Journal articles on the topic 'Economic assistance, Japanese Government policy'

The Japanese economic miracle is known as the record period of Japanese economic growth between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War (1945–1991). One of the reasons for Japan's rapid recovery from post-war trauma was the government's successful economic reform. The government institution that dealt mainly with industrial policy in Japan was the Ministry of Industry. One of the most important economic reforms was the introduction-adaptation of the "Inclined Production Mode". This success has been largely ensured to the interventionist policy of the Government of Japan and, in part, to the assistance provided by the United States in the form of the ,,Marshall Plan“. Keywords: role of government, protectionism, reconstruction, US aid ("Marshall plan"), Japanese economic miracle.

AbstractThis paper examines a new trend in Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy that emerged at the end of the Cold War. In 1992, the Japanese government adopted the "Official Development Assistance Charter," which obliged Japan to use its foreign aid to promote human rights, democracy, and freedom. Since the beginning of the 1990s, there have been cases when Japan imposed "human rights conditionalities" by increasing the amount of foreign aid to the recipient countries with good human rights records and reducing economic assistance to the countries with poor human rights practices. However, there remain doubts whether Japan is truly committed to use its aid power as leverage to ensure that democracy and human rights are respected by the governments of its aid recipients. This paper uses panel data analysis to examine whether the condition of human rights in aid-recipient countries has become one of the factors that influence Japan's ODA allocation. The findings reveal the lack of evidence to prove that the human rights condition in aid-recipient countries has influenced the allocation of Japanese aid.

This paper looks into the role of policy-making carried out by various government officials in the Japanese financial community who contributed to the formulation and implementation of Japanese “Silk Road Diplomacy” in the 1990s and 2000s. Furthermore, it examines the role of key Japanese ministries in the overall Japanese geopolitical engagement in Central Asia. When the five Central Asian republics of the USSR became independent in 1991, they soon encountered a proactive engagement of Japanese diplomacy toward them. Besides boosting bilateral assistance and economic ties, official Tokyo has vigorously promoted the Central Asian states’ eligibility in many international financial institutions and provided extensive advice on reform policies. Both Japanese and Central Asian officials shared a preference for gradualism in economic reforms as a popular approach alternative to the Western neoliberalism in Central Asian countries, although the extent of embracing gradualism varied upon individual republics and advising officials. Spurred by the failures of the Washington consensus and financial crises of the 1990s, Central Asian gradualism can be regarded as an early precursor attempt at post-neoliberalism.

AbstractDuring 1980–90, Japan's annual real GDP growth rate was 4.6%, but which declined to 1.2% in the 1990s. While the drop in itself is a problem, at the same time it exacerbated many other problems, namely inequality, budget deficits, and the increasing burden of an aging society.Society is not concerned about income distribution when the economy is growing, but begins to worry about inequality when an economic slump shows no signs of ending. Moreover, prolonged recession magnifies inequality. With the employment situation surrounding young people worsening, there arose an inequality between those finding jobs and those unemployed. And, the prolonged recession led to a huge budget deficit and the accumulation of government debt. Tax revenue shrank, and the government repeatedly increased public investment in the form of economic stimulus measures, but the Japanese economy did not recover in a sustained fashion.Japan's low growth has already continued for 20 years. Incomes of the younger and middle-aged segments of the population have not increased. Additionally, Japan is an aging society. The aged need pensions, and medical treatment and care, costs which must be borne by younger and middle-aged segments of the population, in fact those who have not experienced Japan's prosperous times.This paper discusses issues relating to the Great Recession, inequality, and the budget deficit and burden of an aging population.Japan's Great Recession is basically explained by monetary shocks. Just the bubble and its bursting are not solely responsible for the prolonged slump. There is no empirical evidence for the assertion that certain structural problems lessened the efficiency of the Japanese economy in the 1990s. TFP (total factor productivity) in the 1990s did not decline compared with the early 1980s. Fiscal policy and the diminution of the financial intermediary function can only explain the Great Recession in small part.The absence of any real monetary policy hampered economic growth through the channels of stock prices and improvement in bank balance sheets. Using vector autoregressive models, the exchange rate was not found to be an important channel of monetary policy, but there is some evidence that it significantly affected output.On inequality problems, that among younger generations is important since it will increase inequality in the future. Japan's economy will stagnate for a long time if the young are not employed and cannot garner skills.Another important point is that the way of maintaining social stability and alleviating inequality in Japan is extremely inefficient. To construct useless dams, roads, ports, and airports is extremely costly just to give jobs to the unemployed. It would be much better to give direct assistance to those in need.There is some reason to think that a budget deficit is not so serious a problem as generally believed, and that the important thing is to cut wasteful government expenditure and not raise government revenue. While I admit this argument carries some weight, there is nevertheless good reason to think that it is necessary to reduce the budget deficit.Before the global financial crisis, Japan's budget deficit was controlled, and declining, but subsequently became uncontrollable. Additionally, and more importantly, an aging population demands more social security expenditure, which causes serious budget problems, but Japan does not seem ready to cope with such problems.The selection of these topics is subjective, but I believe that these are reflected in the Japanese concerns now. Japanese academic circles do not necessarily respond to the interests of the society, but I have tried to select papers on these topics to the extent possible.

The object of the study of this work was the analysis of the features of improving Japanese food security at the beginning of the third decade of the XXI century. This scientific work is an attempt to study the problematic issues of improving the Japanese agro-industrial policy, the most important element of ensuring state food security and, accordingly, the economic security of the country. In the course of the study, the author found that the Japanese government does not stop taking measures to reduce dependence on imports of agricultural products and to provide assistance to agricultural production. The state measures taken to improve food security have led to the fact that today Japan is assigned the third place in the world in terms of state support for individual agricultural producers. Investigating the identified problems, the author concludes that the agrarian economy is sufficiently developed in modern Japan, the state is implementing serious measures related to the support of the agro-industrial complex. These steps make it possible not only to guarantee the provision of food products to the population of the country, but also, in addition, contribute to agricultural producers, without compromising food security, to the implementation of stable export of food products abroad. At the same time, in the process of supporting agricultural production, the state takes measures to preserve the natural environment, consolidate the population in the places of their historical residence, support the life style, style and rhythm that has been rooted and established for centuries.

It is shown that agriculture is sometimes not the main branch of the rural economy. It is emphasized that ensuring control over the impact of agricultural production on the environment is the responsibility of the state. It is revealed that in view of the rapid development and change of international relations, the definition of “food security” as the independence of the state solely through its own production is no longer relevant, today it depends more on the foreign and domestic policy of the country, as well as the importance of its opinion for other countries. It is noted that despite membership in the World Trade Organization, Japan has formed and implemented a policy of comprehensive support for its own producers and encourages the diversification of economic activities in rural areas. Legislatively approved principles of environmental policy of agriculture, forestry and fisheries are strictly controlled and are binding on all business entities. It is emphasized that Japan does not approve of the practice of renting agricultural land in other countries and makes maximum use of its own natural resources. The ways in which Japan provides support and assistance to developing countries to improve the condition of rural areas and agriculture were analyzed, and it was noted that the amount of this assistance is more than 21 % of total assistance. It is shown that in order to preserve agricultural lands, Japan creates artificial territories (islands and coastline extensions), on which large buildings and airports are built. The careful quality control of food introduced by the Government of Japan is noted. The flexible state policy of Japan on the redistribution of resources, which prevents the creation of critical situations in the provision of food to the population, is analyzed. Japan promotes the accelerated construction of vertical farms, which have no analogues in the world in the degree of environmental friendliness. It is shown how powerful Japanese companies - manufacturers of electronics on a global level are willing to expand their scope of activities by growing ultra-pure fruits and vegetables. The need for further research on the policy of rural development and agriculture of the State of Israel was emphasized.

Japan’s universal healthcare insurance is facing economic challenges due to the advanced aging society, however, objective data of dental expenditure has never been introduced. This study aimed to identify the associated factors with dental expenditures using government-provided digitized insurance claims data and calculated the spending in the context of dental cost per person (DCPP). Seven associated factors analyzed were age, demographic, geographic, socioeconomic, regional wealth, the impact of the 8020-national campaign implementation (keep 20 teeth at age 80), and the effect of the home-visit dentistry for the elders. The average DCPP was high in older populations (75+) in all prefectures. The prefectures with the highest and lowest DCPP were significant compared to other states and retained their respective places in the cost hierarchy over the four years. The prefectures with more citizens participating in government assistance programs (GAP) had greater DCPPs. Dental costs were significantly related to geographic regions, age, per capita income, government assistance program prevalence, office complete denture frequency, and home visit care per patient. With a growing aging population, dental care costs will continue to increase, burdening its fiscal future. Associated factors identified should be considered to control the contentious increase of healthcare cost.

In the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, a large-scale effort towards reconstruction of houses damaged by the quake was required. This led to increased mortgage, thereby financially plaguing a number of earthquake victims and inhibiting their long-term sustainability and self-supported recovery. The current framework of housing reconstruction assistance provided by the Japanese government does not account for regional disparities in cost and other socioeconomic factors. This study proposes a technique for estimating the cost of reconstructing household units damaged in an earthquake by considering the effects of construction methods influenced by regional climatic zones. The financial constraints on rebuilding resources have been estimated by considering the annual regional income and household savings, as determined by social factors and employment opportunities. The susceptibility of regions to the occurrence of earthquakes has also been factored in the calculation of recovery costs. Together, these factors are used to provide a more complete picture of economic costs associated with earthquake recovery in different regions of Japan, thereby revealing large disparities in the difficulty and financial burden involved in the reconstruction of household units. Results of this study could be used to develop a robust system for earthquake-recovery assistance that accounts for differences in recovery costs between different regions, thereby improving the speed and quality of post-earthquake recovery.

The 2011 Great East Japan earthquake has shown all too clearly that disaster management and mitigation measures seen from the viewpoint of protecting society are not sufficient for addressing a national crisis such as the projected Nankai Trough earthquake or Tokyo inland earthquake whose damage is expected to exceed the present estimated damage. Our study explores the weakness against disasters in how modern Japanese society uses “reverse thinking” in which investigates studying how large-scale disasters may adversely affect society and increase damage effectively. This process profiles the worst disaster scenarios that could conceivably lead to a national crisis. Classifying these worst scenarios, we suggest policies to the problems that are common to many scenarios, and we present action plans for individual problems. First, we conduct workshops for identifying damage magnification factors and evaluating their importance under the categories of human damage, property damage, and damage to social functions, unifying the awareness of research organization. Second, we have researchers on 1) mortality, 2) tsunami inundation, 3) liquefaction, 4) capital function, 5) evacuation, 6) required assistance, 7) lifelines, 8) high buildings, 9) information networks, 10) government systems, and 11) economic systems analyze damage magnification conditions due to hazard, vulnerability and measure aspects. Third, we sort potential final consequences and separate them based on commonality, and propose new policies and concrete action plans for preventing the occurrence of worst-case scenarios. This research is expected to give new paradigms in disaster management science and new ways of policy making and action planning that will minimize the undesirable consequences of catastrophic earthquake and tsunami and yield new knowledge on disaster processes and damage magnification scenarios. Most importantly, we conclude that it is necessary to have a new Japanese governmental organization, such as a Ministry of Disaster Resilience or a Disaster Resilience Management Agency, handle these national crises.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore how Mongolian alumni of three different scholarship programs sponsored by governments of Japan and Mongolia view their role in national development after graduation. Design/methodology/approach This paper reports findings from a phenomenological study (Creswell, 2007) – the first phase of an exploratory sequential mixed-methods study in a recent PhD study. Based on semi-structured interviews with 24 alumni the study aimed to understand alumni’s perspectives in their voices. Findings Alumni were motivated to contribute to their communities, institutions, economic, political, social and legal conditions of Mongolia. However, they faced various structural challenges including getting jobs in the public sector even when they had binding agreements with employers. The findings call for long-term support for alumni projects and hubs as well as policy frameworks that tie the scholarship programs with national development goals. Originality/value Despite the high mobility rate of Mongolian scholars and a long history of Japanese Official Development Assistance to develop human resources in developing countries especially in Asia, little is known about the impact of these programs on the Mongolian national development. Through the phenomenological study, this study expands the understanding of ways in which alumni contribute to their national development.

Promoting age-friendly environment is one of the appropriate approaches to support quality of life toward ageing populations. However, the information regarding age-friendly environments in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three countries is still limited. This study aimed to survey the perceived age-friendly environments among ASEAN Plus Three older populations. The study employed cross-sectional quantitative research using multistage cluster sampling to select a sample of older adults in the capital cities of Japan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand. The final sample was composed of 2171 older adults aged 55 years and over, including 140 Japanese, 510 Thai, 537 Malaysian, 487 Myanmarese, and 497 Vietnamese older adults. Data collection was conducted using a quantitative questionnaire with 20 items of perceived age-friendly environments with the rating scale based on the World Health Organization (WHO) standard. The score from the 20 items were analyzed and examined high-risk groups of “bad perception level” age-friendly environments using ordinal logistic regression. The research indicated the five highest inadequacies of age-friendly environments including: (1) participating in an emergency-response training session or drill which addressed the needs of older residents; (2) enrolling in any form of education or training, either formal or non-formal in any subject; (3) having opportunities for paid employment; (4) involvement in decision making about important political, economic and social issues in the community; and (5) having personal care or assistance needs met in the older adult’s home setting by government/private care services. Information regarding the inadequacy of age-friendliness by region was evidenced to guide policy makers in providing the right interventions towards older adults’ needs.

The rise of China was not an issue in 1971 or 1972. Therefore, neither the United States nor Japan thought about the consequences of US–China and Japan–China rapprochement in the early 1970s (Kissinger, 2011). The diplomatic normalization between Japan and China took place in 1972 as an appendage of the United States–China rapprochement in 1971, at least in American eyes. At this time, the United States was waging war in Vietnam, while the Cold War was still at the heyday of massive nuclear buildups by the United States and the Soviet Union. China was in the midst of domestic turmoil called the Cultural Revolution, while facing the hostile Soviet Union. To ease their burdens, both countries concluded the surprising rapprochement. It was a great surprise to Japan because it had not been notified about this rapprochement even a couple of days before. In 1971, China entered the United Nations. Japan went ahead of the United States and had achieved diplomatic normalization by 1972. Japan wanted to develop a new market in China when its economy was booming whereby Japan wanted to alleviate the extreme of ‘leaning to one side’ (to the United States). China wanted to alleviate security threats coming from the Soviet Union (‘anti-hegemonism’) and to have Japan involved in the development of the half-frozen economy, especially with the massive Japanese official development assistance. On the disputed islands called Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese government wanted to settle the issue, but the Chinese government saw no immediate urgency to do so. In 1978, both the United States and Japan consolidated their ties with China, again with Japan going ahead of the United States. In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping came back into power, paving the road to ‘economic reform and the opening to the world’. His famous sentence, yangguan taohui (keep low profile, nurture strength), was propagated as the new Chinese policy line, both internally and externally (Vogel, 2011). He focused on economic development while keeping peace on all borders. China started to grow in the 1980s in a strident fashion, although voices for political reform were also on the rise. Such voices culminated in 1989 after the death of former Secretary General Hu Yaopang, a reformist who was dismissed from office in 1987 by Deng Xiaoping. On 4 June 1989, large numbers of demonstrators assembled in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, demanding more freedom and democracy. Deng Xiaoping ordered the all-out suppression of the dissidents. The Tiananmen Square massacre led to embargos by the West and by Japan. The embargos were lifted in 1991. Both Japan and Europe were keen on this. The Chinese economy then registered a two digit annual growth rate for two decades until 2011. Meanwhile the terms of the Japan–China Friendship Treaty of 1978 − that is China forgiving Japan for not paying indemnity − became known in China, giving rise to opposition to the Friendship Treaty in the 1990s. The United States was preoccupied with anti-terrorism after 9/11 in 2001, and the thought of growth in China in the 2000s scarcely came to mind. But by 2011, the growth of China was visible and tangible; a fact that no one can deny is that China is expected to surpass the United States in terms of Gross National Product sooner or later.

In this issue of Journal of Disaster Research, we introduce nine papers on societal responses to recent catastrophic disasters with special focus on long-term recovery processes in Japan and the United States. As disaster impacts increase, we also find that recovery times take longer and the processes for recovery become more complicated. On January 17th of 1995, a magnitude 7.2 earthquake hit the Hanshin and Awaji regions of Japan, resulting in the largest disaster in Japan in 50 years. In this disaster which we call the Kobe earthquake hereafter, over 6,000 people were killed and the damage and losses totaled more than 100 billion US dollars. The long-term recovery from the Kobe earthquake disaster took more than ten years to complete. One of the most important responsibilities of disaster researchers has been to scientifically monitor and record the long-term recovery process following this unprecedented disaster and discern the lessons that can be applied to future disasters. The first seven papers in this issue present some of the key lessons our research team learned from the studying the long-term recovery following the Kobe earthquake disaster. We have two additional papers that deal with two recent disasters in the United States – the terrorist attacks on World Trade Center in New York on September 11 of 2001 and the devastation of New Orleans by the 2005 Hurricane Katrina and subsequent levee failures. These disasters have raised a number of new research questions about long-term recovery that US researchers are studying because of the unprecedented size and nature of these disasters’ impacts. Mr. Mammen’s paper reviews the long-term recovery processes observed at and around the World Trade Center site over the last six years. Ms. Johnson’s paper provides a detailed account of the protracted reconstruction planning efforts in the city of New Orleans to illustrate a set of sufficient and necessary conditions for successful recovery. All nine papers in this issue share a theoretical framework for long-term recovery processes which we developed based first upon the lessons learned from the Kobe earthquake and later expanded through observations made following other recent disasters in the world. The following sections provide a brief description of each paper as an introduction to this special issue. 1. The Need for Multiple Recovery Goals After the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the long-term recovery process began with the formulation of disaster recovery plans by the City of Kobe – the most severely impacted municipality – and an overarching plan by Hyogo Prefecture which coordinated 20 impacted municipalities; this planning effort took six months. Before the Kobe earthquake, as indicated in Mr. Maki’s paper in this issue, Japanese theories about, and approaches to, recovery focused mainly on physical recovery, particularly: the redevelopment plans for destroyed areas; the location and standards for housing and building reconstruction; and, the repair and rehabilitation of utility systems. But the lingering problems of some of the recent catastrophes in Japan and elsewhere indicate that there are multiple dimensions of recovery that must be considered. We propose that two other key dimensions are economic recovery and life recovery. The goal of economic recovery is the revitalization of the local disaster impacted economy, including both major industries and small businesses. The goal of life recovery is the restoration of the livelihoods of disaster victims. The recovery plans formulated following the 1995 Kobe earthquake, including the City of Kobe’s and Hyogo Prefecture’s plans, all stressed these two dimensions in addition to physical recovery. The basic structure of both the City of Kobe’s and Hyogo Prefecture’s recovery plans are summarized in Fig. 1. Each plan has three elements that work simultaneously. The first and most basic element of recovery is the restoration of damaged infrastructure. This helps both physical recovery and economic recovery. Once homes and work places are recovered, Life recovery of the impacted people can be achieved as the final goal of recovery. Figure 2 provides a “recovery report card” of the progress made by 2006 – 11 years into Kobe’s recovery. Infrastructure was restored in two years, which was probably the fastest infrastructure restoration ever, after such a major disaster; it astonished the world. Within five years, more than 140,000 housing units were constructed using a variety of financial means and ownership patterns, and exceeding the number of demolished housing units. Governments at all levels – municipal, prefectural, and national – provided affordable public rental apartments. Private developers, both local and national, also built condominiums and apartments. Disaster victims themselves also invested a lot to reconstruct their homes. Eleven major redevelopment projects were undertaken and all were completed in 10 years. In sum, the physical recovery following the 1995 Kobe earthquake was extensive and has been viewed as a major success. In contrast, economic recovery and life recovery are still underway more than 13 years later. Before the Kobe earthquake, Japan’s policy approaches to recovery assumed that economic recovery and life recovery would be achieved by infusing ample amounts of public funding for physical recovery into the disaster area. Even though the City of Kobe’s and Hyogo Prefecture’s recovery plans set economic recovery and life recovery as key goals, there was not clear policy guidance to accomplish them. Without a clear articulation of the desired end-state, economic recovery programs for both large and small businesses were ill-timed and ill-matched to the needs of these businesses trying to recover amidst a prolonged slump in the overall Japanese economy that began in 1997. “Life recovery” programs implemented as part of Kobe’s recovery were essentially social welfare programs for low-income and/or senior citizens. 2. Requirements for Successful Physical Recovery Why was the physical recovery following the 1995 Kobe earthquake so successful in terms of infrastructure restoration, the replacement of damaged housing units, and completion of urban redevelopment projects? There are at least three key success factors that can be applied to other disaster recovery efforts: 1) citizen participation in recovery planning efforts, 2) strong local leadership, and 3) the establishment of numerical targets for recovery. Citizen participation As pointed out in the three papers on recovery planning processes by Mr. Maki, Mr. Mammen, and Ms. Johnson, citizen participation is one of the indispensable factors for successful recovery plans. Thousands of citizens participated in planning workshops organized by America Speaks as part of both the World Trade Center and City of New Orleans recovery planning efforts. Although no such workshops were held as part of the City of Kobe’s recovery planning process, citizen participation had been part of the City of Kobe’s general plan update that had occurred shortly before the earthquake. The City of Kobe’s recovery plan is, in large part, an adaptation of the 1995-2005 general plan. On January 13 of 1995, the City of Kobe formally approved its new, 1995-2005 general plan which had been developed over the course of three years with full of citizen participation. City officials, responsible for drafting the City of Kobe’s recovery plan, have later admitted that they were able to prepare the city’s recovery plan in six months because they had the preceding three years of planning for the new general plan with citizen participation. Based on this lesson, Odiya City compiled its recovery plan based on the recommendations obtained from a series of five stakeholder workshops after the 2004 Niigata Chuetsu earthquake. <strong>Fig. 1. </strong> Basic structure of recovery plans from the 1995 Kobe earthquake. <strong>Fig. 2. </strong> “Disaster recovery report card” of the progress made by 2006. Strong leadership In the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake, local leadership had a defining role in the recovery process. Kobe’s former Mayor, Mr. Yukitoshi Sasayama, was hired to work in Kobe City government as an urban planner, rebuilding Kobe following World War II. He knew the city intimately. When he saw damage in one area on his way to the City Hall right after the earthquake, he knew what levels of damage to expect in other parts of the city. It was he who called for the two-month moratorium on rebuilding in Kobe city on the day of the earthquake. The moratorium provided time for the city to formulate a vision and policies to guide the various levels of government, private investors, and residents in rebuilding. It was a quite unpopular policy when Mayor Sasayama announced it. Citizens expected the city to be focusing on shelters and mass care, not a ban on reconstruction. Based on his experience in rebuilding Kobe following WWII, he was determined not to allow haphazard reconstruction in the city. It took several years before Kobe citizens appreciated the moratorium. Numerical targets Former Governor Mr. Toshitami Kaihara provided some key numerical targets for recovery which were announced in the prefecture and municipal recovery plans. They were: 1) Hyogo Prefecture would rebuild all the damaged housing units in three years, 2) all the temporary housing would be removed within five years, and 3) physical recovery would be completed in ten years. All of these numerical targets were achieved. Having numerical targets was critical to directing and motivating all the stakeholders including the national government’s investment, and it proved to be the foundation for Japan’s fundamental approach to recovery following the 1995 earthquake. 3. Economic Recovery as the Prime Goal of Disaster Recovery In Japan, it is the responsibility of the national government to supply the financial support to restore damaged infrastructure and public facilities in the impacted area as soon as possible. The long-term recovery following the Kobe earthquake is the first time, in Japan’s modern history, that a major rebuilding effort occurred during a time when there was not also strong national economic growth. In contrast, between 1945 and 1990, Japan enjoyed a high level of national economic growth which helped facilitate the recoveries following WWII and other large fires. In the first year after the Kobe earthquake, Japan’s national government invested more than US$ 80 billion in recovery. These funds went mainly towards the repair and reconstruction of infrastructure and public facilities. Now, looking back, we can also see that these investments also nearly crushed the local economy. Too much money flowed into the local economy over too short a period of time and it also did not have the “trickle-down” effect that might have been intended. To accomplish numerical targets for physical recovery, the national government awarded contracts to large companies from Osaka and Tokyo. But, these large out-of-town contractors also tended to have their own labor and supply chains already intact, and did not use local resources and labor, as might have been expected. Essentially, ten years of housing supply was completed in less than three years, which led to a significant local economic slump. Large amounts of public investment for recovery are not necessarily a panacea for local businesses, and local economic recovery, as shown in the following two examples from the Kobe earthquake. A significant national investment was made to rebuild the Port of Kobe to a higher seismic standard, but both its foreign export and import trade never recovered to pre-disaster levels. While the Kobe Port was out of business, both the Yokohama Port and the Osaka Port increased their business, even though many economists initially predicted that the Kaohsiung Port in Chinese Taipei or the Pusan Port in Korea would capture this business. Business stayed at all of these ports even after the reopening of the Kobe Port. Similarly, the Hanshin Railway was severely damaged and it took half a year to resume its operation, but it never regained its pre-disaster readership. In this case, two other local railway services, the JR and Hankyu lines, maintained their increased readership even after the Hanshin railway resumed operation. As illustrated by these examples, pre-disaster customers who relied on previous economic output could not necessarily afford to wait for local industries to recover and may have had to take their business elsewhere. Our research suggests that the significant recovery investment made by Japan’s national government may have been a disincentive for new economic development in the impacted area. Government may have been the only significant financial risk-taker in the impacted area during the national economic slow-down. But, its focus was on restoring what had been lost rather than promoting new or emerging economic development. Thus, there may have been a missed opportunity to provide incentives or put pressure on major businesses and industries to develop new businesses and attract new customers in return for the public investment. The significant recovery investment by Japan’s national government may have also created an over-reliance of individuals on public spending and government support. As indicated in Ms. Karatani’s paper, individual savings of Kobe’s residents has continued to rise since the earthquake and the number of individuals on social welfare has also decreased below pre-disaster levels. Based on our research on economic recovery from the Kobe earthquake, at least two lessons emerge: 1) Successful economic recovery requires coordination among all three recovery goals – Economic, Physical and Life Recovery, and 2) “Recovery indices” are needed to better chart recovery progress in real-time and help ensure that the recovery investments are being used effectively. Economic recovery as the prime goal of recovery Physical recovery, especially the restoration of infrastructure and public facilities, may be the most direct and socially accepted provision of outside financial assistance into an impacted area. However, lessons learned from the Kobe earthquake suggest that the sheer amount of such assistance may not be effective as it should be. Thus, as shown in Fig. 3, economic recovery should be the top priority goal for recovery among the three goals and serve as a guiding force for physical recovery and life recovery. Physical recovery can be a powerful facilitator of post-disaster economic development by upgrading social infrastructure and public facilities in compliance with economic recovery plans. In this way, it is possible to turn a disaster into an opportunity for future sustainable development. Life recovery may also be achieved with a healthy economic recovery that increases tax revenue in the impacted area. In order to achieve this coordination among all three recovery goals, municipalities in the impacted areas should have access to flexible forms of post-disaster financing. The community development block grant program that has been used after several large disasters in the United States, provide impacted municipalities with a more flexible form of funding and the ability to better determine what to do and when. The participation of key stakeholders is also an indispensable element of success that enables block grant programs to transform local needs into concrete businesses. In sum, an effective economic recovery combines good coordination of national support to restore infrastructure and public facilities and local initiatives that promote community recovery. Developing Recovery Indices Long-term recovery takes time. As Mr. Tatsuki’s paper explains, periodical social survey data indicates that it took ten years before the initial impacts of the Kobe earthquake were no longer affecting the well-being of disaster victims and the recovery was completed. In order to manage this long-term recovery process effectively, it is important to have some indices to visualize the recovery processes. In this issue, three papers by Mr. Takashima, Ms. Karatani, and Mr. Kimura define three different kinds of recovery indices that can be used to continually monitor the progress of the recovery. Mr. Takashima focuses on electric power consumption in the impacted area as an index for impact and recovery. Chronological change in electric power consumption can be obtained from the monthly reports of power company branches. Daily estimates can also be made by tracking changes in city lights using a satellite called DMSP. Changes in city lights can be a very useful recovery measure especially at the early stages since it can be updated daily for anywhere in the world. Ms. Karatani focuses on the chronological patterns of monthly macro-statistics that prefecture and city governments collect as part of their routine monitoring of services and operations. For researchers, it is extremely costly and virtually impossible to launch post-disaster projects that collect recovery data continuously for ten years. It is more practical for researchers to utilize data that is already being collected by local governments or other agencies and use this data to create disaster impact and recovery indices. Ms. Karatani found three basic patterns of disaster impact and recovery in the local government data that she studied: 1) Some activities increased soon after the disaster event and then slumped, such as housing construction; 2) Some activities reduced sharply for a period of time after the disaster and then rebounded to previous levels, such as grocery consumption; and 3) Some activities reduced sharply for a while and never returned to previous levels, such as the Kobe Port and Hanshin Railway. Mr. Kimura focuses on the psychology of disaster victims. He developed a “recovery and reconstruction calendar” that clarifies the process that disaster victims undergo in rebuilding their shattered lives. His work is based on the results of random surveys. Despite differences in disaster size and locality, survey data from the 1995 Kobe earthquake and the 2004 Niigata-ken Chuetsu earthquake indicate that the recovery and reconstruction calendar is highly reliable and stable in clarifying the recovery and reconstruction process. <strong>Fig. 3.</strong> Integrated plan of disaster recovery. 4. Life Recovery as the Ultimate Goal of Disaster Recovery Life recovery starts with the identification of the disaster victims. In Japan, local governments in the impacted area issue a “damage certificate” to disaster victims by household, recording the extent of each victim’s housing damage. After the Kobe earthquake, a total of 500,000 certificates were issued. These certificates, in turn, were used by both public and private organizations to determine victim’s eligibility for individual assistance programs. However, about 30% of those victims who received certificates after the Kobe earthquake were dissatisfied with the results of assessment. This caused long and severe disputes for more than three years. Based on the lessons learned from the Kobe earthquake, Mr. Horie’s paper presents (1) a standardized procedure for building damage assessment and (2) an inspector training system. This system has been adopted as the official building damage assessment system for issuing damage certificates to victims of the 2004 Niigata-ken Chuetsu earthquake, the 2007 Noto-Peninsula earthquake, and the 2007 Niigata-ken Chuetsu Oki earthquake. Personal and family recovery, which we term life recovery, was one of the explicit goals of the recovery plan from the Kobe earthquake, but it was unclear in both recovery theory and practice as to how this would be measured and accomplished. Now, after studying the recovery in Kobe and other regions, Ms. Tamura’s paper proposes that there are seven elements that define the meaning of life recovery for disaster victims. She recently tested this model in a workshop with Kobe disaster victims. The seven elements and victims’ rankings are shown in Fig. 4. Regaining housing and restoring social networks were, by far, the top recovery indicators for victims. Restoration of neighborhood character ranked third. Demographic shifts and redevelopment plans implemented following the Kobe earthquake forced significant neighborhood changes upon many victims. Next in line were: having a sense of being better prepared and reducing their vulnerability to future disasters; regaining their physical and mental health; and restoration of their income, job, and the economy. The provision of government assistance also provided victims with a sense of life recovery. Mr. Tatsuki’s paper summarizes the results of four random-sample surveys of residents within the most severely impacted areas of Hyogo Prefecture. These surveys were conducted biannually since 1999,. Based on the results of survey data from 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005, it is our conclusion that life recovery took ten years for victims in the area impacted significantly by the Kobe earthquake. Fig. 5 shows that by comparing the two structural equation models of disaster recovery (from 2003 and 2005), damage caused by the Kobe earthquake was no longer a determinant of life recovery in the 2005 model. It was still one of the major determinants in the 2003 model as it was in 1999 and 2001. This is the first time in the history of disaster research that the entire recovery process has been scientifically described. It can be utilized as a resource and provide benchmarks for monitoring the recovery from future disasters. <strong>Fig. 4.</strong> Ethnographical meaning of “life recovery” obtained from the 5th year review of the Kobe earthquake by the City of Kobe. <strong>Fig. 5.</strong> Life recovery models of 2003 and 2005. 6. The Need for an Integrated Recovery Plan The recovery lessons from Kobe and other regions suggest that we need more integrated recovery plans that use physical recovery as a tool for economic recovery, which in turn helps disaster victims. Furthermore, we believe that economic recovery should be the top priority for recovery, and physical recovery should be regarded as a tool for stimulating economic recovery and upgrading social infrastructure (as shown in Fig. 6). With this approach, disaster recovery can help build the foundation for a long-lasting and sustainable community. Figure 6 proposes a more detailed model for a more holistic recovery process. The ultimate goal of any recovery process should be achieving life recovery for all disaster victims. We believe that to get there, both direct and indirect approaches must be taken. Direct approaches include: the provision of funds and goods for victims, for physical and mental health care, and for housing reconstruction. Indirect approaches for life recovery are those which facilitate economic recovery, which also has both direct and indirect approaches. Direct approaches to economic recovery include: subsidies, loans, and tax exemptions. Indirect approaches to economic recovery include, most significantly, the direct projects to restore infrastructure and public buildings. More subtle approaches include: setting new regulations or deregulations, providing technical support, and creating new businesses. A holistic recovery process needs to strategically combine all of these approaches, and there must be collaborative implementation by all the key stakeholders, including local governments, non-profit and non-governmental organizations (NPOs and NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), and the private sector. Therefore, community and stakeholder participation in the planning process is essential to achieve buy-in for the vision and desired outcomes of the recovery plan. Securing the required financial resources is also critical to successful implementation. In thinking of stakeholders, it is important to differentiate between supporting entities and operating agencies. Supporting entities are those organizations that supply the necessary funding for recovery. Both Japan’s national government and the federal government in the U.S. are the prime supporting entities in the recovery from the 1995 Kobe earthquake and the 2001 World Trade Center recovery. In Taiwan, the Buddhist organization and the national government of Taiwan were major supporting entities in the recovery from the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake. Operating agencies are those organizations that implement various recovery measures. In Japan, local governments in the impacted area are operating agencies, while the national government is a supporting entity. In the United States, community development block grants provide an opportunity for many operating agencies to implement various recovery measures. As Mr. Mammen’ paper describes, many NPOs, NGOs, and/or CBOs in addition to local governments have had major roles in implementing various kinds programs funded by block grants as part of the World Trade Center recovery. No one, single organization can provide effective help for all kinds of disaster victims individually or collectively. The needs of disaster victims may be conflicting with each other because of their diversity. Their divergent needs can be successfully met by the diversity of operating agencies that have responsibility for implementing recovery measures. In a similar context, block grants made to individual households, such as microfinance, has been a vital recovery mechanism for victims in Thailand who suffered from the 2004 Sumatra earthquake and tsunami disaster. Both disaster victims and government officers at all levels strongly supported the microfinance so that disaster victims themselves would become operating agencies for recovery. Empowering individuals in sustainable life recovery is indeed the ultimate goal of recovery. <strong>Fig. 6.</strong> A holistic recovery policy model.

As the Soviet Union and the countries in Eastern Europe take steps towards market economies and democratic political systems, the U.S. and other western countries have been confronted by a range of difficult and important questions about the appropriate economic policy response. What role should government policies play? How much assistance should be given? In what form? What actual policies have been undertaken? Are they a lot or a little? At one extreme, some argue that the United States and other developed countries should finance the rebuilding of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—even though it may cost tens of billions of dollars per year, for at least a decade. At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that Eastern Europe does not warrant official U.S. assistance, other than for humanitarian purposes, because the situation is just too precarious, because there are worthier uses of scarce government resources, or because any restructuring should be undertaken by the private sector. This paper suggests a framework for answering these questions that considers both the nations of Eastern Europe and recent proposals for direct assistance to the Soviet Union. It draws upon the valuable lessons to be learned from assistance to the developing countries and from historical experience.

1. Introduction – China's Four Modernizations and Japan's Policy StandpointThe Deng Xiaoping government has, since 1978, been tackling the task of achieving Four Modernizations by the end of this century.

Japanese economy was ruined in the WWII, but grew quickly after this war. The strategies of Japanese government used to recover the economy are analyzed through reviewing the literature in this paper. The conclusions are as follows: after the war, Japanese government had applied various policies to help their economy to grow, although not all of them got the expected result. During 1950-1970, Japanese government carried out trade strategy, which can help Japan increase exports, learn from foreign countries, and improve their industry. From 1980s, Japanese government carried out science and technology strategy, which helped Japanese to create some improved versions of technologies based on knowledge they learned from foreigners before. And during 1985 to 1990, in order to remit the appreciation of yen (Japanese money), Japanese government applied a policy called “quantitative easing policy”, which increased the yen in circulation and thus helped yen to depreciate. The first two polices indeed boosted the economy, however the last policy had an negative effect on Japanese economy in the end. But generally speaking, these policies brought Japan to a higher economic level compared with several years before when the WWII ended.

Of all the policy issue areas that concern the U.S. government in its relations with Africa, economic assistance policy has attracted the deepest and widest involvement from U.S. university scholars. University-based analysts have enjoyed numerous avenues of access to officials who define, design, implement and evaluate U.S. foreign aid programs for sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. universities have stronger institutional linkages with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) than with any other Washington institution discussed in this ISSUE, including the U.S. Congress and agencies within the the national security bureaucracy.

Japan's involvement as a donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) can be traced back, historically, to post-second world war arrangements for war damage reparations. At that time, the late 1940s, early 1950s, Japan was itself a low-income country, whose industries had suffered widespread dislocation and ruin due to war. Yet, the new post-war Japanese government, eager to work its way back into the comity of nations, undertook to make reparation for the destruction of economic assets in the territories that had been fought over. The reparations agreements concluded in the 1950s involved many of the developing countries on the Asia/Pacific Rim—reflecting the pattern of wartime conquest—some of them independent, others still under European colonial rule. Thailand and the People's Republic of China were excluded from reparations, the former due to its wartime co-belligerent status, the latter since it was unrecognized by Japan, ironically in view of their subsequent emergence as the largest recipients of Japanese bilateral ODA by the 1980s. In the event, by the time Japanese reparations had become available, reconstruction assistance had already begun to give way to post-reconstruction support for public sector economic growth. A greater part of these reparations consisted of deliveries of Japanese capital goods and equipment, e.g., cargo ships, through transfer mechanisms designed to match Japan's re-emergent industrial export capabilities with the import requirements of Southeast Asian economic development.By way of contrast with the contemporary Western orientation in development assistance to Asia, driven by a 'Big Push' syndrome towards relatively large-scale infrastructure projects through such mechanisms as the Colombo Plan, the Japanese experience with reparations provided from the outset a closer strategic integration between Japan's international donor obligations, on the one hand, and its export strategy and dynamic competitive advantages in international trade, on the other.

This paper addresses the question of what do Japanese foreign policymakers exactly mean when they repeatedly state that development cooperation has been, and still is, a foundation of postwar Japanese foreign policy, through a case study of Japan's official development assistance (ODA) towards China. More particularly, it investigates the complex policy objectives of Japanese ODA and the broader interests behind it, in order to clarify roles and significance of development assistance within Japan's overall foreign policy. My research demonstrates that despite its inherently economic nature, Japan's ODA provision to recipient countries has in application been more politico-strategic than commercial. Thus, it supports the point that development cooperation has undoubtedly been a foundation of postwar Japanese foreign policy.

International development assistance is an integral part of the foreign economic and foreign policy activities of the US government. International aid is one of the largest components of US foreign relations spending and is regarded by many members of Congress as one of the most important foreign policy instruments. However, many US citizens and members of Congress feel that the US cannot afford such international aid spending, given the current budget deficit and competing budgetary priorities. As one of the largest donors of international development aid, the United States is of considerable interest to many researchers, including those who study trends in the polarization of attitudes toward foreign policy, including international aid. This article is devoted to the current US policy in the field of international development cooperation at the beginning of the presidency of Joe Biden. It examines the economic component of US government assistance: the total amount of US economic assistance, as well as the structure of international aid spending and country priorities for US economic assistance, are considered. An assessment of the prospects for US assistance is presented based on an analysis of the Joint Strategic Plan of the State Department and the Agency for International Assistance 2022-2026 and the US National Security Strategy 2022. Despite the stability and relative inertia of the international aid system, one can observe an increase in US interest in development assistance after the transition of power to President Biden, including in the context of competition with China.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to ascertain the major characteristics of contemporary migrant workers in Japan. In order to illustrate their actual situations in relation to the socio-economic conditions and government policies, data have been gathered from relevant government sources and several surveys conducted by Japanese researchers.Design/methodology/approach The paper discusses social background, socio-economic factors and the public response to migrant workers in Japan. The focus is placed upon Japanese policy context and recent trend which demonstrates an increase in foreign workers. The main method is statistical analyses of the government macro data. In addition, some data from the relevant research outcomes are systematised.FindingsThe inflow of migrant workers has consistently augmented, and this has fostered the public debate. Some observers indicate that government deceitfully accepts migrant workers through the “backdoor” and the “side doors”. There has been some criticism, relating to the fact that increasing numbers of foreign employees include many workers with no formal qualifications, such as technical internships and international students who take on part-time jobs.Originality/valueThis article provides some factors for certain migration patterns, featuring contemporary Japan's migration issues. In conclusion, some uniqueness of contemporary migrant workers in Japanese community has been depicted, and the implications of these findings can contribute to prospective research, Japan's policy and practice in this field.

Japan has developed institutional infrastructure designed to exercise government support for research activities, including those in the private sector. This infrastructure includes government agencies which formulate and implement science and technology policy; a system of official plans and programs to support and fund research, as well as legal entities set up by the government to control the use of funds allocated for this purpose. Government infrastructure facilitating research is supplemented by research and analysis units of private companies, which account for more than 80% of total R&amp;D expenditures. A significant role in organizing R&amp;D belongs to universities, including associated research centers and institutes. Legal framework for science and technology policy is provided by the Law on Science, Technology and Innovation. Goals and actual tasks of this policy are formulated in five-year &quot;basic plans&quot;, while government’s vision of it is specified in regularly updated official “innovation strategy”. Supra-ministerial &quot;cross-cutting&quot; programs to support most promising research and innovation are used as a tool of science and technology policy and a part of its institutional infrastructure. Another new policy tool, apart from traditional government funding of scientific and educational institutions, is the formation of a favorable research environment by eliminating intersectoral and interdepartmental barriers to information flows, setting up national databases and digital platforms for researchers. General philosophy and main task of science and technology policy have been shifting from universal support for research with regard for official priorities, to targeted search and funding of projects promising maximum contribution to attaining long-term economic and social goals. Fostering research and innovation is increasingly seen as a key link in implementing national development strategy and economic and social policy related to it. At the same time, support is not linked to specific industries but targeted on fostering “ability to conduct research that push the boundaries of knowledge and create new value” in the form of new products and markets. The main problem for institutions stimulating research and innovation is the lack of reliable objective criteria and methods of assessing effectiveness of financial and organizational support and the quality of environment created for these activities.

AbstractWhen a central government deals with local demands, it may strengthen political accountability of the local governments by political decentralization or offer benefits through economic assistance. An authoritarian regime uses economic assistance policy because political decentralization may contradict regime survival. Although economic benefits can be used to buy political support, the distribution of these benefits is seldom equal. We argue that the unequal distribution is more salient in regions where ethnic minorities reside because the unusual demographic composition of those areas make it difficult for the national government to evaluate the performance of the local government who is responsible for the distribution of the economic benefits. As a result, economic assistance may backfire in ethnic regions and intensify their existing conflicts. We develop a simple formal model to illustrate our arguments and explore the cases of Xinjiang and Hong Kong for empirical analysis.

While supplementary budgeting has long been part of the Japanese fiscal cycle, substantive and procedural aspects of the process have changed. First, since the late 1970s, supplementary budgets have been used to fund government economic stimulus efforts (keizai taisaku), and second, since the late 1980s, these budgets have been assembled several months after the announcement of the actual stimulus packages. Such stimulus policies do not fit the prevailing model of the Japanese electoral business cycle, which emphasizes the targeting of benefits by the Liberal Democratic Party (ldp) at its constituents at election time. This article addresses this anomoly by developing a theory of how governing parties use the economic policy process to serve their electoral interests, particularly through broadly gauged policies designed to improve macroeconomic conditions. The authors amend the prevailing model to allow an adequate test of their electoral theory to be conducted. The results suggest that Japanese economic stimulus policies were the result of governing parties' attempts to expand their support at election time and to satisfy U.S. pressure to usefiscalpolicy to stimulate domestic demand.

Despite the economic statistics from recent years indicating outstanding economic recovery in disaster-affected areas after the Wenchuan Ms 8.0 Earthquake, the causes of these macro-economic changes remain ambiguous. The Chinese Government set up the counterpart assistance policy to aid post-disaster reconstruction after the Wenchuan Ms 8.0 Earthquake in 2008; however, whether the changes seen in the economic statistics can be attributed to this policy remains unclear. This article uses the difference-in-differences model to evaluate the effects of counterpart assistance on economic development in disaster areas. Thirty-nine severely affected counties were chosen as research objects and divided into a treatment group (18 recipient counties) and a control group (non-recipient counties). Empirical results indicate the counterpart assistance policy helped to significantly improve the real GDP and GDP growth rate per capita in the treatment group. Counterpart assistance influenced the real GDP principally by increasing investment in fixed assets, employment, urbanization level, and fiscal expenditure. The findings of this study deepen our understanding of counterpart assistance within the Chinese context.

This research is entitled Effectiveness of Government Policy for MSMEs in Supporting NationalEconomic Recovery in Jember Regency. The purpose of this study was to determine whether theMSME Direct Cash Assistance (BLT) program in Jember Regency was effective and on target?This type of research is qualitative research, with 2 types of data used, namely primary data andsecondary data. The total population is 1330 MSMEs and the sample used is 200 MSMEs.Analysis of the data used is descriptive qualitative analysis. The results of the study show thatthe Government's Policy for MSMEs in Supporting National Economic Recovery in the form ofthe MSME Direct Cash Assistance (BLT) program in Jember Regency has been effective, thiscan be seen from the three indicators used in the study, namely timeliness, accuracy in makingchoices. , and target accuracy. Based on these three indicators, it shows that the BLT MSMEDirect Cash Assistance program in Jember Regency is on time, has made the right choice, and isright on target.

Micro-businesses have an essential role in driving an economic revival in Indonesia. However, they are particularly vulnerable during the pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted the long-term viability of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in the financing, production, distribution, and market demand. This paper argues that an assistance policy model for micro-businesses accelerating the economy during a pandemic is needed. It also raises the question of how government policies in developing micro-businesses. The library method, which relied on secondary data, was used to conduct the research. The result suggests that the ideal assistance model policy for MSMEs in accelerating the regional economy is by using platform-based digital technology so that the flexibility of purchasing raw materials to sales can be integrated into one and reach all consumers around the world. Government policies in developing MSMEs in the new normal era include launching the National Economic Recovery Program, as mandated by Government Regulation Number 23 of 2020, implementing stimulus programs for MSMEs such as interest subsidies and restructuring.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe regained power in end 2012. Almost simultaneously, Japan's economy started flourishing. Abe proclaims that his new economic policy called Abenomics is responsible for the growth. Since many factors account for the current economic boom, it is uncertain how much comes from Abenomics. It is, however, quite certain that Abenomics has worsened the financial condition of the government, which is already struggling with dangerous budgetary problems.

The Japanese government has set an overseas infrastructure deployment policy to involve Japanese companies in all upstream to downstream processes, that is, from project formation, procurement, and construction to operation and maintenance. Although Japanese companies have been hitherto involved in overseas port development through Official Development Assistance, their entry into overseas port operation projects has been limited, meaning the realization of the policy is not expected to be easy. This study thus examines the possibility of sustainable entry into overseas port operation markets by Japanese companies. Specifically, we review port governance in Japan, characteristics of the Japanese market in the global market, and the status of the participation of domestic terminal operators in Japan and overseas, and then identify the possibilities and methods of sustainable inclusion in the future overseas port operations by interviewing representative companies and the government. We finally provide future directions in terms of both increasing entry opportunities and improving the entry environment.

The US economic embargo against Cuba has been in place for fifty years. During that period, its rationale and goals have not changed. As it is stressed in the article, principal purpose of the US sanctions strategy is either to modify the international behavior of Cuba, which Washington regarded as a threat to US strategic interests in the Latin America region, or to eliminate the Cuban political regime entirely. Measured against these goals, the sanctions clearly have failed. Author examines key factors having restricted sanctions’ ability to achieve American proclaimed goals regarding to Cuba. In this context, it is underscored that controversial maintenance of the US embargo against Cuba among US allies directly affected the results of sanctions strategy against Cuba. It is stressed that since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the government. The United States embargo against Cuba is a commercial, economic, and financial embargo imposed by the United States on Cuba. An embargo was first imposed by the United States on sale of arms to Cuba on the 14th of March 1958, during the Fulgencio Batista regime. On October 19, 1960 the U.S. placed an embargo on exports to Cuba except for food and medicine after Cuba nationalized American-owned Cuban oil refineries without compensation. On February 7, 1962 the embargo was extended to include almost all imports. Currently, the Cuban embargo is enforced mainly through six statutes: the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations of 1963, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Helms–Burton Act 1996, and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. The stated purpose of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 is to maintain sanctions on Cuba so long as the Cuban government refuses to move toward democratization and greater respect for human rights. The article emphasizes that The Helms–Burton Act further restricted United States citizens from doing business in or with Cuba, and mandated restrictions on giving public or private assistance to any successor government in Havana unless and until certain claims against the Cuban government were met.

The purpose of this research is to reduce the risk of bad credit, help MSME business actors, so that it is easy to access information and find problems related to decreased income and monitoring carried out by most MSME players during the Covid-19 pandemic. The method of implementing thematic KKN is done by using and creating social media. This social media facility is used to search for data, socialize, and provide counseling to MSME partners including making applications, Whatsapp groups, Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, Youtube. The results showed that UMKM Partners understand the existence of a national economic policy stimulus for MSMEs affected by Covid-19 and some of them have received micro-business assistance from the government. The conclusion of this research is that there are still UMKM partners who do not respond to the economic stimulus provided by the government, MSME business actors affected by Covid-19, socialization of the economic stimulus policy and assistance to MSMEs with the Whatsapp group to exchange information to improve the business of MSMEs by take advantage of the national policy stimulus provided by the government for MSME business actors.

Economic growth and development are in the forefront of international relations and policy making. Developed countries such as the United States and international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund provide assistance that attempts to help the economic growth of developing countries. Foreign aid has been recognized as the most crucial factor in enhancing economic development in many countries. Foreign aid is crucial factor to achieve higher and sustainable economic growth and development of Nepal. However, aid must be linked with sustainable growth and poverty reduction. The objectives of the paper are to study the importance, trends and government initiatives of foreign aids in Nepal.

The Japanese economic policy in South Sulawesi seemed to have different policies when compared to the other colonies in Indonesia. It was indicated by leadership typology of Japanese Navy which based in Makassar, Bukittinggi, and Java. In South Sulawesi, the policy was more focused on the compliance of logistic materials by strengthening on clothing industry, plantation of cotton and castor oil, and fisheries. The important policy of the army was the agricultural massive production sector to support the war. In addition, the agricultural and industrial sectors were also developed such as salt, castor oil, textile, silk, handicrafts and the like. Those phenomena analyzed by historical method. It used archives such as Japanese occupation reports in Makassar, Romusha archives in Makassar, and Japanese local politic documents in South Sulawesi. The reports on Japanese economic activities in South Sulawesi were also consulted. Information from magazines and newspapers were also taken such as Pemberitaan Makassar, Bintang Timoer, Sinar Baroe, Soeara Asia, Hong Po, and Pemandangan. In addition to, it has complied oral history with direct interviews to the people who are still alive and experienced on the era. The Japanese economic policies in South Sulawesi influenced great changes in new economic structure on the emergence of the diversification of popular-based commodity especially clothing and foodstuff during the war. That was the reason why people in South Sulawesi directed to execute intensification of agriculture in a professional productive manner supported by communal industrial policy.

To address economic crisis and promote domestic economy to re-grow, Japanese government has launched Abenomics stimulus package in January 2013 to be disbursed during period 2013-2014. This study is focused and limited to analyze the impact of Abenomics policy on Japanese GDP and its transmission effect to Indonesian GDP. This study employs quantitative analysis method, completed with descriptive analysis based on historical data and relevant literatures. Main findings from this study are Abenomics will spur Japanese GDP positively by 2,37% in 2013 and by 2,79% in 2014. Spillover effect from Japanese demand shock will bring the biggest impact on the main partner of Asian and Oceania countries, including Indonesia. Indonesia will receive additional positive impact on its growth in 2013-2014 and substractive negative impact during 2015 to early 2017, before bounce back to positive zone in the second quarter 2017 to year 2018.

ObjectiveIn a pandemic, government assistance is essential to support the most vulnerable households as they face health and economic challenges. However, government assistance is effective only when it reaches vulnerable households in time. In this paper, we estimated the timeliness of government assistance for the most vulnerable households (ie, the poor households) in Ethiopia during its COVID-19 response of 2020. In particular, we conducted a time-to-event analysis to compare the time to receive government assistance between poor and non-poor households in Ethiopia.MethodsWe used a semiparametric Cox proportional model to evaluate whether the time to first receipt of government assistance during the COVID-19 response in 2020 differed between poor and non-poor Ethiopian households. We used the Schoenfeld test to check the proportionality assumption and conducted the stratified Cox regression analysis to adjust for non-proportional variables. The data from World Bank’s High-Frequency Phone Surveys on COVID-19 and the 2019 Ethiopian Socioeconomic Survey were used for this analysis.ResultsWe found that the poor households in rural areas were 88% (HR: 1.88; 95% CI: 1.19 to 2.98) more likely to receive government assistance than non-poor households at any point within 10 months after the start of the pandemic. However, there was no significant difference between urban poor and non-poor households’ likelihood of receiving government assistance during this timeframe.ConclusionThe Ethiopian government has leveraged its existing social protection network to quickly reach poor households in rural areas during the COVID-19 response of 2020. The country will need to continue strengthening and scaling the existing social protection systems to accurately target the wider vulnerable population in urban areas.

Feeling strong pressure from Western Powers Japan abandoned her seclusion policy in 1854 and inaugurated serious efforts to modernize her society and economy after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. She, in turn, forced Korea who had been keeping the seclusion policy on her own to open the door in 1876. The feudal Korean government (the Yi Dynasty, 1392–1910) was impelled to embark on social and economic reforms by opening the door. Yet, after nearly thirty years’ struggle to make reforms and to secure the independence of the country, Korea was converted into a protectorate of Japan in 1905 and was officially annexed to her in 1910. The Japanese government recognized that the creation of modern monetary and banking systems in Korea was the precondition for trade expansion between the two countries (for Japan, rice imports on the one hand and textile exports on the other) and thus started its colonial rule over Korea by establishing a central bank, development banks and financial cooperatives. This paper aims at setting forth an analysis of a more or less unexplored field in the study of the economic history of Korea, that is, the financial aspects of her economic growth under Japanese rule. Particularly, emphasis will be placed on quantitative analysis of major financial variables represented by money, interest rates and bank credit. Before proceeding to the main subject, it may well serve to review some of the financial problems in the late Yi Dynasty period.

This article analyzes Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) policy in Jordan, focusing primarily on the areas concerning security. After the oil shock in 1973, security concerns in the Middle East affected Japan’s economic security policy. However, Japan’s long vulnerability in energy supply was not the sole determinant of its aid policies in the Middle East. Rather, a paradigm shift in the Japanese government’s ODA policy in the 1990s, the implementation of the human security approach, had a greater impact than economic security in subsequent Japanese ODA programs in Jordan. Japan has given more assistance to areas relevant to military security in its ODA in Jordan, particularly after increasing security concerns about the Middle East since the early twenty-first century. The two phenomena—Japan’s more aggressive commitment in the Middle East, including its deployment of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in the region and Jordan’s greater responsibility in regional security—occurred simultaneously because of a series of crises after 2003. The unusual nature of Jordanian society today, a small society that hosts refugees from many nations, means the new Japanese ODA approach in Jordan has more diverse recipients than ever, as the country is becoming a host for a community of refugees.

Melanesian West Papuans have been seeking refuge in Papua New Guinea since Indonesia annexed the province of Irian Jaya in 1962. The slowness of the Papua New Guinean government to respond to the 12,000 who crossed the border in 1984 paved the way for subsequent policy of minimal assistance so as not to jeopardize national security, by antagonizing Indonesia or by exacerbating the jealously of local people. As in other places, the long-term effect for refugees is likely to be social and economic marginalization, combined with insecure residential status.

Ukraine has always had a special place in Canadian foreign policy. Currently, Canada is deeply engaged in supporting Ukraine to restore political and economic stability and to implement democratic reforms. The Government in Ottawa has condemned Russian aggressive policy and the illegal military occupation of Crimea and has taken a variety of steps and initiatives since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 including imposing sanctions, economic and military assistance, and supporting of NATO measures.

The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was created in 1964 to provide emergency nonfood humanitarian assistance in response to international crises and disasters, in order to save lives and alleviate human suffering and to reduce the economic impact of those disasters. The office operates under the overall mandate of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which is to provide “economic, development and humanitarian assistance around the world in support of the foreign policy goals of the United States.”1 OFDA coordinates relief efforts for the U.S. government, and funds relief efforts by UN humanitarian agencies, private nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other international organizations.

This paper examines macroeconomic policy coordination between Japan and the United States under the locomotive strategy from 1977 to 1979. Previous studies have described the strategy as a fiasco because of its negative economic impact. In fact, the Japanese government, after two years of stimulus packages, quit trying to be a locomotive bringing other developed countries out of their economic difficulties and the u.s. government admitted it in 1979. On the other hand, as this article shows, bilateral cooperation with the United States under this strategy expanded the roles and burdens of Japan, an emerging economic superpower, in international economic policy coordination. Japan’s efforts to implement the strategy made the u.s. government believe that Tokyo would continue to respond to its request to bear larger international responsibilities, while it also increased awareness of Japan’s global role in Tokyo. These bilateral perceptual changes paved the way for subsequent policy coordination and Japan’s assumption of greater burdens, notably the adoption of large-scale stimulus packages under belt-tightening budgets.

AbstractThis paper examines the major ways in which the economic development model of Meiji Japan, 1868-1912, applies to contemporary Africa. The focus is on capital formation and technology policies that contributed to Meiji Japan's rapid industrial capitalist growth: self-directed strategies, technological borrowing, taking advantage of shifts in comparative advantage from the product cycle, educational policy, business assistance, financial institutions, transfer of agricultural savings to industry, low wages policy, industrial dualistic complementarity, and foreign-exchange rate policies conducive to export expansion. For each of these policies, the author analyzes the extent to which African countries can emulate Meiji Japan's approaches or whether changing circumstances require modification of the Japanese model.

The review provides an analysis of government policy measures to support the economy in the North-East Asia countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, implemented in 2022 in the face of increasing external risks. It is shown that the internal political processes in the PRC determined the continued implementation of the «zero-COVID» strategy in 2022. It was determined that many measures to stabilize the Chinese economy in 2022 are a continuation of the measures of 2020-2021, for instance state investments in infrastructure projects and social spending. The new measures in the policy of the PRC in 2022 are including: ensuring economic security, stimulating employment for young people, stabilizing regional budgets and the real estate market. The structural problems of the Japanese economy have become significant constraints on the measures taken by government stimulus policy, even in the face of broad political supporting. For this reason, in 2022 the main changes in the measures of government stimulus policy for the Japanese economy were associated with transformations in the labor market and smoothing prices for basic goods. Along with this, the Japanese leadership has been raising capital in digital and green technologies in 2022 to stimulate long-term economic growth. It was shown that in the first half of 2022 the government of the Republic of Korea began to overcome the negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, therefore, it experienced a gradual tightening of monetary and fiscal policy and solving problems in the real estate market. In 2022, the government of the Republic of Korea began to finance programs for the development of an innovative economy, including creating a promising labor market

This BLT-DD policy was made by Taba Air Pauh Village based on a village meeting organized by the village government, the Village Consultative Body, and several village community leaders taking into account the pandemic conditions which impacted the decline in village community income. The purpose of this study is to describe the process of implementing the BLT-DD Policy as an economic solution for the Taba Air Pauh village community in the post-Covid-19 pandemic and explain what strategies are taken by the Taba Air Pauh Village Government in the process of implementing the Village Fund Direct Cash Assistance Policy (BLT). -DD) Taba Air Pauh, Tebat Karai District, Kepahiang Regency. The research method used is qualitative with a descriptive approach. The results of this study include 1. The BLT-DD policy is fully supported by all levels of government; 2. BLT-DD is direct cash assistance from the Village Fund sourced from the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN); 3. BLT-DD recipients are non-beneficiaries of Social Service assistance, Micro, middle-class Enterprises, and other assistance that are not from BLT-DD; 4. There are still BLT-DD recipients who are not yet on target; and 5. There was a crowd of villagers receiving BLT-DD at the Kepahiang branch of the National Bank of Indonesia (BNI).

This paper investigates the relationship between credit, fiscal policy and income inequality in Indonesia. Annual data collected from Central Statistic Bureau is used from 2010 to 2020. The analytical method of this research is Genralized Least Square (GLS) to examine the relationship between variables. The results show that credit positively and significantly affects income inequality. Local government spending which is a proxy for fiscal policy has a significant and positive effect on income inequaity. The inflation variable has a significant positive effect on income inequality. However, the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GDRP) per capita has a significant negative effect on income inequality. Based on these findings, it is recommended that the government be able to maintain the momentum of the increasing trend of economic growth by providing the right stimulus, among others by providing access to credit that is easier to reach for the low-income class. In addition, local government expenditure allocations should be better allocated to provide benefits for increasing community income, such as social assistance in the form of direct assistance or free job training by utilizing job training centers tailored to each region's potential.

In its reply to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives (The Hockin Committee) on Independence and Internationalism (1986), the Government of Canada reiterated its intention to treat the Asia-Pacific as ‘an area of concentration in the National Trade Strategy’ (Canada's International Relations, 1986, p. 60). Within the National Trade Strategy, significant attention is being given to the development of Canada's economic relationship with the countries of Southeast Asia, most notably the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) grouping. The policy mechanisms deployed to promote closer economic and social ties with Southeast Asian countries include those pertaining to international trade and finance, development assistance, transport, immigration and cultural relations.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to untangle the domestic and international factors that have affected policy making and implementation of the Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), particularly in education, at different times in its history. Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on analysis of governmental policy documents and reports, minutes of ODA consultative meetings, and statistical data on Japanese financial and technical developmental assistance. The major methodology was discourse analysis of primary documents; secondary sources supplement this. Findings – Japan was the first non-western Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) member and has always been in the ambivalent position of being both a DAC member and an Asian latecomer. As the Education for All paradigm took the ground, Japanese ODA to the education sector has shifted to the primary education from Technical and Vocational Education and Training and higher education from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s. While the global trend is clear in Japanese ODA, it has always stressed the importance of establishing and demonstrating the “Japanese model” in ODA policy documents and practices. The sensitive balance between the demand to harmonize with mainstream aid modalities and the drive to demonstrate uniqueness characterize Japanese educational aid. Originality/value – While many important works examined the decision-making mechanism and philosophies of Japanese educational ODA, this paper contextualizes governmental programs in the intersection between domestic factors – bureaucratic, political, and societal – and international influence. It clarifies the changing relationships between Japan and western and Asian countries in determining its agendas and directions from the 1960s to the present.

Trade adjustment assistance (TAA) is government aid to those affected by trade agreements. We review the history of TAA in Canada and ask whether Canada needs to reintroduce it in response to the recent intensification of trade negotiations. In light of the compensation offered by the federal government in connection with the Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), we examine how TAA fits in with the evolution of Canadian federalism in the trade policy area. Based in part on interviews with provincial trade negotiators, we conclude, first, that the compensation is an outcome of Canadian federalism. Second, we argue that while there is no reason to reintroduce a federal TAA program for workers, compensation for provinces is necessary to facilitate their cooperation with the implementation of trade treaty provisions. Third, we suggest that a more transparent rationale for such compensation would be superior to the ad hoc compensation observed in CETA.

This ISSUE is almost totally comprised of the first half of a two part publication series that relates Africanists to the Africa policy of the U.S. government. As a whole, the two parts—in this and the next ISSUE —review the relationship of the opinions and the activities of the Africanist community outside the U.S. government (mainly academics) to the thrust and substance of policy and the process of policy-making inside the U.S. government. The two major articles in the present ISSUE—on Africanists and U.S. foreign and national security policy by Larry Bowman of the University of Connecticut, and on Africanists and U.S. economic assistance policy by Michael Bratton of Michigan State University—represent the first part.

Brazil has a relevant, although relatively unknown, special medicines programme that distributes high-cost products, such as drugs needed for cancer treatments. In 2009, the purchase of these medicines became the responsibility of the Brazilian Federal Government. Until then, there were no clear norms regarding the responsibilities, in terms of the management/financing of these medicines, of the Brazilian Federal Government and of the states themselves. This qualitative study analyses the policy process needed to transfer this programme to the central government. The study examines the reports of the Tripartite Commission between 2000 and 2012, and in-depth interviews with eleven key informants were conducted. The study demonstrates that throughout the last decade, institutional changes have been made in regard to the federal management of these programmes (such as recentralisation of the purchasing of medicines). It concludes that these changes can be explained because of the efficiency of the coordinating mechanisms of the Federal Government. These findings reinforce the idea that the Ministry of Health is the main driver of public health policies, and it has opted for the recentralisation of activities as a result of the development project implicit in the agenda of the Industrial and Economic Heal