Journal articles on the topic 'Elite (Social sciences)'
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1
Cao, Cong. "Social Origins of the Chinese Scientific Elite." China Quarterly 160 (December 1999): 992–1018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000001417.
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The literature on China's social stratification and mobility has discussed the roles of family background and an individual's education attainment. This article aims to extend the existing literature by examining the interplay of these two aspects in fostering a homogeneous group of scientists, the members (yuanshi) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS, Zhongguo kexueyuan). Since its establishment in 1955, honorific CAS membership has been awarded to outstanding Chinese scientists in their respective fields. As of the end of 1997, a total of 859 Chinese natural scientists, including 40 women, had been elected to the five Academic Divisions of the CAS – Mathematics and Physics, Chemistry, Biological Sciences, Earth Sciences, and Technological Sciences (Table 1) – of whom 610 were alive. They have been renowned, nationally if not internationally, for their academic achievements and contributions, and they have a reputation and prestige similar to those enjoyed by their counterparts in other countries, such as members of the National Academy of Sciences in the United States and fellows of the Royal Society in Britain. Because the occupational prestige of scientists is very high in China, as it is in other countries, and following similar research on the scientific elite, it is reasonable to define CAS members as the Chinese scientific elite.
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Bozóki, András. "Theoretical Interpretations of Elite Change in East Central Europe." Comparative Sociology 2, no. 1 (2003): 215–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913303100418762.
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AbstractElite theory enjoyed a remarkable revival in Central and Eastern Europe, and also in international social science research, during the 1990s. Many researchers coming from different schools of thought turned to the analysis of rapid political and social changes and ended up doing centered research. Since democratic transition and elite transformation seemed to be parallel processes, it was understandable that sociologists and political scientists of the region started to use elite theory. The idea of "third wave" of democratization advanced a reduced, more synthetic, "exportable" understanding of democracy in the political science literature. The main focus of social sciences shifted from structures to actors, from path dependency to institutional choices. Transitions, roundtable negotiations, institution-building, constitution-making, compromise-seeking, pactmaking, pact-breaking, strategic choices — all of these underlined the importance of elites and research on them. Elite settlements were seen as alternatives of social revolution. According to a widely shared view democratic institutions came into existence through negotiations and compromises among political elites calculating their own interests and desires. The elite settlement approach was then followed by some important contributions in transitology which described the process of regime change largely as "elite games." By offering a systematic overview of the theoretical interpretations of elite change from New Class theory to recent theorizing of elite change (conversion of capital, reproduction, circulation, political capitalism, technocratic continuity, three elites and the like), the paper also gives an account of the state of the arts in elite studies in different new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
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Flere, Sergej, and Tibor Rutar. "Break-up of the Yugoslav political elite, 1962-1972." Sociologija 63, no. 3 (2021): 500–525. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/soc2103500f.
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The break-up of the Yugoslav communist elite, which came about in the period 1962-1972, is considered. The break-up came about under the elite?s disappointment due to the failure to achieve economic objectives it set for itself, bringing about internal dubiety and mutual suspicion, the political system moving towards consociation also contributed to fracturing. However, this is not sufficient as explanation. Cultural elites also contributed in the same direction. Economic growth was significant, considering the entire period 1945-1991, but it was always clouded by imbalances. Certain issues and discussions were indicative of the break-up. Political unity and communism was gradually replaced as objective by ?resolving the national question?, also a legitimate Marxist concern. It can be considered that by the break-up, a normalization of elite pattern came about, comparable to elites in the greatest number of European states, although the elites kept on being ?ideocratic?. Whereas elites may have become ?normal?, the functioning of the political system became ever more difficult. The ascending national communist elites never undertook steps at the direct dissolution of the Yugoslav state, although they entered into ceaseless disputes and finally paved the way to ethnic entrepreneurs and counter-elites to implement the dissolution. By the elite break-up a relation between elite and nation similar to the one existing in the great majority of European countries was achieved.
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Flere, Sergej, and Tibor Rutar. "Break-up of the Yugoslav political elite, 1962-1972." Sociologija 63, no. 3 (2021): 500–525. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/soc2103500f.
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The break-up of the Yugoslav communist elite, which came about in the period 1962-1972, is considered. The break-up came about under the elite?s disappointment due to the failure to achieve economic objectives it set for itself, bringing about internal dubiety and mutual suspicion, the political system moving towards consociation also contributed to fracturing. However, this is not sufficient as explanation. Cultural elites also contributed in the same direction. Economic growth was significant, considering the entire period 1945-1991, but it was always clouded by imbalances. Certain issues and discussions were indicative of the break-up. Political unity and communism was gradually replaced as objective by ?resolving the national question?, also a legitimate Marxist concern. It can be considered that by the break-up, a normalization of elite pattern came about, comparable to elites in the greatest number of European states, although the elites kept on being ?ideocratic?. Whereas elites may have become ?normal?, the functioning of the political system became ever more difficult. The ascending national communist elites never undertook steps at the direct dissolution of the Yugoslav state, although they entered into ceaseless disputes and finally paved the way to ethnic entrepreneurs and counter-elites to implement the dissolution. By the elite break-up a relation between elite and nation similar to the one existing in the great majority of European countries was achieved.
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Amaliyah, Efa Ida, and Agus Nurhadi. "The Concept of Elite (Thoughts of Antonio Gramsci and the Study in Islamic Studies)." FIKRAH 10, no. 2 (December 24, 2022): 259. http://dx.doi.org/10.21043/fikrah.v10i2.16962.
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<p><span lang="EN-US">This study attempts to reveal the elite concept from Antonio Gramsci's thought which supports elite studies in an Islamic perspective, by using library research methods. The elite according to Gramsci is a social category that is not related to class but related to hegemony. Hegemony is a winning power that is obtained through a consensus mechanism rather than through violence or oppression of other social classes. The regime spreads hegemonic power of influence because it is supported by related infrastructure organizations, namely in which intellectual obedience is supposed to occur due to cultural and political factors. This is where elites emerge which are categorized into two according to Gramsci, namely organic elites (politicians, bureaucrats, academics) and traditional elites (subject to authorities). Elites in Islam bring consequences or impacts by showing the importance of elite positions in the orderliness of civilization, the urgency of elite cadre formation in order to strengthen faith and belief as well as faith. This is important to do because of the vital role played by the elite for the advancement of society around them. Therefore, the religious elite, the religious elite, now have an obligation to participate in realizing national unity and are responsible for maintaining national resilience in its various aspects (ideological, political, economic, and socio-cultural)</span></p>
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Nieva, Ricardo. "Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions." Rationality and Society 33, no. 2 (March 24, 2021): 229–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10434631211001576.
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We have explained the presence of heterogeneous winning coalitions in social revolutions. In an overcrowded agrarian society, two almost identical non-productive enforcers, the landed political elite, collude and bargain over transfers with one of the two peasants to contest over a piece of land, as property rights for land are not well defined. In any other scenario, neither the grand coalition nor the coalition of two peasants and one enforcer forms, thereby deposing the other enforcer with positive probability. So, social revolutions never occur. If foreign wars weaken an enforcer, such as in China (1911), France, and Russia, adding one unit of capital makes the coalition of the peasant, the now worker, and one of the enforcers (now an industrial political elite) attractive: The excess labor can work with it; the weaker enforcer retaliates less and the stronger one more, if excluded. However, if the weaker one (the still-landed political elite) proposes first, a grand coalition forms in which he or she gets less than the other members do (desertion). There is conflict among peasants and among landed elites; thus, the concept of a coalition is more appropriate than that of a class.
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Lazic, Mladen, and Slobodan Cvejic. "Changes in the recruitment patterns of the economic and political elites in Serbia." Sociologija 48, no. 2 (2006): 97–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/soc0602097l.
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In this paper the changing patterns of economic and political elite recruitment in Serbia are studied on the basis of three sets of data, collected in our surveys done in 1989, 1993 and 2004. Our hypothesis was that elite recruitment patterns changed after the political regime change in 2000, but in a different direction compared to the period of the 1990s. From a long-term perspective, we expect continuing increases in the relevance of higher education for elite recruitment, and equalization of the relevance of higher education for both the political and economic elites. On the other hand, we expect decreasing relevance for political affiliation among the economic elite, accompanied by an increasing importance of social networking during the period of a prolonged weak institutional environment. In order to test our general hypothesis we describe inter- and intra-generational patterns of recruitment. The relevance of education, party membership and networking as mobility channels is analyzed by model of logistic regression. We also compare changes in patterns of elites? recruitment with changing mobility patterns of social classes in Serbia, 1989-2004.
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Kongkirati, Prajak. "From Illiberal Democracy to Military Authoritarianism: Intra-Elite Struggle and Mass-Based Conflict in Deeply Polarized Thailand." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (December 20, 2018): 24–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716218806912.
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Thailand fits the pattern of pernicious polarized politics identified in this volume, where a previously excluded group successfully gains political power through the ballot box, governs unilaterally to pursue radical reforms, and produces a backlash from the traditional power elites. In Thailand, elite conflict has been a major part of the story, but this article argues that political polarization there cannot be merely understood as “elite-driven”: conflict among the elites and the masses, and the interaction between them, produced polarized and unstable politics. Violent struggle is caused by class structure and regional, urban-rural disparities; elite struggle activates the existing social cleavages; and ideological framing deepens the polarization. While the Yellow Shirts and traditional elites want to restore and uphold the “Thai-style democracy” with royal nationalism, the Red Shirts espouse the “populist democracy” of strong elected government with popular nationalism and egalitarian social order.
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Bibó, István. "The Elite and Social Sensitivity." Review of Sociology 10, no. 2 (November 1, 2004): 103–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/revsoc.10.2004.2.8.
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Wedel, Janine R. "From Power Elites to Influence Elites: Resetting Elite Studies for the 21st Century." Theory, Culture & Society 34, no. 5-6 (July 10, 2017): 153–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276417715311.
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The dominant theory of elite power, grounded in Weberian bureaucracy, has analyzed elites in terms of stable positions at the top of enduring institutions. Today, many conditions that spawned these stable ‘command posts’ no longer prevail, and elite power thus warrants rethinking. This article advances an argument about contemporary ‘influence elites’. The way they are organized and the modus operandi they employ to wield influence enable them to evade public accountability, a hallmark of a democratic society. Three cases are presented, first to investigate changes in how elites operate and, second, to examine varying configurations in which the new elites are organized. The cases demonstrate that influence elites intermesh hierarchies and networks, serve as connectors, and coordinate influence from multiple, moving perches, inside and outside official structures. Their flexible and multi-positioned organizing modes call for reconsidering elite theory and grappling with the implications of these elites for democratic society.
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Natow, Rebecca S. "The use of triangulation in qualitative studies employing elite interviews." Qualitative Research 20, no. 2 (February 19, 2019): 160–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468794119830077.
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Elite interviews provide valuable information from perspectives of power and privilege. However, the information elites provide may be biased or inaccurate, and researchers must be knowledgeable about the elites they interview. Therefore, the use of triangulation in studies using elite interviews is crucial. This article analyzes more than 120 peer-reviewed articles that reported the findings of elite interview research to understand the researchers’ use of triangulation. This analysis found that triangulation was common in studies that involved elite interviews, particularly by combining interviews with document review. This analysis also found that the purpose and value of triangulation in these studies varied based on the researchers’ interpretive frameworks.
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Maclean, Mairi, Charles Harvey, and Gerhard Kling. "Elite Business Networks and the Field of Power: A Matter of Class?" Theory, Culture & Society 34, no. 5-6 (July 3, 2017): 127–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276417715071.
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We explore the meaning and implications of Bourdieu’s construct of the field of power and integrate it into a wider conception of the formation and functioning of elites at the highest level in society. Corporate leaders active within the field of power hold prominent roles in numerous organizations, constituting an ‘elite of elites’, whose networks integrate powerful participants from different fields. As ‘bridging actors’, they form coalitions to determine institutional settlements and societal resource flows. We ask how some corporate actors (minority) become hyper-agents, those actors who ‘make things happen’, while others (majority) remain ‘ordinary’ members of the elite. Three hypotheses are developed and tested using extensive data on the French business elite. Social class emerges as persistently important, challenging the myth of meritocratic inclusion. Our primary contribution to Bourdieusian scholarship lies in our analysis of hyper-agents, revealing the debts these dominants owe to elite schools and privileged classes.
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Higley, John. "Elite Trust and the Populist Threat to Stable Democracy." American Behavioral Scientist 64, no. 9 (July 19, 2020): 1211–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764220941215.
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One aspect of elite theory holds that democratic stability depends heavily on elites trusting each other to keep distributive issues from reaching acute degrees impelling power seizures. This presumes that agreement about the distribution of valued things is seldom deep or wide in large publics. When distributive issues rise to clear public consciousness, the tendency is toward civil strife. Populists assail and undermine elite trust and the management of politics by elites. They thereby weaken an important basis of democratic stability. I argue that the rise of populist leaders to power leads to an erosion of elite trust, which makes distributive issues more acute and threatens the stability of democratic institutions.
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Atkinson, Rowland, Simon Parker, and Roger Burrows. "Elite Formation, Power and Space in Contemporary London." Theory, Culture & Society 34, no. 5-6 (July 23, 2017): 179–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276417717792.
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In this article we examine elite formation in relation to money power within the city of London. Our primary aim is to consider the impact of the massive concentration of such power upon the city’s political life, municipal and shared resources and social equity. We argue that objectives of city success have come to be identified and aligned with the presence of wealth elites while wider goals, of access to essential resources for citizens, have withered. A diverse national and global wealth-elite is drawn to a city with an almost unique cultural infrastructure, fiscal regime and ushering butler class of politicians. We consider how London is being made for money and the monied – in physical, political and cultural terms. We conclude that the conceptualization of elites as wealth and social power formations operating within urban spatial arenas is important for capturing the nature of new social divisions and changes.
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Adinolfi, Goffredo. "Fascist Era Elites (2). The Fascist ministerial elite." Portugese Journal of Social Sciences 3, no. 2 (September 1, 2004): 91–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/pjss.3.2.91/0.
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Connelly, John. "Internal bolshevisation? Elite social science training in stalinist Poland." Minerva 34, no. 4 (1996): 323–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00127070.
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Davies, William. "Elite Power under Advanced Neoliberalism." Theory, Culture & Society 34, no. 5-6 (June 22, 2017): 227–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276417715072.
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The financial crisis, and associated scandals, created a sense of a juridical deficit with regard to the financial sector. Forms of independent judgement within the sector appeared compromised, while judgement over the sector seemed unattainable. Elites, in the classical Millsian sense of those taking tacitly coordinated ‘big decisions’ over the rest of the public, seemed absent. This article argues that the eradication of jurisdictional elites is an effect of neoliberalism, as articulated most coherently by Hayek. It characterizes the neoliberal project as an effort to elevate ‘unconscious’ processes over ‘conscious’ ones, which in practice means elevating cybernetic, non-human systems and processes over discursive spheres of politics and judgement. Yet such a system still produces its own types of elite power, which come to consist in acts of translation, rather than judgement. Firstly, there are ‘cyborg intermediaries’: elites which operate largely within the system of codes, data, screens and prices. Secondly, there are ‘diplomatic intermediaries’: elites who come to narrate and justify what markets (and associated technologies and bodies) are ‘saying’. The paper draws on Lazzarato’s work on signifying vs asignifying semiotics in order to articulate this, and concludes by considering the types of elite crisis which these forms of power tend to produce.
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Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "Religious Support for Civil Resistance Movements: When and How Does It Contribute to Regime Change?" Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 7 (January 2021): 237802312110549. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23780231211054997.
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There is substantial research on the influence of elite defections on civil resistance campaign outcomes. Yet most studies focus on defections among security forces, political leaders, and economic elites. In this article, the author examines religious elite defections. Analyzing 99 civil resistance struggles, the author explores whether religious leaders’ support is associated with regime change in authoritarian contexts. The author also uses qualitative comparative analysis to determine the conditions and pathways that lead to a successful outcome. The author illustrates these pathways with four cases (Ukraine’s orange revolution, Mali’s uprising against General Traoré, the Philippine People Power movement, and Malawi’s struggle against President Banda). The results indicate that religious elite defections are not necessary for civil resistance success. However, religious support can contribute critical resources to movements, create a positive flank effect, facilitate security force defections, provide space for resistance in conditions of indiscriminate repression, and activate international networks that can pressure a regime.
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Schijf, Huibert, Jaap Dronkers, and Jennifer van den Broeke-George. "Recruitment of members of Dutch noble and high-bourgeois families to elite positions in the 20th century." Social Science Information 43, no. 3 (September 2004): 435–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0539018404045492.
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This article offers a counter-example of the modernization theory by looking at the elite positions of the nobility in the Netherlands in the 20th century. We compare the elite positions of the parents and the children, and between noble families and high bourgeoisie families. The likelihood of achieving an elite position has not decreased for different generations of the nobility or in comparison with the high bourgeoisie. An important factor is their social and cultural capital as indicated by the noble titles of their mothers and parents-in-law. This suggests that the modernization theory may apply to the middle classes, but far less to the elites.
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Michetti, Miqueli. "Transformações no ethos de elites econômicas." Tempo Social 35, no. 3 (December 15, 2023): 59–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/0103-2070.ts.2023.215931.
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O artigo busca compreender as atualizações dos valores e premissas da ação de elites econômicas engajadas com o que é enunciado como mudança social no Brasil a partir da análise da atuação transnacional e das iniciativas de “abertura social” da Fundação Lemann. Por meio uma perspectiva compreensiva e posicional, a pesquisa documental (2002 - 2023) demonstra como valores historicamente característicos de frações dominantes, como o mérito e o individualismo, tem dado lugar a composições com valores como diversidade e responsabilidade, fenômeno que se declina globalmente. O estudo do lastro simbólico das posições de elite permite compreender a denegação social envolvida na produção da convicção de elite e das formas atuais de sua sociodiceia.
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Engelen, Ewald. "Shadow Banking after the Crisis: The Dutch Case." Theory, Culture & Society 34, no. 5-6 (July 23, 2017): 53–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276417716513.
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This paper presents the case of the post-crisis discursive defence of shadow banking in the Netherlands to argue, first, that there is a need to dust off older elite theories and adapt them to post-democratic conditions where there are no widely shared ‘political formulas’ to secure mass support for elite projects. Second, that temporality should be taken more seriously; it is when stories fail that elite storytelling can be observed in practice. As new ‘political formulas’ are minted and become established, elites can again hope to withdraw from the political scene and leave policy-making to the self-evidence of output legitimacy and/or the perpetuum mobile of There-Is-No-Alternative (TINA). This suggests that elite theory should replace an epochal reading of post-democracy with a more conjunctural one.
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Costa Pinto, António. "Fascist Era Elites (3). Salazar’s ministerial elite, 1933–44." Portugese Journal of Social Sciences 3, no. 2 (September 1, 2004): 103–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/pjss.3.2.103/0.
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Banks, Patricia A. "Ethnicity, Class and Trusteeship at African-American and Mainstream Museums." Cultural Sociology 11, no. 1 (July 7, 2016): 97–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1749975516651288.
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While Pierre Bourdieu argues that cultural capital is grounded in distinct aesthetic knowledge and tastes among elites, Francie Ostrower emphasizes that cultural capital grows out of the social organization of elite participation in the arts. This article builds on Ostrower’s perspective on cultural capital, as well as Milton Gordon’s concept of the ethclass group and Prudence Carter’s concept of black cultural capital, to elaborate how culture’s importance for class and ethnic cohesion is rooted in the separate spheres of arts philanthropy among black and white elites. The argument is empirically illustrated using the case of arguably the most prominent mainstream and African-American museums in New York City – the Metropolitan Museum of Art (the Met) and the Studio Museum in Harlem (SMH). Findings show that relative to the Met board the SMH board is an important site of unification for elite blacks, and in comparison to the SMH board, the Met board is a notable site of cohesion for elite whites. This article advances theory and research on cultural capital by elaborating how it varies among elite ethclass groups. Moreover, it highlights how the growth of African-American museums not only adds color to the museum field, but also fosters bonds among the black middle and upper class.
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Davis, Aeron, and Karel Williams. "Introduction: Elites and Power after Financialization." Theory, Culture & Society 34, no. 5-6 (July 10, 2017): 3–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276417715686.
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This article introduces the special issue on ‘Elites and Power after Financialization’. It is presented in three parts. The first sets out the original Weberian problematic that directed the work of Michels and Mills, in the 1910s and 1950s respectively. It then discusses how this framework was appropriated and then cast aside as our understanding of capitalism changed. The second section makes the case for a reset of elite studies around the current capitalist conjuncture of financialization. It is explained how this unifying theme allows for a diverse set of approaches for answering old and new questions about elites and power. The third part identifies four key themes or sites of investigation that emerge within the nine papers offered here. These are: new state-capital relations, innovative forms of value extraction, new elite insecurities and resources in liquid times and the role of elite intermediaries and experts.
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Hicks, Jacqueline, Vincent A. Traag, and Ridho Reinanda. "Turning Digitised Newspapers into Networks of Political Elites." Asian Journal of Social Science 43, no. 5 (2015): 567–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685314-04305004.
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This paper introduces the Elite Network Shifts (ENS) project to the Asian Studies community where computational techniques are used with digitised newspaper articles to describe changes in relations among Indonesian political elites. Reflecting on how “political elites” and “political relations” are understood by the elites, as well as across the disciplinary boundaries of the social and computational sciences, it suggests ways to operationalise these concepts for digital research. It then presents the results of a field trip where six Indonesian political elites were asked to evaluate the accuracy of their own computational networks generated by the project. The main findings of the paper are: (1) The computational identification of political elites is relatively successful, while much work remains on categorising their relations, (2) social scientists should focus on capturing single dimensions of complex social phenomena when using computational techniques, and (3) computational techniques are not able to capture multiple understandings of social concepts.
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Ольга Алексеевна, Коряковцева, and Карпов Андрей Юрьевич. "THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL ELITE IN THE TRANSFORMATIONAL PROCESSES OF MODERNITY." STATE AND MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT SCHOLAR NOTES 1, no. 3 (September 2022): 204–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2079-1690-2022-1-3-204-209.
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The law of circulation of elites is one of the basic theoretical concepts of elitology, but its implementa-tion depends on the political regime, on the transformational processes of the social system of the state, and other factors. The analysis of the mechanisms of elite recruitment has been carried out. It is proved: a) the transformation of the modern political field in Russia requires a corresponding transformation of the elite layer; b) digital technologies are currently the same powerful resource as the traditional institutions of education and religion. A way is proposed to overcome the state of liminality by creating new fundamental foundations for the development of the national elite.
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McNamara, Justin, and Marita P. McCabe. "Exercise Dependence and Elite Athletes: Perceptions of Coaches of Elite Athletes." International Journal of Sports Science & Coaching 1, no. 4 (December 2006): 361–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1260/174795406779367792.
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Dedić, Nikola. "The notion and meaning of interdisciplinarity in the studies of art and media." SAJ - Serbian Architectural Journal 4, no. 2 (2012): 196–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/saj1202196d.
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This text attempts to mark the difference between traditional, modern, monodisciplinary and contemporary interdisciplinary approaches within the analysis of reception of media and artistic contents. Monodisciplinary approaches are connected with the classical basis of humanistic and social sciences which are related to the definition of culture based on opposition between mass and elite culture (art). Avant-garde and linguistic turn within social sciences in the 60s realized re-evaluation of the notion of culture-culture is not seen anymore as a sum of elite products of human spirit but rather as a production of cultural meaning, i.e. as a discourse. This turn enabled interdisciplinary turn within the sciences as aesthetics and art history and also enabled the emergence of contemporary interdisciplinary media theory.
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GRAVELA, MARTA. "The primacy of patrimony: kinship strategies of the political elite of Turin in the late Middle Ages (1340–1490)." Continuity and Change 32, no. 3 (November 13, 2017): 293–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0268416017000303.
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ABSTRACTCombining family history and the analysis of political elites, this article explores the development of the urban elite of Turin (Piedmont) in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, through an analysis of the transformations in the kinships forming the ruling class, with particular regard to their structures and strategies for social and economic reproduction. The deep changes that affected this group and eventually led to its extinction and replacement by a new elite are addressed. It is argued that, alongside institutional rearrangements determined by the Dukes of Savoy, the inheritance strategies pursued by the kinships in order to preserve their economic and political role played a crucial part in their demise.
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REZNIK, OLEKSANDR, and OLEG KOZLOVSKIY. "PECULIARITIES OF MEASURING THE CITIZENS’ POPULIST ORIENTATIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES." Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing, Stmm. 2022 (2) (2022): 40–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/sociology2022.02.040.
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In connection with the spread of populism in the world there was a question of measuring populist orientations. In the social sciences, several scales of measurement have been proposed, based on the already stable conceptualization of attitudes toward populist ideas. The structure of populist orientations has a multidimensional composition consisting of two or more conceptual components. Citizens are considered populists if they adopt anti-elitist views, have a Manichean vision of political processes, and believe in unlimited popular sovereignty as opposed to the pluralistic procedures of representative democracy. The article states the existence of conceptual convergence in attempts to empirically study the support of populism at the mass level. At the same time, it is pointed out that an adaptation of the scales for measuring populist orientations for the study of Ukrainian society should take into account the peculiarities of citizens’ attitudes towards post-communist elites. After all, Ukraine is characterized by the absence of a long state tradition of selecting the ruling elite, when a negative attitude towards the political class prevails, regardless of populist orientations. And this raises some caveats for the use of measurement techniques that are more acceptable for the study of established societies.
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Leinonen, Johanna. "“Money Is Not Everything and That’s the Bottom Line”." Social Science History 36, no. 2 (2012): 243–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0145553200011780.
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This article highlights and fills gaps in research on migrant elites, traditionally defined as highly educated or professional migrants. The research on elite migrants has often suffered from methodological individualism: elite migrants are depicted as male professionals who shuttle from one work assignment or country to another, unrestricted by family relationships or national borders. My research shows the important role of marriage and family ties in life decisions of elite migrants, who in migration statistics and scholarly discussions appear merely as professionals, highly educated persons, or students. I also contribute to the recent literature that challenges the common assumption that migration is a unidirectional movement from one place to another initiated by a single motive, work or family. My research shows that in reality, for both women and men, multiple motives and multidirectional movements are often involved. Furthermore, my research highlights how elite migrants’ high social status does not necessarily guarantee privileged treatment by the host society or that elite migrants feel a part of the society in which they live. I use international marriages between Finns and Americans in Finland and the United States as a case study. I base my analysis on the 74 interviews that I conducted with American migrants and their Finnish spouses living in the capital region of Finland, in or near Helsinki, and with Finnish migrants married to US citizens and living in the state of Minnesota. In addition, I use responses to an online survey of American-born people who were living in Finland in 2008. I received 106 responses to the survey.
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Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. "Elites, Elite Settlements, and Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 1950-1980." Social Science History 18, no. 4 (1994): 543. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1171254.
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Maclean, Mairi, Charles Harvey, and Robert Chia. "Reflexive practice and the making of elite business careers." Management Learning 43, no. 4 (June 20, 2012): 385–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1350507612449680.
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This article develops a new perspective on reflexive practice in the making of elite business careers. It builds upon Bourdieu’s practice framework to examine how business leaders from elite and non-elite backgrounds develop and practice reflexivity in their everyday lives. The article draws upon in-depth life-history interviews with members of the British business elite. Elites exhibited five types of reflexive behaviour, from which two modes of reflexive practice were derived: an accumulative mode, through which business leaders reflexively accumulate capital, positions and perspectives; and a re-constructive mode, through which they re-constitute the self in response to contingences, contexts and insights gathered. Our analysis suggests a link between reflexivity and career advancement, particularly in the case of non-privileged elites. Their greater experience of navigating the social landscape may facilitate perspective-taking, enhancing multipositionality, enabling such individuals to seize opportunities previously unthinkable.
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Keller, Brad S., Annette J. Raynor, Lyndell Bruce, and Fiona Iredale. "Technical attributes of Australian youth soccer players: Implications for talent identification." International Journal of Sports Science & Coaching 11, no. 6 (November 29, 2016): 819–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1747954116676108.
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Objectives To determine whether the technical ability of Australian youth soccer players could distinguish between various playing levels. Design A cross-sectional observational design was used with each player required to complete four technical tests. Methods Sixty-two participants were representatives of three cohorts of youth soccer in Australia: national elite ( n = 18), state elite ( n = 22) and sub-elite ( n = 22). The technical tests used were Loughborough Short Passing Test (LSPT), long passing test (LPT), shooting test and speed dribbling, with all players familiarised with the tests prior to data collection. Differences between cohorts were analysed using a multiple analysis of variance test with follow-up analyses of variance and Tukey Honest Significant Difference post-hoc test, which were subsequently used to inform a sensitivity analysis, more specifically a bootstrapped receiver operating curve to determine cut-off scores for each variable. Results The national elite cohort scored better than state- and sub-elite cohorts on the LSPT, however, the state elite produced the fastest time before penalties. The sub-elite cohort scored less points on the LPT compared to both national- and state-elite cohorts, on both feet. In regards to speed dribbling, national-elite players were faster than both the state- and sub-elite cohorts. Shooting accuracy and velocity were able to discriminate the national- and sub-elite cohorts on the dominant foot, with shooting velocity on the nondominant foot being faster for the national elite compared to both the state- and sub-elite cohorts. Conclusions A number of differences in technical ability were identified between varying levels of Australian youth soccer players. Youth soccer coaches and sports scientists should use the cut-off scores for the technical tests in the talent identification and development process, with aspiring players aiming to reach these levels.
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Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. "Elites, Elite Settlements, and Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 1950–1980: Introduction." Social Science History 18, no. 4 (1994): 543–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0145553200017156.
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Social revolutions as well as revolutionary movements have recently held great interest for both sociopolitical theorists and scholars of Latin American politics. Before we can proceed with any useful analysis, however, we must distinguish between these two related but not identical phenomena. Adapting Theda Skocpol’s approach, we can define social revolutions as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by” mass-based revolts from below, sometimes in cross-class coalitions (Skocpol 1979: 4; Wickham-Crowley 1991:152). In the absence of such basic sociopolitical transformations, I will not speak of (social) revolution or of a revolutionary outcome, only about revolutionary movements, exertions, projects, and so forth. Studies of the failures and successes of twentieth-century Latin American revolutions have now joined the ongoing theoretical debate as to whether such outcomes occur due to society- or movement-centered processes or instead due to state- or regime-centered events (Wickham-Crowley 1992).
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Keller, Brad S., Annette J. Raynor, Lyndell Bruce, and Fiona Iredale. "Physical and anthropometrical attributes of Australian youth soccer players." International Journal of Sports Science & Coaching 13, no. 5 (January 10, 2018): 787–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1747954117752904.
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Objectives To determine whether Australian youth soccer players of varying levels could be distinguished based on their anthropometrical and physical attributes. Design A cross-sectional observational design was used, involving six anthropometrical and physical tests for each player. Methods Participants represented three youth levels of competition, namely national elite (n = 18), state elite (n = 22) and sub-elite (n = 22). Anthropometrical and physical tests included standing height; body mass; 5, 10, 30 m sprint and 20 m ‘flying start’ sprint; zig-zag agility test; vertical jump and Yo-Yo Intermittent Recovery test level 1. A multiple analysis of variance for the main effect of cohort, with a follow-up ANOVA and Tukey's Honest Significant Difference were used to discern which attributes differed between each cohort. Receiver operating characteristic curves were calculated, providing cut-off values between cohorts. Results The national elite cohort was significantly taller than the state elite cohort (ES = 0.94) and faster than the sub-elite athletes across 30 m (ES = 0.79) and 20 m with a flying start (ES = 0.77) (P < 0.05). The national elite cohort had a significantly higher level of intermittent endurance, compared to the state elite athletes who also performed better than the sub-elite cohort. The discrepancy between groups in the Yo-Yo Intermittent Recovery test level 1 was exemplified by the receiver operating characteristic with 94.1% of national elite players running further than 1980 m, while 95.7% of state elite and 100% of sub-elite players failed to reach this distance (ES = 0.88–1.77). Conclusions It is evident that anthropometrical and physical attributes differ between youth cohorts, particularly intermittent endurance. It is important to use this knowledge to enhance the current processes used to identify future talent for success in Australian soccer.
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Artemyeva, Tatiana. "The Making of Russian Intellectual Elites in the Age of Enlightenment." Odysseus. Man in History 28, no. 1 (October 28, 2022): 117–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.32608/1607-6184-2022-28-1-117-139.
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During the age of Enlightenment, the processes of national elites' formation in Western Europe somewhat differed from country to country. While in Britain, especially in Scotland, intellectuals constituted a fairly homogeneous group of literati, which included university professors, educated priests, civil servants, and enlightened nobles, in France the ideological attitudes might have been shared by clerics, university professors, and "free thinkers," primarily "encyclopedists." In Russia, the situation was peculiar. At the beginning of the 18th century, the structure of the intellectual elite changed. The clerical Orthodox elite became segregated due to the restrictive decrees of Peter the Great. After the founding of St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in 1724 and Moscow University in 1755, an academic elite emerged, and a noble intellectual elite took shape. While European intellectual elites developed within a single paradigm and built their internal oppositions most often along the lines of ideological irreconcilability (for example clericals and encyclopedists in France), Russian intellectual elites were barely connected to each other. They were formed in the context of different educational trajectories, shared no common intellectual institutions or communication platforms (it is not by chance that Russian universities had no theology departments: theological education existed in the framework of separate church schools), and they appealed to different authorities. All this contributed to the parallel existence of very different intellectual models and philosophical systems. The situation became even more complex in the 19th century with the emergence of the intelligentsia as a social group in its own right.
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Atria, Jorge, Juan Castillo, Luis Maldonado, and Simón Ramirez. "Economic Elites’ Attitudes Toward Meritocracy in Chile: A Moral Economy Perspective." American Behavioral Scientist 64, no. 9 (July 17, 2020): 1219–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764220941214.
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We analyze economic elites’ perceptions and beliefs about meritocracy from a moral economy perspective. A moral economy perspective considers how norms and beliefs structure socioeconomic practices through the constitution and expression of what is considered acceptable, proper, and legitimate. Our study explores how economic elites make sense of the roles of talent and effort in the distribution of resources and how they reconcile the idea of meritocracy within a rigid social order. The site of our study is Chile, a country with fluid mobility between low and middle classes, but with high and persistent disparities and strong barriers to elite positions. We conducted 44 semistructured interviews with shareholders, board members, and high-level executives of large or high-turnover companies in three major Chilean cities. We find that the economic elite strongly support meritocracy but explain access to top positions based on talent rather than effort. The economic elite define talent in terms of business and leadership skills. They attribute upward mobility in the private sector to meritocratic practice. At the same time, they view the public sector as the epitome of nonmeritocratic practices, incompetence, and inefficiency. They profess empathy with the poor, but they reject redistributive policies. The economic elite believe in the primacy of competition in economic life and the necessity of continual economic growth, and thus, they understand meritocracy as both the means to survive in a market economy and a responsible approach to lead national development.
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LeBas, Adrienne, and Ngonidzashe Munemo. "Elite Conflict, Compromise, and Enduring Authoritarianism: Polarization in Zimbabwe, 1980–2008." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (December 20, 2018): 209–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716218813897.
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How do elites play a role in crafting polarization? And what effects do elite-led conflicts have on democracy and mass politics? To examine these questions, we compare two separate episodes of party-based polarization in Zimbabwe, from 1980 to 1987 and from 2000 to 2008. Each of these moments of polarization ended in an elite power-sharing settlement, but a comparison of the two moments yields insights about both the causes of polarization and its effects. We find that the episodes of polarization were rooted in elite instrumentalization of conflict. They differed, however, in the extent to which they activated foundational myths and built larger master cleavages. We suggest that the latter episode conforms more closely to McCoy, Rahman, and Somer’s pernicious polarization, which we argue is marked by deeper societal penetration and segregation than other forms of political polarization and is also less amenable to resolution.
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Curtis, Ronald. "Review Essays : Does Science Belong to Its Elite?" Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23, no. 1 (March 1993): 77–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839319302300105.
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Scalon, Celi. "Justiça como igualdade? A percepção da elite e do povo brasileiro." Sociologias, no. 18 (December 2007): 126–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s1517-45222007000200007.
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Os estudos sobre as desigualdades sociais no Brasil concentram-se, em geral, nas dimensões objetivas do fenômeno, como sexo, cor, renda, ocupação e escolaridade. A amplitude do fosso entre ricos e pobres, graças às pesquisas já realizadas, é razoavelmente conhecida, mas pouco se sabe sobre a maneira como os brasileiros vêem essa disparidade. Em 2000, como parte do International Social Survey Programme tentou-se preencher essa lacuna com um survey aplicado a representantes das elites nacionais, entendendo-se por "elites" indivíduos pertencentes ao grupo dos 10% mais ricos do país. A pesquisa, de abrangência nacional - 2 mil entrevistas em 195 municípios -, buscou revelar diferenças entre as percepções da "elite" e do "povo" acerca da desigualdade. As questões levantadas pelo survey diziam respeito à imagem que os dois grupos têm da sociedade brasileira e da forma como ela está estruturada; as remunerações que seriam adequadas para trabalhadores de diferentes níveis de qualificação; os valores que deveriam prevalecer na distribuição da riqueza do país; os maiores problemas do Brasil; e as estratégias preferenciais de cada grupo para a redução da pobreza, com destaque para o papel do Estado. As respostas revelaram convergências e divergências surpreendentes entre povo e elite. Os dois grupos percebem a extensão das desigualdades sociais no país, mas tendem a defender estratégias distintas para reduzi-las, transferindo a solução das desigualdades ao Estado. Essas aproximações e diferenças de pontos de vista podem oferecer elementos importantes para se compreender os mecanismos de legitimação das desigualdades.
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Newton, Jacqueline A., and Paul S. Holmes. "Psychological characteristics of champion orienteers: Should they be considered in talent identification and development?" International Journal of Sports Science & Coaching 12, no. 1 (December 20, 2016): 109–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1747954116684392.
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A range of cognitive skills that support the development of sport potential have been suggested to be important for athletes and coaches. This study explored performers’ psychological characteristics within orienteers. The psychological skills of World Elite orienteers and athletes in the National Junior Squads of both Great Britain and Switzerland were assessed using the six-factor Psychological Characteristics of Excellence Questionnaire. Data suggested that, as juniors, elite orienteers reported less support for long-term success than the Swiss juniors, perhaps because of the earlier adoption of self-coaching, but were not significantly different from either junior group on all other factors. British juniors were not significantly different from the other two groups on any factor. Follow-up qualitative approaches explored possible reasons for the World Elites’ early reliance on “self” rather than “other”, the role of the coach and the self-coaching phenomenon. The role of orienteering in developing these skills is also discussed along with unique psychological challenges faced by high performing orienteers.
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Kim, Stephanie K. "Illegitimate Elites and the Politics of Belonging at a Korean University." Journal of Korean Studies 23, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 175–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/21581665-4339107.
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AbstractUniversities are undergoing a transformation in which higher learning intersects with a class of cosmopolitan elites. Certainly within South Korea, universities are launching international colleges as a way to position themselves as choice institutions that cater to elite students seeking global opportunities. Yet little work has been done to examine what happens to the students within these spaces of globality and privilege. This article reveals the interconnections between globalizing higher education and the global aspirations of Korean youth by focusing on the students who enter into an international learning space of a Korean university that itself desires global status. Not quite accepted by the other students but still considered an elite group, these individuals have to negotiate complex campus-based norms where the risk of marginalization from key social networks is magnified by the university’s pursuit of global status. Meanwhile, the university transforms into an ideological battleground and a critical site in the construction of social membership in South Korea.
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Roy, Indrajit. "Class Politics and Social Protection: A Comparative Analysis of Local Governments in India." Journal of South Asian Development 14, no. 2 (July 2, 2019): 121–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0973174119854606.
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Dramatic differences in the quality of human life are a prominent feature of today’s world. In response, many governments and international development agencies have begun to formulate and implement agendas for social protection. Nevertheless, the outcomes of such initiatives remain vastly varied.What explains such variations? In this article, I direct attention to the role of class politics in shaping the implementation of social protection by local governments that implement India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). Based on a synthesis of official data, interviews with beneficiaries of social protections and elites, and direct observations in two Indian States, the author illustrates the ways in which variations in class politics influence the supply of employment works.This article departs from existing analysis of factors that favour the implementation of social protections, namely commitment of bureaucrats and politicians, political party linkages and clientelism, and civil society activism. It also nuances extant class-focused analysis which tend to adopt a polarized model of class conflict between dominant classes and the laboring poor. This article, by contrast, appreciates the conflicts within dominant classes, and emphasizes the role of coalitions and competitions between elite fractions.Where elite fractions successfully co-opt or eliminate one another, they successfully sabotage the labour-friendly MGNREGA. On the other hand, where elite fractions conflict with one another, labour-friendly programs such as the MGNREGA have a chance of being implemented. However, the transformative aspect of the program’s intent, in terms of dissolving the relations of power that bolster poverty, appears to be more in evidence in localities where precarious elites align with the laboring poor to challenge the influence of the entrenched elites. As we examine alternative means of addressing the dramatic differences in the quality of life that continue to blight the contemporary world, the imperative to analyze class politics becomes greater than ever before.
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Csite, András. "Towards a new elite model." Review of Sociology 7, no. 1 (July 1, 2001): 151–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/revsoc.7.2001.1.13.
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Fonseca, Ana Mnica. "The Nazi ministerial elite: 193345." Portugese Journal of Social Sciences 8, no. 1 (June 1, 2009): 43–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/pjss.8.1.43_1.
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Lee, Elizabeth M. "Elite Colleges and Socioeconomic Status." Sociology Compass 7, no. 9 (September 2013): 786–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12068.
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Menezes, Paulo. "Tropa de elite: perigosas ambiguidades." Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 28, no. 81 (February 2013): 63–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0102-69092013000100005.
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Levinger, George. "Uncovering Elite Crime: An Introduction." Journal of Social Issues 43, no. 3 (October 1987): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1987.tb02343.x.
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Morse, Yonatan L. "Elite interviews in the developing world: finding anchors in weak institutional environments." Qualitative Research 19, no. 3 (May 4, 2018): 277–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468794118773245.
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Recently researchers have built on field experiences from novel and challenging settings to develop new insights into elite interviewing strategies, and specifically the question of access. One such context that has been underexplored is the weaker institutional environment found in much of the developing world. Many of the common suggestions regarding access emphasize an elite’s relative insularity and unwillingness to participate in research due to issues of status and prestige. By contrast, in weaker institutional settings many elites are protected by fewer organizational safeguards, are more accustomed to in-person conversations, and are often quite willing to participate in research. The challenge is rather identifying elites to begin with, working around flexible scheduling norms, and adapting to a much more direct and persistent form of communication with elites. Drawing on insights derived mainly from fieldwork in Africa, this article identifies some best practices on how to prepare for elite interviews, organize logistically, and develop contacts once on-site.