Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Electricity markets'
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Hoang, Philip. "Essays in electricity markets /." [St. Lucia, Qld.] :, 2005. http://www.library.uq.edu.au/pdfserve.php?image=thesisabs/absthe18590.pdf.
Full textLe, Coq Chloé. "Quantity choices and market power in electricity markets." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), 2003. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-566.
Full textDiss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2003 [4], iii, [1] s., s. 1-6: sammanfattning, s. 7-119, [5] s.: 4 uppsatser
Le, Coq Chloé. "Quantity choices and market power in electricity markets /." Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (EFI), 2003. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/615.htm.
Full textCubuklu, Omer. "Capacity Trading In Electricity Markets." Master's thesis, METU, 2012. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12613988/index.pdf.
Full textTalasli, Irem. "Stochastic Modeling Of Electricity Markets." Phd thesis, METU, 2012. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12614034/index.pdf.
Full textFerreira, Dias Marta. "Integration of European electricity markets." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2011. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/47365/.
Full textNicholson, Emma Leah. "Essays on restructured electricity markets." Connect to Electronic Thesis (ProQuest) Connect to Electronic Thesis (CONTENTdm), 2008. http://worldcat.org/oclc/436443232/viewonline.
Full textLi, Zili. "Topics in deregulated electricity markets." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2016. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/98895/1/Zili_Li_Thesis.pdf.
Full textHarbord, David William Cameron. "Competition in decentralized electricity markets : three papers on electricity auctions." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2005. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2417/.
Full textMonjoie, Léopold. "Securing Investments in Electricity Markets. Three Essays on Market Design." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université Paris sciences et lettres, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024UPSLD005.
Full textBecause electricity is at the heart of our modern economy, a significant challenge for economists is to ensure sufficient investment. Currently, in most developed countries, it is predominantly private actors who make both investment and consumption decisions. It is in this context that this thesis is concerned with understanding how to design markets that provide virtuous incentives to a diverse set of actors. The aim is then to induce efficient investment and consumption decisions. The methodology employed in this thesis is based on a theoretical representation of actor behavior in electricity markets and studies how this behavior interacts with the rules enacted in these same markets. The first chapter examines the behavior of producers in capacity markets. A capacity market allows generators to generate income in advance in exchange for their commitment to availability, which should provide incentives to invest sufficiently. The first chapter proposes a new approach to conceptualizing offers on these markets, using real options theory. In particular, this model describes the interaction between the characteristics of the contract sold on the capacity market, notably its duration, and the bids made by producers. In this way, the chapter sheds new light on price formation in these markets. The second chapter highlights the importance of choosing the right way to choose the demand on capacity markets. Indeed, it shows that, depending on the characteristics of the markets and the players involved, certain ways of taking demand into account in these markets can have unexpected effects on surplus. These effects can be both positive and negative. Finally, the last chapter raises the question of how to ensure sufficient investment when consumer demand is unknown. It describes the trade-off between financing investment and maximizing welfare. In particular, the chapter points out that setting up markets to achieve a certain level of investment can raise questions of redistribution, with some consumers being harmed even if overall welfare is maximized
Nguyen, Duy Huu Manh. "Analysing electricity markets with evolutionary computation." University of Western Australia. School of Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering, 2002. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2003.0018.
Full textDamsgaard, Niclas. "Deregulation and regulation of electricity markets." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.] (EFI), 2003. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/630.htm.
Full textKockar, Ivana. "Combined poolbilateral operation in electricity markets." Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=84274.
Full textIn this combined market model, all ancillary services including transmission losses and congestion management are supplied by the pool. The market clearing process identifying the scheduled generation levels and the nodal electricity prices (also known as locational marginal prices) is defined by the solution of an optimal power flow which minimizes the total offered generation cost plus any curtailment or non-curtailment costs. This optimization, which is performed centrally by a system operator, simultaneously satisfies the power balance at all the network buses while respecting the power flow limits in all lines including transmission losses. In particular, the market clearing process takes into consideration generation limits imposed by the bilateral contracts, a constraint which as this thesis demonstrates can have a profound impact on the market performance.
The performance of the combined pool/bilateral market is evaluated both technically and financially. The technical performance of a specific market is measured in terms of the pool and bilateral generation levels, by the degree of transmission congestion and by the transmission losses. The financial performance of individual market participants is based on the nodal prices, power transfer rates, as well as on the revenues and expenditures of both generators and loads.
Simulation results indicate that careful coordination of the pool and bilateral trades is essential as certain mixes can force out of merit generator operation, unnecessary transmission congestion, lower generation revenues, and higher consumer payments. This is particularly so if the bilateral contracts are firm.
In order to lessen the consequences of inefficient pool/bilateral mixes, a variation of the combined pool/bilateral market is also examined under which the participants may submit curtailment offers for their firm contracts and non-curtailment bids for their non-firm contracts. The market clearing procedure in this case determines the levels of generation, the nodal prices, as well as the levels of contract curtailment.
Finally, the Aumann-Shapley unbundling procedure is applied to the combined pool/bilateral model with firm contracts. This enables the decomposition of the generation levels into three different service components, namely pool generation, bilateral generation, as well as a generation term supplying ancillary services attributed to the bilateral trades. The unbundling procedure also calculates the corresponding costs associated with these "unbundled" services and allocates them among the different market participants. This service and cost unbundling process is then implemented into a Pay-as-Bid pricing mechanism and compared with the conventional marginal pricing.
林霙芝 and Ying-chi Lam. "Agent-based simulation of electricity markets." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1999. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31222882.
Full textHoullier, M. "Integration of liberalised European electricity markets." Thesis, City University London, 2014. http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/12886/.
Full textKaraduman, Ömer. "Essays on electricity and matching markets." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129011.
Full textCataloged from student-submitted PDF of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 219-228).
This thesis contains two chapters on the Electricity Markets and a chapter on Matching Markets. In the first chapter, I study how an energy storage affects the wholesale electricity market. The transition to a low-carbon electricity system is likely to require grid-scale energy storage to smooth the variability and intermittency of renewable energy. I investigate whether private incentives for operating and investing in grid-scale energy storage are optimal and the need for policies that complement investments in renewables with encouraging energy storage. In a wholesale electricity market, energy storage systems generate profit by arbitraging inter-temporal electricity price differences. In addition, storage induces non-pecuniary externalities due to production efficiency and carbon emissions. I build a new dynamic equilibrium framework to quantify the effects of grid-scale energy storage and apply it to study the South Australian Electricity Market.
This equilibrium framework computes a supply function equilibrium using estimated best responses from conventional sources to observed variation in the residual demand volatility. Accounting for storage's effect on equilibrium prices is quantitatively important: previous methods that ignore this channel overestimate the profitability of operating a storage unit. The first set of results shows that although entering the electricity market is not profitable for privately operated storage, such entry would increase consumer surplus and total welfare and reduce emissions. A storage operator that minimizes the cost of acquiring electricity could further improve consumer surplus by twice as much. Importantly, a competitive storage market cannot achieve this outcome because other power plants distort prices. These results argue for a capacity market to compensate for a private firm for investing in storage.
The second set of results shows that at moderate levels of renewable power, introducing grid-scale storage to the system reduces renewable generators' revenue by decreasing average prices. For high levels of renewable generation capacity, storage increases the return to renewable production and decreases CO₂ emissions by preventing curtailment during low-demand periods. In the second chapter, I study how a large scale wind power investment affects the wholesale electricity market. Renewable subsidies have been an influential device for wind power investment in many parts of the world. These policies help to lower emissions by offsetting high-emitting electricity generation with clean energy. For zero-emission targets, this transition towards renewable power should be accompanied by thermal generators' retirement to set clean the energy mix in the power sector.
In this paper, I build a framework to quantify the offset and revenue impact of large-scale wind power investment in a wholesale electricity market and apply it to study the South Australian Electricity Market. This equilibrium framework computes a supply function equilibrium using estimated best responses from conventional sources to observed variation in the residual demand volatility. I first show that reduced-form methods are biased as the scale of the additional capacity increases. My results highlight that with different investment sizes, the substitution patterns and negative revenue impact for wind power differ considerably. As the penetration level of wind power increases, the electricity becomes cheaper. The offset and negative shock shifts from low-cost inflexible generators to high-cost flexible generators, while the revenue impact is the highest on existing renewable generation.
I also show quite a bit heterogeneity in price impact among different potential wind power projects. These results have some policy implications on renewable targets' long-run effects and the project selection given the subsidy scheme. In the third chapter, joint with Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo and Clayton Featherstone, I study the market failure in kidney exchange. We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from market failures whose remedy could increase transplants by 30 to 63 percent. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient; most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals only partly internalize their patientsâǍŹ benefits from exchange, and current platforms suboptimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third, we calibrate a production function and show that individual hospitals operate below efficient scale.
Eliminating this inefficiency requires either a mandate or a combination of new mechanisms and reimbursement reforms.
by Ömer Karaduman.
Ph. D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
Lam, Ying-chi. "Agent-based simulation of electricity markets /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1999. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B21482391.
Full textSpiridonova, Olga. "Three essays on European electricity markets." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/20613.
Full textThis thesis investigates several questions related to the influence of transmission capacities and generation of renewable energy on the outcomes in the wholesale electricity markets. The thesis consists of three self-contained essays that contribute to the policy debate. The analysis of the first essay focuses on a network with strategic firms that can manipulate power flows to their advantage. Methodologically, this chapter belongs to the research literature that represents electricity markets as equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints. In this framework I compare several policies of enhancing competition and demonstrate that although network expansion can stimulate competition, larger improvements in consumer surplus and welfare can be achieved with restructuring. The second essay is based on a similar model, but in a stylized two node network. This approach demonstrates potential adverse effects (higher prices, lower total consumption, lower consumer surplus) from higher renewable infeed in a network where a region with high renewable potential is separated from a region with high load by a limited transmission capacity. I adopt a worst-case assumption that in each region there is a strategic player exercising its market power. The third essay studies the substitution between transmission and storage expansion - two instruments for the integration of expanding renewable energy. Using a myopic storage heuristic I demonstrate the relatively modest effect of temporal balancing of renewable power. In contrast, transmission expansion has a significant potential in increasing renewable penetration, mitigating curtailment rates, and reducing the minimum conventional generation power at any hour. If Europe is to pursue the high targets of renewable power in electricity consumption, the only way to avoid the expansion of cross border lines is extremely high installed renewable capacities and energy capacities of storage.
Pham, Thao. "Market power in power markets in Europe : the Cases in French and German woholesale electricity markets." Thesis, Paris 9, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA090019/document.
Full textThe two last centuries have witnessed an exceptional revolution in the organization of electric power markets worldwide. The industry's organization has changed from vertically integrated monopolies under regulation to unbundled structures that favor market mechanisms; known as reform process in Europe. The shift to reliance on market prices, given concentrated structures and particular characteristics of electricity industry, raises a possibility that some firms could influence the market prices by exercising their market power. The issues of "market power" in a given industry have been abundantly employed in the literatureof Industrial Organization since the late 1970s but theoretical and empirical studies of "market power in electricity markets" have only been developed recently. In this thesis, we attempt to carry out an insight research around market power questions in deregulated wholesale electricity markets in Europe, as regarding the way of defining and measuring it. We carry out empirical studies in two of the biggest liberalized electricity markets in Europe: France (2009-2012's data) and Germany (2011's data), using econometric regressions and electricity simulation models as main methodologies. The subject is particularly relevant inthe context of energy transition in Europe (transition energetique in France and Energiewende in Germany)
Nanduri, Vishnuteja. "Auction performance evaluation in deregulated electricity markets." [Tampa, Fla.] : University of South Florida, 2005. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/SFE0001105.
Full textPettersen, Erling. "Managing End-user Flexibility in Electricity Markets." Doctoral thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management, 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:no:ntnu:diva-373.
Full textOver the past couple of decades, electricity markets across the world have been deregulated. When the electricity systems were being developed, governments exercised extensive control over the industry to ensure reliable services. Today, most of the basic investments have been carried out, and more and more countries have chosen to let market mechanisms regulate the electricity systems. Different countries have, however, approached the deregulation in different ways. While production of electricity is subject to competition in all deregulated markets, there are differences as to how the wholesale markets and end-user markets are organized. An overview of energy optimization models dealing with uncertainty in both regulated and deregulated electricity markets is found in [5].
The primary focus of this thesis is to analyze how participants in the Norwegian electricity market would behave in a situation where the consumers are metered and charged by the hour. The thesis includes five papers, preceded by an introduction. The current part provides a background for the papers and puts them into a common framework. Another purpose of the background part is to point out the scientific contributions of the thesis, which, as we shall see, primarily lie in the application of known methods to new problems.
In Section 2 of the background part a description of the Norwegian electricity market is provided. The section starts with a very brief overview of when and why the market was opened up for competition. Next, we give a description of the wholesale market, with some emphasis on the regulating market (Section 2.1). The end-user market is the primary subject of this thesis, and an overview of this market is given in Section 2.2. Today Norwegian end-users are normally not metered and charged by the hour, as will be apparent from Section 2.2, but if they were, it is likely that this would induce more short-term flexibility in the end-user market. In Section 3 we give a brief overview of how hourly metering, coupled with some sort of two-way communication, may help achieve this. Also, we discuss some potential effects of such flexibility for consumers, retailers, network operators, environment and society (Section 3.2). Finally, in Section 4, we look at two alternative ways of making the end-users alter their load profiles, and discuss pros and cons of the two solutions. Each paper includes its own introduction, and for an overview of the contents of the papers, we refer to these.
Khazaei, Javad. "Mechanism design for electricity markets under uncertainty." Thesis, University of Auckland, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2292/18995.
Full textPape, Andrew. "Implementing sustainable energy in competitive electricity markets." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp04/mq24221.pdf.
Full textMolina-Escobar, Alberto. "Filtering and parameter estimation for electricity markets." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/21736.
Full textFalcey, Jonathan M. "Electricity Markets, Smart Grids and Smart Buildings." Thesis, University of Denver, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=1536975.
Full textA smart grid is an electricity network that accommodates two-way power flows, and utilizes two-way communications and increased measurement, in order to provide more information to customers and aid in the development of a more efficient electricity market. The current electrical network is outdated and has many shortcomings relating to power flows, inefficient electricity markets, generation/supply balance, a lack of information for the consumer and insufficient consumer interaction with electricity markets. Many of these challenges can be addressed with a smart grid, but there remain significant barriers to the implementation of a smart grid.
This paper proposes a novel method for the development of a smart grid utilizing a bottom up approach (starting with smart buildings/campuses) with the goal of providing the framework and infrastructure necessary for a smart grid instead of the more traditional approach (installing many smart meters and hoping a smart grid emerges). This novel approach involves combining deterministic and statistical methods in order to accurately estimate building electricity use down to the device level. It provides model users with a cheaper alternative to energy audits and extensive sensor networks (the current methods of quantifying electrical use at this level) which increases their ability to modify energy consumption and respond to price signals
The results of this method are promising, but they are still preliminary. As a result, there is still room for improvement. On days when there were no missing or inaccurate data, this approach has R2 of about 0.84, sometimes as high as 0.94 when compared to measured results. However, there were many days where missing data brought overall accuracy down significantly. In addition, the development and implementation of the calibration process is still underway and some functional additions must be made in order to maximize accuracy. The calibration process must be completed before a reliable accuracy can be determined.
While this work shows that a combination of a deterministic and statistical methods can accurately forecast building energy usage, the ability to produce accurate results is heavily dependent upon software availability, accurate data and the proper calibration of the model. Creating the software required for a smart building model is time consuming and expensive. Bad or missing data have significant negative impacts on the accuracy of the results and can be caused by a hodgepodge of equipment and communication protocols. Proper calibration of the model is essential to ensure that the device level estimations are sufficiently accurate. Any building model which is to be successful at creating a smart building must be able to overcome these challenges.
Legbedji, Alexis Motto. "Price schedules coordination for electricity pool markets." Thesis, McGill University, 2001. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=38456.
Full textMaiorano, Annalisa. "Modelling and analysis of oligopolistic electricity markets." Thesis, Brunel University, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.367886.
Full textPetoussis, Andreas G. "Supply function equilibrium analysis for electricity markets." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2009. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1054/.
Full textXu, Li. "Financial and computational models in electricity markets." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/51849.
Full textWagner, Michael R. (Michael Robert) 1978. "Hedging optimization algorithms for deregulated electricity markets." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/16778.
Full textIncludes bibliographical references (p. 83-84).
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Recent trends in many U.S. states are to deregulate their electric power industry and markets with the desire to provide a more consumer-friendly environment than under regulation. However, deregulation also creates uncertainty and risk. It is this risk that we wish to address and contain. In this thesis, we review recently developed stochastic models of physical and financial aspects of deregulated electricity markets and research algorithms to utilize these models to hedge risk. First, we consider the issue of calibrating these models to historical data. Once the models are calibrated sufficiently, we discuss two major frameworks for hedging risk optimally. We begin by first developing a method for static hedging optimization, where we optimize a hedging strategy from a fixed point of time over a finite delivery period. Then we develop a more robust dynamic optimization, where the hedging strategy is continuously improved over a finite hedging period for a finite delivery period. A very lucid and recent motivation for the research in this thesis comes from California, where deregulation took place five years ago. Within the last year, the spot market behaved erratically, causing utility companies to plummet financially, ultimately resulting in many declaring bankruptcy and requiring the state of California to intervene so that California did not fall dark. The hedging optimization algorithms developed in this thesis could be used in deregulated electricity markets to possibly avoid a repetition of the situation that occurred in California.
by Michael R. Wagner.
M.Eng.
Martyr, Randall. "Optimal prediction games in local electricity markets." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/optimal-prediction-games-in-local-electricity-markets(976e566d-e942-444a-9ee0-df17f46188d4).html.
Full textFanone, Enzo. "Three Essays on Modelling of Electricity Markets." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Trieste, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10077/7424.
Full textWu, Zhiyong. "Stratum Electricity Markets: Toward Multi-temporal Distributed Risk Management for Sustainable Electricity Provision." Research Showcase @ CMU, 2012. http://repository.cmu.edu/dissertations/89.
Full textZachmann, Georg. "Empirical Evidence for Inefficiencies in European Electricity Markets." Doctoral thesis, Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden, 2009. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-24857.
Full textHuang, Qingqing Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Efficiency-risk tradeoffs in dynamic oligopoly markets : with application to electricity markets." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82397.
Full textCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-90).
In an abstract framework, we examine how a tradeoff between efficiency and risk arises in different dynamic oligopolistic markets. We consider a scenario where there is a reliable resource provider and agents which enter and exit the market following a random process. Self-interested and fully rational agents can both produce and consume the resource. They dynamically update their load scheduling decisions over a finite time horizon, under the constraint that the net resource consumption requirements are met before each individual's deadline. We first examine the system performance under the non-cooperative and cooperative market architectures, both under marginal production cost pricing of the resource. The statistics of the stationary aggregate demand processes induced by the two market architectures show that although the non-cooperative load scheduling scheme leads to an efficiency loss - widely known as the "price of anarchy" - the stationary distribution of the corresponding aggregate demand process has a smaller tail. This tail, which corresponds to rare and undesirable demand spikes, is important in many applications of interest. With a better understanding of the efficiency-risk tradeoff, we investigate, in a non-cooperative setup, how resource pricing can be used as a tool by the system operator to tradeoff between efficiency and risk. We further provide a convex characterization of the Pareto front of different system performance measures. The Pareto front determines the tradeoff among volatility suppression of concerned measurements in the system with load scheduling dynamics. This is the fundamental tradeoff in the sense that system performance achieved by any load scheduling strategies induced by any specific market architectures is bounded by this Pareto front.
by Qingqing Huang.
S.M.
Rubin, Ofir D. "Equilibrium pricing in electricity markets with wind power." [Ames, Iowa : Iowa State University], 2010. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3403856.
Full textKristiansen, Tarjei. "Risk Management in Electricity Markets Emphasizing Transmission Congestion." Doctoral thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Electrical Power Engineering, 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:no:ntnu:diva-1827.
Full textThis thesis analyzes transmission pricing, transmission congestion risks and their associated hedging instruments as well as mechanisms for stimulating investments in transmission expansion. An example of risk management in the case of a hydropower producer is included.
After liberalization and restructuring of electricity markets, risk management has become important. In particular the thesis analyzes risks due to transmission congestion both in the short- and long-term (investments) for market players such as generators, loads, traders, independent system operators and merchant investors. The work is focused on the northeastern United States electricity markets and the Nordic electricity markets.
The first part of the thesis reviews the literature related to the eight research papers in the thesis. This describes the risks that are relevant for an electricity market player and how these can be managed. Next, the basic ingredients of a competitive electricity market are described including the design of the system operator. The transmission pricing method is decisive for hedging against transmission congestion risks and there is an overview of transmission pricing models considering their similarities and differences. Depending on the transmission pricing method used, locational or area (zonal) pricing, the electricity market players can use financial transmission rights or Contracts for Differences, respectively. In the long-term it is important to create mechanisms for investments in transmission expansion and the thesis describes one possible approach and its potential problems.
The second part comprises eight research papers. It presents empirical analyses of existing markets for transmission congestion derivatives, theoretical analyses of transmission congestion derivatives, modeling of merchant long-term financial transmission rights, theoretical analysis of the risks of the independent system operator in providing financial transmission rights, an analysis of inefficiencies associated with ignoring losses when utilizing area (zonal) pricing, and an application of an integrated risk management model on the power system of Norway’s second largest hydropower producer.
The most important research findings include the following issues. First, Contracts for Differences in the Nordic market appear to be over-priced. Second, a merchant long-term financial transmission rights model is possible to realize in mathematical and economic terms. Third, by including the proceeds from a financial transmission right auction the independent system operator can issue a higher volume of rights because there is a relationship between the congestion rent, the proceeds from the auction and the payments to the financial transmission rights holders. Fourth, ignoring losses in the Norwegian area pricing, can lead to inefficiencies. Next, an integrated risk management model is applicable on large-scale power systems. Then, an overview is presented of different contractual arrangements that can be used to hedge transmission congestion risks. Finally, empirical data from existing financial transmission rights markets demonstrate how these markets work.
Weigt, Hannes. "Modeling Competition and Investment in Liberalized Electricity Markets." Doctoral thesis, Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden, 2009. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-24711.
Full textXia, Zhendong. "Pricing and Risk Management in Competitive Electricity Markets." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/7528.
Full textSturluson, Jon Thor. "Topics in the industrial organization of electricity markets." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.] (EFI), 2003. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/614.htm.
Full textDavis, Clay D. "Competitive electricity markets and the case of California." Manhattan, Kan. : Kansas State University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/784.
Full textLiu, Min, and 劉敏. "Energy allocation with risk management in electricity markets." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2004. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B29335978.
Full textFigueroa, Marcelo Gustavo. "Modelling electricity markets : swing options and hybrid models." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.439778.
Full textConcettini, Silvia. "Competition in electricity markets : retailers, generators and technologies." Thesis, Paris 10, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA100033/document.
Full textThe objective of this thesis is to answer to three questions raised by the wave of reform in electricity industries: has retail liberalization achieved its objectives in European Union? How traditional and renewable generators compete in a liberalized market? What is the impact on congestion and zonal price differences of increased production from renewable intermittent sources in Italy? The first chapter provides a mid-term evaluation of liberalization of electricity retailing in Europe. We propose a comprehensive theory on retail liberalization and test its consistency with the practice in European Union. The analysis highlights the presence of an oligopolistic supply structure, a limited level of customer engagement in the market and asymmetries in the rate and speed of cost-pass through. The attribution of the Default/Last Resort service through an auction mechanism seems the best solution to favor the development of competition. In the second chapter we study the strategic interactions between a traditional generation technology and a renewable one characterized by an intermittent availability of capacity. We employ a modified version of the Dixit model for entry deterrence with two post entry competition settings: the Cournot framework in a two stage game and the dominant firm-competitive fringe setting in a three stage game. In both cases, the analysis suggests that the renewable generator exploits the merit order rule to crowd out the production of its rival. In the third chapter we analyze the impact of renewable generation on congestion and zonal price differences in Italy. Using a unique database we estimate two econometric models on five zonal pairings: a multinomial logit model for the occurrence and direction of congestion and an OLS model for the size of paired-price differences. The analysis shows that in an importing region the effect of a larger local renewable supply is to decrease (increase) the probability of congestion in entry (exit). Increasing renewable generation seems to have a significant impact on the islander zones, decreasing (increasing) the level of positive (negative) price differences
Aketi, Venkata Sesha Praneeth. "Prices in Wholesale Electricity Markets and Demand Response." The Ohio State University, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1388765872.
Full textFezzi, Carlo <1980>. "Econometric models for the analysis of electricity markets." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2007. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/433/1/tesi_dottorato_carlofezzi.pdf.
Full textFezzi, Carlo <1980>. "Econometric models for the analysis of electricity markets." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2007. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/433/.
Full textMazzi, Nicolò. "Optimal offering and operating strategies in electricity markets." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3422428.
Full textNell'ultimo decennio il settore energetico ha sperimentato un'importante crescita dell'utilizzo di fonti energetiche rinnovabili, come l'energia solare ed eolica. Ciò ha portato a nuove sfide nella gestione ottimale di sistemi energetici. La generazione di tali fonti stocastiche può solamente essere predetta con bassa accuratezza, causando sbilanciamenti tra la posizione contrattata in sede di mercato e la reale produzione. Di conseguenza, queste fonti stocastiche devono essere operate con modalità differenti dalle unità di generazione convenzionali, come impianti a gas e a carbone. Anche la gestione di impianti convenzionali può tuttavia essere influenzata dalla crescente penetrazione di fonti rinnovabili non programmabili, poiché l'utilizzo di tali fonti sta causando un calo dei prezzi nei mercati elettrici ed un aumento della richiesta di energia per il bilanciamento. La tesi analizza tre casi studio: la partecipazione ottimale nel mercato elettrico di impianti a fonte rinnovabile non programmabile, di impianti convenzionali e di un gruppo di impianti a fonte rinnovabile e unità convenzionali. Il primo caso studia un impianto a fonte rinnovabile che partecipa al mercato elettrico. Gli sbilanciamenti tra la reale produzione e la posizione contrattata sono penalizzati secondo due schemi di sbilanciamento alternativi presenti nel mercato elettrico italiano. Questi schemi introducono una banda di tolleranza ancorata alla quantità di energia contratta nel Mercato del Giorno Prima. La porzione dello sbilanciamento all'interno di tale banda è riconosciuta ad un prezzo diverso dalla porzione che eccede la banda di tolleranza. Si conclude che questi schemi di sbilanciamento alternativi posso portare a distorsioni nel mercato e di conseguenza non sembrano preferibili agli schemi tradizionali, come ad esempio lo schema “dual-price”. Successivamente, la tesi prende la prospettiva di un impianto di generazione convenzionale. Il mercato elettrico considerato utilizza uno schema di prezzo “pay-as-bid” per remunerare le offerte nel Mercato di Bilanciamento, come accade ad esempio in Italia e Germania. Si propone un approccio innovativo che permette di costruire il problema di “trading” ottimale nei mercati “pay-as-bid” tramite un problema di programmazione lineare. Grazie a questa nuova formulazione, la tesi presenta il problema di ottimizzazione che un produttore convenzionale potrebbe risolvere per ottenere le offerte da sottoporre nel Mercato del Giorno Prima includendo i possibili profitti futuri derivanti dal Mercato di Bilanciamento. Il modello proposto viene testato in un caso studio realistico contro una strategia di offerta sequenziale mostrando la capacità di aumentare i profitti attesi. Per ultimo, la tesi considera un “virtual power plant”, ovvero un insieme di unità di generazione convenzionali, impianti a fonte rinnovabile non programmabile e sistemi di accumulo dell'energia, che si propone nel mercato elettrico come un singolo partecipante. Questo studio introduce una struttura innovativa del Mercato di Bilanciamento che permette un partecipazione attivo/passiva al “virtual power plant”. Infatti, esso può decidere di essere attivo (cioè offrire energia per la regolazione) in alcune ore e passivo (cioè creare sbilanciamenti) nelle restanti ore di negoziazione. Il modello viene testato in un caso studio realistico contro strategie di offerta alternative, ad esempio con partecipazione solo attiva o solo passiva.
Concettini, S. "COMPETITION IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS: RETAILERS, GENERATORS AND TECHNOLOGIES." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/267395.
Full textHu, Linlin. "A novel hybrid technique for short-term electricity price forecasting in deregulated electricity markets." Thesis, Brunel University, 2010. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/4498.
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