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1

Todorova, Zdravka K. Lee Frederic S. "Reconsidering households in economic theory." Diss., UMK access, 2007.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Dept. of Economics. University of Missouri--Kansas City, 2007.
"A dissertation in economics and social science consortium." Advisor: Frederic S. Lee. Typescript. Vita. Title from "catalog record" of the print edition Description based on contents viewed Dec. 19, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 216-240). Online version of the print edition.
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2

Muthoo, Abhinay. "Bargaining theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.257214.

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3

Ribó, Ausias. "Essays in Economic Theory." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/404912.

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This thesis is composed of 3 independent essays on economic theory. Each essay is meant to be read separately, including footnotes and appendices. In particular, essays 2 and 3 include specific bibliography. The general bibliography is included at the end of the thesis. The first essay reviews some well known conceptual and empirical problems that appear when economic theorists deal with preferences and choice theory, in general. While assessing those problems, the essay lays the ground for a detailed discussion of the possibility of preference learning, formation and change. The essay concludes proposing a theoretical framework to study these phenomena. The second essay, although independent from the first, is also devoted to the issue of preference change. In particular, it studies the possibility that cultural preferences evolve as a result of the combination of technological innovation and cultural transmission mechanisms. At the same time, it allows for the possibility that those cultural preferences determine the short term outcome of economic variables. In addition, it builds a framework where the combination of technological innovation, cultural transmission and economic structure lead to a process of endogenous preference heterogeneity and clustering. Hence it provides a model to understand how culture and the economic structure interact and coevolve. The third essay presents some theoretical problems that arise when using the concept of a matching function as a modelling device for the labor market. In particular, necessary conditions for the ratio of the number of matches per job searcher to be interpreted as the average job finding probability are established. References [Abel, 1990] Abel, A. B. (1990). Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the joneses. The American Economic Review, pages 38-42. [Afriat, 1967] Afriat, S. (1967). The construction of utility functions from expenditure data. International Economic Review, 8(1):67-77. [Al-Najjar, 1993] Al-Najjar, N. (1993). Non-transitive smooth preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 60(1):14 -41. [[Aragones et al., 2005] Aragones, E., Gilboa, I., Postlewaite, A., and Schmeidler, D. (2005). Fact-free learning. The American Economic Review, 95(5):1355- 1368. [Ariely et al., 2003] Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., and Prelec, D. (2003). coherent arbitrariness: Stable demand curves without stable preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):73-106. [Arrow, 1986] Arrow, K. (1986). Rationality of self and others in an economic system. Journal of Business, pages 385-399. [Arrow and Hahn, 1971] Arrow, K. and Hahn, F. (1971). General competitive analysis. Holden-Day San Francisco.165 [Arrow, 1959] Arrow, K. J. (1959). Rational choice functions and orderings. Economica, 26(102):121-127. [Aumann, 1962] Aumann, R. (1962). Utility theory without the completeness axiom. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 445-462. [Balasko, 2003] Balasko, Y. (2003). Economies with price-dependent preferences. Journal of economic theory, 109(2):333-359. [Balzer, 1982] Balzer, W. (1982). Empirical claims in exchange economics. In Philosophy of Economics, pages 16-40. Springer. [Becker, 1962] Becker, G. (1962). Irrational behavior and economic theory. The Journal of Political Economy, pages 1-13. [Becker, 1978] Becker, G. S. (1978). The economic approach to human behavior. University of Chicago press. [Berry and Pakes, 2007a] Berry, S. and Pakes, A. (2007a). The pure characteristics demand model. International Economic Review, 48(4):1193-1225. [Berry and Pakes, 2007b] Berry, S. and Pakes, A. (2007b). The pure characteristics demand model*. International Economic Review, 48(4):1193-1225. [Bewley, 1986] Bewley, T. (1986). Knightian uncertainty theory: part i. Yale University. [Blaug, 1992] Blaug, M. (1992). The methodology of economics: Or, how economists explain. Cambridge University Press. [Boudon, 1998] Boudon, R. (1998). Social mechanisms without black boxes. Social mechanisms: An analytical approach to social theory, 172. [Brown and Matzkin, 1996] Brown, D. and Matzkin, R. (1996). Testable restrictions on the equilibrium manifold. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1249-1262. [Bunge, 1993] Bunge, M. (1993). Realism and antirealism in social science. Theory and Decision, 35(3):207-235. [Caldwell, 1984] Caldwell, B. J. (1984). Some problems with falsificationism in economics. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 14(4):489-495. [Chapman and Johnson, 1999] Chapman, G. B. and Johnson, E. J. (1999). Anchoring, activation, and the construction of values. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79(2):115 -153. [Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980] Deaton, A. and Muellbauer, J. (1980). An almost ideal demand system. The American economic review, pages 312-326.
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4

Weinstein, Jonathan. "Essays on economic theory." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33830.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2005.
Includes bibliographical references.
These four essays concern the theory of games and its application to economic theory. The first two, closely linked, chapters are an investigation into the foundational question of the sensitivity of the predictions of game theory to higher-order beliefs. Impact of Higher-Order Uncertainty with Muhamet Yildiz In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very large, implying that present economic theories may be misleading as these theories assume common knowledge of the type structure after specifying the first or the second orders of beliefs. Focusing on normal-form games in which the players' strategy spaces are compact metric spaces, we show that our key condition, called "global stability under uncertainty," implies a variety of results to the effect that the impact of higher-order uncertainty is small. Our central result states that, under global stability, the maximum change in equilibrium strategies due to changes in players' beliefs at orders higher than k is exponentially decreasing in k. Therefore, given any need for precision, we can approximate equilibrium strategies by specifying only finitely many orders of beliefs. Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium with Muhamet Yildiz Present economic theories make a common-knowledge assumption that implies that the first or second-order beliefs determine all higher-order beliefs.
(cont.) We analyze the role of such a closing assumption at any finite order by instead allowing higher orders to vary arbitrarily. Assuming that the space of underlying uncertainty is sufficiently rich, we show that, under an arbitrary fixed equilibrium, the resulting set of possible outcomes must include all outcomes that survive iterated elimination of strategies that are never a strict best reply. For many games, this implies that, unless the game is dominance-solvable, every equilibrium will be highly sensitive to higher-order beliefs, and thus economic theories based on such equilibria may be misleading. Moreover, every equilibrium is discontinuous at each type for which two or more actions survive our elimination process. Conversely, the resulting set of possible outcomes must be contained in rationalizable strategy profiles. This yields a precise characterization in generic instances. Price Dispersion and Loss Leaders Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is inconsistent with the standard model of price competition among identical firms, which predicts that all prices will be driven down to cost. One common explanation for such dispersion is the use of a loss-leader strategy, in which a firm prices one good below cost in order to attract a higher customer volume for profitable goods.
(cont.) By assuming high transportation costs which indeed force each consumer to buy all desired goods at a single firm, we create the possibility of an effective loss-leader strategy. We find, however, that such a strategy cannot be effective in equilibrium, so that additional assumptions limiting price search or rationality must be introduced to explain price dispersion or loss leaders. Two Notes on the Blotto Game We exhibit a new equilibrium of the classic Blotto game in which players allocate one unit of resources among three coordinates and try to defeat their opponent in two out of three. It is well known that a mixed strategy will be an equilibrium strategy if the marginal distribution on each coordinate is U [0, 2]. All known examples of such distributions have two-dimensional support. Here we exhibit a distribution which has one-dimensional support and is simpler to describe than previous examples. The construction generalizes to give one-dimensional distributions with the same property in higher-dimensional simplexes as well. As our second note, we give some results on the equilibrium payoffs when the game is modified so that one player has greater available resources. Our results suggest a criterion for equilibrium selection in the original symmetric game, in terms of robustness with respect to a small asymmetry in resources.
by Jonathan Weinstein.
Ph.D.
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5

Baetz, Oliver. "Essays in economic theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648139.

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6

Kuzmics, Christoph Alexander. "Essays on economic theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.615814.

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7

Yi, Hyun Chang. "Essays in economic theory." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15246.

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This dissertation consists of three research papers on cheap talk game and satisficing behaviour. The first chapter examines the potential for communication via cheap talk between an expert and a decision maker whose type (preferences) is uncertain. The expert privately observes states for each type of the decision maker and wants to persuade the decision maker to choose an action in his favour by informing her of the states. The decision maker privately observes her type and chooses an action. An optimal action for the decision maker depends upon both her type and type-specific states. In equilibrium the expert can always inform the decision maker in the form of comparative statements and the decision maker also can partially reveal her type to the expert or public. The second and third chapters build a dynamic model of satisficing behaviour in which an agent’s “expected” payoff is explicitly introduced, where this expectation is adaptively formed. If the agent receives a payoff above her satisficing level she continues with the current action, updating her valuation of the action. If she receives a payoff below her satisficing level and her valuation falls below her satisficing level she updates both her action and satisficing level. In the second chapter, we find that in the long run, all players satisfice. In individual decision problems, satisficing behaviour results in cautious, maximin choice and in normal form games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, they in the long run play either cooperative or defective outcomes conditional on past plays. In coordination games like the Battle of the Sexes, Choosing Sides and Common Interest, they in the long run coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes. In the third chapter, we find that satisficing players in the long run play subgame dominant paths, which is a refinement of subgame perfection, and identify conditions with which they ‘always cooperate’ or ‘fairly coordinate’ in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and Battle of the Sexes games, respectively, and truthfully communicate in sender-receiver games. Proofs and simulations are provided in appendices.
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8

Rashid, M. "Essays in economic theory." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2015. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1425119/.

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This thesis has two major themes. The first theme (Chapters 1 – 3) focuses on search theory and industrial organisation. I build a novel model of costly search where firms choose price distributions, draws are then taken from these distributions and the collection of draws is presented to consumers. Consumers are aware of the set of prices that firms charge but do not know which price is associated with which firm. As they search, they learn and update their beliefs about the prices offered by the other firms. I extend the model by introducing a price comparison website as well as informed and uninformed consumers. Equilibrium in the model has certain desirable properties. The second theme (Chapters 4 – 6) focuses on game theory, and in particular, games with forgetful players. One of the 'conclusions' of the Games and Economics Behaviour collection of papers on imperfect recall is that there is no one way to model imperfect recall in games; in particular, modelling issues which are of little or no consequence in games of perfect recall suddenly become substantive in games of imperfect recall. Furthermore, there is little consensus on how to proceed. I introduce a class of decision problems where, if we think of forgetting in a novel but intuitive way, we can transform the game into a game of perfect recall – thus resolving the modelling ambiguities. I extend the model to show that an agent with self-control problems may in certain cases be better off having a bad memory. I consider whether a firm can offer different contracts to discriminate between different types of consumer with varying degrees of memory and sophistication. Finally, I consider the consumption behaviour of a forgetful consumer.
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9

He, Wei. "Essays in economic theory." Diss., University of Iowa, 2016. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098.

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This thesis is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 considers the existence of equilibria in games with complete information, where players may have non-ordered and discontinuous preferences. Chapter 2 studies the issues on the existence of pure and behavioral strategy equilibria in games with incomplete information and discontinuous payoffs. We consider the standard setting with Bayesian preferences as well as the case in which players may face ambiguity. Chapter 3 extends the classical results on the Walras-core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economy, where agents maximize maximin expected utilities (MEU). These results are based on the papers He and Yannelis (2014, 2015a,b,c, 2016a,b). In the first chapter, we propose the condition of "continuous inclusion property" to handle the difficulty of discontinuous payoffs in various general equilibrium and game theory models. Such discontinuities arise naturally in economic situations, including auction, price competition of firms and also patent races. Based on the continuous inclusion property, we establish the equilibrium existence result in a very general framework with discontinuous payoffs. On one hand, this condition is sufficiently general from the methodological point of view, as it unifies almost all special conditions proposed in the literature. On the other hand, our condition is also potentially useful from the realistic point of view, as it could be applied to deal with many economic models which cannot be studied before because of the presence of the discontinuity. In the second chapter, I study the existence problem of pure and behavioral strategy equilibria in discontinuous games with incomplete information. The framework of games with incomplete information is standard as in the literature, except for that we allow players' payoffs to be discontinuous. We illustrate by examples that the Bayesian equilibria may not exist in such games and the previous results are not applicable to handle this problem. We propose some general conditions to retain the existence of both pure strategy and behavioral strategy Bayesian equilibrium, and show that our condition is tight. In addition, we study the equilibrium existence problem in discontinuous games under incomplete information and ambiguity, and show that the maximin framework solves the equilibrium existence issue without introducing any additional condition. In the last chapter, I study a general equilibrium model with incomplete information by adopting the maximin expected utilities. The model is powerful enough to describe the behaviors of risk averse agents that cannot be explained by the standard assumption of subjective expected utilities. I use this new formulation to extend many classical results in general equilibrium theory by incorporating ambiguity into the model. In addition, the desirable incentive compatibility property is shown in our model with maximin expected utilities, while this property will typically fail in the traditional setup. Specifically, the existence results are shown for various equilibrium notions in a general equilibrium model, and the incentives can be guaranteed when all agents use the maximin expected utilities.
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10

Dai, Tianjiao Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Essays on economic theory." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122240.

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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2019
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 165-168).
The first chapter considers team incentive schemes that are robust to nonquantifiable uncertainty about the game played by the agents. A principal designs a contract for a team of agents, each taking an unobservable action that jointly determine a stochastic contractible outcome. The game is common knowledge among the agents, but the principal only knows some of the available action profiles. Realizing that the game may be bigger than he thinks, the principal evaluates contracts based on their guaranteed performance across all games consistent with his knowledge. All parties are risk neutral and the agents are protected by limited liability. A contract is said to align the agents' interests if each agent's compensation covaries positively and linearly with the other agents' compensation.
It is shown that contracts that fail to do so are dominated by those that do, both in terms of the surplus guarantee under budget balance, and in terms of the principal's profit guarantee when he is the residual claimant. It thus suffices to base compensation on a one-dimensional aggregate even if richer outcome measures are available. The best guarantee for either objective is achieved by a contract linear in the monetary value of the outcome. This provides a foundation for practices such as team-based pay and profit-sharing in partnership. The second chapter models a ride-sharing market in a traffic network with stochastic ride demands. A monopolistic ride-sharing platform in this traffic network faces a dynamic optimization problem to maximize its per period average payoff in the long run, by choosing policies of setting trip prices, matching ride requests and relocating idle drivers to meet future potential demands.
Directly solving the dynamic optimization problem for the ridesharing platform is computationally prohibitively expensive for a traffic network with reasonably large number of locations and vehicles due to its intrinsic complexity. I provide an theoretical upper bound on the performance of dynamic policies by analyzing a related deterministic problem. Based on the optimal solution to the deterministic problem, I propose implementable heuristic policies for the original stochastic problem that yield average payoffs converging to the theoretical upper bound asymptotically. I also discuss the relative value function iteration method to solve the optimization problem for small-scale markets numerically. The third chapter examines several discrete-time versions of a dynamic moral hazard in teams problem, a continuous-time model of which has been extensively studied in the previous literature.
The way to transform the continuous-time game into a discrete-time one is not unique, and different discrete-time assumptions with the same continuous-time technology limit lead to different discrete-time equilibria. Regardless of the technology assumption, I find that two-period models can give equilibrium results quite different from that in a continuous-time model: while the continuous-time model predicts existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium, its two-period versions can either have multiple symmetric equilibria or none. Also, not all equilibria in the discrete-time models share features similar to the one predicted by the continuous-time model. The subsequent study of multiple-period models with no learning sheds some light on how the equilibria evolve as the discrete-time model better approximates the continuous-time one.
by Tianjiao Dai.
Ph. D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
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11

MILASI, SANTO. "Economic theory and institutions." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata", 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2108/207958.

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12

Dodd, Nigel Bruce. "Money in social theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.239150.

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13

Ibrahimo, Muradali Valimamade. "The economics of credit markets : theory and evidence." Thesis, University of York, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.317856.

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Doutoramento em Economia.
Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in credit markets for a number of reasons: first, credit markets perform important functions in any developed monetary economy, such as the sharing of risk between different individuals, the allocation of financial resources and the transmission of monetary policies; second. several influential theoretical studies have, by taking into consideration the idea of incomplete information, concluded that they operate in a very distinct way compared to most other markets, with equilibria in most cases exhibiting inefficiency; third, the new empirical research has provided support for the importance of the role played by the financial system in the determination of the real economic activity. This thesis examines the relevant works on credit, evaluates the explanatory power of the theories hitherto advanced and, more importantly, offers new theoretical and empirical studies which provide further insights into the subject. Part 1 is devoted to the microeconomic studies on credit with incomplete information. Assuming that borrowers are better informed than lenders about the quality of their investment projects, it derives several theoretical propositions which add to the understanding of credit market functioning. Moreover, it provides empirical evidence on the characteristics of random distributions of rates of return associated with industrial corporations. Part 2 is concerned with macroeconomic studies on credit in the context of the conventional ad-hoc approach with symmetric information. It shows how an explicit credit market may be incorporated in a standard macroeconomic model augmented with wealth effects and government budget constraint in order to allow the examination of issues, such as credit market shocks, that would not otherwise be possible. The thesis' mode of exposition is eclectic, using alternatively 'literary' reasoning, geometrical demonstrations and analytical proofs depending on the nature of the topics under consideration.
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14

Bibow, Jörg. "Essays on liquidity preference theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.388765.

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15

Sahm, Marco. "Essays in Public Economic Theory." Diss., lmu, 2006. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-56335.

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16

Moreno, de Barreda Ines. "Essays in applied economic theory." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2011. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/158/.

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This thesis consists of three essays, all of which use the tools of economic theory to analyze specific situations in which multiple strategic agents interact with each other. The first chapter studies the strategic transmission of information between an informed expert and a decision maker when the latter has access to imperfect private information relevant to the decision. The main insight of the paper is that the access to private information of the decision maker hampers the incentives of the expert to communicate. Surprisingly, in a wide range of environments, the decision maker's information cannot make up for the loss of communication and the welfare of both agents diminishes. The second chapter presents a model of electoral competition between an in- cumbent and a challenger in which the voters receive more information about the quality of the incumbent. If the incumbent can manipulate the information received by the voters through costly effort, the model predicts an incumbency advantage, even though the two candidates are drawn from identical symmetric distributions, and the voters have rational expectations. It is also shown that a supermajority re-election rule improves welfare, mainly through discouraging low-quality politicians from manipulating the information. Finally the third chapter uses a mechanism design approach to characterize the class of social choice functions which cannot be profitably manipulated, when the individuals have symmetric single-peaked preferences. Our result allows for the design of social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.
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17

Lombardi, Michele. "Essays on behavioural economic theory." Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2007. http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/1537.

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The chapters of this work lie at the intersection between classical choice theory and experimental data on decision making. In chapter 21 study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the choice set coincides with the uncovered set of T restricted to that feasible set. This notion of 'maximization' may offer testable restrictions on observable choice behavior. In chapter 3 Mariotti and I give a group revealed preference interpretation to the concept of uncovered set, and we provide a characterization of uncovered bargaining solutions of a Pareto-consistent tournament. In chapter 41 study the rationalizability of reason-based choice correspondences axiomatically. A reason-based choice correspondence rationalizes choice behaviour in terms of a two stage choice procedure. Given a feasible set S, the individual eliminates in the first step all of the dominated alternatives according to her fixed (not necessarily complete) strict preference relation. In the second step, she first constructs for each maximal alternative identified in the first step its lower contour set, and then she eliminates from the maximal set all of those alternatives so that the following justification holds: there exists another maximal alternative whose lower contour set strictly contains that of another maximal alternative. This procedural model captures the basic idea behind the experimental finding known as "attraction effect". Finally, in chapter 51 build a connection between the behavioral property expressed by the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority and a new weak notion of rationality. This notion is weaker than that characterized by the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP).
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18

Pires, Cesaltina Maria Pacheco. "Three essays in economic theory." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11936.

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19

Vela, Ramón G. (Ramón Geraldo Vela Córdova) 1969. "A theory of economic democracy." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8958.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2000.
"June 2000."
Includes bibliographical references (p. 189-194).
What is economic democracy? What, if anything, justifies it? This thesis argues that liberal theories of justice are objectionable insofar as they emphasize the distribution of resources, having little to say about how production is governed. The commitments central to liberal democracy call for some degree of workplace democracy as well as distributive justice. Many liberals begin from a set of fundamental values, derive principles of distribution, and propose to organize economic institutions so as to realize these principles. I call this the 'Fabian logic of contemporary liberalism'. And I argue that it cannot be sustained. The values and ideas central to liberal democracy have implications for economic governance that are independent of distributive justice. They call for some degree of workplace democracy. The thesis defends this claim against three objections: that workplace democracy would be unnecessary in a just society; that there are non-employees -- e.g., community residents -- with a claim to govern the firm; and that workplace democracy is incompatible with liberal neutrality. The liberal conception of democracy underlying this argument has implications beyond the employment relationship. It suggests, most generally, that liberalism has a stronger connection to democratic institutions than its proponents, and many of its critics, have recognized.
by Ramón G. Vela.
Ph.D.
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20

Komai, Mana. "An Economic Theory of Leadership." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11194.

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This dissertation develops an economic theory of leadership based on assignment of information. Common theories assume that organizations exist to reduce transaction costs by replacing imperfect markets with incomplete long term contracts that give managers the power to command subordinates. This view reverses all of these premises: I study an organization in which it is costless to transmit and process information, contracts exist in the backgound if at all, and agents are not bound to the organization. The organization is held together by economies of scale in generating information and by the advantages of controlling access to that information. The minimalist model of organizations produces a minimalist theory of leadership: leaders have no special talent but are leaders simply because they are given exclusive access to certain information. A single leader induces a first best outcome if his incentives are aligned with his subordinates. If a single leader is not credible, then diluting the power of leadership by appointing multiple informed leaders can ensure credibility and improve e.ciency but can not produce the first best. If agents are di.erentiated by their costs of cooperation the most cooperative player is not necessarily the best leader. In this scenario, the ability of the group to sustain fully cooperative outcomes may depend on the player with the least propensity to cooperate. Therefore, to maximize e.ciency (i.e., to maximize the range of circumstances in which e.cient cooperation is sustainable), the group should sometimes promote less cooperative people. Here, "less cooperative" means lazy or busy rather than disagreeable. This dissertation also applies the idea of leadership (endorsement) to voluntary provision of public goods. I show that when the leader is unable to fully reveal his information expected contributions, ex-ante, are unambigeously higher in the leader-follower setting. That is partial revelation of information induces more contribution compared to full revelation or complete information. I also show that if the utility functions are linear then ex-ante welfare is unambigeously higher in the presence of an informed endorser.
Ph. D.
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21

Liang, Annie. "Economic Theory and Statistical Learning." Thesis, Harvard University, 2016. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493561.

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This dissertation presents three independent essays in microeconomic theory. Chapter 1 suggests an alternative to the common prior assumption, in which agents form beliefs by learning from data, possibly interpreting the data in different ways. In the limit as agents observe increasing quantities of data, the model returns strict solutions of a limiting complete information game, but predictions may diverge substantially for small quantities of data. Chapter 2 (with Jon Kleinberg and Sendhil Mullainathan) proposes use of machine learning algorithms to construct benchmarks for “achievable" predictive accuracy. The paper illustrates this approach for the problem of predicting human-generated random sequences. We find that leading models explain approximately 10-15% of predictable variation in the problem. Chapter 3 considers the problem of how to interpret inconsistent choice data, when the observed departures from the standard model (perfect maximization of a single preference) may emerge either from context-dependencies in preference or from stochastic choice error. I show that if preferences are “simple" in the sense that they consist only of a small number of context-dependencies, then the analyst can use a proposed optimization problem to recover the true number of underlying context-dependent preferences.
Economics
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22

Mulberg, Jonathan David. "Social limits to economic theory." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1991. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/109304/.

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This dissertation effects a complete re-orientation of economic theory. It shows how the economic cannot be analysed separately from the political and the social, and lays the foundation for an integrated political economy. The work examines the philosophical difficulties faced by economists, and re-draws the history of economic thought as a response to methodological dilemmas. The traditional History of Economics textbooks re-write the history in terms of the contemporary paradigm. This dissertation, by contrast, shows how the philosophical debates have shaped the trajectory of economics, and how the orientations of the schools undergo major changes so as to attempt to deal with the fundamental dilemmas of a 'policy science’. It brings out the 'hidden history’ of economics, and shows both how laissez-faire can only be defended by dropping any notion of economic 'science', and how economic theory has an implied political theory. It then considers the debate over political economic theory and the consequences for economic organisation and for environmental disruption.
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23

Tanner, Noam. "Essays in Economic Decision Making." Thesis, Yale University, 2015. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3663658.

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My dissertation studies multiple settings of economic decision making- decision making in a group, decision making by an uninformed principal, and the decision making properties of agents with differing degrees of cognitive reflection.

In the first essay, I study a problem of voting with information acquisition. I study information control in settings where such voters acquire information, but may lack control over whether it is revealed to other voters. Therefore, voters must balance their ability to inform themselves with their ability to reveal information and hence influence the actions of others. I examine and compare two different settings: private information acquisition and public information acquisition. Public acquisition improves upon private acquisition in two notable aspects. First, public acquisition eliminates low-payoff equilibria under private acquisition. Second, payoffs under public acquisition may provide all players with a higher payoff than any equilibrium payoff under private acquisition. Finally, I provide conditions when a unanimous voting rule outperforms majority rule.

In the second essay, I study a principal-agent relationship without monetary transfers. The principal is uncertain of the agent's preferences. Before observing the state of nature, agents much choose from a menu of delegation sets, where each delegation set is a set of actions. The defining property of a delegation set is that once an agent selects a delegation set he may only take actions within that set. I show that a pooling menu, a menu consisting of a single, interval (convex) delegation set, is optimal for any distribution over agent preferences. The proof used in this paper provides new intuition for the optimality of interval delegation: the payoff distributions generated by non-convex menus are mean-preserving spreads of those generated by convex menus I also provide comparative statics of the optimal contract.

In the final essay, I examine the relationship between cognitive reflection and time preferences. Using survey data, I find a positive relationship between cognitive reflection scores and consistency with different models of intertemporal choice.

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Anwar, Ahmed Waqar. "Multiple equilibria in theory and practice." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.297967.

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Patel, Mrudula A. "Intertemporal consumer theory with borrowing constraints." Thesis, University of Essex, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.238399.

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Georgoutsos, D. "Essays in applied factor demand theory." Thesis, University of Essex, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.235460.

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27

Veleanu, Veronica. "Credit spreads and economic activity in eight European economies." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2013. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29472/.

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In this thesis we examine the relationship between corporate bond spreads and economic activity in eight European countries using data on 500 corporate bonds between July 1994 and May 2011 for the United Kingdom and between October 2001 and May 2011 for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain. We construct a unique dataset of corporate bond spreads from bond-level data employing a similar methodology to Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a) in the United States. Thus, we ensure that our credit spread measure is not distorted by illiquidity, embedded options, or mismatched maturities and coupon schedules between the two bond instruments being compared. We evaluate the importance of the country-level corporate bond spread index in .predicting the future growth in real activity at the individual country level for various measures of economic activity (such as industrial production, unemployment available at monthly frequency; and employment and real GOP available at quarterly frequency). We find that the credit spread index is a consistent predictor of real activity even when we include measures of monetary policy tightness (such as the term spread and the real interest rate), other leading indicator variables (economic sentiment and consumer confidence) and factors extracted from a large macro dataset. Our results are consistent at different forecasting horizons and are robust to different measures of the credit spread index. We then decompose the credit spread by purging it of expected default, tax and liquidity premia in an attempt to determine what component accounts for its information Content. We find that the excess bond premium, an indicator of financial market tightness, is the major driving source of the spread's predictive content. When)He compare the predictive ability of the credit spread and the excess bond premium across individual countries within the Euro area and Outside the Euro area, we find that mainly the core European countries have similar predictive ability, while the other countries in the Euro area and the UK are more heterogeneous.
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Modica, Salvatore. "Capital and inventory investment : essays in stochastic economic theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.238430.

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29

Parker, Simon C. "An intergenerational theory of the consumption function." Thesis, Durham University, 1991. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6034/.

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This thesis presents a theory of the consumption function called the 'Inter- Generational Hypothesis' (IGH). The theory starts from the premise that individuals derive utility not only from their own consumption, but also from the welfare of their offspring. Individuals are supposed to maximise an intergenerationally altruistic utility function subject to a lifetime budget constraint and so derive their optimal consumption and bequest plans. From these plans, it is possible to construct an individual's consumption function. This contains earnings and inheritance terms, and is non-linear in earnings; this is consistently aggregated over all living individuals to yield the aggregate IGH consumption function. A feature of this function is the rich set of intergenerational information hypotheses it is able to encompass; there are also several implications with respect to earnings redistribution policy. The IGH function is estimated using 23 years of post-war UK data, and tested against rival consumption models, including Hall's (1978) REPIH. The principal finding is that the data do not appear to be consistent with either model in their pure form; however, they support a hybrid consumption function where a proportion of the population behave according to the altruistic IGH, and where the rest behave according to the 'selfish' REPIH. An additional finding, necessarily tentative given the imperfections of the distributional data, is a failure to detect significant non-linearity in the aggregate consumption function. This result casts doubt on the usefulness of policies designed to redistribute incomes in order to affect aggregate consumption.
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Sun, Puyang. "Economic development with finance : studies of emerging economies." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2009. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/495/.

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This thesis is composed of four original working chapters in terms of four researching purposes to show the macroeconomic development with finance, as well as to consider the comparative proxies of investment and trading sectors in emerging economies. These four original working chapters can be briefly presented as: Theoretical Models, Structural Breaks for NICs of Asia, Causations in Steady State and Dynamic Process in NICs of Asia, and Studies with Countries’ Sizes in BICS1. For different groups of countries in the developing world, it is necessary to mention a fact for empirical studies: that the methodology for estimations should be different, due to many realistic situations and some important ideas from development economists. In the theoretical section, some mathematical models are developed to look at the relationship and effects of finance and development, each of which highlights one special aspect of the interconnections in terms of taxonomy idea. The first empirical part of this thesis investigates the different types of emerging economies of New Industrialized Countries (NICs) in Asia, typically Singapore, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, and various stages they pass tough in terms of their economic development and financial growth 1960s to 2007. Another different empirical study concentrates on the size effects on the impacts of financial systems to economic development, which involves specific estimations of four specific large emerging economies of Brazil, China, India and South Africa (BICS) with quarterly data from 1995 to 2007. Specially, the study of BICS means the comparison of interrelationship of real sectors and financial sectors on development in terms of specifications of size effects on financial systems. The roles of financial system to economic development are suggested to be investigated in terms of specifications of different emerging economies based on either theoretical or empirical studies of this thesis.
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Peysakhovich, Alexander. "Essays in Behavioral Economics." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10686.

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Essays in this dissertation cover three topics in behavioral economics: social preferences, ambiguity aversion and self-control. The first essay, based on work with Aurelie Ouss, studies the behavior of individuals making decisions to punish norm violators. It addresses two types of questions. First, what parameters affect these punishment decisions? Second, what do outcomes look like when these decisions are aggregated? Experimental data show that individual punishment decisions appear to respond to individual cost and not necessarily social cost. Additionally, individuals appear not to take the probability that violators will be apprehended into account. Finally, punishment by others does not act as a perfect substitute for own punishment. These combined effects mean that aggregate levels of punishment rarely resemble those in line with commonly used benchmarks such as optimal deterrence. The second essay, based on work with Uma Karmarkar, studies how information affects valuation of ambiguous financial prospects. Experimental results show that across several domains individual valuations appear to react much more strongly to favorable information than unfavorable information. Additional studies indicate that this effect is driven by two mechanisms. The first is a bias towards the integration of favorable information. The second is an effect of ambiguity aversion, individuals appear to be averse to subjective ignorance and so unfavorable information has a positive component: it removes some of this uncertainty. The final essay looks at how dual-self (Fudenberg-Levine (2006)) decision makers can use commitment contracts to combat self-control problems and implement long-run optimal behavior. The main results show that both stick contracts, which levy a fine when an individual gives in to a temptation, and carrot contracts, which give rewards for resisting, can simulate binding commitments. However, carrots have several advantages over sticks. Sticks create a temptation to cancel the contract, carrots are less vulnerable to trembles and finally carrots allow for more flexibility.
Economics
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32

Büttner, Bettina. "Five essays in public economic theory /." [S.l. : s.n.], 2005. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=014735840&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

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Qizilbash, M. "Corruption, political systems and economic theory." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.358574.

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34

Schickner, Benjamin [Verfasser]. "Essays in Economic Theory / Benjamin Schickner." Bonn : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2017. http://d-nb.info/112763951X/34.

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35

Kleiner, Andreas [Verfasser]. "Essays in Economic Theory / Andreas Kleiner." Bonn : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2016. http://d-nb.info/1109879717/34.

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36

Speit, Andre [Verfasser]. "Essays in Economic Theory / Andre Speit." Bonn : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2021. http://d-nb.info/1227990529/34.

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37

Rampal, Jeevant. "Behavioral Economic Theory and Experimental Investigation." The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1491972688590258.

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38

Theodoulou, Stella. "Construing economic behaviour." Thesis, London Metropolitan University, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.297586.

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Helbing, Joseph Ritchey. "Internationalization of the Renminbi Currency : Economic Factors Analysis, a Comparison with the Yen and German Mark and America’s Supporting Role." The Ohio State University, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1367461677.

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40

Kim, D. H. "Rapid economic growth and national economic integration in Korea, 1963-78." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371677.

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41

Zachau, Ulrich. "Essays on cooperation and communication in microeconomic theory." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.385669.

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42

Ibrahimo, Muradali Valimamade. "The economics of credit markets: theory and evidence." Doctoral thesis, University of York, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/12235.

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Doutoramento em Economia.
Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in credit markets for a number of reasons: first, credit markets perform important functions in any developed monetary economy, such as the sharing of risk between different individuals, the allocation of financial resources and the transmission of monetary policies; second. several influential theoretical studies have, by taking into consideration the idea of incomplete information, concluded that they operate in a very distinct way compared to most other markets, with equilibria in most cases exhibiting inefficiency; third, the new empirical research has provided support for the importance of the role played by the financial system in the determination of the real economic activity. This thesis examines the relevant works on credit, evaluates the explanatory power of the theories hitherto advanced and, more importantly, offers new theoretical and empirical studies which provide further insights into the subject. Part 1 is devoted to the microeconomic studies on credit with incomplete information. Assuming that borrowers are better informed than lenders about the quality of their investment projects, it derives several theoretical propositions which add to the understanding of credit market functioning. Moreover, it provides empirical evidence on the characteristics of random distributions of rates of return associated with industrial corporations. Part 2 is concerned with macroeconomic studies on credit in the context of the conventional ad-hoc approach with symmetric information. It shows how an explicit credit market may be incorporated in a standard macroeconomic model augmented with wealth effects and government budget constraint in order to allow the examination of issues, such as credit market shocks, that would not otherwise be possible. The thesis' mode of exposition is eclectic, using alternatively 'literary' reasoning, geometrical demonstrations and analytical proofs depending on the nature of the topics under consideration.
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Fanghella, Valeria. "Promoting energy conservation and environmental protection with behavioral economics: Theory and evidence." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Trento, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11572/294539.

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This Doctoral thesis studies how nudges can help protect the environment. Three empirical and one theoretical studies investigate applications of green nudges and identify situations where they should, or should not, be used to promote environmental conservation. In Chapter 1, we explore the interplay between nudges and financial policy instruments using an incentivized online experiment that reproduces daily energy behaviors. We find that these two tools do not perform better when implemented together than individually. Our results suggest that in some situations, displacements between behavioral and financial policy tools are more likely to arise than synergies. Chapter 2 presents a field study in which a behavioral intervention is used to promote energy conservation in the workplace. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find a significant reduction in branches’ monthly consumption outside the work schedule only, but not on overall consumption. Our findings suggest that nudges that are effective in the household context do not necessarily prompt behavioral change in the working environment. In Chapter 3, we develop a behavioral model for the usage of in-home displays that provide real-time feedback on energy consumption, focusing on social housing. On top of the cost-benefit analysis between financial and moral utility, on the one hand, and the effort from using them, on the other hand, we add the role of cognitive biases. This study seeks to improve the design of behavioral policies aimed at tackling energy poverty. Chapter 4 presents an incentivized online experiment that studies moral cleansing in the interpersonal and environmental domains. We find that bad behaviors that impact others trigger costly moral cleansing, whereas those that impact the environment do not even trigger costless cleansing. This empirically shows that people perceive environmental issues differently from other moral issues.
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Berdell, John Farley. "Essays on the classical theory of economic growth and trade." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.386356.

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Kubota, So. "Essays on Macroeconomics and Family Economics." Thesis, Princeton University, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10621822.

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My dissertation contributes to quantitative macroeconomic approaches to family economics. Compared to dominant microeconometric methods, macroeconomic models have advantages in understanding economic mechanisms behind social phenomena, measuring general equilibrium effects, obtaining quantitative impacts of economic factors, making international comparisons and conducting policy experiments. This thesis applies macroeconomic methods and explores the determinants of family behaviors, particularly female labor supply.

In the first chapter, I study the decline in the female labor force participation rate in the United States in the 1990s and 2000s. This chapter shows that structural changes in the child care market play a substantial role in influencing the evolution of female labor force participation. I provide new estimates of long-term trends in the child care market that hourly expenditures rose by 32% and hours of daycare used declined by 27%. I propose a life-cycle model of married couples and predict that the rise in child care costs leads to a 5% decline in total employment of females, holding all else constant.

In the second chapter, I further study the causes of the increase in child care costs in the United States. I propose a hypothesis that expansion of child care subsidies to lower income households distorted the incentives for home-based child care providers. I provide a simple and tractable model of the child care market to analytically and numerically explain the hypothesis. I also propose the empirical evidence in the period of expanding child care subsidies to support the hypothesis.

In the third chapter, I study the world’s largest decline in the female labor force participation rate in Turkey: it has fallen from 72% in 1955 to 29% in 2011. This chapter argues that, (i) the main industry has shifted from agriculture to non-agriculture, (ii) because of the social stigma against non-family market work for Turkish women, they have failed to move from agriculture to other sectors. I propose a simple general equilibrium model and conduct a cross-country comparison. The model captures the Turkish decline well with the stigma effect. This chapter suggests a quantitative importance of cultural factors.

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Chen, Zhihong. "Three essays in applied econometrics." Thesis, Boston College, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/0.

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Thesis advisor: Arthur Lewbel
This dissertation consists of three self-contained papers in applied econometrics. The frrst chapter, Testing Multivariate Distributions (joint with Jushan Bai), proposes a new method to test multivariate distributions with a focus on multivariate normality and multivariate t distribution, motivated in part by examination of financial market data. Using Khmaladze's martingale transformation to purge the effect of parameter estimation, our test generates a distribution-free statistic and can be easily applied to cases with complicated parameters. Simulation shows our test has good size and power. Finally, we apply our test procedure to a real multivariate financial time series. The result is consistent with the well-known fat tail property of financial data. The second chapter, Measuring the Poverty Line in China - An Equivalence Scale Method, is motivated by the current urban poverty issue in China. The fundamental question is: given the poverty threshold for an individual, how should that threshold vary across households with different demographic characteristics? This paper uses urban Household survey (uHS) data of China to estimate the equivalence scales for Chinese urban households. The results provide a quantitative reference to calculate the comparable poverty lines for households with different demographic compositions. It also can be used to determine appropriate subsidy levels for demographically different households. A useful byproduct of this exercise is the specification of a demand system for China. The third chapter, Dynamics of City Growth: Random or Deterministic? Evidence From China (joint with Shihe Fu), tests the random growth theory and the endogenous growth theory in urban economics using Chinese city size data from 1984-2002. We implement unit root and cointegration tests on pooled heterogeneous cities in the country. Since China is still in the period of rapid urbanization, we can only tentatively conclude that the overall Chinese city growth does not follow either random growth or parallel growth. However, we find that a small number of cities with certain common characteristics do grow parallel
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2005
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
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47

Li, Xue. "The cyclical behavior of prices and inflation." Thesis, University of Missouri - Columbia, 2016. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10178996.

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This paper documents business cycle facts of prices and the inflation rate for the United States from 1959:Q1 to 2013:Q3. Prices are countercyclical and the inflation rate is procyclical. In addition, prices lead the overall cycle by two quarters and the inflation rate lags the overall cycle by three quarters. To account for the observed cyclical behavior, two models are applied and extended including a business cycle model with endogenous money supply (Freeman and Huffman 1991) and a DSGE model with sticky prices (Ireland 2003). The former model only generates countercyclical prices but not procyclical inflation or the phase shift of prices relative to the overall cycle. For the latter model, its sticky-price version captures all the observed cyclical facts; whereas its flexible-price version fails to capture the procyclical behavior of inflation and the phase shift of prices relative to output. Better performance of the sticky-price model indicates that nominal rigidity can account for the cyclical behavior of prices and inflation. Thus, a powerful empirical business cycle model should incorporate a reasonable degree of price stickiness.

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Shen, Jian. "Essays on Nonlinear Pricing, Quality Investment, and Consumer Search." The Ohio State University, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1397250097.

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Leung, Jennifer. "Essays on Bilateral Vertical Specialization,Reversed Fragmentation, Reshoring, and R&D Productivity." The Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1429567575.

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Park, Jongwook. "Essays on Monetary Policy and Time Series Analysis." The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1480584221946903.

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