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Books on the topic 'Electoral mathematics'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

Pietro, Grilli Di Cortona, and Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics., eds. Evaluation and optimization of electoral systems. Philadelphia: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1999.

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2

Felsenthal, Dan S. Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.

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3

Rae, Douglas W. El sistema electoral español: Quince años de experiencia. Madrid: McGraw-Hill, 1993.

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4

Grossman, Gene M. Electoral competition and special interest politics. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994.

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5

Shepsle, Kenneth A. Models of multiparty electoral competition. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991.

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6

Weber, Shlomo. On existence of a fixed-number equilibrium in a multiparty electoral system. Toronto: York University, Dept. of Economics, 1990.

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7

Weber, Shlomo. An equilibrium in electoral competition with entry costs. Toronto: York University, 1992.

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8

Oberholzer-Gee, Felix. Electoral acceleration: The effect of minority population on minority voter turnout. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.

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9

Las formas de medición del fenómeno político: La causalidad en las preferencias electorales, sistemas electorales y la democracia. [Puebla]: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 2010.

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10

America's Electoral College: Choosing the President comparing and analyzing charts, graphs, and tables. New York: Rosen Pub. Group, 2006.

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11

Lee, David Sang-Yoon. The electoral advantage to incumbency and voters' valuation of politicians' experience: A regression discontinuity analysis of elections to the U.S. House. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.

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12

Felsenthal, Dan S., and Moshé Machover. Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2014.

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13

Cortona, Pietro Grilli di, Cecilia Manzi, Aline Pennisi, Federica Ricca, and Bruno Simeone. Evaluation and Optimization of Electoral Systems (Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications). Society for Industrial Mathematics, 1987.

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14

Taagepera, Rein. Predicting Party Sizes: The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2007.

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15

Taagepera, Rein. Predicting Party Sizes: The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press, 2007.

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16

Predicting Party Sizes: The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press, USA, 2007.

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17

Shea, Therese. America's Electoral College: Choosing the President, Comparing and Analyzing Charts, Graphs, and Tables (Math for the Real World). Rosen Publishing Group, 2007.

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18

Miller, Nicholas R. Social Choice Theory and Legislative Institutions. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1.

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This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Please check back later for the full article.Narrowly understood, social choice theory is a specialized branch of applied logic and mathematics that analyzes abstract objects called preference aggregation functions, social welfare functions, and social choice functions. But more broadly, social choice theory identifies, analyzes, and evaluates rules that may be used to make collective decisions. So understood, social choice is a subfield of the social sciences that examines what may be called “voting rules” of various sorts. While social choice theory typically assumes a finite set of alternatives over which voter preferences are unrestricted, the spatial model of social choice assumes that policy alternatives can be represented by points in a space of one or more dimensions, and that voters have preferences that are plausibly shaped by this spatial structure.Social choice theory has considerable relevance for the study of legislative (as well as electoral) institutions. The concepts and tools of social choice theory make possible formal descriptions of legislative institutions such as bicameralism, parliamentary voting procedures, effects of decision rules (e.g., supramajority vs. simple majority rule and executive veto rules), sincere vs. strategic voting by legislators, agenda control, and other parliamentary maneuvers. Spatial models of social choice further enrich this analysis and raise additional questions regarding policy stability and change. Spatial models are used increasingly to guide empirical research on legislative institutions and processes.

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19

Optical Society of America. Conference on Lasers & Elector-Optics (Nineteen Ninety-Seven Technical Digest Series Vol 11). Optical Society of America, 1997.

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20

Goodin, Robert E., and Kai Spiekermann. An Epistemic Theory of Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823452.001.0001.

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One attractive feature of democracy is its ability to track the truth by information aggregation. The formal support for this claim goes back to Condorcet’s famous jury theorem. However, the theorem has often been dismissed as a mathematical curiosity because the assumptions on which the theorem is based are demanding. Such quick dismissals tend to misunderstand the original theorem. They also fail to appreciate how Condorcet’s assumptions can be weakened to obtain jury theorems that are readily applicable in the real world. The first part of the book explains the original theorem and its various extensions and introduces results to deal with the challenge of voter dependence. Part II considers opportunities to make democracies perform better in epistemic terms by improving voter competence and diversity, by dividing epistemic labour, and by preceding voting with deliberation. In the third part, political practices are looked at through an epistemic lens, focusing on the influence of tradition, following opinion leaders or cues, and on settings in which the electorate falls into diverging factions. Part IV analyses the implications for the structures of government. While arguing against the case for epistocracy, the use of deliberation and expert advice in representative democracy can lead to improved truth-tracking, provided epistemic bottlenecks are avoided. The final part summarizes the results and explores how epistemic democracy might be undermined, using as case studies the Trump and Brexit campaigns.

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