Relevant bibliographies by topics / Economic Theory

Academic literature on the topic 'Economic Theory'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 29 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Economic Theory"

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Vukonić, Boris. "ECONOMIC THEORY AND TOURISM ECONOMICS." Acta turistica 30, SI (November 2018): 17–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.22598/at/2018.30.si.17.

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Samuelson, Larry. "Economic Theory and Experimental Economics." Journal of Economic Literature 43, no. 1 (February 1, 2005): 65–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0022051053737816.

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This paper explores the questions of how economic theory can be used to design and interpret experiments and how experimental results can be used to construct and interpret economic theories. The relationship between economic theory and experiments is modeled and illustrated with examples from both theoretical and experimental work. The emphasis is on combing theory and experiment to the benefit of both.
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Gilboa, Itzhak, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, and David Schmeidler. "Economic Theory: Economics, Methods and Methodology." Revue économique Vol. 73, no. 4 (January 11, 2023): 897–919. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/reco.736.0897.

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SZMRECSÁNYI, TAMÁS. "História econômica, teoria econômica e economia aplicada." Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 12, no. 3 (1992): 448–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-31571992-0574.

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RESUMO Esta nota trata da importância da história econômica na formação de um economista. Com a ajuda de grandes profissionais do passado, notadamente Schumpeter e Kula, o artigo mostra que, sem uma grande compreensão do passado, não pode haver análise consistente dos fatores econômicos presentes (e futuros).
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Rezanovich, Irina, Evgeniy Rezanovich, Alevtina Keller, and Irina Savelieva. "EVOLUTION OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC THEORY." Bulletin of South Ural State University series "Economics and management" 12, no. 1 (2018): 23–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.14529/em180103.

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Medvedev, V. "Economic Theory." Problems of Economic Transition 35, no. 7 (November 1, 1992): 55–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/pet1061-1991350755.

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Wallerstein, Immanuel. "A Theory of Economie History in Place of Economic Theory ?" Revue économique 42, no. 2 (1991): 173–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/reco.1991.409273.

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Wallerstein, Immanuel. "A Theory of Economie History in Place of Economic Theory ?" Revue économique 42, no. 2 (March 1, 1991): 173–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/reco.p1991.42n2.0173.

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Kuregyan, S. "ELECTRONIC ECONOMICS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ECONOMIC THEORY." Экономическая наука сегодня, no. 10 (December 11, 2019): 41–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.21122/2309-6667-2019-10-41-46.

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The article is devoted to the study of electronic economy and artificial intelligence from the point of view of their influence on economic theory. Economic theory is still a science that studies the world of things and the economic relations between people and their economic behavior. At the same time, special importance is attached to the effective use of limited material resources in order to create more wealth. All this is becoming unattainable in the age of information technology, the digital economy, which strengthen the intangible forms of capital and its impact on human life. Therefore, the task is to show how the electronic economy can affect economic science, and how economic science can contribute to the development of this economy.
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Watkins, Susan Cotts, Marianne A. Ferber, and Julie A. Nelson. "Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics." Contemporary Sociology 23, no. 6 (November 1994): 901. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2076121.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Economic Theory"

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Todorova, Zdravka K. Lee Frederic S. "Reconsidering households in economic theory." Diss., UMK access, 2007.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Dept. of Economics. University of Missouri--Kansas City, 2007.
"A dissertation in economics and social science consortium." Advisor: Frederic S. Lee. Typescript. Vita. Title from "catalog record" of the print edition Description based on contents viewed Dec. 19, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 216-240). Online version of the print edition.
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Muthoo, Abhinay. "Bargaining theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.257214.

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Ribó, Ausias. "Essays in Economic Theory." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/404912.

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This thesis is composed of 3 independent essays on economic theory. Each essay is meant to be read separately, including footnotes and appendices. In particular, essays 2 and 3 include specific bibliography. The general bibliography is included at the end of the thesis. The first essay reviews some well known conceptual and empirical problems that appear when economic theorists deal with preferences and choice theory, in general. While assessing those problems, the essay lays the ground for a detailed discussion of the possibility of preference learning, formation and change. The essay concludes proposing a theoretical framework to study these phenomena. The second essay, although independent from the first, is also devoted to the issue of preference change. In particular, it studies the possibility that cultural preferences evolve as a result of the combination of technological innovation and cultural transmission mechanisms. At the same time, it allows for the possibility that those cultural preferences determine the short term outcome of economic variables. In addition, it builds a framework where the combination of technological innovation, cultural transmission and economic structure lead to a process of endogenous preference heterogeneity and clustering. Hence it provides a model to understand how culture and the economic structure interact and coevolve. The third essay presents some theoretical problems that arise when using the concept of a matching function as a modelling device for the labor market. In particular, necessary conditions for the ratio of the number of matches per job searcher to be interpreted as the average job finding probability are established. References [Abel, 1990] Abel, A. B. (1990). Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the joneses. The American Economic Review, pages 38-42. [Afriat, 1967] Afriat, S. (1967). The construction of utility functions from expenditure data. International Economic Review, 8(1):67-77. [Al-Najjar, 1993] Al-Najjar, N. (1993). Non-transitive smooth preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 60(1):14 -41. [[Aragones et al., 2005] Aragones, E., Gilboa, I., Postlewaite, A., and Schmeidler, D. (2005). Fact-free learning. The American Economic Review, 95(5):1355- 1368. [Ariely et al., 2003] Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., and Prelec, D. (2003). coherent arbitrariness: Stable demand curves without stable preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):73-106. [Arrow, 1986] Arrow, K. (1986). Rationality of self and others in an economic system. Journal of Business, pages 385-399. [Arrow and Hahn, 1971] Arrow, K. and Hahn, F. (1971). General competitive analysis. Holden-Day San Francisco.165 [Arrow, 1959] Arrow, K. J. (1959). Rational choice functions and orderings. Economica, 26(102):121-127. [Aumann, 1962] Aumann, R. (1962). Utility theory without the completeness axiom. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 445-462. [Balasko, 2003] Balasko, Y. (2003). Economies with price-dependent preferences. Journal of economic theory, 109(2):333-359. [Balzer, 1982] Balzer, W. (1982). Empirical claims in exchange economics. In Philosophy of Economics, pages 16-40. Springer. [Becker, 1962] Becker, G. (1962). Irrational behavior and economic theory. The Journal of Political Economy, pages 1-13. [Becker, 1978] Becker, G. S. (1978). The economic approach to human behavior. University of Chicago press. [Berry and Pakes, 2007a] Berry, S. and Pakes, A. (2007a). The pure characteristics demand model. International Economic Review, 48(4):1193-1225. [Berry and Pakes, 2007b] Berry, S. and Pakes, A. (2007b). The pure characteristics demand model*. International Economic Review, 48(4):1193-1225. [Bewley, 1986] Bewley, T. (1986). Knightian uncertainty theory: part i. Yale University. [Blaug, 1992] Blaug, M. (1992). The methodology of economics: Or, how economists explain. Cambridge University Press. [Boudon, 1998] Boudon, R. (1998). Social mechanisms without black boxes. Social mechanisms: An analytical approach to social theory, 172. [Brown and Matzkin, 1996] Brown, D. and Matzkin, R. (1996). Testable restrictions on the equilibrium manifold. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1249-1262. [Bunge, 1993] Bunge, M. (1993). Realism and antirealism in social science. Theory and Decision, 35(3):207-235. [Caldwell, 1984] Caldwell, B. J. (1984). Some problems with falsificationism in economics. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 14(4):489-495. [Chapman and Johnson, 1999] Chapman, G. B. and Johnson, E. J. (1999). Anchoring, activation, and the construction of values. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79(2):115 -153. [Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980] Deaton, A. and Muellbauer, J. (1980). An almost ideal demand system. The American economic review, pages 312-326.
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Weinstein, Jonathan. "Essays on economic theory." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33830.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2005.
Includes bibliographical references.
These four essays concern the theory of games and its application to economic theory. The first two, closely linked, chapters are an investigation into the foundational question of the sensitivity of the predictions of game theory to higher-order beliefs. Impact of Higher-Order Uncertainty with Muhamet Yildiz In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very large, implying that present economic theories may be misleading as these theories assume common knowledge of the type structure after specifying the first or the second orders of beliefs. Focusing on normal-form games in which the players' strategy spaces are compact metric spaces, we show that our key condition, called "global stability under uncertainty," implies a variety of results to the effect that the impact of higher-order uncertainty is small. Our central result states that, under global stability, the maximum change in equilibrium strategies due to changes in players' beliefs at orders higher than k is exponentially decreasing in k. Therefore, given any need for precision, we can approximate equilibrium strategies by specifying only finitely many orders of beliefs. Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium with Muhamet Yildiz Present economic theories make a common-knowledge assumption that implies that the first or second-order beliefs determine all higher-order beliefs.
(cont.) We analyze the role of such a closing assumption at any finite order by instead allowing higher orders to vary arbitrarily. Assuming that the space of underlying uncertainty is sufficiently rich, we show that, under an arbitrary fixed equilibrium, the resulting set of possible outcomes must include all outcomes that survive iterated elimination of strategies that are never a strict best reply. For many games, this implies that, unless the game is dominance-solvable, every equilibrium will be highly sensitive to higher-order beliefs, and thus economic theories based on such equilibria may be misleading. Moreover, every equilibrium is discontinuous at each type for which two or more actions survive our elimination process. Conversely, the resulting set of possible outcomes must be contained in rationalizable strategy profiles. This yields a precise characterization in generic instances. Price Dispersion and Loss Leaders Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is inconsistent with the standard model of price competition among identical firms, which predicts that all prices will be driven down to cost. One common explanation for such dispersion is the use of a loss-leader strategy, in which a firm prices one good below cost in order to attract a higher customer volume for profitable goods.
(cont.) By assuming high transportation costs which indeed force each consumer to buy all desired goods at a single firm, we create the possibility of an effective loss-leader strategy. We find, however, that such a strategy cannot be effective in equilibrium, so that additional assumptions limiting price search or rationality must be introduced to explain price dispersion or loss leaders. Two Notes on the Blotto Game We exhibit a new equilibrium of the classic Blotto game in which players allocate one unit of resources among three coordinates and try to defeat their opponent in two out of three. It is well known that a mixed strategy will be an equilibrium strategy if the marginal distribution on each coordinate is U [0, 2]. All known examples of such distributions have two-dimensional support. Here we exhibit a distribution which has one-dimensional support and is simpler to describe than previous examples. The construction generalizes to give one-dimensional distributions with the same property in higher-dimensional simplexes as well. As our second note, we give some results on the equilibrium payoffs when the game is modified so that one player has greater available resources. Our results suggest a criterion for equilibrium selection in the original symmetric game, in terms of robustness with respect to a small asymmetry in resources.
by Jonathan Weinstein.
Ph.D.
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Baetz, Oliver. "Essays in economic theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648139.

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Kuzmics, Christoph Alexander. "Essays on economic theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.615814.

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Yi, Hyun Chang. "Essays in economic theory." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15246.

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This dissertation consists of three research papers on cheap talk game and satisficing behaviour. The first chapter examines the potential for communication via cheap talk between an expert and a decision maker whose type (preferences) is uncertain. The expert privately observes states for each type of the decision maker and wants to persuade the decision maker to choose an action in his favour by informing her of the states. The decision maker privately observes her type and chooses an action. An optimal action for the decision maker depends upon both her type and type-specific states. In equilibrium the expert can always inform the decision maker in the form of comparative statements and the decision maker also can partially reveal her type to the expert or public. The second and third chapters build a dynamic model of satisficing behaviour in which an agent’s “expected” payoff is explicitly introduced, where this expectation is adaptively formed. If the agent receives a payoff above her satisficing level she continues with the current action, updating her valuation of the action. If she receives a payoff below her satisficing level and her valuation falls below her satisficing level she updates both her action and satisficing level. In the second chapter, we find that in the long run, all players satisfice. In individual decision problems, satisficing behaviour results in cautious, maximin choice and in normal form games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, they in the long run play either cooperative or defective outcomes conditional on past plays. In coordination games like the Battle of the Sexes, Choosing Sides and Common Interest, they in the long run coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes. In the third chapter, we find that satisficing players in the long run play subgame dominant paths, which is a refinement of subgame perfection, and identify conditions with which they ‘always cooperate’ or ‘fairly coordinate’ in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and Battle of the Sexes games, respectively, and truthfully communicate in sender-receiver games. Proofs and simulations are provided in appendices.
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Rashid, M. "Essays in economic theory." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2015. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1425119/.

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This thesis has two major themes. The first theme (Chapters 1 – 3) focuses on search theory and industrial organisation. I build a novel model of costly search where firms choose price distributions, draws are then taken from these distributions and the collection of draws is presented to consumers. Consumers are aware of the set of prices that firms charge but do not know which price is associated with which firm. As they search, they learn and update their beliefs about the prices offered by the other firms. I extend the model by introducing a price comparison website as well as informed and uninformed consumers. Equilibrium in the model has certain desirable properties. The second theme (Chapters 4 – 6) focuses on game theory, and in particular, games with forgetful players. One of the 'conclusions' of the Games and Economics Behaviour collection of papers on imperfect recall is that there is no one way to model imperfect recall in games; in particular, modelling issues which are of little or no consequence in games of perfect recall suddenly become substantive in games of imperfect recall. Furthermore, there is little consensus on how to proceed. I introduce a class of decision problems where, if we think of forgetting in a novel but intuitive way, we can transform the game into a game of perfect recall – thus resolving the modelling ambiguities. I extend the model to show that an agent with self-control problems may in certain cases be better off having a bad memory. I consider whether a firm can offer different contracts to discriminate between different types of consumer with varying degrees of memory and sophistication. Finally, I consider the consumption behaviour of a forgetful consumer.
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He, Wei. "Essays in economic theory." Diss., University of Iowa, 2016. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098.

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This thesis is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 considers the existence of equilibria in games with complete information, where players may have non-ordered and discontinuous preferences. Chapter 2 studies the issues on the existence of pure and behavioral strategy equilibria in games with incomplete information and discontinuous payoffs. We consider the standard setting with Bayesian preferences as well as the case in which players may face ambiguity. Chapter 3 extends the classical results on the Walras-core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economy, where agents maximize maximin expected utilities (MEU). These results are based on the papers He and Yannelis (2014, 2015a,b,c, 2016a,b). In the first chapter, we propose the condition of "continuous inclusion property" to handle the difficulty of discontinuous payoffs in various general equilibrium and game theory models. Such discontinuities arise naturally in economic situations, including auction, price competition of firms and also patent races. Based on the continuous inclusion property, we establish the equilibrium existence result in a very general framework with discontinuous payoffs. On one hand, this condition is sufficiently general from the methodological point of view, as it unifies almost all special conditions proposed in the literature. On the other hand, our condition is also potentially useful from the realistic point of view, as it could be applied to deal with many economic models which cannot be studied before because of the presence of the discontinuity. In the second chapter, I study the existence problem of pure and behavioral strategy equilibria in discontinuous games with incomplete information. The framework of games with incomplete information is standard as in the literature, except for that we allow players' payoffs to be discontinuous. We illustrate by examples that the Bayesian equilibria may not exist in such games and the previous results are not applicable to handle this problem. We propose some general conditions to retain the existence of both pure strategy and behavioral strategy Bayesian equilibrium, and show that our condition is tight. In addition, we study the equilibrium existence problem in discontinuous games under incomplete information and ambiguity, and show that the maximin framework solves the equilibrium existence issue without introducing any additional condition. In the last chapter, I study a general equilibrium model with incomplete information by adopting the maximin expected utilities. The model is powerful enough to describe the behaviors of risk averse agents that cannot be explained by the standard assumption of subjective expected utilities. I use this new formulation to extend many classical results in general equilibrium theory by incorporating ambiguity into the model. In addition, the desirable incentive compatibility property is shown in our model with maximin expected utilities, while this property will typically fail in the traditional setup. Specifically, the existence results are shown for various equilibrium notions in a general equilibrium model, and the incentives can be guaranteed when all agents use the maximin expected utilities.
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Dai, Tianjiao Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Essays on economic theory." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122240.

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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2019
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 165-168).
The first chapter considers team incentive schemes that are robust to nonquantifiable uncertainty about the game played by the agents. A principal designs a contract for a team of agents, each taking an unobservable action that jointly determine a stochastic contractible outcome. The game is common knowledge among the agents, but the principal only knows some of the available action profiles. Realizing that the game may be bigger than he thinks, the principal evaluates contracts based on their guaranteed performance across all games consistent with his knowledge. All parties are risk neutral and the agents are protected by limited liability. A contract is said to align the agents' interests if each agent's compensation covaries positively and linearly with the other agents' compensation.
It is shown that contracts that fail to do so are dominated by those that do, both in terms of the surplus guarantee under budget balance, and in terms of the principal's profit guarantee when he is the residual claimant. It thus suffices to base compensation on a one-dimensional aggregate even if richer outcome measures are available. The best guarantee for either objective is achieved by a contract linear in the monetary value of the outcome. This provides a foundation for practices such as team-based pay and profit-sharing in partnership. The second chapter models a ride-sharing market in a traffic network with stochastic ride demands. A monopolistic ride-sharing platform in this traffic network faces a dynamic optimization problem to maximize its per period average payoff in the long run, by choosing policies of setting trip prices, matching ride requests and relocating idle drivers to meet future potential demands.
Directly solving the dynamic optimization problem for the ridesharing platform is computationally prohibitively expensive for a traffic network with reasonably large number of locations and vehicles due to its intrinsic complexity. I provide an theoretical upper bound on the performance of dynamic policies by analyzing a related deterministic problem. Based on the optimal solution to the deterministic problem, I propose implementable heuristic policies for the original stochastic problem that yield average payoffs converging to the theoretical upper bound asymptotically. I also discuss the relative value function iteration method to solve the optimization problem for small-scale markets numerically. The third chapter examines several discrete-time versions of a dynamic moral hazard in teams problem, a continuous-time model of which has been extensively studied in the previous literature.
The way to transform the continuous-time game into a discrete-time one is not unique, and different discrete-time assumptions with the same continuous-time technology limit lead to different discrete-time equilibria. Regardless of the technology assumption, I find that two-period models can give equilibrium results quite different from that in a continuous-time model: while the continuous-time model predicts existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium, its two-period versions can either have multiple symmetric equilibria or none. Also, not all equilibria in the discrete-time models share features similar to the one predicted by the continuous-time model. The subsequent study of multiple-period models with no learning sheds some light on how the equilibria evolve as the discrete-time model better approximates the continuous-time one.
by Tianjiao Dai.
Ph. D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
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Books on the topic "Economic Theory"

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van Meerhaeghe, M. A. G. Economic Theory. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1365-8.

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Aubin, Jean-Pierre. Dynamic Economic Theory. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60756-1.

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Vlachou, Andriana, ed. Contemporary Economic Theory. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27714-8.

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Jaime, Marquez, ed. Economic theory andeconometrics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985.

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Nelson, Ed Marianne A. Ferber and Julie A. Beyond economic man :: Feminist theory and economics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.

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J, Ferguson Glenys, and Rothschild R, eds. Business economics: The application of economic theory. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993.

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J, Ferguson Glenys, and Rothschild R, eds. Business economics: The application of economic theory. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1993.

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1923-, Ferber Marianne A., and Nelson Julie A. 1956-, eds. Beyond economic man: Feminist theory and economics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.

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Chaudhuri, Pramit. Economic theory of growth. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989.

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Stefano, Zamagni, and Agliardi E, eds. Time in economic theory. Cheltenham, UK: E. Elgar Pub., 2004.

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Book chapters on the topic "Economic Theory"

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Dubbink, Wim. "Economic Theory." In Issues in Business Ethics, 23–73. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0797-8_2.

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Mills, John. "Economic Theory." In A Critical History of Economics, 13–39. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781403914408_2.

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Stout, Margaret, and Jeannine M. Love. "Economic theory." In Integrative Governance, 144–61. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Global law and sustainable development: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315526294-13.

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van Meerhaeghe, M. A. G. "Economic Theory and Economic Policy." In Economic Theory, 93–100. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1365-8_10.

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van Meerhaeghe, M. A. G. "Economic Doctrines and Economic Policy." In Economic Theory, 85–92. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1365-8_9.

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Cory, Gerald A. "General Equilibrium Theory." In Economic Biology and Behavioral Economics, 90–96. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003303190-13.

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Gandolfo, Giancarlo. "Bifurcation Theory." In Economic Dynamics, 469–502. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-06822-9_25.

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Gandolfo, Giancarlo. "Bifurcation Theory." In Economic Dynamics, 473–517. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03871-6_24.

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Scazzieri, Roberto. "Political Economy of Economic Theory." In The Palgrave Handbook of Political Economy, 193–233. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-44254-3_7.

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Gowdy, John M. "Evolutionary Theory and Economic Theory." In Coevolutionary Economics: The Economy, Society and the Environment, 103–29. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8250-6_5.

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Conference papers on the topic "Economic Theory"

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Ryzhkova, Marina. "Convergence Of Behavioral Economics And Orthodox Economic Theory." In WELLSO 2017 - IV International Scientific Symposium Lifelong wellbeing in the World. Cognitive-Crcs, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2018.04.45.

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Volejnikova, Jolana. "CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC THEORY." In 5th International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on SOCIAL SCIENCES and ARTS SGEM2018. STEF92 Technology, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2018/1.3/s04.067.

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"Exploration of Macro-Economic Theory of New Open Economy." In 2017 4th International Conference on Business, Economics and Management. Francis Academic Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.25236/busem.2017.55.

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Svidina, V. K. "Man's model in economic theory." In ТЕНДЕНЦИИ РАЗВИТИЯ НАУКИ И ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ. НИЦ «Л-Журнал», 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.18411/lj-02-2019-63.

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Li, Beibei, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, and Anindya Ghose. "Improving product search with economic theory." In 2010 IEEE 26th International Conference on Data Engineering Workshops (ICDEW 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icdew.2010.5452727.

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Stenis, Jan. "FLOW ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC MODELLING THEORY." In 18th International Multidisciplinary Scientific GeoConference SGEM2018. Stef92 Technology, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgem2018/5.3/s28.049.

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Singer, Jeremy, and Richard E. Jones. "Economic theory for memory management optimization." In the 6th Workshop. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2069172.2069176.

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Dobzinski, Shahar, Noam Nisan, and Sigal Oren. "Economic efficiency requires interaction." In STOC '14: Symposium on Theory of Computing. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2591796.2591815.

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"Cash holding: static trade-off theory or financing hierarchy theory." In 2019 Asia-Pacific Forum on Economic and Social Development. The Academy of Engineering and Education (AEE), 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.35532/jsss.v2.026.

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Kowli, Anupama. "Exploring Control Theory Advancements for Economic Dispatch." In 2018 IEEE PES Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/appeec.2018.8566425.

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Reports on the topic "Economic Theory"

1

Judd, Kenneth. Computational Economics and Economic Theory: Substitutes or Complements. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/t0208.

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Stiglitz, Joseph. Economics of Information and the Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1566.

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Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert Staiger. An Economic Theory of GATT. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6049.

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Gancia, Gino, Giacomo A. Ponzetto, and Jaume Ventura. A Theory of Economic Unions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26473.

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Tetenov, Aleksey. An economic theory of statistical testing. The IFS, September 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.cem.2016.5016.

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Monge-Naranjo, Alexander. A Theory of Economic Unions: A Comment. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.2019.035.

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Saffer, Henry, and Frank Chaloupka. Tobacco Advertising: Economic Theory and International Evidence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6958.

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Ales, Laurence, Pricila Maziero, and Pierre Yared. A Theory of Political and Economic Cycles. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18354.

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Stiglitz, Joseph. Reconstructing Macroeconomic Theory to Manage Economic Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20517.

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Stiglitz, Joseph. The Theory of Credit and Macro-economic Stability. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22837.

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You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Economic Theory' for particular source types:
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