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Journal articles on the topic 'Empiricism'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 29 July 2024

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1

Bardon, Adrian. "Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume's Manners of Disposition." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5, no. 1 (March 2007): 47–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2007.5.1.47.

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The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume's comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist accounts. Hume's theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.

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2

Intemann, Kristen. "25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?" Hypatia 25, no. 4 (2010): 778–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01138.x.

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Over the past twenty-five years, numerous articles in Hypatia have clarified, revised, and defended increasingly more nuanced views of both feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism. Feminist empiricists have argued that scientific knowledge is contextual and socially situated (Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Anderson 1995), and standpoint feminists have begun to endorse virtues of theory choice that have been traditionally empiricist (Wylie 2003). In fact, it is unclear whether substantive differences remain. I demonstrate that current versions of feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism now have much in common but that key differences remain. Specifically, they make competing claims about what is required for increasing scientific objectivity. They disagree about 1) the kind of diversity within scientific communities that is epistemically beneficial and 2) the role that ethical and political values can play. In these two respects, feminist empiricists have much to gain from the resources provided by standpoint theory. As a result, the views would be best merged into “feminist standpoint empiricism.”

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3

Humphreys, Adam R. C. "Realism, empiricism and causal inquiry in International Relations: What is at stake?" European Journal of International Relations 25, no. 2 (March 13, 2018): 562–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066118759179.

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Discussions of causal inquiry in International Relations are increasingly framed in terms of a contrast between rival philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary — empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of covariation, while scientific realism is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. Scientific realism is, on this basis, claimed to open up avenues of causal inquiry that are unavailable to empiricists. This is misleading. Empiricism appears inferior only if its reformulation by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Bas van Fraassen, is ignored. I therefore develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in International Relations of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ and how it differs from scientific realism. In light of that, I consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. I argue that scientific realists have failed to make a compelling case that what matters is whether researchers are realists. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism differ only on narrow epistemological and metaphysical grounds that carry no clear implications for the conduct of causal inquiry. Yet, insofar as Van Fraassen has reformed empiricism to meet the scientific realist challenge, this has created a striking disjunction between mainstream practices of causal inquiry in International Relations and the vision of scientific practice that scientific realists and contemporary empiricists share, especially regarding the significance of regularities observed in everyday world politics. Although scientific realist calls for a philosophical revolution in International Relations are overstated, this disjunction demands further consideration.

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4

Kuznetsov, Andrei G. "Perception and Observation in the Strong Program in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 59, no. 2 (2022): 183–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202259232.

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The article analyzes a connection between empiricism and the Strong Program in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (D. Bloor, B. Barnes, J. Henry). I use Strong Program’s theories of perception and observation in science as cases to demonstrate this link. The main points of my argument are the following. First, characteristic problems of the empiricist tradition are at the focus of the Strong Program. Second, relations between the Strong Program and empiricist tradition are complex. While proponents of the Strong Program criticize classical empiricism of Bacon and logical empiricism, they employ new empiricism of Mary Hesse’s network model as a crucial theoretical resource for their social theory of knowledge. Third, The Strong Program uses Hesse’s theory as a model for the renewal of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. A key point of the analysis is that it is reasonable to add to the Mannheimian and Wittgensteinian traditions in the sociology of knowledge another empiricist one as exemplified in the Strong Program. I conclude the article by stressing interdisciplinary tendencies in this empiricist sociology of scientific knowledge.

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5

Larkin, Edward. "Empiricist Fictions, Fictions of Empiricism." Novel 49, no. 2 (August 2016): 372–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00295132-3509147.

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6

Heaney, Conor. "Pursuing Joy with Deleuze: Transcendental Empiricism and Affirmative Naturalism as Worldly Practice." Deleuze and Guattari Studies 12, no. 3 (August 2018): 374–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/dlgs.2018.0317.

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In this paper, I seek to extract what I call an empiricist mode of existence through a combined reading of two under-researched vectors of Gilles Deleuze's thought: his ‘transcendental empiricism’ and his ‘affirmative naturalism’. This empiricist mode of existence co-positions Deleuze's empiricism and naturalism as pertaining to a stylistics of life which is ontologically experimentalist, epistemologically open, and immanently engaged in the world. That is, a processual praxis of demystification and organising encounters towards joy.

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7

Campbell, Richmond. "The Virtues of Feminist Empiricism." Hypatia 9, no. 1 (1994): 90–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1994.tb00111.x.

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Despite the emergence of new forms of feminist empiricism, there continues to be resistance to the idea that feminist political commitment can be integral to hypothesis testing in science when that process adheres strictly to empiricist norms and is grounded in a realist conception of objectivity. I explore the virtues of such feminist empiricism, arguing that the resistance is, in large part, due to the lingering effects of positivism.

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8

Weintraub, Ruth. "Locke vs. Hume: Who Is the Better Concept-Empiricist?" Dialogue 46, no. 3 (2007): 481–500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221730000202x.

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ABSTRACTAccording to the received view, Hume is a much more rigorous and consistent concept-empiricist than Locke. Hume is supposed to have taken as a starting point Locke's meaning-empiricism, and worked out its full radical implications. Locke, by way of contrast, cowered from drawing his theory's strange consequences. The received view about Locke's and Hume's concept-empiricism is mistaken, I shall argue. Hume may be more uncompromising (although he too falters), but he is not more rigorous than Locke. It is not because of (intellectual) timidity that Locke does not draw Hume's conclusions from his empiricism. It is, rather, because of his much sounder method.

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9

Fendt, Gene. "Empiricism or Its Dialectical Destruction?" International Philosophical Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2021): 139–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq2021419170.

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Pamphilus’s introductory letter opens up contradictory ways of reading Hume’s Dialogues. The first, suggested by his claim to be a “mere auditor” to the dialogues that were “deeply imprinted in [his] memory,” is the empiricist reading. This traditional reading has gone several ways, including to the conclusions that the design of the mosquito and other “curious artifices of nature” that inflict pain and suffering on all bespeaks an utterly careless and insensate (if not malign) creator. Pamphilus’s preface also opens a more philosophical reading by his consideration of the ancient literary form of dialogue. This second interpretive path suggests that there is more design in its writing, and more revealed in it, than simple empiricist readings allow. Dialogically elucidating the Dialogues confronts us with the limits of empiricism in moral and religious philosophy. Hume’s last work, if read philosophically, exhibits the vacancy of empiricism.

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10

Mijic, Jelena. "Feminist epistemology: “Daughters of Quine”." Filozofija i drustvo 24, no. 3 (2013): 156–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1303156m.

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Feminist epistemology implies an approach to the theory of knowledge, which in its centre sets up feminist issues. The paper analyzes a recent course in the area dealing with feminist epistemology, namely feminist empiricism. Unlike other feminists engaged in epistemology, their goal is to keep the basic concepts of the analytic tradition, but considered in the light of feminist interests. Starting from Quine?s naturalized epistemology, feminist empiricists are introducing different concepts of knowledge and the nature of the knowers, creating a new perspective on the relationship of sociopolitical values and scientific research. The feminist empiricist?s advantage over feminist epistemology approaches outside the analytical framework is precisely in accepting the naturalistic and empiricist approach to gender biases. The aim is to evaluate how successful they are in achieving their ideas, and whether such an approach is acceptable.

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11

Bueno, Otávio. "Neo-Pyrrhonism, Empiricism, and Scientific Activity." Veritas (Porto Alegre) 66, no. 1 (December 27, 2021): e42184. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.42184.

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Pyrrhonism involves the inability to defend claims about the unobservable world, or, more generally, about what is really going on beyond the phenomena (SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, 1994). As a result, the Pyrrhonist is not engaged in developing a philosophical doctrine, at least in the sense of defending a view about the underlying features of reality. The issue then arises as to whether the Pyrrhonist also has something positive to say about our knowledge of the world, while still keeping Pyrrhonism. In this paper, I develop a positive neo-Pyrrhonist attitude, indicating that we can use this attitude to make sense of important aspects of science and empirical knowledge. To do that, I explore the connection between this revived form of Pyrrhonism and contemporary versions of empiricism, in particular constructive empiricism (VAN FRAASSEN, 1980, 1989, 2002, 2008). Although constructive empiricism is not a form of skepticism, there are important elements in common between constructive empiricism and Pyrrhonism. The resulting form of Pyrrhonism suggests that there is something right about the original stance articulated by Sextus Empiricus, and that suitably formulated it provides an insightful approach to think about empirical knowledge (PORCHAT PEREIRA, 2006, for the original inspiration behind neoPyrrhonism).

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12

Andrews, Lindsey. "Black Feminism’s Minor Empiricism: Hurston, Combahee, and the Experience of Evidence." Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience 1, no. 1 (June 24, 2015): 1–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.28968/cftt.v1i1.28808.

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In this article, I argue that the Zora Neale Hurston’s early twentieth-century anthropological work and the Combahee River Collective’s 1977 Black Feminist Statement can be read as part of a genealogy of Black feminist empiricism: a minor empiricism that rejects positivist empiricism, strategically mobilizing dominant scientific practices while also developing an onto-espistemology specific to Black English and what Combahee terms “black women’s style.” Their works make tactical use of positivist empirics to critique and counter legal and medico-scientific circumscription of Black women’s lives, while simultaneously participating in this counter-practice of Black feminist empiricism. As both Combahee’s statement and Hurston’s first ethnography, Mules and Men (1935), reveal, Black feminist empiricism is grounded not in traditional scientific virtues such as transparency and objectivity, but instead in opacity and subjectivity, which make it unavailable for use for purposes of legal subjection, while simultaneously revealing the raced and gendered implications of a legal system dependent on positivist values.

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13

Cartwright, Nancy. "An empiricist defence of singular causes." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46 (March 2000): 47–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100010365.

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Empiricism has traditionally been concerned with two questions: (a) What is the source of our concepts and ideas? and (b) How should claims to empirical knowledge be judged? The empiricist answer to the first question is ‘From observation or experience.’ The concern in the second question is not to ground science in pure observation or in direct experience, but rather to ensure that claims to scientific knowledge are judged against the natural phenomena themselves. Questions about nature must be settled by nature — not by faith, nor metaphysics, nor mathematics, and not by convention or convenience either. From Francis Bacon to Karl Popper empiricists have wanted to police the methods of scientific enquiry.

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14

Uebel, Thomas. "On the Empiricism of Logical Empiricism." Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea 1, no. 1 (October 25, 2021): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n1.e55724.

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This paper warns against misunderstanding the logical empiricists’ take on the concepts of experience and empiricism. Far from expressing traditionalist way-of-ideas conceptions, these concepts were themselves rethought and refashioned to accord with their overall aim of making contemporary philosophy of science fit for purpose. To this end, this paper disarms the supposed counter-examples of Schlick’s foundationalism and Carnap’s Aufbau and exemplifies the aimed for understanding by examples of the physialist theorising of Carnap and Neurath.

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15

Lutz, Sebastian. "Empiricism and Intelligent Design I: Three Empiricist Challenges." Erkenntnis 78, no. 3 (September 29, 2012): 665–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9391-6.

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16

Michael Roberts, John. "Reading Orwell Through Deleuze." Deleuze Studies 4, no. 3 (November 2010): 356–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/dls.2010.0104.

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George Orwell has often been accused of articulating a naive version of empiricism in his writings. Naive empiricism can be said to be based on the belief that an external objective world exists independently of us which can nevertheless be studied and observed by constructing atomistic theories of causality between objects in the world. However, by revisiting some of Orwell's most well-known writings, this paper argues that it makes more sense to place his empiricism within the contours of Deleuze's empiricist philosophy. By recourse to Deleuze's ideas the paper argues that far from being a naive empiricist Orwell in fact engages in a reflexive exploration of his virtual affects through the particular events he writes about. The assemblage that is ‘George Orwell’ is thus comprised by a whole array of affects from this unique middle-class socialist as he crosses through particular events. Orwell subsequently acts as a ‘schizoid nomad’ who transverses the affects of others. As a result Orwell takes flight from his own middle-class surroundings in order to reterritorialise his identity within the affects, habits and sensations of others. By becoming a schizoid nomad Orwell is able to construct a critical and passionate moral standpoint against forces of domination.

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17

Lorenz, Hendrik, and Benjamin Morison. "Aristotle’s Empiricist Theory of Doxastic Knowledge." Phronesis 64, no. 4 (October 25, 2019): 431–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341975.

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AbstractAristotle takes practical wisdom and arts or crafts to be forms of knowledge which, we argue, can usefully be thought of as ‘empiricist’. This empiricism has two key features: knowledge does not rest on grasping unobservable natures or essences; and knowledge does not rest on grasping logical relations that hold among propositions. Instead, knowledge rests on observation, memory, experience and everyday uses of reason. While Aristotle’s conception of theoretical knowledge does require grasping unobservable essences and logical relations that hold among suitable propositions, his conception of practical and productive knowledge avoids such requirements and is consistent with empiricism.

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18

Assunção, Carlos, and Carla Araújo. "Entries on the History of Corpus Linguistics." Linha D'Água 32, no. 1 (April 9, 2019): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.2236-4242.v32i1p39-57.

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Corpus linguistics is anchored in a theoretical paradigm characterised by an empiricist approach and as well as by a conception of language as a probabilistic system. In linguistics, empiricism Empiricism is an approach that grants primordial status to data coming from the observation of language, generally grouped together in a corpus, as opposed to rationalism Rationalism. Rationalism is based on the study of language through introspection, which is regarded as a way of assessing models of structural functioning and the formation of the cognitive process of language. As a result, there is a chasm between the philosophical perspectives characteristic of the empiricist and rationalist conceptions of language, represented by its main contributors. On the one hand, there is Halliday, a representative of the empiricist conception, and, on the other hand, Chomsky, the greatest figure of Rationalism rationalism in linguistics. However, new approaches need to be taken into consideration. From all these conceptions the greatest number of works of corpus linguistics has been derived, in the areas of lexicography and terminology – production of dictionaries, glossaries, terminological databases, etc.

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19

Crignon, Claire. "The Debate about methodus medendi during the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century in England." Early Science and Medicine 18, no. 4-5 (2013): 339–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15733823-1845p0002.

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Following a recent trend in the field of the history of philosophy and medicine, this paper stresses the necessity of recognizing empiricism’s patent indebtedness to the sciences of the body. While the tribute paid to the Hippocratic method of observation in the work of Thomas Sydenham is well known, it seems necessary to take into account a trend more critical of ancient medicine developed by followers of chemical medicine who considered the doctrine of elements and humours to be a typical example of the idols that hinder the improvement of medical knowledge and defend the necessity of experimentation (comparative anatomy, dissection, autopsy, chemical analysis of bodies). In light of the fact that modern discoveries (blood circulation, the lymphatic system, theory of fevers) resulted in a “new frame of human nature,” they developed a critical reading of ancient empiricism. As a consequence, we can distinguish between two distinct anti-speculative traditions in the genesis of philosophical empiricism. The first (which includes Bacon, Boyle and Willis) recommends an active investigation into nature and refers to the figure of Democritus, the ancient philosopher who devoted himself to the dissection of beasts. Defenders of this first tradition refuse point-blank to be called ‘empiricists’, a label which had a very negative meaning during the seventeenth century, when it was used to dismiss charlatans and quacks. The other tradition (including Sydenham and Locke), stressing as it does the role of description and observation, is more sceptical of the ability of dissection or anatomy to give us access to causes of diseases. This later tradition comes closer to the definition of ancient empiricism and to the figure of Hippocrates.

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20

Kareem, Zaryan. "What is Empiricism? Critically Evaluate its Value When Writing History." OTS Canadian Journal 2, no. 5 (May 16, 2023): 12–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.58840/ots.v2i5.29.

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Empiricism is one of the crucial theories for writing history which appeared in late nineteenth century while it focuses only on primary sources and sensory experience. It uses an inductive method of reasoning, which means moving from the specific to the general. Empiricism has become one of the most popular methods that has been used by a large number of historians and academics in the last four centuries which they argued that only primary or original sources should be used by historians. Empiricists believe that investigating primary sources and use only evidence for writing history, however, rationalists believe that examining past events can lead to truth because history is always written by elites of society. In addition, the historian’s position is connected with statements about history this demonstrate the association of empiricism with relativism. Finally, it can be argued that historians cannot obtain facts without evidence, although historian’s interpretation is necessary for writing history while criticising the documents may obtain the truth. However, historian’s explanations can also be problematic, because as empiricists argue their perspectives tend to be a fiction and they cannot agree on a single explanation.

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21

Kareem, Zaryan. "What is Empiricism? Critically Evaluate its Value When Writing History." OTS Canadian Journal 2, no. 5 (May 11, 2023): 12–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.58840/ots.v2i5.24.

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Empiricism is one of the crucial theories for writing history which appeared in late nineteenth century while it focuses only on primary sources and sensory experience. It uses an inductive method of reasoning, which means moving from the specific to the general. Empiricism has become one of the most popular methods that has been used by a large number of historians and academics in the last four centuries which they argued that only primary or original sources should be used by historians. Empiricists believe that investigating primary sources and use only evidence for writing history, however, rationalists believe that examining past events can lead to truth because history is always written by elites of society. In addition, the historian’s position is connected with statements about history this demonstrate the association of empiricism with relativism. Finally, it can be argued that historians cannot obtain facts without evidence, although historian’s interpretation is necessary for writing history while criticising the documents may obtain the truth. However, historian’s explanations can also be problematic, because as empiricists argue their perspectives tend to be a fiction and they cannot agree on a single explanation.

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22

Garau, Rodolfo. "Who was the Founder of Empiricism After All? Gassendi and the ‘Logic’ of Bacon." Perspectives on Science 29, no. 3 (May 2021): 327–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00371.

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Abstract Contentions about the origin of early modern empiricism have been floating about at least since the 1980s, where its exclusive “Britishness” was initially question, and the name of Gassendi was provocatively put forward as the putative “founder” of the current to the detriment of Francis Bacon. Recent scholarship has shown that early modern empiricism did not derive from philosophical speculation exclusively but had multiple sources and “foundations.” Yet, from a historical viewpoint, the question whether Bacon’s method had any influence on the origin and development of Gassendi’s version of empiricism still carries significance, for its answer may open up different views on how the relation between British and “continental” empiricisms shall be framed. In this paper, I deal with Gassendi’s reception of Bacon. On the basis of a deep examination of Gassendi’s corpus, I contend that there is no trace of a consistent influence of Bacon on Gassendi’s empiricism before 1650s; although I show that an indirect influence can be found through the mediation of Peiresc, I put forward the hypothesis that it was more the empirical attitude characterizing Peiresc’s intellectual figure, rather than his interest in Baconianism, to be relevant, along with Epicurus’ philosophy, for Gassendi’s early empiricism. I then analyze Gassendi’s treatment of Bacon’s logic in Gassendi’s Syntagma philosophicum. I show that despite Gassendi’s sympathy for Bacon’s project, his own logic lays on fundamentally different assumptions. Despite this, I argue for Gassendi’s reception of Bacon’s theory of the idols in Syntagma philosophicum. On this basis, I conclude by restating the untenability of “national” accounts of the rise of empiricism, and the importance of highlighting instead the sharing of ideas between its actors.

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23

Sobstyl, Edrie. "Re-radicalizing Nelson's Feminist Empiricism." Hypatia 19, no. 1 (2004): 119–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2004.tb01271.x.

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The relationship between individuals and communities in knowing is a central topic of discussion in current feminist epistemology. Lynn Hankinson Nelson's work is unusual in grounding knowledge primarily in the community rather than the individual. In this essay I argue that responses to Nelson's work are based on a misinterpretation of her holistic approach. However, Nelson's holism is incomplete and hence inconsistent. I defend a more radically holistic feminist empiricism with a multiaspect view of the knower, which is more consistent with a feminist empiricist approach to evidence.

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24

Allen, James. "Medical Empiricism and Causation." Elenchos 42, no. 1 (August 1, 2021): 23–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0005.

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Abstract The Empirical school of medicine, which arose in the third century BCE, defined itself in opposition to rationalist tendencies in medical thought. Causal explanation, which typically appeals to hidden, theoretical entities, is most at home in rationalist physiology and pathology, and much of what the Empiricists had to say about causes belongs to their anti-rationalist polemics. Over the course of the school’s history, however, some members appropriated the language and idea of cause, though always in ways that was consistent with its defining commitment to Empiricism.

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25

Ryder, Dan, and Oleg V. Favorov. "Empiricist word learning." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 6 (December 2001): 1117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01360132.

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At first, Bloom's theory appears inimical to empiricism, since he credits very young children with highly sophisticated cognitive resources (e.g., a theory of mind and a belief that real kinds have essences), and he also attacks the empiricist's favoured learning theory, namely, associationism. We suggest that, on the contrary, the empiricist can embrace much of what Bloom says.

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26

Solomon, Robert C. "Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business." Business Ethics Quarterly 13, no. 1 (January 2003): 43–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq20031314.

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Abstract:Should the responsibilities of business managers be understood independently of the social circumstances and “market forces” that surround them, or (in accord with empiricism and the social sciences) are agents and their choices shaped by their circumstances, free only insofar as they act in accordance with antecedently established dispositions, their “character”? Virtue ethics, of which I consider myself a proponent, shares with empiricism this emphasis on character as well as an affinity with the social sciences. But recent criticisms of both empiricist and virtue ethical accounts of character deny even this apparent compromise between agency and environment. Here is an account of character that emphasizes dynamic interaction both in the formation and in the interplay between personal agency and responsibility on the one hand and social pressures and the environment on the other.

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27

Yap, Audrey. "Feminist Radical Empiricism, Values, and Evidence." Hypatia 31, no. 1 (2016): 58–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12221.

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Feminist epistemologies consider ways in which gender (among other social factors) influences knowledge. In this article, I want to consider a particular kind of feminist empiricism that has been called feminist radical empiricism (where the empiricism, not the feminism, is radical). I am particularly interested in this view's treatment of values as empirical, and consequently up for revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Proponents of this view cite the fact that it allows us to talk about certain things such as racial and gender equality as objective facts: not just whether we have achieved said equality in our society, but whether we are, in fact, all equal. I will raise the concern that the way in which they model the role of values in epistemology may be a problematic idealization of the open‐mindedness of human agents. In some cases, resistance to value‐change cannot be diagnosed as a failure to respond adequately to evidence. If so, the strategy of empirically testing our values that some feminist radical empiricists suggest may not be as useful a tool for social change as they think.

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Duvernoy, Russell J. "Paradoxes of Pure Experience: From the Radical to the Transcendental with James and Deleuze." Contemporary Pragmatism 18, no. 4 (November 29, 2021): 407–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10028.

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Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between James’ radical empiricism and Deleuze’s study of the genesis of sense without a transcendental subject as necessary condition. It shows that James’ concept of pure experience changes the form of relation between mind and world. Considering how to conceptualize experience without a fixed metaphysical or transcendental subject destabilizes ontological identity, leads to a founding conceptual divergence from traditional phenomenology, and motivates Deleuze’s efforts towards transcendental empiricism. The paper reads Deleuze’s work on the genesis of sense in this context, arguing that one important result is an ontological pluralism. Such pluralism is crucial in considering how meaning can be made between and across differences and is in keeping with radical empiricism’s openness to life’s complexity.

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29

Kioko, Richard Mutuku. "A Critical Analysis on the Refutation of Innate Ideas in John Locke’s Philosophical Thoughts." International Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 1 (October 23, 2022): 59–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.47941/ijp.1082.

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Epistemology is an attempt to understand the role of knowledge, its origin, development and validity. The scientists, psychologists, educationalists, moral philosophers – all are analyzing the importance of epistemology in the knowledge process. Epistemology is considered one of the branches of knowledge, and it supports logic by emphasizing the interrelation between the two. While explaining the significance of epistemology R.M. Chisholm says that it deals with issues like the distinction between knowledge and true opinion and the relation between conditions of truth and criteria of evidence. Such issues constitute the subject matter of the theory of knowledge. In the history of Western philosophy, the modern period is significant because, during this period, there were two schools of thought regarding the validity of knowledge and emerged. One is Rationalism, and the other is Empiricism. Rationalism emphasizes that the source of knowledge is the reason. However, the Empiricism emphasizes experience as the basis for knowledge. In both movements, namely, rationalism and empiricism, epistemology has been attempting to find the answers to some questions: What do we know? How do we know? What are the sources of knowledge? What is the difference between belief and knowledge? Furthermore, is it possible to get valid knowledge? The prominent empiricist John Locke read the writings of Descartes. He rejected Descartes' innate ideas logically, and he has elaborately explained the source of knowledge, the limit of knowledge, validity of knowledge, and its kinds in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. His empiricism received much criticism from the latest philosophers because he adapted some philosophical ideas from the pioneers. This article aims to justify whether John Locke’s epistemology is neutral by explaining the basic characteristic of empiricism and its critiques. This study as a qualitative approach depends both on the primary as well as secondary sources related to the study as books. This study attempts to understand Locke from a critical standpoint. In the end, an attempt is made to show how Locke's central and bias philosophy has relevance even today.

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Pym, Anthony. "A spirited defense of a certain empiricism in Translation Studies (and in anything else concerning the study of cultures)." Culture and Society 5, no. 2 (November 28, 2016): 289–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ts.5.2.07pym.

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The scientific method known as empiricism has been attacked in two influential books in Translation Studies. Mona Baker’s Translation and Conflict sees all knowledge as being produced through narrative, thereby excluding the processes of repeated testing and dialogue that can be associated with an empirical approach. Further, Baker’s failure to attend to textual linearity, voice, and narrator position lends her project an ideological essentialism that actively shuns such empirical testing. Lawrence Venuti’s Translation Changes Everything, on the other hand, escapes essentialism by insisting on the active interpretation of all data. However, Venuti thereby falsely opposes hermeneutics to empirical method, in a way that willfully ignores the key twentieth-century epistemologies of science. The resulting anti-empiricism leads him to some very questionable psychoanalytical conclusions and an excessive reliance on the authorities of dictionaries and distanced theorists. Neither Baker nor Venuti can say, as must any empiricist, ‘I don’t know.’

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Goldhaber, Charles. "Kant’s Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist." Journal of the History of Philosophy 62, no. 3 (July 2024): 421–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a932355.

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abstract: There is little consensus about whether Kant intends his Critique of Pure Reason to change the mind of a skeptical empiricist such as Hume. I challenge a common assumption made by both sides of the debate. This is the thought that Kant can convince skeptics only if he does not beg the question against them. Surprisingly, I argue, that is not how Kant sees things. On Kant’s view, skeptical empiricism is an inherently unstable and unsatisfying position, which skeptics cannot help wanting to escape. Kant’s Critique , and especially its Transcendental Deduction, offers thinkers like Hume an appealing means of escape, by explaining a possible relation of the mind to the objects of knowledge that skeptics have overlooked. On Kant’s view of skeptics as inherently dissatisfied with their position, the offer of an explanation can change their minds while neither refuting nor appealing to their skeptical empiricism.

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McArdle, J. Ardle, Patricia Palmer, and Bernard Share. "Lingual Empiricism." Books Ireland, no. 246 (2002): 26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20632390.

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Short. "Empiricism Expanded." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51, no. 1 (2015): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.51.1.1.

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North, John. "Aristotle's Empiricism." Early Science and Medicine 10, no. 1 (2005): 91–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573382053123557.

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Solomon, Miriam. "Social Empiricism." Noûs 28, no. 3 (September 1994): 325. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2216062.

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RUTHERFORD, DANILYN. "KINKY EMPIRICISM." Cultural Anthropology 27, no. 3 (August 2012): 465–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1360.2012.01154.x.

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Greenwood, Michael T. "Empiricism Revisited." Medical Acupuncture 24, no. 1 (March 2012): 2–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/acu.2011.0848.

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Halley, Michael. "Schelling’s Empiricism." Idealistic Studies 37, no. 2 (2007): 105–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies20073723.

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Searls, D. B. "Omic Empiricism." Science Signaling 2, no. 68 (April 21, 2009): eg6-eg6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/scisignal.268eg6.

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Whitford, William C. "Critical Empiricism." Law & Social Inquiry 14, no. 01 (1989): 61–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1989.tb00579.x.

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Hastings, John. "Medical empiricism." New Scientist 207, no. 2769 (July 2010): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0262-4079(10)61734-4.

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Humphreys, Paul. "Computational empiricism." Foundations of Science 1, no. 1 (March 1995): 119–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00208728.

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Ebbatson, Roger. "Destabilising empiricism." Metascience 21, no. 2 (November 29, 2011): 347–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-011-9623-4.

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Spurrett, David. "Empiricism: reloaded." Metascience 21, no. 2 (March 16, 2012): 351–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-012-9652-7.

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Jenkins, Phil. "Deep Empiricism." Process Studies 39, no. 1 (2010): 191–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/process201039116.

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Welle, John P., Pier Paolo Pasolini, Louise K. Barnett, and Ben Lawton. "Heretical Empiricism." Italica 67, no. 3 (1990): 411. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/478653.

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Dellsén, Finnur. "Reconstructed Empiricism." Acta Analytica 32, no. 1 (February 26, 2016): 95–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-016-0289-9.

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Leeds, Stephen. "Constructive empiricism." Synthese 101, no. 2 (November 1994): 187–221. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01064017.

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Nye, Mary Jo. "Passionate Empiricism." Minerva 45, no. 4 (October 25, 2007): 495–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11024-007-9056-9.

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Westbrook, Jay Lawrence. "Comparative Empiricism." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 37, no. 1 (April 1, 1999): 143–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.1532.

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