cognitivist alternatives. Then, in chapter six, I argue that even representational explanations of PP can be subsumed within RSE by accepting fictionalism about their representational posits. Consequently, I conclude that RSE cannot be objected to for failing to account for the brain's role in conscious perception. Finally, in chapter seven, I discuss ‘non-veridical' experiences. Accounts like RSE are often rejected because it is thought they are incapable of explaining the existence of these phenomena. I explain how the existence of such phenomena is wholly compatible with the truth of RSE. Thus, I conclude that RSE should not be rejected solely on the basis that non-veridical experiences exist.
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Corris, Amanda B. "Organism-Environment Codetermination: The Biological Roots of Enactivism." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1593266129358889.
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Martinsson, Linnea. "The Intelligible Necessitation of Consciousness : From ”panpsychism” to autopoietic enactivism." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-186946.
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Panpsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are basic phenomenal subjects, is motivated by a commitment to explaining human subjects of experience, as well as by a rejection of the possibility that phenomenal properties are arbitrarily necessitated – human subjects of experience are thought to only be possible if prefigured by more basic phenomenal subjecthood. In this paper I will consider autopoietic enactivism as an alternative to panpsychism when it comes to explaining human subjects of experience on the basis of subjective precursors. Both of the theories theorise possible subjective precursors but panpsychism (which will be referred to as panphenomenal monism) is mostly based on speculative, unobservable, fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Autopoietic enactivism does not require that there is fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Instead it describes emergent individuals with subjective behaviour at the biological level. This involves a form of bodily subjecthood that may be pre-phenomenal. If autopoietic enactivism involves describing phenomenal subjecthood as possible on the basis of bodily subjecthood, it is not describing an arbitrary but an intelligible necessitation, because phenomenal subjecthood, then, is understandable on the basis of some other subjecthood. However, that other subjecthood is not fundamental. Since autopoietic enactivism does not require fundamental phenomenal subjecthood it is compatible with the NFM (The No Fundamental Mentality Constraint) which means that it is seamlessly compatible with a form of physicalism that panpsychism is not compatible with. The fundamental question that panpsychists start out with is The Hard Problem of Consciousness, a version of the problem of experience that may contain an unnecessarily wide, or even insurmountable, gap between two types of mutually exclusive properties – phenomenal and physical properties. Autopoietic enactivism has a corresponding problem that is tied to a common denominator between phenomenal and physical properties, namely biological life. The enactivist's Body-Body Problem involves an explanatory gap between the living body and the lived body. Since the phenomenal and the physical are united in (at least some) biological life, life is a relevant starting point for investigation regarding the problem of consciousness. I will argue that autopoietic enactivism offers a way of understanding the intelligible necessitation of the known subjects of experience on the basis of emergent, and not necessarily fundamental, subjective precursors. Moreover, I will briefly show how autopoietic enactivism also is compatible with panprotopsychism, a view closely related to panpsychism. My argument in favor of autopoietic enactivism, and against the need for fundamental phenomenal subjecthood, may lead undecided pan(proto)psychists to choose panprotopsychism over panpsychism.
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Rucińska, Zuzanna Aleksandra. "Pretence : role of representations and intersubjectivity?" Thesis, University of Hertfordshire, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2299/16554.
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This thesis investigates the role of representations and intersubjectivity in explaining pretend play of young children. Its goal is to show that basic forms of pretending can be explained without recourse to mental representations. The thesis targets two aspects of pretence: imagining (underlying the ability to act as if), and guiding (underlying the ability to play in specific ways). It proposes an alternative account of pretence to cognitivist accounts that dominate in the literature. The alternative account is based on enactivism; it proposes to explain pretending through dynamic interactions of environmental affordances and animal effectivities in context. The thesis emphasises the role of social and environmental factors as well as cultural engagements in shaping the relevant context for pretence to occur. The thesis is an important contribution both to the literature on pretence as well as to philosophy of mind. While the topic of pretence is narrow, considering it through enactive lens involves considering some of the most debated issues, such as the applicability of mechanistic explanations to studying cognition.
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Paulsson, Agne. "Entities of muscular type : hur kroppen ger mening åt abstrakta begrepp." Thesis, Högskolan Kristianstad, Sektionen för lärande och miljö, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-12159.
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Kognitivismen med rötter i analytisk filosofi och logik beskriver tänkande som symbolmanipulation efter logiska regler. Begrepp har sin mening genom att de refererar till objekt och händelser i världen. Embodied cognition (EC) eller kroppsbasserad kognition, med rötter i biologi, fenomenologi och pragmatism ser istället tänkande som ett emergent fenomen som uppstår ur erfarandet av kroppens aktivitet i världen. Begrepps mening har istället sin grund i det sensomotoriska systemet. Abstrakta begrepp får sin mening via metaforer och metonymer. Likt konstruktivism ser EC lärande som modifiering av tidigare kunskap. Den skiljer sig dock från konstruktivism i avseende på dualism, hur kunskap finns organiserad och var begreppens mening finns. EC:s inflytande på didaktisk forskning inom naturvetenskap och matematik undersöktes genom sökning av artiklar där orden EC eller enactivism finns med. Resultatet visade ett klart större genomslag för EC inom matematikdidaktik med fler artiklar där teorin beskrivs utförligare. Inom naturvetenskapens didaktik har EC uppmärksammats i mycket mindre grad. Orsakerna till detta diskuteras.
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Ampadu, Ernest. "Investigation into the teaching and learning of mathematics in junior secondary schools : the case of Ghana." Thesis, Anglia Ruskin University, 2012. http://arro.anglia.ac.uk/313166/.
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The 2007 revised mathematics curriculum in Ghana introduced many changes to the way mathematics should be taught and learned. However, before this research started in 2010, very little was known about how this subject is taught and learned. This study aims to investigate mathematics teachers’ teaching practices and students’ learning experiences in junior high schools (12-14 years) using a mixed methods design. The study’s conceptual framework is informed by two different, but interrelated theories: behaviourism and constructivism. Participants in the study were 24 mathematics teachers and 358 students from 12 schools. Semistructured questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data about participants’ perceptions, and classroom observations and interviews were used to collect qualitative data about actual classroom practices. The quantitative data was analysed using SPSS, STATSDIRECT and ORIGIN software and the qualitative data assessed using a thematic analysis approach. The key findings include: teachers and students espoused the belief that their teaching and learning practices are consistent with the principles and guidelines of the new mathematics curriculum. Teachers perceived teaching practices were complex as they contain both behaviourist and constructivist beliefs; however, their actual teaching practices were didactic. It also emerged that both teachers and students try to avoid making mistakes, despite the importance of correcting students’ misconceptions when promoting effective teaching and learning. The fact that peer influence is a key factor that shapes students’ learning was an important theme that emerged from the interview and the classroom observations. Students were only willing to participate in class discussions if they knew the correct answer, as they would be ridiculed by their peers for giving a wrong answer. The movement towards a more constructivist approach to teaching and learning, which is the prime objective of the new mathematics curriculum, occurred at a slower pace. Thus, a conceptual model for the teaching and learning of mathematics which advocates collaboration and partnership between teachers and students in the classroom is offered.
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Ampadu, Ernest. "Investigation into the teaching and learning of mathematics in junior secondary schools: the case of Ghana." Thesis, Anglia Ruskin University, 2012. https://arro.anglia.ac.uk/id/eprint/313166/1/Ampadu%20Thesis.pdf.
Full textAbstract:
The 2007 revised mathematics curriculum in Ghana introduced many changes to the way mathematics
should be taught and learned. However, before this research started in 2010, very little was known
about how this subject is taught and learned. This study aims to investigate mathematics teachers’
teaching practices and students’ learning experiences in junior high schools (12-14 years) using a
mixed methods design. The study’s conceptual framework is informed by two different, but interrelated
theories: behaviourism and constructivism.
Participants in the study were 24 mathematics teachers and 358 students from 12 schools. Semistructured
questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data about participants’ perceptions, and
classroom observations and interviews were used to collect qualitative data about actual classroom
practices. The quantitative data was analysed using SPSS, STATSDIRECT and ORIGIN software and
the qualitative data assessed using a thematic analysis approach.
The key findings include: teachers and students espoused the belief that their teaching and learning
practices are consistent with the principles and guidelines of the new mathematics curriculum.
Teachers perceived teaching practices were complex as they contain both behaviourist and
constructivist beliefs; however, their actual teaching practices were didactic. It also emerged that both
teachers and students try to avoid making mistakes, despite the importance of correcting students’
misconceptions when promoting effective teaching and learning. The fact that peer influence is a key
factor that shapes students’ learning was an important theme that emerged from the interview and the
classroom observations. Students were only willing to participate in class discussions if they knew the
correct answer, as they would be ridiculed by their peers for giving a wrong answer.
The movement towards a more constructivist approach to teaching and learning, which is the prime
objective of the new mathematics curriculum, occurred at a slower pace. Thus, a conceptual model for
the teaching and learning of mathematics which advocates collaboration and partnership between
teachers and students in the classroom is offered.
9
O'Regan, John. "Re-thinking the extended mind : moving beyond the machinery." Thesis, University of Hertfordshire, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2299/4824.
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Proponents of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) argue that the mind literally extends into the world because mental states literally extend into the world. But the arguments presented in favour of these claims are compatible with a much weaker conclusion, expressed as the Extended Machinery of Mind Thesis (EMMT) that secures only the extension of the enablers of mental states. What is required is a mark of the mental that can settle the constitutive versus enabling issue. Both sides of the debate accept non-derived content as a necessary condition on a state‘s being mental but this cannot settle the constitution versus enabling issue, meaning the debate has stagnated because there are no decisive moves left to make. Thus, the strongest move for the EM theorist to make is to reject non-derived content as the mark of the mental and seek an alternative. Because enactivism rejects the representational view of mind then if it can be made to work as an account of mentality it offers promise with regard to the formation of a new mark of the mental on which a genuinely interesting EMT can be based.
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Eck, David Alexander. "The Encultured Mind: From Cognitive Science to Social Epistemology." Scholar Commons, 2015. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5472.
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There have been monumental advances in the study of the social dimensions of knowledge in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. But it has been common within a wide variety of fields--including social philosophy, cognitive science, epistemology, and the philosophy of science--to approach the social dimensions of knowledge as simply another resource to be utilized or controlled. I call this view, in which other people's epistemic significance are only of instrumental value, manipulationism. I identify manipulationism, trace its manifestations in the aforementioned fields, and explain how to move beyond it. The principal strategy that I employ for moving beyond manipulationism consists of synthesizing enactivism and neo-Kuhnian social epistemology. Specifically, I expand the enactivist concept of participatory sense-making by linking it to recent conceptual innovations in social epistemology, such as the concept of immanent cogent argumentation.
Books on the topic "Enactivism"
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Menary, Richard, ed. Radical Enactivism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ceb.2.
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Erik, Myin, ed. Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2013.
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The experientiality of narrative: An enactivist approach. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014.
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Baerveldt, Cor, and Theo Verheggen. Enactivism. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195396430.013.0009.
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Wallis, Charles, and Wayne Wright. Enactivism's Vision: Neurocognitive Basis or Neurocognitively Baseless? Edited by John Bickle. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0012.
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This article aims to clarify the central commitment and the claimed advantages of enactivism, a theoretical approach for understanding the mind. The analysis reveals that there is no compelling reason to embrace either the enactivists' aim of completely revolutionizing vision science or their understanding of the character of that new vision science. There are also numerous serious empirical and conceptual problems for even the more modest enactivism. This article discusses enactivist responses to empirical evidence cited as posing difficulties for enactivism and considers areas of neuroscience deemed highly relevant but that remain unconsidered by enactivism.
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Hutto, Daniel D., and Erik Myin. Evolving Enactivism. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10366.001.0001.
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Gallagher, Shaun. Making Enactivism Even More Embodied. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794325.003.0008.
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An enactivist approach to understanding the mind, in its fullest sense, is not just a matter of action-oriented processes; enactivism is about more than action and sensory–motor contingencies. To understand cognition as richly embodied this chapter considers factors involving affectivity and intersubjectivity. Empirical studies show that affectivity, in a wide sense that includes hunger, fatigue, pain, respiration, as well as emotion, has an effect on perception, attention, and judgment. Likewise, intersubjective factors, including the role of bodily postures, movements, gestures, gaze and facial expressions, and dynamical aspects of interaction, have similar effects. This richer conception of embodied cognition also holds implications for understanding how the brain works.
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Richard, Menary, ed. Radical enactivism: Intentionality, phenomenology, and narrative. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub. Co., 2006.
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Hutto, Daniel D., and Erik Myin. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. MIT Press, 2012.
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Hutto, Daniel D., and Erik Myin. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. MIT Press, 2012.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Enactivism"
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Bondì, Antonino. "Enactivism." In Lecture Notes in Morphogenesis, 149–53. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51324-5_31.
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Coles, Alf. "Enactivism." In Being Alongside, 11–24. Rotterdam: SensePublishers, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6209-212-9_2.
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Menary, Richard. "Introduction." In Radical Enactivism, 1–12. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ceb.2.03men.
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Hutto, Daniel D. "Unprincipled engagements." In Radical Enactivism, 13–38. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ceb.2.04hut.
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Myin, Erik, and Lars De Nul. "Feelings and objects." In Radical Enactivism, 39–43. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ceb.2.05myi.
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Hutto, Daniel D. "Impossible problems and careful expositions." In Radical Enactivism, 45–64. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ceb.2.06hut.
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Rudd, Anthony. "Unnatural feelings." In Radical Enactivism, 65–80. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ceb.2.07rud.
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Hutto, Daniel D. "Both Bradley and Biology." In Radical Enactivism, 81–105. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ceb.2.08hut.
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Crane, Tim. "Intentionality and emotion." In Radical Enactivism, 107–19. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ceb.2.09cra.
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Hutto, Daniel D. "Against passive intellectualism." In Radical Enactivism, 121–49. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ceb.2.10hut.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Enactivism"
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Frielick, Stanley. "Autopoiesis, enactivism and student learning: An ecological model." In LINK 2021. Tuwhera Open Access, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/link2021.v2i1.116.
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The paper is a contribution to the LINK 2021 Special Track: Informing design and practice-led research from the epistemology of the Santiago school of cognition. It presents a general ecological model of student learning in higher education, weaving together different threads from student learning research, Bateson’s work on the ecology of mind, and the concepts of autopoiesis and enactivism that emerge from the work of Maturana and Varela in the Santiago school. The paper takes as its starting point the seminal research on deep and surface approaches to student learning, developed inter alia by Marton, Biggs, Ramsden, Prosser and Trigwell during the 80s and 90s. While other neoliberal understandings of student learning as ‘engagement’ or ‘employability’ tend to dominate current discourse, the deep/surface literature is still widely cited and forms the basis of many courses in teaching in higher education. What is less explored are the ways in which the deep/surface learning research resonates with Bateson’s ecological views on mind and learning, and the idea of the embodied mind as developed from the pioneering work of Maturana and Varela. This research also emerged in the 80s and 90s. By tracing the patterns that connect these earlier ideas with current advances in 4E cognition and biosemiotics, the paper develops an ecological model of student learning based on concepts of non-linearity, emergence, complexity, embodiment, cognition as biological, learning as dialogical enquiry, communities of learning and practice, and the shaping influences of power circulating through information networks. The model visually depicts a process of learning informed by key principles: • Both the cognizing agent and everything with which it is associated are in constant flux, each adapting to the other in the same way that the environment evolves simultaneously with the species that inhabit it. • Learning (and similarly teaching) cannot be understood in monologic terms; there is no direct causal, linear, fixable relationship among the various components of any community. Rather, all the contributing factors in any teaching/learning situation are intricately, ecologically and complexly related. • Cognition is thus not the passive representation of a pre-existing world ‘out there’ but rather the ongoing bringing forth or enactment of a world through the biological processes of living. • Learning/teaching is a process of mutually enacting meaning—the student and teacher bringing forth a world together. • Cognition is not located within the abstractions of a decontextualised individual consciousness, but rather in the processes of shared action. • Knowledge is not separate from the world but embedded within it in a series of interrelated systems. • The individual self is thus constituted in a network of relationships. • Enactivism is an ecological epistemology where individual mind is an emergent property of interactions between organism and environment. • An enactivist view of the teaching/learning ecology sees teachers and learners embedded in a dynamic system of relationships between people, information, knowledge, and the institutional structures and processes that form the context of learning. The system acts to generate knowledge by transforming information into understanding.
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Nadyrova, Damilya. "Enactivism And Embodied Cognition In Education Of Music Teachers." In 3rd International Forum on Teacher Education. Cognitive-crcs, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2017.08.02.69.
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Corintha, Isabela, and Giordano Cabral. "The 4E‘s Model of Enactivism through Improvisation within DMIs." In Simpósio Brasileiro de Computação Musical. Sociedade Brasileira de Computação - SBC, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5753/sbcm.2021.19441.
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This paper describes how a theoretical framework focused on the 4E‘s model which describe the mind as fundamentally: embodied, embedded, extended and enactive, within the paradigm of enactive music cognition can contribute to the design of Digital Music Instruments (DMIs). From an epistemological perspective, we discuss improvisation within the Western academic music culture through two examples of DMIs created to improvise in a MIDI keyboard. We argue the 4 E‘s model orientation revealing the fundamentally nature of the embodied musical mind. Ethical and practical possibilities for an enactive music cognition related to improvisation in the context of the skills and needs of 21st are suggested with the goal of helping DMIs designers and musicians to develop approaches based in possibility, imagination, and relationality, rather than in conformity to standardized practices and conventional music pedagogical purposes. Finally, we present some concrete cases of DMIs, and we describe how the experience of musical improvisation with them may be seen through the prism of such theories.
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Đorić, Biljana. "REPRESENTATION OF LEARNING THEORIES IN THE DESIGN OF ELECTRONIC COURSES IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHER EDUCATION." In SCIENCE AND TEACHING IN EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT. FACULTY OF EDUCATION IN UŽICE, UNIVERSITY OF KRAGUJEVAC, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/stec20.147dj.
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E-learning is based on numerous psychological and pedagogical theories of learning, which is why their implementation in the context of instructional design can greatly affect the organization and content of e-courses. Diversity in the contents of certain teaching areas requires different approaches in shaping the learning environment. Therefore, the aim of this pilot study is to examine the representation of learning theories in e-course design in the context of higher education. For the needs of the research, an instrument was created which was piloted on a sample of 20 teachers and associates of the Faculty of Technical Sciences in Čačak, University of Kragujevac. The questionnaire covers the following learning theories: behavioral theories, individual and social constructivism, cognitivism and enactivism. The results of this research indicate that teachers and associates give statistically different estimates of the representation of individual learning theories in their e-courses, although these differences do not exist between all compared categories. The principles of individual constructivism are most represented, and social constructivism and enactivism are the least represented. Based on the obtained results, the paper presents pedagogical and research implications for a more detailed examination and understanding of the subject of research.
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Scarinzi, Alfonsina. "Enactively Conscious Robots: Why Enactivism Does Not Commit the Intermediate Level Fallacy *." In 2020 29th IEEE International Conference on Robot and Human Interactive Communication (RO-MAN). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ro-man47096.2020.9223494.
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Duarte, Emanuel Felipe, Vanessa Maike, Yusseli Lizeth Méndez Mendoza, Camilla Brennand, and M. Cecília Baranauskas. ""The Magic of Science:" Beyond Action, a Case Study on Learning Through Socioenaction." In Workshop de Informática na Escola. Sociedade Brasileira de Computação, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5753/cbie.wie.2019.501.
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Recent advances in Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) can significantly affect technology-enhanced educational contexts. Our evolving relationship technology is a challenging topic of investigation, but alternative theories to cognition and socially aware empirical studies can shed light on the subject. In this paper, we explore "The Magic of Science" workshop, conducted in an educational museum context. With a background on learning through action and enactivism, our objective is to observe how people can individually and socially experience pervasive digital technology in educational contexts. Our study included 15 participant children and adolescents, who explored an exhibit of three interactive artworks and then built an interactive artifact from scratch during the workshop. We observed how these interactions took place and collected feedback on the experience of the workshop. Our results indicate that new ways of interacting with pervasive technologies allow us to expand the concept of learning through action, towards learning through socioenaction.
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Frielick, Stanley. "Autopoiesis, enactivismo y aprendizaje del alumno: Un modelo ecológico." In LINK 2021. Tuwhera Open Access, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/link2021.v2i1.116.g180.
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Este artículo es una contribución propuesta a LINK 2021 Special Track: Diseño informativo e investigación dirigida por la práctica desde la epistemología de la escuela cognitiva de Santiago. Presenta un modelo ecológico general del aprendizaje de los estudiantes en la educación superior, tejiendo diferentes hilos de la investigación del aprendizaje de los estudiantes, el trabajo de Bateson sobre la ecología de la mente y los conceptos de autopoiesis y enactivismo que surgen del trabajo de Maturana y Varela en la escuela de Santiago. El artículo toma como punto de partida la investigación fundamental sobre enfoques profundos y superficiales del aprendizaje de los estudiantes, desarrollada, entre otros, por Marton, Biggs, Ramsden, Prosser y Trigwell durante los años 80 y 90. Mientras que otras concepciones neoliberales del aprendizaje de los estudiantes como “compromiso” o “empleabilidad” tienden a dominar el discurso actual, la literatura profunda/superficial todavía se cita ampliamente y constituye la base de muchos cursos de enseñanza en la educación superior. Lo que se explora menos son las formas en las que la investigación del aprendizaje profundo/superficial resuena con los puntos de vista ecológicos de Bateson sobre la mente y el aprendizaje, y la idea de la mente encarnada desarrollada a partir del trabajo pionero de Maturana y Varela. Esta investigación también surgió en los años 80 y 90. Al rastrear los patrones que conectan las ideas anteriores con los avances actuales en la cognición 4E y la biosemiótica, el artículo desarrolla un modelo ecológico del aprendizaje del estudiante basado en conceptos de no linealidad, emergencia, complejidad, encarnación, cognición como biológica, aprendizaje como investigación dialógica, comunidades de aprendizaje y práctica, y las influencias modeladoras del poder que circula a través de las redes de información. El modelo representa visualmente un proceso de aprendizaje informado por principios clave: • Tanto el agente cognitivo como todo lo que está asociado están en constante cambio, adaptándose cada uno al otro, de la misma manera que el ambiente evoluciona simultáneamente con las especies que lo habitan. • El aprendizaje (y de manera similar, la enseñanza) no puede entenderse en términos monológicos; no existe una relación causal directa, lineal, fijable entre los diversos componentes de una comunidad. Más bien, todos los factores que contribuyen a cualquier situación de enseñanza/aprendizaje están relacionados de manera intrincada, ecológica y compleja. • La cognición, por tanto, no es la representación pasiva de un mundo preexistente “ahí fuera”, sino más bien el surgimiento o la puesta en práctica en curso de un mundo a través de los procesos biológicos de la vida. • Aprender/enseñar es un proceso de representación mutua de significados: el alumno y el maestro crean un mundo juntos. • La cognición no se ubica en las abstracciones de una conciencia individual descontextualizada, sino en los procesos de acción compartida. • El conocimiento no está separado del mundo, sino que está incrustado en él en una serie de sistemas interrelacionados. • El yo individual se constituye así en una red de relaciones. • El enactivismo es una epistemología ecológica en la que la mente individual es una propiedad emergente de las interacciones entre el organismo y el medio ambiente. • Una visión enactivista de la ecología de la enseñanza/aprendizaje ve a los maestros y a los estudiantes integrados en un sistema dinámico de relaciones entre las personas, la información, el conocimiento y las estructuras y procesos institucionales que forman el contexto del aprendizaje. El sistema actúa para generar conocimiento al transformar la información en comprensión.
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Pomponio, Erin, Steven Greenstein, and Denish Akuom. "Making sense of senseless things: an enactivist analysis of harmony and dissonance in problem solving." In 42nd Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. PMENA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51272/pmena.42.2020-161.
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Jiménez de la Rosa, Edda Norma. "Everyday experiences and school knowledge of mathematics. An enactive approach / Experiencias cotidianas y conocimientos escolares de matemáticas. una aproximación enactivista." In 42nd Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. PMENA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51272/pmena.42.2020-213.
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