Journal articles on the topic 'Efficient contract'

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1

Koeppl, Thorsten, Cyril Monnet, and Erwan Quintin. "Efficient contract enforcement." Economic Theory 55, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 161–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0745-3.

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2

Lyons, B. "Empirical relevance of efficient contract theory: inter-firm contracts." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 12, no. 4 (December 1, 1996): 27–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/12.4.27.

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3

Seligman, Matthew. "Moral Diversity and Efficient Breach." Michigan Law Review, no. 117.5 (2019): 885. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.117.5.moral.

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Most people think it is morally wrong to breach a contract. But sophisticated commercial parties, like large corporations, have no objection to breaching contracts and paying the price in damages when doing so is in their self-interest. The literature has ignored the profound legal, economic, and normative implications of that asymmetry between individuals’ and firms’ approaches to breach. To individuals, a contract is a promise that cannot be broken regardless of the financial stakes. For example, millions of homeowners refused to breach their mortgage contracts in the aftermath of the housing crisis even though doing so could have saved them tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars. Their moral beliefs led homeowners to forgo opportunities for efficient breach that firms would have seized, thus exacerbating al-ready swelling wealth inequalities. This Article explains this phenomenon, identifies its consequences and examines strategies to address it. Neither ex post judicial interventions (such as adjusting the remedies for breach) nor traditional ex ante regulatory interventions (such as disclosure requirements) will effectively address the problem. Instead, the most promising approach is a novel solution based on the framework of choice architecture: requiring contracts to include an express term creating an option to exit the contract and pay a fee equivalent to expectation damages. An express exit term elevates an implicit legal option into an explicit contractual option, reframing the moral choice so individuals would perceive exiting the contract as a morally permissible performance of their promise rather than a morally forbidden breaking of it. The presence of that exit term thereby aligns individuals’ perceptions of their moral obligations under the contract with sophisticated firms’ approaches to breach. The Article concludes with new empirical evidence that demonstrates the practical impact of an exit clause. It presents the results of two experimental studies I performed that demonstrate the effectiveness of a mandatory exit clause in reducing the effects of the asymmetry between individuals and firms. Those results show that exit clauses could have substantial practical implications for the regulation of contracts in contexts like consumer and mortgage contracts.
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4

Hueth, B. "Estimation of an efficient tomato contract." European Review of Agriculture Economics 29, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 237–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/eurrag/29.2.237.

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Wang, Yan, Jixin Li, Wansheng Liu, and Aiping Tan. "Efficient Concurrent Execution of Smart Contracts in Blockchain Sharding." Security and Communication Networks 2021 (February 18, 2021): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6688168.

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Throughput performance is a critical issue in blockchain technology, especially in blockchain sharding systems. Although sharding proposals can improve transaction throughput by parallel processing, the essence of each shard is still a small blockchain. Using serial execution of smart contract transactions, performance has not significantly improved, and there is still room for improvement. A smart contract concurrent execution strategy based on concurrency degree optimization is proposed for performance optimization within a single shard. This strategy is applied to each shard. First, it characterizes the conflicting contract feature information by executing a smart contract, analyzing the factors that affect the concurrent execution of the smart contracts, and clustering the contract transaction. Second, in shards with high transaction frequency, considering the execution time, conflict rate, and available resources of contract transactions, finding a serializable schedule of contract transactions by redundant computation and a Variable Shadow Speculative Concurrency Control (SCC-VS) algorithm for smart contract scheduling is proposed. Finally, experimental results show that the strategy increases the concurrency of smart contract execution by 39% on average and the transaction throughput of the whole system by 21% on average.
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Urcola, Hernán A., and Scott H. Irwin. "Hog Options: Contract Redesign and Market Efficiency." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 42, no. 4 (November 2010): 773–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800003953.

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This article tests the efficiency of the hog options market and assesses the impact of the 1996 contract redesign on efficiency. We find that the hog options market is efficient, but some options yielded excess returns during the live hogs period but not during the lean hogs period. Our findings indicate that the hog options market is efficient and is consistent with the new contract improving the efficiency of the market. However, other market conditions such as lower transaction costs during the lean hogs period can also contribute to reduce expected option returns during the latter period.
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Bac, Mehmet, and Serife Genc. "The French first employment contract: efficient screening device or Kleenex contract?" Journal of Economics 98, no. 1 (June 17, 2009): 77–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-009-0080-0.

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8

Zimunya, Kennedy Tapiwa, and Lighton Dube. "Technical Efficiency of Broiler Contract Growers in Chegutu District of Zimbabwe: A Stochastic Frontier Analysis." Scholars Journal of Agriculture and Veterinary Sciences 8, no. 9 (October 27, 2021): 95–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.36347/sjavs.2021.v08i09.003.

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Zimbabwe has witnessed a steady growth in broiler contract farming post the land reform programme which has brought in new players for which little is known about their level of productivity when compared to traditional commercial broiler producers. The purpose of this study was to determine the technical efficiency of broiler contract growers in Chegutu district of Zimbabwe. Specific objectives for the study were to establish socio-economic characteristics of boiler contract growers, estimate their technical efficiency and establish the determinants of technical efficiency. A population of 54 growers under one contract farming arrangement was studied. Cross sectional data was collected using a structured questionnaire and the stochastic frontier analysis was used to analyse the technical efficiencies and the determinants of technical efficiency. Broiler contract farming is dominated by male growers who constitute 72% of the contracted farmers. Significant factors influencing output were found to be batch size, feed quantity and transport cost. The broiler contract growers were found to be highly efficient with a mean technical efficiency of 97.1% ranging from 88.9%-99.6%. Grower residence on the farm and grower management of daily operations were found to significantly reduce technical inefficiency while technical inefficiency increases with grower age and key employee experience. The study recommends that there is need to expand broiler contract farming as it is highly efficient. The government must also put in place measures that encourage young smallholder farmers to venture into broiler contract farming as they are more efficient when compared to older farmers. Measures should also be put in place to encourage more female farmers to venture into broiler contract farming.
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Moxey, Andrew, Ben White, and Adam Ozanne. "Efficient Contract Design for Agri-Environment Policy." Journal of Agricultural Economics 50, no. 2 (November 5, 2008): 187–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-9552.1999.tb00807.x.

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Ahn, Ah-Rim, Ta-Kwan Choi, and Eun-Taek Kang. "Proper Electricity Contract for Efficient Management of Apartment." Korea Real Estate Society 56 (June 30, 2020): 159–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.37407/kres.2020.38.2.159.

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Rohini, A., S. Selvanayaki, and M. Padma Selvi. "Contract farming-an efficient marketing method ofAilanthus excelsa." Indian Journal of Economics and Development 11, no. 4 (2015): 939. http://dx.doi.org/10.5958/2322-0430.2015.00104.3.

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Al-Tawil, Tareq. "English Contract Law and the Efficient Breach Theory." Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 22, no. 3 (June 2015): 396–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1023263x1502200305.

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13

Hasan, Haya, Esra AlHadhrami, Alia AlDhaheri, Khaled Salah, and Raja Jayaraman. "Smart contract-based approach for efficient shipment management." Computers & Industrial Engineering 136 (October 2019): 149–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2019.07.022.

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Baldick, R., and E. Kahn. "Contract paths, phase-shifters, and efficient electricity trade." IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 12, no. 2 (May 1997): 749–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/59.589670.

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15

Mitra, Arijit, and Sumit Sarkar. "Efficient Supply Chain Contracting with Loss-averse Players in Presence of Multiple Plausible Breaches." American Business Review 25, no. 2 (November 16, 2022): 270–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.37625/abr.25.2.270-292.

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The legal literature distinguishes between the liquidated damage and the penalty clauses in contracts, and holds that penalties designed for the prevention of breach are excessive compared to the liquidated damages. In an efficient supply chain contract, the penalty must satisfy the participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the signatories. Considering loss-averse players, we have calculated optimal penalties in a supply chain contract and compared those with the liquidated damages. Two possible breaches are considered – a breach in quality of the delivery and a breach in the process. In the absence of any penalty, a process breach reduces the supplier’s delivery risk and cost of delivery. Determining the parametric conditions for efficient contracts, numerically we show the effects of various variables on the zone of efficient contract. We show that the optimal penalties need not be excessive compared to the liquidated damages.
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Iyer, Rajkamal, and Antoinette Schoar. "Ex Post (In) Efficient Negotiation and Breakdown of Trade." American Economic Review 105, no. 5 (May 1, 2015): 291–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151077.

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This paper examines frictions in contract renegotiation and its implications for allocative efficiency of contracts. Using a novel audit study methodology, we find that contracting parties in general are reluctant to engage in hold up. However, many efficient renegotiations of contracts also do not happen for the fear of being seen as extracting surplus. We also find that ex ante contracts are structured to mitigate losses arising from breach risk rather than hold up. The results also highlight that role of norms of fairness and reputation concerns in sustaining transactions in settings where contracts are primarily incomplete.
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Ene, Charlotte. "Smart contracts - the new form of the legal agreements." Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence 14, no. 1 (July 1, 2020): 1206–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2020-0113.

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AbstractToday we are witnesses an explosion of online business, developed on the internet – a special environment that requires own resources and tools and it is governed by specific rules. In this context, a new type of technology has been developed – the distributed ledger system, which allowed the creation of a new form of the agreement - the smart contracts. Smart contract is the next step forward in the process of digitalized contracts, after using the PDF documents with electronic signatures, and it favors the businesses to be carried out completely automatically, without the need for human intervention, and to gain greater efficiency and reduction in costs. This paper will try to provide the answers to several questions, such as: what is a smart contract?; how smart contract will be used?; how smart contract will be enforced?; etc. Moreover, it will be emphasized the advantages of smart contract and the new developments such as “Ricardian” contracts representing more efficient and transparent agreements that can be drafted and enforced on platform. Most important issue of this paper consists in analysis of legal framework of smart contracts using the basic principles of contract law combined with blockchain regulations, taking into account changing the paradigm from “code is law” to “law is code”.
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18

Abdi, Adel, Hans Lind, and Björn Birgisson. "Designing appropriate contracts for achieving efficient winter road and railway maintenance with high performance quality." International Journal of Quality and Service Sciences 6, no. 4 (November 17, 2014): 399–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijqss-06-2014-0033.

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Purpose – For a long time, the winter maintenance of the Swedish road and railway network had been performed in-house by Swedish Transport Administration, Swedish local authorities i.e. municipalities and Stockholm public transport. During the last 15 years the winter operation and maintenance of these state infrastructures have been performed by public procurement and contracting from independent contractors, where in practice the lowest price is the dominating selection criteria. The aim of this paper is to investigate and identify how these contracts are designed and how satisfied the parties are with the contract and the quality of the performed work during the winter and point our directions for improvement. Design/methodology/approach – The study was conducted by a literature review and followed by semi-structured interviews and electronic questionnaire. Findings – The results of the study which are based on the interviews and the online questionnaire show that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the contracts among both clients and contractors. Practical implications – The article prepares a basis showing how a contract affects the quality of the performed winter road and railway maintenance services. Originality/value – The findings lead to a number of suggestions about how to improve the contracts, e.g. having a separate winter maintenance contract to increase the quality of performed winter maintenance measures, a more partnering-like structure where consultations and adjustment can be made during the contract period. A partnering structure also makes it less important to get all the details right in the contract.
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19

Guriev, Sergei, and Dmitriy Kvasov. "Contracting on Time." American Economic Review 95, no. 5 (November 1, 2005): 1369–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282805775014452.

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The paper shows how time considerations, especially those concerning contract duration, affect incomplete contract theory. Time is not only a dimension along which the relationship unfolds, but also a continuous verifiable variable that can be included in contracts. We consider a bilateral trade setting where contracting, investment, trade, and renegotiation take place in continuous time. We show that efficient investment can be induced either through a sequence of constantly renegotiated fixed-term contracts; or through a renegotiation-proof “evergreen” contract—a perpetual contract that allows unilateral termination with advance notice. We provide a detailed analysis of properties of optimal contracts.
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20

Fujita, Katsuhide, Takayuki Ito, and Mark Klein. "Efficient Issue-Grouping Approach for Multi-Issues Negotiation between Exaggerator Agents." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 25, no. 1 (August 4, 2011): 1778–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.8067.

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Most real-world negotiation involves multiple interdependent issues, which makes an agent's utility functions complex. Traditional negotiation mechanisms, which were designed for linear utilities, do not fare well in nonlinear contexts. One of the main challenges in developing effective nonlinear negotiation protocols is scalability; it can be extremely difficult to find high-quality solutions when there are many issues, due to computational intractability. One reasonable approach to reducing computational cost, while maintaining good quality outcomes, is to decompose the contract space into several largely independent sub-spaces. In this paper, we propose a method for decomposing a contract space into sub-spaces based on the agent's utility functions. A mediator finds sub-contracts in each sub-space based on votes from the agents, and combines the sub-contracts to produce the final agreement. We demonstrate, experimentally, that our protocol allows high-optimality outcomes with greater scalability than previous efforts. We also address incentive compatibility issues. Any voting scheme introduces the potential for strategic non-truthful voting by the agents, and our method is no exception. For example, one of the agents may always vote truthfully, while the other exaggerates so that its votes are always "strong." It has been shown that this biases the negotiation outcomes to favor the exaggerator, at the cost of reduced social welfare. We employ the limitation of strong votes to the method of decomposing the contract space into several largely independent sub-spaces. We investigate whether and how this approach can be applied to the method of decomposing a contract space.
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Ge, Xianyun. "Smart Payment Contract Mechanism Based on Blockchain Smart Contract Mechanism." Scientific Programming 2021 (December 2, 2021): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/3988070.

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In recent years, blockchain technology has become a hot topic in various industries. With the development and maturity of blockchain technology, it has been applied to finance, law, etc., with its advantages of decentralization, openness, information security, and concealment. The application scenarios of industry are becoming more and more abundant. Compared with the traditional TPA payment contract form, the smart contract mechanism based on blockchain technology is obviously more efficient, convenient, and safe. Against this background, we design a smart payment contract suitable for cloud storage by studying Ethereum. The relationship clause in the smart payment contract should be regulated around the contract law. The smart contract payment linkage clause can be classified into three forms, including conditional effective type, contract joint type, and contract link type, which correspond to the contract law. Therefore, the contract legal system for smart contract payment linkage clauses should follow typified thinking. Based on blockchain technology, smart contracts not only reduce the number of interactions in contract execution but also allow users to stop paying for cloud services when data is lost or damaged. The precise method is to generate each node with a private chain and place the smart contract on the private chain. With the decentralization of the blockchain private chain, the advantages of read-only data, and traceability of information, the storage of smart payment contract data is more secure. Both parties to the transaction are more trustworthy. Therefore, the proposed system has a safe and efficient smart contract payment mechanism, which brings a good user experience to users, which proves the significance and value of this research.
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Nwafor, Ndubuisi, Uju Beatrice Obuka, Morning-Glory Nwafor, and Kingsley N. Edeh. "Frustration and Remedies Under the CISG, UNIDROIT Principles and English Law: A Comparative Review." Business Law Review 40, Issue 5 (August 1, 2019): 194–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/bula2019026.

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The doctrine of frustration is one of the most efficient risk sharing mechanisms in a commercial contract under the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Principles of International Commercial Contract and the English law. This article investigates and comparatively discusses the various remedies that can apply under a frustrated contract.
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MacLeod, W. Bentley. "Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement." Journal of Economic Literature 45, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 595–628. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.3.595.

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When the quality of a good is at the discretion of the seller, how can buyers assure that the seller provides the mutually efficient level of quality? Contracts that provide a bonus to the seller if the quality is acceptable or impose a penalty on the seller if quality is unacceptable can, in theory, provide efficient incentives. But how are such contracts enforced? While the courts can be used, doing so involves high real costs. Informal enforcement, involving a loss of reputation and future access to the market for any party that defaults on a contract, may often be a better alternative. This paper explores the use of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms, provides a rationale for a variety of observed market mechanisms, and then generates a number of testable hypotheses.
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Jagannathan, Murali, and Venkata Santosh Kumar Delhi. "Perceptions of Stakeholders on the ‘Redraftability’ of Construction Contracts." IIM Kozhikode Society & Management Review 9, no. 2 (March 7, 2020): 152–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2277975219885285.

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Disputes in construction projects have become an integral part of the construction process. In addition to reducing their productivity, disputes create mistrust between the involved parties. A variety of reasons that contribute to the occurrence of disputes in construction projects have been discussed in the literature. One among them is the nature of the construction contract that exists between the parties. A review of the existing literature brings to the fore two schools of thought regarding the drafting of construction contracts. While the traditional school considers the contract as those documents that contain inherent incompleteness and hence prone to disputes, the liberal school believes that construction contracts can be drafted in an efficient manner to prevent disputes. In this exploratory research, we conducted semi-structured open-ended interviews with experts in contractual decision making and contract drafting in construction organizations to understand their perspective on contract drafting/redrafting process and to classify them under the respective school of thought. The study reveals some interesting insights about the perceptions and motivations of the contract drafters and the senior management of construction organizations in India, when it comes to drafting dispute-free equitable contract documents. We believe that the findings of our study will pave the way for further research in drafting efficient construction contracts that can be practicable and dispute-resistant in the Indian context.
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25

Collins, David. "Efficient Breach, Reliance and Contract Remedies at the WTO." Journal of World Trade 43, Issue 2 (April 1, 2009): 225–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2009010.

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Recent attempts by scholars to apply the doctrine of efficient breach to the remedial system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in order to maximize the joint welfare of trading parties suffer from two principle shortcomings – the difficulty of calibrating an appropriate remedy based on foregone trade and the reality that those truly injured by breach are the private third party exporters, not the contracting Member States. This article therefore proposes a remedy for WTO agreement violations consisting of monetary damages assessed at the reliance measure of common law contract. Breaching WTO Members will compensate exporters in the injured state in an amount commensurate with their expenditures undertaken in anticipation of liberalized trade, obviating the need for an estimated counterfactual and structuring reparation according to actual individual losses rather than on an aggregate state level. In addition to encouraging efficient breach, this method of setting damages has precedent in international law which should foster compliance, is aligned with the tort–like nature of WTO violations and serves an evidentiary purpose that is reflected in the common law’s concept of vesting of third–party rights.
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Tan, Aimin, Constantine Fanaras, and John C. Fanaras. "Efficient interactions with bioanalytical contract research organizations: inside scoop." Bioanalysis 14, no. 16 (August 2022): 1081–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.4155/bio-2022-0129.

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27

Rave, Klaus. "A contract for efficient lighting in German public buildings." Energy 18, no. 2 (February 1993): 159–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0360-5442(93)90099-y.

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28

Bolin, Kristian. "The marriage contract and efficient rules for spousal support." International Review of Law and Economics 14, no. 4 (December 1994): 493–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(94)90029-9.

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Huang, Hai Tao, Mei Xia Zhang, and Xue Ying Hu. "Modeling of Incentive Interruptible Load Contract for Practical Application." Advanced Materials Research 860-863 (December 2013): 2434–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.860-863.2434.

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Interruptible load contract is an important means of demand side management, but its existing models cant coordinate practicality with efficiency. Based on the curtailment cost function of consumers, this paper proposes an optional interruptible load contract and builds an optimal curtailment amount and compensation pricing model by introducing information display and incentive mechanism. The model can guide consumers voluntarily disclose the information on their true cost, and achieve the optimal allocation of load interruption. It is better to coordinate the relationship between utility and economic efficiency, which is more efficient than the traditional practical optional contract for interruptible load, and more practical than the theoretical model of interruptible load contract of fully nonlinear pricing. Numerical examples verify the effectiveness of the proposed model.
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Voronova, O. V., I. V. Il’in, and V. A. Sheleyko. "Developing a Contract Management System for FMCG Chain Retailing Companies in the Context of Digital Transformation." Economics and Management 27, no. 10 (November 17, 2021): 786–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.35854/1998-1627-2021-10-786-795.

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Aim. The presented study aims to develop and describe a contract management system for FMCG chain retailing companies in the context of the digital transformation of the economy.Tasks. The authors examine the specific aspects of developing a contract management system for chain retailing companies; develop a classification of contracts by sector of activity and outline the landscape of the contract management process; create and describe a system for managing contracts.Methods. The methodological basis of this study includes conceptual representations of the contract management system, which make it possible to apply a systems approach, generalization, grouping, methods of formal system representation, and socio-economic experimentation.Results. The study examines the specific aspects of developing a contract management system for chain retailing companies in the context of the digital transformation of the economy, describing the major types of contracts used by these companies. The contracts are classified by sector of activity, and the landscape of the contract management process is outlined. Its individual units correspond to the Deming cycle and represent a cyclically repeating decision-making process.Conclusions. As a result, a contract management system for chain retailing companies is proposed, and the relationship between the management subsystem and the system of requirements for the architecture of business services in the field of contract management is determined. It is shown that successful implementation of an efficient contract management system requires preliminary work to identify requirements for the architecture of business services. Taking into account these requirements in the modeling of architectural solutions and integrating them into the business architecture will ensure high-quality contract management through the optimization of the company’s resources and highly efficient regulation of the relationship between the stakeholders and counterparties of chain retailing companies.
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Haruvy, Ernan, Elena Katok, and Valery Pavlov. "Bargaining Process and Channel Efficiency." Management Science 66, no. 7 (July 2020): 2845–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3360.

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The behavioral literature has demonstrated that the format of supply chain contracts matters even when theoretically it should not and that contracts that in theory coordinate channels fail to do so in laboratory experiments. The existing body of experimental evidence uses an ultimatum bargaining protocol to test analytical models, but there is no reason to think that bargaining in supply chains is in the form of ultimatum offers. We investigate the effect of bargaining on contract performance by extending the bargaining protocol to allow the manufacturer to make concessions. We test coordinating contract with bargaining in the laboratory by comparing wholesale price and the two-part tariff contracts using two different bargaining protocols. We then develop and estimate a statistical model of behavior with bargaining and find that this model organizes our data well. Our main finding is that the contracts that we study are more efficient when participants are allowed to make concessions. The additional channel efficiency is owing to more efficient offers made by manufacturers. The higher channel efficiency primarily benefits the retailer—the weaker party. Our main contribution is the observation that, when testing analytical models of contracts in the laboratory, the way that the bargaining process is implemented, such as the ability to make concessions, has a critical effect on conclusions. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
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Mulya, Chika Afri, Cepriadi Cepriadi, and Ermi Tety. "Comparation of Broiler Chicken Farm Income Between Contracts System and Semi-Contracts System." Journal of Agribusiness and Community Empowerment 4, no. 1 (March 28, 2021): 43–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.32530/jace.v4i1.190.

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The purpose of this study is to determine the income of broiler chicken breeders in contract and semi-contract systems in Kampar Regency and analyze the comparison of broiler chicken breeder income between broiler systems and semi-contract systems in Kampar Regency. Broiler chicken business with a pattern of partnership has spread in entire of Indonesia, one of them is in Riau Province. The largest population of broiler chickens in Riau Province is in Kampar Regency. Commonly, there are two the broiler chicken farms partnership patterns in Kampar District,namely the contract system and and semi- contract system between the broiler farmer and poultry companies or poultry shop. The contract system is a binding agreements between the parties relating to the both of the input production’s price and the arvesting’s price, while the semi-contract are not bound in term of both of the input production’s price and the arvesting’s price. The objective of the study is analyzed comparison of broiler chicken farm income between contracts system and semi-contract system. The study conducted in Kampar Districtby using survey method for 40 broiler chicken farmer. The results of study shows that the average net income of the broiler farmer on the contract system is lower than the semi contrct system, which is IDR 13.910.273,61for compared to IDR 21.387.673,94. The semi contract broiler chicken farm business is more efficient (RCR=1.12) compared to the contract system (RCR=1.08).
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Vidican Auktor, Georgeta, and Markus Loewe. "Subsidy Reform and the Transformation of Social Contracts: The Cases of Egypt, Iran and Morocco." Social Sciences 11, no. 2 (February 21, 2022): 85. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci11020085.

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After independence, subsidies have been a cornerstone of the social contracts in the Middle East and North Africa. Governments spent heavily to reduce poverty and strengthen their legitimacy. Yet, subsidies became financially unsustainable and donors pressed for reforms. This article assesses reform processes in Morocco, Egypt and Iran between 2010 and 2017, thus before sanctions against Iran were further tightened and before the COVID-19 pandemic. We show that even though the three countries had similar approaches to subsidisation, they have used distinct strategies to reduce subsidies and minimise social unrest—with the effect that their respective social contracts developed differently. Morocco tried to preserve its social contract as much as possible; it removed most subsidies, explained the need for reform, engaged in societal dialogue and implemented some compensatory measures, preserving most of its prevailing social contract. Egypt, in contrast, dismantled subsidy schemes more radically, without systematic information and consultation campaigns and offered limited compensation. By using repression and a narrative of collective security, the government transformed the social contract from a provision to a protection pact. Iran replaced subsidies with a more cost-efficient and egalitarian quasi-universal cash transfer scheme, paving the way to a more inclusive social contract. We conclude that the approach that governments used to reform subsidies transformed social contracts in fundamentally different ways and we hypothesize on the degree of intentionality of these differences.
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Ravikumar, G., K. Venkatachalam, Mehedi Masud, and Mohamed Abouhawwash. "Cost Efficient Scheduling Using Smart Contract Cognizant Ethereum for IoMT." Intelligent Automation & Soft Computing 33, no. 2 (2022): 865–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.32604/iasc.2022.024278.

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35

Moy, Cameron, Phúc C. Nguyễn, Sam Tobin-Hochstadt, and David Van Horn. "Corpse reviver: sound and efficient gradual typing via contract verification." Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages 5, POPL (January 4, 2021): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3434334.

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36

Zhai, Manjie, Dezhi Han, Chin-Chen Chang, and Zhijie Sun. "A consortium blockchain-based information management system for unmanned vehicle logistics." Computer Science and Information Systems, no. 00 (2022): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/csis211220019z.

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Unmanned vehicle (UDV) delivery technology can meet the special needs of users and realize efficient and flexible distribution of logistics orders. However, there are risks of order data leakage and tampering in the intelligent logistics distribution environment. To solve this problem, this paper designs and implements a system based on the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain platform. Based on the blockchain technology, the system adopts a distributed architecture to establish a secure and trustworthy logistics data management platform to achieve the integrity and traceability of data in the logistics process. The data dual-chain storage strategy is used to ensure the efficiency of data queries. Furthermore, four smart contracts including order management contract (OMC), access control management contract (ACC), access control policy management contract (ACPC), and environmental data management contract (EDC) are designed in combination with the attribute-based access control strategy. By triggering the smart contract, the controllable access of order data can be realized. Finally, two groups of experiments are designed to test the performance of the system. Experimental results show that the proposed system can maintain high throughput in a large-scale request environment under the premise of ensuring data security.
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37

Obeidat, Yusuf Mohammed Gassim. "The Efficient Breach Theory under Jordanian Civil Law." Arab Law Quarterly 30, no. 4 (October 20, 2016): 336–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15730255-12341328.

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This study examined the ‘efficient breach’ theory and its possible application under Jordanian Civil Law. The theory says the promisor has the right to breach a contract and pay damages whenever his profit from breach exceeds his expected profits from performance. As a prerequisite for its application, the theory requires the general remedy for breach to be the payment of damages, rather than forced performance. Thus, the main area for its application is the common law system, since it favours damages as a primary remedy. This study reached the conclusion that the theory cannot work under Jordanian Civil Law, where the primary remedy for breach of contract is specific performance, that forces the promisor to complete the contract. In addition, it contradicts the good faith principle that Jordanian law is based upon, amongst other principles, and goes against the history of Jordanian legal rules.
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38

Jaffey, Peter. "Efficiency, disgorgement and reliance in contract: a comment on Campbell and Harris." Legal Studies 22, no. 4 (November 2002): 570–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2002.tb00669.x.

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In a recent article in this journal, David Campbell and Donald Harris criticise the House of Lords decision in A-G v Blake, which held that in some circumstances there can be a liability to surrender the profits of a breach of contract to the other contracting party, ie a liability for disgorgement, as it will be referred to here. The criticism invokes what is sometimes referred to as the economic theory of efficient breach, which can be expressed briefly as follows. The performance of contracts generally increases aggregate wealth – ie is efficient – because parties will contract only on terms that provide them with a benefit that exceeds their costs of performance. But sometimes the circumstances will change after contracting, such that overall wealth will be maximised if the contract is not performed as agreed. For example, the defendant contracting party may discover an opportunity that he or she can take up only by abandoning the contract, and this opportunity may generate enough money to leave a profit, even after the claimant has been compensated for breach.
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39

Zhaokai, Yan, and Kevin C. Moffitt. "Contract Analytics in Auditing." Accounting Horizons 33, no. 3 (June 1, 2019): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-52457.

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SYNOPSIS This paper proposes the Contract Analytics Framework (CAF), which provides guidance for incorporating textual analysis into audits of large numbers of contracts. Contracts are used extensively in auditing for risk assessment, analytical procedures, substantive testing, and audit review. While material contracts are carefully examined to assess financial implications, contracts perceived to be low risk are typically audited using standard sampling techniques. This proposed CAF facilitates effective and efficient audit analyses on full populations of contracts. We identify and describe six functional areas in the CAF: (1) Document Management, (2) Content Identification, (3) Cutoff Testing, (4) Record Confirmation, (5) Term Verification, and (6) Additional Audit Tasks. Based on auditing standards, we discuss the application of the CAF in the audit stages of risk assessment, substantive tests, and review. The framework is then implemented on a group of reinsurance contracts to demonstrate the feasibility of auditing full populations of contracts. JEL Classifications: M42; C88; O39.
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Zakaria, Zarabizan Bin, Syuhaida Binti Ismail, and Aminah Binti Md Yusof. "An Overview of Comparison between Construction Contracts in Malaysia: The Roles and Responsibilities of Contract Administrator in Achieving Final Account Closing Success." International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Informatics 16 (March 5, 2022): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.46300/91014.2022.16.1.

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The administration of construction contracts in Malaysia is facilitated through a standard form of contract. The application of each however depends on the type of project, mode of finance and owner of the project. International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC), Public Work Department 203A (PWD203A), Pertubuhan Akitek Malaysia (PAM) Standards form of contract are widely implemented in Malaysia. In generally, each standard form of contract aims at ensuring effective, efficient and non-disputable contract administration. Nonetheless, variations arise in certain matters. This paper appraises the differences in roles and responsibilities of contract administrator as stipulated in each forms, namely PWD203A, PAM and FIDIC via literature review on some different types of forms of contract used in Malaysia. This aim can be achieved by determining the important factors affecting final account closing success caused by contract administrator, and investigating the differences between forms of contract. The understanding of these roles and responsibilities is important at the preliminary stage especially in selecting superintending party as well as identifying the contract liability in the persuasion of the contract. This paper shows that the use of contract documents either FIDIC, PAM and PWD 203A is dependent on the project owner/employer, type of project as well as the nature of a project and financing involved. Most of the projects under the government will apply PWD203A contract document while the private sector will use PAM contract document and FIDIC contract document will be used for projects involving international contracts.
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Ochrana, František, and Kristýna Hrnčířová. "Does the Lowest Bid Price Evaluation Criterion Make for a More Efficient Public Procurement Selection Criterion? (Case of the Czech Republic)." NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 8, no. 1 (June 1, 2015): 41–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nispa-2015-0003.

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Abstract Through the institute of public procurement a considerable volume of financial resources is allocated. It is therefore in the interest of contracting entities to seek ways of how to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. Some public contract-awarding entities, along with some public-administration authorities in the Czech Republic, believe that the use of a single evaluation criterion (the lowest bid price) results in a more efficient tender for a public contract. It was found that contracting entities in the Czech Republic strongly prefer to use the lowest bid price criterion. Within the examined sample, 86.5 % of public procurements were evaluated this way. The analysis of the examined sample of public contracts proved that the choice of an evaluation criterion, even the preference of the lowest bid price criterion, does not have any obvious impact on the final cost of a public contract. The study concludes that it is inappropriate to prefer the criterion of the lowest bid price within the evaluation of public contracts that are characterised by their complexity (including public contracts for construction works and public service contracts). The findings of the Supreme Audit Office related to the inspection of public contracts indicate that when using the lowest bid price as an evaluation criterion, a public contract may indeed be tendered with the lowest bid price, but not necessarily the best offer in terms of supplied quality. It is therefore not appropriate to use the lowest bid price evaluation criterion to such an extent for the purpose of evaluating work and services. Any improvement to this situation requires a corresponding amendment to the Law on Public Contracts and mainly a radical change in the attitude of the Office for the Protection of Competition towards proposed changes, as indicated within the conclusions and recommendations proposed by this study.
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Saputri, Theodora Pritadianing. "MODIFICATION OF PUBLIC CONTRACT: BETWEEN RULE OF FAIR COMPETITION AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT PRINCIPLE." Veritas et Justitia 4, no. 2 (December 24, 2018): 333–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.25123/vej.3035.

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It is internationally accepted that public procurement procedure and public contract shall be organized in accordance with the fair competition principle and fulfil the requirement of transparency. Public procurement regulations are necessary to secure the efficient use of taxpayer resources by the government in purchasing goods, services and works from the market and to ensure fair competition among the public contract should be protected and that therefore it would be necessary to amend existing regulations which prohibit or restrict this right derived from freedom of contract. In addition, law makers should also put in place restriction with regard to corporate restructuring which main intention is to circumvent requirements of tender documents.
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43

Wang, Qinpeng, Longfei He, Daozhi Zhao, and Michele Lundy. "Diverse Schemes of Cost Pooling for Carbon- Reduction Outsourcing in Low-Carbon Supply Chains." Energies 11, no. 11 (November 1, 2018): 3013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en11113013.

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Among responses to governmental regulations for curbing carbon emissions, outsourcing carbon reduction to a specialized third-party is an important means to satisfy a variety of carbon-emission restraints. In this situation, however, designing efficient contracts for emission reducing while retaining appropriate supply-chain profit is a substantial but challenging problem. We therefore refine this from practice and consider a low-carbon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to analyze in which conditions the system should outsource its carbon reduction efforts to an external expert firm under the assumption that consumers with a sense of social responsibility prefer low carbon products. In the decarbonization expert firm embedded supply chain, we examine the respective impacts of three cost-pooling schemes for emission reduction on supply chain performances. We find that the manufacturer-undertaking contract is the worst in terms of profit and carbon reduction level among the contracts being studied, while the retailer-undertaking contract yields the best outcome in terms of the profit and performs well in carbon reduction when the contractor has cost efficiency in carbon reduction, which is even better than the joint-undertaking contract in carbon reduction when the contractor is inefficient. The study shows the diversity of contracts on outsourcing carbon reduction significantly impacts the supply chain profitability, carbon reduction efficiency and sustainability of operations.
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44

Schulte-Nölke, Hans. "No Market for ‘Lemons’: On the Reasons for a Judicial Unfairness Test for B2B Contracts." European Review of Private Law 23, Issue 2 (April 1, 2015): 195–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/erpl2015016.

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Abstract: Judicial intervention into B2B contracts should be construed as part of state infrastructure to improve business efficiency and thereby that of the market itself. The main purpose of unfair contract terms regulation should be to discharge a business from reading, analysing, or even negotiating the bulk of contract terms presented to them by other businesses. This enables businesses to prepare standard terms in advance, particularly those underlying high-volume transactions. Their customers can rest assured that such contracts would need to pass a judicial fairness test before being enforced and can therefore accept the bulk of all terms presented to them in blissful ignorance of the terms' content. However, those terms which an efficient market economy would expect businesses to read carefully and, if necessary, negotiate need not be subjected to this judicial unfairness test. Such terms exempted from the fairness test are, if transparent, those that determine the price and the main subject matter of the contract, those that any aggrieved business had actually itself supplied, and moreover, all terms in a contract of such a high value for which reasonable parties would seek legal advice and painstakingly negotiate every word. There is also no need for a judicial fairness test for those terms that have, in fact, been negotiated in detail by the parties, since the main function of the test is to compensate for the lack of negotiations. In order to free the parties in the most efficient way possible from negotiating, or even reading, all other terms, the following judicially applied unfairness test should apply. The further removed a particular non-negotiated term is from what reasonable and honest parties would have agreed in individual negotiations, the more likely it is that the individual term is unfair.
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Sen, Arijit. "Symmetry in Bargaining and Efficient Contracts under Asymmetric Information." Studies in Microeconomics 5, no. 2 (August 8, 2017): 132–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321022217713094.

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This paper shows that in a Spencian agency model, contract determination through alternating-offer bargaining can generate efficient outcomes. This result holds in parameter regimes in which the screening equilibrium (where the uninformed principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent) and the signalling equilibrium (where the informed agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the principal) both predict inefficient contracts. More generally, this paper clarifies that in negotiations under incomplete information involving interdependent values, symmetry in the bargaining protocol can limit the extent of allocation inefficiencies and can lead to ex post efficient agreements.
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46

Li, Rujia, Qin Wang, Qi Wang, David Galindo, and Mark Ryan. "SoK: TEE-Assisted Confidential Smart Contract." Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2022, no. 3 (July 2022): 711–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.56553/popets-2022-0093.

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The blockchain-based smart contract lacks privacy, since the contract state and instruction code are exposed to the public. Combining smart-contract execution with Trusted Execution Environments provides an efficient solution, called TEE-assisted smart contracts (TCSC), for protecting the confidentiality of contract states. However, the combination approaches are varied, and a systematic study is absent. Newly released systems may fail to draw upon the experience learned from existing protocols, such as repeating known design mistakes or applying TEE technology in insecure ways. In this paper, we first investigate and categorize existing systems into two types: the layer-one solution and the layer-two solution. Then, we establish an analysis framework to capture their common aspects, covering desired properties (for contract services), threat models, and security considerations (for underlying systems). Based on our taxonomy, we identify their ideal functionalities, and uncover fundamental flaws and challenges in each specification’s design. We believe that this work would provide a guide for the development of TEE-assisted smart contracts, as well as a framework to evaluate future TCSC systems.
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47

Ohlendorf, Susanne. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment." American Economic Review 99, no. 4 (August 1, 2009): 1608–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1608.

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This paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship-specific investment by the buyer and the seller. As demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), no contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a fixed per-unit price can induce efficient investment if marginal cost is constant and deterministic. We show that this result does not extend to more general payoff functions. If both parties face the risk of breaching, the first best becomes attainable with a simple price-quantity contract. (JEL D86, K12)
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48

Battaglini, Marco. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers." American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (May 1, 2005): 637–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201369.

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To study how a firm can capitalize on a long-term customer relationship, we characterize the optimal contract between a monopolist and a consumer whose preferences follow a Markov process. The optimal contract is nonstationary and has infinite memory, but is described by a simple state variable. Under general conditions, supply converges to the efficient level for any degree of persistence of the types and along any history, though convergence is history-dependent. In contrast, as with constant types, the optimal contract can be renegotiation-proof, even with highly persistent types. These properties provide insights into the optimal ownership structure of the production technology.
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Chang, Chul-Ki. "Efficient Application of Multi-Trade Contract Method to Public Construction Project." Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 14, no. 2 (March 31, 2013): 35–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.6106/kjcem.2013.14.2.035.

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50

Qasim, Awais, Areeba Bader, and Adeel Munawar. "Efficient Contract-Net Protocol for Formal Modeling of Multi-Agent Systems." International Journal of Computing and Digital Systems 10, no. 1 (November 25, 2021): 805–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.12785/ijcds/100174.

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