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Nilsson, Mats-Ola. "Emmanuel Levinas urminnes trauma : Om relationen till döden i Emmanuel Levinas filosofi." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Filosofi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-34090.
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This paper argues that the notion of death is omnipresent and essential for Emmanuel Levinas through all periods of his thought, although not always explicitly thematized. It tries to show this through a close reading of, firstly, his early period as an explicit polemic against Martin Heidegger’s analysis of death in Being and Time; secondly, his middle period, as an implicit polemic against Alexandre Kojèves influential readings of Hegel; and thirdly, his late period, in the light of psychoanalytical theories about trauma, loss, mourning and survival. This paper further argues that this notion of death, explicitly or implicitly present through all periods of Levinas’s thought, can be characterized as a traumatic survival experience in which a refusal to mourn holds sway. Finally, the paper sketches some consequences that this survival experience of death might have for contemporary post-Levinasian philosophy, to be examined in future research.
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Brody, Donna Hazel. "Emmanuel Levinas : difficult beginnings." Thesis, University of Essex, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.359219.
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Kobayashi, Reiko. "Religion et hétéronomie chez Emmanuel Levinas." Paris 4, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA040007.
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Emmanuel Levinas définit la "religion",non par la notion du sacré,comme les autres chercheurs qui tentent d'élucider des phénomènes religieux,mais par la sainteté. Celle-ci est attestée seulement par l'intrigue à trois dans la société. Elle est pensée non à partir de l'ontologie mais à partir de l'éthique de responsabilité impliquant l'estime d'unicité de chacun et de leur proximité. Dans la prmeière partie,les méthodes employées par Levinas sont analysées. La deuxième partie est consacrée à l'analyse de la notion de l'hétéronymie qui constitue le centre de gravité de toute la philosophie de Levinas. Ainsi,dans la troisième partie,nous voyons s'ouvrir la nouvelle voie de la phénoménologie de la religion qui a pour objet la description et la critique de la sainteté attestée dans le rapport humain,à travers des analyses concrètes du langage et de la temporalité qui phénoménalisent la religionUnlike other thinkers who try to understand religious phenomena,Emmanuel Levinas defines "religion" not in terms of the sacred,but in terms of the holy. .
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De, Wet Daniel Rudolph. "Emmanuel Levinas and the practice of psychology." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/2741.
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Thesis (MA (Psychology))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005.Psychology as a human science is rendered desperate by the human vacuum in its own contents. This paper argues that by adopting the methods and techniques of the natural sciences, psychology and psychotherapy not only transform the patient or client into an a-historical and a-social entity, but also propose an utopian view of reality and lose the inherent moral character of the psychotherapeutic endeavour. It seems as if the Post-Modern theoretical and psychotherapeutic alternatives do not offer a solution that solves the above mentioned problems. This paper aims to introduce the work of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, as a stimulus providing a different starting point in the search for solutions to the mentioned problems. Such an approach seeks to understand the radically ethical character of the therapeutic meeting by recognising the fundamental responsibility of the therapist, not to “totalise” (that is to reduce) otherness (the not me) into sameness (the for me) by assigning differences into pre-established characteristics, properties and categories. Only by recognising the otherness of the client in the “face-to-face meeting” and reacting to the call of the other can psychotherapy be ethical and render justice to historical and social situatedness of the other facing us in therapy. Some of the implications that the ethical challenge of Levinas holds for psychology will be explored. This includes the implications for the therapeutic meeting, psychological ethics, and the possibility of a “Levinasanian psychology”.
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De, Bauw Christine. "L'envers du sujet : lire autrement Emmanuel Levinas /." Bruxelles : Éd. Ousia, 1997. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37672160f.
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Bruno, Carmine Giovanni. "La prospettiva etica di E. Levinas /." Roma : Pontificia università lateranense, 1988. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb35718200z.
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Schöppner, Ralf. "Das gute Leben und die Sinnlichkeit des Fremden zur Philosophie von Emmanuel Levinas." Berlin Logos-Verl, 2006. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=014942680&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Hofmeyr, Augusta Benda. "Ethics and aesthetics in Foucault and Levinas /." Nijmegen : Faculty of philosophy, 2005. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb40087927b.
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Ajzenstat, Oona. "Levinas' prophetic ethics : his use of the sources of Judaism /." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape10/PQDD_0028/NQ50979.pdf.
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Brogan, Michael J. "The good against being ethics and ontology in Emmanuel Levinas /." Click here for download, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1407496581&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=3260&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Hirst, Angela. "Eating the other : Levinas's ethical encounter /." [St. Lucia, Qld.], 2004. http://www.library.uq.edu.au/pdfserve.php?image=thesisabs/absthe18679.pdf.
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Linteau, Richard. "Emmanuel Lévinas et la question de l'être." Sherbrooke : Université de Sherbrooke, 2004.
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Pfeifer, Markus. "Die Frage nach dem Subjekt Levinas' Philosophie als Ausdrucksform nachmetaphysischen Denkens." Würzburg Königshausen & Neumann, 2009. http://d-nb.info/997475293/04.
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Hiraishi, Koki. "Le statut philosophique de l'enseignement chez Emmanuel Levinas." Thesis, Strasbourg, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016STRAC020/document.
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Les recherches que nous présenterons dans cette thèse ont pour principal but de mettre en lumière le statut philosophique de l'« enseignement » chez Emmanuel Levinas. Nous essayerons de montrer que le concept d'enseignement est mis en oeuvre - bien que de façon souvent latente et implicite - dans l'ensemble de sa pensée philosophique. Comme nous l'examinerons tout au long de notre travail, ce concept d'enseignement se détermine chez Levinas d'une manière assez différente de celle habituelle. À savoir que l'enseignement désigne, non par la transmission des connaissances d'une personne à l'autre, mais, avant tout, l'épreuve consistant à « être mis en question » dans la relation avec autrui, que le philosophe qualifie d'« éthique ». C'est du point de vue du croisement de l'enseignement et de l'éthique que notre thèse envisage d'aborder les divers problèmes fondamentaux de la philosophie de Levinas et, par-là, de jeter une nouvelle lumière sur celle-ciThis thesis aims primarily to clarify the philosophical status of '"enseignement" in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. As we will show, the concept of "enseignement" is to be located at the very heart of Levinas' philosophy, and it is defined by him in a different way than usual. Namely, "enseignement" does not mean transmission of knowledge from one person to another, but it means instead passive experience of "being called into question (être mis en question)" in the ethical relation with the Other. It is at this intersection between "enseignement" and ethics that our thesis intends to interpret various fundamental problems of the philosophy of Levinas and to cast a new light on it
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De, Voss Vida V. "Emmanuel Levinas on ethics as the first truth." Thesis, Link to the online version, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10019/49.
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Tahim, Demetrius Oliveira. "Rosto e ?tica no pensamento de Emmanuel Levinas." Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2008. http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/2787.
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Previous issue date: 2008-03-06O presente trabalho tem por objetivo descrever, a partir do pensamento de Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), a rela??o com o rosto de outrem como ?tica. O fio condutor deste trabalho ? a leitura levinasiana da id?ia de infinito na qual ? vislumbrada a possibilidade de descrever um evento n?o pautado na abertura do ser nem como representa??o do eu transcendental. A descri??o da id?ia do infinito indica a rela??o com algo absolutamente exterior ?quele que o pensa, assim como atesta uma abissal dist?ncia entre o pensador e o pensado. Levinas utiliza-se da estrutura formal desta id?ia para descrever a rela??o com outrem, a concretude da id?ia do infinito produz-se na rela??o social que ? mantida com o rosto de outrem. O delineamento dessa rela??o apresenta o eu como acolhedor deste rosto descrito como absolutamente outro. Apenas a presen?a de outrem interpela o eu, confrontando o seu livre e arbitr?rio movimento de apropria??o e posse. Esta impugna??o da liberdade do eu por outrem ser? chamada de ?tica e afirma a anterioridade da justi?a em rela??o ? liberdade e, destarte, a ?tica como anterior ? ontologia. Os desdobramentos dessa rela??o primeira face a face ser?o discutidos no texto tendo como ponto de partida a hist?ria da filosofia dando ?nfase, principalmente, ? cr?tica a ontologia fundamental proposta por Heidegger. Pretende, com isso, mostrar que a rela??o com o rosto n?o se engloba na abertura do ser e, al?m disso, ? fonte de sentido e capaz de promover a justi?a na humanidade como acolhimento da diferen?a.
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Tahim, Demetrius Oliveira. "Rosto e ética no pensamento de Emmanuel Levinas." Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3410.
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Previous issue date: 2008This paper aims to describe, from the thought of Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), the relationship with the face of others as ethics. The leitmotif of this work is the levinasian reading of the infinity’s idea. The description of the idea of infinite indicates the relationship with something completely outside of that who thinks about the former, as well as affirming a big gap between the thinker and thought. Levinas works in the formal structure of this idea in order to describe the relationship with others. The concreteness of the idea of infinity is produced in the social relationship and is maintained with the face of others. The design of this relationship shows the “I” as welcoming of this face which is described as another. Only the presence of others concerns the “I”, confronting its arbitrary and free movement of ownership and possession. This challenging of the someone’s freedom will be called “ethics” and says the anticipations of justice in relation to freedom and, thus, ethics and pre-ontology. The unfolding of this first relationship - face to face - will be discussed in the text taking as a starting point the history of philosophy emphasizing mainly on the critical key to the ontology proposed by Heidegger. The aim, with this, is to show that the relationship with the face does not include the opening of the being and, moreover, is a source of meaning and is capable of promoting justice in humanity as a host of difference.
O presente trabalho tem por objetivo descrever, a partir do pensamento de Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), a relação com o rosto de outrem como ética. O fio condutor deste trabalho é a leitura levinasiana da idéia de infinito na qual é vislumbrada a possibilidade de descrever um evento não pautado na abertura do ser nem como representação do eu transcendental. A descrição da idéia do infinito indica a relação com algo absolutamente exterior àquele que o pensa, assim como atesta uma abissal distância entre o pensador e o pensado. Levinas utiliza-se da estrutura formal desta idéia para descrever a relação com outrem, a concretude da idéia do infinito produz-se na relação social que é mantida com o rosto de outrem. O delineamento dessa relação apresenta o eu como acolhedor deste rosto descrito como absolutamente outro. Apenas a presença de outrem interpela o eu, confrontando o seu livre e arbitrário movimento de apropriação e posse. Esta impugnação da liberdade do eu por outrem será chamada de ética e afirma a anterioridade da justiça em relação à liberdade e, destarte, a ética como anterior à ontologia. Os desdobramentos dessa relação primeira – face a face – serão discutidos no texto tendo como ponto de partida a história da filosofia dando ênfase, principalmente, à crítica a ontologia fundamental proposta por Heidegger. Pretende, com isso, mostrar que a relação com o rosto não se engloba na abertura do ser e, além disso, é fonte de sentido e capaz de promover a justiça na humanidade como acolhimento da diferença.
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Minatomichi, Takashi. "La mort dans la philosophie de Emmanuel Levinas." Paris 1, 1987. http://www.theses.fr/1987PA010658.
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Bien que le problème de la mort n'occupe pas visiblement la place centrale de la méditation philosophique de Levinas, il contribue à élucider la structure de sa pensée fondamentale sur la responsabilité pour autrui. Dans cette perspective, la présente étude développe plusieurs thèses propres à Levinas. La mort pour le sujet que je suis, donc ma propre mort, se définit par son altérite absolue qui transcende mon pouvoir tout entier, et par la violence que je ne peux pas enfin éviter de subir et qui doit être pensée au fond au niveau des rapports interpersonnels. Dans ces rapports, autrui est l'étant dont l'altérité est absolue, comparable à ma propre mort. Or la responsabilité consiste à entretenir une relation pacifique, à renoncer à un exercice de la violence sur lui, même lorsqu'il n'y renonce pas (le sens unique de la responsabilité). Ce n'est pas ma décision libre et active, mais le visage d'autrui qui la rend possible. Le visage m'engage, sans mon engagement libre, dans une relation pacifique par une "force", (comparable à celle que J. L. Austin a découvert à propos de l'énoncé performatif"). Le visage constitue l'appel originaire et pre-langier à la paix et au bien. L'impossibilité d'être sourd à son appel silencieux, qui provient, non pas la menace de mort contre moi, mais la faiblesse d'autrui en face de sa propre mort, c'est la responsabilité, la passivité au-delà de l'activité, activité qui définit la subjectivité dans la philosophie moderne. Engage dans la relation, je me trouve dans le choix entre la réponse obéissant à l'appel-commandement du visage et l'interruption par la violence de cette relation (désobéissance). Obéir, cela se traduit dans le dire passif, parole dans laquelle j'accueille autrui sans attendre aucune récompense. Du point de vue de la mort, il s'agit de m'occuper de la mort d'autrui davantage que ma propre mort. La responsabilité au-delà de l'être, c'est désintéressement.
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Minatomichi, Takashi. "La Mort dans la philosophie de Emmanuel Levinas." Lille 3 : ANRT, 1988. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37608071t.
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Gautier, Zachary L. "Levinas and loving one's neighbor." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2008. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p001-1222.
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Aybar, Valdivia Raphael Gustavo. "Levinas y la fenomenología de la sensibilidad." Master's thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2015. http://tesis.pucp.edu.pe/repositorio/handle/123456789/6227.
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El siguiente trabajo es un análisis del concepto de sensibilidad en la fenomenología de Emmanuel Levinas. La pregunta que lo articula es la siguiente: ¿cómo plantea la filosofía de Levinas la relación entre la experiencia del extraño y la facultad subjetiva de sentir? La hipótesis que defiende es la siguiente: en la filosofía de Levinas la relación del yo con el otro tiene su origen en la vida pasiva del sujeto. Tal relación no se da solo a un nivel consciente, es decir, cuando el yo y el otro están ya constituidos, sino que los niveles más elementales de esta relación, pasivos y sensibles, son condiciones de esta. En esta línea, se busca dar una descripción del nivel primordial de la relación con el extraño, que es genético, en el que es de capital importancia la afección del yo. Este, frente a los contenidos externos a él que le interpelan a un nivel corporal, irrumpe como sujeto consciente. Precisamente, Levinas concibe al yo como ‘reacción’ o ‘respuesta’ ante tales contenidos y considera que ese es el sentido mismo de la intencionalidad y de su vida. Por ello, entiende la subjetivación del yo, la manera en que se auto--‐determina y adquiere una identidad, como ‘respuesta ante el otro’. La identidad, así, depende de la alteridad, de la cosa física que interpela corporalmente al yo y de la materialidad del lenguaje que el otro profiere.
La investigación examina tres formas en que Levinas plantea la relación sensible con el otro. En un primer momento, en una actitud teórica, lo sensible se comprende como dato y el otro dentro de un sistema o red de sentidos. Según esta interpretación, la sensibilidad no se separa de la actividad categorizadora del entendimiento, por lo que en esta actitud el otro pierde su alteridad (que es determinada por la intencionalidad cognoscitiva). En un segundo momento, en la actitud volitiva, lo sensible es el deseo, y el otro la materia que el sujeto quiere o lo deseado. A diferencia de la primera actitud, en esta el yo si se relaciona a una alteridad, aunque esta sea negada en la intención subjetiva, ya que el deseo apunta a la posesión y no respetar la alteridad. En un tercer momento, la sensibilidad es abordada en la vida pasiva del sujeto, en la que se relaciona con la alteridad de la materia y la del otro hombre; aquí, el otro no es una mera determinación del yo, ni tampoco es anulado por su intención. Por medio de las nociones de ‘vulnerabilidad’ y ‘proximidad’, la investigación describe como se gesta relación con el otro hombre en este fondo pasivo.
La tesis se divide en tres capítulos. El primero rastrea las influencias de la noción de sensibilidad de Kant y Husserl en Levinas. Además, explica los conceptos de alteridad y sensibilidad de la actitud teórica. El segundo capítulo examina el concepto de sensibilidad en algunas obras tempranas de Levinas. Además, retoma su temprana crítica a la actitud teórica; luego, presenta el problema cardinal de su filosofía, la trascendencia del yo, en el que se enmarca la relación con el otro. El capítulo, además, presenta algunos conceptos centrales de su obra como subjetividad, sensibilidad, placer y alteridad, constantemente retomados en toda la investigación. Finalmente, el tercer capítulo se divide en dos partes: la primera aborda el concepto de sensibilidad en Totalidad e infinito, y muestra que en esta obra Levinas sostiene que gracias a la sensibilidad emerge una subjetividad separada, es decir, única e idéntica a si; después de esto, presenta algunos problemas del concepto en relación con una presunta oposición que Levinas realiza entre la sensibilidad y el lenguaje. La tercera parte muestra como en su obra tardía Levinas supera dicha oposición; en De otro modo que ser, la sensibilidad no se opone más al lenguaje y está presente en la génesis pasiva del yo. En esta génesis, Levinas destaca una proximidad irreductible del yo con el otro y concluye que la subjetividad se constituye como respuesta a la apelación sensible del otro.Tesis
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Bovo, Elena. "Absence, souvenir, la relation à autrui chez Emmanuel Lévinas et Jacques Derrida /." Turnhout : Brepols, 2005. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb39970219k.
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Pfeuffer, Silvio. "Die Entgrenzung der Verantwortung : Nietzsche, Dostojewskij, Levinas /." Berlin : W. de Gruyter, 2008. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb413933503.
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Kayser, Paulette. "Emmanuel Lévinas : la trace du féminin /." Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 2000. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb376334762.
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Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Philos.--Paris 8, 1998. Titre de soutenance : La défaillance du sujet, le féminin différence sexuelle et immémoriale dans les écrits d'Emmanuel Lévinas.Bibliogr. p. 241-251. Index.
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Bernhardt, Uwe. "Vom Anderen zum Selben : für eine anthropologische Lektüre von Emmanuel Lévinas /." Bonn : Bouvier Verl, 1996. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb358674830.
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Thomas, Elisabeth Louise. "Emmanuel Levinas : ethics, justice, and the human beyond being /." New York : Routledge, 2004. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb39190635z.
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Bouillon, Vincent. "Guerre et paix dans la philosophie d'Emmanuel Levinas." Thesis, Paris 10, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010PA100060.
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Il faut avec Levinas faire le constat d’un premier problème, premier parce qu’il y va du sens de la vie en commun et du respect de l’humain. Annonçons ce problème : « si la proximité ne m’ordonnait qu’autrui tout seul, il n’y aurait pas eu de problème ». Nous ne sommes pas deux au monde et notre rapport à l’autre, au tiers, au prochain comme au lointain, s’impose toujours déjà à nous, avant tout consentement. « Problème », car l’autre est aussi le plus préoccupant par excellence, imprévisible, nous nous trouverons toujours déjà en relation avec lui dans une infinité de rapports indéfectibles. Jetés que nous sommes dans le monde, notre préoccupation de et pour l’autre nous est imposée en héritage avec la même nécessité que notre présence à nous même. Dans notre existence, nous n’avons été et ne serons jamais vraiment seuls, c’est pourquoi notre rapport à l’autre, depuis les rapports de paix jusqu’à la guerre devient un problème fondamental, le premier comme le dernier des problèmes. Nous montrerons dans ce travail que le problème de la guerre et de la paix prend naissance par et pour l’être mais nous irons plus loin en identifiant précisément qu’à l’être et à l’ontologie s’ajoute une autre source de conflit, d’autant plus ambivalente qu’elle sera tout aussi nécessaire aux paix qu’aux guerres : la transcendance. Ce que nous proposerons de faire voir ici et de soutenir, c’est que l’être n’est pas la seule origine du mal et conséquemment de la guerre. La position de Levinas aura sur ce point peu à peu évolué depuis ses écrits de jeunesse et l’expérience des camps jusqu’à ses œuvres de la maturité discréditant la jouissance et le bonheur pour soi. C’est à ce déplacement que nous inviterons le lecteur ainsi qu’à la compréhension des implications touchant à la justice, à l’Etat, au bonheur et à la réalisation effective de la paix comme au surgissement toujours possible et menaçant de la guerre.Ce travail ne fera pas l’économie de la lucidité réclamée par Levinas sur le siècle passé et ses génocides et cherchera à concilier cette dernière avec l’espoir que l’ensemble de sa philosophie veut soutenirAlong a first, major question, primordial as it involves living together and respecting human values. Let us present that problem: «it proximity concerned one person only there would not have been any difficulty». There are not only two of us in this world, and our relation to the other, the third one, the closest as well as the furtherest, is a reality we cannot deny before any consent. «A problem» because the other is equally, par excellence, the most worry some, and unpredictable with the other we shall always be in a relation that includes an infinity of indestructible links. Last as we are in the world our preoccupation “of” and “for” the other is imposed on us as an heritage with the same necessity as our presence to ourselves. In our existence we have never been and never shall be alone; that is why our relation to the other, from peace to war, becomes an essential question, the first as well as the last of the problems. We will show in these links that the problem of war and peace arises by and for the being, we shall to go further by identifying precisely that to being and to ontology is added another source of conflict, which is all the more ambivalent as it will be necessary to peace and war: transcendence. What we would like to let appear and to sustain is that the being is not the only origin of evil and consequently of war. Levinas’s position on that point has slowly but significantly evolved, as the thesis expressed in his early writing has been submitted to the harsh experience of the nazi concentration camps and have finally resulted in his maturity in a general discard for enjoyment and happiness for ourself. This is the voyage to which the reader is invited, as well as to approach of the implications it includes for justice, state, happiness and the effective realization of peace as well as for the always possible and sudden looming up treat of war.We shall accompagny Levinas in his striving for lucidity regarding the last century and its genocides and we shall endeavor to reconcile that lucidity with the hope his whole philosophy wants never theless to sustain
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Fonti, Diego. "Levinas und Rosenzweig das Denken, der Andere und die Zeit." Würzburg Königshausen & Neumann, 2009. http://d-nb.info/995601739/04.
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Stolle, Jeffrey James. "The paradox of ethical immediacy : Levinas and Kant /." view abstract or download file of text, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3004004.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2001.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 222-228). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Dias, Jefferson Polidoro. "A JUSTIÇA EM EMMANUEL LEVINAS: UMA ANÁLISE DO TERCEIRO." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2016. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9161.
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Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e TecnológicoThe following study is of bibliographic nature and aims at understanding the concept of justice in Emmanuel Levinas. After developing the criticism of the concept of totality, demonstrating how certain character ontology hid trapping and control, as well as the idea of ethics of infinite responsibility for the Other (Totality and Infinity), Lévinas explores content secondarily treated in his early writings, but which is of huge significance in his thinking, the Third, ie, society and the State. This other way of thinking the State develops, for Leévinas, ethics and the construction of political subjectivity. So I intend to focus this research in the works Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, to understand how, through political imagination, a free and open society is possible, not based on inflexibility, but in the opening to the Infinite.
O seguinte estudo é de cunho bibliográfico e tem por objetivo o entendimento da concepção de justiça em Emmanuel Lévinas. Após ter desenvolvido a crítica ao conceito de totalidade, demonstrando como a ontologia escondia certo caráter de aprisionamento e controle, bem como a idéia de ética de responsabilidade infinita pelo Outro (Totalidade e Infinito), Lévinas explora um conteúdo tratado secundariamente nos seus primeiros escritos, mas que constitui enorme significação em seu pensamento, o Terceiro, ou seja, a sociedade e o Estado. Este outro modo de pensar o Estado se desenvolve, para Levinas, na construção da subjetividade ética e política. Sendo assim, pretendo focar esta pesquisa nas obras Totalidade e Infinito e Outramente que Ser, para assim compreender como, por meio da imaginação política, é possível uma sociedade aberta e livre, baseada não na inflexibilidade e sim na abertura para o Infinito.
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Thomas, Elisabeth Louise. "Emmanuel Levinas ethics, justice and the human beyond being /." University of Sydney, Philosophy, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/415.
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Abstract: Emmanuel Levinas: Ethics, Justice and the Human beyond Being. Levinas finds the early twentieth century to be marked by a rejection of the concept of humanity, at the moment of its awakening to its own brutality. While accepting the anti-humanist position, insofar as it questions the primacy of free will, and an unquestionable security in its attachment to a pregiven, universal Reason, Levinas' work questions the value of rethinking the human in terms of being. This thesis traces Levinas' attempt to rehabilitate humanity from its devotion to ontology as first philosophy. It argues that Levinas offers a reinterpretation of the relation of being and the human, tracing the movement in Levinas' work from a critical attempt to rethink the human and being, to the notion of the human beyond being. The thesis begins with a critical engagement with Heideggerian ontology suggesting that Levinas' renewal of the question of being in his prewar essays reflects a concern for the meaning of subjective existence and its relation to the social and political totality. These concerns lie behind his reinterpretation of the relation of existence and the existent in his essays of the 1940's in which Levinas undertakes a critique of a Platonic social totality and introduces a notion of the alterity of eros which does not have its value determined in terms of a teleology of social production. From this basis, Levinas is shown to address the question of justice by articulating the essentially ambiguous relation between the subject and another in terms of the ambivalence of the face, and contrasting this with the alterity of love. The development of these ideas is traced across Levinas' major works. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas argues that the response to the singular other is conceived of as the event of the production of a universal which affirms the tertiality of the social totality, that is, attests to the whole of humanity. In Otherwise than Being, the relation of ethics and justice is discussed in different terms, those of the relation of the ethical Saying and the realm of the Said or being's justice. Levinas juxtaposes the ontological tertiality of the third, with the notion of an ethical tertiality, which he calls illeity. Illeity is found to not be reducible to the ontological tertiality of the third party, but to name the exceeding of subjectivity in terms of an absolute susceptibility to the Other, and is an excessive concept of a singular universal: the human beyond being.
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Pick, Anat. "Henry James, Emmanuel Levinas, and the ethics of literature." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:987f3650-6733-45b4-803d-474a3f635f45.
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This study constitutes an attempt to isolate and elucidate the event of personal relations in the later writings of Henry James. I argue that James' singularity rests on his treatment of personal relations in a radical and unfamiliar way. The main goal of this piece is, then, to trace the workings of personal relations, and to understand the peculiar way in which they figure and unfold in the later narratives. By reading James through the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, I wish to reconstruct James' major phase as primarily "ethical." Levinasian ethics differs from the branches of moral philosophy in its insistence on the absolute priority and exteriority of the ethical relation between persons: its disengagement from the realms of psychology and consciousness. The ethical relation is envisioned as flourishing precisely in the absence of cognition and thought. Rather than relating to one another as potentially knowable beings, then, persons in James and Levinas relate to one another as mutually unfathomable others. I maintain that this breaching of cognition and knowledge essentially characterizes Jamesian sociality. Read through ethics, as divorced from ideas of consciousness, James' major phase finds its meaning outside the traditional reign of James studies, which takes James as the master of complex elaborations on modes of consciousness. Not consciousness but alterity is James' defining feature, and it is through the readings of alterity that the fundamental event of Jamesian sociality emerges as both primary and unique. "Ethics" thus opens up a new horizon in which the Jamesian is no longer synonymous with consciousness, a horizon which transforms the understanding, not only of James in particular, but of literature in general.
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Leonard, Philip. "Atheses of alterity : Emmanuel Levinas and post-structuralist theory." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.281660.
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Bovo, Elena. "La pensée d'autrui chez Emmanuel Levinas et Jacques Derrida." Paris 12, 2002. http://www.theses.fr/2002PA120039.
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C'est à partir d'un dialogue avec la phénoménologie husserlienne et heideggerienne que Lévinas et Derrida élaborent leurs conceptions de l'identité du moi. C'est une identité précaire qui est à la fois rendue possible et menacée par autrui. La première partie de ce travail met en lumière les points problématiques et féconds impliqués dans la réflexion husserlienne de l'altérité ainsi que l'enracinement de certains concepts lévinassiens dans une telle réflexion. Dans la deuxième partie une attention particulière est prêtée au développement et au changement de la conception lévinassienne du moi et d'autrui dans les textes postérieurs à Totalité et Infini. Dans ces textes un nouveau concept de mort est aussi à l'œuvre. Dans la troisième partie un tel concept, qui s'oppose explicitement à la conception heideggerienne de la mort, est mis en relation avec la réflexion derridienne du deuil impossible, réflexion qui analyse les conséquences de la perte d'autrui dans la constitution du moiIt is from a dialogue with the husserlien and the heiddegerien phenomenology that Lévinas and Derrida elaborate their concept of the identity of the self. It is a precarious identity, which is at the same time made possible and threatened by the other. The first part of the thesis throws light on the problematic and fertile points implicated in the husserlien reflection of otherness, as well as on the roots of some levinasien concepts in this reflection. In the second part, a special attention is given to the development and the change of levinasien conception of the self and the other, in the texts posterior to Totalité et Infini. In these texts, a new concept of death is introduced as well. In the third part, this concept of death, which explicitly opposes the heideggerien concept of death, is compared with derridien reflection of impossible mourning, a reflection that examines the consequences of the loss of the other for the constitution of the self
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Doublet, Lucie. "« Sublime matérialisme » : Emmanuel Levinas et l’héritage de Karl Marx." Thesis, Paris 10, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA100049.
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Rares sont les références explicites à Marx ou au communisme sous la plume de Levinas, du moins dans ses œuvres principales. Étonnamment rares, si l’on considère leur contexte de rédaction. Les sciences humaines de la seconde moitié du XXème siècle sont occupées par la discussion du paradigme marxiste. Levinas subit de plein fouet les vicissitudes de l’histoire. A Kharkov, il assiste à la révolution russe de 1917. La catastrophe de la Shoah, dans laquelle disparait une grande partie de sa famille, marque à jamais sa mémoire. Toute sa démarche philosophique est orientée par la nécessité d’une nouvelle pensée de la communauté humaine assumant les leçons du XXème siècle. A rebours des lectures qui relèguent la question politique au rang de dimension subsidiaire dans l’œuvre levinassienne, nous faisons alors l’hypothèse de sa centralité. Ce sont les enjeux collectifs qui accusent l’insuffisance et imposent la reconsidération de l’approche humaniste du sujet et de l’éthique menée par Levinas. De ce point de vue, le projet de justice et d’universalisme porté par la tradition socialiste, notamment par Marx, constitue bien pour sa réflexion un objet central. A la fois sources d’inspiration, et révélatrices des limites d’une pensée strictement politique de la communauté, qui prétend faire l’économie de la transcendance, les propositions de Marx travaillent en sous-main les conceptions levinassiennes de l’individu, du pluralisme, de la justice ou encore de l’État. Nous avons voulu reconstituer ce dialogue implicite de Levinas avec Marx. Explorant la portée sociale et politique des motifs levinassiens, il s’avère que ces derniers recèlent une fécondité inattendue. La considération de l’ « anarchie du Bien », de la « patience » et de ce que Levinas nomme l’ « État libéral » permettent d’aborder de manière originale les questions de la justice, de la lutte sociale et des institutions politiques, faisant émerger des propositions ignorées tant par la tradition libérale que par celle du socialisme, dans ses versions marxienne et anarchisteExplicit references to Marx or to communism are rare in Levinas’ writing, especially in his major works. This is astonishing, considering the context in which he was writing. In the second half of the 20th century, human sciences were particularly influenced by the debate of Marxist paradigms. Levinas was truly impacted by the context of his era. He was a witness of the Russian revolution at Kharkov in 1917. Many members of his family were victims of the Shoah. This tragedy profoundly impacted him. His philosophical approach is lead by the necessity of re-thinking the « human community », whilst bearing in mind the lessons that the 20th century has left behind. Several critics have considered Levinas’ work to be “apolitical”, or have at least argued that the political undertones of his work are to be taken in consideration as a secondary factor. This thesis has, in contrary, focused upon and sustained the centrality of Levinas’ politically motivated thought. Communal and societal dilemmas are at the heart of Levinas’ ethical approach. The traditional socialist stance towards justice and universalism, in the line of Marx, constitutes a central focus of his reflexion. The suggestions made by Marx underpin Levinas’ conceptions of the individual, of pluralism, of justice and of the State. On one hand, they are a source of inspiration for Levinas, on the other, a source of critic. The thesis has aimed to reconstitute the intellectual dialogue that Levinas carried out with Marx between the lines. Whilst exploring the social and political leitmotivs of Levinas’ thought, the interminglement with Marx has been illuminating and innovative. It has enabled an original approach to questions revolving around justice, social struggle and political institutions. Considering the levinassian “Anarchy of Good”, the “Patience” and what Levinas calls the “Liberal state”, previously ignored positions emerge, which have been left on the side by the liberal tradition and by socialist thoughts both in Marxian and anarchist terms
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Aybar, Raphael, and Cesare Del Mastro. "Danielle Cohen-Levinas: Lo que no puede ser dicho. Una lectura estética en Emmanuel Levinas." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119249.
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ORGANISTI, UMBERTO JAMES. "L'idea d'intenzionalità di Emmanuel Lévinas." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/748.
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La ricerca, seguendo l’evoluzione dell’idea d’intenzionalità nell’opera di Lévinas, vuole mettere a tema il problema che è all’origine della sua scelta di superare l’intenzionalità stessa. In particolare, intendiamo mostrare che la comprensione della coscienza come esistenza intenzionale rappresentativa, conduce Lévinas a cercare un’esperienza della trascendenza irriducibile alla rappresentazione, e che si presenti come un’interruzione della correlazione tra idea e ideatum. Infatti, per il nostro autore si giunge all’esperienza della trascendenza attraverso un atto al quale è impossibile ritornare a se stesso, essendo ogni ritorno a se stesso il tentativo della coscienza di costituire l’alterità. Questa convinzione ha come conseguenza la separazione tra ontologia ed etica. Tale separazione implica l’impossibilità per la coscienza etica di accedere ad un senso che essa possa intenzionare, vale a dire una pratica senza sapere.The research, following the evolution of the idea of intentional in the script of Levinas, wants to focus the problem at the base of his choice to go through the intention itself. To be more precise, our goal is to demonstrate that the comprehension of conscience as intentional and representative existence make Levinas look for an experience of irreducible transcendence to representation, an experience that seems to be as an interruption of the correlation between idea and ideatum. In fact, the author gets to the experience of the transcendence through an act, which is impossible to go back to again, because every coming back to self is an attempt of the conscience to constitute the concept of Other. This conviction carries the separation between ontology and ethic. This separation implies the impossibility for the ethic conscience to get to a sense that could be intentional, that it means an activity without knowledge.
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Morrison, Glenn. "Levinas, Von Balthasar and Trinitarian Praxis." Thesis, Australian Catholic University, 2004. https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/download/4e9f4ca7152783f542a8bf904f1d0d61ac8f796259d2ee3ec2503378513a652f/11780627/Morrison_2004_Levinas.pdf.
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Gorman, Anthony. "Good infinity : Hegel, Levinas and the accomplishment of ethical life." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.388637.
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Fabri, Marcelo. "Etica e dessacralização : a questão da subjetividade em Emmanuel Levinas." [s.n.], 1995. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280618.
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Orientador: Marcos Lutz MullerTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Doutorado
Doutor em Filosofia
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Passos, Helder Machado. "Relação entre ética e política no pensamento de Emmanuel Levinas." Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-21022013-142033/.
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O objetivo geral da presente tese é demonstrar que existe no pensamento do filósofo Emmanuel Levinas uma relação entre ética e política sem a qual não seria possível pensar o sentido do humano em suas dimensões individual e social. Nele encontramos indicações claras sobre suas preocupações políticas ao ponto de podermos afirmar que suas análises filosóficas têm início a partir do fenômeno da guerra, fato eminentemente político. Para compreender o fenômeno da guerra, Levinas se dirige à filosofia onde constata que a mesma foi, quase sempre, uma ontologia, um discurso sobre o Ser, que se caracteriza pelo fechamento e totalidade do pensamento, impedindo qualquer possibilidade da alteridade surgir e se manter como tal. Nessa tarefa descobre o frente a frente do Eu e do Outro como momento inicial do sentido do humano em que o Eu é questionado pelo seu direito ser. Surge aí a ética como filosofia primeira caracterizada pela responsabilidade assimétrica do Eu pelo Outro. Mas, a ética é relação de único a único e a realidade comporta situações para além do frente a frente. Assim, para se chegar ao sentido do humano, torna-se necessário pensar a multiplicidade que é sugerida pela presença do Terceiro e que permite a Levinas tecer considerações sobre a política e suas relações mútuas com a ética, utilizando-se principalmente de dois sentidos da noção de justiça. Para esse propósito, abordaremos três momentos de sua produção intelectual. O primeiro se refere à estada de Levinas na Lituânia e na França onde nosso autor fora influenciado pelas questões políticas que se impunham pelo fenômeno da guerra e por suas incursões no pensamento filosófico na tentativa de compreender os fundamentos de tal fenômeno. O segundo momento é caracterizado por sua crítica à ontologia como pensamento dominante na filosofia e que, para Levinas, corrobora com o estado de guerra, assim como pelo estabelecimento da ética como filosofia primeira a partir da relação original entre o Eu e o Outro. O terceiro momento traz a temática da relação entre ética e política, permitindo a compreensão de que ela se dá a partir de mútuas impugnações. A ética surge e mantém-se pelas suas preocupações com a política, mas, por outro lado, a política interrompe a ética expandindo o princípio da responsabilidade, presente na relação Eu-Outro, à multiplicidade dos existentes e suas relações. A política surge imprimindo uma tensão à ética e sendo tensionada por ela.The general objective, in this thesis, is to demonstrate that there is a relation between ethics and politics in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas without which would not be possible to think the human meaning in its individual and social dimension. In his thought we find evident indications about his politics concerns so that we can affirm that his philosophical analysis begin from the phenomenon of war. To comprehend the phenomenon of war, Levinas discusses the philosophy and states that it have been almost always an ontology, a discourse on the Being, which is characterized by closure and completeness of thought, preventing any possibility to the otherness emerge and to remain as such. In this task he discovers the face to face of the Self and the Other as an early stage of human meaning in that the Self is asked about its right to Be. There arises ethics as prime philosophy, characterized by asymmetric responsibility between the Self and the Other. But ethics is the relation between unique and unique and the reality has situations beyond the face to face. So, to get to the human meaning, it is necessary to consider the multiplicity that is suggested by the presence of the Third and that allows Levinas to make considerations about the politics and its mutual relations to ethics, using mainly two senses of the concept of justice. For this purpose, we will discuss three moments of his intellectual production. The first refers to Levinass stay in Lithuania and France where our author was influenced by political issues that were imposed by the phenomenon of war and by his incursions in philosophical thought in trying to understand the reasons for such a phenomenon. The second stage is characterized by its criticism to ontology as dominant thought in philosophy and that, for Levinas, corroborates the state of war, as well as the establishment of ethics as first philosophy of the original relation between the Self and the Other. The third stage brings the theme of the relation between ethics and politics, allowing the comprehension that it comes from mutual impugnment. The ethics emerges and remains by its concerns with the politics; but on the other hand, the politics interrupts the ethics, expanding the principle of responsibility, which stands in the relation Self-Other, and the multiplicity of existing relations. The politics emerges and imposes a tension to ethics and is tensioned by it.
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Baniounga, Fabrice Satou. "L'intersubjectivité dans l'œuvre de Jean-Paul Sartre et Emmanuel Levinas." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Amiens, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019AMIE0038.
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Cette thèse se propose d'analyser un problème qui hante la philosophie moderne depuis Descartes : le problème de la connaissance d'autrui dans un monde intersubjectif. En effet, le geste radical par lequel Descartes inaugure la philosophie moderne, sa volonté de n'accorder un statut de certitude qu'aux objets de la connaissance indubitable du cogito, soulève le problème épineux de la connaissance de l'autre qui ne se présente qu'indirectement, par le biais de son corps. A partir du questionnement sur la connaissance de l'autre qui fournit d'ailleurs le point de départ de nos recherche, cette thèse montre avec précision la grande postérité de ce problème au 20ème siècle, notamment à partir du moment où Edmund Husserl, en renouant avec le point de départ radical de la philosophie cartésienne, cherche une nouvelle méthode phénoménologique pour la philosophie. C'est dans ses leçons présentées au Collège de France en 1929, Les méditations cartésiennes, traduites en français par Emmanuel Lévinas et Gabrielle Peiffer, que Husserl tente de résoudre le problème de la connaissance de l'autre et du statut du monde intersubjectif légué par la démarche cartésienne. Cette thèse montre l'aspect très insatisfaisant de la solution proposée par la phénoménologie husserlienne à ce problème. Ce problème fera l'objet d'une réflexion très importante élaborée d'une part par Jean-Paul Sartre dans L'Être et le néant et d'autre part par Emmanuel Levinas, notamment dans Totalité et infini et Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence. Ce travail, déroule une analyse "originale" des réponses données par Sartre et par Levinas au problème de la connaissance d'autrui et de la configuration du monde intersubjectif en montrant toute l'importance de leurs réflexions respectives sur l'altérité, sur le rôle de la corporéité et le thème de l'opacité dans la connaissance de l'autre trop souvent délaissé par la tradition cartésienne, puis par la phénoménologie husserlienne. Cette analyse nous a conduits de prendre en considération les enjeux proprement éthiques des deux positions critiques que Sartre et Levinas élaborent à l'égard de Husserl. A partir de perspectives différentes, la question de la connaissance d'autrui est renforcée dans les deux cas par une réflexion en profondeur sur la responsabilitéThis thesis proposes to analyze a problem that haunts modern philosophy since Descartes : the problem of the knowledge of others in an intersubjective world. Indeed, the radical gesture by which Descartes inaugurated modern philosophy, its desire not place undue reliance status as objects of undoubted knowledge of the cogito, raises the thorny problem of the knowledge of the other who did this indirectly through his body. From the questioning of the knowledge of the other, which provides also the starting point of our research, this thesis shows precisely the great seed of this problem in the 20th century, especially from the time when Edmund Husserl, reconnecting with the radical starting point of the Cartesian philosophy, looking for a new phenomenological method for philosophy. It's in his lectures presented at the Collège de France in 1929, Cartesian Meditations, translated into French by Emmanuel Levinas and Gabrielle Peiffer, Husserl attempts to solve the problem of knowledge of each other and the status of the intersubjective world bequeathed by Cartesian approach.This thesis shows the most unsatisfactory aspect of the solution proposed by the phenomenology of Husserl the problem. This issue will be a very important reflection developed in part by Sartre in Being and Nothingness and secondly by Emmanuel Levinas, particularly in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or -delà gasoline. This work, conducted an "original" analysis of the answers given by Sartre and Levinas to the problem of knowledge of others and intersubjective world configuration by showing the importance of their reflections on otherness, on the role of corporeality and the theme of the opacity in the knowledge of the other too often neglected by the Cartesian tradition, then by Husserl's phenomenology. This analysis has led us to consider the proper ethical issues two critical positions Sartre and Levinas develop towards Husserl. From different perspectives, the question of the knowledge of others is strengthened in both cases by a deep reflection on the responsibility
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Dahl, Jonathan H. "A theological analysis of Emmanuel Levinas, with reference to Kierkegaard." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2007. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p006-1560.
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Adamczewski, Wojciech Henryk. "Il significato del dialogo nell'incontro interumano alla luce della filosofia di Levinas /." Roma : Pontificia università gregoriana, 2007. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016960661&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Gamba, Fiorenza. "Effets de la contre-intentionnalité : l'éthique de Levinas." Paris 4, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001PA040001.
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La contre-intentionnalité est un terme au son âpre, une quasi déclaration de guerre contre la phénoménologie, mais l'adverbe contre indique aussi l'idée de mouvement, de direction opposée, et d'intensité égale à l'action originaire. L'intentionnalité est le concept clé de la phénoménologie sur laquelle se fonde la spéculation levinasienne et l'éthique comme philosophie première, opposée, à la connaissance, se fonde sur un mouvement contraire à l'intentionnalité, la contre-intentionnalité, justement. Ceci se traduit dans le fait que la phénoménologie est un aspect de la philosophie de Levinas qu'il n'est pas possible d'éliminer, par conséquent son éthique est construite avec l'aide de cet instrument méthodologique. La contre-intentionnalité comme modalité éthique s'inscrit dans un cercle paradoxal qui ne peut être compris qu'en se concentrant sur l'aspect du mouvement. Un mouvement qui parvient au sujet de l'extérieur, de l'altérité, mais aussi un mouvement dont la possibilité dérive de l'intentionnalité, comme mouvement originaire qui dépasse la subjectivité en se faisant passivité, responsabilité pour l'autre jusqu'à se faire amour. Premier moment du mouvement est la rupture de la totalité, qui provoque une séparation qui ne se réduit pas à une simple fragmentation, au contraire détermine une subjectivité accueillant l'autre dans une tension qui est significative de la relation éthique comme effet de la contre intentionnalité, cela montre aussi l'équivoque du sujet qui, entendu comme inversion de l'intentionnalité, apparait individualise, et non dispersé par l'inversion. Ainsi se précisent les effets de l'éthique levinasienne : l'unicité du moi, condition nécessaire pour recevoir l'autre, l'importance de la sensibilité comme lieu de la signification éthique, qui souligne l'importance de l'incarnation du sujet humain dans l'éthique; le dialogue comme modalité de la relation éthique.
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Baumgartner, Holly Lynn. "Visualizing Levinas : Existence and existents through Mulholland Drive, Memento, and Vanilla Sky." Connect to this title online, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=bgsu1112629403.
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Hiraoka, Hiroshi. "Phénoménologie et métaphysique. Lecture de Totalité et infini d’Emmanuel Levinas." Thesis, Paris 4, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA040232.
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Levinas s’intéresse à la notion du concret de la phénoménologie de Husserl. En 1930, Levinas montre que la notion de l’être a son origine dans l’expérience concrète de l’être qui est l’intuition immanente philosophique. Dans les années 1940, d’une part, Levinas met en relief que la phénoménologie consiste à rechercher dans les vécus concrets l’origine du phénoménologue et de sa vie ; et d’autre part, il détermine l’esprit humain par sa puissance de coïncider avec l’origine de sa vie et de lui-même. À l’époque de Totalité et infini, Levinas clarifie que la description phénoménologique de l’expérience concrète d’une entité est à la fois l’événement même de la révélation de l’être concret de cette entité et l’événement même de l’effectuation de cette entité. D’où Levinas met en évidence, d’une part, la méthode de concrétisation qui lie les expériences concrètes les unes aux autres et, d’autre part, le perspectivisme qui décrit l’expérience concrète telle qu’elle est vécue maintenant. Dans Totalité et infini, Levinas effectue la description phénoménologique comprise par lui. En décrivant les expériences concrètes du moi, il les distribue en deux séries : celle du besoin (vie naïve) et celle du désir (critique de soi). Dans la série du besoin, sur la base de l’habitation se fondent les expériences du moi naïf : le travail, la possession et la représentation. Et dans la série du désir se distribuent les expériences avec autrui : la parole, l’amour avec la femme et la fécondité. Ces deux séries d’expériences constituent la forme originaire de l’expérience du moi personnel. Totalité et infini est en ce sens la description phénoménologique du moi personnel par excellenceLevinas brings out the notion of the concrete from Husserl’s phenomenology. In his 1930 book, Levinas shows that the notion of the being has its origin in the concrete experience of the being that is philosophical immanent intuition. In two articles published in the 1940s, Levinas reveals that the phenomenology searches in concrete experiences the origin of the phenomenologist himself and his life. On the other hand, he determines the human spirit by its power to coincide with the origin of his life and himself. In four articles published around 1960, Levinas clarifies the phenomenological description of the concrete experience of an entity is the very event of revelation of the concrete being of this entity and the very event of the effectuation of the entity. Hence, Levinas brings out the method of concretization which connects together concrete experiences as well as the perspective which describes concrete experience as it is now experienced. In Totality and infinity, Levinas practices the phenomenological description understood by himself. By describing concrete experiences of the “I”, Levinas categorizes them into two series of experience: that of need (naive life) and that of desire (self-criticism). In the series of need, the experiences of the naive “I” relies on the dwelling : labor, possession and representation. And in the series of desire, experiences with the other are distributed: speech, love with woman and fecundity. These two series of experiences constitute the proto-form of the experience of the personal “I”. Totality and infinity is in this sense the phenomenological description of the personal “I” par excellence
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Larson, Michael. "Locating Responsibility After Heidegger: Levinas and Nancy." Connect to full text in OhioLINK ETD Center, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=toledo1216730094.
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Thesis (M.A.) --University of Toledo, 2008.Typescript. "Submitted as partial fulfillments of the requirements for The Master of Arts in Philosophy." "A thesis entitled"--at head of title. Bibliography: leaves 105-108.
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Pfeuffer, Silvio. "Die Entgrenzung der Verantwortung Nietzsche - Dostojewskij - Levinas." Berlin New York, NY de Gruyter, 2007. http://d-nb.info/990069745/04.
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Love, Kevin J. "Making sense : a study of meaning and desire around Emmanuel Levinas." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.324187.
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