Academic literature on the topic 'Emergency housing Victoria'

LAY SUMMARY This study sought to evaluate a Housing First program for Veterans experiencing homelessness. Housing First is an approach made up of many different aspects of care including peer support and greater access to care resources within the home. These aspects of care are offered in order to address underlying issues and maintain housing stability. The program was implemented across four cities in Canada including London, Toronto, Calgary, and Victoria. To assess the program, interviews with Veterans were conducted at time of enrollment, 3, 9, and 15 months. The Veterans in this study demonstrated a significant reduction in homelessness. As well, a significant reduction in emergency room visits was reported. Other health care interactions and quality-of-life scores remained stable. These findings could, therefore, lead to potential future cost savings in the health care sector. This study demonstrates why this approach to housing for Veterans can be a highly effective and useful way to ensure housing stability.

How does spatial justice take place within cities? To understand spatial justice within a city under lockdown, this article considers both the ‘corporeal emplacements’ within spaces identified by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2015) and the ‘material geographies’ ( Soja 2010 ) essential to understanding spatial justice in everyday life in contemporary cities. Several of the material localities arising during the ‘stay home’ orders of the State of Emergency in Victoria are considered; namely, first, the shared spaces of the street visited by individuals on their permitted forays from home; second, the domestic space of the home; third, the spaces occupied by or allocated to those who lack stable housing; and, finally, hotel rooms, used during the pandemic to house people experiencing homelessness, returned travellers in quarantine, and evacuated detainees. Close examination of such places reveals fault lines of social stratification, linguistic and representational boundary lines regulating their governance, and the stakes of seeking to achieve spatial justice in the pandemic city.

Salah satu target utama dalam rekonstruksi paska bencana ialah tersedianya hunian bagi korban bencana yang kehilangan tempat tinggalnya. Dalam pengadaan hunian paska bencana terdapat berbagai macam strategi rekonstruksi. Pada penelitian ini dibahas mengenai kemungkinan menggunakan penilaian kualitas hunian sebagai alat untuk melakukan evaluasi terhadap strategi rekonstruksi. Metode penilaian kualitas hunian baik secara faktual maupun perseptual dipaparkan sebagai pengantar, kemudian disajikan perbandingan dari beberapa penelitian terdahulu mengenai kualitas hunian paska bencana. Dari penelitian ini, disimpulkan bahwa penilaian kualitas hunian paska bencana merupakan cara yang efektif untuk melakukan evaluasi terhadap strategi rekonstruksi. Penilaian kualitas hunian paska bencana itu sendiri dapat menggunakan pendekatan faktual, perseptional, maupun perpaduan keduanya, sesuai dengan obyek pengamatan yang dipilih.Kata-kata Kunci: kualitas hunian, paska bencana, analisis faktual, analisis perseptual SCORING METHOD OF THE QUALITY OF POST DISASTER HOUSING AS RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY’S EVALUATION : FACTUAL AND PERCEPTUAL ANALYSIS APPROACHOne of post disaster recontruction’s main targets is providing proper housing for the victims who lost their homes. In post-disaster housing procurement there are various reconstruction strategies. This research discusses about ability to rate the quality of housing in evaluating the reconstruction strategy. Scoring method of the quality of housing, factually or perceptually, both are explained as preface. And then comparation of previous study about the quality of post disaster housing is discussed. From this research it learned that scoring of the quality of post disaster housing is an effective way to evaluate the reconstruction strategy. The scoring method of the quality of post disaster housing itself, can be seen from different approaches, the factual analysis approach, the perceptual analysis approach, or both, depends on the chosen study object.Keywords: quality of housing, post disaster, factual analysis, perceptual analysisREFERENCESAl-Hussaini, T. M., Seraj, S. M., Islam, M. K., Safiullah, A. M. M., Choudhury, J. R. (1999). A Methodology For Selection Of Post Disaster Shelter. H&H Dhaka99Batchelor, Victoria. (2011). Tarpaulins, transitional shelter or permanent houses : how does the shelter assistance provide affect the recovery of communities after disaster? Dissertation on Oxford Brookes UniversityCollins, Sam. Corsellis, Tom. Vitale, Antonella. (2010).Transitional Shelter: Understanding Shelter from The Emergency Through Reconstruction and Beyond. ALNAP. Diakses melalui www.sheltercenter.orgDola, K. and Parva, M. (2012). Transformation Of Earthquake Disaster Victims’ Shelter Into Sustainable Home: The Case Of Lar City, Iran. ALAM CIPTA, International Journal of Sustainable Tropical Design Research and Practice. Universiti Putra Malaysia. Volume 5 (2) December 2012Kamel, Nabil M. O. and Loukaitou-Sideris, Anastasia (2003). Residential Assistance and Recovery Following the Northridge Earthquake. Urban Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3, 533–562, March 2004.Kwanda, T., Rahardjo, J., Wardhani, M.K. (2001). Analisis Kepuasan Penghuni Perumahan Sederhana di Denpasar Berdasarkan Faktor Lokasi, Prasarana, Sarana, Kualitas Bangunan, Desain dan Harga. Dimensi Teknik Arsitektur Vol. 29, No. 2, Desember 2001: 117 – 125.Leon, E., Kelman, I., Kennedy, J., and Ashmore,J. (2009). Capacity Building Lessons From A Decade Of Transitional Settlement And Shelter. International Journal Of Strategic Property Management (2009) 13, 247–265Önder, D. E., Köseoğlu, E., Bġlen, Ö. (2010). The Effect Of User Participation In Satisfaction: Beyciler After-Earthquake Houses In Düzce. Itu A|ZPamungkas, H.B.E, Harianto, F. (2012). Analisis Kualitas Perumahan Mutiara Regency Sidoarjo. Jurnal IPTEK Vol 16 No.1 Mei 2012Ratnayake R.M.G.D., Rameezdeen, Raufdeen. (2008).Post Disaster Housing Reconstruction: Comparative Study Of Donor Driven Vs. Owner Driven Approach. International Conference on Building Education and Research (BEAR)Rini, Johanita Anggia. (2012). Evaluasi Penerapan Prinsip Tahan Gempa pada Renovasi atau Rekonstruksi Rumah Pasca Gempa 2006 di Yogyakarta. Tesis Magister, Institut Teknologi Bandung.Saleh, Sakhrul Dachlan. (2010). Kajian Kualitas Bangunan Rumah Pondokan Terhadap Kenyamanan Huni Berdasarkan Persepsi Penghuni di Permukiman Sekitar Kampus Universitas Hasanuddin. Masters Thesis, Universitas Diponegoro.Samaddar, S., Okada, N. (2006). Participatory Approach for Post-Earthquake Reconstruction in the Villages of Kachchh, India. Annuals of Disas. Prev. Res. Inst., Kyoto Univ., No. 49 B, 2006

Salah satu target utama dalam rekonstruksi paska bencana ialah tersedianya hunian bagi korban bencana yang kehilangan tempat tinggalnya. Dalam pengadaan hunian paska bencana terdapat berbagai macam strategi rekonstruksi. Pada penelitian ini dibahas mengenai kemungkinan menggunakan penilaian kualitas hunian sebagai alat untuk melakukan evaluasi terhadap strategi rekonstruksi. Metode penilaian kualitas hunian baik secara faktual maupun perseptual dipaparkan sebagai pengantar, kemudian disajikan perbandingan dari beberapa penelitian terdahulu mengenai kualitas hunian paska bencana. Dari penelitian ini, disimpulkan bahwa penilaian kualitas hunian paska bencana merupakan cara yang efektif untuk melakukan evaluasi terhadap strategi rekonstruksi. Penilaian kualitas hunian paska bencana itu sendiri dapat menggunakan pendekatan faktual, perseptional, maupun perpaduan keduanya, sesuai dengan obyek pengamatan yang dipilih.Kata-kata Kunci: kualitas hunian, paska bencana, analisis faktual, analisis perseptual SCORING METHOD OF THE QUALITY OF POST DISASTER HOUSING AS RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY’S EVALUATION : FACTUAL AND PERCEPTUAL ANALYSIS APPROACHOne of post disaster recontruction’s main targets is providing proper housing for the victims who lost their homes. In post-disaster housing procurement there are various reconstruction strategies. This research discusses about ability to rate the quality of housing in evaluating the reconstruction strategy. Scoring method of the quality of housing, factually or perceptually, both are explained as preface. And then comparation of previous study about the quality of post disaster housing is discussed. From this research it learned that scoring of the quality of post disaster housing is an effective way to evaluate the reconstruction strategy. The scoring method of the quality of post disaster housing itself, can be seen from different approaches, the factual analysis approach, the perceptual analysis approach, or both, depends on the chosen study object.Keywords: quality of housing, post disaster, factual analysis, perceptual analysisREFERENCESAl-Hussaini, T. M., Seraj, S. M., Islam, M. K., Safiullah, A. M. M., Choudhury, J. R. (1999). A Methodology For Selection Of Post Disaster Shelter. H&H Dhaka99Batchelor, Victoria. (2011). Tarpaulins, transitional shelter or permanent houses : how does the shelter assistance provide affect the recovery of communities after disaster? Dissertation on Oxford Brookes UniversityCollins, Sam. Corsellis, Tom. Vitale, Antonella. (2010).Transitional Shelter: Understanding Shelter from The Emergency Through Reconstruction and Beyond. ALNAP. Diakses melalui www.sheltercenter.orgDola, K. and Parva, M. (2012). Transformation Of Earthquake Disaster Victims’ Shelter Into Sustainable Home: The Case Of Lar City, Iran. ALAM CIPTA, International Journal of Sustainable Tropical Design Research and Practice. Universiti Putra Malaysia. Volume 5 (2) December 2012Kamel, Nabil M. O. and Loukaitou-Sideris, Anastasia (2003). Residential Assistance and Recovery Following the Northridge Earthquake. Urban Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3, 533–562, March 2004.Kwanda, T., Rahardjo, J., Wardhani, M.K. (2001). Analisis Kepuasan Penghuni Perumahan Sederhana di Denpasar Berdasarkan Faktor Lokasi, Prasarana, Sarana, Kualitas Bangunan, Desain dan Harga. Dimensi Teknik Arsitektur Vol. 29, No. 2, Desember 2001: 117 – 125.Leon, E., Kelman, I., Kennedy, J., and Ashmore,J. (2009). Capacity Building Lessons From A Decade Of Transitional Settlement And Shelter. International Journal Of Strategic Property Management (2009) 13, 247–265Önder, D. E., Köseoğlu, E., Bġlen, Ö. (2010). The Effect Of User Participation In Satisfaction: Beyciler After-Earthquake Houses In Düzce. Itu A|ZPamungkas, H.B.E, Harianto, F. (2012). Analisis Kualitas Perumahan Mutiara Regency Sidoarjo. Jurnal IPTEK Vol 16 No.1 Mei 2012Ratnayake R.M.G.D., Rameezdeen, Raufdeen. (2008).Post Disaster Housing Reconstruction: Comparative Study Of Donor Driven Vs. Owner Driven Approach. International Conference on Building Education and Research (BEAR)Rini, Johanita Anggia. (2012). Evaluasi Penerapan Prinsip Tahan Gempa pada Renovasi atau Rekonstruksi Rumah Pasca Gempa 2006 di Yogyakarta. Tesis Magister, Institut Teknologi Bandung.Saleh, Sakhrul Dachlan. (2010). Kajian Kualitas Bangunan Rumah Pondokan Terhadap Kenyamanan Huni Berdasarkan Persepsi Penghuni di Permukiman Sekitar Kampus Universitas Hasanuddin. Masters Thesis, Universitas Diponegoro.Samaddar, S., Okada, N. (2006). Participatory Approach for Post-Earthquake Reconstruction in the Villages of Kachchh, India. Annuals of Disas. Prev. Res. Inst., Kyoto Univ., No. 49 B, 2006

This article explores the emergence of a new mode of representing the poor that became dominant in Britain in the early twentieth century—a mode in which the “point of view” of impoverished people themselves was increasingly foregrounded. Focusing on examples drawn from documentary film, Mass Observation, and the publications of Victor Gollancz Ltd., the article considers how, while marking a kind of formal shift away from a late Victorian discourse of poverty, this development maintains that earlier discourse’s disciplinary agenda. In examining three case studies—John Taylor, Arthur Elton, Edgar Anstey, and Ruby Grierson’s Housing Problems; Humphrey Jennings and Charles Madge’s Mass Observation Day Survey; and H. Beales and R. Lambert’s Memoirs of the Unemployed—it argues that the new point of view mode marked a continuation in the twentieth century of the outlook that shaped representations of poverty in the late Victorian era.

Atas do IX Simpósio Nacional de Investigação em PsicologiaUniversidade do Algarve, 2016 Gestão da ansiedade na adaptação ao ensino superior: O contributo do biofeedback (pp. 137-141)Paulo Chaló, Anabela Pereira, Luís Sancho e Helena Mateus Health promotion through the modification of harmful habits and lifestyles (pp. 142-146)Pedro Matos Gonçalves, Orlindo Gouveia Pereira e Susana Machado Mendes Reflexividade ética na carreira: Papel de variáveis sociodemográficas (pp. 147-150)Cátia Marques, Ana Daniela Silva e Maria do Céu Taveira Capacidade de planeamento no envelhecimento saudável: O nível educacional interessa? (pp. 151-154)Beatriz Rosa, Maria Victoria Perea, Valentina Ladera Fernandez e Ricardo García Influência da escolaridade dos pais no prestígio do curso universitário escolhido pelos filhos (pp. 155-158)Jaisso Vautero, Ana Daniela Silva, Cátia Marques e Maria do Céu Taveira The importance of neurocognitive factors in the adoption of risky driving behavior: A comprehensive review (pp. 159-164)Sara Moreira, Diana Moreira e Fernando Barbosa O impacto da tensão trabalho-família e a sua relação com o compromisso organizacional (pp. 165-170)Lucília Abreu e Marta Alves Genograma da carreira: Análise de dissertações de doutoramento (pp. 171-175)Bruna Rodrigues, Sílvia Amado Cordeiro, Íris M. Oliveira, Ana Daniela Silva, Cátia Marques e Maria do Céu Taveira A avaliação da eficácia de um programa de desenvolvimento de competências para a vida junto de adolescentes em acolhimento residencial (pp. 176-179)Laura Santos, Maria do Rosário Pinheiro, Cristina Velho e Carla Palaio Um programa online de mindfulness: Efeitos na regulação emocional, stress e bem-estar (pp. 180-191)Cláudia Ramos, Sónia P. Gonçalves e Vasco Gaspar More socially responsible, more ethical, more attractive as a future employer? Contributes of corporate social performance and ethical reputation for the attraction of future employees (pp. 192-197)Ana Patrícia Duarte, Vítor Hugo Silva, Eduardo Simões e José Gonçalves das Neves Complexidade da conceção de parentalidade em famílias adotivas (pp. 198-201)Lília Silva, Cristina Nunes e Ana Susana Almeida O papel da felicidade na relação entre a liderança autêntica e a criatividade (pp. 202-209)Neuza Ribeiro, Ana Suzete Semedo e Arnaldo Coelho When a relationship of intimacy turns into homicide: About a case study (pp. 210-220)Andreia Azeredo, Diana Moreira e Fernando Almeida Onde estão as árvores? Análise exploratória de mapas mentais de um Campus universitário (pp. 221-226)Joana Bizarro, Gabriela Gonçalves, Catarina Silva, Patrícia Silva e Jacinta Fernandes O que pode fazer António? Os serviços de saúde mental nos processos de integração comunitária (pp. 227-231)Maria F. Jorge-Monteiro e José Ornelas Estudo da relação entre a confiança grupal e a satisfação dos membros numa perspetiva longitudinal e dinâmica (pp. 232-236)Ana Isabel de Gouveia Rente, Paulo Renato, Teresa Rebelo e Isabel Dimas Ser estudante de doutoramento: A relação de orientação e a perceção de desenvolvimento pessoal (pp. 237-242)José Simões e Madalena Melo Estudo inicial de adaptação e validação da Decision-Specific Reinvestment Scale numa amostra de atletas Portugueses (pp. 243-249)José Fernando Cruz, Patrícia Simões, Rui Sofia e Francisco J. Rodrigues Obesidade na adolescência: O papel da actividade física nas funções executivas (pp. 250-253)Fátima Gameiro, Beatriz Rosa e António Palmeira Observação de Bullying: Avaliação, sensibilidade moral e motivação para ajudar as vítimas (pp. 254-260)Sónia Pereira e Madalena Melo Relação entre cronótipo e desempenho escolar em estudantes portugueses dos 2.º e 3.º ciclos do ensino básico: Resultados preliminares (pp. 261-267)José Martins e Marco Miguel Bento Promoção da literacia emergente à luz do modelo Response to Intervention (RTI) (pp. 268-277)Marco Bento, Diana Alves, Orlanda Cruz e Ana Paula Silva Estudantes Cabo-Verdianas em Portugal: Novos perfis migratórios (pp. 278-285)Luciana Soares e Conceição Nogueira Uma perspectiva ecológica sobre o papel da qualidade da casa e da escolha na promoção do recovery e da integração comunitária no programa Casas Primeiro – Lisboa (pp. 286-291)Paulo Martins e José Ornelas “Dream Teens”: os jovens na promoção da saúde do seu grupo de pares (pp. 292-296)Cátia Branquinho, Margarida Gaspar de Matos e Projeto Aventura Social Dream Teens O recurso à suspensão provisória do processo em crimes de violência doméstica: Perceções e decisões dos/as magistrados/as (pp. 297-300)Sofia Jamal e Celina Manita The role of independent housing and working in the promotion of personal empowerment in people with mental illness (pp. 301-307)Luis Sá Fernandes e José Ornelas Sentimento de culpa e o suporte social no autocuidado das cuidadoras informais familiares (pp. 308-312)Lisneti Castro, Dayse Neri de Souza, Anabela Pereira, Evelyn Santos, Roselane Lomeo, Laurinda Mendes, Helena Teixeira, Cláudio Guimarães, Maria do Céu Ferreira e Ana Catarina Leite A Perturbação de Stresse Pós-Traumático (PTSD) em Portugal: Relação com a estima de si e o coping (pp. 313-319)João Hipólito, Odete Nunes, Rute Brites, Tito Laneiro, António Correia e Carlos Anunciação Sentido psicológico de comunidade: Um estudo multimétodo num contexto associativo (pp. 320-328)Olga Oliveira Cunha e José Henrique Ornelas

Abstract Four synchronous epidemics of measles and scarlet fever are observed in the historical data collected by colonial authorities in Victoria, Australia from 1853 to 1876, suggesting some sort of synergistic relationship between the two diseases. While epidemics of measles, as recorded by the colonial record keepers, still occurred during the remainder of the study period (until 1916), no further epidemics of scarlet fever occurred after 1876. This is suggestive of a change in Victoria’s disease ecology in the late 1870s. After analysis of the historical data for potential artifactual cases, it does not appear to be the result of confusion in diagnosis and changes in case definitions do not appear to have affected reporting of the causes of death. We conclude that the most likely explanation for the observed pattern is an epidemic synergy that ended after the 1876 epidemic. We hypothesize that this synergistic relationship between measles and scarlet fever in mid-nineteenth-century Victoria ended due to a shift in the dominant group A streptococci (GAS) M-type or the loss of a GAS bacteriophage. Support for this hypothesis comes from observations that other diagnoses associated with group A strep infections also changed their mortality profiles during the 1870s, particularly “Bright’s disease,” a possible descriptor of post-streptococcal glomerulonephritis. We situate the emergence and end of this pattern within the demographic and socioeconomic conditions of the Victorian gold-mining boom in the 1850s to 1870s and postboom changes in fertility, mortality, and housing infrastructure, highlighting the importance of social conditions in disease evolution.

Introduction I think the Privacy Act is a huge edifice to protect the minority of things that could go wrong. I’ve got a good example for you, I’m just trying to think … yeah the worst one I’ve ever seen was the Balga Youth Program where we took these students on a reward excursion all the way to Fremantle and suddenly this very alienated kid started to jump under a bus, a moving bus so the kid had to be restrained. The cops from Fremantle arrived because all the very good people in Fremantle were alarmed at these grown-ups manhandling a kid and what had happened is that DCD [Department of Community Development] had dropped him into the program but hadn’t told us that this kid had suicide tendencies. No, it’s just chronically bad. And there were caseworkers involved and … there is some information that we have to have that doesn’t get handed down. Rather than a blanket rule that everything’s confidential coming from them to us, and that was a real live situation, and you imagine how we’re trying to handle it, we had taxis going from Balga to Fremantle to get staff involved and we only had to know what to watch out for and we probably could have … well what you would have done is not gone on the excursion I suppose (School Principal, quoted in Balnaves and Luca 49). These comments are from a school principal in Perth, Western Australia in a school that is concerned with “at-risk” students, and in a context where the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 has imposed limitations on their work. Under this Act it is illegal to pass health, personal or sensitive information concerning an individual on to other people. In the story cited above the Department of Community Development personnel were apparently protecting the student’s “negative right”, that is, “freedom from” interference by others. On the other hand, the principal’s assertion that such information should be shared is potentially a “positive right” because it could cause something to be done in that person’s or society’s interests. Balnaves and Luca noted that positive and negative rights have complex philosophical underpinnings, and they inform much of how we operate in everyday life and of the dilemmas that arise (49). For example, a ban on euthanasia or the “assisted suicide” of a terminally ill person can be a “positive right” because it is considered to be in the best interests of society in general. However, physicians who tacitly approve a patient’s right to end their lives with a lethal dose by legally prescribed dose of medication could be perceived as protecting the patient’s “negative right” as a “freedom from” interference by others. While acknowledging the merits of collaboration between people who are working to improve the wellbeing of students “at-risk”, this paper examines some of the barriers to collaboration. Based on both primary and secondary sources, and particularly on oral testimonies, the paper highlights the tension between privacy as a negative right and collaborative helping as a positive right. It also points to other difficulties and dilemmas within and between the institutions engaged in this joint undertaking. The authors acknowledge Michel Foucault’s contention that discourse is power. The discourse on privacy and the sharing of information in modern societies suggests that privacy is a negative right that gives freedom from bureaucratic interference and protects the individual. However, arguably, collaboration between agencies that are working to support individuals “at-risk” requires a measured relaxation of the requirements of this negative right. Children and young people “at-risk” are a case in point. Towards Collaboration From a series of interviews conducted in 2004, the school authorities at Balga Senior High School and Midvale Primary School, people working for the Western Australian departments of Community Development, Justice, and Education and Training in Western Australia, and academics at the Edith Cowan and Curtin universities, who are working to improve the wellbeing of students “at-risk” as part of an Australian Research Council (ARC) project called Smart Communities, have identified students “at-risk” as individuals who have behavioural problems and little motivation, who are alienated and possibly violent or angry, who under-perform in the classroom and have begun to truant. They noted also that students “at-risk” often suffer from poor health, lack of food and medication, are victims of unwanted pregnancies, and are engaged in antisocial and illegal behaviour such as stealing cars and substance abuse. These students are also often subject to domestic violence (parents on drugs or alcohol), family separation, and homelessness. Some are depressed or suicidal. Sometimes cultural factors contribute to students being regarded as “at-risk”. For example, a social worker in the Smart Communities project stated: Cultural factors sometimes come into that as well … like with some Muslim families … they can flog their daughter or their son, usually the daughter … so cultural factors can create a risk. Research elsewhere has revealed that those children between the ages of 11-17 who have been subjected to bullying at school or physical or sexual abuse at home and who have threatened and/or harmed another person or suicidal are “high-risk” youths (Farmer 4). In an attempt to bring about a positive change in these alienated or “at-risk” adolescents, Balga Senior High School has developed several programs such as the Youth Parents Program, Swan Nyunger Sports Education program, Intensive English Centre, and lower secondary mainstream program. The Midvale Primary School has provided services such as counsellors, Aboriginal child protection workers, and Aboriginal police liaison officers for these “at-risk” students. On the other hand, the Department of Community Development (DCD) has provided services to parents and caregivers for children up to 18 years. Academics from Edith Cowan and Curtin universities are engaged in gathering the life stories of these “at-risk” students. One aspect of this research entails the students writing their life stories in a secured web portal that the universities have developed. The researchers believe that by engaging the students in these self-exploration activities, they (the students) would develop a more hopeful outlook on life. Though all agencies and educational institutions involved in this collaborative project are working for the well-being of the children “at-risk”, the Privacy Act forbids the authorities from sharing information about them. A school psychologist expressed concern over the Privacy Act: When the Juvenile Justice Department want to reintroduce a student into a school, we can’t find out anything about this student so we can’t do any preplanning. They want to give the student a fresh start, so there’s always that tension … eventually everyone overcomes [this] because you realise that the student has to come to the school and has to be engaged. Of course, the manner and consequences of a student’s engagement in school cannot be predicted. In the scenario described above students may have been given a fair chance to reform themselves, which is their positive right but if they turn out to be at “high risk” it would appear that the Juvenile Department protected the negative right of the students by supporting “freedom from” interference by others. Likewise, a school health nurse in the project considered confidentiality or the Privacy Act an important factor in the security of the student “at-risk”: I was trying to think about this kid who’s one of the children who has been sexually abused, who’s a client of DCD, and I guess if police got involved there and wanted to know details and DCD didn’t want to give that information out then I’d guess I’d say to the police “Well no, you’ll have to talk to the parents about getting further information.” I guess that way, recognising these students are minor and that they are very vulnerable, their information … where it’s going, where is it leading? Who wants to know? Where will it be stored? What will be the outcomes in the future for this kid? As a 14 year old, if they’re reckless and get into things, you know, do they get a black record against them by the time they’re 19? What will that information be used for if it’s disclosed? So I guess I become an advocate for the student in that way? Thus the nurse considers a sexually abused child should not be identified. It is a positive right in the interest of the person. Once again, though, if the student turns out to be at “high risk” or suicidal, then it would appear that the nurse was protecting the youth’s negative right—“freedom from” interference by others. Since collaboration is a positive right and aims at the students’ welfare, the workable solution to prevent the students from suicide would be to develop inter-agency trust and to share vital information about “high-risk” students. Dilemmas of Collaboration Some recent cases of the deaths of young non-Caucasian girls in Western countries, either because of the implications of the Privacy Act or due to a lack of efficient and effective communication and coordination amongst agencies, have raised debates on effective child protection. For example, the British Laming report (2003) found that Victoria Climbié, a young African girl, was sent by her parents to her aunt in Britain in order to obtain a good education and was murdered by her aunt and aunt’s boyfriend. However, the risk that she could be harmed was widely known. The girl’s problems were known to 6 local authorities, 3 housing authorities, 4 social services, 2 child protection teams, and the police, the local church, and the hospital, but not to the education authorities. According to the Laming Report, her death could have been prevented if there had been inter-agency sharing of information and appropriate evaluation (Balnaves and Luca 49). The agencies had supported the negative rights of the young girl’s “freedom from” interference by others, but at the cost of her life. Perhaps Victoria’s racial background may have contributed to the concealment of information and added to her disadvantaged position. Similarly, in Western Australia, the Gordon Inquiry into the death of Susan Taylor, a 15 year old girl Aboriginal girl at the Swan Nyungah Community, found that in her short life this girl had encountered sexual violation, violence, and the ravages of alcohol and substance abuse. The Gordon Inquiry reported: Although up to thirteen different agencies were involved in providing services to Susan Taylor and her family, the D[epartment] of C[ommunity] D[evelopment] stated they were unaware of “all the services being provided by each agency” and there was a lack of clarity as to a “lead coordinating agency” (Gordon et al. quoted in Scott 45). In this case too, multiple factors—domestic, racial, and the Privacy Act—may have led to Susan Taylor’s tragic end. In the United Kingdom, Harry Ferguson noted that when a child is reported to be “at-risk” from domestic incidents, they can suffer further harm because of their family’s concealment (204). Ferguson’s study showed that in 11 per cent of the 319 case sample, children were known to be re-harmed within a year of initial referral. Sometimes, the parents apply a veil of secrecy around themselves and their children by resisting or avoiding services. In such cases the collaborative efforts of the agencies and education may be thwarted. Lack of cultural education among teachers, youth workers, and agencies could also put the “at-risk” cultural minorities into a high risk category. For example, an “at-risk” Muslim student may not be willing to share personal experiences with the school or agencies because of religious sensitivities. This happened in the UK when Khadji Rouf was abused by her father, a Bangladeshi. Rouf’s mother, a white woman, and her female cousin from Bangladesh, both supported Rouf when she finally disclosed that she had been sexually abused for over eight years. After group therapy, Rouf stated that she was able to accept her identity and to call herself proudly “mixed race”, whereas she rejected the Asian part of herself because it represented her father. Other Asian girls and young women in this study reported that they could not disclose their abuse to white teachers or social workers because of the feeling that they would be “letting down their race or their Muslim culture” (Rouf 113). The marginalisation of many Muslim Australians both in the job market and in society is long standing. For example, in 1996 and again in 2001 the Muslim unemployment rate was three times higher than the national total (Australian Bureau of Statistics). But since the 9/11 tragedy and Bali bombings visible Muslims, such as women wearing hijabs (headscarves), have sometimes been verbally and physically abused and called ‘terrorists’ by some members of the wider community (Dreher 13). The Howard government’s new anti-terrorism legislation and the surveillance hotline ‘Be alert not alarmed’ has further marginalised some Muslims. Some politicians have also linked Muslim asylum seekers with terrorists (Kabir 303), which inevitably has led Muslim “at-risk” refugee students to withdraw from school support such as counselling. Under these circumstances, Muslim “at-risk” students and their parents may prefer to maintain a low profile rather than engage with agencies. In this case, arguably, federal government politics have exacerbated the barriers to collaboration. It appears that unfamiliarity with Muslim culture is not confined to mainstream Australians. For example, an Aboriginal liaison police officer engaged in the Smart Communities project in Western Australia had this to say about Muslim youths “at-risk”: Different laws and stuff from different countries and they’re coming in and sort of thinking that they can bring their own laws and religions and stuff … and when I say religions there’s laws within their religions as well that they don’t seem to understand that with Australia and our laws. Such generalised misperceptions of Muslim youths “at-risk” would further alienate them, thus causing a major hindrance to collaboration. The “at-risk” factors associated with Aboriginal youths have historical connections. Research findings have revealed that indigenous youths aged between 10-16 years constitute a vast majority in all Australian States’ juvenile detention centres. This over-representation is widely recognised as associated with the nature of European colonisation, and is inter-related with poverty, marginalisation and racial discrimination (Watson et al. 404). Like the Muslims, their unemployment rate was three times higher than the national total in 2001 (ABS). However, in 1998 it was estimated that suicide rates among Indigenous peoples were at least 40 per cent higher than national average (National Advisory Council for Youth Suicide Prevention, quoted in Elliot-Farrelly 2). Although the wider community’s unemployment rate is much lower than the Aboriginals and the Muslims, the “at-risk” factors of mainstream Australian youths are often associated with dysfunctional families, high conflict, low-cohesive families, high levels of harsh parental discipline, high levels of victimisation by peers, and high behavioural inhibition (Watson et al. 404). The Macquarie Fields riots in 2005 revealed the existence of “White” underclass and “at-risk” people in Sydney. Macquarie Fields’ unemployment rate was more than twice the national average. Children growing up in this suburb are at greater risk of being involved in crime (The Age). Thus small pockets of mainstream underclass youngsters also require collaborative attention. In Western Australia people working on the Smart Communities project identified that lack of resources can be a hindrance to collaboration for all sectors. As one social worker commented: “government agencies are hierarchical systems and lack resources”. They went on to say that in their department they can not give “at-risk” youngsters financial assistance in times of crisis: We had a petty cash box which has got about 40 bucks in it and sometimes in an emergency we might give a customer a couple of dollars but that’s all we can do, we can’t give them any larger amount. We have bus/metro rail passes, that’s the only thing that we’ve actually got. A youth worker in Smart Communities commented that a lot of uncertainty is involved with young people “at-risk”. They said that there are only a few paid workers in their field who are supported and assisted by “a pool of volunteers”. Because the latter give their time voluntarily they are under no obligation to be constant in their attendance, so the number of available helpers can easily fluctuate. Another youth worker identified a particularly important barrier to collaboration: because of workers’ relatively low remuneration and high levels of work stress, the turnover rates are high. The consequence of this is as follows: The other barrier from my point is that you’re talking to somebody about a student “at-risk”, and within 14 months or 18 months a new person comes in [to that position] then you’ve got to start again. This way you miss a lot of information [which could be beneficial for the youth]. Conclusion The Privacy Act creates a dilemma in that it can be either beneficial or counter-productive for a student’s security. To be blunt, a youth who has suicided might have had their privacy protected, but not their life. Lack of funding can also be a constraint on collaboration by undermining stability and autonomy in the workforce, and blocking inter-agency initiatives. Lack of awareness about cultural differences can also affect unity of action. The deepening inequality between the “haves” and “have-nots” in the Australian society, and the Howard government’s harshness on national security issues, can also pose barriers to collaboration on youth issues. Despite these exigencies and dilemmas, it would seem that collaboration is “the only game” when it comes to helping students “at-risk”. To enhance this collaboration, there needs to be a sensible modification of legal restrictions to information sharing, an increase in government funding and support for inter-agency cooperation and informal information sharing, and an increased awareness about the cultural needs of minority groups and knowledge of the mainstream underclass. Acknowledgments The research is part of a major Australian Research Council (ARC) funded project, Smart Communities. The authors very gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the interviewees, and thank *Donald E. Scott for conducting the interviews. References Australian Bureau of Statistics. 1996 and 2001. Balnaves, Mark, and Joe Luca. “The Impact of Digital Persona on the Future of Learning: A Case Study on Digital Repositories and the Sharing of Information about Children At-Risk in Western Australia”, paper presented at Ascilite, Brisbane (2005): 49-56. 10 April 2006. http://www.ascilite.org.au/conferences/brisbane05/blogs/proceedings/ 06_Balnaves.pdf>. Dreher, Tanya. ‘Targeted’: Experiences of Racism in NSW after September 11, 2001. Sydney: University of Technology, 2005. Elliot-Farrelly, Terri. “Australian Aboriginal Suicide: The Need for an Aboriginal Suicidology”? Australian e-Journal for the Advancement of Mental Health, 3.3 (2004): 1-8. 15 April 2006 http://www.auseinet.com/journal/vol3iss3/elliottfarrelly.pdf>. Farmer, James. A. High-Risk Teenagers: Real Cases and Interception Strategies with Resistant Adolescents. Springfield, Ill.: C.C. Thomas, 1990. Ferguson, Harry. Protecting Children in Time: Child Abuse, Child Protection and the Consequences of Modernity. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al. New York: Pantheon, 1980. Kabir, Nahid. Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History. London: Kegan Paul, 2005. Rouf, Khadji. “Myself in Echoes. My Voice in Song.” Ed. A. Bannister, et al. Listening to Children. London: Longman, 1990. Scott E. Donald. “Exploring Communication Patterns within and across a School and Associated Agencies to Increase the Effectiveness of Service to At-Risk Individuals.” MS Thesis, Curtin University of Technology, August 2005. The Age. “Investing in People Means Investing in the Future.” The Age 5 March, 2005. 15 April 2006 http://www.theage.com.au>. Watson, Malcolm, et al. “Pathways to Aggression in Children and Adolescents.” Harvard Educational Review, 74.4 (Winter 2004): 404-428. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Kabir, Nahid, and Mark Balnaves. "Students “at Risk”: Dilemmas of Collaboration." M/C Journal 9.2 (2006). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0605/04-kabirbalnaves.php>. APA Style Kabir, N., and M. Balnaves. (May 2006) "Students “at Risk”: Dilemmas of Collaboration," M/C Journal, 9(2). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0605/04-kabirbalnaves.php>.

Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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This chapter considers the evolving urban form of residential architecture and urban design in Glasgow. It traces the history of the Victorian tenement, the city’s failed modernist redevelopment, and the subsequent emergence of a place-making agenda that has reimagined the tenement for contemporary living. The chapter uses interviews with key informants and a review of archival data to describe the city’s approach to contemporary placemaking at two major urban regeneration projects, Laurieston and Pollokshaws. The chapter argues that both projects attempt to ‘recreate’ lost parts of the Victorian city and erase the city’s experience with modernism, while also mixing social housing with market housing to encourage more complete communities. The paper argues that this approach has led to a creeping reliance on the viability of market housing to deliver social housing and the wider regeneration aims of the project masterplans.

This chapter charts the Los Angeles community benefits movement, launched at the turn of the millennium to strengthen low-income communities by transforming local redevelopment. The movement was built on an emergent partnership between community-based organizations promoting “equitable development” in the face of gentrification and labor movement groups, led by the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), challenging the city-sponsored proliferation of low-wage jobs, especially in the multifaceted retail industry. The legal instrument used to codify campaign victories was the community benefits agreement, or CBA—a contract under which a developer agreed to provide specific levels of living wage jobs, affordable housing, and other benefits in exchange for community support for project approvals and public subsidies. Because CBAs offered a proactive response to redress negative development externalities through contractual compromise, they rested on a distinctive model of community organizing—leveraging the power of broad-based coalitions to extract benefits through negotiation—and thus enlisted a particular role for lawyers focused on strategic counseling and contract drafting. This chapter traces the evolution and outcomes of Los Angeles’s seminal community benefits campaigns: from the nation’s first CBA with the developer of a transformational downtown sports and entertainment complex anchored around the Staples Center, through a $500 million CBA centered on environmental mitigation in connection with the expansion of the L.A. International Airport, to the Grand Avenue CBA, which focused on affordable housing production in a proposed upscale development on downtown’s Bunker Hill. Following this arc, the chapter shows how the CBA movement conferred significant benefits on low-income communities and institutionalized pro-labor policy in the city—while also revealing tensions in the community-labor alliance at the movement’s heart and the limits of contract-based solutions to inequality.